

U.S. Foreign Policy

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# INTRODUCTION

On April 13, 1971, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird told newsmen that the United States would maintain naval and air forces in Southeast Asia indefinitely as a deterrent to future "aggression" in the region. While many Congressmen expressed shock and dismay at Laird's announcement, the Secretary's statement came as no surprise to those analysts who knew of the Pentagon's multi-billion dollar program for the construction of new military bases in Asia and the Pacific. The permanent installations now under construction or recently completed in Okinawa, Taiwan, Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Laos, Australia and the British Indian Ocean Territory constitute visible proof that the United States intends to maintain a significant military establishment in Asia for some time to come.

Similarly, when the New York Times reported on October 8, 1970 that the United States had prepared for military intervention in Jordan during the September 1970 crisis there, observers of the American military machine had long since come to the same conclusion on the basis of troop movements reported in the world press.

It is clear, from these and many similar incidents, that a careful analysis of public information on the disposition of American military forces enables the trained observer to predict, with a high degree of accuracy, Pentagon operations at home and abroad. At the present time, such skills are the exclusive prerogatives of military correspondents, White House "insiders," and professional analysts associated with the military "think-tanks" and research organizations. If such skills were widely shared by the public, however, it is possible that interventions such as those which occurred in the Dominican Republic (1965), Cambodia (1970) and Laos (1971) could have been prevented by mass political activity.

In order to provide the public with greater access to information on America's worldwide military operations, it is necessary to disseminate as widely as possible the data that is already available to professional analysts. Contrary to public information, such "hard" information on Pentagon activity is available to the public—if one knows where to look for it. For the past three years, NACLA has been collecting, storing and disseminating information on the overseas operations of the U.S. War Machine. Much of this information has appeared in print in the United States—in the NACLA Newsletter and NACLA's Latin America Report, and other publications—and has been translated for publication abroad.

Now, in this handbook, we have brought together all of this documentation in a single, uniform publication. All of the material has been brought up to date, and—to the best of our ability—checked for accuracy and clarity. Furthermore, we have provided a research methodology guide to help our readers to pursue their own studies of the military establishment.

This handbook is designed as a "first generation" guide to the worldwide U.S. military apparatus, reflecting our current knowledge of this subject. We hope it will help people around the world to better understand how the military is organized, how it is armed and equipped, and how it functions to promote and protect U.S. interests abroad. Any such study of the military apparatus is, of course, hampered by government secrecy and the complexity of the subject; we recognize, therefore, that there are gaps in our knowledge and topics that are only partially understood. We hope, however, that our readers will view this study as a collective undertaking and will contribute their insights and knowledge to future editions of this handbook. Please send your suggestions, comments and criticisms to: NACLA-West Military Project, P.O. Box 226, Berkeley, Calif. 94701.

—Mike Klare & Nancy Stein  
NACLA-West Military Project

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Part II:

# THE OVERSEAS APPARATUS



# U.S. Military & Police Aid Programs

## THE MERCENARIZATION OF THE THIRD WORLD

In its effort to secure and maintain mastery over the resources of the greater part of the Third World, the United States has often encountered the resistance of rebellious peoples who have resorted to armed insurgency as the only means of obtaining control over their own lives. Occasionally, it has been necessary for the United States to intervene with its own troops to suppress these insurgencies (Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, Laos, the Dominican Republic, Cambodia). Most often, however, the U.S. Government has found it advisable to employ foreign mercenaries and the armies of client regimes in order to attain its objectives. In Vietnam, for instance, American funds have been used to pay the expenses of Korean, Thai, Laotian, Cambodian and Philippine troops as well as the one million man army of the Saigon regime. In addition, the United States has paid the governments of Thailand and Korea a bribe of several hundreds of millions of dollars each to obtain the use of their soldiers as cannon-fodder in South Vietnam.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, various minority peoples inhabiting the highlands of central Indochina have been mobilized into CIA-funded "irregular" armies to bear the brunt of the fighting in the border areas of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Similar tactics have been employed by the United States in Bolivia, the Congo, and the Bay of Pigs.

The substitution of mercenaries for American troops in counterinsurgency warfare has many advantages for the U.S. Military Establishment: domestic opposition to foreign operations is reduced because our involvement is less visible and less costly; opposition abroad is reduced because people are not confronted with the overt presence of our expeditionary forces; and, finally, foreign troops cost the United States much less to maintain than our own troops. These benefits were summarized by former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford in an unusually candid statement to the Congress on January 15, 1969: "Clearly, the overriding goal of our collective defense efforts in Asia must be to assist our allies in building a capability to defend themselves. Besides costing substantially less (an Asian soldier costs about 1/15th as much as his American counterpart), there are compelling political and psychological advantages on both sides of the Pacific for such a policy."<sup>2</sup> [Emphasis added.]

The cost of mercenarization has been staggering: Pentagon figures indicate that between 1946 and 1970 the United States provided \$35 billion in weapons, supplies, training and cash to foreign armies under the Military Assistance Program. Another \$8.1 billion was provided to the armies of Vietnam, Thailand and Laos through the regular Department of Defense appropriations. Military equipment given away from "excess" U.S. stocks accounted for an additional \$1.4 billion in military aid, while naval vessels transferred for an indefinite period represent another \$1.7 billion. Local currencies worth \$1.5 billion were secured through the "Food for Peace" program (Public Law 480) for supplementary purchases of military hardware abroad. In addition, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the Export-Import Bank provided foreign countries with credits of \$3.6 billion for purchase of U.S.




arms. (For a breakdown of aid funding by country, and sources of data, see table of U.S. Military Assistance Programs 1946-1970.) Commodities delivered through the Military Assistance Program (MAP) have included 4,385 F-84 aircraft, 206 patrol boats, 21,725 tanks, 132,501 jeeps, 181,135 submachine guns, 2,425,000 rifles, 5,211 155mm. howitzers, and 2,782 Nike missiles.<sup>3</sup>

Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and subsequent legislation, certain key nations are designated "Forward Defense Countries" and have first call on all MAP funds. In Fiscal 1972, the five Forward Defense Countries--South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Turkey and Greece--received 79 percent of MAP grants. (Military aid to our Vietnam "allies" is channeled through the regular Department of Defense appropriation.) The remaining 21 percent was divided, in the Fiscal 1972 program, between an additional 41 countries (some received funds for training purposes only).<sup>4</sup>

Besides providing arms and equipment, the United States has assumed responsibility for the training of its clients' armies. Almost the entire officer class of Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand received its advanced education at American military schools or at in-country academies financed, directed and staffed by the Department of Defense. According to Pentagon statistics, a total of 319,043 foreign officers and enlisted men received some training under the MAP program at service schools in the United States or at U.S. bases abroad (for a breakdown by country, see table of Training of Foreign Military Personnel 1950-1970). Many top-ranking officers of Third World armies are graduates of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, the Infantry School at Fort Benning, or one of 140 other military training centers in the United States. Upon returning to their own countries, these men often constitute the only pool of skilled technicians in such fields as telecommunications, aircraft maintenance, electronics, and all forms of engineering. In addition to learning technical skills, these men are indoctrinated in the abominations of communism and the merits of capitalism. Visits to such attractions as Disneyland, Colonial Williamsburg, and selected suburban communities are designed to inculcate an appreciation for the American Way of Life and a consciousness of the rewards available to those who advance American interests in their own countries.<sup>5</sup>

Map: Keith Buchanan



# U.S. Military Missions Abroad

Authorized personnel strengths of United States Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), Military Missions, and Military Groups abroad, as of July 1, 1971<sup>a</sup>

Region and country	U.S. Personnel	Foreign Personnel	Total	Region and country	U.S.	Foreign	Total
<b>EUROPE</b>				<b>EAST ASIA<sup>b</sup></b>			
HQ, European Command ..	56	0	56	HQ, Pacific Command ...	82	0	82
Belgium/Luxembourg ....	8	6	14	Cambodia .....	113	0	113
Denmark .....	8	6	14	China (Taiwan) .....	216	26	242
France .....	8	7	15	Indonesia .....	49	20	69
Germany .....	33	9	42	Japan .....	10	6	16
Italy .....	15	3	18	Korea .....	716	279	995
Netherlands .....	8	6	14	Philippines .....	58	6	64
Norway .....	7	5	12	<b>Total</b>	<b>1,244</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>1,581</b>
Portugal .....	14	7	21				
Spain .....	55	21	76	<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>			
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>212</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>282</b>	HQ, Southern Command ..	28	0	28
<b>NEAR EAST &amp; SOUTH ASIA</b>				Argentina .....	33	6	39
Greece .....	68	37	105	Bolivia .....	38	7	45
India .....	9	7	16	Brazil .....	60	30	90
Iran .....	204	24	228	Chile .....	28	5	33
Jordan .....	14	3	17	Colombia .....	50	6	56
Pakistan .....	10	8	18	Costa Rica .....	4	1	5
Saudi Arabia .....	137	4	141	Dominican Republic ....	33	2	35
Turkey .....	181	101	282	El Salvador .....	16	2	18
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>623</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>807</b>	Guatemala .....	27	3	30
<b>AFRICA</b>				Honduras .....	14	3	17
Congo (Kinshasa) .....	38	6	44	Nicaragua .....	17	2	19
Ethiopia .....	103	34	137	Panama .....	7	1	8
Liberia .....	17	5	22	Paraguay .....	17	3	20
Libya .....	5	1	6	Peru .....	7	4	11
Morocco .....	33	7	40	Uruguay .....	19	5	24
Nigeria .....	2	1	3	Venezuela .....	50	3	53
Tunisia .....	15	3	18	<b>Total</b> .....	<b>448</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>531</b>
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>213</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>270</b>	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b> .....	<b>2,740</b>	<b>731</b>	<b>3,471</b>

<sup>a</sup>Source: U.S. Department of Defense press release, August 13, 1971.

<sup>b</sup>Excludes the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), and covert U.S. military missions in Laos and Burma.




Arguing that police forces constitute the "first line of defense" against insurgency and subversion, the United States has established an elaborate program of police assistance under the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety (OPS). Between 1961 and 1971, the United States spent over \$283 million on the OPS program to supply Third World police forces with modern communications equipment, intelligence systems and antiriot gear. As in the case of the Military Assistance Program, this aid has been supplemented by training programs in the United States and abroad (see "Police Aid for Tyrants," below).

The Military Assistance Program is administered by a resident military assistance advisory group (MAAG) or military mission in each recipient country. These groups provide instruction to the local troops who will use the equipment furnished by MAP, and generally oversee the process of mercenarization. (See table of U.S. Military Missions Abroad for a breakdown of MAAG strength by country.) In-country supervision of the police assistance program is performed by resident Public Safety Advisors attached to the AID mission in recipient countries. (For more on the role of MAAGs, see "Arming the Generals," below.)

#### THE NIXON DOCTRINE

In order to further reduce the U.S. military presence abroad, the Nixon Administration seeks to modernize and strengthen our mercenary armies in the Third World. This policy, the so-called "Nixon Doctrine," clearly requires a vast increase in MAP spending. Vietnamization alone will cost an estimated \$6 billion, while modernization of the Korean army is expected to cost another \$1. to \$2 billion. Accordingly, the Administration has been requesting progressively greater MAP appropriations during the past few years: MAP grant aid doubled between 1970 and 1971, from \$388 million to \$775 million, and other elements of the aid program experienced a corresponding increase. (For a discussion of rising arms sales, see "Arm Now - Pay Later," below.) In describing the Administration's defense posture to Congress in 1970, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird stated:

The basic policy of decreasing direct U.S. military involvement cannot be successful unless we provide our friends and allies, whether through grant aid or credit sales, with the material assistance necessary to assure the most effective possible contribution by the manpower they are willing and able to commit to their own and the common defense. Many of them simply do not command the resources or technical capabilities to assume greater responsibility for their own defense without such assistance. The



# TRAINING OF FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

Students Trained in the United States and at U.S. Bases Abroad, 1950-70<sup>A</sup>

Region & country	Number trained in U.S.	Number trained Abroad	Total number trained
<b>EAST ASIA, Total</b> .....	<b>89,342</b>	<b>54,551</b>	<b>143,893</b>
Cambodia .....	215	122	337
China, Rep. of .....	19,732	4,088	23,820
Indochina (1950-54) ....	408	26	434
Indonesia .....	2,873	414	3,287
Japan .....	9,643	5,637	15,280
Korea .....	21,063	9,374	30,437
Malaysia .....	225	18	243
Philippines .....	8,729	4,845	13,574
Thailand .....	8,110	2,994	11,104
Vietnam, Rep. of .....	16,364	5,196	21,560
Classified countries <sup>b</sup> ..	1,980	21,837	23,817
<b>NEAR EAST &amp; SOUTH ASIA, Total</b> .....	<b>42,238</b>	<b>8,204</b>	<b>50,442</b>
Afghanistan .....	292	-	292
Ceylon .....	39	-	39
Greece .....	11,538	2,037	13,575
Iran .....	8,597	1,719	10,316
Iraq .....	372	32	404
Jordan .....	478	12	490
Lebanon .....	191	1,188	1,379
Saudi Arabia .....	1,035	218	1,253
Syria .....	23	-	23
Turkey .....	15,479	2,435	17,914
Yemen .....	5	-	5
Classified countries <sup>c</sup> ..	4,189	563	4,752
<b>EUROPE, Total</b> .....	<b>52,592</b>	<b>11,068</b>	<b>63,660</b>
Austria .....	393	11	404
Belgium .....	3,768	1,430	5,198
Denmark .....	3,836	874	4,710
France .....	12,600	1,742	14,342
Germany (West) .....	1,190	434	1,624
Italy .....	8,144	1,219	9,363
Luxembourg .....	63	113	176
Netherlands .....	4,744	1,553	6,297
Norway .....	4,049	1,483	5,532
Portugal .....	2,106	609	2,715
Spain .....	6,868	1,233	8,101
United Kingdom .....	3,719	148	3,867
Yugoslavia .....	625	219	844
NATO Agencies .....	465	-	465
Classified countries ...	22	-	22

Region & country	Number trained in U.S.	Number trained Abroad	Total number trained
<b>AFRICA, Total</b> .....	<b>5,415</b>	<b>1,363</b>	<b>6,778</b>
Congo .....	215	126	341
Ethiopia .....	2,716	116	2,832
Ghana .....	118	-	118
Guinea .....	4	-	4
Liberia .....	420	-	420
Libya .....	436	41	477
Mali .....	64	5	69
Morocco .....	770	929	1,699
Nigeria .....	326	-	326
Senegal .....	17	-	17
Sudan .....	118	8	126
Tunisia .....	191	138	329
Upper Volta .....	20	-	20
<b>LATIN AMERICA, Total</b> .....	<b>23,878</b>	<b>30,392</b>	<b>54,270</b>
Argentina .....	2,382	426	2,808
Bolivia .....	410	2,248	2,658
Brazil .....	6,009	847	6,856
Chile .....	2,553	1,821	4,374
Colombia .....	2,126	2,503	4,629
Costa Rica .....	33	496	529
Cuba (1950-60) .....	307	214	521
Dominican Republic .....	609	1,984	2,593
Ecuador .....	1,538	2,746	4,284
El Salvador .....	185	886	1,071
Guatemala .....	626	1,654	2,280
Haiti .....	444	60	504
Honduras .....	189	1,389	1,578
Mexico .....	393	202	595
Nicaragua .....	615	3,379	3,994
Panama .....	38	3,110	3,148
Paraguay .....	287	753	1,040
Peru .....	2,890	2,117	5,007
Uruguay .....	933	790	1,723
Venezuela .....	1,311	2,767	4,078
<b>WORLDWIDE, Total</b> .....	<b>213,465</b>	<b>105,578</b>	<b>319,043</b>

<sup>A</sup>Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C.: 1971).

<sup>b</sup>Include Laos, Burma.

<sup>c</sup>Include Israel, Egypt.


challenging aspects of our new policy can, therefore, best be achieved when each partner does its share and contributes what it best can to the common effort. In the majority of cases, this means indigenous manpower organized into properly equipped and well-trained armed forces with the help of materiel, training, technology and specialized skills furnished by the United States through the Military Assistance Program or as Foreign Military Sales.<sup>6</sup> [Emphasis added.]

According to Laird, the MAP program is "the essential ingredient" of the Nixon Doctrine plan to "honor our obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units." When looked at in these terms, Laird asserted, "a MAP dollar is of far greater value than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces."<sup>7</sup>

FOOTNOTES:

1. See: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearings, 91st Congress [Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1971], Volume I, Part 3, Kingdom of Thailand, and Volume II, Part 6, Republic of Korea.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, The 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970-74, Statement of Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 76.
3. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 14.
4. Ibid., pp. 1-5.
5. See: Drew Middleton, "Thousands of Military Men Studying in the U.S.," The New York Times, November 1, 1970.
6. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971, Hearings, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970, p. 307.
7. U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget, Statement by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (Washington, D.C., 1970).

Map: Keith Buchanan



# U.S. Military Operations / Latin America

## ARMING THE GENERALS

*Note: The following essay is a revised version of "U.S. Military Operations / Latin America," from the October 1968 issue of NACLA Newsletter; By Michael Klare*

In his report to the President on a 1969 fact-finding mission to Latin America, Nelson Rockefeller warned the nation that:

Rising frustrations throughout the Western Hemisphere over poverty and political instability have led increasing numbers of people to pick the United States as a scapegoat and to seek out Marxist solutions to their socio-economic problems. At the moment there is only one Castro among the 26 nations of the hemisphere; there could well be more in the future. And a Castro on the mainland, supported militarily and economically by the Communist world, would present the gravest kind of threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and pose an extremely difficult problem for the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Although Rockefeller's report was ostensibly concerned with the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in Latin America, it is obvious that the driving force behind his presentation is the fear of "more Castros" in the hemisphere. Thus a considerable portion of the report is devoted to a discussion of proposals for improvements in the Military Assistance Program and other internal security programs sponsored by the United States.

Ever since the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, in fact, Pentagon strategists have been developing contingency plans for counterinsurgency operations against the next Castros. Unlike current U.S. planning for Southeast Asia, our plans for Latin America do not envision a significant overt American military presence; the emphasis, indeed, is on low-cost, low-visibility assistance and training programs designed to upgrade the capacity of local forces to overcome guerrilla movements. Between 1960 and 1970, the United

States spent some \$1 billion dollars on military modernization programs in Latin America; most of this money, as we shall see, was concentrated in the area of counterinsurgency and internal security capabilities.

American military policy in Latin America is based on the premise that while economic and social progress is an important task for the hemisphere, no true development can take place in a climate of instability and rebellion. Before the poorer countries can begin the process of modernization, in this view, they must first be able to maintain an atmosphere of "law and order." For many Latin American nations, Rockefeller indicated in 1959, "the question is less one of democracy or lack of it, than it is simply of orderly ways of getting along."<sup>2</sup> [Emphasis added.] In some countries, the armed forces have found it necessary to seize power in order to ensure the maintenance of public order. The United States, in Rockefeller's view, should forget "the philosophical disagreements it may have with particular regimes," and extend support to the military strongmen who now rule two-thirds of the Latin American republics.<sup>3</sup>

Current U.S. programs for support of the Latin American military, and other U.S. military activities in the hemisphere, are discussed in detail below.

### THE CHANGING NATURE OF U.S. MILITARY AID

The Military Assistance Program (MAP) constitutes the major instrument of U.S. military policy in Latin America. The origins of this program, according to Professor Edwin Lieuwen of the University of New Mexico, "can be traced to the eve of World War II, when Washington, in order to counter the threat of Fascist and Nazi subversion, began to establish military missions."<sup>4</sup> Under the Lend Lease Act of March 11, 1941, Latin American armies were supplied with American

arms and equipment in return for access to the region's strategic raw materials and the right to use certain air and naval bases. After the United States entered the war, we continued supplying weapons while Latin America provided temporary bases, stepped up production of strategic materials; and collaborated in antisubmarine and other defense operations.<sup>5</sup>

Military aid to Latin America was suspended in the immediate postwar era; as the Cold War intensified, however, the supply of arms to Latin America's armed forces once again became an objective of United States foreign policy. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, funds were made available for the strengthening of Latin American armies in the interests of "Hemispheric defense." A country became eligible for these funds upon ratification of bilateral mutual defense assistance pacts with the United States. Such agreements were concluded with Ecuador, Cuba, Colombia, Peru and Chile in 1952; with Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay in 1953; with Nicaragua and Honduras in 1954; with Haiti and Guatemala in 1955; and with Bolivia in 1958. (The United States has temporarily suspended MAP aid to some nations following coups, and has permanently cut off aid to Cuba and Haiti.) As part of their contribution to the hemispheric defense effort, MAP recipients are pledged to supply the United States with minerals and other strategic raw materials needed by the U.S. war machine.<sup>6</sup>

Throughout the 1950's, the ostensible objective of U.S. military aid to Latin America was to strengthen the region's defense against external (presumably Soviet) attack. Thus as recently as 1960 the principal goal of the MAP program was the development of a strong antisubmarine warfare capability in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. Charles H. Shuff, the then Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, told a Congressional committee

in 1959 that "the most positive threat to hemispheric security is submarine action in the Caribbean sea and along the coast of Latin America."<sup>7</sup> However, when the Kennedy Administration took office in 1961, the threat of armed revolution became the major concern of U.S. military planning in the Third World and the goals of the MAP program were modified accordingly. As noted by Professor Lieuwen, "the basis for military aid to Latin America abruptly shifted from hemispheric defense to internal security, from the protection of coastlines and from antisubmarine warfare to internal defense against Castro-Communist guerrilla warfare."<sup>8</sup>

Funds for counterinsurgency training and supplies were made available to Latin American armies beginning with the fiscal year 1963 MAP program. In the following year, Director of Military Assistance General Robert J. Wood announced that "the primary purpose of the proposed fiscal year 1965 Military Assistance Program for Latin America is to counter the threat to the entire region by providing equipment and training which will bolster the internal security capabilities of the recipient countries."<sup>9</sup> And during the 1967 debate on the Foreign Assistance Act, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara asserted that "the primary objective [of the MAP program] in Latin America is to aid, where necessary, in the continued development of indigenous military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, in conjunction with police and other security forces, the needed domestic security."<sup>10</sup>

Of the \$45.5 million requested for MAP grant aid in fiscal 1968, the Pentagon proposed to spend \$34.7 million, or 76 percent, on hardware and services related to counterinsurgency.<sup>11</sup> According to Defense Secretary McNamara, "the [1968] grant program will provide no tanks, artillery, fighter aircraft, or combat ships. The emphasis is on



Drawing: Mingo, Marcha (Montevideo)



vehicles and helicopters for internal mobility, communications equipment for better coordination of in-country security efforts, and spare parts for maintenance of existing inventories."<sup>12</sup> These priorities have continued to shape the MAP program under the Nixon Administration; thus in 1970 the present Director of Military Assistance, Gen. Robert H. Warren, told a Congressional committee that the objectives of the fiscal 1971 aid program were "to help Latin American nations maintain military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, with police forces, internal security essential to orderly political, social and economic development."<sup>13</sup>

Total U.S. military aid to Latin America during the period 1950-1970 amounted to \$1.3 billion; this amount includes direct grants totalling \$778 million, credits provided under the Foreign Military Sales program for the purchase of U.S. arms valued at \$253 million, indefinite loans of U.S. naval vessels worth \$201 million, and transfers of "excess" U.S. arms worth another \$63 million. (For a country-by-country breakdown of these expenditures, see the Appendix.) As one would expect, the major recipients of military aid have been the larger countries whose armed forces have come to bear the indelible stamp of U.S. military doctrine, equipment and ideology. Thus Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela and Peru, which together account for about 60 percent of the gross national product of Latin America, received \$915 million in U.S. aid between 1950 and 1970, or 70 percent of MAP expenditures in the region (see Table 1).

TABLE 1:  
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EXPENDITURES  
IN LATIN AMERICA, 1950-1970<sup>a</sup>

*Includes grants furnished under the Military Assistance Program, credits provided by the Foreign Military Sales program, indefinite loans of U.S. naval vessels, and deliveries of excess U.S. defense articles.*

[By fiscal year; dollars in millions]

Country	Amount	Country	Amount
Argentina.....	131.0	Jamaica.....	1.1
Bolivia.....	25.3	Mexico.....	10.6
Brazil.....	378.4	Nicaragua.....	13.1
Chile.....	151.9	Panama.....	4.1
Colombia.....	114.1	Paraguay.....	11.6
Costa Rica.....	1.8	Peru.....	147.8
Dominican Rep....	28.0	Uruguay.....	45.9
Ecuador.....	57.0	Venezuela.....	106.1
El Salvador.....	6.9	Region <sup>b</sup> .....	27.8
Guatemala.....	18.7		
Haiti (to 1963)..	4.4	TOTAL.....	1,294.2
Honduras.....	8.6		

<sup>a</sup>Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Statistics and Reports, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1971).

<sup>b</sup>Includes \$12.4 million to Cuba (1950-60).

When, however, MAP recipients are ranked by the percentage of their total defense outlays supplied by the United States, a different pattern emerges; as can be seen in Table 2, the most favored recipients of U.S. aid, on a proportional basis, are the smaller and poorer nations of South and Central America--most of which have experienced guerrilla uprisings in the past decade.

Although the MAP grant program has been declining steadily over the past few years (from a high of \$73 million in fiscal 1968 to \$15.7 million in 1971), arms sales to Latin America have been increasing at a spectacular rate: from an average of \$30 million per year in the 1960's, U.S. sales to Latin American governments under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program rose to \$72 million in fiscal 1971 and an estimated \$144 million in 1972.<sup>14</sup> Among the major customers for U.S. arms were Argentina (with purchases of \$79 million between 1950 and 1970), Brazil (\$85 million), Peru (\$50 million), and Venezuela (\$103 million).<sup>15</sup> In order to increase military exports to Latin America through the FMS program, President Nixon was obliged, in May 1971, to waive the \$75 million ceiling on arms transfers to the region that had been imposed by Congress in 1968 (under Section 33 of the Foreign Military Sales Act). (For a further discussion of the arms sales program, see "Arm Now - Pay Later.")

#### TRAINING


After the supply of arms and equipment, the most important function of the U.S. military ap-

TABLE 2:  
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF  
LATIN AMERICAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1964-67

[In rank order, dollars in millions]

Country	Total defense expenditures, 1964-67 <sup>a</sup>	U.S. aid as a percentage of defense spending
Panama.....	4	32.5
Bolivia.....	57	21.9
Uruguay.....	51	18.0
Paraguay.....	30	17.0
Ecuador.....	100	16.0
Honduras.....	27	12.9
Guatemala.....	56	12.5
Colombia.....	302	10.2
Peru.....	367	9.8
Chile.....	321	9.7
El Salvador.....	38	9.0
Dominican Republic...	133	6.3
Argentina.....	843	2.7
Brazil.....	2,380	2.1
Venezuela.....	712	0.6

Source: U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 1969 (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 18.



paratus in Latin America is to provide training to indigenous military personnel. In recent years, about two-thirds of the MAP grant program has been devoted to this purpose. Training also constitutes the principal day-to-day activity of U.S. officers attached to the military missions in seventeen Latin American countries. The high priority given to training programs was underscored by Defense Secretary McNamara in 1962 as follows:

Probably the greatest return on our military assistance investment comes from the training of selected officers and key specialists at our military schools and training centers in the United States and overseas. These students are handpicked by their countries to become instructors when they return home. They are the coming leaders.... I need not dwell upon the value of having in positions of leadership men who have first-hand knowledge of how Americans do things and how they think. It is beyond price to us to make such friends of such men.<sup>16</sup> [Emphasis added.]

The United States maintains three training programs for Latin American personnel; first, "in-country" training provided by mobile training teams (MTT's) which are sent to a country on a temporary basis to offer instruction in specialized military skills; second, training at the U.S. military schools in the Panama Canal Zone; and third, training at service schools in the United States. Between 1950 and 1970, 54,270 Latin American officers and enlisted men received training under the MAP program (see Table 3). The various training programs are discussed in detail below.

TABLE 3:  
LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL TRAINED UNDER  
THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 1950-70<sup>a</sup>

Country	Number trained in U.S.	Number trained abroad <sup>b</sup>	Total number trained
Argentina.....	2,382	426	2,808
Bolivia.....	410	2,248	2,658
Brazil.....	6,009	847	6,856
Chile.....	2,553	1,821	4,374
Colombia.....	2,126	2,503	4,629
Costa Rica.....	33	496	529
Cuba (1950-60)...	307	214	521
Dominican Rep....	609	1,984	2,593
Ecuador.....	1,538	2,746	4,284
El Salvador.....	185	886	1,071
Guatemala.....	626	1,654	2,280
Haiti.....	444	60	504
Honduras.....	189	1,389	1,578
Mexico.....	393	202	595
Nicaragua.....	615	3,379	3,994
Panama.....	38	3,110	3,148
Paraguay.....	287	753	1,040
Peru.....	2,890	2,117	5,007
Uruguay.....	933	790	1,723
Venezuela.....	1,311	2,767	4,078
TOTAL.....	23,878	30,392	54,270

<sup>a</sup>Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C., 1971).

<sup>b</sup>Mostly in the Panama Canal Zone.

#### SOUTHCOM

All U.S. training programs in Latin America are supervised by the U.S. Forces Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), located at Quarry Heights in the Panama Canal Zone. SOUTHCOM is the "unified command" headquarters which oversees all Army, Navy and Air Force activities in South and Central America. Ordinarily, the most important activity of SOUTHCOM personnel is the supervision of the seventeen U.S. military missions in Latin America and administration of the MAP program. The advisory missions, or Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), range in size from 5 men in Costa Rica to 90 in Brazil; as of July 1, 1971, there were 531 officers, enlisted men and civilian employees assigned to the MAAG's and missions in Latin America. These men provide training in various military and technical skills, and advise the host country military in the development of counterinsurgency and internal security programs.

In addition to its administrative and training functions, SOUTHCOM maintains a communications and logistics network which directs and supplies all U.S. military forces in Latin America. This network is designed to support any U.S. troops that would be deployed in future interventions or "police actions" in the region.

### U.S. Army School of the Americas

The U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA), located at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone, is the only Army training institution catering exclusively to Latin American personnel. It is also the only military school to provide instruction in a foreign language. An element of SOUTHCOM, the School has trained over 26,000 Latin American officers and enlisted men in various military specialties. Most of the courses at the School emphasize counterinsurgency and other internal security functions. According to the September 1968 issue of Army Digest magazine, the School's Irregular Warfare Committee "teaches various measures required to defeat an insurgent on the battlefield, as well as military civic action functions in an insurgent environment."<sup>17</sup> Military cadets who receive their advanced training at USARSA undertake a week-long maneuver known as the "Balboa Crossing" in which they "trek across the isthmus from Pacific to Atlantic shores on a simulated seach-and-destroy mission, putting into practice what they have learned about guerrilla warfare and jungle living."<sup>18</sup>

USARSA boasts that "alumni have risen to such key positions as Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff in Bolivia, Director of Mexico's War College, Minister of War and Chief of Staff in Colombia, Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Argentina, and Undersecretary of War in Chile." The United States profits from this arrangement as well; according to Army Digest, "training Latin Americans in U.S. military skills, leadership techniques and doctrine also paves the way for cooperation and support of U.S. Army missions, attaches, military assistance advisory groups and commissions operating in Latin America."<sup>19</sup>

### Inter-American Air Forces Academy


Closely related to the Army's School of the Americas is the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) at Albrook Air Force Base in the Canal Zone. Like USARSA, the Academy offers instruction in Spanish and caters primarily to Latin American personnel. By the end of 1970, some 10,000 officers and enlisted men had received training at the Academy. Instruction is provided in aircraft maintenance, electronics, radio, instrument training and repair, engine and weapons mechanics, and medical specialties. As at Fort Gulick, the emphasis is on counterinsurgency and civic action programs. Beginning in 1963, the Academy offered a course on "Special Air Operations" jointly with USARSA and the 24th Special Operations Wing (the Air Force equivalent of the Army's Special Forces); the course includes study of such skills as close air support on the battlefield, supply operations for counter-guerrilla forces, and airborne operations.<sup>20</sup>

### Eighth U.S. Special Forces

Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone is the headquarters of the Eight U.S. Special Forces--the

famed "Green Berets." This elite unit consists of some 1,100 officers and enlisted men, who in turn constitute approximately 25 Mobile Training Teams of up to 30 men each. These MTT's have traveled throughout Latin America, supplementing the work of the resident U.S. military missions by providing intensive training in counter-guerrilla operations. Since the formation of the 8th Special Forces in 1962, such teams have visited every Latin American country except Cuba, Haiti and Mexico. As noted by MIT's Center for International Studies, MTT activity always peaks when a pro-U.S. regime is threatened by insurgent uprisings.<sup>21</sup>

Visitors to Fort Gulick are told that "the principle mission of the Special Forces is to advise, train and aid the Latin American military and paramilitary forces to conduct counterinsurgency activities, and to do so in support of the objectives of the United States of America within the framework of the Cold War."<sup>22</sup> In fulfillment of this mission, 16 Green Berets headed by Maj. Ralph W. "Pappy" Shelton traveled to Bolivia in April 1967 to train and supervise the Bolivian Army ranger battalion that was used to hunt down the guerrilla band of Ernesto Che Guevara.<sup>23</sup>



TRICONTINENTAL (Havana)

### Inter-American Defense College

The Inter-American Defense College (IADC) was established in 1962 as a senior service school similar to the U.S. National War College, Great Britain's Imperial Defense College, and the NATO Defense College. Located at Fort Lesley McNair in Washington, D.C., IADC occupies a building that was refurbished for its use by the MAP program at a cost of \$1 million. The College is administered by the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), which is composed of military representatives of the 22 member nations of the Organization of American States.

The emphasis at IADC is on the quality, not the quantity, of its students, who come from all Latin American countries except Cuba. Admission requirements include the rank of lieutenant colonel or above, graduation from an advanced command and general staff college, and military command experience. IADC, according to an official brochure, is "a military institution of high level studies, devoted to conducting courses on the Inter-American System and the political, social, economic, and military factors that constitute essential components of Inter-American defense." The nine-month course of study stresses Cold War ideology and the need for joint action against "Castro-Communist" guerrillas. The curriculum also includes several sessions on the theory and practice of military civic action and related counterinsurgency activities. Most instruction is given in Spanish; as of June 1970, some 230 students had graduated from IADC.<sup>24</sup>

### International Police Academy

The International Police Academy (IPA), located in the Georgetown section of Washington, D.C., is sometimes referred to as the "West Point" of the international law enforcement community. Administered by the Office of Public Safety (OPS) of the Agency for International Development, IPA provides instruction in various police and paramilitary skills to foreign police commanders. Originally known as the Inter-American Police Academy and located in the Panama Canal Zone, IPA was moved to Washington in 1964 and its scope broadened to include students from throughout the Third World (Latin Americans still constitute a majority of the student body, however). By 1969, over 3,000 foreign police officials had graduated from IPA.

Although IPA provides instruction on such conventional subjects as fingerprint identification and firearms maintenance, the emphasis is on internal security and riot control. Students at the Academy spend three days at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., for a series of briefings on "civil-military relationships in counterinsurgency operations and police support in unconventional warfare."<sup>25</sup> Prior to graduation, IPA students test their knowledge of anti-riot tactics in a facility known as



the Police Operations Control Center (POCC). One journalist who visited IPA reported: "At the front of the POCC is a magnetic game board on which has been constructed the map of a mythical city, Rio Bravos... From the control booth, faculty field commanders alert the students to a communist-inspired riot at the city's university, or to a bombing attempt by communist subversives from the neighboring country, Maoland. The students deploy their forces on the board and plan strategies, much as they would from a real police control center."<sup>26</sup>

### Service Schools in the United States

Over 140 Army, Navy, and Air Force installations in the United States provide training for foreign military personnel under the MAP program (see Appendix for a list of these facilities). Although precise figures on the numbers of Latin Americans attending each of these schools is not available, it is known that the Army has tailored the curricula of two of the schools to emphasize military operations in underdeveloped areas. These installations are the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, N.C., and the Civil Affairs and Military Government School at Fort Gordon, Ga.

The Special Warfare School (part of the John Kennedy Center for Military Assistance) offers courses on counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. Most of the students are U.S. military personnel who have been assigned to military missions or Special Forces units in the Third World; however, it is known that several hundred Latin American officers have also received training at the School.<sup>27</sup> In 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin reported that Latin American military personnel were receiving training at Fort Bragg "in riot control, counter guerrilla operations and tactics, intelli-

gence and counterintelligence, and other subjects which will contribute to the maintenance of public order."<sup>28</sup>

The Civil Affairs School is the principal center in the United States for training in the administration of military civic action programs. As at Fort Bragg, most students are U.S. military personnel assigned to a military mission, military assistance advisory group, or mobile training team in the Third World. The civic action course includes instruction in the theory of economic development, organization and logistics for civic action projects, and psychological operations in counterinsurgency.<sup>29</sup>

\* \* \* \*

U.S. military assistance to Latin American armed forces has often provoked criticism from the world press, particularly when U.S.-equipped armies have seized power from democratically-elected governments. In response to this criticism, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated in 1964 that "the essential role of the Latin American military as a stabilizing force outweighs any risks involved in providing military assistance for internal security purposes."<sup>30</sup> McNamara acknowledged that discontent would not disappear from Latin America until the underlying problems of poverty and underdevelopment were overcome; it was for this purpose, he indicated, that the United States had launched the Alliance for Progress. But U.S. policy is firm on one point: "the goals of the Alliance," he insisted, "can only be achieved within a framework of law and order."<sup>31</sup> [Emphasis added.] Current U.S. policy, as we have seen, calls for the use of the Latin American military as the prime instrument of "law and order." American bases in Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone and the U.S. mainland constitute a logistical and communications apparatus that would be used to support any future intervention operations. SOUTHCOM's Canal Zone facilities have already been described; in the following section, we will look at some of the installations in Puerto Rico that contribute to America's intervention capability in Latin America.

#### PUERTO RICO INSTALLATIONS

Puerto Rico performs for the U.S. Navy the same pivotal role performed for the Army by the Panama Canal Zone. The island "Commonwealth" is the headquarters of the Commander, South Atlantic Force (COMSOLANT) and of the 10th Naval District commanding the Caribbean Sea Frontier. The Navy's offices in San Juan and at the Roosevelt Roads Naval base command all Navy activity in the Caribbean and in the Atlantic Ocean south of the Tropic of Cancer. Other Navy bases, at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Chaguaramas in Trinidad and St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, are also under the jurisdiction of the Puerto Rico commands. The naval blockade of Cuba and Navy support operations dur-

ing the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic were both directed from Puerto Rico.<sup>32</sup>

Roosevelt Roads is an all-purpose Naval base located on the east coast of Puerto Rico. It has three harbors, the largest of which can berth dozens of major warships at one time (thus serving as the South Atlantic equivalent of Pearl Harbor in the Pacific). The facilities at Roosevelt Roads can accommodate any warship in the world, including the giant aircraft carrier Enterprise, which trained here before sailing to the waters off Vietnam. The base also encompasses a large Naval Air Station, which house several squadrons of jet interceptors and reconnaissance aircraft.

Vieques is an island located just off the east coast of Puerto Rico which is largely devoted to military use. Of the island's 35,000 acres, some 26,000 have been appropriated by the U.S. Navy for training facilities and other installations, including a huge underground ammunition storage depot. Vieques acquires special prominence periodically during the year as the site of the Atlantic Fleet's training exercises. A New York Times dispatch of April 10, 1965 describes one of these exercises as follows: "about 4,000 Marines and Army paratroopers fought a sham war today across the sun-baked brown hills of Vieques... The troops, supported by a Navy amphibious force and Air Force, Marine and Navy planes, continued Quick Kick VII, a combined airborne-amphibious assault." It is clear from this and other reports that these exercises are designed to prepare the Atlantic Fleet for future interventions in Latin America which would require an amphibious landing.

Culebra is a small island located off the eastern tip of Puerto Rico which is used by the Navy for bombing and shelling practice exercises, and for tests of new non-nuclear munitions. In the past few years, Culebra residents have organized a campaign to expell the Navy gunners from their island. After a Congressional investigation and many protests by the Culebrans, the Navy agreed in 1971 to find alternative sites for its shelling exercises.

Ramey Air Force Base is the principal Military Airlift Command (MAC) base in Latin America. The base normally houses a full complement of heavy transport aircraft capable of airlifting almost every type of military equipment, plus large numbers of troops, to airstrips in the Caribbean and South America. During the Dominican crisis of 1965, Ramey provided logistical support to General Wessin y Wessin's blockaded troops at San Isidro airbase, and later was used to ferry U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic. Massive airlift operations of this type have come to assume a crucial place in U.S. intervention strategy, and it is safe to assume that Ramey will play a pivotal role in any future "police actions" in the Western Hemisphere.

## Footnotes

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31. Foreign Assistance 1967, p. 117.
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## The U.S. 'Public Safety' Program

# POLICE AID FOR TYRANTS

By Nancy Stein & Mike Klare

*Note: The following essay is based on these articles from NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report: "U.S. Police Operations - Latin America" (January 1970), "U.S. Police Assistance Programs in Latin America" (May-June 1970), "The Mercenarization of the Third World" (November 1970), "AID Police Programs, 1971-72" (July-August 1971).*

The United States is rapidly becoming the world's policeman in the most precise sense of the word. It has achieved this status not only by placing its troops on the front lines of combat, as in Indochina, but by taking upon itself the task of organizing, training, equipping and indoctrinating the police forces of the Third World. U.S. funds have been used to construct the National Police Academy in Brazil, to renovate and expand the South Vietnamese prison system, and to install a national police communications network in Colombia. The Agency for In-



ternational Development (AID) estimates that over one million foreign policemen have received some training or supplies through its "Public Safety" program--a figure which includes 100,000 Brazilian police and the entire 95,000-man National Police Force of South Vietnam. Such local forces have received training not only in routine police matters, but also in paramilitary and counterinsurgency techniques developed in response to the threat of civil unrest.

United States policy for the underdeveloped areas calls for a modest acceleration of economic growth, to be achieved wherever possible through the normal profit-making activities of U.S. corporations and lending institutions. It is obvious, however, that an atmosphere of insecurity and rebelliousness does not provide an attractive climate for investment. Throughout the rapidly urbanizing areas of the Third World, civil disorders have become a common phenomenon as landless peasants stream to the cities in search of economic and cultural opportunities. Since most of the poorer countries cannot satisfy the aspirations of these new city-dwellers under existing social and economic systems, built-up tensions are increasingly giving way to attacks on the status quo. Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who witnessed such attacks first-hand during his 1969 tour of Latin America, told President Nixon:

With urbanization in the Western Hemisphere have come crowded living conditions and a loss of living space. The urban man tends to become both depersonalized and fragmented in his human relationships. Unemployment is high, especially among the young.... These sprawling urban areas of the hemisphere spawn restlessness and anger which are readily exploited by the varying forces that thrive on trouble....<sup>2</sup>

Rockefeller further warned that while Latin American armies have "gradually improved their capabilities for dealing with Castro-type agrarian



guerrillas," it appeared that "radical revolutionary elements in the hemisphere [are] increasingly turning toward urban terrorism in their attempts to bring down the existing order."<sup>3</sup>

Since the late 1950's the principal instrument used by the United States to maintain stability in its Third World domains is the Military Assistance Program, which is designed to improve the counterinsurgency capabilities of the local armed forces (see "Arming the Generals," above). In dealing with urban discontent and political unrest, however, the military has proved itself less than effective. Thus Professor David Burks of Indiana University told a Senate committee:

... I think we have to face a reality. The reality is that when the insurgents appear, the governments will call upon the army to eliminate the insurgents. And, in most cases that I have examined, this was not too difficult to do. But there comes a point--and this came in Cuba in 1957 and 1958 when Castro was in the Sierra Maestra--there can come a point when the army cannot handle this kind of situation simply because the military establishment tends to use too much force, tends to use the wrong techniques and tends, therefore, to polarize the population and gradually force the majority of those who are politically active to support the revolutionary or insurgent force....<sup>4</sup>

The military, according to Burks, are just not trained or indoctrinated for this function. The police force, on the other hand, "is with the people all the time carrying on the normal functions of control or apprehension of ordinary criminals and can, therefore, move very quickly whenever an insurgent problem develops."<sup>5</sup> This argument is shared by the Agency for International Development, whose chief officer declared in 1964: "... the police are a most sensitive point of contact between government and people, close to the focal points of unrest, and more acceptable than the army as keepers of order over long periods of time."<sup>6</sup>

Another reason advanced for the support of police forces (and one which is rarely mentioned in public), is that the police constitute a highly trained and indoctrinated force, whereas the rank and file of the armed forces are often filled with relatively undisciplined and unmotivated draftees--many of whom are Indians, peasants, or members of other oppressed groups.

At the core of these arguments is the hope that an effective police force, backed by massive U.S. aid, can prevent or postpone the need for direct military intervention by the United States or its allies--as was required to salvage the Saigon regime. At the 1965 graduation ceremonies of AID's International Police Academy, General Maxwell Taylor told Third World police cadets:

The outstanding lesson [of the Indochina conflict] is that we should never let another



Vietnam-type situation arise again. We were too late in recognizing the extent of the subversive threat. We appreciate now that every young, emerging country must be constantly on the alert, watching for those symptoms which, if allowed to develop unrestrained, may eventually grow into a disastrous situation such as that in South Vietnam. We have learned the need for a strong police force and a strong police intelligence organization to assist in identifying early the symptoms of an incipient subversive situation.<sup>7</sup>

Acting on the premise that police forces constitute the "first line of defense against subversion," the United States is flooding the Third World with antiriot equipment and police advisers under AID's Public Safety program. During hearings on the Foreign Assistance appropriations for 1965, AID Administrator David Bell described the rationale behind U.S. police assistance programs as follows:

Maintenance of law and order including internal security is one of the fundamental responsibilities of government....

Successful discharge of this responsibility is imperative if a nation is to establish and maintain the environment of stability and security so essential to economic,

social, and political progress....

Plainly, the United States has very great interests in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of law and order under humane, civil concepts and control.... Where there is a need, technical assistance to the police of developing nations to meet their responsibilities promotes and protects these U.S. interests.<sup>8</sup>

The United States Government, through AID's Office of Public Safety (OPS), assists Third World police forces in these three ways:

(1) By offering advanced training to senior police officers at the International Police Academy (IPA) in Washington, D.C., and at other police schools in the United States. Between 1961 and 1971, some 6,800 Third World police officials received training in the United States, of whom about 60 percent were Latin Americans. (See Table 2 for a breakdown of police training by country, and Table 3 for a list of police training programs in the United States. For a description of IPA, see "Arming the Generals.")

(2) By stationing "Public Safety Advisors" in selected Third World countries to provide training for rank-and-file police officers and to advise top police officials at the country's national police headquarters. As of June 30, 1968, there were 400 Public Safety Advisors stationed abroad, of whom half were assigned to



Vietnam and 90 to Latin America (see Table 2). Most Public Safety Advisors are recruited from the CIA, the FBI, the Special Forces, Military Police, or domestic law enforcement agencies.

(3) By making direct grants of specialized police equipment, including riot gasses, pistols, shotguns, gas masks, radios and walkie-talkies, patrol cars, jeeps, and computers. About half of OPS's total spending is allocated to this supply effort. In an emergency, AID is empowered to make emergency shipments of riot equipment and other police matériel to support a favored regime.

Total aid provided by OPS between 1961 and 1971 amounted to \$282.8 million, of which some two-thirds was allocated to Southeast Asia, primarily South Vietnam and Thailand. As can be seen in Table 1, U.S. assistance has been concentrated in a handful of countries in each region, most of which have experienced insurgent uprisings in the past decade.

The available documentation on U.S. Public Safety programs abroad suggests that OPS focuses its efforts on certain key elements of the local police system--particularly training, intelligence, communications, riot-control, and counter-insurgency--in order to gain maximum influence in areas of greatest concern to the United States. Thus a description of the AID program in East Asia (Thailand, Laos, Korea and the Philippines) indicates:

Specifically, the Public Safety programs will focus on the development of key institutional elements, such as communications networks and training systems; on better administration and management leading to the effective use of resources; the improvement of rural paramilitary police ability to prevent and deal with guerrilla activities; the provision of effective police services at the hamlet level; the improvement of urban policing, including the humane control of civil disturbances and riots.<sup>9</sup>

TABLE 1:  
A.I.D. OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY EXPENDITURES  
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, FISCAL 1961-1971.

[Dollars in thousands]

Region & country:	Expenditures:
EAST ASIA, Total .....	196,452
Thailand .....	82,663
South Vietnam .....	85,099
NEAR EAST & SO. ASIA, Total .....	13,939
Pakistan .....	8,478
AFRICA, Total .....	21,104
Congo (Kinshasa) .....	4,077
Liberia .....	3,286
Somali Republic .....	4,560
LATIN AMERICA, Total .....	51,262
Brazil .....	8,475
Colombia .....	6,237
Dominican Republic .....	3,809
Guatemala .....	4,024
<b>GRAND TOTAL, All countries .....</b>	<b>282,762</b>

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics & Reports Division, A.I.D. Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1971, and earlier editions.

# U.S. Police Assistance Program

## Office Of Public Safety Expenditures, 1961-71<sup>1</sup>

[By fiscal year; dollars in thousands]

Region and country	Total, 1961-69	1970	1971	Total, 1961-71
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>236,332</b>	<b>25,171</b>	<b>21,259</b>	<b>282,762</b>
<b>EAST ASIA, Total</b>	<b>160,669</b>	<b>19,199</b>	<b>16,584</b>	<b>196,452</b>
Burma	195	-	-	195
Cambodia	2,583	-	-	2,583
Indonesia	10,121	-	-	10,121
Korea	6,704	391	337	7,432
Laos	3,184	547	480	4,211
Philippines	2,386	825	937	4,148
Thailand	71,316	5,981	5,366	82,663
Vietnam, Republic of	64,180	11,455	9,464	85,099
<b>NEAR EAST &amp; SOUTH ASIA, Total</b>	<b>12,873</b>	<b>794</b>	<b>272</b>	<b>13,939</b>
Greece	129	-	-	129
Iran	1,712	-	-	1,712
Jordan	2,365	100	71	2,536
Lebanon	149	-	-	149
Nepal	188	-	-	188
Pakistan	7,583	694	201	8,478
Turkey	200	-	-	200
United Arab Republic	312	-	-	312
CENTO/Region	235	-	-	235
<b>AFRICA, Total</b>	<b>19,155</b>	<b>943</b>	<b>1,006</b>	<b>21,104</b>
Central African Republic	241	-	-	241
Chad	527	-	-	527
Congo (Kinshasa)	3,133	380	564	4,077
Dahomey	323	-	-	323
Ethiopia	2,875	49	-	2,924
Ivory Coast	743	-	-	743

## Police Aid

Region and country	1961-69	1970	1971	1961-71
Kenya	679	18	-	697
Liberia	2,752	276	258	3,286
Libya	444	-	-	444
Malagasy Republic	454	-	-	454
Niger	398	-	-	398
Rwanda	1,073	-	-	1,073
Somali Republic	4,416	144	-	4,560
Tunisia	640	76	77	793
Upper Volta	219	-	-	219
Region/other countries	238	-	107	345
<b>LATIN AMERICA, Total</b>	<b>43,630</b>	<b>4,235</b>	<b>3,397</b>	<b>51,262</b>
Argentina	120	-	-	120
Bolivia	1,598	209	133	1,940
Brazil	7,416	614	445	8,475
Chile	2,265	106	15	2,386
Colombia	5,723	267	247	6,237
Costa Rica	1,235	230	179	1,644
Dominican Republic	3,116	386	307	3,809
Ecuador	3,219	153	151	3,523
El Salvador	1,826	83	66	1,975
Guatemala	2,482	1,129	413	4,024
Guyana	955	149	124	1,228
Honduras	1,188	107	148	1,443
Jamaica	451	75	75	601
Mexico	745	-	-	745
Panama	1,467	131	163	1,761
Peru	4,115	27	-	4,142
Uruguay	1,032	285	619	1,936
Venezuela	2,627	284	195	3,106
Other countries	582	-	117	699
Regional costs	1,468	-	-	1,468

<sup>a</sup>Includes commodities delivered, training in the United States, and in-country training and advice provided by U.S. Public Safety Advisors. Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, A.I.D. Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1971, and previous editions.

By concentrating its efforts on these strategic aspects of police work, OPS is able to exert considerable influence over the direction of the local police apparatus despite the modest size of the funding input. Thus AID's presentation to Congress on the Fiscal Year 1967 OPS program in the Dominican Republic notes that while the proposed grant of \$720,000 represents but 4.7 percent of the Dominican police budget, "for U.S. objectives it provides the necessary leverage."<sup>10</sup> [Emphasis added.] Not surprisingly, AID's "program objectives" in the Dominican Republic, as in

other Third World countries, stress the suppression of civil disturbances and revolutionary activity--i.e., those aspects of police work which provide protection for U.S. business interests--rather than the reform of brutal and corrupt police administrations.<sup>11</sup>

In providing assistance to Third World police agencies, OPS notes that most countries maintain a unified "civil security service" which, "in addition to regular police include paramilitary units within civil police organizations and para-

**Table 2: Public Safety Training & Advisory Programs**

Region & country	Foreign Police Personnel trained in the U.S., 1961-71 <sup>a</sup>	Resident Public Safety Advisors, as of June 30, 1968 <sup>b</sup>	Region & country	Personnel trained	Advisors stationed
TOTAL, All countries	6,812	407	Sierra Leone	3	4
EAST ASIA, Total	1,430	276	Somali Republic	125	5
Indonesia	231	-	Sudan	8	-
Korea	40	6	Tanzania	30	-
Laos	56	4	Tunisia	105	1
Philippines	193	8	Upper Volta	12	-
Thailand	491	58	Other countries	67	3
Vietnam (South)	382	200	LATIN AMERICA, Total	3,833	90
Other countries	33	-	Argentina	84	-
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA, Total	714	14	Bolivia	105	3
Greece	34	-	Brazil	613	17
Iran	216	-	Chile	103	1
Jordan	58	5	Colombia	404	7
Lebanon	15	-	Costa Rica	136	4
Pakistan	125	6	Dominican Republic	174	15
Saudi Arabia	67	-	Ecuador	221	6
Turkey	41	-	El Salvador	214	4
UAR/Egypt	97	-	Guatemala	329	2
CENTO/other countries	61	3	Guyana	39	2
AFRICA, Total	843	27	Honduras	87	2
Central African Rep.	7	-	Jamaica	61	2
Chad	8	2	Nicaragua	65	-
Congo (Kinshasa)	109	5	Panama	295	3
Dahomey	19	-	Paraguay	17	-
Ethiopia	114	2	Peru	151	9
Ghana	32	-	Uruguay	113	3
Kenya	12	1	Venezuela	564	10
Liberia	106	3	Other countries	58	-
Libya	22	-			
Mali	8	-			
Morocco	14	-			
Niger	12	-			
Nigeria	30	-			

<sup>a</sup>Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, A.I.D. Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1971, and earlier editions.

<sup>b</sup>Source: A.I.D. Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1968.

military forces such as gendarmeries, constabularies, and civil guards which perform police functions and have as their primary mission maintaining internal security." The Public Safety program, according to AID, is designed to assist the entire police/paramilitary apparatus; thus,

Individual Public Safety programs, while varying from country to country, are focused in general on developing within the civil security forces a balance of (1) a capability for regular police operations, with (2) an investigative capability for detecting and identifying criminal and/or subversive individuals and organizations and neutralizing their activities, and with (3) a capability for controlling militant activities ranging from demonstrations, disorders, or riots through small-scale guerrilla operations.<sup>12</sup>

In many countries, OPS funds are being used for "improving records and identification facilities," and for the development of "national police command centers." Clearly, AID's intention in these efforts is to establish centralized data banks on political activists and to upgrade the anti-riot and paramilitary forces. In the Dominican Republic, for instance, six of the 15 Public Safety Advisors present in 1966-67 were in fact CIA operatives whose job was to work with the local intelligence organization.<sup>13</sup> In Venezuela, to cite another example, OPS funds were used to create a unified operations center in Caracas to coordinate riot-control activities.<sup>14</sup> In South Vietnam, OPS has launched a national identification campaign designed to register every inhabitant over 15 years of age. All citizens are to be provided with an unbreakable ID card which they must show to police officers on request; anyone

## Table 3: Police Training Centers In The U.S.

[Condensed from: U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Public Safety, Program Guide: Public Safety Training (Washington, D.C., 1968)]

Institution	Course and Description
International Police Academy, Washington, D.C.	Senior Course [for high-level police commanders] - instruction in police organization, management, operation, planning and research; communications; investigation; counterinsurgency.
	General Course [for middle-level police commanders] - training in police administration, organization and operations; internal security; counter-insurgency and counter subversion; riot control; scientific and technical aids; firearms, narcotics law enforcement; border patrol and customs. (In English and French.)
	Inter-American General Course - same as above, in Spanish.
Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, Quantico, Va.	National Academy course of instruction - scientific and technical topics involving police records, firearms and ballistics, investigation procedures, police tactics.
U.S. Post Office Department Scientific Investigation Lab, Washington, D.C.	Questioned Document Examination - scientific examination of documents.
International Police Services School, Washington, D.C.	Police Records Management.
International Police Academy and other Government agencies	Special Actions & Riot Control [in French] - training for civil disturbances and control of peaceful assemblages, including handling of weapons and equipment
	Police Telecommunications Management
	Police Radio Communications
U.S. Coast Guard Training Center, Yorktown, Va., and Coast Guard Academy, New London, Conn.	Maritime Law Enforcement
Criminal Investigation Lab, Fort Gordon, Ga.	Firearms Identification
Southern Illinois University	Penology and Corrections - [four courses] - Management of Correctional Institutions; Correctional Institution Design and Construction; Correctional Relationships with Juvenile and Criminal Courts; Probation and Parole Systems.

caught without one is considered a "Vietcong suspect" and subject to arrest. By the end of 1970, South Vietnam's National Police command had amassed a full set of fingerprints, biographical information, photographs and data on the political beliefs of nearly 12,000,000 people. With the help of this information plus an elaborate system of roadblocks and checkpoints, the National Police detained over 153,000 people in 1970 as part of the CIA-funded Operation Phoenix.<sup>15</sup>

In South Vietnam, U.S. aid to the Saigon police apparatus extends all the way to the prison system, which is partially subsidized by OPS funds. Top Vietnamese prison officials have received training in correctional techniques at U.S. expense, and AID funds have been used to expand Vietnam's prison facilities. AID's involvement in the Saigon prison system was highlighted in 1970, when Congressmen visiting the Con Son prison complex were shown the notorious "Tiger Cells" for political prisoners.<sup>16</sup>

A less explicit, but nonetheless important aspect of police assistance is the psychological warfare function. Police equipment supplied to Third World forces is designed not only to aid in the suppression of existing threats to the status quo, but also to intimidate the public and thus prevent future disturbances. Large numbers of patrol cars, a cop on every corner, visible machine guns and shotguns, helicopters and checkpoints--all contribute to a climate of fear and hopelessness in the general population. This sense of helplessness is perhaps best described in Frantz Fanon's study of the Algerian independence struggle, The Wretched of the Earth:

In the innermost recesses of [the Algerian's] brains, the [French] settlers' tanks and airplanes occupy a huge place. When they are told, "action must be taken," they see bombs raining down on them, armored cars coming at them on every path, machine gunning and police action ... and they sit quiet, they are beaten from the start.<sup>17</sup>

As noted above, the Office of Public Safety is empowered to provide emergency aid to threatened Third World regimes. A State Department memorandum, issued in November 1962, gives OPS "a series of powers and responsibilities which will enable it to act rapidly, vigorously, and effectively ... powers greater than any other technical office or division of AID."<sup>18</sup> These powers were spelled out by Administrator Bell in 1964 as follows: "In order to deal with the dynamics of internal security situations, the Public Safety program has developed and utilized methods to deliver to threatened countries, in a matter of days, urgently needed assistance including equipment, training and technical advice."<sup>19</sup> When a crisis develops in a client state, OPS officials work "around the clock" to insure that needed supplies--including tear gas





and riot batons--reach the police forces of the beleaguered regime.

Several instances of rapid intervention by Public Safety personnel can be identified. In 1962, when the government of Venezuela (then headed by President Romulo Betancourt) came under heavy pressure from the guerrilla forces of the FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation), John F. Kennedy launched a crash program to upgrade the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Caracas police. A Public Safety Advisor named John Logan was secretly flown to the Venezuelan capital to train an elite team of local policemen in anti-riot techniques. According to journalist Peter T. Chew, Logan "persuaded Venezuelan police to favor the old-fashioned shotgun and showed how shotguns, firing buckshot and gas grenades, could be effectively used against terrorists."<sup>20</sup> When, in following years, U.S. trained Venezuelan police entered the Congress to arrest dissident Congressmen and Senators and occupied the national university, the chief OPS official on the scene told Washington in a secret memo that "two privileged sanctuaries where communist activities were planned--and to a large extent carried out from-- have been eliminated."<sup>21</sup>

OPS instructors were twice rushed into the Dominican Republic to provide emergency training in riot-control techniques. The first such intervention occurred in 1962, when Spanish-speaking detectives from the "Mexican squad" of the Los Angeles Police Department were brought in to train the notorious "Cascos Blancos" (white helmets)--the Santo Domingo riot force. When the Cascos Blancos were disarmed by popular action during the 1965 uprising, OPS personnel were called in to reconstitute the riot patrol.<sup>22</sup>

In their annual presentation to the Congress, AID officials affirm that Public Safety assistance is "not given to support dictatorships." This rule, however, has been violated periodically: Administrator Bell told a Senate Committee "it is obviously not our purpose or intent to assist a head of state who is repressive. On the other hand, we are working in a lot of countries where the governments are controlled by people who have shortcomings."<sup>23</sup> [Emphasis added.] Not wanting to embarrass the United States Government or any of its friends, Mr. Bell did not identify the rulers with "shortcomings" --but he did go on to justify our support of them by insisting that, "The police are a very strongly anti-communist force right now. For that reason it is a very important force to us."<sup>24</sup>

Although it is obviously absurd to expect AID to identify its repressive clients, a quick look at any breakdown of OPS expenditures (see Table 1) will provide ample information on the flow of U.S. funds to authoritarian regimes. Thus Brazil, the major recipient of OPS funds in Latin America, has been condemned by the International Commission of Jurists and other humanitarian organizations for its brutal treatment of political prisoners. And the current regimes in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, both large recipients of U.S. aid, have been condemned by the Organization of American States as violators of human rights.<sup>25</sup>

As information about AID's support for repressive police forces has become more abundant, protest and criticism have increased. In 1971, after holding a series of hearings on repression in Brazil, Senator Frank Church commented:

... the U.S. aid program to Brazilian military and police agencies ... serve mainly to identify the U.S. with a repressive government. The hearings revealed an altogether too close identification of the U.S. with the current Brazilian government, and they raise a serious question about the wisdom of assistance to the Brazilian police and military.<sup>26</sup>

Another series of hearings, conducted by the House Committee on Government Operations, disclosed evidence of U.S. complicity in the torture and murder of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese civilians under the OPS-funded Phoenix campaign.<sup>27</sup>

Much criticism has focused on police collaboration with clandestine right-wing terrorist organizations (which operate, in practice, with unofficial government approval) such as "La Mano Blanca" (The White Hand) and "Ojo por Ojo" (An Eye for an Eye) in Guatemala, "La Banda" (The Gang) in the Dominican Republic, and the "Death Squad" in Brazil. These groups, largely composed of off-duty policemen, attack and assassinate left-wing politicians and other public figures feared by the ruling junta, and do so without (directly) implicating the uniformed services. The New York Times estimates that in Brazil, 500-1,000 people--including many political activ-

ists--have been executed by the Death Squads in the past six years; according to the Miami Herald, the chief criminal judge of Sao Paulo, Nelson Fonseca, told newsmen in 1970 that "the members of the Death Squad are policemen ... and everyone knows it."<sup>28</sup> The terrorist groups keep the population intimidated and frightened, and allow the "legitimate" police agencies to disassociate themselves from political violence. OPS, in turn, can also disassociate itself from such violence while nevertheless furnishing arms which ultimately wind up in the hands of the terrorists.

\* \* \* \* \*

Despite the growing criticism of the Public Safety program, it is clear that the program is unlikely to be discontinued in the near future. The Nixon Administration, with its emphasis on the development of local counterinsurgency forces, has asked Congress for an increase in OPS funding. Moreover, as civil discontent and revolutionary activity increase in the Third World, U.S. business interests will certainly press for increased aid to local police forces. Thus Nelson Rockefeller, in his report to President Nixon on the 1969 tour of Latin America, urged that the United States "respond to requests for assistance of the police and security forces of the hemisphere nations by providing them with the essential tools to do their job." Accordingly, he specified,

The United States should meet reasonable requests from other hemisphere governments for trucks, jeeps, helicopters and like equipment to provide mobility and logistical support for these forces; for radios, and other command control equipment for proper communications among the forces; and for small arms for security forces.<sup>29</sup>

Although such measures may provide some added longevity to pro-U.S. regimes in the Third World, they do not treat the basic problems of underdevelopment and poverty which lead to discontent and thus cannot postpone indefinitely a popular insurrection. By becoming identified with the forces of repression, moreover, the United States engenders the hostility of the masses, and feeds, therefore, the currents of anti-Americanism which are sweeping through the Third World.

## Footnotes

1. This article is largely based on AED documents which have been published in the NACLA Newsletter and NACLA's Latin America Report. See, in particular, "AID Assistance to Civil Security Forces," NACLA Newsletter, September, 1970; "How U.S. AID Shapes the Dominican Police,"

- NACLA Newsletter, April, 1971; "AID Police Programs for Latin America," NACLA Newsletter, July-August, 1971; and "Command & Control - U.S. Police Operations in Latin America," NACLA's Latin America Report, January, 1972.
2. Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Quality of Life in the Americas," Report of a U.S. Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, Department of State Bulletin, December 8, 1969, p. 503.
  3. Ibid., p. 506.
  4. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, Compilation of Studies and Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 414.
  5. Ibid.
  6. U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance Appropriations, 1965, Hearings, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, p. 7. (Hereinafter cited as Foreign Assistance 1965.)
  7. Maxwell D. Taylor, Address at Graduation Exercise, International Police Academy, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State press release, December 17, 1965.
  8. Foreign Assistance 1965, p. 72.
  9. U.S. Agency for International Development, Program and Project Data Presentation to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1972 (Washington, D.C., 1971). (Hereinafter cited as Project Data Presentation 1972.)
  10. U.S. Agency for International Development, Project Data Summary FY 1966: Dominican Republic (Washington, D.C., 1965):
  11. Ibid. See also Project Data Presentation 1972.
  12. "A.I.D. Assistance to Civil Security Forces," U.S. Department of State press release, February 11, 1970.  
February 11, 1970.
  13. See interview with David Fairchild, former AID administrator in the Dominican Republic, in NACLA Newsletter, November, 1970, p. 8.
  14. From an unpublished AID report quoted in John George, "Police Assistance," a paper prepared for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society." The Venezuela excerpt was published as "U.S. Police Program in Venezuela - An Inside View," in NACLA's Latin America Report, January, 1972, pp. 16-18.
  15. Project Data Presentation 1972. See also: U.S. Agency for International Development, The Role of Public Safety in Support of the National Police of Vietnam (Washington, D.C., 1969).
  16. Project Data Presentation 1972. See also: The New York Times, July 7, 1970.
  17. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 63.
  18. Cited by Holmes Alexander in "The Inside Story of Venezuela," undated article inserted in Foreign Assistance 1965, p. 76.
  19. Foreign Assistance 1965, p. 74.
  20. Peter T. Chew, "America's Global Peace Officers," The Kiwanis Magazine, April, 1969, p. 24.
  21. "U.S. Police Program in Venezuela," NACLA's Latin America Report, January, 1972, p. 18.
  22. John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 122. See also: "How U.S. AID Shapes the Dominican Police," NACLA Newsletter, April, 1971, pp. 19-28.
  23. Foreign Assistance 1965, p. 82.
  24. Ibid., p. 75.
  25. "U.S. to End Police Aid to Brazil," The New York Times, July 15, 1971.
  26. The Washington Post, July 25, 1971.
  27. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971.
  28. The Miami Herald, July 24, 1970.
  28. The Miami Herald, July 24, 1970.
  29. Rockefeller, op. cit., pp. 516-17.



# U.S. Arms Sales to the Third World

## ARM NOW PAY LATER

One of the fastest growing markets for industrial products in the world today is the defense systems of Third World nations. Total military spending by the underdeveloped nations is growing at a rate of nine percent a year--twice that of developed countries, and also twice the rate of economic growth in the Third World.<sup>1</sup> One survey of worldwide defense spending indicates that Third World expenditures on military hardware increased from \$3.3 billion in 1968 to an estimated \$5.5 billion in 1972--an increase of 67 percent in five years.<sup>2</sup> Since most countries seek to acquire increasingly complex and sophisticated weapons, the production of such equipment tends to be concentrated in a handful of the most advanced industrial nations: between 1950 and 1969, four countries--the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France--supplied 87 percent of the major weapons systems acquired by underdeveloped countries.<sup>3</sup> The United States, faced with mounting balance-of-payments deficits, has sought to encourage and exploit the growing appetite for advanced weapons in the Third World by mounting an aggressive and well-organized sales campaign.

The Pentagon's arms sales effort, known as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, was developed as an adjunct to the grant system of Military Assistance Program (MAP). Thus FMS shared the MAP program's Cold War goal of strengthening "Free World" defenses against anticipated Soviet invasions. George Thayer, who discusses the U.S. sales effort in his book The War Business, has written that: "Our arms aid program was originally conceived to promote the defensive strength of the West against the communist threat and to promote the concept of cooperative logistics--i.e., the use of common weapons systems--among allies. It was grounded

in the knowledge that most of our allies were militarily vulnerable and in the belief that the Soviet Union was about to march into Western Europe and several other areas. Thus, the United States began to ship large quantities of weapons to its allies who, it was hoped, would help stem the Soviet tide."<sup>4</sup> Since, in the immediate postwar era, most of our allies were unable to shoulder the burden of their own and the common defense, the United States gave generously of its own resources to remilitarize Western Europe and the "forward defense areas" on the borders of the Soviet Union in Asia. Between 1945 and 1961, the United States gave away weapons worth a total of \$25 billion, while arms sales in the same period amounted to only \$2.5 billion, or ten percent of the grant effort.

When President Kennedy took office in 1961, the goals of the FMS program changed radically. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who sought to expand the Pentagon's conventional warfare capabilities, recognized that overseas deployment of U.S. troops (and other war-related activities in Southeast Asia) would contribute to an ever-increasing balance-of-payments deficit. In order to compensate for increased U.S. military spending abroad, therefore, he sought to persuade our allies in Western Europe and Asia to make substantial purchases of U.S. weapons.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, McNamara discovered that Congress was increasingly unwilling to subsidize the defense expenditures of our less-fortunate allies (MAP grant aid to Third World countries dropped from \$1.3 billion in fiscal 1963 to \$678 million in 1967), and thus he established an elaborate program of credits and loans to enable poor countries to borrow funds for the purchase of U.S. arms at attractive interest rates.<sup>6</sup> McNamara's new arms sales policies were summarized in 1963 in Department of Defense Directive

Number 5132.3, which affirmed: "Consistent with overall security objectives, maximum effort will be made to promote the program of selling U.S.-produced military equipment and services to friendly nations."<sup>7</sup>

In order to facilitate overseas purchases of U.S. arms, McNamara in 1961 established a Pentagon sales agency, the International Logistics Negotiations (ILN) Office, and appointed Henry J. Kuss, Jr. to head the FMS promotion campaign. Often compared to Sir Basil Zaharoff, the original "Merchant of Death," Kuss was promoted to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1964 for his success in boosting military sales. "Henry wore a homburg," one of his associates later recalled, "but he wasn't a Zaharoff... McNamara simply appointed him vice-president and general manager in charge of pushing arms in the far corners of the globe--and Henry pushed them."<sup>8</sup> While heading the ILN office, Kuss converted the Pentagon's military aid missions abroad into agents for the U.S. arms industry--a function they still serve (see below). The results of this campaign were striking: between 1961 and 1967, U.S. arms sales increased sixfold--from \$300 million to \$1.8 billion annually.<sup>9</sup>

During the Kuss regime, the Pentagon's sales campaign was directed primarily at the developed nations of Western Europe, as well as Japan, Canada and Australia. Between 1962 and 1968, FMS sales to developed countries amounted to \$10.5 billion while sales to underdeveloped nations came to only \$1.1 billion.<sup>10</sup> As the 1960's progressed, however, the market for American military products in the developed nations began to shrink: worried that the increased sophistication of modern arms would lead to the

monopolization of weapons development by the Soviet Union and the United States, many European nations (and later Japan) expanded their own arms industries in order to be assured that they would not be "frozen out" of advanced military technologies. U.S. sales to developed countries reached a peak of \$1.6 billion in fiscal 1966, and then dropped to an average of \$900 million annually in the succeeding five years (see Chart A). In order to make up for this decline in foreign sales, the Pentagon began to encourage substantial arms purchases by the Third World nations dependent upon the U.S. for economic and military aid: no longer would our underdeveloped allies receive gratis the weapons we wanted them to have--instead they would be obliged to further tax their citizenry in order to pay for the military equipment we persuaded them to buy. As a result of a vigorous promotional campaign, FMS sales to underdeveloped countries rose from \$96 million in fiscal 1965 to \$1 billion in 1971--a 1,000 percent increase. (see Chart A).

Increased U.S. weapons sales to the Third World is a major component of President Nixon's military policy. Under pressure from an aroused public and a war-weary Congress, the Administration has been obliged to withdraw American combat troops from Asia and to reduce the rate of defense spending at home. In order to protect American interests abroad from the threat of armed liberation movements, Nixon has forced our client regimes in the Third World to purchase substantial quantities of U.S. arms and to supply mercenaries for U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations. The Administration's plan was spelled out by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in 1970 as follows:

**Table 1: Foreign Military Sales Trends, 1965-71**

[By fiscal year; dollars in millions]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	Total, 1965-71
FMS Sales to developed nations	1,147	1,556	966	784	1,170	688	834	7,145
FMS sales to underdeveloped nations	96	204	128	299	515	227	1,048	2,517
FMS sales to int'l organizations	6	25	34	30	34	19	15	163
TOTAL FMS SALES <sup>a</sup>	1,248	1,785	1,128	1,113	1,720	933	1,898	9,825
Commercial sales <sup>b</sup>	274	312	345	335	329	567	416	2,578
GRAND TOTAL, SALES	1,522	2,097	1,473	1,448	2,049	1,500	2,314	12,403
Total Military Assistance grants <sup>c</sup>	1,236	1,062	814	719	589	538	702	5,622
MAP grants to developing nations	1,042	965	678	640	584	538	702	5,149

<sup>a</sup>Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C.: 1971).

<sup>b</sup>Source: Department of States Bulletin, February 22, 1971, p. 226.

<sup>c</sup>Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Statistics and Reports, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Preliminary FY 1971 and Trend Data (Washington, D.C.: 1971).

The Nixon Doctrine places the Military Assistance Program and Foreign Military Sales in a special position in our foreign policy. It is now more important than ever that these two instruments of U.S. policy be put to optimum use in helping to reduce both the monetary and the manpower burden we now carry in honoring international obligations. I believe that the best hope of reducing our overseas involvements and expenditures lies in getting allied and friendly nations to do even more in their own defense. To realize that hope, however, requires that we must continue, if requested, to give or sell them the tools they need for this bigger load we are urging them to assume.

That is why, in the interests of maintaining an adequate defense posture at minimum cost, the growing use of credit-assisted sales of military equipment, as well as increased military assistance, seem clearly indicated for the immediate future.<sup>11</sup>

On the basis of this argument, Nixon in 1971 sought approval for the largest FMS program in United States history: \$510 million in credits and loan guarantees was requested to help finance total arms purchases estimated at \$2.15 billion--a 700 percent increase over the pre-1961 average of \$300 million a year and twice the average rate during the 1960's.



In its effort to increase arms sales to the developing areas, the Nixon Administration has had to overcome the resistance of a handful of Congressmen who--in an attempt to prevent more Vietnam-type wars--have sought to limit military exports to Third World nations. Led by Senators J.W. Fulbright and Stuart Symington of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee, these dissidents have been able to impose several restraints upon the FMS program. The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 limits annual arms exports to Latin America and Africa to \$75 million and \$40 million respectively, and suspends all U.S. economic and military aid to underdeveloped countries which divert an "excessive" amount of their resources to the acquisition of weapons. Amendments to the Foreign Military Sales Act and Foreign Assistance Act have further restricted the transfer of advanced military equipment (particularly supersonic aircraft) to Third World countries.<sup>12</sup>

The 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act and subsequent legislation constitute a significant obstacle to President Nixon's effort to increase arms sales to the Third World, and Administration officials have campaigned vigorously to overcome these restrictions. In a 1969 statement to the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Charles A. Meyer reported that "Latin Americans have become puzzled and even suspicious of our motives. Strong nationalist resentment has arisen over what is seen as United States efforts to infringe on the sovereign rights of a country to determine its own military requirements." While these countries would prefer to obtain American equipment for their armed forces, he argued, Congressional restraints on the sale of sophisticated weapons are forcing them to turn to more expensive European substitutes.<sup>13</sup> Since major sales agreements are normally accompanied by the provision of on-site training and technical assistance, the switch to European (or Soviet) producers would involve a corresponding decline in American influence upon the indigenous military. Backed by these arguments, the Administration is pressuring Congress to raise the ceilings on arms exports to Latin America and Africa. Meanwhile, not content to await the outcome of this legislative campaign, President Nixon in 1971 exercised his option, under Section 33c of the Foreign Military Sales Act, to waive the \$75 million ceiling on arms transfers to Latin America.<sup>14</sup>

#### U.S. ARMS SALES PROGRAMS

In its drive to secure increased exports of military hardware to the Third World, the Department of Defense can employ a variety of methods for consummating and financing such sales.

**FMS Credit Sales:** Under the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Pentagon is authorized to extend credit to underdeveloped nations for the

# U.S. ARMS SALES ABROAD<sup>a</sup>

## Defense Dept. Deliveries by Country, 1950-70<sup>b</sup>

[By fiscal year; dollars in millions]

Region & country	Deliveries, 1950-1970	Region & country	Deliveries, 1950-1970
<b>EAST ASIA &amp; PACIFIC, Total</b> .....	994.6	Liberia .....	1.2
Australia .....	605.1	Libya .....	23.5
China, Republic of .....	69.1	Mali .....	0.1
Indochina (1946-54) .....	7.9	Morocco .....	21.0
Indonesia .....	0.6	Nigeria .....	0.4
Japan .....	197.5	South Africa .....	2.8
Korea (South) .....	4.5	Sudan .....	1.5
Malaysia .....	15.1	Tunisia .....	2.9
New Zealand .....	65.4	United Arab Republic .....	0.4
Philippines .....	6.2		
Singapore .....	20.1	<b>LATIN AMERICA, Total</b> .....	395.2
Thailand .....	1.3	Argentina .....	79.4
Vietnam .....	**	Bolivia .....	0.9
Region* .....	1.8	Brazil .....	84.9
		Chile .....	32.8
<b>NEAR EAST &amp; SOUTH ASIA, Total</b> .....	1,458.5	Colombia .....	11.3
Ceylon .....	0.3	Costa Rica .....	0.9
Greece .....	29.1	Cuba (1950-60) .....	4.5
India .....	#	Dominican Republic .....	1.9
Iraq .....	12.9	Ecuador .....	4.3
Iran .....	450.7	El Salvador .....	1.5
Israel .....	#	Guatemala .....	2.7
Jordan .....	#	Haiti .....	0.2
Lebanon .....	#	Honduras .....	1.1
Pakistan .....	#	Jamaica .....	**
Saudi Arabia .....	#	Mexico .....	10.8
Turkey .....	5.2	Nicaragua .....	2.3
Region* .....	960.3	Panama .....	**
		Paraguay .....	0.4
<b>EUROPE, Total</b> .....	5,745.8	Peru .....	49.7
Austria .....	51.8	Uruguay .....	2.5
Belgium .....	115.0	Venezuela .....	103.1
Denmark .....	69.3		
France .....	312.3	<b>CANADA</b> .....	797.2
Germany .....	3,138.8	<b>INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS</b> .....	214.1
Italy .....	374.8		
Luxembourg .....	1.9	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b> .....	9,661.4
Netherlands .....	100.4		
Norway .....	146.1		
Portugal .....	7.9		
Spain .....	72.0		
Sweden .....	30.5		
Switzerland .....	103.8		
United Kingdom .....	1,209.5		
Yugoslavia .....	11.6		
<b>AFRICA, Total</b> .....	55.9		
Congo (Kinshasa) .....	1.5		
Ethiopia .....	0.7		
Ghana .....	0.1		

<sup>a</sup>Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C., 1971), pp. 22-23.

<sup>b</sup>Represents completed Department of Defense sales only; excludes sales by private concerns and prepaid orders if delivery had not been made by June 30, 1970.

# Classified data.

\* Includes figures for classified countries.

\*\* Less than \$50,000.



## Table 2: Military Sales by Region, 1950-72

[By Fiscal Year; dollars in millions]

	Total, 1950-64	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970 <sup>c</sup>	Estimated		Total, 1950-72		Grand Total 1950-72
								1971	1972	Cash Sales	Credit Sales	
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	445	268	174	135	164	158	173	259	245	1,546	462	2,008
NEAR EAST & S. ASIA	222	154	355	354	346	607	246	1,031	711	1,864	2,153	4,017
EUROPE & CANADA	4,015	793	1,181	525	522	863	472	500	1,029	9,786	110	9,896
AFRICA	9	6	2	38	3	21	7	21	18	73	53	125
LATIN AMERICA	267	22	47	43	48	36	16	72	144	313	377	690
INT'L ORGANIZATIONS	136	6	25	34	30	34	19	-	-	257	23	280
Unallocated credit	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	15	15
<b>TOTAL FMS SALES</b>	<b>5,095</b>	<b>1,248</b>	<b>1,785</b>	<b>1,128</b>	<b>1,113</b>	<b>1,720</b>	<b>933</b>	<b>1,898</b>	<b>2,146</b>	<b>13,838</b>	<b>3,193</b>	<b>17,031</b>

<sup>a</sup>Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts* (Washington, D.C.: 1971), p. 21.

<sup>b</sup>Department of Defense sales only - excludes direct sales by U.S. private firms.

<sup>c</sup>No FMS credits appropriated in fiscal year 1970.

purchase of American arms. Such funds must be appropriated by Congress, and when repaid, returned to the U.S. Treasury. Credit terms are generally favorable: interest rarely exceeds 6 percent annually, and up to 10 years are allowed for repayment. (Recently, the Pentagon has requested approval of "concessionary" credit terms--3 percent interest and 20 years to pay-- in order to further encourage purchases by Third World nations.)<sup>15</sup> Between 1950 and 1970, the Pentagon provided a total of \$1.86 billion in credits under the FMS program, and another \$1.34 billion is programmed for 1971-1972. (See Table 2 for a breakdown of FMS credits by region; credits to individual countries are provided in *NACLA Newsletter*, Vol. V, No. 2, April, 1971.)

**FMS Loan Guaranties:** In order to generate additional funds for purchase of U.S. weapons the Pentagon is authorized to guaranty loans by private banks and lending institutions to foreign governments for the purpose of obtaining American military goods. Under the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Department of Defense must maintain a reserve equivalent to 25 percent of all outstanding loans; funds for this purpose are voted annually by Congress. In the past, such guaranties have amounted to approximately \$100 million annually (entailing an appropriation of \$25 million for the reserve fund).

**FMS Cash Sales:** Under the Foreign Military Sales Act and other legislation, the Department of Defense is authorized to arrange direct government-to-government sales of American military hardware. Such sales totalled \$11.13 billion between 1950 and 1970, and were expected to reach \$13.84 billion by the end of fiscal 1972.

As can be seen in Table 2, Western Europe, Canada and Japan have been the largest customers for our military products.

**Export-Import Bank Loans:** Since 1963, the U.S. Government's Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has been authorized to serve as an agent for the Department of Defense by providing funds for the purchase of U.S. arms. Principal Eximbank borrowers have been the advanced nations of Western Europe--but Third World countries have also obtained funds from the bank under a program known as "Country-X" loans, in which the identity of the borrower was known only to the Department of Defense.<sup>16</sup> Country-X loans were prohibited by the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, and now the Eximbank is only allowed to make loans to developed countries. So far, six countries have made use of this service: Britain (\$810 million), Australia (\$614 million), Italy (\$153 million), Spain (\$120 million), New Zealand (\$55 million), and Austria (\$31 million); together, these countries have borrowed a total of \$1.78 billion from the Eximbank.<sup>17</sup>

**Direct Commercial Sales:** Under existing legislation, direct sales of military hardware by private U.S. firms to foreign governments are under the purview of the Department of State and Treasury. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 requires that firms wishing to engage in such trade must obtain a license from the State Department's Office of Munitions Control. Once a license has been issued (presumably after it has received the blessing of the Department of Defense), the Office has no authority to supervise a sales agreement or to publish reports of such transactions.<sup>18</sup> Total commercial sales for 1962-69 amounted to \$3.5 billion,

while sales for 1970-71 came to an estimated \$983 million.<sup>19</sup> Europe, Canada and Japan accounted for the bulk of such purchases.

**Licensed Overseas Production:** The 1954 Mutual Security Act and associated legislation enable the State Department's Office of Munitions Control to permit private U.S. firms to sell licenses for the overseas production of American arms by foreign firms or governments. Such transactions can involve merely the sale of blueprints, or the construction of entire munitions factories (an example of the latter is the arrangement whereby Colt Industries, Inc. will supply equipment for and supervise construction of an M-16 rifle assembly plant in South Korea). Recent licensing agreements involve the production of Sikorsky CH-53G Sea Stallion helicopters in West Germany, and McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers in Japan. (see Appendix).

**"Third Country" Arrangements:** Occasionally, the United States will permit a foreign government to sell its U.S.-supplied weapons to another country, or a private U.S. firm to arrange for the licensed production of U.S. arms in one country for sale to another country. Thus, Boeing-Vertol CH-47C Chinook helicopters now being assembled in Italy are eventually destined for sale to Iran. Such third-country transactions are often employed when direct American sales would prove embarrassing to the U.S. Government. United States regulations require that all third-country deals receive the approval of the U.S. Government; needless to say, such

mandates are extremely difficult to enforce while in many cases, there is no desire to enforce them. Thus a study team organized by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported in 1967 that some North American F-86 Sabre fighters manufactured under license in Canada for use by the West German air force and later "sold" to Iran had ultimately wound up in the hands of Pakistan despite an "official" U.S. policy of halting arms transfers to that country.<sup>20</sup>

Actual sales and credit agreements under these various programs for the years 1965-71 are summarized in Table 1, "Trends in Foreign Military Sales," and in Table 2, "Foreign Military Sales Summary by Region." During this period, FSM sales to underdeveloped countries rose steadily from \$96 million in fiscal 1965 to \$1.05 billion in 1971, amounting to a total of \$2.5 billion for the entire period (the dramatic increase in FMS sales to Third World nations is indicated in Chart A). Military Assistance Program grant aid declined in these years from \$1.24 billion in fiscal 1965 to \$680 million in 1971; total MAP aid during this period amounted to \$5.6 billion, or less than half the amount of sales. (The shift in emphasis from grant aid to FMS sales is vividly demonstrated in Table B.) As can be seen in the Appendix, the principal beneficiaries of the growing sales program are the aerospace companies which produce the jet fighters, transport planes, light aircraft, and helicopters currently sought by foreign armed forces. (For a list of major U.S. arms transfers 1968-1972, see Appendix.)


#### THE U.S. SALES APPARATUS



In order to provide greater coordination of U.S. military export programs at the command level, President Nixon on August 11, 1971, created the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) as the sixth Defense-wide management organization (other such organizations are the Defense Supply Agency, Defense Communications Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency). DSAA assumed most of the functions of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance and Sales (the successor to the International Logistics Negotiations Office originally headed by Henry Kuss), which had shared authority over the FMS program with the sales agencies of the separate services. The new head of DSAA, Army Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious II, has direct access to the Secretary of Defense as well as increased authority over the service sales agencies. The new Agency's charter (embodied in Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.38) specifies that, among other functions, DSAA will:

-- Conduct international logistics and sale negotiations with foreign countries, as directed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary

Chart A: FMS SALES TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES VS. FMS SALES TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

[By fiscal year; amounts in millions]



 FMS sales to developed nations  
 FMS sales to underdeveloped nations

of Defense (Installations and Logistics).  
 -- Maintain liason with and assist U.S. industry in the export of military supplies, equipment and services.  
 -- Manage governmental and government-supported private sources of credit financing of foreign military sales.<sup>21</sup>

If the Director of DSAA is the Pentagon's "Vice-President and General Manager for sales," then the principal salesmen in the field are the military advisors assigned to U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) in 45 countries. MAAG personnel are specifically charged with the responsibility to "further the sale of U.S.-produced military equipment to meet valid requirements."<sup>22</sup> MAAG functions under the FMS program include supplying the Pentagon with data on host country capabilities, resources and requirements, and acting as a go-between for the host country and the U.S. Government in processing and implementing sales transactions. Specifically, the MAAG's are enjoined with the responsibility to:

- Analyze and survey potential needs and requirements of the country, keeping higher logistics headquarters informed, and requesting [data on the] availability (or future availability) of U.S. material that could be sold to meet these needs.
- As appropriate, develop plans and programs to demonstrate and promote the sale of such available (and future available) material to the country.
- Work directly with military departments and appropriate military area commands in arranging for receipt and transfer of military sales material, training and services.
- Provide assistance to the country in preparation of purchase or loan requests.<sup>23</sup>


The wealth of information supplied to Pentagon salesmen in Washington by MAAG personnel gives the United States a distinct competitive advantage when negotiating for the sale of American equipment. As noted by the Arms Control Project of MIT's Center for International Studies, "it can also be suggested that any state interested in selling its arms to other countries is at a tremendous advantage when it has military advisors capable of providing sales information in such detail assigned to advise its potential sales customers."<sup>24</sup> Under current Department of Defense regulations, U.S. military advisors are also mandated to cooperate with private industry in promoting the sales of American arms abroad. Thus the Air Force manual on Military Assistance Sales indicates: "When directed by appropriate authority, [MAAG personnel will] cooperate with representatives of specified U.S. firms in furthering sales of U.S.-produced military equipment to meet valid country requirements."<sup>25</sup> Not only are the MAAG's enjoined to provide private firms with information, but also to actively promote such commercial sales: the same manual notes that it is U.S. Air Force (USAF) policy "to encourage direct transactions

between eligible recipients and U.S. manufacturers or suppliers, for defense articles and services which are not available from USAF stocks or resources."<sup>26</sup> Concluding that significant host country purchases of U.S. arms will win Washington's approval and thus advance their careers, many MAAG officers develop a personal interest in the FMS program, and thus, as noted by the MIT Arms control Project, generate independent momentum for the sales effort.<sup>27</sup>

In their efforts to further the sale of American weapons to the Third World, MAAG personnel benefit from the program which sends thousands of Third World military personnel to armed forces schools in the United States and the Panama Canal Zone every year for training in various military specialties. Between 1950 and 1970, 319,000 foreign military officers and enlisted men received training at schools in the United States and at U.S. bases abroad. Of this number, the great majority came from Third World countries: thus Latin America accounted for 54,000 men, East Asia 144,000 and the Near East 50,000.<sup>28</sup> Although ostensibly this program is designed to improve the defense capabilities of underdeveloped countries, a very real--if unspoken--goal is to inculcate a familiarity with, and appetite for, American-produced weapons. In supporting this program, Pentagon officials calculate that when such students return to their country, they will request purchases of the American equipment they had become accustomed to using in training exercises. It is argued, for instance, that Latin American pilots

Chart B: MILITARY ASSISTANCE GRANT AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES VS. FMS SALES TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1965-71

[By fiscal year; amounts in millions]



who receive technical instruction at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Albrook Air Force Base in the Canal Zone will naturally seek to fly in American planes (the kinds they are most familiar with) when they rejoin their own air forces.<sup>29</sup>

In summarizing the Government's arguments on behalf of the Foreign Military Sales program, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke commented in 1968 that "in a perfect world we wouldn't have to deal with arms sales. But we are no more in a position to discontinue our supply of arms to our friends than we are in a position to disarm unilaterally, and I think in effect if we were to foreclose our sales of military equipment... to our friends throughout the world, we are disarming ourselves." Warnke went on to suggest:

In many instances these are the cheapest defense dollars that we spend. By equipping

the indigenous people to contribute to their own defense and hence to the defense of the free world, we make it unnecessary for ourselves to get directly involved in [Vietnam-type] situations. Hopefully, we will be able at some point to talk with the Soviets both about the mutual disarmament and about control over arms races. Until that day comes, however, I believe it is absolutely essential that we retain the ability to supply those countries that are willing to work with us toward a program of collective security.<sup>30</sup>

Since, as we have seen, the United States Government is determined to expand weapons sales to the Third World in order to further enrich the U.S. arms industry while arming America's client regimes, it is unlikely that the day will come soon when the United States will cooperate in the control of overseas arms races.

Michael Klare

## Notes

### NOTES


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3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: Armquist & Wiksell, 1971), p. 9. (Hereinafter cited as Arms Trade/3rd World.)
4. George Thayer, "American Arms Abroad," The Washington Monthly, January, 1970, p. 63.
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6. For discussion of these programs, see: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Arms Sales and Foreign Policy, Staff Study, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 1967, pp. 5-7; and Arms Trade/3rd World, pp. 171-4.
7. Cited in U.S. Department of the Air Force, Military Assistance Sales, Air Force Manual 400-3 (Washington, D.C.: 1966), pp. 2-3.
8. Quoted in Peter T. Chew, "Purveying Weapons to World's 'Needy,'" National Observer, February 16, 1970.
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17. U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Statistics and Reports, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1970 (Washington, D.C.: 1971).
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22. U.S. Military Assistance Institute, "MAAG Duties," Memorandum, December 3, 1964, cited in James Refson, U.S. Military Training and Advice: Implications for Arms Transfer Policies, Arms Control Project, Center for International Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1970), p. 10. (The MIT study is hereinafter cited as Military Training and Advice.)
23. U.S. Department of the Army, General Policies and Principles for Furnishing Defense Articles and Services on a Sale or Loan Basis, Army Regulation 795-2-4, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1966, cited in Military Training and Advice, p. 42.
24. Military Training and Advice, p. 46.
25. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Manual 400-3, *op. cit.*, p. 2-3.
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27. Military Training and Advice, pp. 49-50.
28. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington D.C.: 1971), p. 15.
29. For discussion of U.S. training programs for Latin Americans, see: Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1966); Michael Klare, "U.S. Military Operations - Latin America," NACLA Newsletter, II (October, 1968), p. 1-8; and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Reports of the Special Study Mission to Latin America, Committee Print, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970.
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# U.S. Bases & Forces Abroad

As of January 1, 1972, the United States had some 875,000 servicemen stationed abroad, out of a total armed strength of approximately 2.5 million men. In addition to uniformed personnel, there are some 26,000 U.S. civilians, 300,000 dependents and 225,000 foreign nationals attached to U.S. overseas installations. (See list of U.S. Military Bases Abroad in Appendix for breakdown by country of U.S. troops stationed overseas.)

The United States currently maintains over 2,250 military installations and bases abroad (not including bases in South Vietnam and Laos, which number in the hundreds), of which some 400 are designated "major" bases. "Major" installations are defined by the Pentagon as bases "which are large in number of acres occupied or personnel accommodated, or which represent a high acquisition cost to the United States Government, or which are used in support of a principal U.S. military activity or mission." Major bases include large airfields, shipyards and fleet facilities, principal headquarters and command centers, large communications facilities, and troop training and housing complexes. "Minor" installations include navigational aids and radar posts, small communications facilities, and small administrative buildings supporting incidental activities; military missions and military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) are also included in this category.

As part of an ongoing NACLA study of overseas U.S. military bases, programs and activities, we include here two documents on U.S. forces abroad: "The Sun Never Sets on America's Empire," from Commonweal (May 22, 1970); and a list of U.S. Military Bases Abroad. Since no such listings can ever be considered complete, we invite readers to submit additional information, corrections, etc. on U.S. bases and operations abroad.



## 22. Haiti 1959-1963

### The Marines land, again

"Duvalier has performed an economic miracle," remarked a Haitian of his country's dictator. "He has taught us to live without money ... to eat without food ... to live without life."<sup>1</sup>

And when Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier's voodoo magic wore thin, he could always count on the US Marines to continue his people's education.

During the night of 12-13 August 1959, a boat landed on the northern coast of Haiti with a reported 30 men, Haitians and Cubans and perhaps others aboard. The men had set sail from Cuba some 50 miles away. Their purpose was to overthrow the tyrannical Haitian government, a regime whose secret police, it was said, outnumbered its army.

In short order, the raiding party, equipped with heavy weapons, captured a small army post and began to recruit and arm villagers for the cause.<sup>2</sup> The government reported that about 200 persons had joined them.<sup>3</sup> Haitian exiles in Venezuela, in an apparently coordinated effort, broadcast appeals to their countrymen to aid the invaders. They set at 120 the number of men who had landed in Haiti, although this appears to be an exaggeration.<sup>4</sup>

The initial reaction of the Duvalier government was one of panic, and the police began rounding up opposition sympathizers.<sup>5</sup> It was at this point that the US military mission, in Haiti to train Duvalier's forces, stepped in. The Americans instituted an air and sea reconnaissance to locate the rebels. Haitian soldiers, accompanied by US Marines, were airlifted to the area and went into the field to do battle with them.<sup>6</sup> Two other US Navy planes and a helicopter arrived from Puerto Rico.<sup>7</sup>

According to their commander, Col. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., the American Marines took part in the fighting, which lasted until 22 August.<sup>8</sup> The outcome was a complete rout of the rebel forces.

Information about the men who came from Cuba derives almost exclusively from the Haitian government and the American military mission. These sources claim that the raiding party was composed of about 30 men and that, with the exception of one or two Haitians who led them, they were all Cubans. Another report, referred to in the *New York Times*, stated that there were ten Haitians and two Venezuelans amongst the 30 invaders.<sup>9</sup> The latter ratio is probably closer to the truth, for there was a considerable number of Haitian exiles living in Cuba, many of whom had gained military experience during the recent Cuban revolution; for obvious reasons of international politics and fighting incentive, such men were the most likely candidates to be part of an invasion of their homeland.

The Castro government readily admitted that the raiding party had come from Cuba but denied that the government had known or approved of it. This claim would seem rather suspect were it not for the fact that the Cuban coast guard had thwarted a similar undertaking in April.<sup>10</sup>

The first members of the American military mission had arrived in Haiti in January, largely in response to another invasion attempt the previous July (originating probably in the Dominican Republic). Regardless of all the horror stories about the Haitian regime—such as the one Col. Heinl tells of his 12-year-old son being arrested when he was overheard expressing sympathy for a group of hungry peasants he saw—Duvalier was Washington's man. After all was said and done, he could be counted upon to keep his Black nation, which was usually accorded the honor of being Latin America's poorest, from turning Red. Heinl has recounted the instructions he received from a State Department Under Secretary in January:

Colonel, the most important way you can support our objectives in Haiti is to help keep Duvalier in power so he can serve out his full term in office, and maybe a little longer than that if everything works out.<sup>11</sup>

The Kennedy administration, which came to power in January 1961, had little use for Papa Doc, and supported his overthrow as well as his possible assassination. According to the later testimony of CIA official Walter Elder before a Senate investigating committee, the Agency furnished arms to Haitian dissidents seeking to topple the dictator. Elder added that while the assassination of Duvalier was not contemplated, the arms were provided "to help [the dissidents] take what measures were deemed necessary to replace the government," and it was realized, he said, that Duvalier might be killed in the course of the overthrow.<sup>12</sup>

But as Cuba increasingly became the United States' *bête noire*, the CIA's great obsession, Washington's policy changed. Haiti's cooperation was needed for the success of US efforts to have Cuba expelled from the Organization of American States in 1963. From that point on, Duvalier enjoyed the full diplomatic and economic support of the US. When the

Haitian leader died on 12 April 1971, the American Ambassador Clinton Knox was the only diplomat present at the midnight swearing-in of 19-year-old Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier as the new President for Life, who was to receive the same economic, political and military support as had "Papa Doc", with only the occasional hiccup of a protest from Washington when the level of repression became difficult to ignore.<sup>13</sup>



## 23. Guatemala 1960

### One good coup deserves another

In November 1960, as John F. Kennedy was preparing to succeed Dwight Eisenhower, the obsessive priority of American foreign policy—to invade Cuba—proceeded without pause. On the beaches and in the jungles of Guatemala, Nicaragua and Florida, the Bay of Pigs invasion was being rehearsed.

On the 13th of the month, five days after Kennedy's victory, Guatemalan military personnel broke out in armed rebellion against the government of General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, seizing two military bases and the port city of Puerto Barrios. Reports of the number of officers involved in the uprising vary from 45 to 120, the latter figure representing almost half the Guatemalan Army's officer corps. The officers commanded as many as 3,000 troops, a significant percentage of the armed forces. Their goals, it later developed, were more nationalistic than ideological. The officers were fed up with the corruption in the Ydigoras regime and in the army, and were particularly incensed about the use of their country by a foreign power as a springboard for an invasion of Cuba, some of them being admirers of Fidel Castro for his nationalist policies. One of the dissident officers later characterized the American training base in Guatemala as "a shameful violation of our national sovereignty. And why was it permitted? Because our government is a puppet."<sup>1</sup>

The rebellion was crushed within a matter of days, reportedly by the sole power of the Guatemalan Air Force. Some years later, a different picture was to emerge.

The rebels were a force to be reckoned with. The ease with which they had taken over the two garrisons and the real possibility of their mutiny spreading to other bases set alarms ringing at the CIA base, a large coffee plantation in a remote corner of southwestern Guatemala, where the Agency and the US Air Force were training the army of Cuban exiles who were to launch the attack upon their homeland. The CIA feared, and rightly so, that a new regime would send them, the Cubans, and the whole operation packing.

In Washington, President Eisenhower ordered US naval and air units to patrol the Caribbean coast and "shoot if necessary" to prevent any "communist-led" invasion of Guatemala or Nicaragua.<sup>2</sup> Eisenhower, like Ydigoras, saw the hand of international communism, particularly Cuba, behind the uprising, although no evidence of this was ever presented.<sup>3</sup> It was all most ironic in light of the fact that it was the conspiracy of the two leaders to overthrow Cuba that was one of the reasons for the uprising; and that the US naval fleet ordered into action was deployed from Guantánamo Naval Base in Cuba, an American military installation present in that country against the vociferous objections of the Cuban government.

In Guatemala, meanwhile, the CIA decided upon a solution to the dilemma that was both remarkably simple and close at hand: American and Cuban pilots took off from their training ground and bombed and strafed rebel headquarters outside Guatemala City, and bombed the town and airfield of Puerto Barrios. Caught completely by surprise, and defenseless against this superior force, the rebels' insurrection collapsed.<sup>4</sup>

Back at the coffee plantation, the CIA resumed the function which had been so rudely interrupted, the preparation for the overthrow of the Cuban government.

No announcement about the bombings was made in Washington, nor did a report appear in the American press.

The CIA actions were probably not widely known about in Guatemala either, but it

became public knowledge that President Ydigoras had asked Washington for the naval and air support, and had even instructed the Guatemalan Ambassador in Washington to "Get in touch immediately with [Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs] Thomas Mann to coordinate your action."<sup>5</sup> Thus it was that the Guatemalan president, needing afterward to distance himself a little from so much Yankee protection, was moved to state that countries like Guatemala are at a disadvantage because "Cuba is a satellite of powerful Russia", but "we are not a satellite of the United States."<sup>6</sup>

The final irony was that some of the dissident officers who went into hiding became more radicalized by their experience. During their revolt they had spurned offers of support from some of the peasants—though this would necessarily have been very limited in any case—because fighting for social change was not at all what the officers had in mind at the time. But as fugitives, thrown into greater contact with the peasants, they eventually came to be moved by the peasants' pressing need for land and for a way out of their wretched existence.<sup>7</sup> In 1962, several of the officers were to emerge as leaders of a guerrilla movement which incorporated "November Thirteen" as part of its name. In their opening statement, the guerrillas declared:

Democracy vanished from our country long ago. No people can live in a country where there is no democracy. That is why the demand for changes is mounting in our country. We can no longer carry on in this way. We must overthrow the Ydigoras government and set up a government which represents human rights, seeks ways and means to save our country from its hardships, and pursues a serious self-respecting foreign policy.<sup>8</sup>

A simple sentiment, stated even simpler, but, as we shall see, a movement fated to come up against the wishes of the United States. For if Washington could casually do away with an elected government in Guatemala, as it had in 1954, it could be moved by a guerrilla army only as rocks by waves or the moon by howling wolves.

## 24. France/Algeria 1960s

### *L'état, c'est la CIA*

When John F. Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, he was confronted with a CIA at the zenith of its power and credibility. In the Agency's first 14 years, no formal congressional investigation of it had taken place, nor had any "watchdog" committee been established; four investigations of the CIA by independent task forces during this period had ensured that everything relating to things covert remained just that; with the exception of the U-2 incident the year before, no page-one embarrassments, scandals, or known failures; what had received a measure of publicity—the coups in Guatemala and Iran—were widely regarded as CIA success stories. White House denials and a compliant media had kept the Agency's misadventure in Indonesia in 1958 from the public scrutiny it deserved.

It is probable that the CIA had more staff officers overseas, under official and unofficial covers, than the State Department, and this in addition to its countless paid agents. Often the CIA Chief of Station had been in a particular country longer than the American ambassador, had more money at his disposal, and exerted more influence. When it suited their purposes, Agency officers would completely bypass the ambassador and normal protocol to deal directly with the country's head of state and other high officials.

The CIA had its own military capabilities, including its own air force; for all intents and purposes, its own foreign service with, indeed, its own foreign policy, though never at cross-purposes with fundamental US cold-war, anti-communist ideology and goals.

Seemingly without fear of exposure or condemnation, the Agency felt free to carry out sundry Dr. Strangelove experiments involving control of the human mind and all manner of biochemical weapons, including the release of huge amounts of bacteria into the air in the United States which resulted in much illness and a number of deaths.

It was all very heady stuff for the officers of the CIA, playing their men's games with their boys' toys. They recognized scarcely any limitation upon their freedom of action. British colonial governors they were, and all the world was India.

Then, in mid-April, came the disaster at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. The international repercussions had barely begun to subside when the Agency was again catapulted into world headlines. On 22 April four French generals in Algeria seized power in an attempt to maintain the country's union with France. The *putsch*, which held out but four days, was a direct confrontation with French President Charles de Gaulle, who had dramatically proclaimed a policy leading "not to an Algeria governed from France, but to an Algerian Algeria".

The next day, the leftist Italian newspaper, *Il Paese*, stated that "It is not by chance that some people in Paris are accusing the American secret service headed by Allen Dulles of having participated in the plot of the four 'ultra' generals."<sup>1</sup>

Whether *Il Paese* was the original source of this charge remains a mystery. Dulles himself later wrote that the Italian daily was "one of the first to launch it" (emphasis added). He expressed the opinion that "This particular myth was a Communist plant, pure and simple."<sup>2</sup>

The *New York Times* reported that the rumors apparently began circulating by word of mouth on the day of the *putsch*,<sup>3</sup> a report echoed by the *Washington Star* which added that some of the rumors were launched "by minor officials at the Elysée Palace itself" who gave reporters "to understand that the generals' plot was backed by strongly anti-communist elements in the United States Government and military services."<sup>4</sup>

Whatever its origins, the story spread rapidly around the world, and the French Foreign Office refused to refute the allegation. *Le Monde* asserted in a front-page editorial on 28 April that "the behavior of the United States during the recent crisis was not particularly skillful. It seems established that American agents more or less encouraged Challe [the leader of the *putsch*] ... President Kennedy, of course, knew nothing of all this."<sup>5</sup>

Reports from all sources were in agreement that if the CIA had indeed been involved in the *putsch*, it had been so for two reasons: (1) the concern that if Algeria were granted its independence, "communists" would soon come to power, being those in the ranks of the National Liberation Front (NLF) which had been fighting the French Army in Algeria for several years—the legendary Battle of Algiers. It was with the NLF that de Gaulle was expected to negotiate a settlement; (2) the hope that it would precipitate the downfall of de Gaulle, an end desired because the French President was a major stumbling block to US aspirations concerning NATO: among other things, he refused to incorporate French troops into an integrated military command, and he opposed exclusive American control over the alliance's nuclear weapons.

By all accounts, it appears that the rebel officers had counted on support from important military and civilian quarters in France to extend the rebellion to the home country and overthrow de Gaulle. Fanciful as this may sound, the fact remains that the French government took the possibility seriously—French Premier Michel Debré went on television to

warn the nation of an imminent paratroop invasion of the Paris area and to urge mass opposition.<sup>6</sup>

Reaction in the American press to the allegations had an unmistakably motley quality. *Washington Post* columnist Marquis Childs said that the French were so shocked by the generals' coup that they had to find a scapegoat. At the same time he quoted "one of the highest officials of the French government" as saying:

Of course, your government, neither your State Department nor your President, had anything to do with this. But when you have so many hundreds of agents in every part of the world, it is not to be wondered at that some of them should have got in touch with the generals in Algiers.<sup>7</sup>

*Time* magazine discounted the story, saying too that the United States was being made a scapegoat and that the CIA had become a "favorite target in recent weeks".<sup>8</sup>

James Reston wrote in the *New York Times* that the CIA:

was involved in an embarrassing liaison with the anti-Gaullist officers who staged last week's insurrection in Algiers ... [the Bay of Pigs and Algerian events have] increased the feeling in the White House that the CIA has gone beyond the bounds of an objective intelligence-gathering agency and has become the advocate of men and policies that have embarrassed the Administration.<sup>9</sup>

However, C.L. Sulzberger, who had been the man at the *New York Times* closest to the CIA since its founding, stated flatly that "No American in Algeria had to do with any insurrectional leader ... No consular employee saw any rebel." (A few days later, though, Secretary of State Dean Rusk disclosed that an emissary of the rebellious French generals had visited the US Consulate in Algiers to request aid but had been summarily rebuffed.)

The affair, wrote Sulzberger, was "a deliberate effort to poison Franco-American relationships" begun in Moscow but abetted by "anti-American French officials" and "naive persons in Washington ... When one checks, one finds all this began in a Moscow *Izvestia* article April 25."<sup>10</sup> This last, as we have seen, was incorrect.

Dean of American columnists, Walter Lippmann, who had seen de Gaulle in Paris shortly before the *putsch*, wrote:

the reason why the French Government has not really exculpated the CIA of encouraging the Algerian rebel generals is that it was already so angry with the CIA for meddling in French internal politics. The French grievance, justified or not, has to do with recent French legislation for the French nuclear weapon, and the alleged effort of CIA agents to interfere with that legislation.<sup>11</sup>

*Newsweek* repeated the claim that it was "French officials" who had been "the main sources" of the rumors in the first place. When challenged by the American administration the French denied their authorship and tended to soften the charges. Some French officials eventually declared the matter to be closed, though they still failed to explicitly rule out the allegations about American involvement.<sup>12</sup>

In early May 1961, *L'Express*, the widely-read French liberal weekly, published what was perhaps the first detailed account of the mysterious affair. Their Algerian correspondent, Claude Krief, reported:<sup>13</sup>

Both in Paris and Washington the facts are now known, though they will never be publicly admitted. In private, the highest French personalities make no secret of it. What they say is this: "The CIA played a direct part in the Algiers coup, and certainly weighed heavily on the decision taken by ex-general Challe to start his *putsch*."

Not long before, Challe had held the position of NATO Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe, as a result of which he had been in daily contact with US military officers.<sup>14</sup> Krief wrote that certain American officials in NATO and the Pentagon had encouraged Challe, and that the general had several meetings with CIA officers who told him that "to get rid of de Gaulle would render the Free World a great service". Krief noted that Challe, despite an overweening ambition, was very cautious and serious-minded: "All the people who know him well, are deeply convinced that he had been encouraged by the CIA to go ahead."

At a luncheon in Washington the previous year, Jacques Soustelle, the former Governor-General of Algeria who had made public his disagreement with de Gaulle's Algeria policy, had met with CIA officials, including Richard Bissell, head of covert operations. Soustelle convinced the Agency officials, according to Krief, that Algeria would become, through de Gaulle's blundering, "a Soviet base". This luncheon became something of a *cause célèbre* in the speculation concerning the CIA's possible role. The *New York Times* and others reported that it had been given by the Agency for Soustelle.<sup>15</sup> US officials, however, insisted that the luncheon had been arranged by someone at the French Embassy at Soustelle's request. This French official, they said, had been present throughout the meeting and thus there could have been no dark conspiracy.<sup>16</sup> Why the French Embassy would host a luncheon for a prominent and bitter foe of de Gaulle, a man who only two months earlier had been kicked out of de Gaulle's cabinet for his "ultra" sympathies, was not explained. Nor, for that matter, why in protocol-minded Washington of all places, the CIA would attend. In any event, it seems somewhat fatuous to imply that this was the only chance Soustelle and the CIA had to talk during his stay in the United States, which lasted more than a week.

A clandestine meeting in Madrid also received wide currency within the controversy. Krief dates it 12 April 1961, and describes it as a meeting of "various foreign agents, including members of the CIA and the Algiers conspirators, who disclosed their plans to the CIA men". The Americans were reported to have angrily complained that de Gaulle's policy was "paralyzing NATO and rendering the defense of Europe impossible", and assured the generals that if they and their followers succeeded, Washington would recognize the new Algerian Government within 48 hours.

It may well be that the French Government did have evidence of the CIA's complicity. But in the unnatural world of international diplomacy, this would not necessarily lead to an unambiguous public announcement. Such a move could result in an open confrontation between France and the United States, a predicament both sides could be expected to take pains to avoid. Moreover, it might put the French in the position of having to *do* something about it. And what could they do? Breaking relations with the United States was not a realistic option; neither were the French in any position to retaliate economically or militarily. But French leaders were too angry to simply let the matter pass into obscurity. Thus, to complete the hypothetical scenario, they took the backdoor approach with all its shortcomings.

In a similar vein, the United States knew that the Russians, for at least one year, were intercepting telephone calls in the US of government and congressional officials, but said nothing publicly because it was unable to end the practice for technical reasons.<sup>17</sup> And this concerned an "enemy", not an ally.

Between 1958 and the middle of the 1960s, there occurred some 30 serious assassination attempts upon the life of Charles de Gaulle, in addition to any number of planned attempts which didn't advance much beyond the planning stage.<sup>18</sup> A world record for a

head of state, it is said. In at least one of the attempts, the CIA may have been a co-conspirator against the French president. By the mid-1960s, differences between de Gaulle and Washington concerning NATO had almost reached the breaking point; in February 1966, he gave NATO and the United States a deadline to either place their military bases in France under French control or dismantle them.

In 1975, the *Chicago Tribune* featured a front-page story which read in part:

Congressional leaders have been told of Central Intelligence Agency involvement in a plot by French dissidents to assassinate the late French President Charles De Gaulle. Within the last two weeks, a CIA representative disclosed sketchy details of the scheme ... Sometime in the mid-1960s—probably in 1965 or 1966—dissidents in the De Gaulle government are said to have made contact with the CIA to seek help in a plot to murder the French leader. Which party instigated the contact was not clear ... According to the CIA briefing officer, discussions were held on how best to eliminate De Gaulle, who by then had become a thorn in the side of the Johnson administration because of his ouster of American military bases from French soil and his demands that United States forces be withdrawn from the Indochina War. Thus the following plan is said to have evolved after discussions between CIA personnel and the dissident French. There is, however, no evidence the plot got beyond the talking stage.

A hired assassin, armed with a poison ring, was to be slipped into a crowd of old soldiers of France when General De Gaulle was to be the host at a reception for them. The killer would make his appearance late in the day when it could be presumed De Gaulle's hand would be weary and perhaps even numb from shaking hundreds of hands. The assassin would clasp the general's hand in lethal friendship and De Gaulle would fail to detect the tiny pin prick of poison as it penetrated his flesh. The executioner would stroll off to become lost in the crowd as the poison began coursing through De Gaulle's veins either to his heart or brain, depending on the deadly poison used. How quickly death would come was not divulged, if that was even discussed at the time ...

In the outline presented to the congressional leaders, there is no hint of what the CIA's actual role might have been had the plot reached fruition.<sup>19</sup>

The dissidents involved in the alleged plot were embittered French army officers and former Algerian settlers who still bore deep resentment toward de Gaulle for having "sold out French honor" by his retreat from the North African colony.

There was no mention in the reported CIA testimony about any involvement of Lyndon Johnson, although it was well known that there was no love lost between Johnson and de Gaulle. The French leader was firmly convinced that the United States was behind the failure of his trip to South America in 1964. He believed that the CIA had used its network of agents in South America to prevent a big turnout of crowds.<sup>20</sup> There is some evidence to indicate that the General was not just paranoid. In 1970, Dr Alfred Stepan, a professor of political science at Yale, testified before Congress about his experience in South America in 1964 when he was a journalist for *The Economist*.

When De Gaulle was going to make his trip through Latin America, many of the Latin Americans interviewed [officers of various embassies] said that they were under very real pressure by various American groups not to be very warm towards De Gaulle, because we considered Latin America within the United States area of influence.<sup>21</sup>

After the appearance of the *Chicago Tribune* story, CIA Director William Colby confirmed that "foreigners" had approached the Agency with a plot to kill de Gaulle. The Agency rejected the idea, Colby said, but he did not know if the French government had been advised of the plot.<sup>22</sup> It is not clear whether the incident referred to by Colby was related to the one discussed in the *Tribune*.

In the early evening of Monday, 9 November 1970, Charles de Gaulle died peacefully at the age of 80, sitting in his armchair watching a sentimental television serial called "Nanou".

## 25. Ecuador 1960-1963

### A textbook of dirty tricks

If the *Guinness Book of World Records* included a category for "cynicism", one could suggest the CIA's creation of "leftist" organizations which condemned poverty, disease, illiteracy, capitalism, and the United States in order to attract committed militants and their money away from legitimate leftist organizations.

The tiny nation of Ecuador in the early 1960s was, as it remains today, a classic of banana-republic underdevelopment; virtually at the bottom of the economic heap in South America; a society in which one percent of the population received an income comparable to United States upper-class standards, while two-thirds of the people had an average family income of about ten dollars per month—people simply outside the money economy, with little social integration or participation in the national life; a tale told many times in Latin America.

In September 1960, a new government headed by José María Velasco Ibarra came to power. Velasco had won a decisive electoral victory, running on a vaguely liberal, populist, something-for-everyone platform. He was no Fidel Castro, he was not even a socialist, but he earned the wrath of the US State Department and the CIA by his unyielding opposition to the two stated priorities of American policy in Ecuador: breaking relations with Cuba, and clamping down hard on activists of the Communist Party and those to their left.

Over the next three years, in pursuit of those goals, the CIA left as little as possible to chance. A veritable textbook on covert subversion techniques unfolded. In its pages could be found the following, based upon the experiences of Philip Agee, a CIA officer who spent this period in Ecuador.<sup>1</sup>

Almost all political organizations of significance, from the far left to the far right, were infiltrated, often at the highest levels. Amongst other reasons, the left was infiltrated to channel young radicals away from support to Cuba and from anti-Americanism; the right, to instigate and co-ordinate activities along the lines of CIA priorities. If, at a point in time, there was no organization that appeared well-suited to serve a particular need, then one would be created.

Or a new group of "concerned citizens" would appear, fronted with noted personalities, which might place a series of notices in leading newspapers denouncing the penetration of the government by the extreme left and demanding a break with Cuba. Or one of the noted personalities would deliver a speech prepared by the CIA, and then a newspaper editor, or a well-known columnist, would praise it, both gentlemen being on the CIA payroll.

Some of these fronts had an actual existence; for others, even their existence was phoney. On one occasion, the CIA Officer who had created the non-existent "Ecuadorean Anti-Communist Front" was surprised to read in his morning paper that a real organization with that name had been founded. He changed the name of his organization to "Ecuadorean Anti-Communist Action".

Wooing the working class came in for special emphasis. An alphabet-soup of labor organizations, sometimes hardly more than names on stationery, were created, altered, combined, liquidated, and new ones created again, in an almost frenzied attempt to find the right combination to compete with existing left-oriented unions and take national leadership away from them. Union leaders were invited to attend various classes conducted by the CIA in Ecuador or in the United States, all expenses paid, in order to impart to them the dangers of communism to the union movement and to select potential agents.



This effort was not without its irony either. CIA agents would sometimes jealously vie with each other for the best positions in these CIA-created labor organizations; and at times Ecuadorean organizations would meet in "international conferences" with CIA labor fronts from other countries, with almost all of the participants blissfully unaware of who was who or what was what.

In Ecuador, as throughout most of Latin America, the Agency planted phoney anti-communist news items in co-operating newspapers. These items would then be picked up by other CIA stations in Latin America and disseminated through a CIA-owned news agency, a CIA-owned radio station, or through countless journalists being paid on a piece-work basis, in addition to the item being picked up unwittingly by other media, including those in the United States. Anti-communist propaganda and news distortion (often of the most far-fetched variety) written in CIA offices would also appear in Latin American newspapers as unsigned editorials of the papers themselves.

In virtually every department of the Ecuadorean government could be found men occupying positions, high and low, who collaborated with the CIA for money and/or their own particular motivation. At one point, the Agency could count amongst this number the men who were second and third in power in the country.

These government agents would receive the benefits of information obtained by the CIA through electronic eavesdropping or other means, enabling them to gain prestige and promotion, or consolidate their current position in the rough-and-tumble of Ecuadorean politics. A high-ranking minister of leftist tendencies, on the other hand, would be the target of a steady stream of negative propaganda from any or all sources in the CIA arsenal; staged demonstrations against him would further increase the pressure on the president to replace him.

The Postmaster-General, along with other post office employees, all members in good standing of the CIA Payroll Club, regularly sent mail arriving from Cuba and the Soviet bloc to the Agency for its perusal, while customs officials and the Director of Immigration kept the Agency posted on who went to or came from Cuba. When a particularly suitable target returned from Cuba, he would be searched at the airport and documents prepared by the CIA would be "found" on him. These documents, publicized as much as possible, might include instructions on "how to intensify hatred between classes", or some provocative language designed to cause a split in Communist Party ranks. Generally, the documents "verified" the worst fears of the public about communist plans to take over Ecuador under the masterminding of Cuba or the Soviet Union; at the same time, perhaps, implicating an important Ecuadorean leftist whose head the Agency was after. Similar revelations, staged by CIA stations elsewhere in Latin America, would be publicized in Ecuador as a warning that Ecuador was next.

Agency financing of conservative groups in a quasi-religious campaign against Cuba and "atheistic communism" helped to seriously weaken President Velasco's power among the poor, primarily Indians, who had voted overwhelmingly for him, but who were even more deeply committed to their religion. If the CIA wished to know how the president was reacting to this campaign it need only turn to his physician, its agent, Dr. Felipe Ovalle, who would report that his patient was feeling considerable strain as a result.

CIA agents would bomb churches or right-wing organizations and make it appear to be the work of leftists. They would march in left-wing parades displaying signs and shouting slogans of a very provocative anti-military nature, designed to antagonize the armed forces and hasten a coup.

The Agency did not always get away clean with its dirty tricks. During the election

campaign, on 19 March 1960, two senior colonels who were the CIA's main liaison agents within the National Police participated in a riot aimed at disrupting a Velasco demonstration. Agency officer Bob Weatherwax was in the forefront directing the police during the riot in which five Velasco supporters were killed and many wounded. When Velasco took office, he had the two colonels arrested and Weatherwax was asked to leave the country.

CIA-supported activities were carried out without the knowledge of the American ambassador. When the Cuban Embassy publicly charged the Agency with involvement in various anti-Cuban activities, the American ambassador issued a statement that "had everyone in the [CIA] station smiling". Stated the ambassador: "The only agents in Ecuador who are paid by the United States are the technicians invited by the Ecuadorean government to contribute to raising the living standards of the Ecuadorean people."

Finally, in November 1961, the military acted. Velasco was forced to resign and was replaced by Vice-President Carlos Julio Arosemana. There were at this time two prime candidates for the vice-presidency. One was the vice-president of the Senate, a CIA agent. The other was the rector of Central University, a political moderate. The day that Congress convened to make their choice, a notice appeared in a morning paper announcing support for the rector by the Communist Party and a militant leftist youth organization. The notice had been placed by a columnist for the newspaper who was the principal propaganda agent for the CIA's Quito station. The rector was compromised rather badly, the denials came too late, and the CIA man won. His Agency salary was increased from \$700 to \$1,000 a month.

Arosemana soon proved no more acceptable to the CIA than Velasco. All operations continued, particularly the campaign to break relations with Cuba, which Arosemana steadfastly refused to do. The deadlock was broken in March 1962 when a military garrison, led by Col. Aurelio Naranjo, gave Arosemana 72 hours to send the Cubans packing and fire the leftist Minister of Labor. (There is no need to point out here who Naranjo's financial benefactor was.) Arosemana complied with the ultimatum, booting out the Czech and Polish delegations as well at the behest of the new cabinet which had been forced upon him.

At the CIA station in Quito there was a champagne victory celebration. Elsewhere in Ecuador, people angry about the military's domination and desperate about their own lives, took to arms. But on this occasion, like others, it amounted to naught ... a small band of people, poorly armed and trained, infiltrated by agents, their every move known in advance—confronted by a battalion of paratroopers, superbly armed and trained by the United States. That was in the field. In press reports, the small band grew to hundreds; armed not only to the teeth, but with weapons from "outside the country" (read Cuba), and the whole operation very carefully planned at the Communist Party Congress the month before.

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On 11 July 1963 the Presidential Palace in Quito was surrounded by tanks and troops. Arosemana was out, a junta was in. Their first act was to outlaw communism; "communists" and other "extreme" leftists were rounded up and jailed, the arrests campaign being facilitated by data from the CIA's Subversive Control Watch List. (Standard at many Agency stations, this list would include not only the subject's name, but the names and addresses of his relatives and friends and the places he frequented—anything to aid in tracking him down when the time came).

Civil liberties were suspended; the 1964 elections canceled; another tale told many times in Latin America.

And during these three years, what were the American people told about this witch's

brew of covert actions carried out, supposedly, in their name? Very little, if anything, if the *New York Times* is any index. Not once during the entire period, up to and including the coup, was any indication given in any article or editorial on Ecuador that the CIA or any other arm of the US government had played any role whatever in any event which had occurred in that country. This is the way the writings read even if one looks back at them with the advantage of knowledge and hindsight and reads between the lines.

There is a solitary exception. Following the coup, we find a tiny announcement on the very bottom of page 20 that Havana radio had accused the United States of instigating the military takeover.<sup>2</sup> The Cuban government had been making public charges about American activities in Ecuador regularly, but this was the first one to make the *New York Times*. The question must be asked: Why were these charges deemed unworthy of reporting or comment, let alone investigation?

## 26. The Congo 1960-1964

### The assassination of Patrice Lumumba

Within days of its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, the land long known as the Belgian Congo, and later as Zaire, was engulfed in strife and chaos as multiple individuals, tribes, and political groups struggled for dominance or independence. For the next several years the world press chronicled the train of Congolese governments, the endless confusion of personalities and conspiracies, exotic place names like Stanleyville and Leopoldville, shocking stories of European hostages and white mercenaries, the brutality and the violence from all quarters with its racist overtones.

Into this disorder the Western powers were "naturally" drawn, principally Belgium to protect its vast mineral investments, and the United States, mindful of the fabulous wealth as well, and obsessed, as usual, with fighting "communism".

Successive American administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, looking through cold-war binoculars perceived an East-West battleground. The CIA station in the Congo cabled Washington in August that "Embassy and station believe Congo experiencing classic communist effort [to] takeover government." CIA Director Allen Dulles warned of a "communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences ... for the interests of the free world". At the same time, Dulles authorized a crash-program fund of up to \$100,000 to replace the existing government of Patrice Lumumba with a "pro-western group".<sup>1</sup>

It's not known what criteria the CIA applied to determine that Lumumba's government was going communist, but we do know how the *Washington Post* arrived at the same conclusion:

Western diplomats see ... the part [of the Congo] controlled by volatile Premier Patrice Lumumba sliding slowly but surely into the Communist bloc. ... Apart from the fevered activity of Communist bloc nations here, the pattern of events is becoming apparent to students of Communist policy. Premier Lumumba's startling changes of position, his open challenge of the United Nations and Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, his constant agitation of the largely illiterate Congolese can be explained in no other way, veteran observers say.<sup>2</sup>

Years later, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon told a Senate investigating committee (the Church committee) that the National Security Council and President Eisenhower had believed in 1960 that Lumumba was a "very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world."<sup>3</sup> This statement moved author Jonathan Kwitny to observe:

How far beyond the dreams of a barefoot jungle postal clerk in 1956, that in a few short years he would be *dangerous to the peace and safety of the world!* The perception seems insane, particularly coming from the National Security Council, which really does have the power to end all human life within hours.<sup>4</sup>

Patrice Lumumba became the Congo's first prime minister after his party received a plurality of the votes in national elections. He called for the nation's economic as well as political liberation and did not shy away from contact with socialist countries. At the Independence Day ceremonies he probably managed to alienate all the attending foreign dignitaries with his speech, which read in part:

Our lot was eighty years of colonial rule ... We have known tiring labor exacted in exchange for salary which did not allow us to satisfy our hunger ... We have known ironies, insults, blows which we had to endure morning, noon, and night because we were "Negroes" ... We have known that the law was never the same depending on whether it concerned a white or a Negro ... We have known the atrocious sufferings of those banished for political opinions or religious beliefs ... We have known that there were magnificent houses for the whites in the cities and tumble-down straw huts for the Negroes.<sup>5</sup>

In 1960, it must be borne in mind, this was indeed radical and inflammatory language in such a setting.

On 11 July, the province of Katanga—home to the bulk of the Congo's copper, cobalt, uranium, gold, and other mineral wealth—announced that it was seceding. Belgium, the principal owner of this fabulous wealth, never had any intention of giving up real control of the country, and it now supported the move for Katanga's independence, perceiving the advantage of having its investments housed in their own little country, not accountable to nor paying taxes to the central government in Leopoldville. Katanga, moreover, was led by Moïse Tshombe, a man eminently accommodating to, and respectful of, whites and their investments.

The Eisenhower administration supported the Belgian military intervention on behalf of Katanga; indeed, the American embassy had previously requested such intervention. Influencing this policy, in addition to Washington's ideological aversion to Lumumba, was the fact that a number of prominent administration officials had financial ties to the Katanga wealth.<sup>6</sup>

The Belgian intervention, which was a very violent one, was denounced harshly by the Soviet Union, as well as many countries from the Afro-Asian bloc, leading the UN Security Council on the 14th to authorize the withdrawal of Belgian troops and their replacement by a United Nations military force. This was fine with the United States, for the UN under Dag Hammarskjöld was very closely allied to Washington. The UN officials who led the Congo operation were Americans, in secret collaboration with the State Department, and in exclusion of the Soviet bloc; the latter's citizens who worked at the UN Secretariat were kept from seeing the Congo cables. Hammarskjöld himself was quite hostile toward Lumumba.<sup>7</sup>

The UN force entered Katanga province and replaced the Belgian troops, but made no effort to end the secession. Unable to put down this uprising on his own, as well as one in another province, Lumumba had appealed to the United Nations as well as the United States to supply him with transport for his troops. When they both refused, he turned to the Soviet Union for aid, and received it,<sup>8</sup> though military success still eluded him.

The Congo was in turmoil in many places. In the midst of it, on 5 September, President Joseph Kasavubu suddenly dismissed Lumumba as prime minister—a step of very debatable legality, taken with much American encouragement and assistance, as Kasavubu “sat at the feet of the CIA men.”<sup>9</sup> The action was taken, said the Church committee later, “despite the strong support for Lumumba in the Congolese Parliament.”<sup>10</sup>

During the early 1960s, according to a highly-placed CIA executive, the Agency “regularly bought and sold Congolese politicians.”<sup>11</sup> US diplomatic sources subsequently confirmed that Kasavubu was amongst the recipients.<sup>12</sup>

Hammarskjöld publicly endorsed the dismissal before the Security Council, and when Lumumba tried to broadcast his case to the Congolese people, UN forces closed the radio station. Instead, he appeared before the legislature, and by dint of his formidable powers of speech, both houses of Parliament voted to reaffirm him as prime minister. But he could taste the fruits of his victory for only a few days, for on the 14th, army strongman Joseph Mobutu took power in a military coup.

Even during this period, with Lumumba not really in power, “CIA and high Administration officials continued to view him as a threat” ... his “talents and dynamism appear [to be] overriding factor in reestablishing his position each time it seems half lost” ... “Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the ability to stir masses of people to action” ... “if he ... started to talk to a battalion of the Congolese Army he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes” ...<sup>13</sup>

In late September, the CIA sent one of its scientists, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, to the Congo carrying “lethal biological material” (a virus) specifically intended for use in Lumumba's assassination. The virus, which was supposed to produce a fatal disease indigenous to the Congo area of Africa, was transported via diplomatic pouch.<sup>14</sup>

In 1975, the Church committee went on record with the conclusion that Allen Dulles had ordered Lumumba's assassination as “an urgent and prime objective” (Dulles's words).<sup>15</sup> After hearing the testimony of several officials who believed that the order to kill the African leader had emanated originally from President Eisenhower, the committee decided that there was a “reasonable inference” that this was indeed the case.<sup>16</sup>

As matters evolved in the Congo, the virus was never used, for the CIA's Congo station was unable to come up with “a secure enough agent with the right access” to Lumumba before the potency of the biological material was no longer reliable.<sup>17</sup>

The Church committee observed, however, that the CIA station in Leopoldville

continued to maintain close contact with Congolese who expressed a desire to assassinate Lumumba. CIA officers encouraged and offered to aid these Congolese in their efforts against Lumumba, although there is no evidence that aid was ever provided for the specific purpose of assassination.<sup>18</sup>

Fearing for his life, Lumumba was on the run. For a while he was protected from Mobutu by the United Nations, which, under considerable international pressure, had been forced to put some distance between itself and Washington.<sup>19</sup> But on 1 December, Lumumba was taken into custody by Mobutu's troops. A 28 November CIA cable indicates that the Agency was involved in tracking down the charismatic Congo leader. The cable spoke of the CIA station working with the Congolese government to get the roads blocked and troops alerted to close a possible escape route of Lumumba's.<sup>20</sup>

The United States had also been involved in the takeover of government by Mobutu—

whom author and CIA-confidant Andrew Tully described as having been "discovered" by the CIA.<sup>21</sup> Mobutu detained Lumumba until 17 January 1961 when he transferred his prisoner into the hands of Moïse Tshombé of Katanga province, Lumumba's bitter enemy. Lumumba was assassinated the same day.

In 1978, former CIA Africa specialist John Stockwell related in his book how a ranking Agency officer had told him of driving around with Lumumba's body in the trunk of his car, "trying to decide what to do with it".<sup>22</sup> What he did do with it has not yet been made public.

During the period of Lumumba's imprisonment, US diplomats in the Congo were pursuing a policy of "deploring" his beatings and trying to secure "humane treatment" for him, albeit due to "considerations of international opinion and not from tender feelings toward him".<sup>23</sup> The immediate and the long-term effect of Lumumba's murder was to make him the martyr and symbol of anti-imperialism all over Africa and elsewhere in the Third World which such American officials had feared. Even Mobutu later felt compelled to build a memorial to his victim.

Without a clearcut "communist" enemy like Lumumba, the Kennedy administration, which came to power on 20 January 1961, was very divided on the Katanga question. Although the United States wound up supporting—in the name of Congolese stability—the UN military operation in the summer to suppress the secession, Tshombé had outspoken support in the US Congress, and sentiment amongst officials at the State Department and the White House mirrored this division. The sundry economic and diplomatic ties of these officials appear to have been more diverse and contradictory than under the Eisenhower administration, and this is reflected in the lack of a unified policy. However, according to Kennedy adviser and biographer, Arthur Schlesinger, opinions on both sides of the issue were expressed in terms of hindering supposed malevolent Soviet/communist designs in the Congo.<sup>24</sup>

In an even more marked policy division, US Air Force C-130s were flying Congolese troops and supplies against the Katangese rebels, while at the same time the CIA and its covert colleagues in the Pentagon were putting together an air armada of heavy transport aircraft, along with mercenary units, to aid the very same rebels.<sup>25</sup> (This marked at least the third instance of the CIA acting in direct military opposition to another arm of the US government.)<sup>26</sup>

Washington officials were more in unison when dealing with another prominent leftist—Antoine Gizenga, who had been Vice-Prime Minister under Lumumba. Following the latter's dismissal, according to the Church committee, the CIA station chief in the Congo, Lawrence Devlin, urged "a key Congolese leader" (presumably Mobutu) to "arrest" or undertake a "more permanent disposal of Lumumba, Gizenga, and Mulele." (Pierre Mulele was another Lumumba lieutenant.)<sup>27</sup> Gizenga was in fact arrested shortly after Mobutu took power, but a UN contingent from Ghana, whose leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was Lumumba's ally, intervened and freed him.<sup>28</sup>

In the continuous musical-chairs game of Congolese politics, the first of August 1961 found Gizenga as the Vice-Prime Minister under one Cyrille Adoula. By the end of the month, Gizenga was as well, and simultaneously, the leader of a rebel force that had set up a regime in the Stanleyville area which it proclaimed as the legitimate government of the entire Congo. He fancied himself the political and spiritual successor to Lumumba.

The Soviet Union may have believed Gizenga, for apparently they were sending him arms and money, using Sudan, which borders the Congo on the north, as a conduit. When

the CIA learned that a Czech ship was bound for Sudan with a cargo of guns disguised as Red Cross packages for refugee relief in the Congo, the Agency turned to its most practiced art, bribery, to persuade a crane operator to let one of the crates drop upon arrival. On that day, the dockside was suddenly covered with new Soviet Kalashnikov rifles. Through an equally clever ploy at the Khartoum (Sudan) airport, the CIA managed to separate a Congolese courier from his suitcase of Soviet money destined for Gizenga.<sup>29</sup>

The State Department, meanwhile, was, in its own words,

urging Adoula to ... dismiss Gizenga and declare him in rebellion against the national government so that police action can now be taken against him. We are also urging the U.N. to take military action to break his rebellion ... We are making every effort to keep Gizenga isolated from potential domestic and foreign support ... We have taken care to insure that this [US] aid has been channelled through the central government in order to provide the economic incentive to encourage support for that government.<sup>30</sup>

The CIA was supplying arms and money to Adoula's supporters, as well as to Mobutu's.<sup>31</sup> Adoula, who had a background of close ties to both the American labor movement and the CIA international labor movement (via the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions—see British Guiana chapter), was chosen to be prime minister instead of Gizenga by a parliamentary conference during which the parliamentarians were bribed by the CIA and even by the United Nations. A subsequent CIA memorandum was apparently paying tribute to this when it stated: "The U.N. and the United States, in closely coordinated activities, played essential roles in this significant success over Gizenga."<sup>32</sup>

In January 1962, United Nations forces with strong American backing ousted Gizenga and his followers from Stanleyville, and a year later finally forced Tshombe to end his secession in Katanga. These actions were carried out in the name of "uniting the Congo", as if this were a matter to be decided by other than Congolese. Never before had the UN engaged in such offensive military operations, and the world organization was criticized in various quarters for having exceeded its charter. In any event, the operations served only to temporarily slow down the dreary procession of changing leaders, attempted coups, autonomous armies, shifting alliances, and rebellions.

Adding an ironic and absurd touch to the American Congo policy, three months after the successful action against Gizenga, Allen Dulles (thanks to the Bay of Pigs, now the former Director of the CIA) informed a television audience that the United States had "over-rated the danger" of Soviet involvement ... "It looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt at takeover in the Belgian Congo, well it did not work out that way at all."<sup>33</sup>

Nonetheless, by the middle of 1964, when rebellion—by the heirs of Lumumba and Gizenga—was more widespread and furious than ever and the collapse of the central government appeared as a real possibility, the United States was pouring in a prodigious amount of military aid to the Leopoldville regime. In addition to providing arms and planes, Washington dispatched some 100 to 200 military and technical personnel to the Congo to aid government troops, and the CIA was conducting a paramilitary campaign against the insurgents in the eastern part of the country.<sup>34</sup>

The government was now headed by none other than Moise Tshombe, a man called "Africa's most unpopular African" for his widely-recognized role in the murder of the popular Lumumba and for his use of white mercenaries, many of them South Africans and Rhodesians, during his secession attempt in Katanga. Tshombe defended the latter action by



explaining that his troops would not fight without white officers.<sup>35</sup>

Tshombe once again called upon his white mercenary army, numbering 400 to 500 men, and the CIA called upon its own mercenaries as well, a band which included Americans, Cuban-exile veterans of the Bay of Pigs, Rhodesians, and South Africans, the latter having been recruited with the help of the South African government. "Bringing in our own animals" was the way one CIA operative described the operation. The Agency's pilots carried out regular bombing and strafing missions against the insurgents, although some of the Cubans were reported to be troubled at being ordered to make indiscriminate attacks upon civilians.<sup>36</sup> Looking back at the affair in 1966, the *New York Times* credited the CIA with having created "an instant air force" in the Congo.<sup>37</sup>

When China protested to the United States about the use of American pilots in the Congo, the State Department issued an explicit denial, then publicly reversed itself, but insisted that the Americans were flying "under contract with the Congolese government". The next day, the Department said that the flights would stop, after having obtained assurances from "other arms of the [U.S.] Government", although it still held to the position that the matter was one between the Congolese government and civilian individuals who were not violating American law.<sup>38</sup>

The Congolese against whom this array of military might was brought to bear were a coalition of forces. Some of the leading figures had spent time in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or China and were receiving token amounts of arms and instruction from those countries; but they were never necessarily in the communist camp any more than the countless Third Worlders who have gone to university in the United States and have been courted afterwards are necessarily in the Western/capitalist camp. (This does not hold for professional military officers who, unlike students, tend to be a particularly homogeneous group—conservative, authoritarian, and anti-communist.)

Africa scholar M. Crawford Young has observed that amongst the coalition leadership, "The destruction of the [Leopoldville] regime, a vigorous reassertion of Congolese control over its own destiny, and a vague socialist commitment were recurrent themes. But at bottom it appeared far more a frame of mind and a style of expression, than an interrelated set of ideas."<sup>39</sup> The rebels had no revolutionary program they could, or did, proclaim.

Co-existing with this element within the coalition were currents of various esoteric churches, messianic sects, witch-finding movements, and other occult inspirations as well as plain opportunists. Many believed that the magic of their witch doctors would protect them against bullets. One of their leaders, Pierre Mulele, was a quasi-Catholic who baptized his followers in his own urine to also make them immune to bullets. The insurgents were further divided along tribal lines and were rent by debilitating factionalism. No single group or belief could dominate.<sup>40</sup>

"Rebel success created the image of unified purpose and revolutionary promise," wrote Young. "Only in its subsequent phase of decay and disintegration" did the coalition's "dramatic lack of cohesion" and "disparity in purpose and perception" become fully evident.<sup>41</sup>

The *New York Times* addressed the question of the coalition's ideology as follows:

There is evidence that most supporters of the Stanleyville regime have no ideological commitment but are mainly Congolese who are disillusioned with the corruption and irresponsibility that has characterized the Leopoldville regimes. The rebel leaders have received advice and money from Communists but few if any of the rebels consider themselves Communists. It is probable that few have heard of Karl Marx.<sup>42</sup>

In the coalition-controlled area of Stanleyville, between 2,000 and 3,000 white foreign-

ers found themselves trapped by the war. One of the rebel leaders, Christopher Gbenye, conditioned their safe release upon various military concessions, principally a cessation of American bombing, but negotiations failed to produce an agreement.<sup>43</sup>

Instead, on 24 November 1964, the United States and Belgium staged a dramatic rescue mission in which over 500 Belgian paratroopers were dropped at dawn into Stanleyville from American transport planes. Much chaos followed, and the reports are conflicting, but it appears that more than 2,000 hostages were rescued, in the process of which the fleeing rebels massacred about 100 others and dragged several hundred more into the bush.

American and Belgian officials took great pains to emphasize the purely "humanitarian" purpose of the mission. However, the rescuers simultaneously executed a key military maneuver when they "seized the strategic points of the city and coordinated their operation with the advancing columns of Tshombe's mercenary army that was moving swiftly towards the city."<sup>44</sup> Moreover, in the process of the rescue, the rescuers killed dozens of rebels and did nothing to curtail Tshombe's troops when they reached Stanleyville and began an "orgy of looting and killing".<sup>45</sup>

Tshombe may have provided a reminder of the larger-than-humanitarian stake at hand in the Congo when, in the flush of the day's success, he talked openly with a correspondent of *The Times* of London who reported that Tshombe "was confident that the fall of Stanleyville would give a new impetus to the economy and encourage investors. It would reinforce a big development plan announced this morning in collaboration with the United States, Britain and West Germany."<sup>46</sup>

The collapse of the rebels' stronghold in Stanleyville marked the beginning of the end for their cause. By spring 1965 their fortune was in sharp decline, and the arrival of about 100 Cuban revolutionaries, amongst whom was Che Guevara himself, had no known effect upon the course of events. Several months later, Guevara returned to Cuba in disgust at the low level of revolutionary zeal exhibited by the Congolese guerrillas and the local populace.<sup>47</sup>

The concluding tune for the musical chairs was played in November, when Joseph Mobutu overthrew Tshombe and Kasavubu. Mobutu, later to adopt the name Mobutu Sese Seko, has ruled with a heavy dictatorial hand ever since.

In the final analysis, it mattered precious little to the interests of the US government whether the forces it had helped defeat were really "communist" or not, by whatever definition. The working premise was that there was now fixed in power, over a more-or-less unified Congo, a man who would be more co-operative with the CIA in its African adventures and with Western capital, and less accessible to the socialist bloc, than the likes of Lumumba, Gizenga, et al. would have been. The CIA has chalked this one up as a victory.

What the people of the Congo (now Zaire) won is not clear. Under Mobutu, terror and repression became facts of daily life, civil liberties and other human rights were markedly absent. The country remains one of the poorest to be found anywhere despite its vast natural riches. Mobutu, however, is reputed to be one of the richest heads of state in the world. (See Zaire chapter.)

William Atwood, US Ambassador to Kenya in 1964-65, who played a part in the hostage negotiations, also saw the US role in the Congo in a positive light. Bemoaning African suspicions toward American motives there, he wrote: "It was hard to convince people that we had provided the Congo with \$420 million in aid since independence just to

## 27. Brazil 1961-1964

### Introducing the marvelous new world of Death Squads

When the leading members of the US diplomatic mission in Brazil held a meeting one day in March 1964, they arrived at the consensus that President João Goulart's support of social and economic reforms was a contrived and thinly veiled vehicle to seize dictatorial power.<sup>1</sup>

The American ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, informed the State Department that "a desperate lunge [by Goulart] for totalitarian power might be made at any time."<sup>2</sup>

The Brazilian army chief of staff, General Humberto de Alencar Castelo (or Castello) Branco, provided the American Embassy with a memorandum in which he stated his fear that Goulart was seeking to close down Congress and initiate a dictatorship.<sup>3</sup>

Within a week after the expression of these concerns, the Brazilian military, with Castelo Branco at its head, overthrew the constitutional government of President Goulart, the culmination of a conspiratorial process in which the American Embassy had been intimately involved. The military then proceeded to install and maintain for two decades one of the most brutal dictatorships in all of South America.

What are we to make of all this? The idea that men of rank and power lie to the public is commonplace, not worthy of debate. But do they as readily lie to each other? Is their need to rationalize their misdeeds so great that they provide each other a moral shoulder to lean on? "Men use thoughts only to justify their injustices," wrote Voltaire, "and speech only to conceal their thoughts."

The actual American motivation in supporting the coup was something rather less heroic than preserving democracy, even mundane as such matters go. American opposition to Goulart, who became president in 1961, rested upon a familiar catalogue of complaints:

US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara questioned Brazil's neutral stand in foreign policy. The Brazilian ambassador in Washington, Roberto Campos, responded that "neutrality" was an inadequate term and explained that "what was involved was really a deep urge of the Brazilian people to assert their personality in world affairs."<sup>4</sup>

American officials did not approve of some of the members of Goulart's cabinet, and said so. Ambassador Campos pointed out to them that it was "quite inappropriate" for the United States "to try to influence the composition of the cabinet."<sup>5</sup>

Attorney-General Robert Kennedy met with Goulart and expressed his uneasiness about the Brazilian president allowing "communists" to hold positions in government agencies. (Bobby was presumably acting on the old and very deep-seated American belief that once you welcome one or two communists into your parlor, they take over the whole house and sign the deed over to Moscow.) Goulart did not see this as a danger. He replied that he

was in full control of the situation, later remarking to Campos that it was as if he had been told that he had no capacity for judging the men around him.<sup>6</sup>

The American Defense Attaché in Brazil, Col. Vernon Walters, reported that Goulart showed favoritism towards "ultra-nationalist" military officers over "pro-U.S." officers. Goulart saw it as promoting those officers who appeared to be most loyal to his government. He was, as it happens, very concerned about American-encouraged military coups and said so explicitly to President Kennedy.<sup>7</sup>

Goulart considered purchasing helicopters from Poland because Washington was delaying on his request to purchase them from the United States. Ambassador Gordon told him that he "could not expect the United States to like it".<sup>8</sup>

The Goulart administration, moreover, passed a law limiting the amount of profits multinationals could transmit out of the country, and a subsidiary of ITT was nationalized. Compensation for the takeover was slow in coming because of Brazil's precarious financial position, but these were the only significant actions taken against US corporate interests.

Inextricably woven into all these complaints, yet at the same time standing apart, was Washington's dismay with Brazil's "drift to the left" ... the communist/leftist influence in the labor movement ... leftist "infiltration" wherever one looked ... "anti-Americanism" among students and others (the American Consul General in São Paulo suggested to the State Department that the United States "found competing student organizations") ... the general erosion of "U.S. influence and the power of people and groups friendly to the United States"<sup>9</sup>... one might go so far as to suggest that Washington officials felt unloved, were it not for the fact that the coup, as they well knew from much past experience, could result only in intensified anti-Americanism all over Latin America.

Goulart's predecessor, Jânio da Silva Quadros, had also irritated Washington. "Why should the United States trade with Russia and her satellites but insist that Brazil trade only with the United States?" he asked, and proceeded to negotiate with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries to (re)establish diplomatic and commercial relations. He was, in a word, independent.<sup>10</sup>

Quadros was also more-or-less a conservative who clamped down hard on unions, sent federal troops to the northeast hunger dens to squash protest, and jailed disobedient students.<sup>11</sup> But the American ambassador at the time, John Moors Cabot, saw fit to question Brazil's taking part in a meeting of "uncommitted" (non-aligned) nations. "Brazil has signed various obligations with the United States and American nations," he said. "I am sure Brazil is not going to forget her obligations ... It is committed. It is a fact. Brazil can uncommit itself if it wants."<sup>12</sup>

In early 1961, shortly after Quadros took office, he was visited by Adolf Berle, Jr., President Kennedy's adviser on Latin American affairs and formerly ambassador to Brazil. Berle had come as Kennedy's special envoy to solicit Quadros's backing for the impending Bay of Pigs invasion. Ambassador Cabot was present and some years later described the meeting to author Peter Bell. Bell has written:

Ambassador Cabot remembers a "stormy conversation" in which Berle stated the United States had \$300 million in reserve for Brazil and in effect "offered it as a bribe" for Brazilian cooperation ... Quadros became "visibly irritated" after Berle refused to heed his third "no". No Brazilian official was at the airport the next day to see the envoy off.<sup>13</sup>

Quadros, who had been elected by a record margin, was, like Goulart, accused of seeking to set up a dictatorship because he sought to put teeth into measures unpopular with the oligarchy, the military, and/or the United States, as well as pursuing a "pro-communist"

foreign policy. After but seven months in office he suddenly resigned, reportedly under military pressure, if not outright threat. In his letter of resignation, he blamed his predicament on "reactionaries" and "the ambitions of groups of individuals, some of whom are foreigners ... the terrible forces that arose against me."<sup>14</sup>

A few months later, Quadros reappeared, to deliver a speech in which he named Berle, Cabot, and US Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon as being among those who had contributed to his downfall. Dillon, he said, sought to mix foreign policy with Brazil's needs for foreign credits.<sup>15</sup> (Both Berle and Cabot had been advocates of the 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan President Arbenz, whose sins, in Washington's eyes, were much the same as those Goulart was now guilty of.)<sup>16</sup> At the same time, Quadros announced his intention to lead a "people's crusade" against the "reactionaries, the corrupt and the Communists".<sup>17</sup>

As Quadros's vice president, Goulart succeeded to the presidency in August 1961 despite a virtual coup and civil war initiated by segments of the military to block him because he was seen as some sort of dangerous radical. Only the intervention of loyalist military units and other supporters of the constitutional process allowed Goulart to take office.<sup>18</sup> The military opposition to Goulart arose, it should be noted, before he had the opportunity to exhibit his alleged tendencies toward dictatorship. Indeed, as early as 1954, the military had demonstrated its antipathy toward him by forcing President Vargas to fire him from his position as Minister of Labor.<sup>19</sup> The American doubts about Goulart also predated his presidency. In 1960, when Goulart was elected vice president, "concern at the State Department and the Pentagon turned to panic" according to an American official who served in Brazil.<sup>20</sup>

Goulart tried to continue Quadros's independent foreign policy. His government went ahead with resumption of relations with socialist countries, and at a meeting of the Organization of American States in December 1961 Brazil abstained on a vote to hold a special session aimed at discussing "the Cuban problem", and stood strongly opposed to sanctions against the Castro government.<sup>21</sup> A few months later, speaking before the US Congress, Goulart affirmed Brazil's right to take its own stand on some of the cold-war issues. He declared that Brazil identified itself "with the democratic principles which unite the peoples of the West", but was "not part of any politico-military bloc".<sup>22</sup>

*Time* magazine, in common with most US media, had (has) a difficult time understanding the concept and practice of independence amongst America's allies. In November 1961, the magazine wrote that Brazil's domestic politics were "confused" and that the country was "also adrift in foreign affairs. Goulart is trying to play the old Quadros game of international 'independence', which means wooing the East while panhandling from the West." *Time* was critical of Goulart in that he had sought an invitation to visit Washington and on the same day he received it he "called in Communist Poland's visiting Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, [and] awarded him the Order of the Southern Cross—the same decoration that Quadros hung on Cuba's Marxist mastermind, Che Guevara".<sup>23</sup>

Former *Time* editor and Latin America correspondent, John Gerassi, commented that every visiting foreign dignitary received this medal, the *Cruzeiro do Sul*, as part of protocol. He added:

Apparently *Time* thinks that any President who wants to visit us must necessarily hate our enemies as a consequence, and is "confused" whenever this does not occur. But, of course, *Time* magazine is so unused to the word "independent" that an independent foreign policy must be very confusing indeed. In South America, where everyone would like to follow an independent foreign policy but where only Brazil has, at times, the courage, no one was confused.<sup>24</sup>

Goulart, a millionaire land-owner and a Catholic who wore a medal of the Virgin around his neck, was no more a communist than was Quadros, and he strongly supported the United States during the "Cuban Missile Crisis" of October 1962. He offered Ambassador Gordon a toast "To the Yankee Victory!",<sup>25</sup> perhaps unaware that only three weeks earlier, during federal and state elections in Brazil, CIA money had been liberally expended in support of anti-Goulart candidates. Former CIA officer Philip Agee has stated that the Agency spent between 12 and 20 million dollars on behalf of hundreds of candidates.<sup>26</sup> Lincoln Gordon says the funding came to no more than 5 million.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to the direct campaign contributions, the CIA dipped into its bag of dirty tricks to torment the campaigns of leftist candidates.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, the Agency for International Development (AID), at the express request of President Kennedy, was allocating monies to projects aimed at benefiting chosen gubernatorial candidates.<sup>29</sup> (While Goulart was president, no new US economic assistance was given to the central government, while regional assistance was provided on a markedly ideological basis. When the military took power, this pattern was sharply altered.)<sup>30</sup>

Agee adds that the CIA carried out a consistent propaganda campaign against Goulart which dated from at least the 1962 election operation and which included the financing of mass urban demonstrations, "proving the old themes of God, country, family and liberty to be as effective as ever" in undermining a government.<sup>31</sup>

CIA money also found its way to a chain of right-wing newspapers, *Diarias Associadas*, to promote anti-communism; for the distribution of 50 thousand books of similar politics to high school and college students; and for the formation of women's groups with their special Latin mother's emphasis on the godlessness of the communist enemy. The women and other CIA operatives also went into the rumor-mongering business, spreading stories about outrages Goulart and his cronies were supposed to be planning, such as altering the constitution so as to extend his term, and gossip about Goulart being a cuckold and a wife-beater.<sup>32</sup>

All this to overthrow a man who, in April 1962, had received a ticker-tape parade in New York City, was warmly welcomed at the White House by President Kennedy, and had addressed a joint session of Congress.

The intraservice confrontation which had attended Goulart's accession to power apparently kept a rein on coup-minded officers until 1963. In March of that year the CIA informed Washington, but not Goulart, of a plot by conservative officers.<sup>33</sup> During the course of the following year, the plots thickened. Brazilian military officers could not abide by Goulart's attempts at populist social reforms, though his program was timid, his rhetoric generally mild, and his actions seldom matched either. (He himself pointed out that General Douglas MacArthur had carried out a more radical distribution of land in Japan after the Second World War than anything planned by the Brazilian Government.) The military men were particularly incensed at Goulart's support of a weakening of military discipline and his attempts to build up a following among non-commissioned officers.<sup>34</sup> This the president was genuinely serious about because of his "paranoia" about a coup.

Goulart's wooing of NCOs and his appeals to the population over the heads of a hostile Congress and state governors (something President Reagan later did on several occasions) were the kind of tactics his enemies labeled as dictatorial.

In early 1964, disclosed *Fortune* magazine after the coup, an emissary was sent by some of the military plotters "to ask U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon what the U.S. position would be if civil war broke out". The emissary "reported back that Gordon was cau-

tious and diplomatic, but he left the impression that if the [plotters] could hold out for forty-eight hours they would get U.S. recognition and help."<sup>35</sup>

The primary American contact with the conspirators was Defense Attaché Vernon Walters who arrived in Brazil after having been apprised that President Kennedy would not be averse to the overthrow of João Goulart.<sup>36</sup> Walters, who later became Deputy Director of the CIA, had an intimacy with leading Brazilian military officers, particularly General Castelo Branco, going back to World War II when Walters had served as interpreter for the Brazilian Expeditionary Force then fighting in Italy with the Allies. Brazil was the only Latin American country to send ground combat troops to the war, and it allowed the United States to build huge aircraft staging bases on its territory.<sup>37</sup> The relationship between US and Brazilian officers was continued and enhanced after the war by the creation of the Higher War College (*Escola Superior de Guerra*) in Rio de Janeiro in 1949. Latin America historian Thomas E. Skidmore has observed:

Under the U.S.-Brazilian military agreements of the early 1950s, the U.S. Army received exclusive rights to render assistance in the organization and operation of the college, which had been modeled on the National War College in Washington. In view of the fact that the Brazilian War College became a rallying point for leading military opponents of civilian populist politicians, it would be worth examining the extent to which the strongly anti-Communist ideology—bordering on an anti-political attitude—[of certain officers] was reinforced (or moderated?) by their frequent contacts with United States officers.<sup>38</sup>

There was, moreover, the ongoing US Military Assistance Program, which Ambassador Gordon described as a "major vehicle for establishing close relationships with personnel of the armed forces" and "a highly important factor in influencing [the Brazilian] military to be pro-US."<sup>39</sup>

A week before the coup, Castelo Branco, who emerged as the leader of the conspirators, gave Walters a copy of a paper he had written which was in effect a justification for a military coup, another variation on the theme of upholding the constitution by preventing Goulart from instituting a dictatorship.<sup>40</sup>

To Lincoln Gordon and other American officials, civil war appeared a real possibility as the result of a coup attempt. As the scheduled day approached, contingency plans were set up.

A large quantity of petroleum would be sent to Brazil and made available to the insurgent officers, an especially vital commodity if Goulart supporters in the state oil union were to blow up or control the refineries.<sup>41</sup>

A US Navy task force would be dispatched to Brazilian coastal waters, the presence of which would deliver an obvious message to opponents of the coup.<sup>42</sup>

Arms and ammunition would be sent to Branco's forces to meet their fighting needs.<sup>43</sup>

Concerned that the coup attempt might be met by a general strike, Washington discussed with Gordon the possible need "for the U.S. to mount a large material program to assure the success of the takeover."<sup>44</sup> The conspirators had already requested economic aid from the United States, in the event of their success, to get the government and economy moving again, and had received a generally favorable response.<sup>45</sup>

At the same time, Gordon sent word to some anti-Goulart state governors emphasizing the necessity, from the American point of view, that the new regime have a claim to legitimacy. The ambassador also met with former president Juscelino Kubitschek to urge him to take a stronger position against Goulart and to use his considerable influence to "swing a large congressional group and thereby influence the legitimacy issue".<sup>46</sup>



Of the American contingency measures, indications are that it was the naval show of force—which, it turned out, included an aircraft carrier, destroyers, and guided missiles—which most encouraged the Brazilian military plotters or convinced those still wavering in their commitment.<sup>47</sup>

Another actor in the unfolding drama was the American Institute for Free Labor Development. The AIFLD came formally into being in 1961 and was technically under the direction of the American labor movement (AFL-CIO), but was soon being funded almost exclusively by the US government (AID) and serving consistently as a CIA instrument in most countries of Latin America. In May 1963, the AIFLD founded the *Instituto Cultural Trabalho* in Brazil which, over the next few years, gave courses to more than 7,000 union leaders and members.<sup>48</sup> Other Brazilians went to the United States for training. When they returned to Brazil, said AIFLD executive William Doherty, Jr., some of them:

became intimately involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution before it took place on April 1. What happened in Brazil on April 1 did not just happen—it was planned—and planned months in advance. Many of the trade union leaders—some of whom were actually trained in our institute—were involved in the revolution, and in the overthrow of the Goulart regime.<sup>49</sup>

Doherty did not spell out any details of the AIFLD role in the coup (or revolution as he called it), although *Reader's Digest* later reported that one of the AIFLD-trained labor leaders set up courses for communication workers in combatting communism in the labor movement in Brazil, and "After every class he quietly warned key workers of coming trouble and urged them to keep communications going no matter what happened."<sup>50</sup> Additionally, Richard Martinez, an unwitting CIA contract employee who was sent to Brazil to work with the Agency's Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (formerly Doherty's domain), has revealed that his field workers in Brazil burned down Communist Party headquarters at the time of the coup.<sup>51</sup>

The coup began on 31 March 1964 with the advance upon Rio of troops and tanks. Officers obtained the support of some units of enlisted men by telling them they were heading for the city to secure it against Goulart's enemies. But at the main air force base pro-Goulart enlisted men, hearing of the move toward Rio, seized the base and put their officers under arrest. Indecision and cold feet intervened, however, and what might have reversed the course of events instead came to nought. Other military units loyal to Goulart took actions elsewhere, but these too fizzled out.<sup>52</sup>

Here and there a scattering of workers went out on strike; several short-lived, impotent demonstrations took place, but there was little else. A number of labor leaders and radicals were rounded up on the orders of certain state governors; those who were opposed to what was happening were not prepared for violent resistance; in one incident a group of students staged a protest—some charged up the stairs of an Army organization, but the guard fired into their midst, killing two of them and forcing the others to fall back.<sup>53</sup>

Most people counted on loyal armed forces to do their duty, or waited for the word from Goulart. Goulart, however, was unwilling to give the call for a civil war; he did not want to be responsible, he said, for bloodshed amongst Brazilians, and fled to Uruguay.<sup>54</sup>

Lincoln Gordon cabled Washington the good news, suggesting the "avoidance of a jubilant posture". He described the coup as "a great victory for the free world", adding, in a remark that might have had difficulty getting past the lips of even John Foster Dulles, that without the coup there could have been a "total loss to the West of all South American Republics". Following a victory parade in Rio on 2 April by those pleased with the coup—a March of Family with God for Liberty—Gordon informed the State Department that the

"only unfortunate note was the obviously limited participation in the march of the lower classes."<sup>55</sup>

His cable work done, the former Harvard professor turned his attention back to trying to persuade the Brazilian Congress to bestow a seal of "legitimacy" upon the new government.<sup>56</sup>

Two years later, Gordon was to be questioned by a senator during hearings to consider his nomination as Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. "I am particularly concerned," said the senator, "with the part you may have played, if any, in encouraging, promoting, or causing that overthrow."

Said Lincoln Gordon: "The answer to that, senator, is very simple. The movement which overthrew President Goulart was a purely, 100 percent—not 99.44—but 100 percent purely Brazilian movement. Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part in the process whatsoever."<sup>57</sup>

Gordon's boss, Dean Rusk, was not any more forthright. When asked about Cuban charges that the United States was behind the coup, the Secretary of State responded: "Well, there is just not one iota of truth in this. It's just not so in any way, shape, or form."<sup>58</sup> While Attorney General Robert Kennedy's view of the affair, stated to Gordon, was: "Well, Goulart got what was coming to him. Too bad he didn't follow the advice we gave him when I was there."<sup>59</sup>

Gordon artfully combined fast talk with omission of certain key facts about Brazilian politics—his summary of Goulart's rise and fall made no mention at all of the military's move to keep him from taking office in 1961—to convince the assembled senators that Goulart was indeed seeking to set up a personal dictatorship.<sup>60</sup>

Depending on the setting, either "saving Brazil from dictatorship" or "saving Brazil from communism" was advanced as the rationale for what took place in 1964. (General Andrew O'Meara, head of the US Southern [Latin America] Command, had it both ways. He told a House committee that "The coming to power of the Castelo Branco government in Brazil last April saved that country from an immediate dictatorship which could only have been followed by Communist domination.")<sup>61</sup>

The rescue-from-communism position was especially difficult to support, the problem being that the communists in Brazil did not, after all, *do* anything which the United States could point to. Moreover, the Soviet Union was scarcely in the picture. Early in 1964, reported a Brazilian newspaper, Russian leader Khrushchev told the Brazilian Communist Party that the Soviet government did not wish either to give financial aid to the Goulart regime or to tangle with the United States over the country.<sup>62</sup> In his reminiscences—albeit, as mentioned earlier, not meant to be a serious work of history—Khrushchev does not give an index reference to Brazil.

A year after the coup, trade between Brazil and the USSR was running at \$120 million per year and a Brazilian mission was planning to go to Moscow to explore Soviet willingness to provide a major industrial plant.<sup>63</sup> The following year, the Russians invited the new Brazilian president-to-be, General Costa e Silva, to visit the Soviet Union.<sup>64</sup>

During the entire life of the military dictatorship, extending into the 1980s, Brazil and the Soviet bloc engaged in extensive trade and economic cooperation, reaching billions of dollars per year and including the building of several large hydroelectric plants in Brazil. A similar economic relationship existed between the Soviet bloc and the Argentine military dictatorship of 1976-83, so much so that in 1982, when Soviet leader Brezhnev died, the Argentine government declared a national day of mourning.<sup>65</sup>

It was only by ignoring facts like these during the cold war that the anti-communist propaganda machine of the United States could preach about the International Communist Conspiracy and claim that the coup in Brazil had saved the country from communism. For a typical example of this propaganda, one must read "The Country That Saved Itself," which appeared in *Reader's Digest* several months after the coup. The innumerable lies about what occurred in Brazil, fed by the magazine to its millions of readers, undoubtedly played a role in preparing the American public for the great anti-communist crusade in Vietnam just picking up steam at the time. The article began:

Seldom has a major nation come closer to the brink of disaster and yet recovered than did Brazil in its recent triumph over Red subversion. The communist drive for domination—marked by propaganda, infiltration, terror—was moving in high gear. Total surrender seemed imminent—and then the people said *No!*<sup>66</sup>

The type of independence shown by the Brazilian military government in its economic relations with the Soviet Union was something Washington could accept from a conservative government, even the occasional nationalization of American property, when it knew that the government could be relied upon to keep the left suppressed at home and to help in the vital cold-war, anti-communist campaigns abroad. In 1965, Brazil sent 1,100 troops to the Dominican Republic in support of the US invasion, the only country in Latin America to send more than a token force. And in 1971 and 1973, the Brazilian military and intelligence apparatuses contributed to the American efforts in overthrowing the governments of Bolivia and Chile.

The United States did not rest on its laurels. CIA headquarters immediately began to generate hemisphere-wide propaganda, as only the Agency's far-flung press-asset network could, in support of the new Brazilian government and to discredit Goulart.<sup>67</sup> Dean Rusk, concerned that Goulart might be received in Uruguay as if he were still Brazil's president on the grounds that he had not resigned, cabled the American Embassy in Montevideo that "it would be useful if you could quietly bring to the attention of appropriate officials the fact that despite his allegations to the contrary Goulart has abandoned his office."<sup>68</sup>

At the same time, the CIA station in Uruguay undertook a program of surveillance of Brazilian exiles who had fled from the military takeover, to prevent them from instigating any kind of insurgency movement in their homeland. It was a simple matter for the Agency to ask their (paid) friend, the head of Uruguayan intelligence, to place his officers at the residences of Goulart and other key Brazilians. The officers kept logs of visitors while posing as personal security men for the exiles, although it is unlikely that the exiles swallowed the story.<sup>69</sup>

In the first few days following the coup, "several thousand" Brazilians were arrested, "communist and suspected communist" all.<sup>70</sup> AIFLD graduates were promptly appointed by the new government to purge the unions.<sup>71</sup> Though Ambassador Gordon had assured the State Department before the coup that the armed forces "would be quick to restore constitutional institutions and return power to civilian hands,"<sup>72</sup> this was not to be. Within days, General Castelo Branco assumed the presidency and over the next few years his regime instituted all the features of military dictatorship which Latin America has come to know and love: Congress was shut down, political opposition was reduced to virtual extinction, habeas corpus for "political crimes" was suspended, criticism of the president was forbidden by law, labor unions were taken over by government interveners, mounting protests were met by police and military firing into crowds, the use of systematic "disappearance" as a form of repression came upon the stage of Latin America, peasants' homes were burned down, priests were brutalized ... the government had a name for its program: the "moral

rehabilitation" of Brazil ... then there was the torture and the death squads, both largely undertakings of the police and the military, both underwritten by the United States.<sup>73</sup>

In the chapters on Guatemala and Uruguay, we shall see how the US Office of Public Safety (OPS), the CIA and AID combined to provide the technical training, the equipment, and the indoctrination which supported the horrors in those countries. It was no less the case in Brazil. Dan Mitrione of the OPS, whom we shall encounter in his full beauty in Uruguay, began his career in Brazil in the 1960s. By 1969, OPS had established a national police force for Brazil and had trained over 100,000 policemen in the country, in addition to 523 receiving more advanced instruction in the United States.<sup>74</sup> About one-third of the students' time at the police academies was devoted to lectures on the "communist menace" and the need to battle against it.<sup>75</sup> The "bomb school" and techniques of riot control were other important aspects of their education.

Tortures range from simple but brutal blows from a truncheon to electric shocks. Often the torture is more refined: the end of a reed is placed in the anus of a naked man hanging suspended downwards on the *pau de arara* [parrot's perch] and a piece of cotton soaked in petrol is lit at the other end of the reed. Pregnant women have been forced to watch their husbands being tortured. Other wives have been hung naked beside their husbands and given electric shocks on the sexual parts of their body, while subjected to the worst kind of obscenities. Children have been tortured before their parents and vice versa. At least one child, the three month old baby of Virgilio Gomes da Silva was reported to have died under police torture. The length of sessions depends upon the resistance capacity of the victims and have sometimes continued for days at a time.

Amnesty International<sup>76</sup>

Judge Agamemnon Duarte indicated that the CCC [Commandos to Hunt Communists, a death squad armed and aided by the police] and the CIA are implicated in the murder of Father Henrique Neto. He admitted that ... the American Secret Service (CIA) was behind the CCC.

*Jornal do Brazil*<sup>77</sup>

Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army, General Breno Borges Forte, at the Tenth Conference of American Armies in 1973:

The enemy is undefined ... it adapts to any environment and uses every means, both licit and illicit, to achieve its aims. It disguises itself as a priest, a student or a campesino, as a defender of democracy or an advanced intellectual, as a pious soul or as an extremist protestor; it goes into the fields and the schools, the factories and the churches, the universities and the magistracy; if necessary, it will wear a uniform or civil garb; in sum, it will take on any role that it considers appropriate to deceive, to lie, and to take in the good faith of Western peoples.<sup>78</sup>

In 1970, a US Congress study group visited Brazil. It gave this summary of statements by American military advisers there:

Rather than dwell on the authoritarian aspects of the regime, they emphasize assertions by the Brazilian armed forces that they believe in, and support, representative democracy as an ideal and would return government to civilian control if this could be done without sacrifice to security and development. This withdrawal from the political arena is not seen as occurring in the near future. For that reason they emphasize the continued importance of the military assistance training program as a means of exerting U.S. influence and retaining the current pro-U.S. attitude of the Brazilian armed forces. Possible disadvantages to U.S. interests in being so closely identified with an authoritarian regime are not seen as particularly important.<sup>79</sup>

The CIA never rests ... a footnote: the *New York Times* reported in 1966 ...

When the CIA learned last year that a Brazilian youth had been killed in 1963, allegedly in an auto accident, while studying on a scholarship at the Lumumba University in Moscow, it mounted a massive publicity campaign to discourage other South American families from sending their youngsters to the Soviet Union.<sup>80</sup>

## 28. Peru 1960-1965

### Fort Bragg moves to the jungle

It was a CIA dream come true. A commando raid by anti-Castro Cubans upon the Cuban Embassy in Lima had uncovered documentary proof that Cuba had paid out “hundreds of thousands” of dollars in Peru for propaganda to foster favorable attitudes toward the Cuban revolution and to promote Communist activities within the country.

This was no standard broad-brush, cold-war accusation, for the documents disclosed all manner of details and names—the culprits who had been on the receiving end of the tainted money; men in unions and universities and in politics; men who had secretly visited Cuba, all expenses paid.<sup>1</sup> To top it all off, these were men the CIA looked upon as enemies.

The only problem—and it wasn't really a problem—was that some of the documents were counterfeit. The raid had certainly taken place, on 8 November 1960 to be exact. And documents had indeed been seized, at gunpoint. But the most incriminating of the documents, presented a month later with the authentic ones, had been produced by the experts of the CIA's Technical Services Division.<sup>2</sup>

It was a propaganda windfall. The story received wide media coverage in Latin America and the United States, accompanied by indignant anti-communist articles and editorials. The *Wall Street Journal* was moved to run an extremely long, slightly hysterical piece, obviously based on Washington handouts, strikingly unquestioned, which warned that “mountainous stacks of intelligence data from the 20 nations stretching from Mexico to Argentina tell of a widening Communist push into the hemisphere”.<sup>3</sup>

To be sure, the Cubans insisted that the documents were not genuine, but that was only to be expected. The affair was to cast a shadow over Castro's foreign relations for some time to come.

The most propitious outcome, from the CIA's standpoint, was that within days after the disclosure the Peruvian government broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. This was a major priority of the Agency in Lima, as in most other CIA stations in Latin America, and led further to the Cuban news agency, *Prensa Latina*, being barred from operating in Peru. The news agency's dispatches, the Peruvian authorities now decided, were “controlled from Moscow”.<sup>4</sup>

A week later, there was further welcome fallout from the incident. The government enacted legislation making it easier to arrest members of the Communist Party, although this was repealed a year later. During its deliberations the Peruvian legislature accepted a sworn statement from one Francisco Ramos Montejo, a recent defector from the Cuban Embassy who had been present during the raid, who “confirmed” that all the documents were genuine. Ramos, who was now living in Miami and working for the CIA, added fresh

revelations that there had been detailed plans for the assassination of Peruvian officials and for the overthrow of the government, and that arms had been smuggled into Peru from Bolivia and Ecuador, presumably for these purposes.<sup>5</sup>

Of such stuff is the battle for the hearts and minds of Latin Americans made.

The political history of Peru has been of the classic South American mold—an oligarchy overthrown by a military coup replaced by another oligarchy ... periodically punctuated by an uprising, sporadic violence from the forgotten below to remind those above that they are still alive, albeit barely. Veteran Latin America newsman John Gerassi described the state of those below in the Peru of the early 1960s:

In Lima, the capital, whose colonial mansions enveloped by ornate wooden balconies help make it one of the most beautiful cities in the world, half of the 1.3 million inhabitants live in rat-infested slums. One, called El Montón, is built around, over, and in the city dump. There, when I visited it, naked children, some too young to know how to walk, competed with pigs for a few bits of food scraps accidentally discarded by the garbage men ... [The peasants] chew cocaine-producing coca leaves to still hunger pains, and average 500 calories a day. Where there is grass, the Peruvian Andes Indian eats it—and also the sheep he kills when it gets so hungry that it begins tearing another sheep's wool off for its food. The peons who work the land of the whites average one sol (4 cents) a day, and ... labor from sunup to sundown.<sup>6</sup>

During this period, a movement led by Hugo Blanco organized peasants into unions, staged strikes and seized land. The movement engaged in little which could be termed guerrilla warfare, using its meagre arms to defend the squatters, and was easily and brutally put down by the police and army, apparently without significant American assistance other than the "routine" arming and training of such forces.

By 1965, however, several guerrilla groups had evolved in the eastern slopes of the Andes, cognizant of the bare truth that organizing peasants was, by itself, painfully inadequate; some would say suicidal. Inspired by the Cuban revolution, impressed with the social gains which had followed, and, in some cases, trained by the Cubans, these sons of the middle class met in May to plan a common strategy. Guerrilla warfare began in earnest the following month. By the end of the year, however, a joint Peruvian-American counter-insurgency operation had broken the back of three rebel groups, two of them in less than two months. Those guerrillas who remained alive and active were reduced to futile and impotent skirmishes over the next year or so.<sup>7</sup>

The role of the CIA in this definitive military mop-up has been concisely depicted by the former high official of the Agency, Victor Marchetti:

Green Berets participated ... in what was the CIA's single large-scale Latin American intervention of the post-Bay of Pigs era. This occurred in the mid-1960s, when the agency secretly came to the aid of the Peruvian government, then plagued by guerrilla troubles in its remote eastern regions. Unable to cope adequately with the insurgent movement, Lima had turned to the U.S. government for aid, which was immediately and covertly forthcoming.

The agency financed the construction of what one experienced observer described as "a miniature Fort Bragg" in the troubled Peruvian jungle region, complete with mess halls, classrooms, barracks, administrative buildings, parachute jump towers, amphibious landing facilities, and all the other accoutrements of paramilitary operations. Helicopters were furnished under cover of official military aid programs, and the CIA flew in arms and other combat equipment. Training was provided by the agency's Special Operations Division personnel and by Green Beret instructors on loan from the Army.<sup>8</sup>

In February 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara summed up this effort in a Senate hearing: "In Peru, the Government has already made good progress against guerrilla concentrations, and U.S. trained and supported Peruvian army and air force units have played prominent roles in this counter-guerrilla campaign."<sup>9</sup>

Typically, and ironically, such training would have included instilling in the Peruvian officers the motivation for doing battle with the insurgents in the first place. As US military affairs scholar Michael Klare has pointed out:

Many Latin American military officers would rather command elite units like jet fighter squadrons, naval flotillas, or armored brigades than slug it out with the guerrillas in long, unspectacular jungle campaigns. U.S. training programs are designed, therefore, to emphasize the importance of counterinsurgency operations (and to suggest, thereby, that the United States will reward those officers who make a good showing at this kind of warfare).<sup>10</sup>

The extent to which American military personnel engaged directly in combat is not known. They did, however, set up their headquarters in the center of an area of heavy fighting, in the village of Mazanari, and in September 1965 the *New York Times* reported that when the Peruvian army opened a major drive against the guerrillas, "At least one United States Army counter-insurgency expert was said to have helped plan and direct the attack."<sup>11</sup>

In the urban areas a concurrent round-up of guerrilla supporters was carried out, based materially on CIA intelligence: the list of "subversives" regularly compiled by Agency stations throughout the world for just such occasions.<sup>12</sup> The CIA is usually in a much better position to collect this information than the host government, due to its superior experience in the field, funds available for hiring informants, technical equipment for eavesdropping, and greater motivation.

While this was taking place the war in Vietnam and the militant protest against it had already captured the front pages of American newspapers, and the isolated *New York Times* dispatch referred to above easily passed into oblivion. Yet, the American objective in Peru—to crush a movement aimed at genuine land reform and the social and political changes inevitably stemming from such—was identical to its objective in Vietnam. And the methods employed were similar: burning down peasants' huts and villages to punish support for the guerrillas, defoliating the countryside to eliminate guerrilla sanctuaries, saturation bombing with napalm and high explosives, even throwing prisoners out of helicopters.<sup>13</sup>

The essential difference, one which spelled disaster for the Peruvian insurgents, was that their ranks were not augmented in any appreciable number by the Indian peasants, a group with little revolutionary consciousness and even less daring; four centuries of dehumanization had robbed them of virtually all hope and the sense of a right to revolt; and when this sense stirred even faintly, such as under Hugo Blanco, it was met head-on by the brick wall of official violence.

As common in the Third World as it is ludicrous, the bulk of the armed forces employed to keep the peasants pacified were soldiers of peasant stock themselves. It is a measure of the ultimate cynicism of the Peruvian and American military authorities that soldiers were stationed outside their home areas to lessen their resistance when the order was given to shoot.<sup>14</sup>

But it all worked. It worked so well that more than a decade was to pass before desperate men took to arms again in Peru.



## 29. Dominican Republic 1960-1966

### Saving democracy from communism by getting rid of democracy

On the night of 30 May 1961, Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, mass murderer, torturer par excellence, absolute dictator, was shot to death on a highway in the outskirts of the capital city, Ciudad Trujillo.

The assassination set off a chain of events over the next five years which featured sustained and remarkably gross intervention into the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic by the United States, the likes of which had not been seen in Latin America since the heyday of American gunboat diplomacy.

The United States had been an accomplice in the assassination itself of the man it had helped to climb power and to endure for some 30 years. It marked one of the rare occasions that the US government acted to overthrow a right-wing despot, albeit anti-communism was still the motivating force.

Whatever repugnance individual Washington policy makers may have felt toward Trujillo's incredible violations of human rights over the years, his fervent adherence to American policies, his repression of the left, and, as a consequence, the vigorous support he enjoyed in Congress (where Trujillo's money was no stranger) and in other influential American circles, were enough to keep successive United States administrations looking the other way.

When, in January 1959, Fulgencio Batista fell before the forces of Fidel Castro in near-by Cuba, a reconsideration of this policy was thrust upon Washington's agenda. This historic event seemed to suggest that support of right-wing governments might no longer be the best way of checking the rise of revolutionary movements in Latin America, but rather might be fostering them. Indeed, in June a force of Dominican exiles launched an invasion of their homeland from Cuba. Although the invasion was a complete failure, it could only serve to heighten Washington's concern about who was swimming around in "The American Lake".

"Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is to \_\_\_\_\_" was the implicit assumption, and Washington wanted to ensure that it could help fill in the blank," is the way one analysis formulated the problem. "As a result, the United States began to cast about for a way to get rid of Trujillo and at the same time to ensure a responsible successor."<sup>1</sup> Ironically, it was to Trujillo's Dominican Republic that Batista had fled.

The decision to topple Trujillo was reinforced in early 1960 when the United States sought to organize hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime. This policy ran head-on into the familiar accusation that the United States opposed only leftist governments, never those of the right, no matter how tyrannical. The close association with Trujillo, widely regarded as Washington's "protégé", was proving increasingly to be an embarrassment. The circumstances were such that President Eisenhower was led to observe that "It's certain that American public opinion won't condemn Castro until we have moved against Trujillo."<sup>2</sup> (The president's apparent belief in the independence of the American mind may have been overly generous, for Washington was supporting right-wing dictatorships in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti and elsewhere before and after Trujillo's assassination, yet the American public fell readily into line in condemning Castro.)

As early as 1958, the then-CIA chief of station in the Dominican Republic, Lear Reed, along with several Dominicans, had plotted an assassination of Trujillo, one which never got off the ground.<sup>3</sup> What the Agency's motivation was, and whether it was acting on its

own or at the behest of higher echelons in Washington, is not known. However, in February 1960 the National Security Council's Special Group in Washington gave consideration to a program of covert aid to anti-Trujillo Dominicans.<sup>4</sup> Two months later, Eisenhower approved a contingency plan which provided, in part, that if the situation deteriorated still further: "the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and—if necessary—military support."<sup>5</sup>

Seemingly unaware of the currents swirling about him, Trujillo continued to live up to his gangster reputation. In June, his henchmen blew up a car carrying Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt, an outspoken critic of the Dominican dictator. As a result, Washington came under renewed pressure from several of the more democratic Caribbean countries for action against Trujillo. Betancourt, who had survived the blast, told US Secretary of State Christian Herter: "If you don't eliminate him, we will invade."<sup>6</sup>

For a full year, the dissidents and various American officials played cloak-and-dagger games: There were meetings in New York and Washington, in Ciudad Trujillo and Venezuela; Americans living in the Dominican Republic were enlisted for the cause by the CIA; schemes to overthrow Trujillo were drawn up at different times by the State Department, the CIA, and the dissidents, some approved by the Special Group. A training camp was set up in Venezuela for Dominican exiles flown there from the United States and Puerto Rico by the CIA; the dissidents made numerous requests for weapons, from sniper rifles to remote-control detonating devices, for the understood purpose of assassinating Trujillo and other key members of his regime. Several of the requests were approved by the State Department or the CIA; support for the dissidents was regularly reiterated at high levels of the US government ... yet, after all was said and done, none of the ambitious plans was even attempted (the actual assassination was essentially a spur-of-the-moment improvised affair), only three pistols and three carbines were ever passed to the anti-Trujillistas, and it is not certain that any of these guns were used in the assassination.<sup>7</sup>

In the final analysis, the most significant aid received by the dissidents from the United States was the assurance that the "Colossus to the North" would not intervene militarily to prevent the assassination and would support them afterwards if they set up a "suitable" government. In Latin America this is virtually a *sine qua non* for such undertakings, notably in the Dominican Republic where American marines have landed on four separate occasions in this century, the last intervention having created a centralized Dominican National Guard which the US placed under the control of a young officer it had trained named Rafael Trujillo.

The gap between the word and the deed of the American government concerning the assassination appears to have been the consequence of a growing uncertainty in Washington about what would actually take place in the wake of Trujillo's demise—would a pro-Castro regime emerge from the chaos? A secondary consideration, perhaps, was a reluctance to engage in political assassination, both as a matter of policy and as a desire to avoid, as one State Department official put it, "further tarnishing in the eyes of the world" of the "U.S. moral posture".<sup>8</sup> This was particularly the expressed feeling of President John Kennedy and others in his administration who had assumed office in January 1961, although they were later to undertake several assassination attempts against Castro.

The dismal failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April further dampened the enthusiasm of Washington officials for Caribbean adventures (except against Cuba in revenge) and induced them to request a postponement of the assassination. The plotters, however, were well past the point of no return.

The Dominicans who pulled the triggers and their fellow conspirators were in no way revolutionaries. They came from the ranks of the conservative, privileged sectors of Dominican society and were bound together primarily by an intense loathing of Trujillo, a personal vendetta—each of them, or someone close to them, had suffered a deep humiliation at the hands of the diabolical dictator, if not torture or murder.

Their plan as to what would follow the elimination of Trujillo was only half-baked, and even this fell apart completely. As matters turned out, the day after the assassination, Rafael ("Ramfis") Trujillo, Jr. rushed home from his playboy's life in Paris to take over the reins of government. Little had been resolved, either in the Dominican Republic or in Washington. The Kennedy administration was confronted with the same ideological questions which had caused them so much indecision before the assassination, as they had the Eisenhower administration. To wit: What is the best way of preventing the establishment of left-wing governments intent upon radical social change? The traditional iron fist of right-wing dictatorship, or a more democratic society capable of meeting many of the legitimate demands of the populace? How much democracy? Would too much open the door for even greater, and unacceptable, demands and provide the left with a legal platform from which to sway ("dupe", Washington would call it) the public? And if it is a dictatorship that is to be supported, how are liberal American leaders to explain this to the world and to their own citizens?

John F. Kennedy and his men from Harvard tended to treat such policy questions in a manner more contemplative than American political figures are usually inclined to do: on occasion, it might be said, they even agonized over such questions. But in the end, their Latin American policy was scarcely distinguishable from that of conservative Republican administrations. A leader who imposed "order" with at least the facade of democracy, who kept the left submerged without being notoriously brutal about it; in short, the anti-communist liberal, still appeared to be the safest ally for the United States.

"There are three possibilities," Kennedy said, "in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third."<sup>9</sup>

Rafael Trujillo, Jr. was clearly not ideal. Besides bearing the inescapable stigma of his name and family, he proceeded to carry out a bloodbath of revenge over the next six months.<sup>10</sup> But, unlike his father in his last years, Ramfis could be prodded by Washington into making a few token reforms, and both parties might have been content to continue in this fashion indefinitely had not many people of the Dominican Republic felt terribly cheated by the turn of events. Their elation over the assassination had soured in the face of business-as-usual.

Resentment spilled over into the streets. By October, the protests were occurring daily and were being put down by tanks; students were shot dead by government troops. The United States began to make moves, for the situation in the streets and high places of the government was anarchic enough, Washington feared, to provide an opening for the proverbial (and seemingly magical) "communist takeover", although, in fact, the left in the Dominican Republic was manifestly insignificant from years of repression.

American diplomats met in the capital city with the Trujillo clan and Dominican military leaders and bluntly told them that US military power would, if necessary, be used to compel the formation of a provisional government headed by Joaquín Balaguer until elections could be held. Balaguer had been closely tied to the Trujillo family for decades, was serving as president under Trujillo at the time of the assassination, and had remained in the

same capacity under Ramfis, but he was not regarded as a threat to continue the tyranny. As Kennedy put it: "Balaguer is our only tool. The anticommunist liberals aren't strong enough. We must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to democracy."<sup>11</sup> Just how committed John F. Kennedy was to democracy in the Dominican Republic we shall presently see.

To make certain that the Dominicans got the message, a US naval task force of eight ships with 1,800 Marines aboard appeared off the Dominican coast on 19 November, just outside the three-mile limit but in plain sight of Ciudad Trujillo. Spanish-language broadcasts from the offshore ships warned that the Marines were prepared to come ashore; while overhead, American jet fighters streaked along the coastline. Brigadier General Pedro Rodriguez Echevarría, a key military figure, was persuaded by the United States to put aside any plans for a coup he may have been harboring and to support the American action. Rodriguez proceeded—whether of his own initiative is not clear—to order the bombing of the air base outside the capital where Trujillistas had been massing troops. Over the next two days, Ramfis returned to the pleasure temples of Europe while other prominent Trujillistas left for the good life in Florida.<sup>12</sup>

However, when Balaguer proved to be a major obstacle to beginning the process of democratization and indicated that he did not regard his regime as temporary, the United States added its own special pressure to that of Balaguer's domestic opposition to force him to resign after only two months in office. Washington then turned around and issued another stern warning to General Rodriguez, threatened Dominican leaders with a large loss of aid if they supported a coup, and mounted another naval show-of-force to help other military officers block the general's attempt to seize power.<sup>13</sup>

While a seven-man "Council of State" then administered the affairs of government, the US continued to treat the Dominican Republic as its private experiment in the prevention of communism. The American Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, pressed the Council to curb left-wing activity. By his own admission, Martin urged the use of "methods once used by the police in Chicago": harassment of suspects by repeated arrests, midnight raids on their homes, beatings, etc.<sup>14</sup>

When street disturbances erupted, US Attorney General Robert Kennedy arranged for riot-control equipment to be sent to Santo Domingo (the original name of the capital, now restored). The equipment came complete with two Spanish-speaking Los Angeles detectives to impart to their Dominican counterparts the fine art of quelling such uprisings that they had acquired in the Mexican barrios of east Los Angeles. In a few weeks, Ambassador Martin could report that the Council had "rewon the streets, thanks almost entirely to those two detectives".<sup>15</sup>

This riot-control unit remained as a permanent part of the Santo Domingo police force. Known as the *Cascos Blancos* (white helmets), they came to be much hated by the populace. Shortly afterwards, the US military undertook a long-range program to transform the country's armed forces into what was hoped would be an efficient anti-guerrilla organization, though guerrillas were as rare on the Caribbean island as members of the Trujillo family.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, in December 1962, elections were held, under terms dictated in large part by Ambassador Martin to the two major candidates. His purpose was to introduce into the Dominican Republic some of the features that Americans regard as necessary to a viable and democratic electoral system, but Martin's fiat was inescapably a highly condescending intrusion into the affairs of a supposedly sovereign nation. His instructions extended down to the level of what the loser should say in his concession speech.

Further, under an "Emergency Law", the United States and the Council arranged for

the deportation of some 125 Trujillistas and "Castro communists" to the United States, from where they were not allowed to leave until after the election in order "to help maintain stability so elections could be held".<sup>17</sup>

The winner, and first more-or-less-democratically elected president of the Dominican Republic since 1924, was Juan Bosch, a writer who had spent many years in exile while Trujillo reigned. Here at last was Kennedy's liberal anti-communist, non-military and legally elected by a comfortable majority as well. Bosch's government was to be the long-sought-after "showcase of democracy" that would put the lie to Fidel Castro. He was given the grand treatment in Washington shortly before he took office in February 1963.

Bosch was true to his beliefs. He called for land reform, including transferring some private land to the public sector as required; low-rent housing; modest nationalization of business; an ambitious project of public works, serving mass needs more than vested interests; a reduction in the import of luxury items; at the same time, he favored incentives to private enterprise and was open to foreign investment provided it was not excessively exploitative of the country—all in all, standard elements in the program of any liberal Third World leader serious about social change. He was likewise serious about the thing called civil liberties: Communists, or those labeled as such, or anyone else, were not to be persecuted unless they actually violated the law.

A number of American officials and congressmen expressed their discomfort with Bosch's plans, as well as his stance of independence from the United States. Land reform and nationalization are always touchy issues in Washington, the stuff that "creeping socialism" is made of. In several quarters of the US press Bosch was red-baited and compared with Castro, and the Dominican Republic with Cuba. (Castro, for his part, branded Bosch a "Yankee puppet".) Some of the press criticism was clearly orchestrated, in the manner of many CIA campaigns.<sup>18</sup>

In both the United States and the Dominican Republic, the accusations most frequently cast at Bosch were the ones typically used against Latin American leaders who do not vigorously suppress the left (cf. Arbenz and Goulart): Bosch was allowing "communists" to "infiltrate" into the country and into the government, and he was not countering "communist subversion", the latter referring to no more than instances of people standing up for their long-denied rights. Wrote a reporter for the *Miami News*: "Communist penetration of the Dominican Republic is progressing with incredible speed and efficiency." He did not, however, name a single communist in the Bosch government. As it happens, the reporter, Hal Hendrix, was a valuable press asset and a "secret operative" of the CIA in the 1960s.<sup>19</sup>

The CIA made a further contribution to the anti-Bosch atmosphere. Ambassador Martin has reported that the Agency "gave rumors [about communists in the Dominican Republic] a credibility far higher than I would have ... In reporting a Castro/Communist plot, however wildly implausible, it is obviously safer to evaluate it as 'could be true' than as nonsense."<sup>20</sup>

John F. Kennedy also soured on Bosch, particularly for his refusal to crack down on radicals. Said the president to Ambassador Martin one day:

I'm wondering if the day might not come when he'd [Bosch] like to get rid of some of the left. Tell him we respect his judgment, we're all for him, but the time may come when he'll want to deport 30 or 50 people, when it'd be better to deport them than to let them go. I suppose he'd have to catch them in something.<sup>21</sup>

When the United States failed to commit any new economic assistance to the Dominican Republic and generally gave the indication that Juan Bosch was a doomed ven-

ture, right-wing Dominican military officers could only be encouraged in their craving to be rid of the president and his policies. Sam Halper, former Caribbean Bureau Chief of *Time* magazine, later reported that the military coup ousting Bosch went into action "as soon as they got a wink from the U.S. Pentagon".<sup>22</sup>

In July, a group of officers formally presented Bosch with a statement of principle-cum-ultimatum: Their loyalty to his regime was conditioned upon his adoption of a policy of rigorous anti-communism. Bosch reacted by going on television and delivering a lecture about the apolitical role required of the military in a democratic society, surely an occult subject to these products of 31 years of Trujilloism.

The beleaguered president could see that a premature demise lay ahead for his government. His speech on television had sounded very much like a farewell. The failure of Washington to intervene on his behalf could only enlarge the writing on the wall. Indeed, Bosch and some of his aides strongly suspected that the US military and the CIA were already conspiring with the Dominican officers. Several American military officers had disregarded diplomatic niceties by expressing their reservations about Bosch's politics loud enough to reach his ears.<sup>23</sup>

A week before the inevitable coup, the CIA/AIFLD-created union federation in the Dominican Republic, CONATRAL, which had been set up to counter and erode Bosch's support in the labor movement, placed an ad in a leading newspaper urging the people to put their faith in the army to defend them against communism.<sup>24</sup>

The end came in September, a scant seven months after Bosch had taken office. He had not had the time to accomplish much that was worthwhile in this hopelessly corrupt society before the military boots marched, as they have always marched in Latin America.

The United States, which can discourage a military coup in Latin America with a frown, did nothing to stand in the way of the Dominican officers. There would be no display of American military might this time—although Bosch asked for it—"unless a Communist takeover were threatened," said the State Department.<sup>25</sup>

"Democracy," said *Newsweek* magazine, "was being saved from Communism by getting rid of democracy."<sup>26</sup>

There were the customary expressions of regret in Washington about the death of democracy, and there was the *de rigueur* withholding of recognition of the new regime. But two months later, when opposition to the yet-again repressive dictatorship began to manifest itself noticeably, the junta yelled "communist" and was quickly embraced by the United States with recognition and the other perquisites which attach to being a member in good standing of the "Free World".<sup>27</sup>

Nineteen months later, a revolution broke out in the Dominican Republic which promised to put the exiled Bosch back in power at the hands of a military-civilian force that would be loyal to his program. But for the fifth time in the century, the American Marines landed and put an abrupt end to such hopes.

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In the early morning of Saturday, 24 April 1965, a group of young army officers of middle rank, acting in concert with civilian Bosch partisans, declared themselves in revolt against the government. The "constitutionalists", as they called themselves, were soon joined by other officers and their units. Spurred by ecstatic radio proclamations, thousands of Dominicans poured into the streets shouting "Viva Bosch" and grabbed up the arms handed out by the rebel military forces.

The television station was taken over and for two days a "potpourri of politicians, sol-

diers, women, children, adventurers, hoodlums and anyone who wished to, shouted against the status quo."<sup>28</sup>

The participants in the uprising were a mixed bag, not all of them sympathetic to Bosch or to social reform; some were on the right, with their own varied motivations. But the impetus clearly lay with the constitutionalists, and the uprising was thus viewed with alarm by the rest of the military and the US Embassy as a movement to restore Bosch to power with all that that implied.

Philip Geyelin of the *Wall Street Journal* (and formerly with the CIA), who had access to the official embassy cables and the key actors in the drama, has written:

What the record reveals, in fact, is that from the very outset of the upheaval, there was a concerted U.S. Government effort, if not actually a formal decision, to checkmate the rebel movement by whatever means and at whatever cost.

By Sunday, April 25 ... the Santo Domingo embassy had clearly cast its lot with the "loyalist" military cabal and against the rebellion's original aim: the return of Juan Bosch ... Restoration of the Bosch regime would be "against U.S. interests", the embassy counseled. Blocking Bosch could mean further bloodshed, the embassy conceded. Nonetheless, Washington was advised, the embassy military attaches had given "loyalist" leaders a go-ahead to do "everything possible" to prevent what was described as the danger of a "Communist take-over".<sup>29</sup>

The attachés as well as the US Consul made emergency visits to several still-uncommitted Dominican military commanders to persuade them, apparently with notable success, to support the government.<sup>30</sup>

A bloody civil war had broken out in the streets of Santo Domingo. During the first few days, the momentum of battle swung to one side, then the other. By the night of 28 April, however, the military and police inside Santo Domingo had collapsed, and the constitutionalists were preparing to attack the military's last bastion, San Isidro, their main base about 10 miles away.<sup>31</sup>

"The Generals at San Isidro were dejected, several were weeping, and one was hysterically urging 'retreat'," read the cable sent by the American ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, to Washington in the early evening of the 28th. (Bennett, as we shall see, was given to hyperbole of the worst sort, but the Dominican military certainly were isolated and demoralized.) Bennett added, whether in the same cable or another one is not clear, that if US troops did not immediately land, American lives would be lost and "Castro-type elements" would be victorious.<sup>32</sup>

Within hours, the first 500 US Marines were brought in by helicopter from ships stationed a few miles off the coast. Two days later, American forces ashore numbered over 4,000. At the peak, some 23,000 troops, Marine and Army, were to take up positions in the beleaguered country, with thousands more standing by on a 35-ship task force offshore.

The American action was in clear violation of several international agreements, including the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) which prohibited intervention "directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state".

During the entire course of the US military occupation, American pronouncements would have had the world believe that its forces were in the Dominican Republic in a "neutral" capacity: to protect the lives of Americans and other foreigners, establish a ceasefire, ensure free elections, etc. As we have seen, however, the United States had committed itself to one side from the start of hostilities. This continued to be the case. The morning after the landing of the first Marines, Ambassador Bennett was instructed by the State Department



that US military officers should be used "to help San Isidro develop operational plans to take the rebel stronghold downtown".<sup>33</sup>

Within a few days, American troops were deployed in an armed corridor through the center of Santo Domingo so as to divide the constitutionalists' zone and cut off their main body from access to the rest of the country, bottling them up in a small downtown area with their backs to the sea. Other American forces were stationed throughout the countryside. The rebel offensive against San Isidro had been prevented. It was the end of their revolution.

The American forces came to the aid of the Dominican military in a number of ways, supplying them with equipment, food and even their salaries, but it was the direct military involvement that was most telling. On one striking occasion, the sea of American troops parted to allow the Dominican military to pass through and brutally attack and mop up the northern section of the rebel zone while the main rebel force in the south remained helplessly blocked behind the American line. This "smashing victory," the *New York Times* reported, was "visibly aided by United States troops". Other American journalists also reported that US troops took part in the fighting, although Washington officials angrily denied it.<sup>34</sup>

The rebels were reduced to little more than sniping attacks on American soldiers, for which they paid a heavy price. US forces blasted apart a building in downtown Santo Domingo from which sniper fire was coming; advancing into a constitutionalist zone, again after sniper fire, they killed some 67 rebels and bystanders; American paratroops were seen firing at rebels who were retreating, and the constitutionalists' Minister of Justice and Police was "reported to have been killed by United States machine-gun fire as he attempted to capture the empty Presidential Palace in midtown with a squad of his troops."<sup>35</sup>

When the Johnson administration was not denying such actions outright, it was claiming that they were either contrary to orders, "individual indiscretions", or "isolated incidents".

A covert team of Green Berets arrived at one point to help ensure the safety of American civilians. But when they discovered that some of the Americans were assisting rebel forces, "their main objective shifted from protecting their fellow countrymen to spying on them".<sup>36</sup>

The Green Berets also found the time to lay the groundwork for the assassination of one of the leading constitutionalist leaders, Col. Francisco Caamaño. The plot was canceled at the last moment due to the excessive risk involved.<sup>37</sup>

Another group of American visitors was that of some leaders of the National Student Association, ostensibly come to the Dominican Republic to talk with their counterparts about educational matters, but actually there at the behest of the CIA to gather information on local students. This was still two years before the exposé of the long-lasting relationship between the CIA and the prominent student organization.<sup>38</sup>

Throughout this period, the communication guns of the US government were aimed at the people of the United States, the Dominican Republic and the world to convince them that "communists" were a dominant element amongst the constitutionalists, that they represented a threat to take over the movement, or that they had already taken it over, with frightening consequences for all concerned.

At various times the Johnson administration released lists of "communists and Castroites" in the ranks of the rebels. These lists totaled 53 or 58 or 77 names and became a cause célèbre as well as an object of media ridicule. Besides the laughably small numbers involved (in a rebellion of tens of thousands with numerous leaders), several of those on the lists, it turned out, were in prison while others were out of the country.

The American Embassy in Santo Domingo assured reporters that if they went to rebel headquarters, they would see the named communist in the flesh. The newspeople went and looked but could find no identifiable communists (however one identifies a communist). Subsequently, administration officials explained that the reason that newspeople had seen such little evidence of communist activity was that the American landings had scared the Reds into hiding.

Eventually, American officials admitted their doubt that they could prove that communists had gained control of the constitutionalists, although President Johnson had pressed the CIA and FBI into an intensive search for evidence. (A CIA cable to Washington on 25 April reported that the Communist Party [Partido Socialista Dominicano] had been "unaware of the coup attempt".)<sup>39</sup>

Former CIA officer Philip Agee, stationed in Uruguay at the time, wrote later that the new password at his station became "Fifty-eight trained communists". The proper reply was "Ten thousand marines".<sup>40</sup>

The embassy, and Ambassador Bennett in particular, poured forth "a rising stream of hysterical rumors, atrocity stories, and alarmist reports"<sup>41</sup> about the rebels, reminiscent of the Bolshevik horror stories which had filled the pages of the American press following the Russian Revolution: embassies being ransacked ... "Castroite-style mass executions" ... rebels parading in the streets with the heads of their victims on poles ...

President Johnson made reference to the "atrocities" in public statements, but none of the stories were ever proven, for none were true; no one ever located any of the many headless Dominicans; and American officials, in a monument to *chutzpah*, later denounced the press for reporting such unverified rumors.<sup>42</sup>

Meanwhile, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the US Information Agency were conducting their own intensive propaganda campaign in the Dominican Republic to give credence to the American position and discredit Dominican groups opposed to it. Experts on psychological warfare arrived to ply their trade, radio stations and newspapers were covertly set up, rebel radio stations jammed, leaflets airdropped in the countryside. The USIA also secretly subsidized the publication of pro-administration material aimed for distribution in the United States.<sup>43</sup>

From all the wild charges and the frequent contradictory statements made by American officials, the expression "credibility gap" entered the American popular language and soon came to haunt the Johnson presidency.<sup>44</sup>

Historian Richard Barnet has noted another interesting side to the American propaganda effort:

To justify the intervention, which had aroused violent opposition from traditional friends of the United States because of its crudeness and the swathe of lies in which it was wrapped ... [Washington] began a direct assault on the concept of non-intervention, the rhetorical foundation stone of Latin-American policy enshrined in numerous treaties, declarations, and Pan-American Day speeches ... Under Secretary Thomas Mann told newspaper correspondents that the OAS and UN charters were drawn up in "19th-century terms" ... Averell Harriman remarked in Montevideo that the principle of non-intervention was becoming "obsolete". By a vote of 315 to 52 the House of Representatives passed a resolution ... justifying the unilateral use of force on foreign territory by any nation which considers itself threatened by "international communism, directly or indirectly." ... The President [declared in a speech]: "The first reality is that old concepts and old labels are largely obsolete. In today's world, with enemies of freedom talking about 'Wars of national liberation,' the old distinction between 'Civil War' and 'International War' has already lost much of its meaning ... The moment of decision must become the moment of action."

"This is the essence of the Johnson Doctrine," wrote Barnett, "a virtually unlimited claim of legitimacy for armed intervention in civil strife."<sup>45</sup>

The last American troops did not leave the Dominican Republic until September 1966. The interim period witnessed a succession of ceasefires, broken truces, and protracted negotiations under provisional governments.

In June 1966, elections were held in which Joaquín Balaguer defeated Juan Bosch by a surprisingly large margin. Yet, it was not all that surprising. For five long years the people of the Dominican Republic had lived under a cloud of chaos and violence. The experience had instilled in them a deep longing for a return to "normalcy", to order, without foreign intervention, without soldiers patrolling their streets, without curfews, tear gas and bloodshed. With the US Army still very much in evidence and the American distaste for Bosch well known ... with the ubiquitous American propaganda hammering home fear of The Red Menace and associating the constitutionalists, and thus Bosch, with communism ... with the Dominican military still largely Trujillista in personnel and ideology ... a victory for Bosch would be seen by many voters as a danger that all the horrors would rain down upon their heads once more. Bosch, who had returned several months prior to the election, was himself so fearful for his personal safety that he never left his home during the campaign.

Joaquín Balaguer remained in office for the next 12 years, ruling his people in the grand Latin American style: The rich became richer and the poor had babies, hungry babies; democracy remained an alien concept; the police and military regularly kidnapped, tortured and murdered opponents of the government and terrorized union organizers.<sup>46</sup>

But the man was not, personally, the monster that Trujillo was. There was relative calm and peace. No "communist threat" hovered over the land. The pot was sweetened for foreign investors, and American corporations moved in with big bucks. There was stability and order. And the men who ran the United States looked and were satisfied. Perhaps some of them had come to the realization that the anti-communist liberal government was an impossible ideal; for any movement seeking genuine democracy and social reform would invariably attract individuals whom the United States would invariably categorize as "communist"; the United States would then feel driven to discredit, subvert and eventually overturn the movement. A Catch 22.

## 30. Cuba 1959 to 1980s

### The unforgivable revolution

The existence of a revolutionary socialist government with growing ties to the Soviet Union only 90 miles away, insisted the United States Government, was a situation which no self-respecting superpower should tolerate, and in 1961 it undertook an invasion of Cuba.

But less than 50 miles from the Soviet Union sat Pakistan, a close ally of the United States, a member since 1955 of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the US-created anti-communist alliance. On the very border of the Soviet Union was Iran, an even closer ally of the United States, with its relentless electronic listening posts, aerial surveillance, and infiltration into Russian territory by American agents. And alongside Iran, also bordering the Soviet Union, was Turkey, a member of the Russians' mortal enemy, NATO, since 1951.

In 1962 during the "Cuban Missile Crisis", Washington, seemingly in a state of near-panic, informed the world that the Russians were installing "offensive" missiles in Cuba. The US promptly instituted a "quarantine" of the island—a powerful show of naval and marine forces in the Caribbean would stop and search all vessels heading towards Cuba; any found to contain military cargo would be forced to turn back.

The United States, however, had missiles and bomber bases already in place in Turkey and other missiles in Western Europe pointed toward the Soviet Union. Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev later wrote:

The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we'd be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine. ... After all, the United States had no moral or legal quarrel with us. We hadn't given the Cubans anything more than the Americans were giving to their allies. We had the same rights and opportunities as the Americans. Our conduct in the international arena was governed by the same rules and limits as the Americans.<sup>1</sup>

Lest anyone misunderstand, as Khrushchev apparently did, the rules under which Washington was operating, *Time* magazine was quick to explain. "On the part of the Communists," the magazine declared, "this equating [referring to Khrushchev's offer to mutually remove missiles and bombers from Cuba and Turkey] had obvious tactical motives. On the part of neutralists and pacifists [who welcomed Khrushchev's offer] it betrayed intellectual and moral confusion." The confusion lay, it seems, in not seeing clearly who were the good guys and who were the bad guys, for "The purpose of the U.S. bases [in Turkey] was not to blackmail Russia but to strengthen the defense system of NATO, which had been created as a safeguard against Russian aggression. As a member of NATO, Turkey welcomed the bases as a contribution to her own defense." Cuba, which had been invaded only the year before, could have, it seems, no such concern. *Time* continued its sermon:

Beyond these differences between the two cases, there is an enormous moral difference between U.S. and Russian objectives ... To equate U.S. and Russian bases is in effect to equate U.S. and Russian purposes ... The U.S. bases, such as those in Turkey, have helped keep the peace since World War II, while the Russian bases in Cuba threatened to upset the peace. The Russian bases were intended to further conquest and domination, while U.S. bases were erected to preserve freedom. The difference should have been obvious to all.<sup>2</sup>

Equally obvious was the right of the United States to maintain a military base on Cuban soil—Guantánamo Naval Base by name, a vestige of colonialism staring down the throats of the Cuban people, which the US, to this day, refuses to vacate despite the vehement protest of the Castro government.

In the American lexicon, in addition to good and bad bases and missiles, there are good and bad revolutions. The American and French Revolutions were good. The Cuban Revolution is bad. It must be bad because so many people have left Cuba as a result of it.

But at least 100,000 people left the British colonies in America during and after the American Revolution. These Tories could not abide by the political and social changes, both actual and feared, particularly that change which attends all revolutions worthy of the name: Those looked down upon as inferiors no longer know their place. (Or as the US Secretary of State put it after the Russian Revolution: the Bolsheviks sought "to make the ignorant and incapable mass of humanity dominant in the earth.")<sup>3</sup>

The Tories fled to Nova Scotia and Britain carrying tales of the godless, dissolute, barbaric American revolutionaries. Those who remained and refused to take an oath of allegiance to the new state governments were denied virtually all civil liberties. Many were jailed, murdered, or forced into exile. After the American Civil War, thousands more fled to South America and other points, again disturbed by the social upheaval. How much more is such an exodus to be expected following the Cuban Revolution?—a true social revolution, giving rise to changes much more profound than anything in the American experience. How many more would have left the United States if 90 miles away lay the world's wealthiest nation welcoming their residence and promising all manner of benefits and rewards?

After the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, we learned that there are also good and bad hijackings. On several occasions Cuban planes and boats were hijacked to the United States but they were not returned to Cuba, nor were the hijackers punished. Instead, some of the planes and boats were seized by US authorities for non-payment of debts claimed by American firms against the Cuban government.<sup>4</sup> But then there were the bad hijackings—planes forced to fly from the United States to Cuba. When there began to be more of these than flights in the opposite direction, Washington was obliged to reconsider its policy.

It appears that there are as well good and bad terrorists. When the Israelis bombed PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985, Ronald Reagan expressed his approval. The president asserted that nations have the right to retaliate against terrorist attacks "as long as you pick out the people responsible".<sup>5</sup>

But if Cuba had dropped bombs on any of the headquarters of the anti-Castro exiles in Miami or New Jersey, Ronald Reagan would likely have gone to war, though for 25 years the Castro government had been on the receiving end of an extraordinary series of terrorist attacks carried out in Cuba, in the United States, and in other countries by the exiles and their CIA mentors. (We shall not discuss the consequences of Cuba bombing CIA headquarters.)

Bombing and strafing attacks of Cuba by planes based in the United States began in October 1959, if not before.<sup>6</sup> In early 1960, there were several fire-bomb air raids on Cuban cane fields and sugar mills, in which American pilots also took part—at least three of whom died in crashes, while two others were captured. The State Department acknowledged that one plane which crashed, killing two Americans, had taken off from Florida, but insisted that it was against the wishes of the US government.<sup>7</sup>

In March a French freighter unloading munitions from Belgium exploded in Havana taking 75 lives and injuring 200, some of whom subsequently died. The United States denied Cuba's accusation of sabotage but admitted that it had sought to prevent the shipment.<sup>8</sup>

And so it went ... reaching a high point in April of the following year in the infamous CIA-organized invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Over 100 exiles died in the attack. Close to 1,200 others were taken prisoner by the Cubans. It was later revealed that four American pilots flying for the CIA had lost their lives as well.<sup>9</sup>

The Bay of Pigs assault had relied heavily on the Cuban people rising up to join the invaders,<sup>10</sup> but this was not to be the case. As it was, the leadership and ranks of the exile forces were riddled with former supporters and henchmen of Fulgencio Batista, the dictator overthrown by Castro, and would not have been welcomed back by the Cuban people under any circumstances.

Despite the fact that the Kennedy administration was acutely embarrassed by the unmitigated defeat—indeed, *because* of it—a campaign of smaller-scale attacks upon Cuba was initiated almost immediately. Throughout the 1960s, the Caribbean island was subject-

ed to countless sea and air commando raids by exiles, at times accompanied by their CIA supervisors, inflicting damage upon oil refineries, chemical plants and railroad bridges, cane fields, sugar mills and sugar warehouses; infiltrating spies, saboteurs and assassins ... anything to damage the Cuban economy, promote disaffection, or make the revolution look bad ... taking the lives of Cuban militia members and others in the process ... pirate attacks on Cuban fishing boats and merchant ships, bombardments of Soviet vessels docked in Cuba, an assault upon a Soviet army camp with 12 Russian soldiers reported wounded ... a hotel and a theatre shelled from offshore because Russians and East Europeans were supposed to be present there ...<sup>11</sup>

These actions were not always carried out on the direct order of the CIA or with its foreknowledge, but the Agency could hardly plead "rogue elephant". It had created an operations headquarters in Miami that was truly a state within a city—over, above, and outside the laws of the United States, not to mention international law, with a staff of several hundred Americans directing many more Cuban agents in just such types of actions, with a budget in excess of \$50 million a year, and an arrangement with the local press to keep operations in Florida secret except when the CIA wanted something publicized.<sup>12</sup>

Title 18 of the US Code declares it to be a crime to launch a "military or naval expedition or enterprise" from the United States against a country with which the United States is not (officially) at war. Although US authorities now and then aborted an exile plot or impounded a boat—sometimes because the Coast Guard or other officials had not been properly clued in—no Cubans were prosecuted under this act. This was no more than to be expected inasmuch as Attorney General Robert Kennedy had determined after the Bay of Pigs that the invasion did not constitute a military expedition.<sup>13</sup>

The commando raids were combined with a total US trade and credit embargo, which continues to this day, and which genuinely hurt the Cuban economy and chipped away at the society's standard of living. So unyielding has the embargo been that when Cuba was hard hit by a hurricane in October 1963, and Casa Cuba, a New York social club, raised a large quantity of clothing for relief, the United States refused to grant it an export license on the grounds that such shipment was "contrary to the national interest".<sup>14</sup>

Moreover, pressure was brought to bear upon other countries to conform to the embargo, and goods destined for Cuba were sabotaged: machinery damaged, chemicals added to lubricating fluids to cause rapid wear on diesel engines, a manufacturer in West Germany paid to produce ball-bearings off-center, another to do the same with balanced wheel gears—"You're talking about big money," said a CIA officer involved in the sabotage efforts, "when you ask a manufacturer to go along with you on that kind of project because he has to reset his whole mold. And he is probably going to worry about the effect on future business. You might have to pay him several hundred thousand dollars or more."<sup>15</sup>

One manufacturer who defied the embargo was the British Leyland Company, which sold a large number of buses to Cuba in 1964. Repeated expressions of criticism and protest by Washington officials and congressmen failed to stem deliveries of some of the buses. Then, in October, an East German cargo ship carrying another 42 buses to Cuba collided in thick fog with a Japanese vessel in the Thames. The Japanese ship was able to continue on, but the cargo ship was beached on its side; the buses would have to be "written off", said the Leyland company. In the leading British newspapers it was just an accident story.<sup>16</sup> In the *New York Times* it was not even reported. A decade was to pass before the American columnist Jack Anderson disclosed that his CIA and National Security Agency sources had confirmed that the collision had been arranged by the CIA with the cooperation of British intelligence.<sup>17</sup> Subsequently, another CIA officer stated that he was skeptical about the col-

lision story, although admitting that "it is true that we were sabotaging the Leyland buses going to Cuba from England, and that was pretty sensitive business."<sup>18</sup>

What undoubtedly was an even more sensitive venture was the use of chemical and biological weapons against Cuba by the United States. It is a remarkable record.

In August 1962, a British freighter under Soviet lease, having damaged its propeller on a reef, crept into the harbor at San Juan, Puerto Rico for repairs. It was bound for a Soviet port with 80,000 bags of Cuban sugar. The ship was put into dry dock and 14,135 sacks of sugar were unloaded to a warehouse to facilitate the repairs. While in the warehouse, the sugar was contaminated by CIA agents with a substance that was allegedly harmless but unpalatable. When President Kennedy learned of the operation he was furious because it had taken place in US territory and if discovered could provide the Soviet Union with a propaganda field-day and could set a terrible precedent for chemical sabotage in the cold war. He directed that the sugar not be returned to the Russians, although what explanation was given to them is not publicly known.<sup>19</sup> Similar undertakings were apparently not canceled. The CIA official who helped direct worldwide sabotage efforts, referred to above, later revealed that "There was lots of sugar being sent out from Cuba, and we were putting a lot of contaminants in it."<sup>20</sup>

The same year, a Canadian agricultural technician working as an adviser to the Cuban government was paid \$5,000 by "an American military intelligence agent" to infect Cuban turkeys with a virus which would produce the fatal Newcastle disease. Subsequently, 8,000 turkeys died. The technician later claimed that although he had been to the farm where the turkeys had died, he had not actually administered the virus, but had instead pocketed the money, and that the turkeys had died from neglect and other causes unrelated to the virus. This may have been a self-serving statement. The *Washington Post* reported that "According to U.S. intelligence reports, the Cubans—and some Americans—believe the turkeys died as the result of espionage."<sup>21</sup>

Authors Warren Hinckle and William Turner, citing a participant in the project, have reported in their book on Cuba that:

During 1969 and 1970, the CIA deployed futuristic weather modification technology to ravage Cuba's sugar crop and undermine the economy. Planes from the China Lake Naval Weapons Center in the California desert, where hi tech was developed, overflew the island, seeding rain clouds with crystals that precipitated torrential rains over non-agricultural areas and left the cane fields arid (the downpours caused killer flash floods in some areas).<sup>22</sup>

In 1971, also according to participants, the CIA turned over to Cuban exiles a virus which causes African swine fever. Six weeks later, an outbreak of the disease in Cuba forced the slaughter of 500,000 pigs to prevent a nationwide animal epidemic. The outbreak, the first ever in the Western hemisphere, was called the "most alarming event" of the year by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.<sup>23</sup>

Ten years later, the target may well have been human beings, as an epidemic of dengue fever swept the Cuban island. Transmitted by blood-eating insects, usually mosquitos, the disease produces severe flu symptoms and incapacitating bone pain. Between May and October 1981, over 300,000 cases were reported in Cuba with 158 fatalities, 101 of which were children under 15.<sup>24</sup> In 1956 and 1958, declassified documents have revealed, the US Army loosed swarms of specially bred mosquitos in Georgia and Florida to see whether disease-carrying insects could be weapons in a biological war. The mosquitos bred for the tests were of the *Aedes Aegypti* type, the precise carrier of dengue fever as well as other



diseases.<sup>25</sup> In 1967 it was reported by *Science* magazine that at the US government center in Fort Detrick, Maryland, dengue fever was amongst those "diseases that are at least the objects of considerable research and that appear to be among those regarded as potential BW [biological warfare] agents."<sup>26</sup> Then, in 1984, a Cuban exile on trial in New York testified that in the latter part of 1980 a ship travelled from Florida to Cuba with

a mission to carry some germs to introduce them in Cuba to be used against the Soviets and against the Cuban economy, to begin what was called chemical war, which later on produced results that were not what we had expected, because we thought that it was going to be used against the Soviet forces, and it was used against our own people, and with that we did not agree.<sup>27</sup>

It's not clear from the testimony whether the Cuban man thought that the germs would somehow be able to confine their actions to only Russians, or whether he had been misled by the people behind the operation.

The full extent of American chemical and biological warfare against Cuba will never be known. Over the years, the Castro government has in fact blamed the United States for a number of other plagues which afflicted various animals and crops.<sup>28</sup> And in 1977, newly-released CIA documents disclosed that the Agency "maintained a clandestine anti-crop warfare research program targeted during the 1960s at a number of countries throughout the world."<sup>29</sup>

It came to pass that the United States felt the need to put some of its chemical and biological warfare (CBW) expertise into the hands of other nations. As of 1969, some 550 students, from 36 countries, had completed courses at the US Army's Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama. The CBW instruction was provided to the students under the guise of "defense" against such weapons—just as in Vietnam, as we have seen, torture was taught. As will be described in the chapter on Uruguay, the manufacture and use of bombs was taught under the cover of combating terrorist bombings.<sup>30</sup>

The ingenuity which went into the chemical and biological warfare against Cuba was apparent in some of the dozens of plans to assassinate or humiliate Fidel Castro. Devised by the CIA or Cuban exiles, with the cooperation of American mafiosi, the plans ranged from poisoning Castro's cigars and food to a chemical designed to make his hair and beard fall off and LSD to be administered just before a public speech. There were also of course the more traditional approaches of gun and bomb, one being an attempt to drop bombs on a baseball stadium while Castro was speaking; the B-26 bomber was driven away by anti-aircraft fire before it could reach the stadium.<sup>31</sup> It is a combination of such Cuban security measures, informers, incompetence, and luck which has served to keep the bearded one alive to the present day.

Attempts were also made on the lives of Castro's brother Raul and Che Guevara. The latter was the target of a bazooka fired at the United Nations building in New York in December 1964.<sup>32</sup> Various Cuban exile groups have engaged in violence on a regular basis in the United States with relative impunity for decades. One of them, going by the name of Omega 7 and headquartered in Union City, New Jersey, was characterized by the FBI in 1980 as "the most dangerous terrorist organization in the United States."<sup>33</sup> Attacks against Cuba itself began to lessen around the end of the 1960s, due probably to a lack of satisfying results combined with ageing warriors, and exile groups turned to targets in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

During the next decade, while the CIA continued to pour money into the exile community, more than 100 serious "incidents" took place in the United States for which Omega 7 and other groups claimed responsibility. (Within the community, the distinction between a terrorist and a non-terrorist group is not especially precise; there is much overlapping identity and frequent creation of new names.) There occurred repeated bombings of the Soviet UN Mission, its Washington Embassy, its automobiles, a Soviet ship docked in New Jersey, the offices of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, with a number of Russians injured from these attacks; several bombings of the Cuban UN Mission and its Interests Section in Washington, many attacks upon Cuban diplomats, including at least one murder; a bomb discovered at New York's Academy of Music in 1976 shortly before a celebration of the Cuban Revolution was to begin; a bombing two years later of the Lincoln Center after the Cuban ballet had performed ...<sup>34</sup>

The single most violent act of this period was the blowing up of a Cubana Airlines plane shortly after it took off from Barbados on 6 October 1976, which took the lives of 73 people including the entire Cuban championship fencing team. CIA documents later revealed that on 22 June, a CIA officer abroad had cabled a report to Agency headquarters that he had learned from a source that a Cuban exile group planned to bomb a Cubana airliner flying between Panama and Havana. The group's leader was a baby doctor named Orlando Bosch. After the plane crashed in the sea in October, it was Bosch's network of exiles that claimed responsibility. The cable showed that the CIA had the means to penetrate the Bosch organization, but there's no indication in any of the documents that the Agency undertook any special monitoring of Bosch and his group because of their plans, or that the CIA warned Havana.<sup>35</sup>

In 1983, while Orlando Bosch sat in a Venezuelan prison charged with masterminding the plane bombing, the City Commission of Miami proclaimed a "Dr. Orlando Bosch Day."<sup>36</sup> In 1968, Bosch had been convicted of a bazooka attack on a Polish ship in Miami.

Cuban exiles themselves have often come in for harsh treatment. Those who have visited Cuba for any reason whatever, or publicly suggested, however timidly, a rapprochement with the homeland, they too have been the victims of bombings and shootings in Florida and New Jersey. American groups advocating a resumption of diplomatic relations or an end to the embargo have been similarly attacked, as have travel agencies handling trips to Cuba and a pharmaceutical company in New Jersey which shipped medicines to the island. Dissent in Miami has been effectively silenced, while the police, city officials, and the media look the other way, when not actually demonstrating support for the exiles' campaign of intimidation.<sup>37</sup> In Miami and elsewhere, the CIA—ostensibly to uncover Castro agents—has employed exiles to spy on their countrymen, to keep files on them, as well as on Americans who associate with them.<sup>38</sup>

Although there has always been the extreme lunatic fringe in the Cuban exile community (as opposed to the normal lunatic fringe) insisting that Washington has sold out their cause, over the years there has been only the occasional arrest and conviction of an exile for a terrorist attack in the United States, so occasional that the exiles can only assume that Washington's heart is not wholly in it. The exile groups and their key members are well known to the authorities, for the anti-Castroites have not excessively shied away from publicity. At least as late as the early 1980s, they were training openly in southern Florida and southern California; pictures of them flaunting their weapons appeared in the press.<sup>39</sup> The CIA, with its countless contacts-cum-informers amongst the exiles, could fill in many of the missing pieces for the FBI and the police, if it wished to. In 1980, in a detailed report on Cuban-exile terrorism, *The Village Voice* of New York reported:

Two stories were squeezed out of New York police officials ... "You know, it's funny," said one cautiously, "there have been one or two things ... but let's put it this way. You get just so far on a case and suddenly the dust is blown away. Case closed. You ask the CIA to help, and they say they aren't really interested. You get the message." Another investigator said he was working on a narcotics case involving Cuban exiles a couple of years ago, and telephone records he obtained showed a frequently dialed number in Miami. He said he traced the number to a company called Zodiac, "which turned out to be a CIA front." He dropped his investigation.<sup>40</sup>

In 1961, amid much fanfare, the Kennedy administration unveiled its showpiece program, the Alliance for Progress. Conceived as a direct response to Castro's Cuba, it was meant to prove that genuine social change could take place in Latin America without resort to revolution or socialism. "If the only alternatives for the people of Latin America are the status quo and communism," said John F. Kennedy, "then they will inevitably choose communism."<sup>41</sup>

The multi-billion dollar Alliance program established for itself an ambitious set of goals which it hoped to achieve by the end of the decade. These had to do with economic growth, more equitable distribution of national income, reduced unemployment, agrarian reform, education, housing, health, etc. In 1970, the Twentieth Century Fund of New York—whose list of officers read like a Who's Who in the government/industry revolving-door world—undertook a study to evaluate how close the Alliance had come to realizing its objectives. One of the study's conclusions was that Cuba, which was not one of the recipient countries, had

come closer to some of the Alliance objectives than most Alliance members. In education and public health, no country in Latin America has carried out such ambitious and nationally comprehensive programs. Cuba's centrally planned economy has done more to integrate the rural and urban sectors (through a national income distribution policy) than the market economies of the other Latin American countries.<sup>42</sup>

Cuba's agrarian reform program as well was recognized as having been more widesweeping than that of any other Latin American country, although the study took a wait-and-see attitude towards its results.<sup>43</sup>

These and other economic and social gains were achieved despite the US embargo and the inordinate amount of resources and labor Cuba was obliged to devote to defense and security because of the hovering giant to the north. Moreover, though not amongst the stated objectives of the Alliance, there was another area of universal importance in which Cuba stood apart from many of its Latin neighbors: there were no legions of *desaparecidos*, no death squads, no systematic torture.

Cuba had become what Washington had always feared from the Third World—a good example.

Parallel to the military and economic belligerence, the United States has long maintained a relentless propaganda offensive against Cuba. A number of examples of this occurring in other countries can be found in other chapters of this book. In addition to its vast overseas journalistic empire, the CIA has maintained anti-Castro news-article factories in the United States for decades. The Agency has reportedly subsidized at times such publications in Miami as *Avance*, *El Mundo*, *El Prensa Libre*, *Bohemia* and *El Diario de Las Americas*, as well as AIP, a radio news agency that produced programs sent free of charge to more than 100 small stations in Latin America. Two CIA fronts in New York, Foreign Publications, Inc, and Editors Press Service, also served as part of the propaganda network.<sup>44</sup>

Was it inevitable that the United States would attempt to topple the Cuban government? Could relations between the two neighboring countries have taken a different path? Based on the American record of invariable hostility towards even moderately leftist governments, the answer would appear to be that there's no reason to believe that Cuba's revolutionary government could have been an exception. Washington officials, however, were not immediately ill-disposed towards the Cuban Revolution. There were those who even expressed their tentative approval or optimism. This was evidently based on the belief that what had taken place in Cuba was little more than another Latin American change in government, the kind which had occurred with monotonous regularity for over a century, where the names and faces change but subservience to the United States remains fixed. (The fact that John Foster Dulles was dying of cancer at this time could only contribute to the atmosphere of tolerance. Dulles left the State Department in early February 1959, a month after the revolution. One of his last acts was to withdraw the US military mission from Cuba.)

Then Castro revealed himself to be cut from a wholly different cloth. It was not to be business as usual in the Caribbean. He soon became outspoken in his criticism of the United States. He referred acrimoniously to the 60 years of American control of Cuba; how, at the end of those 60 years, the masses of Cubans found themselves impoverished; how the United States used the sugar quota as a threat. He spoke of the unacceptable presence of the Guantánamo base; and he made it clear enough to Washington that Cuba would pursue a policy of independence and neutralism in the cold war. It was for just such reasons that Castro and Che Guevara had forsaken the prosperous bourgeois careers awaiting them in law and medicine to lead the revolution in the first place. Serious compromise was not on their agenda; nor on Washington's, which was not prepared to live with such men and such a government. Soon, Castro and his regime were consigned to the "communist" slot, a word known to instantly cut off the flow of blood to the brain cells of the user.

A National Security Council meeting of 10 March 1959 included on its agenda the feasibility of bringing "another government to power in Cuba".<sup>45</sup> This was before Castro had nationalized any US property. The following month, after meeting with Castro in Washington, Vice President Richard Nixon wrote a memo in which he stated that he was convinced that Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that the Cuban leader would have to be treated and dealt with accordingly. Nixon later wrote that his opinion at this time was a minority one within the Eisenhower administration.<sup>46</sup> But before the year was over, CIA Director Allen Dulles had decided that an invasion of Cuba was necessary. In March of 1960, it was approved by President Eisenhower.<sup>47</sup> Then came the embargo, leaving Castro no alternative but to turn more and more to the Soviet Union, thus confirming in the minds of Washington officials that Castro was indeed a communist. Some speculated that he had been a covert Red all along.

In this context, it's interesting to note that the Cuban Communist Party had long supported Batista, had served in his cabinet, and had been unsupportive of Castro and his followers until their accession to power appeared imminent.<sup>48</sup> To add to the irony, during 1957-58 the CIA was channeling funds to Castro's movement; this while the US continued to support Batista with weapons to counter the rebels; in all likelihood, another example of the Agency hedging its bets.<sup>49</sup>

If Castro had toned down his early rhetoric and observed the usual diplomatic niceties, but still pursued the policies of self-determination and socialism which he felt were best for Cuba (or inescapable if certain changes were to be realized), he could only have postponed the day of reckoning, and that not for long. Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala, Mossadegh of Iran, Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana, and other Third World leaders have gone out of their

way to avoid stepping on Washington's very sensitive toes unnecessarily, and were much less radical in their programs and in their stance toward the United States than Castro; nonetheless, all of them fell under the CIA axe.

In 1974, by way of marking 15 years of American hostility towards Cuba, Castro observed that "Cuba is the only country in the world where John Foster Dulles is still Secretary of State."<sup>50</sup>

## 31. Indonesia 1965

### Liquidating President Sukarno ... and 500,000 others

Armed with wide-bladed knives called *parangs*, Moslem bands crept at night into the homes of communists, killing entire families. ... Travellers ... tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies. River transportation has at places been seriously impeded.

*Time* magazine, December 1965 <sup>1</sup>

Nearly 100 Communists, or suspected Communists, were herded into the town's botanical garden and mowed down with a machine gun ... the head that had belonged to the school principal, a P.K.I. [Communist Party] member, was stuck on a pole and paraded among his former pupils, convened in special assembly.

*New York Times*, May 1966 <sup>2</sup>

Estimates of the total number of Indonesians murdered over a period of several years following an aborted coup range from 500,000 to one million.<sup>3</sup>

In the early morning hours of 1 October 1965, a small force of junior military officers abducted and killed six generals and seized several key points in the capital city of Jakarta. They then went on the air to announce that their action was being taken to forestall a *putsch* by a "Generals' Council" scheduled for Army Day, the fifth of October. The *putsch*, they said, had been sponsored by the CIA and was aimed at capturing power from President Sukarno. By the end of the day, however, the rebel officers in Jakarta had been crushed by the army under the direction of General Suharto, although some supportive army groups in other cities held out for a day or two longer.<sup>4</sup>

Suharto—a man who had served both the Dutch colonialists and the Japanese invaders<sup>5</sup>—and his colleagues charged that the large and influential PKI was behind the junior officers' "coup attempt", and that behind the party stood Communist China. The triumphant armed forces moved in to grab the reins of government, curb Sukarno's authority (before long he was reduced to little more than a figurehead), and carry out a bloodbath to eliminate once and for all the PKI with whom Sukarno had obliged them to share national power for many years. Here at last was the situation which could legitimate these long-desired actions.

Anti-Communist organizations and individuals, particularly Muslims, were encouraged to join in the slaying of anyone suspected of being a PKI sympathizer. Indonesians of Chinese descent as well fell victim to crazed zealots. The Indonesian people were stirred up in part by the display of photographs on television and in the press of the badly decomposed bodies of the slain generals. The men, the public was told, had been castrated and