

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #9:

48. "Ambassador Richard C. Patterson Devises the 'Duck Test', 1949."
49. "Eisenhower's Recollection of American Intervention in Guatemala, 1954."
50. "John Foster Dulles Reports on Guatemala, 1954."
51. "An American Scholar Explains the Overthrow of the Arbenz Regime, 1954."
52. "Eisenhower Prepares to Subvert the Castro Government in Cuba, 1960."
53. "Eisenhower on U.S. Policy Toward Indochina, April 7, 1954."
54. "President Eisenhower's Disarmament Proposals, July 21, 1955."
55. "Killing Hope: Iran, 1953."
56. "Killing Hope: Guatemala, 1953-54."
57. "Eisenhower's Farewell Address, January 17, 1961."

Eisenhower, Dulles, and Hemispheric Security: Intervention in Guatemala

Your textbook emphasizes Eisenhower's role in improving Soviet-American relations and limiting the American commitment in Vietnam. It is clear, however, that the president and his militant anticommunist secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, were equally committed to a policy of sometimes brutal interventionism in the Third World. In no instance was their determination more evident than in the case of Guatemala, where in 1954, the left-leaning but independent regime of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz-Guzman defied the American-controlled United Fruit Company and challenged the hemispheric dominance of the United States. The following documents explore the Eisenhower-Dulles rationale for dislodging the democratically elected Arbenz government. As you analyze the evidence, be especially aware of the assumptions and motivations behind American policy.

The first document, the often-quoted "duck test" for the legitimacy of Third World regimes, establishes continuity between the conservative anticommunism of the Eisenhower administration and the Cold War liberalism of the Truman era. Former U.S. ambassador Richard C. Patterson, the author of these remarks, remained outspoken in his public warnings of a communist threat following his recall from Guatemala in 1949.

More subtle but equally alarmed was President Eisenhower, who was determined to prevent the establishment of a Soviet beachhead in Central America.

Like Dulles, the president viewed the Arbenz regime as a threat to hemispheric security. The excerpt from his memoirs clearly reveals his reason for approving CIA efforts to overthrow the elected government of Guatemala. Even more outspoken was Secretary Dulles, who addressed the American public in June 1954 in an effort to justify American intervention. Note the Eisenhower-Dulles interpretation of democracy and popular will. Try to determine where they place blame for the crisis.

In sharp contrast to the administration position is professor Philip B. Taylor's account of the events in Guatemala, written only a few months after the American intervention. Taylor, a professor of political science at Michigan State University, published his version of the counterrevolution in the *American Political Science Review*. Be aware of Taylor's background as you assess his interpretation of historical events, and compare his article with the administration's view.

Try to determine if the successful intervention in Guatemala was related to other policies of the Eisenhower administration. Be sensitive to the administration's overall approach to Third World challenges, as described in the textbook. Finally, in view of Eisenhower's acknowledgment of a role in the Bay of Pigs planning, think about the relationship between Guatemala in 1954 and subsequent American policies in dealing with hemispheric problems.

Questions for Analysis

1. What were the Eisenhower administration's basic assumptions about the nature of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala? What do the documents tell us about Eisenhower's and Dulles's own ideologies? How did their personal beliefs influence their handling of the crisis?
2. What were the desires of the Guatemalan people in 1954? What was the meaning of Dulles's assertion that the United States would maintain its support for the "just aspirations of the Guatemalan people"? How would the legitimacy of those aspirations be determined in the future? By whom?
3. Compare the Dulles-Eisenhower view of the historical origins of the crisis with Philip B. Taylor's account of the same events. Which analysis is correct? How are the writers of these documents using history? How would you explain their conflicting interpretations of the evidence?
4. What was the American response to Third World revolution in the 1950s? How would you account for that attitude? In what way did the Guatemalan incident exemplify weaknesses or strengths in the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration? What was the administration's major policy goal? Provide evidence for your argument from the documents.

5. What do the documents reveal concerning the motivations behind U. S. Latin American policies in the 1950s? How does the evidence clarify the geopolitical reasons for the actions of Eisenhower and Dulles? What were the economic, political, ideological, and strategic influences on the development of administration policy?
6. How would you describe and evaluate the methods employed by the Eisenhower administration to achieve its foreign-policy goals in the Third World? What new agencies, tools, and approaches were used? In what way did the assumptions, policies, and approaches used in Guatemala influence the future character and direction of American policy? Do the documents contain evidence of past-present linkages in American approaches to Third World challenges? What does the evidence reveal about how modern Americans view revolutionary forces in the Third World?

A.

1. Ambassador Richard C. Patterson Devises the "Duck Test," 1949

Many times it is impossible to prove legally that a certain individual is a communist; but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of detection—the "duck test." The duck test works this way: suppose you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. This bird wears no label that says "duck." But the

bird certainly looks like a duck. Also he goes to the pond and you notice he swims like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he's wearing a label or not.

A.

2. Eisenhower's Recollection of American Intervention in Guatemala, 1954

... The troubles had been long-standing, reaching back nine years to the Guatemalan revolution of 1944, which had resulted in the overthrow of the dictator General Jorge Ubico. Thereafter, the Communists busied themselves with agitating and with infiltrating labor unions, peasant organizations, and the press and radio. In 1950 a military officer, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, came to power and by his actions soon created the strong suspicion that he was merely a puppet manipulated by Communists.

The American republics wanted no Communist regime within their midst. They recognized that subversion by Communism was only another form of aggression, even more evil than that achieved by naked military force. However, in unstable regions where revolutions and risings were not uncommon, where some governments were being maintained by dictatorial means, where resentments against the United States were sometimes nurtured by groups other than Communist cells, it was difficult to differ-

entiate positively between Communist influence and uncontrolled and politically rebellious groups. For example, on February 24, 1953, the Arbenz government announced its intention, under an agrarian reform law, to seize about 225,000 acres of unused United Fruit Company land. . . .

Expropriation in itself does not, of course, prove Communism; expropriation of oil and agricultural properties years before in Mexico had not been fostered by Communists.

Approximately six weeks after the announcement of the United Fruit Company land seizure, however, Guatemala withdrew from the five-nation Organization of Central American States, alleging aggression by Guatemala's neighbors. In this instance, the real reason was apparent: Guatemala could not risk participation in a debate on an anti-Communist resolution scheduled for presentation by El Salvador at a forthcoming meeting of the organization. Arbenz denied that his government was Com-

munist, a denial that was issued in a speech at a May Day celebration featuring seventy thousand marchers. . . .

About that time [October 1953] a new ambassador, John E. Peurifoy, was appointed to Guatemala. He was familiar with the tactics of the Communists in Greece, where he had served. Peurifoy soon reached definite conclusions on the nature of the Arbenz government. . . .

Something had to be done quickly. The first task was to marshal and crystallize Latin American public opinion on the issue. The opportunity presented itself at the Tenth Inter-American Conference of the Organization of the American States (OAS) which met in Caracas, Venezuela, in March of 1954. At that meeting the United States urged the adoption of a joint condemnation of Communism, contending vigorously that it should not be permitted to control any state in the Western Hemisphere. Foster Dulles, representing the United States, argued that if Communism should succeed to this extent, it should be treated as a threat to the peace. On March 6 he introduced a draft resolution of a "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against International Communist Intervention." . . .

On March 26, in a plenary session, the organization approved the resolution by a vote of seventeen to one, with Guatemala opposing, and Argentina and Mexico abstaining—Costa Rica was absent. As passed, it differed in only one respect from the draft: it called not for immediate action to meet the Communist threat but rather for a "meeting to consider the adoption of measures in accordance with existing treaties." . . .

In the two months from March to May, 1954, the agents of international Communism in Guatemala continued their efforts to penetrate and subvert their neighboring Central American states, using consular agents for their political purposes and fomenting political assassinations and strikes. In Guatemala itself the government answered protests by suspending constitutional rights, conducting mass arrests, and killing leaders in the political opposition.

In May things came to a head. On the 17th of that month Foster Dulles reported to the press that the United States had reliable information on a shipment of arms from behind the Iron Curtain. . . .

On May 19 Nicaragua broke diplomatic ties with Guatemala. Five days later we announced that the United States was airlifting arms to Honduras and Nicaragua to help counter the danger created by the

Czech shipment to Guatemala. Our initial shipment comprised only fifty tons of rifles, pistols, machine guns, and ammunition, hardly enough to create apprehension in neighboring states. . . .

Meanwhile, in Guatemala, Arbenz had declared a state of siege and launched a reign of terror. Then on June 18 armed forces under Carlos Castillo Armas, an exiled former colonel in the Guatemalan Army, crossed the border from Honduras into Guatemala, initially with a mere handful of men—reportedly about two hundred. As he progressed he picked up recruits. Simultaneously three obsolete bombers, presumably under his direction, buzzed Guatemala City and bombed the ordnance depot. Things seemed to be going well for Castillo's small band until June 22. On that date Allen Dulles reported to me that Castillo had lost two of the three old bombers which he was supporting his "invasion." . . .

"What do you think Castillo's chances would be," I asked Allen Dulles, "without the aircraft?"

His answer was unequivocal: "About zero."

"Suppose we supply the aircraft. What would the chances be then?"

Again the CIA chief did not hesitate: "About 20 per cent."

I considered the matter carefully. I realized full well that United States intervention in Central America and Caribbean affairs earlier in the century had greatly injured our standing in all of Latin America. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to refuse to cooperate in providing indirect support to a strictly anti-Communist faction in this struggle would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Caracas resolution. I had faith in the strength of the inter-American resolve therein set forth. On the actual value of a shipment of planes, I knew from experience the important psychological impact of even a small amount of air support. In any event, our proper course of action—indeed my duty—was clear to me. We would replace the airplanes. . . .

The major factor in the successful outcome was the disaffection of the Guatemalan armed forces and the population as a whole with the tyrannical regime of Arbenz. The air support enjoyed by Castillo Armas, though meager, was important in relative terms; it gave the regular armed forces an excuse to take action in their own hands to throw out Arbenz. The rest of Latin America was not in the least displeased. . . .

By the middle of 1954 Latin America was free, for the time being at least, of any fixed outposts of Communism. . . .

A . 3. John Foster Dulles Reports on Guatemala, 1954

Tonight I should like to talk with you about Guatemala. It is the scene of dramatic events. They expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system, and they test the ability of the American States to maintain the peaceful integrity of this hemisphere.

For several years international communism has been probing here and there for nesting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics.

The intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies. . . .

In Guatemala, international communism had an initial success. It began 10 years ago, when a revolution occurred in Guatemala. The revolution was not without justification. But the Communists seized on it, not as an opportunity for real reform, but as a chance to gain political power.

Communist agitators devoted themselves to infiltrating the public and private organizations of Guatemala. They sent recruits to Russia and other Communist countries for revolutionary training and indoctrination in such institutions as the Lenin School at Moscow. Operating in the guise of "reformers" they organized the workers and peasants under Communist leadership. Having gained control of what they call "mass organizations," they moved on to take over the official press and radio of the Guatemalan Government. They dominated the social security organization and ran the agrarian reform program. Through the technique of the "popular front" they dictated to the Congress and the President. . . .

Guatemala is a small country. For its power, standing alone, is not a measure of the threat. The master plan of international communism is to gain a solid political base in this hemisphere, a base that can be used to extend Communist penetration to the other peoples of the other American Governments. It was not the power of the Arbenz government that concerned us but the power behind it.

If world communism captures any American State, however small, a new and perilous front is established which will increase the danger to the entire free world and require even greater sacrifices from the American people.

This situation in Guatemala had become so dan-

gerous that the American States could not ignore it. At Caracas last March the American States held their Tenth Inter-American Conference. They then adopted a momentous statement. They declared that "the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement . . . would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America." . . .

Throughout the period I have outlined, the Guatemalan Government and Communist agents throughout the world have persistently attempted to obscure the real issue—that of Communist imperialism—by claiming that the United States is only interested in protecting American business. . . . But this issue is relatively unimportant. All who know the temper of the U.S. people and Government must realize that our overriding concern is that which, with others, we recorded at Caracas, namely the endangering by international communism of the peace and security of this hemisphere.

The people of Guatemala have not been heard from. Despite the armaments piled up by the Arbenz government, it was unable to elicit the spiritual cooperation of the people.

Led by Col. Castillo Armas, patriots arose in Guatemala to challenge the Communist leadership—and to change it. Thus, the situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves.

Last Sunday, President Arbenz of Guatemala resigned and seeks asylum. Others are following his example. . . .

The need for vigilance is not past. Communism is still a menace everywhere. But the people of the United States and of the other American Republics can feel tonight that at least one grave danger has been averted. Also an example is set which promises increased security for the future. The ambitious and unscrupulous will be less prone to feel that communism is the wave of their future.

In conclusion, let me assure the people of Guatemala. As peace and freedom are restored to that sister Republic, the Government of the United States will continue to support the just aspirations of the Guatemalan people. A prosperous and progressive Guatemala is vital to a healthy hemisphere. The United States pledges itself not merely to political opposition to communism but to help to alleviate conditions in

Guatemala and elsewhere which might afford communism an opportunity to spread its tentacles throughout the hemisphere. Thus we shall seek in

positive ways to make our Americas an example which will inspire men everywhere.

4. An American Scholar Explains the Overthrow of the Arbenz Regime, 1954

... There is little doubt that communism got its start in Guatemala under [Juan José] Arévalo [who was elected for the 1945-1951 presidential term]; Arévalo's successor, Lt. Col. Arbenz, who served from March, 1951, until his ouster in July, 1954, was quite sympathetic to Communist activities, but under the best of contrary circumstances the ouster of Communists from their positions in the government would have been extremely difficult and would have stripped the government of its trained, though not necessarily efficient, bureaucracy. . . .

Among the excuses forced from Guatemala by the operations of the Arévalo-Arbenz government was Lt. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who had been condemned to death for his implication in an unsuccessful attempt against the government in late 1950. . . .

The Tenth Inter-American Conference met at Caracas, Venezuela in March, 1954. The United States had previously expressed its desire to have the conference record itself as being anti-Communist. . . .

It is significant that those who sprang to Dulles' support in the debates following the presentation of the [United States] resolution were not the democratic nations but the authoritarians, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Peru. . . .

Events in Guatemala leading to the civil war seem to have commenced with the State Department announcement on May 17, 1954, that a shipment of arms totaling 1,980 tons had arrived at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala. . . .

The United States employed the shipment to arouse sympathy for its subsequent anti-Arbenz actions. It was also employed as the basis for a nearly unprecedented request to the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that they grant the United States the privilege of searching their merchant ships on the high seas for arms shipments to Guatemala. The request was rejected by all of the nations to which requests were made.

On May 20, the United States concluded a Mutual Security Treaty with Honduras (a similar treaty had been signed with Nicaragua on April 23), and on

request a special O.A.S. Council meeting] was intended as a smoke-screen rather than as a sincere request. . . . The questions why the United States should have requested the investigation after the hose had fled the stable, rather than before, seems almost rhetorical under the circumstances. Investigation, or the proposal of a real study of the situation, prior to the outbreak of fighting, would have been sincere. . . .

The O.A.S. Council met in special session on July 2 to approve 18-1, with one abstention, the motion presented by Honduras and seconded by the United States that the July 7 meeting be postponed *sine die*. . . .

And, of course, the inspection team of the Peace Committee did not reach its destination either. It was in Mexico City when the Castillo-Morón negotiations opened, and it remained there. At the urgent request of the Morón junta, it cancelled its trip at that point on July 2 and returned to Washington. The inaction of the U.N. Security Council and of the Inter-American Peace Committee (as agent for the O.A.S.) had combined with the successful operations of Castillo Armas to overthrow the Arbenz government. . . .

The shocked conscience of the world was probably represented here in the British House of Commons on July 14, 1954, by Clement Attlee, head of the Labor party, in foreign affairs debate:

May 24 it was announced that the United States Air Force was airlifting war material to the two nations. . . .

Col. Castillo Armas' troops entered Guatemalan territory from Honduras on June 19. A period of somewhat desultory fighting followed. Arbenz resigned on June 27 after an all-day conference with his military leaders, and the Army Chief of Staff, Col. Enrique Díaz, established a short-lived provisional government composed of three officers. One of these, Colonel Eliego Morón, replaced Díaz on the 29th, after the direct intervention of Ambassador Peñarroy, Peñarroy and a Marine bodyguard, both armed, were present in the conference room at the time power changed hands. . . .

The conclusion that the United States played an important part in the struggle in Guatemala seems inescapable. . . . [I]t can be shown that the United States played a role in the United Nations which tended to deny to Guatemala the privileges apparently guaranteed it by its membership in that organization. . . .

In response to the urgent request of the Guatemalan representative on June 19, the U.N. Security Council met on the call of its president, United States representative Henry Cabot Lodge, on June 20. Guatemalan representative Eduardo Castillo-Arriola asked immediate U.N. investigation of his charge that the fighting had begun with the invasion of his country by forces stationed in Honduras and Nicaragua and backed by "foreign monopolies" with the knowledge of the United States State Department. . . .

The Council meeting [of June 25] voted to take no direct action until it had the opportunity to receive a report from the Peace Committee. The Guatemalan government, which prior to the second Council meeting had rejected O.A.S. Peace Committee investigation, now reconsidered and announced it would welcome it. The date was the afternoon of June 26. After confirming the Guatemalan change of attitude, the Committee on the 27th determined that it would send a five-member team to Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, starting the 28th.

It seems quite tenable to argue that the action [to

"The fact is that this was a plain act of aggression, and one cannot take one line on aggression in Asia and another line in Central America. I confess that I was rather shocked at the joy and approval of the American Secretary of State on the success of this patch.

. . . we cannot pass this off as just a Central American squabble, of which there are so many. There was a principle involved and that principle was the responsibility of the United Nations. . . . Therefore, I am afraid that Guatemala has left a rather unpleasant taste in one's mouth because, to illustrate the theme I was putting, it seems in some instances that the acceptance of the principles of the United Nations is subordinated to a hatred of Communism. . . ."

[The] entire situation leads to the conclusion that the United States failed to give evidence of faith in the processes of the United Nations; that it dragged its feet regarding effective O.A.S. action beyond the point of reason; that it was intimately involved in a situation of subversion of a constitutional government; and that it did not at any time undertake to make the record clear to the people either of the United States or of Latin America. . . .

A - 5. Eisenhower Prepares to Subvert the Castro Government in Cuba, 1960

"... while President, he had directed that measures be taken to help organize, train and equip Cuban refugees so they could act at the proper time. . . .

"The former President said he gave the order for the organization, training and equipping of the Cuban refugees on March 17, 1960."

Chapter 28: Document Set 2 References

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American policy toward Indochina during the Eisenhower Administration

Remarks by President Eisenhower at a Press Conference, April 7, 1954.

Question. Mr. President, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of Indo-China to the free world? I think there has been across the country some lack of understanding on just what it means to us.

President Eisenhower. Mr. Eisenhower said that the question could be approached both specifically and generally. First of all, he said, there is the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.

Then, he continued, there is the possibility that many human beings could pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world; and, finally, there are broader considerations that might follow the "falling domino" principle.

If someone sets up a row of dominoes, and knocks over the first one, the President said, it is certain that the last one will go over very quickly. It would be the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

With respect to Indo-China's specific value, Mr. Eisenhower explained, this area produces two items that the world uses, tin and tungsten. They are very important, he said, and Indo-China also produces other materials, including rubber.

With respect to the possibility that more people might pass under a dictatorship, Mr. Eisenhower pointed out that Asia has already lost some 450 million of its people to the Communist dictatorship. He asserted that the U.S. simply can't afford greater losses.

The third possibility, said the President, is that the loss of Indo-China would set off the loss of Burma, of Thailand, of the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia. This would not only multiply the disadvantages the U.S. would suffer through loss of materials, or sources of materials, but it would involve millions and millions and millions of people, and would create a new geographical position, he said.

It would turn the so-called island defenses' chain of Japan, Formosa and the Philippines, Mr. Eisenhower said, and to the southward it would move in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.

In its economic aspects, the President added, it would take away that region that Japan must have as a trading area, or it would force Japan to turn toward China and Manchuria, or toward the Communist areas in order to live. The possible consequences of the loss to the free world are just incalculable, Mr. Eisenhower said.

Remarks by Secretary Dulles at a Press Conference, May 11, 1954.

Question. Mr. Secretary, if I understood you correctly, you believed that Southeast Asia could, if necessary, be held without Indo-China. Does that represent a modification of what has been variously called the "domino" or "cock in the bottle" theory? The contents in both cases refer to remarks of President Eisenhower at one news conference in which he likened the situation in Southeast Asia to a series of dominoes—that if Indo-China fell, the others would fall.

Secretary Dulles. The situation in the area, as we found it, was that it was subject to the so-called "domino theory." That means that if one went, another would go. We are trying to change it so that that would not be the case. That is the whole theory of collective security. That is the theory of the North Atlantic Treaty. As nations come together, then the "domino theory," so-called, ceases to apply. What we are trying to do is create a situation in Southeast Asia where the domino situation will not apply. And

while I see it might be said that I felt that Southeast Asia could be secured, even without perhaps Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, I do not want for a minute to underestimate the importance of those countries. Neither do I want for a minute to give the impression that we believe that they are going to be lost or that we have given up trying to prevent their being lost. On the contrary, we recognize that they are extremely important and that the problem of saving Southeast Asia is far more difficult if they are lost. But I do not want to give the impression either that if events we could not control—and which we do not anticipate—should lead to their being lost that we would consider the whole situation hopeless and we would give up in despair. We do not give up in despair. Also, we do not give up in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

Question. You said the other day, Mr. Secretary, that it was the Government's policy to oppose a Communist advance in Indo-China by whatever means. What would be your attitude toward a victory of Ho Chi Minh or a coalition in a free election in Indo-China? Would you recognize that or would you consider that to also be barred by your formula?

Secretary Dulles. I said that I thought that the United States should not stand passively by and see the extension of Communism by any means into Southeast Asia. We are not standing passively by.

Question. I asked you what would be your attitude toward a victory of Ho Chi Minh or a coalition in a genuinely free election in Indo-China. Would you be prepared to recognize such a government?

Secretary Dulles. I have just said that I don't think the present conditions are conducive to a free election there, and I don't care now to answer the hypothetical question of what might result if they did have elections.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, JULY 21, 1955⁵⁹

The Conference at the Summit which the Big Four Powers staged in Geneva in July 1955 marked an interruption in the cold war waged between the Soviet Union and the West. High point of the conference was President Eisenhower's disarmament proposals, which came as a complete surprise to the other participants. The President's object was to test by deeds the Soviet's new profession of its desire to outlaw war. Significantly, no Russian leader directly answered the speech at that time. The principal stumbling block to an East-West disarmament agreement was the issue of German unification, which it was no longer entirely within the power of the Big Four to settle.

Disarmament is one of the most important subjects on our agenda. It is also extremely difficult. In recent years the scientists have discovered methods of making weapons many, many times more destructive of opposing armed forces—but also of homes, and industries, and lives—than ever known or imagined before. These same scientific discoveries have made much more complex the problem of limitation and control and reduction of armament.

After our victory as allies in World War II, my country rapidly disarmed. Within a few years our disarmament was at a very low level. Then events occurred which caused us to realize that we had disarmed too much. For our own security and to safeguard peace, we needed greater strength. Therefore we proceeded to rearm and to associate with others in a partnership for peace and for mutual security.

⁵⁹ *The New York Times*, July 22, 1955.

But we know that a mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

It would ease the fears of war in the anxious hearts of people everywhere. It would lighten the burdens upon the backs of the people. It would make it possible for every nation, great and small, developed and less developed, to advance the standards of living of its people, to attain better food, and clothing, and shelter, more of education and larger enjoyment of life.

Therefore the United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this subject be made within our own Government. . . .

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement.

The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the danger of war and do not brighten the prospect of peace.

Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subjects of inspection and reporting. . . .

We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. . . .

Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fear and danger of surprise attack.

I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement very quickly; as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include:

to give each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments. . . .

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country . . . and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.

Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning. . . .

The quest for peace is the statesman's most exacting duty. Security of the nation entrusted to his care is his greatest responsibility. Practical progress in lasting peace is his fondest hope. Yet in pursuit of his hope he must not betray the trust placed in him as guardian of the people's security. A sound peace—with security, justice, well-being, and freedom for the people of the world—can be achieved, but only by patiently and thoughtfully following a hard and sure-tested road.

9. Iran 1953

Making it safe for the King of Kings

"So this is how we got rid of that madman Mossadegh," announced John Foster Dulles to a group of top Washington policy makers one day in June 1953. The Secretary of State held in his hand a plan of operation to overthrow the prime minister of Iran prepared by Kermit (Kini) Roosevelt of the CIA. There was scarcely any discussion amongst the high-powered men in the room, no probing questions, no legal or ethical interjections.

"This was a grave decision to have made," Roosevelt later wrote. "It involved tremen-

does risk. Surely it deserved thorough examination, the closest consideration, somewhere at the very highest level. It had not received such thought at this meeting. In fact, I was morally certain that almost half of those present, if they had felt free or had the courage to speak, would have opposed the undertaking."¹

Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodore and distant cousin of Franklin, was expressing suspicion more than disappointment at glimpsing American foreign-policy-making undressed.

The original initiative to oust Mossadegh had come from the British, for the elderly Iranian leader had spearheaded the parliamentary movement to nationalize the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the sole oil company operating in Iran. In March 1951, the bill for nationalization was passed, and at the end of April Mossadegh was elected prime minister by a large majority of Parliament. On 1 May, nationalization went into effect. The Iranian people, Mossadegh declared, "were opening a hidden treasure upon which lies a dragon."²

As the prime minister had anticipated, the British did not take the nationalization gracefully, though it was supported unanimously by the Iranian parliament and by the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people for reasons of both economic justice and national pride. The Mossadegh government tried to do all the right things to placate the British: it offered to let an extra 25 percent of the net profits of the oil operation as compensation; it guaranteed the safety and the jobs of the British employees; it was willing to sell its oil without disturbance to the tidy control system so dear to the hearts of the international oil gnomes. But the British would have none of it. What they wanted was their oil company back. And they wanted Mossadegh's head. A servant does not affront his lord with impudence.

A military show of force by the British navy was followed by a ruthless international economic blockade and boycott, and a freezing of Iranian assets which brought Iran's oil exports and foreign trade to a virtual standstill, plunged the already impoverished country into near starvation, and made payment of any compensation impossible. Nonetheless, and long after they had moved to oust Mossadegh, the British demanded compensation not only for the physical assets of the AIOC, but for the value of their enterprise in developing the oil fields, a request impossible to meet, and, in the eyes of Iranian nationalists, something which denies of large British profits had paid for many times.

The British attempt at economic strangulation of Iran ... did not have games off the ground without the active co-operation and support of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and American oil companies. At the same time, the Truman administration argued with the British that Mossadegh's collapse could open the door to the proverbial communist takeover.³ When the British were later expelled from Iran, however, they had no alternative but to turn to the United States for assistance in coping Mossadegh. In November 1952, the Churchill government approached Roosevelt, the *de facto* head of the CIA's Middle East division, who told the British that he felt that there was "no chance to win approval from the outgoing administration of Truman and Acheson. The new Republicans, however, might be quite different."⁴

John Foster Dulles was certainly different. The apocalyptic anti-communist saw in Mossadegh the epitome of all that he detested in the Third World: unequivocal neutrality in the cold war, tolerance of Communism, and disrespect for free enterprise, as demonstrated by the oil nationalization. Ironically, in recent years Great Britain had nationalized several of its own basic industries, and the government was the majority owner of the AIOC. To the likes of John Foster Dulles, the eccentric Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh was indeed a madman. And when the Secretary of State considered further that Iran was a nation exceedingly rich in the liquid gold, and that it shared a border with the Soviet Union more than

1,000 miles long, he was not unduly plagued by indecision as to whether the Iranian prime minister should finally retire from public life.

An matter turned out, the overthrow of Mossadegh in August 1953 was much more an American operation than a British one. Twenty-six years later, Kermit Roosevelt took the unusual step of writing a book about how he and the CIA carried out the operation. He called his book *Countdown* to press home the idea that the CIA coup was staged only to prevent a takeover of power by the Iranian Communist Party (The Tudeh) closely backed by the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was thus arguing that Mossadegh had to be removed to prevent a Communist takeover, whereas the Truman administration had felt that Mossadegh had to be kept in power to prevent one.

It would be incorrect to state that Roosevelt offers little evidence to support his thesis of the Communist danger. It would be more precise to say that he offers no evidence at all. Instead, the reader is subjected to mere assertions of the thesis which are stated over and over, apparently in the belief that enough repetition will convince even the most skeptical. That are we treated to variations on the theme such as the following:

"The Soviet threat [was] indeed genuine, dangerous and imminent" ... Mossadegh "had formed an alliance" with the Soviet Union to oust the Shah ... "the obvious threat of Russian takeover" ... "the alliance between [Mossadegh] and the Russian-dominated Tudeh was taking on a threatening shape" ... Mossadegh's "increasing dependence on the Soviet Union" ... "the hand of the Tudeh, and behind them the Russians, is showing more openly every day" ... "Russian backing of the Tudeh and Tudeh backing of [Mossadegh] became ever more obvious" ... the Soviet Union was "ever more active in Iran. Their control over Tudeh leadership was growing stronger all the time. It was exercised often and, so our eyes, with deliberate ostentation" ...⁵

But none of this salubrious and threatening activity was, apparently, ever open, obvious, or ostentatious enough to provide Roosevelt with a single example he could impart to a curious reader.

In reality, although the Tudeh Party more or less faithfully followed the fluctuating Moscow line on Iran, the relation of the party to Mossadegh was much more complex than Roosevelt and other cold-war chroniclers have made it out to be. The Tudeh felt very ambivalent about the wealthy, economic, land-owning prime minister who, nonetheless, was standing up to imperialism. Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, described Mossadegh as "essentially a rich, reactionary, feudal-minded Persian," hardly your typical Communist Party fellow-traveler.

On occasion the Tudeh had supported Mossadegh's policies; more often it had attacked them bitterly, and in one instance, on 15 July 1951, a Tudeh-sponsored demonstration was brutally suppressed by Mossadegh, resulting in some 100 deaths and 500 injured. The Iranian leader, moreover, had campaigned successfully against lingering Soviet occupation of northern Iran after World War II, and in October 1947 had led Parliament in its rejection of a government proposal that a joint Iran-Soviet oil company be set up to exploit the oil of northern Iran.⁶

What, indeed, did Mossadegh have to gain by relinquishing any of his power to the Tudeh and/or the Soviet Union? The idea that the Russians even desired the Tudeh to take power is no more than speculation. There was just as much evidence, or as little, to conclude that the Russians, once again, were more concerned about their relationship with Western governments than with the fate of a local Communist Party in a country outside the socialist bloc of Eastern Europe.

A secret State Department intelligence report, dated 9 January 1953, in the closing days

of the Truman administration, stated that Mossadegh had not sought any alliance with the Turks, and that "The major opposition to the National Front [Mossadegh's governing coalition] arises from the sound interest, on the one hand, and the Turkish Party on the other."⁹

The Turkish Party had been declared illegal in 1949 and Mossadegh had not listed that but although he allowed the party to operate openly, at least to some extent because of his democratic conviction, and had appointed some Turkish sympathizers to government posts.

Many of the Turkish objectives paralleled those espoused by the National Front, the State Department report observed, but "An open Turkish move for power... would probably enter independent and non-Communist of all political leanings and would result... in energetic efforts to destroy Turkish by force."¹⁰

The National Front itself was a coalition of highly diverse political and religious elements including right-wing anti-Communists, held together by respect for Mossadegh's personal character and honesty, and by nationalistic sentiments, particularly in regard to the nationalization of oil.

In 1979, when he was asked about this State Department report, Kermit Roosevelt replied: "I don't know what to make of that... Loy Henderson [US ambassador to Iran in 1953] thought that there was a serious danger that Mossadegh was going to, in effect, place Iran under Soviet domination."¹¹ Though he was the principal moving force behind the coup, Roosevelt was now passing the buck, and to a man who, as we shall see in the Middle East chapter, was given to alarmist statements about "communist takeovers".

One can but wonder what Roosevelt, or anyone else, made of a statement by John Foster Dulles before a Senate committee in July 1953, when the operation to oust Mossadegh was already in progress. The Secretary of State, the press reported, testified "that there was 'no substantial evidence' to indicate that Iran was cooperating with Russia. On the whole, he added, Moscow appeared to cooperate in its predicament, although at times the Iranian Government appears to rely for support on the Turkish party, which is communitarian."¹²

The young Shah of Iran had been relegated to little more than a passive role by Mossadegh and the Iranian political process. His power had been whittled away to the point where he was "incapable of independent action", noted the State Department itself. Mossadegh was passing for control of the armed forces and were any other representatives of the royal court, and the inexperienced and indiscrete Shah—the "King of Kings"—was reluctant to openly oppose the prime minister because of the latter's popularity.

The actual sequence of events instigated by Roosevelt which culminated in the Shah's abdication appears quite simple in hindsight, even naive, and owed not a little to luck. The first step was to convince the Shah that Eisenhower and Churchill were behind him in his struggle for power with Mossadegh and were willing to provide whatever military and political support he needed. Roosevelt did not actually know what Eisenhower felt, or even knew about the operation and went so far as to fabricate a message from the president to the Shah expressing his encouragement.¹³

At the same time, the Shah was persuaded to issue royal decrees dismissing Mossadegh as prime minister and replacing him with one Fardolakh Zahedi, a general who had been imprisoned during the war by the British for collaboration with the Nazis.¹⁴ Late in the night of 14/15 August, the Shah's emissary delivered the royal decree to Mossadegh's house,

which was guarded by troops. Not surprisingly, he was received very coolly and did not get in to see the prime minister. Instead, he was obliged to leave the decree with a servant who signed a receipt for the piece of paper dismissing his master from power. Equally unimpressed, Mossadegh did not abdicate. The prime minister, who maintained that only Parliament could dismiss him, delivered a radio broadcast the following morning in which he stated that the Shah, encouraged by "foreign elements", had attempted a coup d'état. Mossadegh then declared that he was, therefore, compelled to take full power unto himself. He denounced Zahedi as a traitor and sought to have him arrested, but the general had been hidden by Roosevelt's men.

The Shah, fleeing all was lost, fled with his queen to Rome via Baghdad without so much as packing a suitcase. Undercover, Roosevelt went ahead and directed the retransmitting of copies of the royal decree for distribution to the public, and sent two of his Iranian agents to important military commanders to seek their support. It appears that this crucial matter was left to the last minute, almost as an afterthought. Indeed, one of the two Iranian had been recruited for the cause only the same day, and it was only he who succeeded in winning a commitment of military support from an Iranian colonel who had tanks and armored cars under his command.¹⁵

Beginning on 16 August, a mass demonstration arranged by the National Front, supporting Mossadegh and attacking the Shah and the United States, took place in the capital city, Teheran. Roosevelt characterizes the demonstration simply as "the Turkish, with strong Russian encouragement", once again failing to offer any evidence to support his assertion. The New York Times referred to them as "Turkish partisans and Nationalist elements", the latter term being one which could have applied to individuals comprising a wide range of political leanings.¹⁶

Among the demonstrators there was as well a number of individuals working for the CIA. According to Richard Cozzani, an American academic and author reportedly in the employ of the Agency in Teheran at this time, these agents went out "into the streets to act as if they were Turkish. They were more than just provocateurs, they were shock troops, who acted as if they were Turkish people throwing rocks at mosques and prisons", the purpose of which was to stamp the Turkish and, by implication, Mossadegh as being anti-religious.¹⁷

During the demonstrations, the Turkish raised their familiar demand for the creation of a democratic republic. They appealed to Mossadegh to form a united front and to provide them with arms to defend against the coup, but the prime minister refused.¹⁸ Instead, on 18 August he ordered the police and army to put an end to the Turkish demonstrations which they did with considerable force. According to the accounts of Roosevelt and Ambassador Henderson, Mossadegh took this step as a result of a meeting with Henderson in which the ambassador complained of the extreme harassment being suffered by US citizens at the hands of the Iranians. It is left unclear by both of the Americans how much of this harassment was real and how much manufactured by them for the occasion. In any event, Henderson told Mossadegh that unless it ceased, he would be obliged to order all Americans to leave Iran at once. Mossadegh, says Henderson, begged him not to do this for an American evacuation would make it appear that his government was unable to control the country, although at the same time the prime minister was accusing the CIA of being behind the issuance of the royal decree.¹⁹ (The Turkish newspaper at this time was demanding the expulsion of "Americanists" American diplomats.)²⁰

Whatever Mossadegh's motivation, his action was again in sharp contradiction to the idea that he was in alliance with the Turkish or that the party was in a position to grab the reins of power. Indeed, the Turkish did not take to the streets again.

The following day, 19 August, Roosevelt's Iranian agent staged a parade through Teheran. With a fund of some one million dollars having been established in a tank in the American embassy, the "extremely competent professional 'organizers,'" as Roosevelt called them, had no difficulty in buying themselves a mob, probably using but a small fraction of the fund. (The various accounts of the CIA role in how the Agency spending from \$10,000 to \$19 million to overthrow Mossadegh. The larger amounts are based on reports that the CIA engaged in heavy bribery of members of Parliament and other influential Iranians to enlist their support against the prime minister.)

Soon a line of people could be seen coming out of the ancient bazaar, led by circus and athletic performers to attract the public. The marchers were waving banners, shouting "Long live the Shah!" Along the edges of the procession, men were passing out Iranian currency adorned with a portrait of the Shah. The demonstrators gathered followers as they went, people joining and picking up the chants, undoubtedly for a myriad of political and personal reasons. The balance of psychology had swung against Mossadegh.

Along the way, some marchers broke ranks to attack the offices of pro-Mossadegh newspapers and political parties, Tudeh and government offices. Presumably, a noise broke in over the radio in Teheran announcing that "The Shah's instructions that Mossadegh be dismissed has been carried out. The new Prime Minister, Fardolakh Zafedi, is now in office. And His Imperial Majesty is on his way home!"

This was a lie, or a "pre-truth" as Roosevelt suggested. Only then did he go to fetch Zafedi from his hiding place. On the way, he happened to run into the commander of the air force who was among the marching throng. Roosevelt told the officer to get hold of a tank in which to carry Zafedi to Mossadegh's house in proper fashion.²¹

Kenneth Roosevelt would have the reader believe that at this point it was all over but the shouting and the champagne he was soon to serve: Mossadegh had fled, Zafedi had assumed power, the Shah had been notified to return—a dramatic, joyful, and peaceful triumph of popular will. Inexplicably, he neglects to mention at all that in the streets of Teheran and in front of Mossadegh's house that day, a nine-hour battle raged, with soldiers loyal to Mossadegh on one side and those supporting Zafedi and the Shah on the other. Some 300 people were reported killed and hundreds more wounded before Mossadegh's defenders finally succumbed.²²

Roosevelt also fails to mention any contribution of the British to the whole operation, which considerably irritated the men in MI6, the CIA's counterpart, who claim that they, as well as AIOC staff, local businessmen and other Iranians, had indeed played a role in the events. But they have been tight-lipped about what that role was precisely.²³

The US Military Mission in Iran also claimed a role in the action, as Major General George C. Stewart later testified before Congress:

Now, when this crisis came on and the thing was about to collapse, we ordered our normal troops out among the other things we did, we provided the army immediately with an emergency base, blankets, shoes, uniforms, electric generators, and medical supplies that provided and created the atmosphere in which they could support the Shah. ... The gear that they had in their hands, the trucks that day rolls in, the armored cars that day drove through the streets, and the tanks come in that permitted their control, were all furnished through the military defense assistance program.²⁴

The latter part of the General's statement would, presumably, apply to the other side as well.

"It is conceivable that the Tudeh could have turned the fortunes of the day against the royalist," wrote Kenneth Love, a New York Times reporter who was in Teheran during the crucial days of August. "But for some reason they remained completely aloof from the conflict. ... My own conjecture is that the Tudeh were remained by the Soviet Embassy because the Kermanshah, in the last post-World War II year, was not willing to take on such consequences as might have resulted from the establishment of a communist-controlled regime in Teheran."

Love's views, contained in a paper he wrote in 1960, may well have been inspired by information received from the CIA. By his own admission, he was in close contact with the Agency in Teheran and even aided them in their operations.²⁵

Earlier in the year, the New York Times had noted that "prevailing opinion among detailed observers in Teheran" was that "Mossadegh is the most popular politician in the country." During a period of more than 40 years in public life, Mossadegh had "acquired a reputation as an honest patriot."²⁶

In July, the State Department Director of Iranian Affairs had testified that "Mossadegh has such tremendous control over the masses of people that it would be very difficult to throw him out."²⁷

A few days later, "at least 100,000" people filled the streets of Teheran to express strong anti-US and anti-Shah sentiments. Though sponsored by the Tudeh, the turnout far exceeded any estimate of party adherents.²⁸

But popularity and masses, of the untrained kind, counted for little, for in the final analysis what Teheran witnessed was a military showdown carried out on both sides by soldiers obediently following the orders of a handful of officers, some of whom were making their careers and ambitions on choosing the winning side; some had a more ideological commitment. The New York Times characterized the sudden reversal of Mossadegh's fortunes as "nothing more than a mutiny ... against pro-Mossadegh officers" by "the lower ranks" who revolted the Shah, had brutally quelled the demonstrations the day before, but refused to do the same on 19 August, and instead turned against their officers.²⁹

What connection Roosevelt and his agents had with any of the pro-Shah officers beforehand is not clear. In an interview given at about the same time that he finished his book, Roosevelt stated that a number of pro-Shah officers were given refuge in the CIA compound adjoining the US Embassy at the time the Shah fled to Rome.³⁰ But inasmuch as Roosevelt mentions not a word of this rather important and interesting development in his book, it must be regarded as yet another of his assertions to be approached with caution.

In any event, it may be that the 19 August demonstration organized by Roosevelt's team was just the encouragement and spark these officers were waiting for. Yet, if so, it further illustrates how much Roosevelt had left to chance.

In light of all the questionable, contradictory, and devious statements which emanated at times from John Foster Dulles, Kenneth Roosevelt, Loy Henderson and other American officials, what conclusions can be drawn about American motivation in the toppling of Mossadegh? The consequences of the coup may offer the best guide.

For the next 25 years, the Shah of Iran stood fast as the United States' closest ally in the Third World, to a degree that would have shocked the independent and neutral Mossadegh. The Shah literally placed his country at the disposal of US military and intelligence organizations to be used as a cold-war weapon, a window and a door to the Soviet Union—electronic listening and radar posts were set up near the Soviet border; American aircraft used Iran as a base to launch surveillance flights over the Soviet Union; espionage

agents were infiltrated across the border; various American military installations dotted the Iranian landscape. Iran was viewed as a vital link in the chain being forged by the United States to "contain" the Soviet Union. In a telegram to the British Acting Foreign Secretary in September, Dulles said: "I think if we can in coordination move quickly and efficiently in Iran we would close the most dangerous gap in the line from Europe to South Asia."¹⁰ In February 1955, Iran became a member of the Baghdad Pact, set up by the United States, in Dulles's words, "to create a solid band of resistance against the Soviet Union."¹¹

One year after the coup, the Iranian government completed a contract with an international consortium of oil companies. Amongst Iran's new foreign partners, the British lost the exclusive right they had enjoyed previously, being reduced now to 40 percent. Another 40 percent now went to American oil firms, the remainder to other countries. The British, however, received an exceedingly generous compensation for their former property.¹²

In 1958, Kevitt Roosevelt left the CIA and generally went to work for Gulf Oil Co., one of the American oil firms in the consortium. In this position, Roosevelt was director of Gulf's relations with the US government and foreign governments, and had occasion to deal with the Shah. In 1960, Gulf appointed him a vice president. Subsequently, Roosevelt formed a consulting firm, Downs and Roosevelt, which between 1967 and 1970, reportedly received \$116,000 a year above expenses for its efforts on behalf of the Iranian government. Another client, the Northrop Corporation, a Los Angeles-based aerospace company, paid Roosevelt \$71,000 a year to aid in its sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia and other countries.¹³ (See the Middle East chapter for Roosevelt's CIA connection with King Saud of Saudi Arabia.)

Another American member of the new consortium was Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (now Exxon), a client of Sullivan and Cromwell, the New York law firm of which John Fozari Dulles had long been the senior member. Another Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, had also been a member of the firm.¹⁴ Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported some years later that the Rockefeller family, who controlled Standard Oil and Chase Manhattan Bank, had "helped arrange the CIA coup that brought down Mossadegh". Anderson listed a number of ways in which the Shah demonstrated his gratitude to the Rockefellers, including heavy deposits of his personal fortune in Chase Manhattan, and housing developments in Los Angeles by a Rockefeller family company.¹⁵

The standard "textbook" account of what took place in Iran in 1953 is that—whatever else one might say for or against the operation—the United States and Britain intervened in a boarding country, the Soviet Union did nothing that would support such a premise. When the British Navy staged the largest concentration of its forces since World War II in Iranian waters, the Soviets took no belittling steps nor when Great Britain instituted draconian international sanctions which left Iran in a deep economic crisis and externally vulnerable, did the oil fields "fall hostage" to the Bolsheviks; they, despite "the whole of the Jewish Party at its disposal" as agents, at Roosevelt's bid, "Not even in the face of the coup, with its threat of foreign hands, did Moscow make a threatening move, neither did Mossadegh at any point ask for Russian help."

One year later, however, the New York Times could editorialize that "Moscow ... counted its chickens before they were hatched and thought that Iran would be the next 'People's Democracy'." At the same time, the newspaper warned, with surprising arrogance, that "underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost that may be paid by one of their number which goes hand-in-hand with financial nationalism."¹⁶

A decade later, Allen Dulles solemnly stated that communism had "achieved control of the governmental apparatus" in Iran.¹⁷ And a decade after that, *Foreign Magazine*, to cite one of many examples, kept the story alive by writing that Mossadegh "plotted with the Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh, to overthrow Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and hook up with the Soviet Union."¹⁸

And what of the Iranian people? What did being saved from communism do for them? For the preponderance of the population, life under the Shah was a grim tableau of grinding poverty, police terror, and injustice. Thousands were executed in the name of fighting communism. Disaster was cradled from the outset of the new regime with American assistance. Kenneth Loeb writes that he believed that CIA officer George Carroll, whom he knew personally, worked with General Fathol Dastgheer, the new military governor of Teheran, "in preparation for the very efficient smothering of a potentially dangerous dissident movement emanating from the house area and the Tudeh in the first two weeks of November, 1957."¹⁹

The notorious Iranian secret police, SAVAK, created under the guidance of the CIA and Israel,²⁰ spread its tentacles all over the world to punish Iranian dissidents. According to a former CIA analyst on Iran, SAVAK was instructed to recruit technicians by the Agency.²¹ Amnesty International summed up the situation in 1976 by noting that Iran had the "highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief. No country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran."²²

When to this is added a level of corruption that "stunned even the most hardened observers of Middle Eastern thievery",²³ it is understandable that the Shah needed his huge military and police force, maintained by unusually large US aid and training programs,²⁴ to keep the lid down for as long as he did. Said Senator Hubert Humphrey, apparently with some surprise:

Do you know what the head of the Iranian Army said one of our people? He said the Army was in good shape, thanks to U.S. aid—was even capable of coping with the civilian population. That Army isn't going to fight the Russians. It's plotting to fight the Iranian people.²⁵

When forces might fail, the CIA turned to its most trusted weapon—money. To insure support for the Shah, or at least the absence of dissent, the Agency began making payments to Iranian religious leaders, always a capricious bunch. The payments to the ayatollahs and mullahs began in 1953 and continued regularly until 1977 when President Carter abruptly halted them. One "informed intelligence source" estimated that the amount paid reached in each a \$400 million a year; others thought that figure too high, which is certainly so, to be. The out-pour of funds to the holy men, it is believed, was one of the elements which precipitated the beginning of the end for the King of Kings.²⁶

American States, other countries individually, the world press, even the United States itself, in the desperate hope that it was all a big misunderstanding, that in the end, reason would prevail.

Nothing helped. Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles had decided that the legally-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz was "communist", therefore must go and go it did, in June 1954.

In the midst of the American preparation to overthrow the government, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, lamented that the United States was castigating "as 'communists' every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive liberal reforms."²⁷

Toriello was close to the truth, but Washington officials retained enough contact with reality and world opinion to be aware of the inappropriateness of coming out against nationalism, independence or reform. That it was that Secretary of State Dulles asserted that Guatemalans were living under a "Communist type of tutelage"²⁸ ... President Eisenhower warned about "the Communist dictatorship" establishing "an outpost on this continent to the detriment of all the American nations"²⁹ ... the US Ambassador to Guatemala, John Peabody, declared that "We cannot permit a Soviet Republic to be established between Texas and the Panama Canal"³⁰ ... others warned that Guatemala could become a base from which the Soviet Union might actually seize the Canal ... Senator Margaret Chase Smith stated, unmistakably, that the "unjustified increases in the price of coffee" imported from Guatemala were due to communist control of the country, and called for an investigation³¹ ... and so it went.

The Soviet Union could be accused if it was somewhat bewildered by all the rhetoric, for the Russian had scant interest in Guatemala, did not provide the country with any kind of military assistance, did not even maintain diplomatic relations with it, thus did not see how the normally indispensable embassy from which to conduct such nefarious activities. (During this period, the height of McCarthyism "logic", there were undoubtedly those Americans who maintained "All the better to deceive us!")

With the exception of one occasion, the countries of Eastern Europe had as little to do with Guatemala as did the Soviet Union. A month before the coup, that is, long after Washington had begun preparation for it, Czechoslovakia ... It seems safe to say that Guatemala for cash, something the Czechs would no doubt have ... of other countries willing to pay the price. The weapons, it turned out, were, in the words of the New York Times, "military military junk". Two magazine pool-probed the newspaper's report and told US military men giving a better appraisal of the weapons. It may be that neither Taw nor the military men could conceive that one member of the International Communist Conspiracy could do such a thing to another member.³²

The American propaganda mill made much of this arms transaction. Less publicized was the fact that Guatemalans had to seek arms from Czechoslovakia because the United States had refused to sell it any since 1948 due to its reformist government, and had pressured other countries to do the same despite Arbenz's repeated pleas to lift the embargo.³³

Like the Soviets, Arbenz had reason to wonder about the American charges. The Guatemalan president, who took office in March 1951 after being elected by a wide margin, had no special contact or spiritual/ideological ties with the Soviet Union or the rest of the Communist bloc. Although American policymakers and the American press, explicitly and implicitly, often labeled Arbenz a communist, there were those in Washington who knew better, at least during their more dispassionate moments. Under Arbenz's administration, Guatemala had voted at the United Nations so closely with the United States on issues

10. Guatemala 1953-1954

While the world watched

To whom do you turn for help when the police are assaulting you? The old question.
To whom does a poor banana republic turn when a CIA army is advancing upon its territory and CIA planes are overhead bombing the country?
The leaders of Guatemala tried everyone—the United Nations, the Organization of

72

American States, other countries individually, the world press, even the United States itself, in the desperate hope that it was all a big misunderstanding, that in the end, reason would prevail.

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With the exception of one occasion, the countries of Eastern Europe had as little to do with Guatemala as did the Soviet Union. A month before the coup, that is, long after Washington had begun preparation for it, Czechoslovakia made a possible arms sale to Guatemala for cash, something the Czechs would no doubt have done for any other country willing to pay the price. The weapons, it turned out, were, in the words of the *New York Times*, "worthless military junk". *Time* magazine pool-pooled the newspaper's report and cited US military men giving a better appraisal of the weapons. It may be that neither *Time* nor the military men could conceive that one member of the International Communist Conspiracy could do such a thing to another member.⁶

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Like the Soviets, Arbenz had reason to wonder about the American charges. The Guatemalan president, who took office in March 1951 after being elected by a wide margin, had no special contact or spiritual/ideological ties with the Soviet Union or the rest of the Communist bloc. Although American policymakers and the American press, explicitly and implicitly, often labeled Arbenz a communist, there were those in Washington who knew better, at least during their more dispassionate moments. Under Arbenz's administration, Guatemala had voted at the United Nations so closely with the United States on issues

of "Soviet imperialism" that a State Department group occupied with planning Arbenz's overthrow concluded that propaganda concerning Guatemala's UN record "would not be particularly helpful in our case".⁸ And a State Department analysis paper reported that the Guatemalan president had support "not only from Communist-led labor and the radical fringe of professional and intellectual groups, but also among many anti-Communist nationalists in urban areas".⁹

Nonetheless, Washington repeatedly and adamantly expressed its displeasure about the presence of communists working in the Guatemalan government and their active participation in the nation's political life. Arbenz maintained that this was no more than proper in a democracy, while Washington continued to insist that Arbenz was too tolerant of such people—not because of anything they had done which was intrinsically threatening or offensive to the US or Western civilization, but simply because they were of the species communist, well known for its infinite capacity for treachery. Ambassador Peurifoy—a diplomat whose suit might have been pinstriped, but whose soul was a loud check—warned Arbenz that US-Guatemalan relations would remain strained so long as a single communist remained on the public payroll.¹⁰

The centerpiece of Arbenz's program was land reform. The need for it was clearly expressed in the all-too-familiar underdeveloped-country statistics: In a nation overwhelmingly rural, 2.2 percent of the landowners owned 70 percent of the arable land; the annual per capita income of agricultural workers was \$87. Before the revolution of 1944, which overthrew the Ubico dictatorship, "farm laborers had been roped together by the Army for delivery to the low-land farms where they were kept in debt slavery by the landowners."¹¹

The expropriation of large tracts of uncultivated acreage which was distributed to approximately 100,000 landless peasants, the improvement in union rights for the workers, and other social reforms, were the reasons Arbenz had won the support of Communists and other leftists, which was no more than to be expected. When Arbenz was criticized for accepting Communist support, he challenged his critics to prove their good faith by backing his reforms themselves. They failed to do so, thus revealing where the basis of their criticism lay.¹²

The party formed by the Communists, the Guatemalan Labor Party, held four seats in Congress, the smallest component of Arbenz's ruling coalition which commanded a total of 51 seats in the 1953-54 legislature.¹³ Communists held several important sub-cabinet posts but none was ever appointed to the cabinet. In addition, there were Communists employed in the bureaucracy, particularly in the administration of land reform.¹⁴

Lacking anything of substance they could accuse the Guatemalan left of, Washington officials were reduced to condemnation by semantics. Thus, communists, unlike normal human beings, did not take jobs in the government—they "infiltrated" the government. Communists did not support a particular program—they "exploited" it. Communists did not back Arbenz—they "used" him. Moreover, communists "controlled" the labor movement and land reform—but what type of person is it who devotes himself in an underdeveloped country to furthering the welfare of workers and peasants? None other than the type that Washington calls "communist".

The basic idea behind the employment of such language—which was standard Western fare throughout the cold war—was to deny the idea that communists could be people sincerely concerned about social change. American officials denied it to each other as well as to the world. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a CIA report about Guatemala, prepared in 1952 for the edification of the White House and the intelligence community:

Communist political success derives in general from the ability of individual Communists and fel-

low travelers to identify themselves with the nationalist and social aspirations of the Revolution of 1944. In this manner, they have been successful in infiltrating the Administration and pro-Administration political parties and have gained control of organized labor... [Arbenz] is essentially an opportunist whose politics are largely a matter of historical accident... The extension of [communist] influence has been facilitated by the applicability of Marxist 'cliques' to the anti-colonial and social aims of the Guatemalan Revolution.¹⁵

The first plan to topple Arbenz was a CIA operation approved by President Truman in 1952, but at the eleventh hour, Secretary of State Dean Acheson persuaded Truman to abort it.¹⁶ However, soon after Eisenhower became president in January 1953, the plan was resurrected.

Both administrations were pressured by executives of United Fruit Company, much of whose vast and uncultivated land in Guatemala had been expropriated by the Arbenz government as part of the land reform program. The company wanted nearly \$16 million for the land, the government was offering \$525,000, United Fruit's own declared valuation for tax purposes.¹⁷

United Fruit functioned in Guatemala as a state within a state. It owned the country's telephone and telegraph facilities, administered its only important Atlantic harbor, and monopolized its banana exports. A subsidiary of the company owned nearly every mile of railroad track in the country. The fruit company's influence amongst Washington's power elite was equally impressive. On a business and/or personal level, it had close ties to the Dulles brothers, various State Department officials, congressmen, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, and others. Anne Whitman, the wife of the company's public relations director, was President Eisenhower's personal secretary. Under-secretary of State (and formerly Director of the CIA) Walter Bedell Smith was seeking an executive position with United Fruit at the same time he was helping to plan the coup. He was later named to the company's board of directors.¹⁸

Under Arbenz, Guatemala constructed an Atlantic port and a highway to compete with United Fruit's holdings, and built a hydro-electric plant to offer cheaper energy than the US-controlled electricity monopoly. Arbenz's strategy was to limit the power of foreign companies through direct competition rather than through nationalization, a policy not feasible of course when it came to a fixed quantity like land. In his inaugural address, Arbenz stated that:

Foreign capital will always be welcome as long as it adjusts to local conditions, remains always subordinate to Guatemalan laws, cooperates with the economic development of the country, and strictly abstains from intervening in the nation's social and political life.¹⁹

This hardly described United Fruit's role in Guatemala. Amongst much else, the company had persistently endeavored to frustrate Arbenz's reform programs, discredit him and his government, and induce his downfall.

Arbenz was, accordingly, wary of multinationals and could not be said to welcome them into his country with open arms. This attitude, his expropriation of United Fruit's land, and his "tolerance of communists" were more than enough to make him a marked man in Washington. The United States saw these policies as being inter-related: that is, it was communist influence—not any economic or social exigency of Guatemalan life—which was responsible for the government's treatment of American firms.

In March 1953, the CIA approached disgruntled right-wing officers in the Guatemalan army and arranged to send them arms. United Fruit donated \$64,000 in cash. The following

month, uprisings broke out in several towns but were quickly put down by loyal troops. The rebels were put on trial and revealed the fruit company's role in the plot, but not the CIA's.²⁰

The Eisenhower administration resolved to do the job right the next time around. With cynical glee, almost an entire year was spent in painstaking, step-by-step preparation for the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Of the major CIA undertakings, few have been as well documented as has the coup in Guatemala. With the release of many formerly classified government papers, the following story has emerged.²¹

Headquarters for the operation were established in Opa Locka, Florida, on the outskirts of Miami. The Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza lent/leased his country out as a site for an airstrip and for hundreds of men—Guatemalan exiles and US and Central American mercenaries—to receive training in the use of weapons and radio broadcasting, as well as in the fine arts of sabotage and demolition. Thirty airplanes were assigned for use in the "Liberation", stationed in Nicaragua, Honduras and the Canal Zone, to be flown by American pilots. The Canal Zone was set aside as a weapons depot from which arms were gradually distributed to the rebels who were to assemble in Honduras under the command of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas before crossing into Guatemala. Soviet-marked weapons were also gathered for the purpose of planting them inside Guatemala before the invasion to reinforce US charges of Russian intervention. And, as important as arms, it turned out, hidden radio transmitters were placed in and around the perimeter of Guatemala, including one in the US Embassy.

An attempt was made to blow up the trains carrying the Czech weapons from portside to Guatemala City; however, a torrential downpour rendered the detonators useless, whereupon the CIA paramilitary squad opened fire on one train, killing a Guatemalan soldier and wounding three others; but the convoy of trains made it safely to its destination.

After the Czech ship had arrived in Guatemala, Eisenhower ordered the stopping of "suspicious foreign-flag vessels on the high seas off Guatemala to examine cargo".²² The State Department's legal adviser wrote a brief which concluded in no uncertain terms that "Such action would constitute a violation of international law." No matter. At least two foreign vessels were stopped and searched, one French and one Dutch. It was because of such actions by the British that the United States had fought the War of 1812.

The Guatemalan military came in for special attention. The US ostentatiously signed mutual security treaties with Honduras and Nicaragua, both countries hostile to Arbenz, and dispatched large shipments of arms to them in the hope that this would signal a clear enough threat to the Guatemalan military to persuade it to withdraw its support of Arbenz. Additionally, the US Navy dispatched two submarines from Key West, saying only that they were going "south". Several days later, the Air Force, amid considerable fanfare, sent three B-36 bombers on a "courtesy call" to Nicaragua.

The CIA also made a close study of the records of members of the Guatemalan officer corps and offered bribes to some of them. One of the Agency's clandestine radio stations broadcast appeals aimed at military men, as well as others, to join the liberation movement. The station reported that Arbenz was secretly planning to disband or disarm the armed forces and replace it with a people's militia. CIA planes dropped leaflets over Guatemala carrying the same message.

Eventually, at Ambassador Peurifoy's urging, a group of high-ranking officers called on Arbenz to ask that he dismiss all communists who held posts in his administration. The president assured them that the communists did not represent a danger, that they did not run the government, and that it would be undemocratic to dismiss them. At a second meeting, the officers also demanded that Arbenz reject the creation of the "people's militia".

Arbenz himself was offered a bribe by the CIA, whether to abdicate his office or something less is not clear. A large sum of money was deposited in a Swiss bank for him, but he, or a subordinate, rejected the offer.

On the economic front, contingency plans were made for such things as cutting off Guatemalan credit abroad, disrupting its oil supplies, and causing a run on its foreign reserves.²³ But it was on the propaganda front that American ingenuity shone at its brightest. Inasmuch as the Guatemalan government was being overthrown because it was communist, the fact of its communism would have to be impressed upon the rest of Latin America. Accordingly, the US Information Agency (USIA) began to place unattributed articles in foreign newspapers labeling particular Guatemalan officials as communist and referring to various actions by the Guatemalan government as "communist-inspired". In the few weeks prior to Arbenz's fall alone, more than 200 articles about Guatemala were written and placed in scores of Latin American newspapers.

Employing a method which was to become a standard CIA/USIA feature all over Latin America and elsewhere, as we shall see, articles placed in one country were picked up by newspapers in other countries, either as a result of CIA payment or unwittingly because the story was of interest. Besides the obvious advantage of multiplying the potential audience, the tactic gave the appearance that independent world opinion was taking a certain stand and further obscured the American connection.

The USIA also distributed more than 100,000 copies of a pamphlet entitled "Chronology of Communism in Guatemala" throughout the hemisphere, as well as 27,000 copies of anti-communist cartoons and posters. The American propaganda agency, moreover, produced three films on Guatemala, with predictable content, and newsreels favorable to the United States for showing free in cinemas.

Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York, a prelate possessed of anti-communism, a man who feared social change more than he feared God, was visited by the CIA. Would his Reverence arrange CIA contact with Archbishop Mariano Rossell Arellano of Guatemala? The Cardinal would be delighted. Thus it came to pass that on 9 April 1954, a pastoral letter was read in Guatemalan Catholic churches calling to the attention of the congregations the presence in the country of a devil called communism and demanding that the people "rise as a single man against this enemy of God and country", or at least not rally in Arbenz's defense. To appreciate the value of this, one must remember that Guatemala's peasant class was not only highly religious, but that very few of them were able to read. . . . could receive the Lord's Word only in this manner. For those who could read, many thousands of pamphlets carrying the Archbishop's message were air-dropped around the country.

In May, the CIA covertly sponsored a "Congress Against Soviet Intervention in Latin America" in Mexico City. The same month, Somoza called in the diplomatic corps in Nicaragua and told them, his voice shaking with anger, that his police had discovered a secret Soviet shipment of arms (which had been planted by the CIA) near the Pacific Coast, and suggested that the communists wanted to convert Nicaragua into "a new Korean situation". A few weeks later, an unmarked plane parachuted arms with Soviet markings onto Guatemala's coast.

On such fare did the people of Latin America dine for decades. By such tactics were they educated about "communism".

In late January 1954 the operation appeared to have suffered a serious setback when photostat copies of Liberation documents found their way into Arbenz's hands. A few days later, Guatemala's newspapers published copies of correspondence signed by Castillo Armas, Somoza and others under banner headlines. The documents revealed the existence

of some of the staging, training and invasion plans, involving, amongst others, the "Government of the North".²⁴

The State Department labeled the accusations of a US role "ridiculous and untrue" and said it would not comment further because it did not wish to give them a dignity they did not deserve. Said a Department spokesperson: "It is the policy of the United States not to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. This policy has repeatedly been reaffirmed under the present administration."

Time magazine gave no credence whatsoever to the possibility of American involvement in such a plot, concluding that the whole exposé had been "masterminded in Moscow".²⁵

The *New York Times* was not so openly cynical, but its story gave no indication that there might be any truth to the matter. "Latin American observers in New York," reported the newspaper, "said the 'plot' charges savored of communist influence." This article was followed immediately on the page by one headed "Red Labor Chiefs Meet. Guatemalan Confederation Opens Its Congress".²⁶

And the CIA continued with its preparations as if nothing had happened.

The offensive began in earnest on 18 June with planes dropping leaflets over Guatemala demanding that Arbenz resign immediately or else various sites would be bombed. CIA radio stations broadcast similar messages. That afternoon, the planes returned to machine-gun houses near military barracks, drop fragmentation bombs and strafe the National Palace.

Over the following week, the air attacks continued daily—strafing or bombing posts, fuel tanks, ammunition dumps, military barracks, the international airport, a school, and several cities; nine persons, including a three-year-old girl, were reported wounded; an unknown number of houses were set afire by incendiary explosives. During one night-time raid, a tape recording of a bomb attack was played over loudspeakers set up on the roof of the US Embassy to heighten the anxiety of the capital's residents. When Arbenz went on the air to try and calm the public's fear, the CIA radio team jammed the broadcast.

Meanwhile, the Agency's army had crossed into Guatemala from Honduras and captured a few towns, but its progress in the face of resistance by the Guatemalan army was unimpressive. On the broadcasts of the CIA's "Voice of Liberation" the picture was different: The rebels were everywhere and advancing; they were of large numbers and picking up volunteers as they marched; war and upheaval in all corners; fearsome battles and major defeats for the Guatemalan army. Some of these broadcasts were transmitted over regular public and even military channels, serving to convince some of Arbenz's officers that the reports were genuine. In the same way, the CIA was able to answer real military messages with fake responses. All manner of disinformation was spread and rumors fomented; dummy parachute drops were made in scattered areas to heighten the belief that a major invasion was taking place.

United Fruit Company's publicity office circulated photographs to journalists of mutilated bodies about to be buried in a mass grave as an example of the atrocities committed by the Arbenz regime. The photos received extensive coverage. Thomas McCann of the company's publicity office later revealed that he had no idea what the photos represented: "They could just as easily have been the victims of either side—or of an earthquake. The point is, they were widely accepted for what they were purported to be—victims of communism."²⁷

In a similar vein, Washington officials reported on political arrests and censorship in Guatemala without reference to the fact that the government was under siege (let alone who was behind the siege), that suspected plotters and saboteurs were the bulk of those being arrested, or that, overall, the Arbenz administration had a fine record on civil liberties. The performance of the American press in this regard was little better.

The primary purpose of the bombing and the many forms of disinformation was to make it appear that military defenses were crumbling, that resistance was futile, thus provoking confusion and division in the Guatemalan armed forces and causing some elements to turn against Arbenz. The psychological warfare conducted over the radio was directed by E. Howard Hunt, later of Watergate fame, and David Atlee Phillips, a newcomer to the CIA. When Phillips was first approached about the assignment, he asked his superior, Tracy Barnes, in all innocence, "But Arbenz became President in a free election. What right do we have to help someone topple his government and throw him out of office?"

"For a moment," wrote Phillips later, "I detected in his face a flicker of concern, a doubt, the reactions of a sensitive man." But Barnes quickly recovered and repeated the party line about the Soviets establishing "an easily expandable beachhead" in Central America.²⁸

Phillips never looked back. When he retired from the CIA in the mid-1970s, he founded the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, an organization formed to counteract the flood of unfavorable publicity sweeping over the Agency at the time.

American journalists reporting on the events in Guatemala continued to exhibit neither an investigative inclination nor a healthy conspiracy mentality. But what was obscure to the US press was patently obvious to large numbers of Latin Americans. Heated protests against the United States broke out during this week in June in at least eleven countries and was echoed by the governments of Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile which condemned American "intervention" and "aggression".

Life magazine noted these protests by observing that "world communism was efficiently using the Guatemalan show to strike a blow at the U.S." It scoffed at the idea that Washington was behind the revolt.²⁹ *Newsweek* reported that Washington "officials interpreted" the outcry "as an indication of the depth of Red penetration into the Americas".³⁰ A State Department memo at the time, however, privately acknowledged that much of the protest emanated from non-communist and even pro-American moderates.³¹

On 21 and 22 June, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello made impassioned appeals to the United Nations for help in resolving the crisis. American UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge tried to block the Security Council from discussing a resolution to send an investigating team to Guatemala, characterizing Toriello's appeals as communist maneuvers. But under heavy pressure from UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the Council was convened. Before the vote, while Lodge worked on the smaller nations represented on the Council, Eisenhower and Dulles came down hard on France and Great Britain, both of whom favored the resolution. Said the President of the United States to his Secretary of State: "The British expect us to give them a free ride and side with them on Cyprus. And yet they won't even support us on Guatemala! Let's give them a lesson."³²

As matters turned out, the resolution was defeated by five votes to four, with Britain and France abstaining, although their abstentions were not crucial inasmuch as seven votes were required for passage. Hammarskjöld was so upset with the American machinations, which he believed undercut the strength of the United Nations, that he confided that he

might be forced "to reconsider my present position in the United Nations".³³

During this same period, the CIA put into practice a plan to create an "incident". Agency planes were dispatched to drop several harmless bombs on Honduran territory. The Honduran government then complained to the UN and the Organization of American States, claiming that the country had been attacked by Guatemalan planes.³⁴

Arbenz finally received an ultimatum from certain army officers: Resign or they would come to an agreement with the invaders. The CIA and Ambassador Peurifoy had been offering payments to officers to defect, and one army commander reportedly accepted \$60,000 to surrender his troops. With his back to the wall, Arbenz made an attempt to arm civilian supporters to fight for the government, but army officers blocked the disbursement of weapons. The Guatemalan president knew that the end was near.

The Voice of Liberation meanwhile was proclaiming that two large and heavily armed columns of invaders were moving towards Guatemala City. As the hours passed, the further advance of the mythical forces was announced, while Castillo Armas and his small band had actually not progressed very far from the Honduran border. The American disinformation and rumor offensive continued in other ways as well, and Arbenz, with no one he could trust to give him accurate information, could no longer be certain that there wasn't at least some truth to the radio bulletins.

Nothing would be allowed to threaten the victory so near at hand: A British freighter docked in Guatemala and suspected of having arrived with fuel for Arbenz's military vehicles, was bombed and sunk by a CIA plane after the crew had been warned to flee. It turned out that the ship had come to Guatemala to pick up a cargo of coffee and cotton.

A desperate Toriello pleaded repeatedly with Ambassador Peurifoy to call off the bombings, offering even to reopen negotiations about United Fruit's compensation. In a long cable to John Foster Dulles, the foreign minister described the aerial attacks on the civilian population, expressed his country's defenselessness against the bombings, and appealed to the United States to use its good offices to put an end to them. In what must have been a deeply humiliating task, Toriello stated all of this without a hint that the United States was, or could be, a party to any of it. The pleas were not simply too late. They had always been too late.

The Castillo Armas forces could not have defeated the much larger Guatemalan army, but the air attacks, combined with the belief in the invincibility of the enemy, persuaded Guatemalan military officers to force Arbenz to resign. No Communists, domestic or foreign, came to his aid. He asked the head of the officers, Army Chief of Staff Col. Carlos Diaz, only that he give his word not to negotiate with Castillo Armas, and Diaz, who despised the rebel commander as much as Arbenz did, readily agreed. What Diaz did not realize was that the United States would not be satisfied merely to oust Arbenz. Castillo Armas had been groomed as the new head of government, and that was not negotiable.

A CIA official, Enno Hobbing, who had just arrived in Guatemala to help draft a new constitution (sic) for the incoming regime, told Diaz that he had "made a big mistake" in taking over the government. "Colonel," said Hobbing, "you're just not convenient for the requirements of American foreign policy."

Presently, Peurifoy confronted Diaz with the demand that he deal directly with Castillo Armas. At the same time, the Ambassador showed the Guatemalan general a long list of names of some leaders, requiring that Diaz shoot them all within 24 hours.

"But why?" Diaz asked.

"Because they're communists," replied Peurifoy.³⁵

Although Diaz was not a communist sympathizer, he refused both requests, and indicated that the struggle against the invaders would continue.³⁶ Peurifoy left, livid with anger. He then sent a simple cable to CIA headquarters in Florida: "We have been double-crossed. BOMB!" Within hours, a CIA plane took off from Honduras, bombed a military base and destroyed the government radio station. Col. Castillo Armas, whose anti-communism the United States could trust, was soon the new leader of Guatemala.

The propaganda show was not yet over. At the behest of the CIA, Guatemalan military officers of the new regime took foreign correspondents on a tour of Arbenz's former residence where they could see for themselves rooms filled with school textbooks published in ... yes, the Soviet Union. The *New York Times* correspondent, Paul Kennedy, considered to be strongly anti-Arbenz, concluded that the "books had been planted" and did not bother to report the story.³⁷ *Time* made no mention of the books either, but somehow came upon the story that mobs had plundered Arbenz's home and found "stacks of communist propaganda and four bags of earth, one each from Russia, China, Siberia and Mongolia."³⁸ *Time's* article made it clear enough that it now knew of the American role in Arbenz's downfall (although certainly not the full story), but the magazine had nothing to say about the propriety of overthrowing a democratically elected government by force.

Castillo Armas celebrated the liberation of Guatemala in various ways. In July alone, thousands were arrested on suspicion of communist activity. Many were tortured or killed. In August a law was passed and a committee set up which could declare anyone a communist, with no right of appeal. Those so declared could be arbitrarily arrested for up to six months, could not own a radio or hold public office. Within four months the committee had registered 72,000 names. A committee official said it was aiming for 200,000.³⁹ Further implementation of the agrarian reform law was stopped and all expropriations of land already carried out were declared invalid.⁴⁰ United Fruit Company not only received all its land back, but the government banned the banana workers' unions as well. Moreover, seven employees of the company who had been active labor organizers were found mysteriously murdered in Guatemala City.⁴¹

The new regime also disenfranchised three-quarters of Guatemala's voters by barring illiterates from the electoral rolls and outlawed all political parties, labor confederations and peasant organizations. To this was added the closing down of opposition newspapers (which Arbenz had not done) and the burning of "subversive" books, including Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*, Dostoyevsky novels, and the works of Guatemala's Nobel Prize-winning author Miguel Angel Asturias, a biting critic of United Fruit.⁴²

Meanwhile, John Foster Dulles, who was accused by Toriello of seeking to establish a "banana curtain" in Central America,⁴³ was concerned that some "communists" might escape retribution. In cables he exchanged with Ambassador Peurifoy, Dulles insisted that the government arrest those Guatemalans who had taken refuge in foreign embassies and that "criminal charges" be brought against them to prevent them leaving the country, charges such as "having been covert Moscow agents". The Secretary of State argued that communists should be automatically denied the right of asylum because they were connected with an international conspiracy. The only way they should be allowed to leave, he asserted, was if they agreed to be sent to the Soviet Union. But Castillo Armas refused to accede to Dulles's wishes on this particular issue, influenced perhaps by the fact that he, as well as some of his colleagues, had been granted political asylum in an embassy at one time or another.⁴⁴

One of those who sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy was a 25-year-old

Argentine doctor named Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Guevara, who had been living in Guatemala since sometime in 1953, had tried to spark armed resistance to the invading forces, but without any success. Guevara's experience in Guatemala had a profound effect upon his political consciousness. His first wife, Hilda Gades, whom he met there, later wrote:

Up to that point, he used to say, he was merely a striper, criticizing from a theoretical point of view the political panorama of our America. From here on he was convinced that the struggle against the oligarchic system and the main enemy, Yankee imperialism, must be an armed one, supported by the people.⁴⁵

In the wake of the coup, the United States confiscated a huge amount of documents from the Guatemalan government, undoubtedly in the hope of finally uncovering the hand of The International Communist Conspiracy behind Arbenz. If this is what was indeed discovered, it has not been made public.

On 30 June, while the dust was still settling, Dulles summed up the situation in Guatemala in a speech which was a monument to coldwarsspeak:

[The events in Guatemala] expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system ... having gained control of what they call the mass organizations, [the communists] moved on to take over the official press and radio of the Guatemalan Government. They dominated the social security organization and ran the agrarian reform program ... dictated to the Congress and to the President ... Arbenz ... was openly manipulated by the leaders of communism ... The Guatemalan regime enjoyed the full support of Soviet Russia ... [the] situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves.⁴⁶

When it came to rewriting history, however, Dulles's speech had nothing on these lines from a CIA memo written in August 1954 and only for internal consumption no less: "When the communists were forced by outside pressure to attempt to take over Guatemala completely, they forced Arbenz to resign (deleted). They then proceeded to establish a Communist Junta under Col. Carlos Diaz."⁴⁷

And in October, John Peurifoy sat before a congressional committee and told them:

My role in Guatemala prior to the revolution was strictly that of a diplomatic observer ... The revolution that overthrew the Arbenz government was engineered and instigated by those people in Guatemala who rebelled against the policies and ruthless oppression of the Communist-controlled government.⁴⁸

Later, Dwight Eisenhower was to write about Guatemala in his memoirs. The former president chose not to offer the slightest hint that the United States had anything to do with the planning or instigation of the coup, and indicated that his administration had only the most tangential of connections to its execution.⁴⁹ (When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs were published in the West, the publisher saw fit to employ a noted Kremlinologist to annotate the work, pointing out errors of omission and commission.)

Thus it was that the educated, urbane men of the State Department, the CIA and the United Fruit Company, the pipe-smoking, comfortable men of Princeton, Harvard and Wall Street, decided that the illiterate peasants of Guatemala did not deserve the land which had been given to them, that the workers did not need their unions, that hunger and torture were a small price to pay for being rid of the scourge of communism.

The terror carried out by Castillo Armas was only the beginning. It was, as we shall see, to get much worse in time. It has continued with hardly a pause for 40 years.

In 1955, the *New York Times* reported from the United Nations that "The United States has begun a drive to scuttle a section of the proposed Covenant of Human Rights that poses a threat to its business interests abroad." The offending section dealt with the right of peoples to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. Said the newspaper: "It declares in effect that any country has the right to nationalize its resources ..."⁵⁰

DOCUMENT 1

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, JANUARY 17, 1961

A few days before his departure from office, Eisenhower delivered this radio and television address which attracted unusual attention because of his warning against the dangers of "the military-industrial complex." In the drafting Eisenhower was assisted by Presidential aide Malcolm Moos.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. . . .

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts the United

States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for the development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the con-

duct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.