

Université de Grenoble

**The History of United States
Foreign Policy since 1939**

edited by

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of

The Center For the Advanced Study of American
Institutions and Social Movements

<http://dimension.ucsd.edu/CEIMSA-IN-EXILE/>

U.S. Foreign Policy

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5. "Burton K. Wheeler Takes Aim at Hollywood, 1941."
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7. "Wendell Willkie Defends Freedom of the Screen, 1941."

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68. "JFK calls for an 'Alliance for Progress', 1961."
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75. "Pretexts to Justify U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba."

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75. "*The NACLA Handbook*: U.S. Military & Police Aid Programs."
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79. "*The NACLA Handbook*: U.S. Bases & Forces Abroad, 1972."
80. "*Killing Hope*: Haiti, 1959-63."
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110. "President Reagan on America's Spiritual Reawakening, 1983."
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112. "President Reagan's Soviet Union as 'Evil Empire', 1983."
113. "Reagan Sets a Tone for Central American Policy, 1985."
114. "The Inter-Religious Task Force Attacks the Administration Program in Nicaragua, 1985-86."
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116. "Congressional Panel's Conclusion on the Iran-Contra Affair: *The Majority View*, 1987."
117. "Iran-Contra Affair: *A Minority Opinion*, 1987."
118. "Elliot Abrams on the Iran-Contra Scandal, 1989."
119. "*Killing Hope: Afghanistan, 1979-92.*"
120. "*Killing Hope: El Salvador, 1980-94.*"
121. "Reagan on Russia as an 'Evil Empire', 1983."
122. "A Congressional Committee Reports on 'Irangate', 1987."
123. "Soviet Leader Gorbachev Charts a New Direction, 1988."
124. "The *New York Times* Announces the 'End of the Cold War', 1989."
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127. "*Killing Hope: Iraq, 1990-91.*"

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129. "President Clinton's International Economic Program, 1993."
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133. "Crimes of Fashion, 1995."
134. "NAFTA Thoughts, 1995."
135. "Partnership for Peace, 1994."
136. "Jim Hightower on Fair Trade, 1998."

137. "Take the Rich off Welfare."
138. "Myths and Realities of the Free Market."
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142. "Give Peace a Chance: How Long Can NATO Continue Bombing Yugoslavia?"
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
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151. "Impact of the 9-Year Sanctions War on the People of Iraq."
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153. "God Save the King: On British Imperialism."
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156. "Israel's Approved Ethnic Cleansing: Part I, 'Making Facts on the Ground'."
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159. "First the Carrot, Then the Stick: Behind the Carnage in Palestine."
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165. "List of Accomplishments by George W. Bush, the first few months in office."
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168. "To Kill Iraq."
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171. "Greg Palast on American Journalism since 9/11."
172. "Justice Department Drafts Sweeping Expansion of Anti-Terrorism Act."
173. "Lettre à George Bush", par Michael Moore.

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174. "Ravaging the Poor: The International Monetary Fund Indicted By Its Own Data," by Gabriel Kolko.
175. "NAFTA at 10: Where Do We Go From Here?" by Jeff Faux.
176. "The Erosion of American National Interests (*Foreign Affairs*, 1997)" by Samuel Huntington.


177. "Building Up New Bogeymen (a review of Samuel Huntington's book, *The Clash of Civilizations* in *Foreign Policy*, 1998), by Stephen M. Walt.
178. "Why Consensus is So Elusive in U.S. Foreign Policy (*The Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 1998) by Peter Trubowitz.
179. "Ethnic Conflict (*Foreign Policy*, summer 1998) by Yahya Sadowski.
180. "The clash of Samuel Huntingtons (*The American Prospect*, Jul/Aug 1998)" by Jacob Heilbrunn.
181. "Torture at Abu Ghraib," by Seymour M. Hersh.
182. "Greg Palast: Guerrilla of the Week," by Jenn Bleyer.
183. "The Cruise Missile Left (Part 5): Samantha Power and the Genocide Gambit," by Edward S. Herman.
184. "The Crisis in NATO: A geopolitical earthquake?" by Gabriel Kolko.
185. "Corporate fronts, Astroturf groups and co-opted social movements: taking the risk out of civil society," by Michael Barker (ZNet, September 2006).
186. Map: The World with Commanders' Areas of Responsibility.
187. *World Defense Review* (February 2007) "President George W. Bush announces the New U. S. Military Command for Africa," by J. Peter Pham.
188. "Conform or reform? Social movements and the Mass Media," by Michael Barker (*Fifth Estate*, February 2007).



THE WORLD OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE COLD WAR

Appendix 4

Member Organizations of the U.S. Intelligence Community*



U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #1:

1. "Warner Brothers Declares War on the German-American Bund, 1939."
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7. "Wendell Willkie Defends Freedom of the Screen, 1941."

CHAPTER 26

DOCUMENT SET 1

Hollywood's Foreign Policy: Interventionism in American Films, 1939–1940

The first section of Chapter 26 is devoted to the final stage of the neutrality period. From 1939 on, American public opinion shifted toward a more activist role in support of the democracies' struggle against fascism. Your text notes the increasing interest in interventionist literature and radio programming at this time; but equally significant were feature films, some of them addressing the escalating crisis in Europe. The following documents focus on two motion pictures, one produced in 1939 and one in 1940, that show how feature films can shed light on both popular and elite cultures.

In September 1941, isolationist senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota charged that in the nation's movie capital, "one speaks not of the foreign policy of the United States but of the foreign policy of Hollywood." His rhetoric reflected the reality that some movie producers had entered the national foreign policy debate with topical films containing a strong interventionist bias.

An important cinematic breakthrough occurred in 1939, when Warner Brothers declared war on Germany with *Confessions of a Nazi Spy*, a strident exposé of the pro-fascist German-American Bund. Alerted to the activities of a Nazi spy ring by Roosevelt, Jack Warner decided to use the film to call attention to the potential for German subversion in the United States. Review the excerpt from screenwriter Milton Krims's shooting script for an indication of the film's political bias, and search Pare Lorentz's review for clues to critical and public reactions to the film.

The second group of documents focuses on the Walter Wanger–Alfred Hitchcock thriller, *Foreign Cor-*

respondent (1940). Review the textbook account of the escalating German offensive of spring 1940, which provides the historical background for this film. Try to determine Wanger's intent in producing this film at this time. As you consider the public impact of *Foreign Correspondent*, review the letter from Wanger's friend, Marcus Rebock.

Political reaction to Hollywood's new stance was sharp and quick, as revealed in Montana senator Burton K. Wheeler's letters to Paramount News and movie czar Will Hays. Isolationist anxieties reached a climax in Nye's St. Louis speech, which detailed the charges against the film industry. Examine these remarks to gain the isolationists' perspective on the forces at work on American public opinion in 1941. The end result, a Senate investigation of movie propaganda, revealed the depth of antiwar sentiment as the nation edged toward intervention.

Reacting to the Senate attacks, the movie producers engaged former presidential candidate Wendell Willkie as defense counsel for the hearings. Willkie's letter to the investigating committee revealed not only his own interventionist bias (see textbook account of the 1940 campaign), but also indicated Hollywood's belief in its educational role and public responsibility. As you evaluate Willkie's remarks, reflect on the significance of film content as an expression of the movie industry's perception of popular values. Your analysis of the evidence should focus on the state of American opinion concerning intervention as well as on government and media roles in shaping public attitudes.

Questions for Analysis

1. As you review the film script excerpts, can you determine why senators Nye and Wheeler were so concerned about the film industry in 1941? To what extent were their fears and suspicions justified? Explain.
2. What were the backgrounds of Jack Warner, Walter Wanger, Alfred Hitchcock, and some of the other Hollywood figures active in the effort to incorporate topical subject material into films produced between 1939 and 1941? To what extent did personal background and political affiliation influence Hollywood productions?
3. In what way can a motion picture be understood as a historical document? Do films reflect popular values and attitudes? Or do they influence public opinion in a particular direction? Defend your position, using the evidence from the film scripts and textbook background as you develop your case.
4. What larger issues were raised by Nye's attack on the motion-picture industry? Using Willkie's letter as a primary source, explain what the producers and studio

heads believed to be at stake in 1941. Which position was most persuasive? Why?

5. The final version of *Foreign Correspondent*, released in August 1940, was set in London. How would you account for this revision of the final shooting script of June 5, 1940? What was the result?
6. The term *propaganda* appears frequently in the documents. How would you define the term? If Walter Wanger believed in the interventionist position, why did he object to the term being applied to his work, including *Foreign Correspondent*? Do you think the term applies to the films coming out of Hollywood between 1939 and 1941? Why or why not?

1. Warner Brothers Declares War on the German-American Bund, 1939

CONFESSIONS OF A NAZI SPY

by
Milton Krims
and
John Wexley
Based on the articles of
Leon G. Turrour
Directed
by
Anatole Litvak

Supervisor, Lord

328. Newspaper Headlines

**U.S. ATTORNEY DEMANDS
INDICTMENT
HIGH NAZI OFFICIALS!!**

**German Naval Intelligence Chief
Indicted in U.S. Spy Ring**

**Grand Jury Indicts Eighteen
Including Nazi Officials**

**NAZI SPY TRIAL STARTS
TOMORROW!!!**

331. Close Shot Kellog Another Angle

KELLOG:

. . . In simple language, the indictment means that this group of defendants conspired to secure secret information about our national defense and to transmit this information to the advantage of a foreign government—namely, Germany!

332. Full Shot Court

Commotion and hubbub of voices. Jury reacting. Reporters reacting big. Messengers rushing out.

KELLOG'S VOICE:

(deliberately)

I wish to make it perfectly clear—that this conspiracy was conceived in and operated directly by the present German Government.

333. Close Shot Kellog Another Angle

KELLOG:

(continuing)

. . . It has been suggested that the roles of these four defendants are inconsequential. That is true—but therein lies their precise value—their personal unimportance. They have been but little cogs in a vast and intricate machine . . . A worldwide spy network whose organized efficiency leaps all oceans and boundaries . . . A vicious network whose complex fabric weaves inevitably through the Naval Intelligence Offices in Bremen and Hamburg—through many German-American organizations here—through the War and Propaganda Ministries in Berlin to the inner sanctums of present Germany's highest officialdom . . .

338. Int. Berlin Office Med. Shot

very modern, very luxurious. At one end hangs a large silk swastika banner—at the other end a picture of Hitler. The whole side wall is a huge map of the world. A man stands with his back to CAMERA. Several men in the uniforms of high-ranking Nazis, including Von Eichen, Straubel and Huber, stand fac-

ing him. The Man speaks—and CAMERA SLOWLY MOVES IN to follow his finger.

MAN'S VOICE:

Our power increases from day to day. All of Europe is at our mercy, on its knees, begging us not to destroy it. Austria is part of Greater Germany. Czechoslovakia is through. Italy is with us and safeguards Jugo-Slavia. Japan is our ally. Hungary is practically ours. Our agents are succeeding in Rumania, Poland and Lithuania. Franco will soon have all Spain. France will be isolated from all sides.

(CONTINUED)

MAN'S VOICE:

(moves pointer to U.S.)

But now, since our glorious victory at Munich, all our efforts must be directed at the strongest remaining democracy—the United States. Here we must repair the few petty mistakes that have recently been made . . .

(points to South America)

In order to dominate completely the countries of South America—all excellent markets for our manufactured goods, all superb sources of raw materials—

(points to U.S.)

—we must paralyze the influence of the United States by using every instrument of propaganda at our command.—Furthermore we must know every military and naval secret it possesses. . . .

339. Insert Headlines

**"NAZI SPY CASE GOES TO JURY
TODAY!!
U.S. ATTORNEY KELLOG FINISHES
SUMMATION!"**

340. Int. Court Room Long Shot (Kellog in B.G.)

KELLOG:

. . . It has been suggested that the information these defendants have obtained for Germany is of small moment—but as we have endeavored to bring out during the course of this trial—we have only scratched the surface of the Nazi espionage network. We cannot calculate the extent of this spy-ring that has penetrated every nerve and tissue of this nation, together with its propaganda and religious hatred.

(picks up large chart)

Here, on this chart

341. Insert Chart

KELLOG:

(continuing—OVER chart)

. . . We can see the amazing system of sinister forces at work in this country. . . .

DISSOLVE THRU TO:

342. News Headlines

double exposed on chart, in b.g.

**NAZI SPIES FOUND GUILTY!
JURY CONVICTS GERMAN SPIES!
JUDGE TO PRONOUNCE SENTENCE!**

WIPE TO:

343e. Closeup Kellog

speaking directly into CAMERA.

KELLOG:

And some still say there is nothing to fear—that we are immune—that we are separated by vast oceans from the bacteria of aggressive Dictatorships and Totalitarian states. But we know, and have seen the mirror of history in Europe's last year.

343f. Montage Over Kellog's Closeup

Over Kellog's closeup, we see: Bund meetings—American Legion fight—Camp Horst Wessel meetings—drilling—pamphlet distribution—Hitler screaming—Kassel screaming, etc.

KELLOG:

And we know this bacteria can slowly poison the organism of our civilized society and dull its common sense and reason—working insidiously through its Bunds and training camps—where its spies take cover and where it diligently trains its youth to seize power. . . .

344. Superimposed Shots of American Bund Order Service

marching, are replaced by row on row of grim, robot-like German troops marching with full battle equipment

2. Pare Lorentz Assesses the Warner Brothers' Attack, 1939

If you needed to be convinced that we have a free screen, one look at *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* should convince you, because the Warner Brothers have declared war on Germany in this one. Although it is hysterical, vicious, ill-contrived, and peculiarly ambiguous, I do not object to the picture because it will be a notable one in many ways; a direct assault on the rulers of a foreign nation, a direct accusation of espionage in this country on the part of Germany, it at least is a political movie that pulls no punches. It is, however, wild-eyed in itself.

It is based on a series of articles written by a G-man who is not, I am told by officials, held in great repute by the Department of Justice, for whom he worked. It is further based on as fishy a trial as I ever read about—a trial that involved an army deserter

who wrote to a German newspaper, "I want to be a spy," and who copied military information out of a book he found in the New York Public Library. From the petty and almost burlesque facts of the trial, the Warners claim that the Germans are, through the German-American Bunds, attempting to organize a Nazi group in this country that eventually hopes to seize control of the government. . . .

[W]hether it annoys you or frightens you, *Confessions of a Nazi Spy* is an important picture. From now on we should see some action on the screen; with this precedent there is no possible way any producer could argue against dramatizing any social or political theme on the grounds that he's afraid of domestic or foreign censorship. Everybody duck.

3. Walter Wanger and Alfred Hitchcock Call for Preparedness, 1940

. . . As Johnny steps up to the microphone, the announcer steps back out of picture. Johnny holds a manuscript in his hand, from which he reads:

JOHNNY:

(quietly, his eyes on the manuscript)

Hello, America. I have been watching a part of the world being blown to pieces. A part of the world as nice as Vermont and Ohio, Virginia, California and Illinois, lies ripped up and bleeding like a steer in a slaughter house.

Through the foregoing comes the sound of sirens. Johnny glances around a second towards where Carol is sitting, then continues above the noise.

JOHNNY:

And I've seen things that make the history of the savages read like Pollyanna legends. I've seen—
An official steps quickly forward to Johnny.

OFFICIAL:

(with a slight accent)

Pardon. They are coming. We will have to postpone the broadcast.

JOHNNY:

Postpone, my eye! Let's talk while we've still got a chance.

Carol has risen. She comes to stand beside him. The sound of the sirens increase.

ANOTHER FRENCH OFFICIAL:

The Nazis! The bombers! (to Carol) Madam, we have a shelter downstairs!

VARIOUS VOICES:

Lights out! They're in the sky! Out—downstairs, every one!

Johnny puts his arm around Carol.

JOHNNY:

How about it, Carol?

CAROL:

They're listening in America, Johnny.

The lights go out, leaving Johnny's and Carol's faces alone, dimly lit. Behind them we can hear the general exodus—various officials darting about, etc.

JOHNNY:

O. K., we'll tell 'em then.

He looks down at his manuscript, grins and throws it away. He turns back to the microphone.

JOHNNY:

I can't read the rest of the speech I had because all the lights have gone out so I'll have to just talk off the cuff. All that noise you hear isn't static. It's death

coming to Paris. Yes, they're coming here now. You can hear the bombs now, falling on the streets, cafes and homes. Don't tune me out. Hang on a while. This is a big story—and you're part of it. It's too late to do anything here except stand in the dark and let them come. It feels like all the lights are out everywhere—except in America. Keep those lights burning there.

Cover them with steel, ring them with guns. Build a canopy of battleships and bombing planes around them.—Hello, America! Hang onto your lights. They're the only lights left in the world!
FADE OUT.

THE END

4. A Friend Supports Wanger's Use of Propaganda in Films, 1940

129 Greenaway Rd.,
Eggertsville, N.Y.
Sept. 19, 1940

Dear Walter:

Glad to hear that you are reading *THE EAGLES GATHER*, and hope that they have awakened your enthusiasm, and the interest I also hope I aroused in you during our conversation in New York.

My wife and I saw *FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT*. You did an excellent job, and in Buffalo, at least, it was received with excitement and enthusiasm. The story is not only vital, but retains interest all along, reaching a fine patriotic climax.

True to your belief, the picture does more than deliver a mere message. It cannot be stressed too much these days. The idea that people may get tired

of propaganda is ridiculous. People like it if given to them in an entertaining form. Through that medium, not only will they listen, but will enjoy the message. It is therefore my belief that taking my suggestion as a lead, I am sure that joining *THE EAGLES* with *DYNASTY*, you will be able to produce a magnificent film which can stress the necessity for preparedness, and rearmament. . . .

Sincerely,
Marcus Rebock

5. Burton K. Wheeler Takes Aim at Hollywood, 1941

UNITED STATES SENATE
Committee on Interstate Commerce

January 13, 1941

Mr. Will Hays
28 West 44th Street
New York City

My dear Mr. Hays:

I have just sent the following letter to *Paramount News* at Washington, D.C.:

" . . . The propaganda for war that is being waged by the motion picture companies of this coun-

try is reaching a point at which I believe legislation will have to be enacted regulating the industry in this respect unless the industry itself displays a more impartial attitude."

Many complaints are coming to me and to other members of Congress to the effect that the motion picture industry is carrying on a violent propaganda campaign intending to incite the American people to the point where they will become involved in this war.

As you well know, the motion picture and news reel is one of the great agencies for molding public opinion of this country and if we are going to preserve this nation as a democratic republic, it is highly essential that both sides of each question be presented.

I sincerely hope that you will call this to the atten-

tion of your people as I am fast coming to the conclusion that legislation should be enacted to remedy the present situation.

Yours respectfully,

(sgd) B. K. Wheeler

6. Gerald P. Nye Attacks Propaganda in Films, 1941

... To carry on propaganda you must have money. But you also must have the instruments of propaganda. And one of the most powerful, if not the most powerful, instrument of propaganda is the movies. In Germany, Italy, and in Russia—the dictator countries—the government either owns or completely controls and directs the movies. And they are used as instruments of government propaganda. In this country the movies are owned by private individuals. But, it so happens that these movie companies have been operating as war propaganda machines almost as if they were being directed from a single central bureau.

We all go to the movies. We know how, for too long now, the silver screen has been flooded with picture after picture designed to rouse us to a state of war hysteria. Pictures glorifying war. Pictures telling about the grandeur and the heavenly justice of the British Empire. Pictures depicting the courage, the passion for democracy, the love of humanity, the tender solicitude for other people, by the generals and trade agents and the proconsuls of Great Britain, while all the peoples who are opposed to her, including even courageous little Finland now, are drawn as course, bestial, brutal scoundrels. . . .

Why do they do this? Well, because they are interested in foreign causes. You cannot doubt that. Go to Hollywood. It is a raging volcano of war fever. The place swarms with refugees. It also swarms with British actors. In Hollywood they call it the "British Army of Occupation." The leaders are almost all heavy contributors to the numerous committees of all sorts organized, under the guise of relief to Britain, Greece, or Russia, to propagandize us into war.

Why do they want to push us into war? Well, they have all sorts of interests. But here is one I can give you: One of the leading Wall Street investment

houses made a study of these movie industries only a few months ago. It told its clients that if Britain loses, seven of the eight leading companies will be wiped out. . . .

What I would like to know is this: Are the movie moguls doing this because they like to do it, or has the Government of the United States forced them to become the same kind of propaganda agencies that the German, Italian, and Russian film industries have become? I have excellent reason to believe that this governmental influence has prevailed. . . .

Americans, we want to be strong and ready always to effectively defend ourselves against the worst that any part of the world might choose to bring against us, of course. We want to leave no stone unturned that will aid in guaranteeing such a defense.

But, likewise, we ought to want freedom from foreign influence in times like these. Let's have courageous American thinking, not the kind which finds us waiting for the cue that Churchill gives; not the kind that has to be painted and pictured by propagandists or by forces whose profits are dependent upon foreign causes.

Let's be Americans because of and for causes that are American. Let us bury forever the thought that real Americanism is determined only by those who both hate Hitler most and love Britain best. Let us be giving larger thought to what is best for America. . . .

This is a wonderful hour for more America-first thinking; for a fine, clean expression by all our people of determination to stay out of these never-ending foreign wars, to keep faith with ourselves and with those who 150 years ago, won for us divorcement from the hates, the wars, and the power politics of Europe.

7. Wendell Willkie Defends Freedom of the Screen, 1941

Willkie, Owen, Otis & Bailly,
Washington, D.C., September 8, 1941.

United States Senator D. Worth Clark,
Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

My Dear Senator Clark: You are beginning an investigation of the motion-picture industry. My firm has been asked to represent it as counsel. We assume the charges against the industry are contained in Resolution 152, introduced in but not yet passed by the United States Senate, and in the speech of Senator Nye, coauthor of the resolution, which was delivered by him in St. Louis on the day the resolution was introduced.

After reading the resolution and Senator Nye's speech with care, I have come to the conclusion that your subcommittee intends to inquire whether or not the motion-picture industry, as a whole, and its leading executives, as individuals, are opposed to the Nazi dictatorship in Germany. If this is the case, there need be no investigation.

The motion-picture industry and its executives are opposed to the Hitler regime in Germany; they have watched with horror the destruction of a free life within Germany and the ruthless invasions of other countries by Nazis. On behalf of the motion-picture industry and its personnel, I wish to put on the record this simple truth: We make no pretense of friendliness to Nazi Germany nor to the objectives and goals of this ruthless dictatorship. We abhor everything which Hitler represents. . . .

Senator Nye, in his address, has also accused the industry of cooperating with the national administration on matters of national defense. . . .

Again, for the record, on behalf of the motion-picture industry and its personnel, may I put this simple truth: We are proud to admit that we have done everything possible to inform the public of the progress of the national-defense program.

The motion-picture industry has no wish to flout the authority or the position of your committee. But the industry has instructed me to say that it intends to continue to present to the American people a truthful and accurate portrayal of their defense effort. However, when Senator Nye says that the industry is doing this work on the demand of the administration, we emphatically and indignantly deny his charge. The administration has made no such demand, and frankly, the motion-picture industry

would be ashamed if it were not doing voluntarily what it is now doing in this patriotic cause. . . .

The resolution charges that the motion-picture business is in the hands of groups interested in involving the United States in war. The co-author, Senator Nye, explains this allegation on the basis of the individual opinions of the executives of the business, their racial and geographic backgrounds, and their mercenary motives. This charge should be supported by cold facts. We know that your committee will want to discuss only facts, so, in brief, I will present them for your record.

Of the more than 1,100 feature pictures produced since the outbreak of the present war, only some 50 have had anything to do with the issues involved in the war or with the ideological beliefs of the participants. Some of these 50, we are glad to admit, do portray nazi-ism for what it is—a cruel, lustful, ruthless, and cynical force. We know that this is an accurate portrayal of nazi-ism. . . .

The pictures portraying England and Germany do not purport to tell the American people what they should do about nazi-ism, save as the knowledge of the true facts may, as it always has, influence the judgment of right-thinking men and women. We believe that it is the truth which makes and keeps men free and that it is the suppression of the truth which is a menace to human liberty wherever it occurs. . . .

I cannot let pass this opportunity to warn of the very genuine dangers involved in the type of investigation which you are now proposing to start. The radio business is already included in the original resolution. From the motion picture and radio industries, it is just a small step to the newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals. And from the freedom of the press, it is just a small step to the freedom of the individual to say what he believes. The United States, with England and its allies, remain the bulwark of the rights of the individual in the world today. The rights of the individual mean nothing if freedom of the press and freedom of speech are destroyed. There can be no disunity within the United States on this principle, and I know there is none.

In conclusion, we insist that your committee is proceeding with doubtful legal authority in the conduct of the proposed hearings on the subjects contained in the original resolution and amplified in Sen-

ator Nye's speech. Furthermore, the manner of the committee's creation does not establish the impression of impartiality. And, as I have said above, the investigation and harassment of free expression in the United States, is a procedure, once accepted, that may

be applied to the theater, to newspapers and magazines, to the radio, to publications of all kinds and finally to the right of public officials and private citizens to speak freely. As American citizens, we protest this as vigorously as possible. . . .

**Chapter 26:
Document Set 1 References**

1. Warner Brothers Declares War on the German-American Bund, 1939
Milton Krims and John Wexley, *Confessions of a Nazi Spy*, Script, 1939 (Including Revisions), in John Wexley Papers, Madison, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Box 1.
2. Pare Lorentz Assesses the Warner Brothers' Attack, 1939
Pare Lorentz, "Confessions of a Nazi Spy," in *Lorentz on Film* (New York: Hopkinson and Blake, 1975), pp. 168-169.
3. Walter Wanger and Alfred Hitchcock Call for Preparedness, 1940
"Shooting Script," June 5, 1940, *Foreign Correspondent*, in Walter Wanger Papers, Madison, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Box 78.
4. A Friend Supports Wanger's Use of Propaganda in Films, 1940
Marcus Rebock to Walter Wanger, September 19, 1940, in Wanger Papers, Box 77.
5. Burton K. Wheeler Takes Aim at Hollywood, 1941
Burton K. Wheeler to Will Hays, January 13, 1941, in United Artists Collection, Madison, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Monroe Greenthal File, Box 4.
6. Gerald P. Nye Attacks Propaganda in Films, 1941.
Gerald P. Nye, "Our Madness Increases as Our Emergency Shrinks," Extension of Remarks of Hon. Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota in the Senate of the United States, Monday, August 4, 1941, in Gerald P. Nye Papers, West Branch, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Box 58.
7. Wendell Willkie Defends Freedom on the Screen, 1941
Wendell Willkie to D. Worth Clark, September 8, 1941, in United States Congress, Senate, *Propaganda in Motion Pictures, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, United States Senate*, 77th Cong., 1st session, pp. 18-21.

Professeur F. Feeley

Université de Grenoble

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #2:

8. "A. Philip Randolph States Black Goals, 1942."
9. "Black Doubts About the War for Democracy, 1944."
10. "Walter White Describes Racial Tension in Wartime Detroit, 1944."

CHAPTER 26

DOCUMENT SET 2

War and Society: Outsiders on the Inside

World War II resulted in revolutionary changes in American society and the national economy. Chapter 26 concentrates on this social transformation and examines the long-term consequences of total war for the future of the United States. Among the groups most directly affected by wartime changes were American women and the black community. The following documents explore their social and economic experiences, revealing the catalytic effects of war.

The first three documents focus on the black response to wartime opportunity. Beginning with black labor leader A. Philip Randolph's remarks on the March on Washington Movement's goals, these materials reflect the heightened militancy of black activists who sought to infuse the war with social meaning. Relate the urgency of his comments and Grant Reynolds's outrage to the new social mobility described in your textbook. Similarly, Walter White's reflections on the economic background of the Detroit riot in 1943 should be read in conjunction with both the textbook section on black economic advances and the "Place in Time" essay on wartime Detroit. Note the relationship between the authors' backgrounds, their forums, and the views expressed. Search the documents for evidence of war as a stimulus to social change.

No less affected by the war's unsettling influence were American women, who entered the labor force in unprecedented numbers. Seizing the opportunity to

combine patriotism and financial gain, women responded to wartime propaganda appeals that stressed common sacrifice. As you review the remaining documents, try to determine what motives propelled women into the work force.

In the first two selections, the Labor Department's Women's Bureau details the entry of women into the steel industry and the shipyards. Examine these descriptions for evidence of the government's long-term intentions with regard to the future sexual division of labor. Moreover, be aware of workplace problems unique to female workers. The Women's Bureau's Mary Elizabeth Pidgeon offers useful analysis of women's work concerns as the war drew to a close.

The final selections provide a sample of black and female recollections of the changes wrought by World War II. Drawn from Studs Terkel's *The Good War*, these oral-history accounts reflect mature judgments concerning the social meaning of war. Always be cautious about the possibility of selective memory as you compare wartime accounts and later recollections of the wartime experience.

As you analyze the documents, be aware of continuities and contrasts in the black/female historical experiences. Try to judge the long-term effects of World War II on blacks and women, relating the documents to your textbook's account of the war as a destabilizing force.

Questions for Analysis

1. How do the goals, demands, and experiences of blacks and women in the 1940s compare with the ideas expressed during World War I (see document sets for Chapter 22)? Do you find evidence that the social environment had changed?
2. What do the documents reveal about government appeals to attract women into the labor force? What was the result of these appeals? Why did women enter the work force?
3. Review the White report, textbook account, and "Place in Time" essay for clues to the causes behind the Detroit riot of 1943. What does the evidence reveal about the origins of the clash?
4. What do the documents suggest with regard to impediments to widespread female labor-force participation? How were these concerns overcome? What evidence do the documents provide concerning long-term change?
5. What was the meaning of World War II to black Americans? What do the documents reveal about their goals for the war? What problems were present for blacks in the work force and military service?
6. What problems did women encounter in the workplace? In what ways were these concerns unique to female workers? To what extent was unionism helpful in dealing with the problems of women workers?
7. How did women perceive themselves as part of the American work force? How did they regard the future of women's employment in the postwar era? In what way does the evidence clarify the reasons for the ultimate outcome?

1. A. Philip Randolph States Black Goals, 1942

... When the defense program began and billions of the taxpayers' money were appropriated for guns, ships, tanks, and bombs, Negroes presented themselves for work only to be given the cold shoulder. North as well as South, and despite their qualifications, Negroes were denied skilled employment. Not until their wrath and indignation took the form of a proposed protest march on Washington, scheduled for July 1, 1941, did things begin to move in the form of defense jobs for Negroes. The march was postponed by the timely issuance (June 25, 1941) of the famous Executive Order No. 8802 by President Roosevelt. But this order and the President's Committee on Fair Employment Practice, established thereunder, have as yet only scratched the surface by way of eliminating discriminations on account of race or color in war industry. Both management and labor

unions in too many places and in too many ways are still drawing the color line.

It is to meet this situation squarely with direct action that the March on Washington Movement launched its present program of protest mass meetings. Twenty thousand were in attendance at Madison Square Garden, June 16; 16,000 in the Coliseum in Chicago, June 26; 9,000 in the City Auditorium of St. Louis, August 14. Meetings of such magnitude were unprecedented among Negroes. . . .

By fighting for their rights now, American Negroes are helping to make America a moral and spiritual arsenal of democracy. Their fight against the poll tax, against lynch law, segregation, and Jim Crow, their fight for economic, political, and social equality, thus becomes part of the global war for freedom.

2. Black Doubts About the War for Democracy, 1944

For the past two years and ten months I have been a Chaplain on active duty with the United States Army. I have found Negro soldiers bitterly resentful of their lot in this war. . . .

Out on the Pacific Coast I found young Negroes holding key positions in the industries—the airplane industry to be exact—which produce the most difficult of weapons to master, the army bomber. Other young Negroes are now flying these planes. Still other young Negroes are now prepared to be their navigators. Now it is a commonly accepted fact among honest men and women that no racial group has cornered the market on either intelligence or native ability. This is what the celebrated pamphlet *The Races of Mankind* would have told a few thousand army officers had it not been banned by stupid people who refuse to recognize the obvious. All Negro soldiers are not graduate engineers. Nor are all white soldiers. All Negro soldiers were not born in that section of the nation, which because it seeks to keep the Negro in

the educational gutter, directs that white youth too must wallow in the pig sty of ignorance. But the Honorable Secretary of War has not claimed that white soldiers cannot master the techniques of modern weapons of war. His blanket statement about the Negro soldier's inability in this respect not only insults the thousands of intelligent Negro youth in our armed forces from all sections of the country, but by indirection it classifies them as morons incapable of attaining the intelligence level of the most ignorant southern cracker. What does the Negro soldier think about this? He considers it a vicious attack upon his manhood. And what is more he thinks that the Administration continues to insult him as long as such men are allowed to control his destiny in this war. The Negro soldier will not give his life for the perpetuation of this outright lynching of his ability, nor for the right of domestic nazis to make of him a military scapegoat.

3. Walter White Describes Racial Tension in Wartime Detroit, 1944

In 1916 there were 8,000 Negroes in Detroit's population of 536,650. In 1925 the number of Negroes in

Detroit had been multiplied by ten to a total of 85,000. In 1940, the total had jumped to 149,119. In

June, 1943, between 190,000 and 200,000 lived in the Motor City. . . .

Jobs

Early in July, 1943, 25,000 employees of the Packard Plant, which was making Rolls-Royce engines for American bombers and marine engines for the famous PT boats, ceased work in protest against the upgrading of three Negroes. Subsequent investigation indicated that only a relatively small percentage of the Packard workers actually wanted to go on strike. The UAW-CIO bitterly fought the strike. But a handful of agitators charged by R. J. Thomas, president of the UAW-CIO, with being members of the Ku Klux Klan, had whipped up sentiment particularly among the Southern whites employed by Packard against the promotion of Negro workers. During the short-lived strike, a thick Southern voice outside the plant harangued a crowd shouting, "I'd rather see Hitler and Hirohito win than work beside a nigger on the assembly line." The strike was broken by the resolute attitude of the union and of Col. George E. Strong of the United States Aircraft Procurement Division, who refused to yield to the demand that the three Negroes be down-graded. . . . The racial hatred created, released, and crystallized by the Packard strike played a considerable role in the race riot which was soon to follow. It also was the culmination of a long and bitter fight to prevent the employment of Negroes in wartime industry. There had been innumerable instances, unpublicized, in the Detroit area of work stoppages and slow downs by white workers, chiefly from the South, and of Polish and Italian extraction. Trivial reasons for these stoppages had been given by the workers when in reality they were in protest against unemployment or promotion of Negroes. . . .

Detroit Labor Unions and the Negro

One of the most extraordinary phenomena of the riot was the fact that while mobs attacked Negro victims outside some of the industrial plants of Detroit, there was not only no physical clash inside any plant in Detroit but not as far as could be learned even any verbal clash between white and Negro workers. This can be attributed to two factors: first, a firm stand against discrimination and segregation of Negro workers by the UAW-CIO, particularly since the Ford strike of 1941. The second factor is that when the military took over, the armed guards in the plants were ordered by the Army to maintain order at all costs and to prevent any outbreak within the plants. . . .

The Detroit riot brought into sharp focus one of the most extraordinary labor situations in the United States. Prior to the Ford strike of 1941 many Negroes in Detroit considered Ford their "great white father" because the Ford plant almost alone of Detroit industries employed Negroes. When the UAW-CIO and the UAW-AFL sought to organize Ford workers, their approach at the beginning was a surreptitious one. The unions felt that the very high percentage of Southern whites in Detroit would refuse to join the Union if Negroes were too obviously participating. But when the strike broke, far-sighted Negro leaders in Detroit took an unequivocal position in behalf of the organization of workers. A serious racial clash was averted by the intercession of thoughtful whites and Negroes. Following the winning of the NLRB election by the union, it began to take a broader and more unequivocal position that all workers and union members should share in the benefits of union agreements irrespective of race, creed, or color. . . .

4. The Women's Bureau Recommends Improved Conditions for Female Shipyard Workers, 1944

. . . Times have changed with lightning speed. By late 1943, thousands of women along both coasts and on the Gulf, Great Lakes, and inland waterways were actively engaged in almost every phase of ship building and repair work, and it is anticipated that it will be necessary to recruit thousands more before the war is over. Though the introduction of women into the

shipyards did not begin in earnest until the fall of 1942, by January 1943 as many as 4 per cent of all the production wage earners in the industry were women. The proportion had risen to a little over 5 per cent by March, and by September to 9.5 per cent. In January 1944 it was 10 per cent. These figures include the 8 navy yards engaged in ship construction and repair,

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #3:

11. "The Women's Bureau Recommends Improved Conditions for Female Shipyard Workers, 1944."
12. "The Women's Bureau's Assessment of Women's Progress the Work Place, 1944."
13. "Dellie Hahne Recalls the War's Impact on Women's Attitudes, ca. 1945."
14. "Memories of War as Opportunity, Ca. 1942-45."

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shipyards did not begin in earnest until the fall of 1942, by January 1943 as many as 4 per cent of all the production wage earners in the industry were women. The proportion had risen to a little over 5 per cent by March, and by September to 9.5 per cent. In January 1944 it was 10 per cent. These figures include the 8 navy yards engaged in ship construction and repair,

in which women have made extensive gains and comprised in September nearly one-fourth of the women wage earners in the industry. . . .

It is clear, then, that the shipyards are charting new seas in the utilization of the woman labor force, and the mistakes or successes that result may have a profound effect not only on the production and repair of ships, but on the cost and efficiency of such production and the health, work, and life histories of thousands of women. It is important to take stock now. Misconceptions should be dispelled, well-founded facts pooled, and the fund of information available from industries with longer histories in the employment of women disseminated. It is with these objects in view that the present report is submitted. It is the aim of the Women's Bureau through the recommendations and suggestions made here to promote conditions for the woman shipyard worker conducive to her most efficient and productive employment and her well-being as a member of society and the labor force. . . .

1. Secure the cooperation of men supervisors and workers.

2. Select and place women carefully.
3. Employ women only in jobs found to be suitable.
4. Pay women and upgrade them on the same basis as men.
5. Schedule an 8-hour day and a 48-hour 6-day week; allow a lunch period of at least 30 minutes, and rest periods of 10 to 15 minutes in each work spell of as much as 4 hours. Rotate shifts no more frequently than every two months.
6. Set up an effective woman employee counselor system.
7. Give new women workers preliminary induction into the work and environment of the shipyard before putting them on the job.
8. Provide personal-service, food, and medical facilities that meet approved standards of adequacy and quality.
9. Study and expand the safety program to adapt it to women workers, and instruct women thoroughly in safe work practice.

5. The Women's Bureau's Assessment of Women's Progress in the Work Place, 1944

In the past the opportunity given women workers to learn and to exercise skills has been narrower in range than men's has been. In consequence, very large numbers of women were little thought of in connection with other types of work, and so they continued to be given little opportunity to develop additional skills. The war situation has changed that considerably. With shortages of men workers, women have been employed in a greater variety of occupations than before. . . .

Unfortunately, there are many cases where women still have been given far too little chance to be upgraded to their highest skills. In 1943, the National Industrial Conference Board analyzed reports from some 130 plants, chiefly in heavier metal industries, plants that had employed relatively few women or none. In nearly 60 percent of these plants there were no plans for advancing women from the top production jobs they held at the time of reporting to more highly skilled jobs. Moreover, numerous instances are reported of the placement of women in jobs that are not in the usual line for the job progression; in

such blind-alley jobs neither proficiency nor length of service can bring these women beyond a limited early stage of work. If this situation continues, it will be a great disadvantage to women after the war, and in fact government agencies are finding promotional discrimination against them as one of the major reasons why women quit jobs in war plants. . . .

Plant seniority practices under the clauses of many union agreements give women workers very inadequate protection. For example, some agreements definitely provide that women's occupation of jobs formerly held by men shall be for the duration only. Some agreements give women employed at time of signing the agreement full seniority rights with men, but for women employed after that time set up a list for women separate from that for men. Some agreements provide for the seniority of women as "separate and distinct from the seniority of men." Agreements fixing seniority by department only may affect women and men quite differently. Other agreements are so vaguely worded as to permit interpretations that are of disadvantage to women. . . .

6. Dellie Hahne Recalls the War's Impact on Women's Attitudes, ca. 1945

There was *one* good thing came out of it. I had friends whose mothers went to work in factories. For the first time in their lives, they worked outside the home. They realized that they were capable of doing something more than cook a meal. I remember going to Sunday dinner one of the older women invited me to. She and her sister at the dinner table were talking about the best way to keep their drill sharp in the factory. I had never heard anything like this in my life. It was just marvelous. I was tickled.

But even here we were sold a bill of goods. They were hammering away that the woman who went to work did it temporarily to help her man, and when he came back, he took her job and she cheerfully leaped back to the home.

There was a letter column in which some woman

wrote to her husband overseas: "This is an exact picture of our dashboard. Do we need a quart of oil?" Showing how dependent we were upon our men. Those of us who read it said, This is pure and simple bullshit. 'Cause if you don't know if you need a quart of oil, drive the damn thing to the station and have the man show you and you'll learn if you need a quart of oil. But they still wanted women to be dependent, helpless.

I think a lot of women said, Screw that noise. 'Cause they had a taste of freedom, they had a taste of making their own money, a taste of spending their own money, making their own decisions. I think the beginning of the women's movement had its seeds right there in World War Two. . . .

7. Memories of War as Opportunity, ca. 1942–1945

The war started and jobs kinda opened up for women that the men had. I took a job at a shoe-repair place on Wilshire Boulevard. Cleanin' shoes and dyin' shoes, the same thing that men did. They started takin' applications at Douglas, to work in a defense plant. I was hired.

I didn't want a job on the production line. I heard so many things about accidents, that some girls got their fingers cut off or their hair caught in the machines. I was frightened. All I wanted to do was get in the factory, because they were payin' more than what I'd been makin'. Which was forty dollars a week, which was pretty good considering I'd been makin' about twenty dollars a week. When I left Tennessee I was only makin' two-fifty a week, so that was quite a jump. . . .

They [other women workers] weren't interested in the war. Most of them were only interested in the money. Most of us was young and we really didn't know. All we were after was that buck. I didn't care about the money. That was a big salary for me, I was satisfied with that. . . .

I do know one thing, this place was very segregated when I first come here. Oh, Los Angeles, you just couldn't go and sit down like you do now. You had certain places you went. You had to more or less

stick to the restaurants and hotels where black people were. It wasn't until the war that it really opened up. 'Cause when I come out here it was awful, just like bein' in the South. . . .

I really didn't know what the war was about. I was in the house one day and all of a sudden they started yellin' about the war, war, war. Roosevelt had declared war. Well, they know that when there's a war, somebody's gonna get a job. This was during the Depression, so I think people were kinda glad the war had started. So right away they started hirin'. I think the war had kind of a pleasure. People didn't realize the seriousness of the war. All they were thinkin' about is they had lived in these Depression days. It was so hard to come by a dollar.

Those who had to go, that was the sad part. I had a brother that went to war, my youngest. He come back. The war helped some people because they come back, they took trades, learned to do things. My brother come back and now he is very successful. I think the army really made a man out of him. He works at Rockwell in the missile department and he's a supervisor. He wouldn't have known what to do if he hadn't gone in the army. . . .

They didn't mix the white and black in the war. But now it gives you a kind of independence because

they felt that we gone off and fought, we should be equal. Everything started openin' up for us. We got a chance to go places we had never been able to go before.

In ways it was too bad that so many lives were lost. But I think it was for a worthy cause, because it did make a way for us. And we were able to really get out.

Chapter 26:
Document Set 2 References

1. A. Philip Randolph States Black Goals, 1942
A. Philip Randolph, "Why Should We March?," *Survey Graphic* (November, 1942).
2. Black Doubts About the War for Democracy, 1944
Grant Reynolds, "What the Negro Thinks of this War," *The Crisis*, Vol. 51 (September, 1944).
3. Walter White Describes Racial Tension in Wartime Detroit, 1944
Walter White, "What Caused the Detroit Riots?" Part I in *What Caused the Detroit Riots* by Walter White and Thurgood Marshall (New York: NAACP, 1943), pp. 5-16.
4. The Women's Bureau Recommends Improved Conditions for Female Shipyard Workers, 1944
Dorothy K. Newman, "Employing Women in the Shipyards," *Bulletin of the Women's Bureau*, no. 192-196 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), pp. 1-6.
5. The Women's Bureau's Assessment of Women's Progress in the Work Place, 1944
Mary Elizabeth Pidgeon, "A Preview as to Women Workers in Transition from War to Peace," Special Bulletin No. 18 of the Women's Bureau (Washington: Government Printing Office, March, 1944).
6. Dellie Hahne Recalls the War's Impact on Women's Attitudes, ca. 1945
"Dellie Hahne," in Studs Terkel, *The Good War: An Oral History of World War II* (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 122.
7. Memories of War as Opportunity, ca. 1942-1945
"Sarah Killingworth," in Terkel, pp. 113-116.

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #4 :

15. "Churchill and Stalin reach an Understanding on the Balkans, October 9, 1944."
16. "Dean Acheson Explains the Truman Doctrine, 1947."
17. "Harry S Truman's Message to Congress, March 12, 1947."
18. "Henry A. Wallace and James F. Byrnes Disagree over Policy Toward Russia in summer/fall 1946."

When I left office the question of our future relations with the satellite countries was still under discussion.

CHURCHILL AND STALIN REACH
AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE BALKANS,
OCTOBER 9, 1944¹

Document 9

The moment was apt for business, so I said, "Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests, missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about Yugoslavia?" While this was being translated I wrote out on a half-sheet of paper:

Rumania	
Russia	90%
The others	10%
Greece	
Great Britain (in accord with U.S.A.)	90%
Russia	10%
Yugoslavia	50-50%
Hungary	50-50%
Bulgaria	
Russia	75%
The others	25%

I pushed this across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to me. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down.

Of course we had long and anxiously considered our point, and were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won.

After this there was a long silence. The pencilled paper lay in the centre of the table. At length I said, "Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper." "No, you keep it," said Stalin.

¹ Selected from W. S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), pp. 227-28. Reprinted by permission of and arrangement with the authorized publishers.

CHAPTER 27

DOCUMENT SET 1

The Greek Crisis and the Truman Doctrine: Origins of Containment

Perhaps no historical problem has been more controversial than the origins of the Cold War after World War II. Acknowledging its importance to an understanding of modern American foreign policy, your textbook devotes a substantial portion of Chapter 27 to anticommunism and containment. The following documents focus on a pivotal incident of the early Cold War, the Greek crisis of 1947, and on the Truman Doctrine as evidence of the postwar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. As you examine these materials, be conscious of the conflicting world views that gave rise to the clash. Try also to relate the debates of 1947 to foreign-policy problems that have plagued the United States in more recent times.

The first two documents contain the Truman administration's analysis of the issues at stake when Great Britain withdrew from Greece. Examine acting secretary of state Dean Acheson's and President Truman's assumptions as they moved to forge the Truman Doctrine into a broad commitment to the containment of communism. As you evaluate the argument, compare their position with the Soviet perspective on Truman's message to Congress, as reflected in the *Soviet News* editorial. How did the Soviet and American views of the Greek situation differ? Use the textbook account as a guide to Washington's policy assumptions and sense of urgency.

Questions for Analysis

1. What do the documents reveal about the origins of the Greek crisis in 1946–1947? How did American and Soviet analysts interpret the roots of conflict?
2. What were the underlying purposes of the Truman Doctrine? How did the Truman administration implement its plan? With what results, both short term and long term?
3. Define containment as Kennan intended the policy to operate. What do the documents reveal about the assumptions held by Kennan, Acheson, and Truman? What was the logic of Kennan's argument, and what did he hope to achieve through the policies advanced in the "Sources of Soviet Conduct"?
4. What were the criticisms of the Kennan-Truman position, in both the United States and the Soviet Union? On what basis did Kennan himself later fault the Truman administration's adaptation of his ideas? How would you account for the ambivalence expressed in Kennan's memoirs?
5. Democratic senator Walter George of Georgia responded to the Truman Doctrine by saying: ". . . when we make a policy of this kind we are irrevocably committing ourselves to a course of action, and there is no way to get out of it next week or next year. You go down to the end of the road." Where was the end of the road? What do the documents suggest about the future implications of the decisions of 1947–1948?

Once Truman settled on the containment program, his most serious problem involved persuading the Congress (and the public) that the new departure was necessary. The result was a hard-sell campaign that convinced important Republicans, such as Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, that resistance to an expansive communist movement was essential. Vandenberg's letter to a constituent reveals his own beliefs and motives for embracing bipartisanship in foreign policy. Equally significant were the signs of future danger inherent in Truman's approach. Determine why Vandenberg was concerned about the foreign-policy crisis.

A final group of documents explores the intellectual rationale for a firm anti-Soviet stance in American foreign policy. Transcending the immediate Greek problem, George Frost Kennan's well-known essay, "Sources of Soviet Conduct," established a broad framework for Soviet-American relations in the future. Compare the excerpt from Kennan's remarks with the skeptical response of foreign-policy critic Walter Lippman.

As you review the concluding document, drawn from Kennan's memoirs, assess the author's reservations about the Truman Doctrine. Try to relate Kennan's and Vandenberg's concerns to the evolution and extension of the containment policy in a modern setting.

6. In what way do the documents contribute to an understanding of the origins of the Cold War? What light do they shed on the issue of responsibility for the breakdown in Soviet-American relations, 1945-1948? Is there any reason to believe that the Cold War could have been avoided?
7. As originally conceived by Kennan and Acheson, was the containment policy a political, economic, or military policy? How was the policy implemented in subsequent years? What do the documents reveal about original intent?

1. Dean Acheson Explains the Truman Doctrine, 1947

On February 24 of this year the British Ambassador, in a note dated February 21, informed the Department of State that as of March 31 the British Government would be obliged to discontinue the financial, economic, and advisory assistance which it has been giving to Greece and Turkey. Within a week the President informed congressional leaders of this situation and advised with them on the course of action which the Government should take. On March 12, the President informed Congress and the Nation of the situation and recommended that this Government extend aid to Greece and Turkey.

On March 3 we received from the Greek Government an urgent appeal for financial, economic, and expert assistance. Assistance is imperative, the Greek Government says, if Greece is to survive as a free nation. . . .

[I]t is necessary only to glance at the map to realize that the survival and integrity of Greece is of grave importance in a much wider situation. The inexorable facts of geography link the future of Greece and Turkey. Should the integrity and independence of Greece be lost or compromised, the effect upon Turkey is inevitable. . . .

I need not emphasize to you what would more than likely be the effect on the nations in the Middle East of a collapse in Greece and Turkey, and the installation of totalitarian regimes there. Both from the point of view of economics and morale, the effects upon countries to the east would be enormous, especially if the failure in Greece and Turkey should come about as the result of the failure of this great democracy to come to their aid. On the other hand, I ask you to consider the effects on their morale and their internal development should Greece and Turkey receive a helping hand from the United States, the country with which they closely associate the principles of freedom. It is not too much to say that the outcome in Greece and Turkey will be watched with deep con-

cern throughout the vast area from the Dardanelles to the China Sea.

It is also being watched with deepest anxiety by the peoples to the west, particularly the peoples of Europe who, as the President said, are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedom and independence while they repair the damage of war. . . .

The present parliament of Greece was democratically elected in an election which foreign observers agreed was fair. There can be no doubt that it represents the majority of the Greek people. The present Greek Cabinet contains representatives of 85 percent of the members of the Greek Parliament. The mere fact that Greece has a king does not necessarily make Greece's form of government less democratic than that of other countries, as is shown for instance by the governments of Norway, of Sweden, of Denmark, of the Netherlands and of Great Britain.

It is not the object of our aid to Greece either to help to maintain or to help to remove the present government or the King of Greece. It is our object to help to maintain the present constitutional system of Greece so long as the majority of Greeks desire it, and to help Greece create conditions in which its free institutions can develop in a more normal fashion.

In Greece today we do not have a choice between a perfect democracy and an imperfect democracy. The question is whether there shall be any democracy at all. If the armed minorities that now threaten Greece's political and economic stability were to gain control, free institutions and human freedoms would disappear, and democratic progress would come to an abrupt halt.

It is not claimed that all persons involved in the present armed challenge to the Greek Government are Communists. There are among them many persons who honestly, but in our opinion, mistakenly, support the Communist-led forces because they do

not like the present Greek Government. The political amnesty offered by the Greek Government offers to all the opportunity to cooperate in making democratic Greek institutions work.

We are planning aid to Greece with the hope and intention that conditions will be created in which the Greek Government can achieve more efficient administration and perfect its democratic processes. . . .

2. Harry S Truman Outlines a Program for Greece and Turkey, 1947

. . . The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the *status quo* is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the *status quo* in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are

of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence. . . .

We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the \$350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel. . . .

85 - THE COLD WAR.

Within two years, the two major Allies led the two antagonistic ideological blocks that divided the world. The US was on the world scene for good. While he painfully protected New Deal acquisitions at home, H. S Truman implemented a policy of «containment» of Communist expansion within the sphere defined at the Yalta Conference (hence US support for Turkey and Greece). Interpreting this as an open threat of encirclement, the USSR dropped the Iron Curtain which, for at least ten years, divided the «totalitarian» from the «free» world. To all the latter, the US stood ready to give military and economic assistance (Truman Doctrine), especially to Germany, where the split started, and Japan.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose on them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta Agreement, in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

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Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war [...].

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world — and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

Harry S TRUMAN, *Message to Congress*,
March 12, 1947.

Louis J. HALLE : *The Cold War as History*, New York : Harper & Row, 1967.

Joseph M. JONES : *The Fifteen Weeks*, New York : Viking, 1955.

HENRY A. WALLACE AND
JAMES F. BYRNES DISAGREE OVER
POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA

Document 3

(a) *Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace:*¹

I became seriously worried about our stand against Russia when I listened to the first discussion of the atomic bomb in Cabinet meeting. Secretary of War Stimson had a truly statesmanlike attitude, which he expressed in convincing, forthright language. But his view did not prevail.

Stimson was opposed to the policy of keeping atomic energy from the world, within the narrow confines of one nation's military secret. As a matter of fact, he told us, America could not keep it a secret anyhow. There was nothing to be lost, and much to be gained, by imparting it to all peoples. I feel that his departure from the Cabinet was one of the tragedies of the postwar world.

After he left, the Cabinet became more and more heavily loaded on the side of the Russia-haters. As Secretary of Commerce I became aware of the fact that many big businessmen who had co-operated with the Army and Navy during the war were looking ahead to the probability, if not the inevitability, of war with Russia. They were not trying to stop that drift; on the contrary, they looked with favor on very large appropriations for military purposes.

It was steadily driven home to me that these larger businessmen welcomed the thought of being taxed in order to get the nation in trim to fight Russia! Soon it became apparent that the press was cultivating the same red hysteria that arose after the last war and that this hysteria was being used as a club to beat liberals of any kind.

This disturbed me so much that I put my thoughts on paper in a letter to President Truman dated July 23, 1946. The high point of this letter was my urging that we develop, in co-operation with Russia, practical plans for the two nations to live in the same world without danger of eventual atomic bomb warfare. This letter was not made public until September 17, when the White House authorized its publication.

What caused my resignation, however, were certain sentences in my September 12 speech, which had been cleared face to face with President Truman on September 10. These sentences disturbed Secretary Byrnes and Senator Vandenberg in Paris—not because of the fact that I said them, but because President Truman said at a press conference that he had read my speech and approved it. The key sentences were the following:

"The real peace treaty we now need is between the United States and Russia. On our part we should recognize that we have no more business in the *political* affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the *political* affairs

¹ Selected from *Toward World Peace*, pp. 8-10. Copyright 1948 by Henry A. Wallace. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc.

of Latin America, Western Europe, and the United States. We cannot permit the door to be closed to our trade in Eastern Europe any more than we can in China. But at the same time we have to recognize that the Balkans are closer to Russia than to us—and that Russia cannot permit either England or the United States to dominate the politics of that area.”

In retrospect I cannot help thinking that the so-called Truman Doctrine as exemplified in Greece and Turkey was already being incubated in certain minds, that these minds had not yet “sold” Truman, and that therefore he had kicked over their apple cart when he announced his agreement with my sentiments.

(b) *Secretary of State James F. Byrnes:*²

My hope for united support of our foreign policies received a serious setback when, on September 12, 1946, while I was in Paris, Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace made a speech at Madison Square Garden contending that the policy which had been approved by the President, and carried out by me, was too harsh to the Soviet Union and that a more conciliatory approach to them was necessary. I was not greatly surprised by the Secretary's action. Previously, he had made a statement to the *New York Times* referring to our negotiations with Iceland for the use of the airfield we had built there. His statement was effectively used by the Communists in Iceland and it had obstructed the efforts of the State Department to secure an agreement important to the defense of this hemisphere.

In Paris, the importance of Mr. Wallace's Madison Square Garden speech was magnified in the minds of the representatives of foreign governments by newspaper reports quoting President Truman as saying at a press conference that he approved the Wallace speech in its entirety. This report stimulated widespread discussion among the governmental representatives attending the peace conference; it inspired inquiries to our representatives in various capitals. Foreign Ministers wondered whether in my various public statements I had correctly presented American policy.

Senator Vandenberg issued a statement saying that he wanted to cooperate with the administration but he could co-operate with only one Secretary of State at a time.

Senator Connally declared that he supported the policy we had announced and had been following.

I concluded that I should not make a public statement; that the matter called for correction by the President.

Of course, the position of our delegation was a very unhappy one. So far as possible, I tried to avoid delegates to the conference or the other Foreign Ministers because I wanted to avoid answering questions about whether the policy of our government had changed. Our difficulties were increased rather than lessened when Mr. Wallace announced on the White House steps that he and the President had agreed that the Secretary of Commerce would make no more speeches until after the peace conference. To the delegates in Paris, this implied that the President had not objected to a later renewal of his attacks on our foreign policy.

² Selected from *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 239-40. Copyright 1947 by James F. Byrnes. Reprinted with permission.

amorphous mass of human beings among whom no independent organizational structure is tolerated. In Russia there is not even such a thing as local government. The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies.

Thus the future of Soviet power may not be by any means as secure as Russian capacity for self-delusion would make it appear to the men in the Kremlin. That they can keep power themselves, they have demonstrated. That they can quietly and easily turn it over to others remains to be proved. Meanwhile, the hardships of their rule and the vicissitudes of international life have taken a heavy toll of the strength and hopes of the great people on whom their power rests. It is curious to note that the ideological power of Soviet authority is strongest today in areas beyond the frontiers of Russia, beyond the reach of its police power. This phenomenon brings to mind a comparison used by Thomas Mann in his great novel "Buddenbrooks." Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farthest advanced, he compared the Buddenbrook family, in the days of its greatest glamour, to one of those stars whose light shines most brightly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane? This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved. But the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the sprouting of these seeds is well advanced.

IV

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet régime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence

of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

But in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined. This is not only a question of the modest measure of informational activity which this government can conduct in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although that, too, is important. It is rather a question of the degree to which the United States can create among the peoples of the world generally the impression of a country which knows what it wants, which is coping successfully with the problems of its internal life and with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear sterile and quixotic, the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's supporters must wane, and added strain must be imposed on the Kremlin's foreign policies. For the palsied decrepitude of the capitalist world is the keystone of Communist philosophy. Even the failure of the United States to experience the early economic depression which the ravens of the Red Square have been predicting with such complacent confidence since hostilities ceased would have deep and important repercussions throughout the Communist world.

By the same token, exhibitions of indecision, disunity and internal disintegration within this country have an exhilarating effect on the whole Communist movement. At each evidence of these tendencies, a thrill of hope and excitement goes through

the Communist world; a new jauntiness can be noted in the Moscow tread; new groups of foreign supporters climb on to what they can only view as the band wagon of international politics; and Russian pressure increases all along the line in international affairs.

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement — and particularly not that of the Kremlin — can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the over-all worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation.

Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear.



U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #5:

19. "The Soviet Reaction to the Truman Doctrine, 1947."
20. "Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. Justifies a Bipartisan Foreign Policy, 1947."
21. "Mr. 'X' on the Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947."
22. "A Critique of Containment by Walter Lippmann, 1947."
23. "George F. Kennan Recalls an Early Response to the Truman Doctrine, 1947."
24. "Joseph Stalin Eats Greek Crow, 1947."

3. The Soviet Reaction to the Truman Doctrine, 1947

The pathetic appeal of the Tsaldaris Government to the U.S.A. is clear evidence of the bankruptcy of the political regime in Greece. But the matter does not lie solely with the Greek Monarchists and their friends, now cracked up to American Congressmen as the direct descendants of the heroes of Thermopylae: it is well known that the real masters of Greece have been and are the British military authorities.

British troops have been on Greek territory since 1944. On Churchill's initiative, Britain took on herself the responsibility for "stabilising" political conditions in Greece. The British authorities did not confine themselves to perpetuating the rule of the reactionary, anti-democratic forces in Greece, making no scruple in supporting ex-collaborators with the Germans. The entire political and economic activities under a number of short-lived Greek Governments have been carried on under close British control and direction.

Today we can see the results of this policy—complete bankruptcy. British troops failed to bring peace and tranquility to tormented Greece. The Greek people have been plunged into the abyss of new sufferings, of hunger and poverty. Civil war takes on ever fiercer forms.

Was not the presence of foreign troops on Greek territory instrumental in bringing about this state of affairs? Does not Britain, who proclaimed herself the

guardian of Greece, bear responsibility for the bankruptcy of her charge?

... Truman did not even consider it necessary to wait for the findings of the Security Council Commission specially sent to Greece to investigate the situation on the spot.

Truman, indeed, failed to reckon either with the international organisation or with the sovereignty of Greece. What will be left of Greek sovereignty when the "American military and civilian personnel" gets to work in Greece by means of the 250 million dollars brought into that country? The sovereignty and independence of Greece will be the first victims of such singular "defence"...

Henry Wallace and several other leading American figures came out with a sharply negative response to Truman's message.

We are now witnessing a fresh intrusion of the U.S.A. into the affairs of other states. American claims to leadership in international affairs grow parallel with the growing appetite of the American quarters concerned. But the American leaders, in the new historical circumstances, fail to reckon with the fact that the old methods of the colonizers and die-hard politicians have out-lived their time and are doomed to failure. In this lies the chief weakness of Truman's message.

4. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., Justifies a Bipartisan Foreign Policy, 1947

May 12, 1947

You ask me whether there is any "precedent" for the action we are taking in Greece and Turkey. Of course, there are many partial precedents in respect to relief for stricken countries and even for "military missions." But I doubt whether there is any over-all "precedent." But I am afraid we cannot rely upon "precedents" in facing the utterly unprecedented condition in the world today.

Certainly there is no "precedent" for today's world-wide cleavage between democracy and communism. Perhaps, however, there is something of a

"parallel" in remembering what occurred prior to a similar cleavage between democracy and nazism when we surely learned that we cannot escape trouble by trying to run away from it and when "appeasement" proved to be a fatal investment. Of course, we shall never know whether history would have been different if we had all stood up to the aggressor at Munich. But at least we know what it cost to "lie down." Perhaps this is a "precedent"...

Greece must be helped or Greece sinks permanently into the communist order. Turkey inevitably

follows. Then comes the chain reaction which might sweep from the Dardanelles to the China sea. . . . I do not know whether our new American policy can succeed in arresting these subversive trends (which ultimately represent a direct threat to us). I can only say that I think the adventure is worth trying as an alternative to another "Munich" and perhaps to another war (against the occurrence of which every human effort must be made).

March 24, 1947

The trouble is that these "crises" never reach Congress until they have developed to a point where Congressional discretion is pathetically restricted. When

things finally reach a point where a President asks us to "declare war" there usually is nothing left except to "declare war." In the present instance, the overriding fact is that the President has made a long-delayed statement regarding Communism on-the-march which must be supported if there is any hope of ever impressing Moscow with the necessity of paying any sort of peaceful attention to us whatever. If we turned the President down—after his speech to the joint Congressional session—we might as well either resign ourselves to a complete Communist encirclement and infiltration or else get ready for World War No. Three. . . .

5. Mr. "X" on the Sources of Soviet Conduct, 1947

. . . [I]t will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. . . .

It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and weakening of all rival influence and rival power.

Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as

opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. . . .

It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. . . .

6. A Critique of Containment by Walter Lippmann, 1947

. . . My objection, then, to the policy of containment is not that it seeks to confront the Soviet power with American power, but that the policy is misconceived, and must result in a misuse of American power. For

as I have sought to show, it commits this country to a struggle which has for its objective nothing more substantial than the hope that in ten or fifteen years the Soviet power will, as the result of long frustration,

“break up” or “mellow.” In this prolonged struggle the role of the United States is, according to Mr. X, to react “at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points” to the encroachments of the Soviet power.

The policy, therefore, concedes to the Kremlin the strategical initiative as to when, where and under what local circumstances the issue is to be joined. It compels the United States to meet the Soviet pressure at these shifting geographical and political points by using satellite states, puppet governments and agents which have been subsidized and supported, though their effectiveness is meager and their reliability uncertain. By forcing us to expend our energies and our substance upon these dubious and unnatural allies on the perimeter of the Soviet Union, the effect of the policy is to neglect our natural allies in the Atlantic community, and to alienate them. . . .

All the other pressures of the Soviet Union at the “constantly shifting geographical and political points,” which Mr. X is so concerned about—in the Middle East and in Asia—are, I contend, secondary and subsidiary to the fact that its armed forces are in the heart of Europe. It is to the Red Army in Europe, therefore, and not to ideologies, elections, forms of government, to socialism, to communism, to free enterprise, that a correctly conceived and soundly planned policy should be directed. . . .

We may now consider how we are to relate our role in the United Nations to our policy in the conflict with Russia. Mr. X does not deal with this question. But the State Department, in its attempt to operate under the Truman Doctrine, has shown where that doctrine would take us. It would take us to the destruction of the U.N. . . .

Judging by the speeches in the Greek affair of the British and the American delegates, Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Herschel Johnson appear to be acting on instructions which treat the U.N. as expendable in our conflict with Russia. It is a great pity. Nothing is being accomplished to win the conflict, to assuage it, or to settle it. But the U.N., which should be preserved as the last best hope of mankind that the conflict can be settled and a peace achieved, is being chewed up. The seed corn is being devoured.

Why? Because the policy of containment, as Mr. X has exposed it to the world, does not have as its objective a settlement of the conflict with Russia. It is therefore implicit in the policy that the U.N. has no future as a universal society, and that either the U.N. will be cast aside like the League of Nations, or it will be transformed into an anti-Soviet coalition. In either event the U.N. will have been destroyed. . . .

7. George F. Kennan Recalls an Early Response to the Truman Doctrine, 1947

. . . I accepted the conclusion, to which many others in the government had arrived, that (and I use the words of the War College presentation) “if nothing were done to stiffen the backs of the non-Communist elements in Greece at this juncture the Communist elements would soon succeed in seizing power and in establishing a totalitarian dictatorship along the lines already visible in other Balkan countries.” . . . Communist rule, I thought, “would probably be successfully consolidated in the long run and might some day have most unfortunate strategic consequences from the standpoint of any military adversary of the Soviet Union.” And more important still were the probable repercussions which such a development would have on neighboring areas. . . .

So much for the reasons for our limited intervention in Greece. Why, then, approving this action, did

I take exception to the language of the President’s message?

I took exception to it primarily because of the sweeping nature of the commitments which it implied. The heart of the message and the passage that has subsequently been most frequently quoted was this:

I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

This passage, and others as well, placed our aid to Greece in the framework of a universal policy rather than in that of a specific decision addressed to a specific set of circumstances. It implied that what we had decided to do in the case of Greece was some-

thing we would be prepared to do in the case of any other country, provided only that it was faced with the threat of "subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

It seemed to me highly uncertain that we would invariably find it in our interests or within our means to extend assistance to countries that found themselves in this extremity. The mere fact of their being in such a plight was only one of the criteria that had to be taken into account in determining our action. The establishment of the existence of such a threat was only the beginning, not the end, of the process of decision. I listed, in my presentation to the War College, three specific considerations that had supported our decision to extend assistance to Greece:

A. The problem at hand is one within our economic, technical, and financial capabilities.

B. If we did not take such action, the resulting situation might redound very decidedly to the advantage of our political adversaries.

C. If, on the other hand, we do take the action in question, there is good reason to hope that the favorable consequences will carry far beyond the limits of Greece itself.

These considerations, I pointed out, did not nec-

essarily apply to all other regions. I doubted, for example, that any of them would fully apply in the case of China: the first most definitely would not.

Nevertheless, the misapprehension already conveyed was, as I see it, never entirely corrected. Throughout the ensuing two decades the conduct of our foreign policy would continue to be bedeviled by people in our own government as well as in other governments who could not free themselves from the belief that all another country had to do, in order to qualify for American aid, was to demonstrate the existence of a Communist threat. Since almost no country was without a Communist minority, this assumption carried very far. And as time went on, the firmness of understanding for these distinctions on the part of our own public and governmental establishment appeared to grow weaker rather than stronger. In the 1960s so absolute would be the value attached, even by people within the government, to the mere existence of a Communist threat, that such a threat would be viewed as calling, in the case of Southeast Asia, for an American response on a tremendous scale, without serious regard even to those main criteria that most of us in 1947 would have thought it natural and essential to apply. . . .

8. Joseph Stalin Eats Greek Crow, 1947

TODAY'S SPECIALTY, WITH TRUMAN DOCTRINE DRESSING

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U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

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25. "George C. Marshall's Address at Harvard University, June 5, 1947."
26. "The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949."
27. "Dean Acheson's Speech For NATO, March 18, 1949."
28. "Robert A. Taft's Speech Against NATO, July 11, 1949."
29. "*Killing Hope*: Italy, 1947-48."
30. "*Killing Hope*: Greece, 1947-50."
31. "*Killing Hope*: Albania, 1949-53."
32. "*Killing Hope*: Eastern Europe, 1948-56."
33. "*Killing Hope*: Germany, 1950s."

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

— 45 —

THE MARSHALL PLAN, JUNE 5, 1947⁵⁷

The historic Marshall Plan was launched in an address at Harvard University by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who had been Chairman of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the principal Allied strategist in World War II. The Soviet Union and her satellites refused to participate in the Marshall Plan program, but at the first conference, in July 1947, sixteen nations attended and set up a Committee for European Economic Cooperation.

I need not tell you, gentlemen, that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisal of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their govern-

⁵⁷ *The New York Times*, June 6, 1947.

ments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past ten years conditions have been highly abnormal.

The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization or by simple destruction.

In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the food-stuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of Labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. . . .

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must

have substantial additional help, or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative.

Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States. . . .

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, APRIL 4, 1949⁵⁸

The Vandenberg resolution of June 11, 1948, sanctioned informal collaboration by the United States with the Western European Union of some five nations which had been formed the previous March. The next move was the more comprehensive North Atlantic Alliance, which came to fruition in the North Atlantic Treaty, whose defensive intentions and legality were denounced by the Soviet government. The United States Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 82 to 13 (June 21, 1949), but a "great debate" ensued over the specific issue of implementing NATO with United States troops. At length a compromise resolution was adopted, April 4, 1951, endorsing the assignment of United States troops to NATO, but calling upon the President to consult with Congress and the military authorities, and restricting American ground troops to four divisions.

PREAMBLE. The parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic Area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1. The parties undertake, as set forth in

⁵⁸ *The New York Times*, March 19, 1949. The text was published before the official signing.

the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2. The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3. In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4. The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5. The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6. For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include

an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic Area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.

ARTICLE 7. This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8. Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this treaty.

ARTICLE 9. The parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a Defense Committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10. The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic Area to accede to this treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11. This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will

notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12. After the treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic Area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13. After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, any party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the governments of the other parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14. This treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that government to the governments of the other signatories.

In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.

DAISON.

DOCUMENT 11

DEAN ACHESON, SPEECH FOR THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY,

MARCH 18, 1949

In the excerpted portions of this radio address, the recently appointed Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, explained the purposes of the North Atlantic pact.

The paramount purposes of the pact are peace and security. If peace and security can be achieved in the North Atlantic area, we shall have gone a long way to assure peace and security in other areas as well.

The achievement of peace and security means more than that in the final outcome we shall have prevented and brought about the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. There must be conviction of people everywhere that war will be prevented and that disputes will be settled peacefully. In the most practical terms, true international peace and security require a firm belief by the peoples of the world that they will not be subjected to unprovoked attack, to coercion and intimidation, to interference in their own affairs. Peace and security require confidence in the future, based on the assurance that the peoples of the world will be permitted to improve their conditions of life, free from fear that the fruits of their labor may be taken from them by alien hands. . . .

It is important to keep in mind that the really successful national and international institutions are those that recognize and express underlying realities. The North Atlantic community of nations is such a reality. It is based on the affinity and natural identity of interests of the North Atlantic powers.

The North Atlantic treaty which will formally unite them is the product of at least 350 years of history and perhaps more. There developed on our Atlantic Coast a community, which has spread across the continent, connected with Western Europe by common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs. Similarities of this kind are not superficial, but fundamental. They are the strongest kind of ties, because they are based on moral conviction, on acceptance of the same values in life.

The very basis of Western civilization, which we share with the other nations bordering on the North Atlantic, and which all of us share with many other nations, is the ingrained spirit of restraint and tolerance. This is the opposite of the Communist belief that coercion by force is a proper method of hastening the inevitable. Western civilization has lived by mutual restraint and tolerance. This civilization permits and stimulates free inquiry and bold experimentation. It creates the environment of freedom, from which flows the greatest amount of ingenuity, enterprise, and accomplishment. . . .

Now successful resistance to aggression in the modern world requires modern arms and trained military forces.

As a result of the recent war, the European countries joining in the pact are generally deficient in both requirements. The treaty does not bind the United States to any arms program. But we all know that the United States is now the only democratic nation with the resources and the productive capacity to help the free nations of Europe to recover their military strength.

Therefore, we expect to ask the Congress to supply our European partners some of the weapons and equipment they need to be able to resist aggression. We also expect to recommend military supplies for other free nations which will cooperate with us in safeguarding peace and security.

In the compact world of today the security of the United States cannot be defined in terms of boundaries and frontiers. A serious threat to international peace and security anywhere in the world is of direct concern to this country. Therefore it is our policy to help free peoples to maintain their integrity and independence, not only in Western Europe, not only in the Americas, but wherever the aid we are able to provide can be effective. . . .

Allegations that aggressive designs lie behind this country's signature of the Atlantic pact can rest only on a malicious misrepresentation or a fantastic misunderstanding of the nature and aims of American society. . . .

The United States is waging peace by throwing its full strength and energy into the struggle, and we shall continue to do so.

We sincerely hope that we can avoid strife, but we cannot avoid striving for what is right. We devoutly hope we can have genuine peace, but we cannot be complacent about the present uneasy and troubled peace.

A secure and stable peace is not a goal we can reach all at once and for all time. It is a dynamic state, produced by effort and faith, with courage and justice. The struggle is continuous and hard. The prize is never irrevocably ours.

To have this genuine peace we must constantly work for it. But we must do even more. We must make it clear that armed attack will be met by collective defense, prompt and effective.

That is the meaning of the North Atlantic pact.

ROBERT A. TAFT, SPEECH AGAINST
THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY,

JULY 11, 1949

Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, perhaps the ablest and most articulate spokesman of American isolationism, stated in this speech in the Senate why he opposed the North Atlantic Treaty. After a long debate, however, the treaty was ratified on July 21, by a vote of 87 to 13 in the Senate.

I think the pact carries with it an obligation to assist in arming, at our expense, the nations of western Europe, because with that obligation I believe it will promote war in the world rather than peace, and because I think that with the arms plan it is wholly contrary to the spirit of the obligations we assumed in the United Nations Charter. I would vote for the pact if a reservation were adopted denying any legal or moral obligation to provide arms. . . .

The Atlantic Treaty as drawn is certainly no improvement over the United Nations, nor can it by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as a perfection of or supplement to that Charter. From the point of view of an international organization, it is a step backward. . . .

What is the nature of that treaty?

It is obviously . . . a defensive military alliance between certain nations, the essence of which is an obligation under article 5 to go to war if necessary with any nation which attacks any one of the signers of the treaty. . . . The obligation is completely binding for a period of 20 years. . . . By executing a treaty of this kind, we put ourselves at the mercy of the foreign policies of 11 other nations, and do so for a period of 20 years. The [treaty] is obviously aimed at possible Russian aggression against Western Europe, but the obligation assumed is far broader than that. I emphasize again that the obligation is much

more unconditional, much less dependent on legal processes and much less dependent on joint action than the obligation of the United Nations Charter. . . .

Second. The pact standing by itself would clearly be a deterrent to war. If Russia knows that if it starts a war it will immediately find itself at war with the United States, it is much less likely to start a war. . . . But if Russia sees itself ringed about gradually by so-called defensive arms, from Norway and Denmark to Turkey and Greece, it may form a different opinion. It may decide that the arming of western Europe, regardless of its present purpose, looks to an attack upon Russia. . . . They may well decide that if war is the certain result, that war might better occur now rather than after the arming of Europe is completed. . . .

Third. The pact with the arms obligation, I believe, violates our obligations under the United Nations. . . . I do not think article 51 extends the actual exercise of this right [of self-defense against armed attack] to the arming of other nations prior to the occurrence of such an attack. An undertaking by the most powerful nation in the world to arm half the world against the other half goes far beyond any "right of collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs." It violates the whole spirit of the United Nations Charter. . . .

Fourth. The obligation to furnish arms is either a mere token obligation, or it is one of vast extent. . . . We are entering on a new lend-lease. . . .

Fifth. The justification for the arms aid rests on the necessity of defense against Russia, but remember that once these arms are provided, they are completely within the control of the nation receiving them. They are subject to the orders of those who, at the time, control the government of the country. Those governments may be Communists or Fascists, they may be peace-loving, or they may be aggressors. . . .

Sixth. By approving this pact with the arms program, I believe we are committing ourselves to a particular course of action in war which may be unwise at the time when a war may actually develop. It is one thing to agree to go to war with Russia if it attacks western Europe. It

is another to send American ground troops to defend Norway or Denmark or Holland or Italy or even France and England. . . .

Seventh. Finally . . . it is becoming increasingly apparent that England, at least, intends to trade extensively with Russia, and inevitably the same thing will be true of other western European nations. . . . The more we take off their shoulders the burden of providing for their own defense, the more free they will be to ship steel and heavy machinery to the east. . . . I do not think that the American people at this time desire to increase the overall aid we are giving to western Europe with its tremendous burden on the American taxpayer. . . .

My conclusion has been reached with the greatest discomfort. When so many disagree with that conclusion, I must admit that I may be completely wrong. . . . I would like to be able to vote for a policy that will commit us to war if Russia attacks western Europe. I would be glad to join in an agreement to occupy Germany indefinitely to guard against a third attack from that quarter. I would waive my other objections to the Atlantic Pact if I did not feel that it was inextricably involved with the arms program. But I cannot escape the logic of the situation as I see it, and therefore I cannot vote for a treaty which, in my opinion, will do far more to bring about a third world war than it will ever maintain the peace of the world.

Lama's guard, often referred to picturesquely as "the fearsome Khamba horsemen", and others who had already engaged in some guerrilla activity against Peking rule and/or the profound social changes being instituted by the revolution. (Serfdom and slavery were, literally, still prevalent in Tibet.) Those selected were flown to the United States, to an unused military base high in the Colorado mountains, an altitude approximating that of their mountainous homeland. There, hidden away as much as possible from the locals, they were trained in the fine points of paramilitary warfare.

After completing training, each group of Tibetans was flown to Taiwan or another friendly Asian country, thence to be infiltrated back into Tibet, or elsewhere in China, where they occupied themselves in activities such as sabotage, mining roads, cutting communication lines, and ambushing small communist forces. Their actions were supported by CIA aircraft and on occasion led by Agency contract mercenaries. Extensive support facilities were constructed in northeast India.

The operation in Colorado was maintained until some time in the 1960s. How many hundreds of Tibetans passed through the course of instruction will probably never be known. Even after the formal training program came to an end, the CIA continued to finance and supply their exotic clients and nurture their hopeless dream of reconquering their homeland.

In 1961, when the *New York Times* got wind of the Colorado operation, it acceded to a Pentagon request to probe no further. The matter was particularly sensitive because the CIA has traditionally been forbidden to conduct anything of this sort within the United States, although this question has never actually been adjudicated.³⁰

Above and beyond the bedevilment of China on its own merits, there was the spillover from the Korean war into Chinese territory—numerous bombings and strafings by American planes which, the Chinese frequently reported, took civilian lives and destroyed homes. And there was the matter of germ warfare.

The Chinese devoted a great deal of effort to publicizing their claim that the United States, particularly during January to March 1952, had dropped quantities of bacteria and bacteria-laden insects over Korea and northeast China. It presented testimony of about 38 captured American airmen who had purportedly flown the planes with the deadly cargo. Many of the men went into voluminous detail about the entire operation: the kinds of bombs and other containers dropped, the types of insects, the diseases they carried, etc. At the same time, photographs of the alleged germ bombs and insects were published. Then, in August, an "International Scientific Committee" was appointed, composed of scientists from Sweden, France, Great Britain, Italy, Brazil and the Soviet Union. After an investigation in China of more than two months, the committee produced a report of some 600 pages, many photos, and the conclusion that:

The peoples of Korea and China have indeed been the objectives of bacteriological weapons. These have been employed by units of the U.S.A. armed forces, using a great variety of different methods for the purpose, some of which seem to be developments of those applied by the Japanese during the second world war.³¹

The last reference has to do with the bacteriological warfare experiments the Japanese had carried out against China between 1940 and 1942. The Japanese scientists responsible for this program were captured by the United States in 1945 and given immunity from prosecution in return for providing technical information about the experiments to American scientists from the Army biological research center at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The Chinese were aware of this at the time of the International Scientific Committee's investigation.³²

It should be noted that some of the American airmen's statements contained so much technical biological information and were so full of communist rhetoric—"imperialist, capitalist Wall Street war monger" and the like—that their personal authorship of the statements must be seriously questioned. Moreover, it was later learned that most of the airmen had confessed only after being subjected to physical abuse.³³

But in view of what we have since learned about American involvement with chemical and biological weapons, the Chinese claims cannot be dismissed out of hand. In 1970, for example, the *New York Times* reported that during the Korean War, when US forces were overwhelmed by "human waves" of Chinese, "the Army dug into captured Nazi chemical warfare documents describing Sarin, a nerve gas so lethal that a few pounds could kill thousands of people in minutes. ... By the mid-nineteen-fifties, the Army was manufacturing thousands of gallons of Sarin."³⁴

And during the 1950s and 1960s, the Army and the CIA conducted numerous experiments with biological agents within the United States. To cite just two examples: In 1955, there is compelling evidence that the CIA released whooping-cough bacteria into the open air in Florida, followed by an extremely sharp increase in the incidence of the disease in the state that year.³⁵ The following year, another toxic substance was disseminated in the streets and tunnels of New York City.³⁶

We will also see in the chapter on Cuba how the CIA conducted chemical and biological warfare against Fidel Castro's rule.

In March 1966, Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke before a congressional committee about American policy toward China. Mr. Rusk, it seems, was perplexed that "At times the Communist Chinese leaders seem to be obsessed with the notion that they are being threatened and encircled." He spoke of China's "imaginary, almost pathological, notion that the United States and other countries around its borders are seeking an opportunity to invade mainland China and destroy the Peiping [Peking] regime". The Secretary then added:

How much Peiping's "fear" of the United States is genuine and how much it is artificially induced for domestic political purposes only the Chinese Communist leaders themselves know. I am convinced, however, that their desire to expel our influence and activity from the western Pacific and Southeast Asia is not motivated by fears that we are threatening them.³⁷

2. Italy 1947-1948

Free elections, Hollywood style

"Those who do not believe in the ideology of the United States, shall not be allowed to stay in the United States," declared the American Attorney General, Tom Clark, in January 1948.¹

In March, the Justice Department, over which Clark presided, determined that Italians who did not believe in the ideology of the United States would not be allowed to emigrate to, or even enter, the United States.

This was but one tactic in a remarkable American campaign to ensure that Italians who did not believe in the ideology of the United States would not be allowed to form a govern-

ment of a differing ideology in Italy in their election of 1948.

Two years earlier, the Italian Communist Party (PCI), one of the largest in the world, and the Socialist Party (PSI) had together garnered more votes and more seats in the Constituent Assembly election than the Christian Democrats. But the two parties of the left had run separate candidates and thus had to be content with some ministerial posts in a coalition cabinet under a Christian Democrat premier. The results, nonetheless, spoke plainly enough to put the fear of Marx into the Truman administration.

For the 1948 election, scheduled for 18 April, the PCI and PSI united to form the Popular Democratic Front (FDP) and in February won municipal elections in Pescara with a 10 percent increase in their vote over 1946. The Christian Democrats ran a poor second. The prospect of the left winning control of the Italian government loomed larger than ever before. It was at this point that the US began to train its big economic and political guns upon the Italian people. All the good ol' Yankee know-how, all the Madison Avenue savvy in the art of swaying public opinion, all the Hollywood razzmatazz would be brought to bear on the "target market".

Pressing domestic needs in Italy, such as agricultural and economic reform, the absence of which produced abysmal extremes of wealth and poverty, were not to be the issues of the day. The lines of battle would be drawn around the question of "democracy" vs. "communism" (the idea of "capitalism" remaining discreetly to one side). The fact that the Communists had been the single most active anti-fascist group in Italy during the war, undergoing ruthless persecution, while the Christian Democrat government of 1948 and other electoral opponents on the right were riddled through with collaborators, monarchists and plain unreconstructed fascists ... this too would be ignored; indeed, turned around. It was now a matter of Communist "dictatorship" vs. their adversaries' love of "freedom": this was presumed *a priori*. As one example, a group of American congressmen visited Italy in summer 1947 and casually and arbitrarily concluded that "The country is under great pressure from within and without to veer to the left and adopt a totalitarian-collective national organization."²

To make any of this at all credible, the whole picture had to be pushed and squeezed into the frame of *The American Way of Life vs. The Soviet Way of Life*, a specious proposition which must have come as somewhat of a shock to leftists who regarded themselves as Italian and neither Russian nor American.

In February 1948, after non-Communist ministers in Czechoslovakia had boycotted cabinet meetings over a dispute concerning police hiring practices, the Communist government dissolved the coalition cabinet and took sole power. The Voice of America pointed to this event repeatedly, as a warning to the Italian people of the fate awaiting them if Italy "went Communist" (and used as well by anti-communists for decades afterward as a prime example of communist duplicity). Yet, by all appearances, the Italian Christian Democrat government and the American government had conspired the previous year in an even more blatant usurpation of power.

In January 1947, when Italian Premier Alcide de Gasperi visited Washington at the United States' invitation, his overriding concern was to plead for crucial financial assistance for his war-torn, impoverished country. American officials may have had a different priority. Three days after returning to Italy, de Gasperi unexpectedly dissolved his cabinet, which included several Communists and Socialists. The press reported that many people in Italy believed that de Gasperi's action was related to his visit to the United States and was aimed at decreasing leftist, principally Communist, influence in the government. After two weeks of tortuous delay, the formation of a center or center-right government sought by de

Gasperi proved infeasible; the new cabinet still included Communists and Socialists although the left had lost key positions, notably the ministries of foreign affairs and finance.

From this point until May, when de Gasperi's deputy, Ivan Lombardo, led a mission to Washington to renew the request for aid, promised loans were "frozen" by the United States for reasons not very clear. On several occasions during this period the Italian left asserted their belief that the aid was being held up pending the ouster of leftists from the cabinet. The *New York Times* was moved to note that, "Some observers here feel that a further Leftward swing in Italy would retard aid." As matters turned out, the day Lombardo arrived in Washington, de Gasperi again dissolved his entire cabinet and suggested that the new cabinet would manage without the benefit of leftist members. This was indeed what occurred, and over the ensuing few months, exceedingly generous American financial aid flowed into Italy, in addition to the cancellation of the nation's \$1 billion debt to the United States.³

At the very same time, France, which was also heavily dependent upon American financial aid, ousted all its Communist ministers as well. In this case there was an immediate rationale: the refusal of the Communist ministers to support Premier Ramadier in a vote of confidence over a wage freeze. Despite this, the ouster was regarded as a "surprise" and considered "bold" in France, and opinion was widespread that American loans were being used, or would be used, to force France to align with the US. Said Ramadier: "A little of our independence is departing from us with each loan we obtain."⁴

As the last month of the 1948 election campaign began, *Time* magazine pronounced the possible leftist victory to be "the brink of catastrophe."⁵

"It was primarily this fear," William Colby, former Director of the CIA, has written, "that had led to the formation of the Office of Policy Coordination, which gave the CIA the capability to undertake covert political, propaganda, and paramilitary operations in the first place."⁶ But covert operations, as far as is known, played a relatively minor role in the American campaign to break the back of the Italian left. It was the very overtness of the endeavor, without any apparent embarrassment, that stamps the whole thing with such uniqueness and arrogance—one might say swagger. The fortunes of the FDP slid downhill with surprising acceleration during the final month in the face of an awesome mobilization of resources such as the following:⁷

- A massive letter writing campaign from Americans of Italian extraction to their relatives and friends in Italy—at first written by individuals in their own words or guided by "sample letters" in newspapers, soon expanded to mass-produced, pre-written, postage-paid form letters, cablegrams, "educational circulars", and posters, needing only an address and signature. And—from a group calling itself The Committee to Aid Democracy in Italy—half a million picture postcards illustrating the gruesome fate awaiting Italy if it voted for "dictatorship" or "foreign dictatorship". In all, an estimated 10 million pieces of mail were written and distributed by newspapers, radio stations, churches, the American Legion, wealthy individuals, etc.; and business advertisements now included offers to send letters airmail to Italy even if you didn't buy the product. All this with the publicly expressed approval of the Acting Secretary of State and the Post Office which inaugurated special "Freedom Flights" to give greater publicity to the dispatch of the mail to Italy.

The form letters contained messages such as: "A communist victory would ruin Italy. The United States would withdraw aid and a world war would probably result." ... "We implore you not to throw our beautiful Italy into the arms of that cruel despot communism. America hasn't anything against communism in Russia [sic], but why impose it on other people, other lands, in that way putting out the torch of liberty?" ... "If the forces of true democracy should lose in the Italian

any more money to you, our relatives."

These were by no means the least sophisticated of the messages. Other themes emphasized were Russian domination of Italy, loss of religion and the church, loss of family life, loss of home and land.

Veteran newsman Howard K. Smith pointed out at the time that "For an Italian peasant a telegram from anywhere is a wondrous thing; and a cable from the terrestrial paradise of America is not lightly to be disregarded."

The letters threatening to cut off gifts may have been equally intimidating. "Such letters," wrote a Christian Democrat official in an Italian newspaper, "struck home in southern Italian and Sicilian villages with the force of lightning." A 1949 poll indicated that 16 percent of Italians claimed relatives in the United States with whom they were in touch; this, apparently, was in addition to friends there.

- The State Department backed up the warnings in the letters by announcing that "If the Communists should win ... there would be no further question of assistance from the United States." The Italian left felt compelled to regularly assure voters that this would not really happen; this, in turn, inspired American officials, including Secretary of State George Marshall, to repeat the threat. (Marshall was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953.)
- A daily series of direct short-wave broadcasts to Italy backed by the State Department and featuring prominent Americans. (The State Department estimated that there were 1.2 million short-wave receivers in Italy as of 1946.) The Attorney General went on the air and assured the Italian people that the election was a "choice between democracy and communism, between God and godlessness, between order and chaos." William Donovan, the wartime head of the OSS (forerunner of the CIA) warned that "under a communist dictatorship in Italy," many of the "nation's industrial plants would be dismantled and shipped to Russia and millions of Italy's workers would be deported to Russia for forced labor." If this were not enough to impress the Italian listeners, a parade of unknown but passionate refugees from Eastern Europe went before the microphone to recount horror stories of life behind "The Iron Curtain".
- Several commercial radio stations broadcast to Italy special services held in American Catholic churches to pray for the Pope in "this, his most critical hour". On one station, during an entire week, hundreds of Italian-Americans from all walks of life delivered one-minute messages to Italy which were relayed through the short-wave station. Station WOV in New York invited Italian war brides to transcribe a personal message to their families back home. The station then mailed the recordings to Italy.
- Voice of America daily broadcasts into Italy were sharply increased, highlighting news of American assistance or gestures of friendship to Italy. A sky-full of show-biz stars, including Frank Sinatra and Gary Cooper, recorded a series of radio programs designed to win friends and influence the vote in Italy. Five broadcasts of Italian-American housewives were aired, and Italian-Americans with some leftist credentials were also enlisted for the cause. Labor leader Luigi Antonini called upon Italians to "smash the Muscovite fifth column" which "follows the orders of the ferocious Moscow tyranny," or else Italy would become an "enemy totalitarian country".
- To counter Communist charges in Italy that negroes in the United States were denied opportunities, the VOA broadcast the story of a negro couple who had made a fortune in the junk business and built a hospital for their people in Oklahoma City. (It should be remembered that in 1948 American negroes had not yet reached the status of second-class citizens.)
- Italian radio stations carried a one-hour show from Hollywood put on to raise money for the orphans of Italian pilots who had died in the war. (It was not reported if the same was done for the orphans of German pilots.)
- American officials in Italy widely distributed leaflets extolling US economic aid and staged exhibitions among low-income groups. The US Information Service presented an exhibition on "The Worker in America" and made extensive use of documentary and feature films to sell the

American way of life. It was estimated that in the period immediately preceding the election more than five million Italians each week saw American documentaries. The 1939 Hollywood film "Ninotchka", which satirized life in Russia, was singled out as a particularly effective feature film. It was shown throughout working-class areas and the Communists made several determined efforts to prevent its presentation. After the election, a pro-Communist worker was reported as saying that "What licked us was 'Ninotchka'."

- The Justice Department served notice that Italians who joined the Communist Party would be denied that dream of so many Italians, emigration to America. The State Department then ruled that any Italians known to have voted for the Communists would not be allowed to even enter the terrestrial paradise. (A Department telegram to a New York politico read: "Voting Communist appears to constitute affiliation with Communist Party within meaning of Immigration Law and therefore would require exclusion from United States.") It was urged that this information be emphasized in letters to Italy.
- President Truman accused the Soviet Union of plotting the subjugation of Western Europe and called for universal military training in the United States and a resumption of military conscription to forestall "threatened communist control and police-state rule". During the campaign, American and British warships were frequently found anchored off Italian ports. *Time*, in an edition widely displayed and commented upon in Italy shortly before the election, gave its approval to the sentiment that "The U.S. should make it clear that it will use force, if necessary, to prevent Italy from going Communist."⁸
- The United States and Italy signed a ten-year treaty of "friendship, commerce and navigation". This was the first treaty of its kind entered into by the US since the war, a point emphasized for Italian consumption.
- A "Friendship Train" toured the United States gathering gifts and then traveled round Italy distributing them. The train was painted red, white and blue, and bore large signs expressing the friendship of American citizens toward the people of Italy.
- The United States government stated that it favored Italian trusteeship over some of its former African colonies, such as Ethiopia and Libya, a wholly unrealistic proposal that could never come to pass in the post-war world. (The Soviet Union made a similar proposal.)
- The US, Great Britain and France maneuvered the Soviet Union into vetoing, for the third time, a motion that Italy be admitted to the United Nations. (The first time, the Russians had expressed their opposition on the grounds that a peace treaty with Italy had not been signed. After the signing in 1947, they said they would accept the proposal if other World War II enemies, such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania were also made members.)
- The same three allied nations proposed to the Soviet Union that negotiations take place with a view to returning Trieste to Italy. Formerly the principal Italian port on the Adriatic coast, bordering Yugoslavia, Trieste had been made a "free city" under the terms of the peace treaty. The approval of the Soviet Union was necessary to alter the treaty, and the Western proposal was designed to put the Russians on the spot. The Italian people had an intense sentimental attachment to Trieste, and if the Russians rejected the proposal it could seriously embarrass the Italian Communists. A Soviet acceptance, however, would antagonize their Yugoslav allies. The US prodded the Russians for a response, but none was forthcoming. From the Soviet point of view, the most obvious and safest path to follow would have been to delay their answer until after the election. Yet they chose to announce their rejection of the proposal only five days before the vote, thus hammering another nail into the FDP coffin.
- A "Manifesto of peace to freedom-loving Italians", calling upon them to reject Communism, was sent to Premier de Gasperi. Its signatories included two former US Secretaries of State, a former Assistant Secretary of State, a former Attorney General, a former Supreme Court Justice, a former Governor of New York, the former first lady Eleanor Roosevelt, and many other prominent personages. This message was, presumably, suitably publicized throughout Italy, a task easy in the extreme inasmuch as an estimated 82 percent of Italian newspapers were in the hands of those unsympathetic to the leftist bloc.

- More than 200 American labor leaders of Italian origin held a conference, out of which came a cable sent to 23 daily newspapers throughout Italy similarly urging thumbs down on the Reds. At the same time, the Italian-American Labor Council contributed \$50,000 to anti-Communist labor organizations in Italy. The CIA was already secretly subsidizing such trade unions to counteract the influence of leftist unions,⁹ but this was standard Agency practice independent of electoral considerations. (According to a former CIA officer, when, in 1945, the Communists came very near to gaining control of labor unions, first in Sicily, then in all Italy and southern France, co-operation between the OSS and the Mafia successfully stemmed the tide.)¹⁰
- The CIA, by its own later admission, gave \$1 million to Italian "center parties", a king's ransom in Italy 1948,¹¹ although another report places the figure at \$10 million. The Agency also forged documents and letters purported to come from the PCI which were designed to put the party in a bad light and discredit its leaders; anonymous books and magazine articles funded by the CIA told in vivid detail about supposed communist activities in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; pamphlets dealt with PCI candidates' sex and personal lives as well as smearing them with the fascist and/or anti-church brush.¹²
- An American group featuring noted Italian-American musicians traveled to Rome to present a series of concerts.
- President Truman chose a month before the election as the time to transfer 29 merchant ships to the Italian government as a "gesture of friendship and confidence in a democratic Italy". (These were Italian vessels seized during the war and others to replace those seized and lost.)
- Four days later, the House Appropriations Committee acted swiftly to approve \$18.7 million in additional "interim aid" funds for Italy.
- Two weeks later, the United States gave Italy \$4.3 million as the first payment on wages due to 60,000 former Italian war prisoners in the US who had worked "voluntarily" for the Allied cause. This was a revision of the peace treaty which stipulated that the Italian government was liable for such payments.
- Six days before election day, the State Department made it public that Italy would soon receive \$31 million in gold in return for gold looted by the Nazis. (The fact that only a few years earlier Italy had been the "enemy" fighting alongside the Nazis was now but a dim memory.)
- Two days later, the US government authorized two further large shipments of food to Italy, one for \$8 million worth of grains. A number of the aid ships, upon their arrival in Italy during the election campaign, had been unloaded amid ceremony and a speech by the American ambassador.
- A poster prominent in Italy read: "The bread that we eat—40 per cent Italian flour—60 per cent American flour sent free of charge." The poster neglected to mention whether the savings were passed on to the consumer or served to line the pockets of the baking companies.
- Four days before election day, the American Commission for the Restoration of Italian Monuments, Inc. announced an additional series of grants to the Italian Ministry of Fine Arts.
- April 15 was designated "Free Italy Day" by the American Sympathizers for a Free Italy with nation-wide observances to be held.
- The American ambassador, James Clement Dunn, traveled constantly throughout Italy pointing out to the population "on every possible occasion what American aid has meant to them and their country". At the last unloading of food, Dunn declared that the American people were saving Italy from starvation, chaos and possible domination from outside. His speeches usually received wide coverage in the non-left press. By contrast, the Italian government prohibited several of its own ambassadors abroad from returning home to campaign for the FDP.

In his historic speech of 12 March 1947, which came to be known as "The Truman Doctrine", the president had proclaimed:

I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting

attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.¹³

It scarcely needs to be emphasized how hypocritical this promise proved to be, but the voices which spoke out in the United States against their government's crusade in Italy were few and barely audible above the roar. The Italian-American Committee for Free Elections in Italy held a rally to denounce the propaganda blitz, declaring that "Thousands of Americans of Italian origin feel deeply humiliated by the continuous flow of suggestions, advice and pressure put on the Italians, as though they were unable to decide for themselves whom to elect."¹⁴

The Progressive Party also went on record, stating: "As Americans we repudiate our Government's threat to cut off food from Italy unless the election results please us. Hungry children must not go unfed because their parents do not vote as ordered from abroad."¹⁵ The party's candidate for president in 1948 was Henry Wallace, the former vice-president who was an outspoken advocate of genuine detente with the Soviet Union. History did not provide the opportunity to observe what the reaction would have been—amongst those who saw nothing wrong with what the United States was doing in Italy—if a similar campaign had been launched by the Soviet Union or the Italian left in the United States on behalf of Wallace.

Though some Italians must have been convinced at times that Stalin himself was the FDP's principal candidate, the actual Soviet intervention in the election hardly merited a single headline. The American press engaged in speculation that the Russians were pouring substantial sums of money into the Communist Party's coffers. However, a survey carried out by the Italian bureau of the United Press revealed that the anti-Communist parties spent 7 1/2 times as much as the FDP on all forms of propaganda, the Christian Democrats alone spending four times as much.¹⁶ As for other Soviet actions, Howard K. Smith's observation is to the point:

The Russians tried to respond with a few feeble gestures for a while—some Italian war prisoners were released; some newspaper was sent to Italy and offered to all parties for their campaign. But there was no way of resisting what amounted to a tidal wave.

There is evidence that the Russians found the show getting too rough for them and actually became apprehensive of what the American and British reaction to a Communist victory at the polls might be. (Russia's concern about conflict with the West was also expressed within a month of the Italian elections in one of the celebrated Cominform letters to Tito, accusing the Yugoslavs of trying to involve the Soviets with the Western powers when "it should have been known ... that the U.S.S.R. after such a heavy war could not start a new one".)¹⁷

The evidence Smith was alluding to was the Soviet rejection of the Trieste proposal. By its timing, reported the *New York Times*, "the unexpected procedure caused some observers to conclude that the Russians had thrown the Italian Communist Party overboard."¹⁸ The party's newspaper had a difficult time dealing with the story. Washington did as well, for it undermined the fundamental premise of the Italian campaign: that the Italian Communist Party and the Soviet Union were indistinguishable as to ends and means; that if you buy the one, you get the other as well. Thus the suggestion was put forth that perhaps the Soviet rejection was only a tactic to demonstrate that the US could not keep its promise on Trieste. But the Soviet announcement had not been accompanied by any such propaganda message, and it would not explain why the Russians had waited several weeks until near the crucial end to deliver its body blow to their Italian comrades. In any event, the United States could only come out smelling a lot sweeter than the Russians.

stood as the clear winner with 48 percent of the vote. The leftist coalition had been humiliated with a totally unexpected polling of but 31 percent. It had been a crusade of the kind which Aneurin Bevan had ascribed to the Tories: "The whole art of Conservative politics in the 20th century," the British Labour leader wrote, "is being deployed to enable wealth to persuade poverty to use its political freedom to keep wealth in power."

3. Greece 1947 to early 1950s From cradle of democracy to client state

Jorge Semprun is a Spaniard, a Frenchman, a novelist and film-writer, former Communist, former inmate of Buchenwald. He was at the infamous Nazi concentration camp in 1944 with other party members when they heard the news:

For some days now, we had talked of nothing else. ... At first some of us had thought it was a lie. It had to be. An invention of Nazi propaganda, to raise the morale of the people. We listened to the news bulletins on the German radio, broadcast by all the loudspeakers, and we shook our heads. A trick to raise the morale of the German people, it had to be. But we soon had to face up to the evidence. Some of us listened in secret to the Allied broadcasts, which confirmed the news. There was no doubt about it: British troops really were crushing the Greek Resistance. In Athens, battle was raging, British troops were retaking the city from the ELAS forces, district by district. It was an unequal fight: ELAS had neither tanks nor planes.

But Radio Moscow had said nothing, and this silence was variously interpreted.¹

The British army had arrived in Greece during October and November 1944, shortly after the bulk of the Germans had fled, an evacuation due in no small part to ELAS, the People's Liberation Army. Founded during the course of 1941-42 on the initiative of the Greek Communist Party, ELAS and its political wing EAM cut across the entire left side of the political spectrum, numbering many priests and even a few bishops amongst its followers. The guerrillas had wrested large areas of the country from the Nazi invaders who had routed the British in 1941.

ELAS/EAM partisans could be ruthless and coercive toward those Greeks who did not cooperate with them or who were suspected of collaboration with the Germans. But they also provided another dramatic example of the liberating effects of a world war: the encrusted ways of the Greek old guard were cast aside; in their place arose communities which had at least the semblance of being run by the local residents, inchoate institutions and mechanisms which might have been the precursor of a regenerated Greek society after the war; education, perhaps geared toward propaganda, but for the illiterate education nonetheless; fighting battalions of women, housewives called upon for the first time to act independently of their husbands' control ... a phenomenon which spread irrepressibly until EAM came to number some one to two million Greeks out of a population of seven million.²

This was hardly the kind of social order designed to calm the ulcers of the British old guard (Winston Churchill for one) who had long regarded Greece as their private manor. The Great Man was determined that the Greek king should be restored to his rightful place, with all that that implied, and the British military in Greece lost no time in installing a government dedicated to that end. Monarchists, quislings, and conservatives of all stripes found

themselves in positions of political power, predominant in the new Greek army and police; members of EAM/ELAS found themselves dead or in prison.³

In the early days of the world war, when defeating the Nazis was the Allies' over-whelming purpose, Churchill had referred to ELAS as "those gallant guerrillas", and ELAS's supporters had welcomed the British in early November 1944 with a sign reading, "We greet the Brave English Army. ... EAM."⁴

But the following month, fighting broke out between ELAS and the British forces and their Greek comrades-in-arms, many of whom had fought against ELAS during the war and, in the process, collaborated with the Germans; others had simply served with the Germans. (The British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, acknowledged in August 1946 that there were 228 ex-members of the Nazi Security Battalions—whose main task had been to track down Greek resistance fighters and Jews—on active service in the new Greek army.)⁵ Further support for the campaign against ELAS came from the US Air Force and Navy which transported more than two British divisions into Greece.⁶ All this while the war against Germany still raged in Europe.

In mid-January 1945 ELAS agreed to an armistice, one that had much of the appearance and the effect of a surrender. There is disagreement amongst historians as to whether ELAS had been militarily defeated or whether the Communists in the ELAS and EAM hierarchy had received the word from Stalin to lay down the gun. If the latter were the case, it would have been consistent with the noted agreement between Stalin and Churchill in October 1944, whereby spheres of influence in Eastern Europe were allocated between the two powers. In this cynical (as Churchill acknowledged) Monopoly game Britain had landed on Greece. Churchill later wrote that Stalin had "adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October, and during all the long weeks of fighting the Communists in the streets of Athens not one word of reproach came from *Pravda* or *Izvestia*."⁷ Nor, as Jorge Semprun noted, from Radio Moscow.

"It is essential to remember," Professor D.F. Fleming has pointed out in his eminent history of the cold war, "that Greece was the first of the liberated states to be openly and forcibly compelled to accept the political system of the occupying Great Power. It was Churchill who acted first and Stalin who followed his example, in Bulgaria and then in Rumania, though with less bloodshed."⁸

A succession of Greek governments followed, serving by the grace of the British and the United States; thoroughly corrupt governments in the modern Greek tradition, which continued to terrorize the left, tortured them in notorious island prison camps, and did next to nothing to relieve the daily misery of the war-torn Greek people.⁹ "There are few modern parallels for government as bad as this," CBS's chief European correspondent Howard K. Smith observed at the time.¹⁰

In the fall of 1946 the inevitable occurred: leftists took to the hills to launch phase two of the civil war. The Communists had wrenched Stalin's strangulating hand from their throats, for their very survival was at stake and everything that they believed in.

The British were weighed down by their own post-war reconstruction needs, and in February 1947 they informed the United States that they could no longer shoulder the burden of maintaining a large armed force in Greece nor provide sizeable military and economic aid to the country. Thus it was that the historic task of preserving all that is decent and good in Western Civilization passed into the hands of the United States.

Several days later, the State Department summoned the Greek chargé d'affaires in Washington and informed him that his government was to ask the US for aid. This was to be effected by means of a formal letter of request; a document, it turned out, to be written

ed, "had been drafted with a view to the mentality of Congress ... It would also serve to protect the U.S. Government against internal and external charges that it was taking the initiative of intervening in a foreign state or that it had been persuaded by the British to take over a bad legacy from them. The note would also serve as a basis for the cultivation of public opinion which was under study."¹¹

In July, in a letter to Dwight Griswold, the head of the American Mission to Aid Greece (AMAG), Secretary of State George Marshall said:

It is possible that during your stay in Greece you and the Ambassador will come to the conclusion that the effectiveness of your Mission would be enhanced if a reorganization of the Greek Government could be effected. If such a conclusion is reached, it is hoped that you and the Ambassador will be able to bring about such a reorganization indirectly through discreet suggestion and otherwise in such a manner that even the Greek political leaders will have a feeling that the reorganization has been effected largely by themselves and not by pressure from without.¹²

The Secretary spelled out a further guideline for Griswold, a man the *New York Times* shortly afterwards called the "most powerful man in Greece":¹³

During the course of your work you and the members of your Mission will from time to time find that certain Greek officials are not, because of incompetence, disagreement with your policies, or for some other reason, extending the type of cooperation which is necessary if the objectives of your Mission are to be achieved. You will find it necessary to effect the removal of these officials.¹⁴

These contrivances, however, were not the most cynical aspects of the American endeavor. Washington officials well knew that their new client government was so venal and so abusive of human rights that even confirmed American anti-communists were appalled. Stewart Alsop for one. On 23 February 1947 the noted journalist had cabled from Athens that most of the Greek politicians had "no higher ambition than to taste the profitable delights of a free economy at American expense".¹⁵ The same year, an American investigating team found huge supplies of food aid rotting in warehouses at a time when an estimated 75 percent of Greek children were suffering from malnutrition.¹⁶

So difficult was it to gloss over this picture, that President Truman, in his address to Congress in March 1947 asking for aid to Greece based on the Greek "request" (the "Truman Doctrine" speech), attempted to pre-empt criticism by admitting that the Greek government was "not perfect" and that "it has made mistakes". Yet, somehow, by some ideological alchemy best known to the president, the regime in Athens was "democratic", its opponents the familiar "terrorists".¹⁷

There was no mention of the Soviet Union in this particular speech, but that was to be the relentless refrain of the American rationale over the next 2 1/2 years: the Russians were instigating the Greek leftists so as to kidnap yet another "free" country and drag it kicking and screaming behind the Iron Curtain.

The neighboring Communist states of Bulgaria, Albania, and particularly Yugoslavia, in part motivated by old territorial claims against Greece, did aid the insurgents by allowing them important sanctuary behind their borders and furnishing them with military supplies (whether substantial or merely token in amount is a debatable question). The USSR, however, in the person of Joseph Stalin, was adamantly opposed to assisting the Greek "commanders". At a meeting with Yugoslav leaders in early 1948 (a few months before Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union), described by Milovan Djilas, second-in-com-

mand to Tito, Stalin turned to the foreign minister Edvard Kardelj and asked: "Do you believe in the success of the uprising in Greece?"

Kardelj replied, "If foreign intervention does not grow, and if serious political and military errors are not made."

Stalin went on, without paying attention to Kardelj's opinion: "If, if! No, they have no prospect of success at all. What, do you think that Great Britain and the United States—the United States, the most powerful state in the world—will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean? Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible."¹⁸

The first major shipments of military assistance under the new American operation arrived in the summer of 1947. (Significant quantities had also been shipped to the Greek government by the US while the British ran the show.) By the end of the year, the Greek military was being entirely supported by American aid, down to and including its clothing and food. The nation's war-making potential was transformed: continual increases in the size of the Greek armed forces ... fighter-bombers, transport squadrons, air fields, napalm bombs, recoilless rifles, naval patrol vessels, communication networks ... docks, railways, roads, bridges ... hundreds of millions of dollars of supplies and equipment, approaching a billion in total since the end of the world war ... and millions more to create a "Secret Army Reserve" fighting unit, composed principally of the ex-members of the Nazi Security Battalions referred to earlier.¹⁹

The US Military Mission took over the development of battle plans for the army from the ineffective Greek generals. The Mission, related British military writer Major Edgar O'Ballance, "took a tough line and insisted that all its recommendations be carried into effect, at once and in full".²⁰ Eventually, more than 250 American army officers were in the country, many assigned to Greek army divisions to ensure compliance with directives; others operated at the brigade level; another 200 or so US Air Force and Navy personnel were also on active duty in Greece.

All military training methods and programs were "revised, revitalized and tightened up" under American supervision²¹... infantry units made more mobile, with increased firepower; special commando units trained in anti-guerrilla tactics; training in mountain warfare, augmented by some 4,000 mules (sic) shipped to Greece by the United States ... at American insistence, whole sections of the population uprooted to eliminate the guerrillas' natural base of operation and source of recruits, just as would be done in Vietnam 20 years later.

"Both on the ground and in the air, American support was becoming increasingly active," observed C.M. Woodhouse, the British colonel and historian who served in Greece during the mid-1940s, "and the theoretical line between advice, intelligence and combat was a narrow one."²²

The Greek leftists held out for three terrible years. Despite losses of many tens of thousands, they were always able to replenish their forces, even increase their number. But by October 1949, foreseeing nothing but more loss of lives to a vastly superior destruction-machine, the guerrillas announced over their radio a "cease fire". It was the end of the civil war.

The extent of American hegemony over Greece from 1947 onwards can scarcely be exaggerated. We have seen Marshall's directives to Griswold, and the American management of the military campaign. There were many other manifestations of the same phenom-

anon, of which the following are a sample:

In September 1947, Vice-Prime Minister Constantine Tsaldaris agreed to the dissolution of the government and the creation of a new ruling coalition. In doing so, said the *New York Times*, Tsaldaris had "surrendered to the desires of Dwight P. Griswold ... of [US] Ambassador MacVeagh, and also of the King."²³ Before Tsaldaris addressed the Greek legislature on the matter, MacVeagh stepped in to make a change to the speech.²⁴

Over the next several years, each of the frequent changes of prime minister came about only after considerable American input, if not outright demand.²⁵ One example of the latter occurred in 1950 when then American Ambassador Henry Grady sent a letter to Prime Minister Venizelos threatening to cut off US aid if he failed to carry out a government reorganization. Venizelos was compelled to step down.²⁶ The American influence was felt in regard to other high positions in Greek society as well. Andreas Papandreou, later to become prime minister himself, has written of this period that "Cabinet members and army generals, political party leaders and members of the Establishment, all made open references to American wishes or views in order to justify or to account for their own actions or positions."²⁷

Before undertaking a new crackdown on dissidents in July 1947, Greek authorities first approached Ambassador MacVeagh. The ambassador informed them that the US government would have no objection to "preventive measures if they were considered necessary". Reassured, the Greeks went ahead and rounded up 4,000 people in one week.²⁸

An example of what could land a Greek citizen in prison is the case of the EAM member who received an 18-month sentence for printing remarks deemed insulting to Dwight Griswold. He had referred to the American as "the official representative of a foreign country."²⁹

"In the economic sphere," Andreas Papandreou noted, the United States "exercised almost dictatorial control during the early fifties requiring that the signature of the chief of the U.S. Economic Mission appear alongside that of the Greek Minister of Co-ordination on any important documents."³⁰

Earlier, American management of the economy may have been even tighter. A memorandum from Athens dated 17 November 1947, from the American Mission to Aid Greece to the State Department in Washington, read in part: "we have established practical control ... over national budget, taxation, currency issuance, price and wage policies, and state economic planning, as well as over imports and exports, the issuance of foreign exchange and the direction of military reconstruction and relief expenditures."³¹

There was, moreover, the creation of a new internal security agency, named and modeled after the CIA (KYP in Greek). Before long, KYP was carrying out all the endearing practices of secret police everywhere, including systematic torture.

By the early 1950s, Greece had been molded into a supremely reliable ally-client of the United States. It was staunchly anti-communist and well integrated into the NATO system. It sent troops to Korea to support the United States' pretence that it was not simply an American war.

It is safe to say that had the left come to power, Greece would have been much more independent of the United States. Greece would likely have been independent as well of the Soviet Union, to whom the Greek left owed nothing. Like Yugoslavia, which is also free of a common border with the USSR, Greece would have been friendly towards the Russians.

When, in 1964, there came to power in Greece a government which entertained the novel idea that Greece was a sovereign nation, the United States and its Greek cohorts, as we shall see, quickly and effectively stamped out the heresy.

American camps during the Korean War were taught "what democracy stands for." 51

The predicted Chinese aggression manifested itself about four months after the war in Korea began. The Chinese entered the war after American planes had violated their air space on a number of occasions, had bombed and strafed Chinese territory several times (always "in error"), when hydro-electric plants on the Korean side of the border, vital to Chinese industry, stood in great danger, and US or South Korean forces had reached the Chinese border, the Yalu River, or come within a few miles of it in several places.

The question must be asked: How long would the United States refrain from entering a war being waged in Mexico by a Communist power from across the sea, which strafed and bombed Texas border towns, was mobilized along the Rio Grande, and was led by a general who threatened war against the United States itself?

American airpower in Korea was fearsome to behold. As would be the case in Vietnam, its use was celebrated in the wholesale dropping of napalm, the destruction of villages "suspected of aiding the enemy", bombing cities so as to leave no useful facilities standing, demolishing dams and dikes to cripple the irrigation system, wiping out rice crops ... and in those moving expressions like "scorched-earth policy", "saturation bombing", and "operation killer". 52

"You can kiss that group of villages good-bye," exclaimed Captain Everett L. Hundley of Kansas City, Kansas after a bombing raid. 53

"I would say that the entire, almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess," testified Major General Emmett O'Donnell before the Senate when the war was one year old. "Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the name." 54

And here, the words of the venerable British military guide, *Brassey's Annual*, in its 1951 yearbook:

It is no exaggeration to state that South Korea no longer exists as a country. Its towns have been destroyed, much of its means of livelihood eradicated, and its people reduced to a sullen mass dependent upon charity and exposed to subversive influences. When the war ends no gratitude can be expected from the South Koreans, but it is to be hoped that the lesson will have been learned that it is worse than useless to destroy to liberate. Certainly, western Europe would never accept such a "liberation". 55

The worst of the bombing was yet to come. That began in the summer of 1952 and was Washington's way of putting itself in a better bargaining position in the truce discussions with the Communists, which had been going on for a full year while the battles raged. The extended and bitter negotiations gave rise to another pervasive Western belief—that it was predominantly Communist intransigence, duplicity, and lack of peaceful intentions which frustrated the talks and prolonged the war.

This is a lengthy and entangled chapter of the Korean War story, but one does not have to probe too deeply to discover the unremarkable fact that the barriers were erected by the anti-Communist side as well. Syngman Rhee, for example, was so opposed to any outcome short of total victory that both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations drew up plans for overthrowing him, 56 which is not to suggest that the American negotiators were negotiating in the best of faith. The last thing they wanted to be accused of was having allowed the commies to make suckers of them. Thus it was that in November of 1951 we could read in the *New York Times*:

The unadorned way that an apparently increasing number of them [American soldiers in Korea] see the situation right now is that the Communists have made important concessions, while the United Nations Command, as they view it, continues to make more and more demands. ... The United Nations truce team has created the impression that it switches its stand whenever the Communists indicate that they might go along with it. 57

At one point during this same period, when the Communists proposed that a ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops from the combat line should take place while negotiations were going on, the United Nations Command reacted almost as if this were a belligerent and devious act. "Today's stand by the Communists," said the UNC announcement, "was virtually a renunciation of their previously stated position that hostilities should continue during armistice talks." 58

Once upon a time, the United States fought a great civil war in which the North attempted to reunite the divided country through military force. Did Korea or China or any other foreign power send in an army to slaughter Americans, charging Lincoln with aggression?

Why did the United States choose to wage full-scale war in Korea? Only a year earlier, in 1949, in the Arab-Israeli fighting in Palestine and in the India-Pakistani war over Kashmir, the United Nations, with American support, had intervened to mediate an armistice, not to send in an army to take sides and expand the fighting. And both these conflicts were less in the nature of a civil war than was the case in Korea. If the US/UN response had been the same in these earlier cases, Palestine and Kashmir might have wound up as the scorched-earth desert that was Korea's fate. What saved them, what kept the US armed forces out, was no more than the absence of a communist side to the conflict.

6. Albania 1949-1953

The proper English spy

"To simultaneously plan and sabotage this ill-fated venture must have been a severe test of his energy and ingenuity," wrote one of Kim Philby's biographers.¹ The venture was the clandestine attempt, begun in 1949, by the United States and Great Britain to overthrow the pro-Soviet regime of Enver Hoxha through guerrilla-fomented uprisings.

It ended in disaster, in part because the Russians had apparently been alerted by Philby, the proper Englishman who had gone to all the right schools and penetrated the highest ranks of British and American intelligence, though he had been a Soviet spy since the age of 21.

Philby had moved to Washington the year before to act as the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) liaison to the CIA. In that capacity he served as a co-director of the CIA-SIS task force engaged in planning the Albanian operation. The choice had fallen upon Albania because it was regarded as the most vulnerable of the socialist states, the smallest and the weakest, not sharing a border with the Soviet Union, isolated between a US-controlled Greece and a Yugoslavia that was a renegade from the Soviet bloc. Moreover, a recent agreement between the Soviet Union and Albania involved aid for Albania in return for a Soviet right to build a submarine base with direct access to the Mediterranean. By the rules

... ..
The task force began by recruiting scattered Albanian émigrés who were living in Italy, Greece and elsewhere. They were exposed to basic military trainings, with a touch of guerrilla warfare thrown in, at sites established on the British island of Malta in the Mediterranean, in the American occupation zone of West Germany, and, to a lesser extent, in England itself.⁴ "Whenever we want to subvert any place," confided Frank Wisner, the CIA's head of covert operations, to Philby, "we find that the British own an island within easy reach."⁵

Intermittently, for some three-and-a-half years, the émigrés were sent back into their homeland: slipping up into the mountains of Greece and over the border, parachuting in from planes which had taken off from bases in Western Europe, entering by sea from Italy. American planes and balloons dropped propaganda leaflets and goods as well, such items as scarce supply in Albania as flour, halvah, needles, and razor blades, along with a note announcing that they were a gift from the "Albanian National Liberation Front"⁶—another instance of the subtle "marketing" touch that the CIA, born and raised in America, was to bring to so many of its operations.

In outline, the plan, or the hope, was for the guerrillas to make for their old home regions and try to stir up anti-Soviet and anti-Communist sentiments, eventually leading to uprisings. They were to distribute propaganda, obtain political, economic and military information, engage in sabotage, recruit individuals into cells, and supply them with equipment. Later infusions of men and material would expand these cells into "centers of resistance."⁶

Cold-war conventional wisdom dictated that the masses of Eastern Europe were waiting to be sparked into open rebellion for their freedom. Even if this were the case, the choice of ignition was highly dubious, for the guerrillas included amongst their numbers many who supported a reinstatement of the Albanian monarchy in the person of the reactionary King Zog, then in exile, and others who had collaborated with the Italian fascists or Nazis during their wartime occupations of Albania.

To be sure, there were those of republican and democratic leanings in the various émigré committees as well, but State Department papers, later declassified, reveal that prominent Albanian collaborators played leading roles in the formation of these committees. These were individuals the State Department characterized as having "somewhat checked" political backgrounds, who "might sooner or later occasion embarrassment to this government". They were admitted to the United States over the Department's objections because of "intelligence considerations". One of the checkered gentlemen was Xhafer Deva, minister of interior during the Italian occupation, who had been responsible for deportations of "Jews, Communists, partisans and suspicious persons" (as a captured Nazi report put it) to extermination camps in Poland.⁷

In the name of the CIA-funded National Committee for a Free Albania, a powerful underground radio station began broadcasting inside the country, calling for the nation's liberation from the Soviet Union. In early 1951, several reports came out of Albania of open organized resistance and uprisings.⁸ To what extent these happenings were a consequence of the Western infiltration and agitation is impossible to determine. Overall, the campaign had little to show for its efforts. It was hounded throughout by logistical foul-ups, and the grim reality that the masses of Albanians greeted the émigrés as something less than liberators, either from fear of the harsh Hoxha regime, or because they supported the social changes taking place more than they trusted what the émigrés had to offer.

Worst of all, the Albanian authorities usually seemed to know in which area the guerrillas would be arriving, and when. Kim Philby was not the only potential source of disclosure. The Albanian groups were almost certainly infiltrated, and careless talk indulged in by the motley émigrés could have contributed to the fiasco. Philby, referring to the CIA-SIS task force members' habit of poking fun at Albanians, wrote: "Even in our more serious moments, we Anglo-Saxons never forgot that our agents were just down from the trees."⁹

So lax was security that *New York Times* correspondent Cyrus L. Sulzberger filed several dispatches from the Mediterranean area touching upon the intervention which required virtually no reading between the lines.¹⁰ (The articles carried no attention-grabbing headlines, there was no public comment about them from Washington, no reporters asked government officials any embarrassing questions ... ergo: a "non-event" for Americans.)

Despite one failure after another, and without good reason to expect anything different in the future, the operation continued until the spring of 1953, resulting in the death or imprisonment of hundreds of men. It was not simply the obsession with chopping off one of Stalin's fingers. Professional prestige and careers had been invested, a visible success was needed to "recoup past losses" and "justify earlier decisions".¹¹ And the men who were being lost were, after all, only Albanians, who spoke not a word of the Queen's English, and did not yet walk upright properly.

There was, however, the danger of the action escalating into conflict with the Soviet Union. The Soviets did in fact send some new fighter planes to Albania, presumably in the hope that they could shoot down the foreign aircraft making drops.¹² The operation could not fail to remind Stalin, Hoxha, and the entire socialist bloc of another Western intervention 30 years earlier in the Soviet Union. It could only serve to make them yet more "paranoïd" about Western intentions and convince them to turn the screw of internal security yet tighter. Indeed, every now and again over the ensuing years, Hoxha mentioned the American and British "invasion" and used it to justify his policy of isolation.¹³

In the early 1960s, Hoxha himself did what the CIA and SIS had failed to do: He pulled Albania out of the Soviet orbit. The Albanian leader purged pro-Soviet officials in his government and aligned his country with China. There was no military retaliation on the part of the USSR. In the mid-1970s, Hoxha forsook China as well.

7. Eastern Europe 1948-1956

Operation Splinter Factor

Jozef Swiatlo surfaced at a press conference in Washington on 28 September 1954. Swiatlo was a Pole; he had been a very important one, high up in the Ministry of Public Security, the secret police. The story went that he had defected in West Berlin the previous December while on a shopping trip, and now the State Department was presenting him to the world to clear up the mystery of the Fields, the American citizens who had disappeared in 1949. Swiatlo revealed that Noel Field and his wife Herta had been arrested in Hungary, and that brother Hermann Field had suffered the same fate in Poland at the hands of Swiatlo himself, all in connection with the trial of a leading Hungarian Communist. The State Department had already dispatched strong letters to the governments of Hungary and Poland.¹

There is a more expanded and more sinister version of the Jozef Swiatlo story. This

story was Swiatlo seeking to defect to the British in Warsaw back in 1948 at a time when he was already in his high security position. The British, for various reasons, turned his case over to the United States and, at the request of Allen Dulles, Swiatlo was told to remain at his post until further notice.

At this time Dulles was not yet Director of the CIA, but was a close consultant to the Agency, had his own men in key positions, and was waiting only until November for Thomas Dewey to win the presidential election and appoint him to the top position. (Harry Truman's surprising re-election postponed this for four years, but Dulles did become Deputy Director in 1951.)

Noel Field, formerly a State Department Foreign Service Officer, was a long-time Communist fellow-traveler, if not a party member in the United States or Europe. During the Second World War, his path converged with Dulles's in intrigue-filled Switzerland. Dulles was an OSS man, Field the representative of the Unitarian Church in Boston helping refugees from Nazi occupation. Field made it a point particularly to help Communist refugees, of which there were many inasmuch as Communists were second only to Jews on the German persecution list. The OSS aided the operation financially; the Communists in turn were an excellent source of information about happenings in Europe of interest to Washington and its allies.

Toward the end of the war, Field induced Dulles to provide American support for a project which placed agents in various European countries to prepare the way for the advancing Allied troops. The men chosen by Field, unsurprisingly, were all Communists and their placement in certain Eastern European countries helped them to get their hands on the reins of power long before non-Communist forces were able to regroup and organize themselves.

It could be concluded from this that Allen Dulles had been duped. Moreover, the OSS, under Dulles's direction and again with Field involved, had financed the publication of a clandestine newspaper inside Germany; anti-fascist and left-wing, the paper was called *Neues Deutschland*, and immediately upon liberation became the official newspaper of the East German Communist Party.

After the war these incidents served as jokes which intelligence services of both East and West could and did appreciate. Before long, the joke fell heavily upon Noel Field.

In 1949 when Field visited Poland he was regarded with grave suspicion by Polish authorities. He was seen to have worked during the war in a position which could easily have been a front for Western espionage, a position which brought him into regular contact with senior Communist Party members; and he had, after all, worked closely with Allen Dulles, famous already as a spy master, and the brother of John Foster Dulles, prominent in Washington official circles and already making his calls for the "liberation" of the Soviet bloc nations.

At the time of Field's arrival in Poland, Jozef Swiatlo was looking to implicate Jakob Berman, a high party and state official whom Swiatlo was suspicious of and detested. It was his failure to convince the Polish president to act against Berman that reportedly drove Swiatlo to try to defect the year before. When Noel Field wrote to Berman asking his help in obtaining a job in Eastern Europe, Swiatlo learned of the letter and saw his chance to nail Berman.

But first Noel Field had to be established as an American spy. Given the circumstantial evidence pointing in that direction, that would not be too difficult for a man of Swiatlo's high position and low character. Of course, if Field really *was* working with US intelligence, Swiatlo couldn't very well be exposing him since the Polish security officer was now himself an American agent. Accordingly, he sent his first message to the CIA, describing his plan about Berman and Field and the harm it could do to the Communist Party in Poland. He

UNLISHED WITH: ANY OBJECTIONS?

Allen Dulles had none. His reaction to Swiatlo's message was one of pleasure and amusement. The time had come to settle accounts with Noel Field. More importantly, Dulles saw that Swiatlo, using Noel Field, "the American spy", as a bludgeon could knock off countless leading Communist officials in the Soviet bloc. It could put the whole of the bloc into a state of acute paranoia and set off a wave of repression and Stalinist tyranny that could eventually lead to uprisings. Dulles called his plan: Operation Splinter Factor.

Thus it was that Jozef Swiatlo was directed to find spies everywhere in Eastern Europe. He would uncover American plots and British plots, "Trotskyist" conspiracies and "Titoist" conspiracies. He would report to Soviet secret-police chief Lavrenti Beria himself that at the center of the vast network was a man named Noel Haviland Field.

Field was arrested and wound up in a prison in Hungary, as did his wife Herta when she came looking for him. And when his brother Hermann Field sought to track down the two of them, he met the same fate in Poland.

Swiatlo was in a unique position to carry out Operation Splinter Factor. Not only did he have the authority and command, he had the files on countless Communist Party members in the bloc countries. Any connection they had had with Noel Field, anything that Field had done, could be interpreted to show the hand of American intelligence or an act of real or potential subversion of the socialist states. The Soviets, and Stalin himself, were extremely interested in the "Fieldists". Noel Field had known almost everyone who was anyone in the Soviet bloc.

Just in case the level of paranoia in the infant, insecure governments of Eastern Europe was not high enough, a CIA double agent would "corroborate" a vital piece of information, or introduce the right rumor at the right time; or the Agency's Radio Free Europe would broadcast certain tantalizing, seemingly-coded messages; or the CIA would direct the writing of letters from "East European expatriates" in the United States to leading Communists in their homelands, containing just the bit of information, or the phrase, carefully designed to lift the eyebrows of a security officer.

Many of the victims of Swiatlo's purges were people who had spent the war years in the West rather than in the Soviet Union and thus had crossed Field's path. These were people who tended to be more nationalist Communists, who wanted to put greater distance between their countries and the Soviet Union, as Tito had done in Yugoslavia, and who favored a more liberal regime at home. Dulles brushed aside the argument that these were people to be supported, not eliminated. He felt that they were potentially the more dangerous to the West because if their form of Communism were allowed to gain a foothold in Eastern Europe then Communism might become respectable and accepted; particularly with Italy and France threatening to vote Communists into power, Communism had to be shown at its worst.

There were hundreds of trials all over Eastern Europe—"show trials" and lesser spectacles—in which the name of Noel Field played an important part. What Operation Splinter Factor began soon took on a life of its own: following the arrest of a highly-placed person, others fell under suspicion because they knew him or had been appointed by him; or any other connection to an arrested person might serve to implicate some unlucky soul.

Jozef Swiatlo had his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, a man firmly entrenched in the upper rungs of the Czech security apparatus. The man, whose name is not known, had been recruited by General Reinhard Gehlen, the former Nazi intelligence chief who went to work for the CIA after the war.

members of the Czech Communist Party had been arrested—ten percent of the entire membership. There were tens of thousands more in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Hundreds were put to death, others died in prison or went insane.²

After Swiatlo defected in December 1953, East European intelligence services came to realize that he had been working for the other side all along. Four weeks after Swiatlo held his Washington press conference, the Polish government announced that it was releasing Hermann Field because investigation had revealed that the charges which had been brought against him by "an American agent and provocateur", Jozef Swiatlo, were "baseless".³ Field was later paid \$50,000 for his imprisonment as well as having his convalescence at a sanatorium paid for.⁴

Three weeks after Hermann Field's release, Noel and Herta Field were freed in Hungary. The government in Budapest stated that it could not justify the charges against them.⁵ They were also compensated and chose to remain in Hungary.

Once Noel Field had been officially declared innocent, the cases of countless others in East Europe had to be reviewed. First in trickles, then in rushes, the prisoners were released. By 1956 the vast majority stood outside prison walls.

Throughout the decade following the war, the CIA was fanning the flames of discontent in Eastern Europe in many ways other than Operation Splinter Factor. Radio Free Europe (RFE, cf. Soviet Union chapter), broadcasting from West Germany, never missed a (dirty) trick. In January 1952, for example, after RFE learned that Czechoslovakia was planning to devalue its currency, it warned the population, thus stimulating a nation-wide buying panic.⁶ RFE's commentaries about various European Communists were described by Blanche Wiesen Cook in her study of the period, *The Declassified Eisenhower*. She wrote that the broadcasts:

involved a wide range of personal criticism, tawdry and slanderous attacks ranging from rumors of brutality and torture, to corruption, and to madness, perversion, and vice. Everything was used that could be imagined in order to make communists, whether in England or in Poland, look silly, undignified, and insignificant.⁷

One of the voices heard frequently over RFE on the subject of Communist obnoxiousness was none other than Jozef Swiatlo, who had earned the nickname of "Burcher" for his proclivity to torture. Needless to say, the born-again humanitarian made no mention of Splinter Factor or his double role, although some of his broadcasts reportedly shook up the Polish security system for the better.⁸

Any way the US could stir up trouble and nuisance ... supporting opposition groups in Rumania⁹ ... setting up an underground radio station in Bulgaria¹⁰ ... dropping propaganda from balloons over Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (on one day in August 1951 alone, 11,000 balloons carrying 13 million leaflets)¹¹ ... dropping people as well: four American airmen, presumably intelligence operatives, landing in Hungary¹² ...

In 1955, Eastern Europeans could be found at Fort Bragg, North Carolina training with the Green Berets, learning guerrilla warfare tactics, hopefully to be used in their native lands.¹³

By the following year, hundreds of Hungarians, Rumanians, Poles and others were being trained by CIA paramilitary specialists at a secret installation in West Germany.

When, in October 1956, the uprising in Hungary occurred, these men, according to the CIA, were not used because they were not yet ready.¹⁴ But the Agency did send its agents in Budapest into action to join the rebels and help organize them.¹⁵ In the meantime, RFE was exhorting the Hungarian people to continue their resistance, offering tactical advice, and implying that American military assistance was on the way. It never came.

There is no evidence that Operation Splinter Factor contributed to the Hungarian uprising or to the earlier ones in Poland and East Germany. Nonetheless, the CIA could point to all the cold-war, anti-Communist propaganda points it had won because of the witch hunts in the East, the human cost notwithstanding.

8. Germany 1950s

Everything from juvenile delinquency to terrorism

Within a period of 30 years and two world wars with Germany, the Soviet Union suffered more than 40 million dead and wounded, enormous devastation to its land, and to its cities razed to the ground. At the close of the Second World War, the Russians were not kindly disposed toward the German people. With their own country to rebuild, they placed the reconstruction of Germany far down on their list of priorities.

The United States emerged from the war with relatively minor casualties and its territory completely unscathed. It was ready, willing and able to devote itself to its main priority in Europe: the building of an anti-Communist bulwark in the West, particularly in the strategic location of Germany.

In 1945, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson has written, official American policy was explicitly "to bring home to the Germans that they could not escape the suffering they had brought upon themselves ... [and] to control [the] German economy to ... prevent any higher standard of living than in neighboring nations."¹

"From the outset," Acheson added, US officials in Germany believed this plan "to be unworkable".²

Acheson did not explain what lay behind this prognosis, but its correctness soon became apparent for three distinct reasons: (1) influential American business and financial leaders, some of them occupying important government positions, had too great a stake in a highly-industrialized Germany (usually dating back to before the war) to allow the country to sink to the depths that some American policy-makers advocated as punishment; (2) a revitalized West Germany was seen as an indispensable means of combating Soviet influence in the Eastern sector of the country, if not in all of Eastern Europe. West Germany was to become "the showcase of Western democracy"—dramatic, living proof of the superiority of capitalism over socialism; (3) in American conservative circles, and some liberal ones as well, wherein a Soviet invasion of Western Europe remained perpetually imminent, the idea of tying West Germany's industrial hands was one which came perilously close to being "soft on communism", if not worse.³

Dwight Eisenhower echoed this last sentiment when he later wrote:

Had certain officials in the Roosevelt administration had their way, Germany would have been far worse off, for there were those who advocated the flooding of the Ruhr mines, the wrecking of German factories, and the reducing of Germany from an industrial to an agricultural nation. Among

involved in a Soviet espionage ring operating within our government ... proposed exactly that.⁴

Thus it was that the de-industrialization of West Germany met the same fate as the demilitarization of the country would in the coming years, as the United States poured in massive economic assistance: \$4 billion of Marshall Plan aid and an army of industrial and technical experts.

At the same time, the Soviet Union was pouring massive economic assistance *out* of East Germany. The Soviets dismantled and moved back home entire factories with large amounts of equipment and machinery, and thousands of miles of railroad track. When added to war reparations, the toll reached into the billions of dollars.

By the early 1950s, though social services, employment, and cultural life in East Germany were on a par or superior to that in West Germany, the Western sector had the edge in those areas of prosperity with the most sex appeal: salaries were higher, the eating was better, consumer goods more available, and the neon lights emblazoned the nights along the Kurfürstendamm.

American cold warriors, however, as if discontent with the game score or with leaving so much to chance, instituted a crude campaign of sabotage and subversion against East Germany designed to throw the economic and administrative machinery out of gear. The CIA and other US intelligence and military services in West Germany (with occasional help from the likes of British intelligence and the West German police) recruited, equipped, trained and financed German activist groups and individuals of West and East. Finding recruits for such a crusade was not difficult, for in post-war Germany, anti-communism lived on as the only respectable vestige of Nazism.

The most active of these groups, which went by the name of Fighting Group Against Inhumanity, admitted that it had received financial support from the Ford Foundation and the West Berlin government.⁵ Subsequently, an East Berlin news magazine published a copy of a letter from the Ford Foundation confirming a grant of \$150,000 to the National Committee for a Free Europe "so that it, in turn, could support the humanitarian activities of 'The Fighting Group Against Inhumanity'."⁶ The National Committee for a Free Europe, in turn, was a CIA front organization which also ran Radio Free Europe.⁷

The Association of Political Refugees from the East, and the Investigating Committee of Freedom-minded Jurists of the Soviet Zone, were two of the other groups involved in the campaign against East Germany. The actions carried out by these operatives ran the spectrum from juvenile delinquency to terrorism; anything "to make the commies look bad". It added up to the following remarkable record:⁸

- through explosives, arson, short circuiting, and other methods they damaged power stations, shipyards, a dam, canals, docks, public buildings, gas stations, shops, a radio station, outdoor stands, public transportation;
- derailed freight trains, seriously injuring workers; burned 12 cars of a freight train and destroyed air pressure hoses of others;
- blew up road and railway bridges; placed explosives on a railway bridge of the Berlin-Moscow line but these were discovered in time—hundreds would have been killed;
- used special acids to damage vital factory machinery; put sand in the turbine of a factory, bringing it to a standstill; set fire to a tile-producing factory; promoted work slow-downs in factories; stole blueprints and samples of new technical developments;
- killed 7,000 cows of a co-operative dairy by poisoning the wax coating of the wire used to bale the cows' corn fodder;

- added soap to powdered milk destined for East German schools;
- raided and wrecked left-wing offices in East and West Berlin, stole membership lists; assaulted and kidnapped leftists and, on occasion, murdered them;
- set off stink bombs to disrupt political meetings;
- floated balloons which burst in the air, scattering thousands of propaganda pamphlets down upon East Germans;

• were in possession, when arrested, of a large quantity of the poison cantharidin with which it was planned to produce poisoned cigarettes to kill leading East Germans;

• attempted to disrupt the World Youth Festival in East Berlin by sending out forged invitations, false promises of free bed and board, false notices of cancellations; carried out attacks on participants with explosives, firebombs, and tire-puncturing equipment; set fire to a wooden bridge on a main motorway leading to the festival;

- forged and distributed large quantities of food ration cards—for example, for 60,000 pounds of meat—to cause confusion, shortages and resentment;
- sent out forged tax notices and other government directives and documents to foster disorganization and inefficiency within industry and unions;

• "gave considerable aid and comfort" to East Germans who staged an uprising on 17 June 1953; during and after the uprising, the US radio station in West Berlin, RIAS (Radio In the American Sector), issued inflammatory broadcasts into East Germany appealing to the populace to resist the government; RIAS also broadcast warnings to witnesses in at least one East German criminal case being monitored by the Investigating Committee of Freedom-minded Jurists of the Soviet Zone that they would be added to the committee's files of "accused persons" if they lied.

Although many hundreds of the American agents were caught and tried by East Germany, the ease with which they could pass back and forth between the two sectors and infiltrate different enterprises without any language barrier provided opportunities for the CIA unmatched anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

Throughout the 1950s, the East Germans and the Soviet Union repeatedly lodged complaints with the Soviets' erstwhile allies in the West and with the United Nations about specific sabotage and espionage activities and called for the closure of the offices in West Germany they claimed were responsible, and for which they provided names and addresses. Inevitably the East Germans began to tighten up entry into the country from the West.

The West also bedeviled the East with a vigorous campaign of recruiting East German professionals and skilled workers. Eventually, this led to a severe labor and production crisis in the East, and in August 1961, to the building of the infamous Berlin Wall.

While staging their commando attacks upon East Germany, American authorities and their German agents were apparently convinced that the Soviet Union had belligerent designs upon West Germany; perhaps a textbook case of projection. On 8 October 1952, the Minister-President of the West German state of Hesse, Georg August Zinn, disclosed that the United States had created a secret civilian army in his state for the purpose of resisting a Russian invasion.

This force of between 1,000 and 2,000 men belonged to the so-called "Technical Service" of the German Youth Federation, the latter characterized by the *New York Times* as "a Right-wing youth group frequently charged with extremist activities" (a reference to the terrorist tactics described above). The stalwarts of the Technical Service were hardly youths, however, for almost all appeared to be between 35 and 50 and most, said Zinn, were "former officers of the Luftwaffe, the Wehrmacht and the S.S. [Hitler's Black-shirts]".

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #7:

34. "President Truman's Loyalty Order, 1947."
35. "Whittaker Chambers Hears the Voice of the People, 1952."
36. "J. Edgar Hoover Notes the Communist Interest in Hollywood, 1947."
37. "Edward Dmytryk Recalls the Hollywood Ten in Washington, 1947."
38. "Lillian Hellman Defies HUAC, 1952."
39. "Joseph R. McCarthy's Wheeling Speech, 1950."
40. "McCarthy Attacks George C. Marshall, 1951."

CHAPTER 27

DOCUMENT SET 2

The Great Fear Unleashed: The Cold War Comes Home

Postwar tensions with the Soviet Union bred a climate of fear and suspicion in the United States as Americans adjusted to peacetime conditions. The Truman administration's rigidity and militance in foreign policy were matched by the president's commitment to anticommunism at home. Beset by mounting evidence of subversive activity, Truman moved to strengthen internal security amidst conservative charges of laxity, himself contributing to the rising paranoia. The result was an atmosphere of intolerance, described in your textbook as a scramble to find scapegoats for the nation's domestic and foreign problems. Before the hysteria subsided, American political culture became homogenized, while civil liberties suffered their most serious setback since the Great Red Scare of 1919. The documents that follow provide vivid evidence of the link between a Cold War foreign policy and intolerance on the home front.

It was not coincidental that nine days after the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the president issued a loyalty order intended to root out subversives in government service. As you review his order, focus on Truman's justification for action and the grounds established for a person's removal from government employment.

Your textbook indicates that anticommunism had long been present in Congress, where the House Un-American Activities Committee became the focal point for efforts to explore subversion. No case was more dramatic than that of former New Dealer Alger Hiss, accused of domestic spying. Using the textbook account of the Hiss incident as background, analyze the excerpt from Whittaker Chambers's personal account of the affair. Be attentive to the theme of the

Chambers comment and what it reveals about the sources of anticommunism.

Equally dramatic were the 1947 HUAC hearings described in your textbook. Although labor unions and political dissenters drew the committee's fire, its attack on the entertainment industry caught the public imagination as did few others. The next group of documents explores the ramifications of HUAC's interest in the motion picture industry. Review FBI director J. Edgar Hoover's analysis of alleged communist infiltration of the media and its significance. An excerpt from the autobiography of film director Edward Dmytryk, who refused to cooperate with the Committee in 1947, reveals not only the presence of political radicals in Hollywood but also the constitutional issue raised by the Hollywood resisters. Both Dmytryk's recollection and the personal memoir of screenwriter/playwright Lillian Hellman document the insidious blacklist that was the film industry's response to anticommunist political pressure. Notice what these documents reveal about the personal, constitutional, and political implications of the anticommunist crusade.

The concluding documents record the climax of the red scare in the unparalleled demagoguery of Wisconsin senator Joseph R. McCarthy. As you review the excerpts from his Wheeling speech (1950) and sweeping attack on secretary of defense George C. Marshall (1951), identify the targets of the senator's criticism. Be also aware of the close linkage between foreign policy and domestic politics in the age of the Cold War. Try to assess the relationship between anticommunist hysteria and the Democratic party's decline, described in your textbook as the end of an era.

Questions for Analysis

1. What were the sources of anticommunism in the postwar United States? What evidence do the documents provide to explain domestic support for Joseph McCarthy and his predecessors? What was the basis for the anticommunist appeal?
2. What were the similarities and differences between the Red Scare of 1919 and the anticommunism of the Truman years? Consider the instigators, targets, duration, and implications of the two movements.
3. Using the loyalty program and the Hiss case as points of departure, evaluate the Truman administration as a carrier of the liberal social, economic, and political tradition. How did the demands of the Cold War domestic environment influence the prospects for reform? What did "liberalism" mean in the immediate postwar years, and how was it affected by the anticommunist crusade?

4. What do the documents reveal about the significance of presidential leadership at the onset of the postwar anticommunist movement? What was Truman's attitude toward the Soviet Union, and how did it influence the national debate over alleged internal subversion? What light does the evidence shed on the roots of McCarthyism?
5. Why did American opponents of communism focus their attention on the motion-picture industry between 1947 and 1951? In what way did the House Un-American Activities Committee hearings document the charges against Hollywood?
6. What were the constitutional and civil-liberties issues at stake during the second red scare? What evidence of these concerns can be found in the documents? How did the accused respond to the assault against them? With what results?
7. To what extent were class differences and socioeconomic divisions a factor in the clash over alleged internal subversion? What evidence exists that these conflicts played a role in the thinking of the communist-hunters?

1. President Truman's Loyalty Order, 1947

Executive Order 9835

Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employees Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government

Whereas each employee of the government of the United States is endowed with a measure of trusteeship over the democratic processes which are the heart and sinew of the United States; and

Whereas it is of vital importance that persons employed in the federal service be of complete and unwavering loyalty to the United States; and

Whereas, although the loyalty of by far the overwhelming majority of all government employees is beyond question, the presence within the government service of any disloyal or subversive person constitutes a threat to our democratic processes; and

Whereas maximum protection must be afforded the United States against infiltration of disloyal persons into the ranks of its employees, and equal protection from unfounded accusations of disloyalty must be afforded the loyal employees of the government:

Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, . . . it is hereby, in the interest of the internal management of the government, ordered as follows:

Part I—Investigation of Applicants

1. There shall be a loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian employment of any department or agency of the executive branch of the federal government. . . .

Part V—Standards

1. The standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the government of the United States.

2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which may be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the following:

a. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs;

b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof;

c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the constitutional form of government of the United States;

d. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or nonpublic character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the government of the United States;

e. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States;

f. Membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination

of persons, designated by the attorney general as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny

other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means. . . .

2. Whittaker Chambers Hears the Voice of the People, 1952

. . . Those were the forces—Thomas Murphy, Richard Nixon, the men of the F.B.I.—who, together with the two grand juries and Tom Donegan and the two trial juries, finally won the Hiss Case for the nation. It is important to look hard at them for a moment . . . For the contrast between them and the glittering Hiss forces is about the same as between them and the glittering French chivalry and the somewhat tattered English bowmen who won at Agincourt. The inclusive fact about them is that, in contrast to the pro-Hiss rally, most of them, regardless of what they had made of themselves, came from the wrong side of the railroad tracks. . . .

No feature of the Hiss Case is more obvious, or more troubling as history, than the jagged fissure, which it did not so much open as reveal, between the plain men and women of the nation, and those who affected to act, think and speak for them. It was, not invariably, but in general, the “best people” who were for Alger Hiss and who were prepared to go to almost any length to protect and defend him. It was the enlightened and the powerful, the clamorous proponents of the open mind and the common man, who snapped their minds shut in a pro-Hiss psychosis, of a kind which, in an individual patient, means the simple failure of the ability to distinguish between reality and unreality, and, in a nation, is a warning of the end.

It was the great body of the nation, which, not invariably, but in general, kept open its mind in the Hiss Case, waiting for the returns to come in. It was they who suspected what forces disastrous to the na-

tion were at work in the Hiss Case, and had suspected that they were at work long before there was a Hiss Case, while most of the forces of enlightenment were poohpoohing the Communist danger and calling every allusion to it a witch hunt. It was they who, when the battle was over, first caught its real meaning. It was they who almost unfailingly understood the nature of the witness that I was seeking to make, as I have tested beyond question whenever I have talked to any group of them. And it was they who, in the persons of the men I have cited, produced the forces that could win a struggle whose conspicuous feature is that it was almost without leadership. From the very outset, I was in touch with that enormous force, for which I was making the effort, and from which I drew strength. Often I lost touch with it or doubted it, cut off from it in the cities, or plunged in the depths of the struggle. But when I came back to it, it was always there. It reached me in letters and messages of encouragement and solicitude, understanding, stirring, sometimes wringing the heart. But even when they did not understand, my people were always about me. I had only to look around me to see them—on the farms, on the streets, in homes, in shops, in the day coaches of trains. My people, humble people, strong in common sense, in common goodness, in common forgiveness, because all felt bowed together under the common weight of life.

And at the very end of the Hiss Case, I heard their speaking voice, like themselves, anonymous, and speaking not to me as an individual, but to me in the name of all those who made the struggle. . . .

3. J. Edgar Hoover Notes the Communist Interest in Hollywood, 1947

. . . The party has departed from depending upon the printed word as its medium of propaganda and has taken to the air. Its members and sympathizers have

not only infiltrated the airways but they are now persistently seeking radio channels.

The American Communists launched a furtive

attack on Hollywood in 1935 by the issuance of a directive calling for a concentration in Hollywood. The orders called for action on two fronts: (1) an effort to infiltrate the labor unions; (2) infiltrate the so-called intellectual and creative fields.

In movie circles, Communists developed an effective defense a few years ago in meeting criticism. They would counter with the question, "After all, what is the matter with communism?" It was effective because many persons did not possess adequate knowledge of the subject to give an intelligent answer.

Some producers and studio heads realized the

possibility that the entire industry faces serious embarrassment because it could become a springboard for Communist activities. Communist activity in Hollywood is effective and is furthered by Communists and sympathizers using the prestige of prominent persons to serve, often unwittingly, the Communist cause. The party is content and highly pleased if it is possible to have inserted in a picture a line, a scene, a sequence conveying the Communist lesson and, more particularly, if they can keep out anti-Communist lessons. . . .

4. Edward Dmytryk Recalls the Hollywood Ten in Washington, 1947

. . . Since *Crossfire* was a worldwide smash, my attack, as well as Adrian's, centered on the committee's ethnic bias and its attempts to limit freedom of speech in the area of national self-criticism. But none of our lawyers really expected that we would be heard, and the strategy was say nothing, hide under the possible cover of the First Amendment, and hope for a favorable verdict from the Supreme Court. "Taking the Fifth" was never considered, though it would have kept us out of jail; the implication of guilt was considered too dangerous. . . .

With all the public feeling in our favor, Bart Crum suggested that Adrian and I should testify freely, which we were perfectly willing to do. We felt it might serve to pull the committee's fangs. You'd have thought we were offering to atomize the Kremlin. The unanimity rule was invoked, and that was that. From their point of view, they were absolutely right. If we had answered any substantive questions at all, we would have been legally required to give names if we were asked to. If we refused to name party members, as, at that time, we certainly would have done, we would still be cited for contempt. If we had given the names, the other members of our group would have been in the soup. Eventually, that's where we wound up anyway, but at this point the battle had barely begun and our eyes were fixed on a liberal Supreme Court. With no argument, we put our suggestion aside and on the 27th of October, entered the chamber prepared to face the inquisitors.

The chamber was crowded; the real fun was about to begin. . . . Dore Schary sat beside me as we watched John Howard Lawson being sworn in. He was the leader and would set the tone of our attack. Unfortunately, Lawson was tone-deaf.

It started with the usual identification by name and address. Then Lawson requested permission to read a statement. After a bit of bickering, Thomas asked to look at it before making his decision. He was, as they say in court, making a record. The statement was handed over to the chairman, who made only a slight pretense of reading it, then ruled that it was irrelevant. Lawson started to argue; Thomas banged his gavel. The exchange got so hot that the chairman nearly forgot to ask what came to be called "the sixty-four dollar question": "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist party?"

Now Lawson started shouting in earnest, trying to enumerate his reasons for refusing to answer the question. Between gavel poundings, the chairman screamed, "Answer yes or no!" Shouting and banging—banging and shouting. It was a miserable scene. I was hit by a feeling I had had once before, when a car skidded into me across a wet street. "This is it," I thought. I scrunched down in my seat and turned to Dore.

"What are my chances at the studio now?" I asked.

"You have an ironclad contract," he replied.

And so it went for the rest of the hearing. I could literally feel the listeners' sympathies oozing away with each shout from one of our group. Thomas had made a ridiculous show of himself with his shouting and free use of the gavel; now we were matching him shout for shout—it was a fight we couldn't win. . . .

We made it back to Hollywood, basking for a short time in the light of what our leftist friends assured us was a fine and glorious victory, but the decision that would affect our lives was being made at the

Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York. There, on November 27, 1947, the representatives of the motion picture industry formally decided to fire any accused worker who would not freely answer all questions asked by the Un-American Activities Committee and who could not clear himself of charges that he was or had been a member of the Communist party. The

following day, since Dore refused to be the hatchet man, N. Peter Rathvon called Scott and me into his office and asked us once more to recant and to purge ourselves. With hardly any sense of martyrdom at all, we refused. In that case, he informed us, we were no longer employees of RKO. So much for ironclad contracts. . . .

5. Lillian Hellman Defies HUAC, 1952

May 19, 1952

Honorable John S. Wood
Chairman
House Committee on Un-American Activities
Room 226 Old House Office Building
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Wood:

As you know, I am under subpoena to appear before your Committee on May 21, 1952.

I am most willing to answer all questions about myself. I have nothing to hide from your Committee and there is nothing in my life of which I am ashamed. I have been advised by counsel that under the Fifth Amendment I have a constitutional privilege to decline to answer any questions about my political opinions, activities and associations, on the grounds of self-incrimination. I do not wish to claim this privilege. I am ready and willing to testify before the representatives of our Government as to my own opinions and my own actions, regardless of any risks or consequences to myself.

But I am advised by counsel that if I answer the Committee's questions about myself, I must also answer questions about other people and that if I refuse to do so, I can be cited for contempt. My counsel tells me that if I answer questions about myself, I will have waived my rights under the Fifth Amendment and could be forced legally to answer questions about others. This is very difficult for a layman to understand. But there is one principle that I do understand: I am not willing, now or in the future, to bring bad trouble to people who, in my past association with them, were completely innocent of any talk or any action that was disloyal or subversive. I do not like subversion or disloyalty in any form and if I had ever seen any I would have considered it my duty to have reported it to the proper authorities. But to hurt innocent people whom I knew many years ago in order to save myself is, to me, inhuman and indecent and dis-

honorable. I cannot and will not cut my conscience to fit this year's fashions, even though I long ago came to the conclusion that I was not a political person and could have no comfortable place in any political group.

I was raised in an old-fashioned American tradition and there were certain homely things that were taught to me: to try to tell the truth, not to bear false witness, not to harm my neighbor, to be loyal to my country, and so on. In general, I respected these ideals of Christian honor and did as well with them as I knew how. It is my belief that you will agree with these simple rules of human decency and will not expect me to violate the good American tradition from which they spring. I would, therefore, like to come before you and speak of myself.

I am prepared to waive the privilege against self-incrimination and to tell you anything you wish to know about my views or actions if your Committee will agree to refrain from asking me to name other people. If the Committee is unwilling to give me this assurance, I will be forced to plead the privilege of the Fifth Amendment at the hearing.

A reply to this letter would be appreciated.
Sincerely yours,

Lillian Hellman

The letter that I sent the Committee on May 19, 1952, had been refused by letter on May 20. It was, therefore, necessary for me to do what I did not want to do: take the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment is, of course, a wise section of the Constitution: you cannot be forced to incriminate yourself. But the amendment has difficulties that are hard for a layman to understand. . . .

The opening questions were standard: what was my name, where was I born, what was my occupation, what were the titles of my plays. It didn't take long to get to what really interested them: my time in

Hollywood, which studios had I worked for, what periods of what years, with some mysterious emphasis on 1937. (My time in Spain, I thought, but I was wrong.)

Had I met a writer called Martin Berkeley? (I had never, still have never, met Martin Berkeley, although Hammett told me later that I had once sat at a lunch table of sixteen or seventeen people with him in the old Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer commissary.) I said I must refuse to answer that question. . . .

Was I a member of the Communist Party, had I been, what year had I stopped being? How could I harm such people as Martin Berkeley by admitting I had known them, and so on. At times I couldn't follow the reasoning, at times I understood full well

that in refusing to answer questions about membership in the Party I had, of course, trapped myself into a seeming admission that I once had been.

But in the middle of one of the questions about my past, something so remarkable happened that I am to this day convinced that the unknown gentleman who spoke had a great deal to do with the rest of my life. A voice from the press gallery had been for at least three or four minutes louder than the other voices. (By this time, I think, the press had finished reading my letter to the Committee and were discussing it.) The loud voice had been answered by a less loud voice, but no words could be distinguished. Suddenly a clear voice said, "Thank God somebody finally had the guts to do it." . . .

6. Joseph R. McCarthy's Wheeling Speech, 1950

Five years after a world war has been won, men's hearts should anticipate a long peace, and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes with war. But this is not such a period—for this is not a period of peace. This is a time of the "cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile armed camps

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate or members of minority groups who have been selling this Nation out, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest nation on earth has had to offer—the finest homes, the finest college education, and the finest jobs in Government we can give.

This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been the worst. . . . In my opinion the State Department, which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with Communists.

I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals who would appear to be either card carrying members or

certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy. . . .

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all crimes—of being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of great trust. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefore, and the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.

When this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent, proclaimed to the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high treason, and betrayal of a sacred trust, the blasphemy was so great that it awakened the dormant indignation of the American people.

He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of national honesty and decency in government.

7. McCarthy Attacks George C. Marshall, 1951

. . . How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this Government

are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a

scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.

Who constitutes the highest circles of this conspiracy? About that we cannot be sure. We are convinced that Dean Acheson, who steadfastly serves the interests of nations other than his own, the friend of Alger Hiss, who supported him in his hour of retribution, who contributed to his defense fund, must be high on the roster. The President? He is their captive. I have wondered, as have you, why he did not dispense with so great a liability as Acheson to his own and his party's interests. It is now clear to me. In the relationship of master and man, did you ever hear of man firing master? Truman is a satisfactory front. He is only dimly aware of what is going on. . . .

What can be made of this unbroken series of decisions and acts contributing to the strategy of defeat? They cannot be attributed to incompetence. If Marshall were merely stupid, the laws of probability would dictate that part of his decisions would serve this country's interest. If Marshall is innocent of guilty intention, how could he be trusted to guide the defense of this country further? We have declined so precipitously in relation to the Soviet Union in the last 6 years. How much swifter may be our fall into disaster with Marshall at the helm? Where will all this stop? That is not a rhetorical question: Ours is not a

rhetorical danger. Where next will Marshall carry us? It is useless to suppose that his nominal superior will ask him to resign. He cannot even dispense with Acheson.

What is the objective of the great conspiracy? I think it is clear from what has occurred and is now occurring: to diminish the United States in world affairs, to weaken us militarily, to confuse our spirit with talk of surrender in the Far East and to impair our will to resist evil. To what end? To the end that we shall be contained, frustrated and finally fall victim to Soviet intrigue from within and Russian military might from without. . . .

It is the great crime of the Truman administration that it has refused to undertake the job of ferreting the enemy from its ranks. I once puzzled over that refusal. The President, I said, is a loyal American; why does he not lead in this enterprise? I think that I know why he does not. The President is not master in his own house. Those who are master there not only have a desire to protect the sappers and miners—they could not do otherwise. They themselves are not free. They belong to a larger conspiracy, the world-wide web of which has been spun from Moscow. It was Moscow, for example, which decreed that the United States should execute its loyal friend, the Republic of China. The executioners were that well-identified group headed by Acheson and George Catlett Marshall.

Chapter 27:

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7. McCarthy Attacks George C. Marshall, 1951
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He expounded how he thought the Korean war should be waged.

While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint, proved a sound one. As I say, it proved a sound one, as we hurled back the invader and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete, and our objectives within reach, when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces.

This created a new war and an entirely new situation, a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders; a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China, and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need, as I saw it, to neutralize sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made necessary—

- (1) The intensification of our economic blockade against China.
- (2) The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.
- (3) Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coastal areas and of Manchuria.
- (4) Removal of restrictions on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa, with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the Chinese mainland.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint

... way or Denmark or Holland or Italy or even France and England. . . .

Seventh. Finally . . . it is becoming increasingly apparent that England, at least, intends to trade extensively with Russia, and inevitably the same thing will be true of other western European nations. . . . The more we take off their shoulders the burden of providing for their own defense, the more free they will be to ship steel and heavy machinery to the east. . . . I do not think that the American people at this time desire to increase the overall aid we are giving to western Europe with its tremendous burden on the American taxpayer. . . .

My conclusion has been reached with the greatest discomfort. When so many disagree with that conclusion, I must admit that I may be completely wrong. . . . I would like to be able to vote for a policy that will commit us to war if Russia attacks western Europe. I would be glad to join in an agreement to occupy Germany indefinitely to guard against a third attack from that quarter. I would waive my other objections to the Atlantic Pact if I did not feel that it was inextricably involved with the arms program. But I cannot escape the logic of the situation as I see it, and therefore I cannot vote for a treaty which, in my opinion, will do far more to bring about a third world-war than it will ever maintain the peace of the world.

DOCUMENT 13

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, ADDRESS TO CONGRESS,

APRIL 19, 1951

When he returned from the Far East after his removal by President Truman, General MacArthur was greeted as a hero by a large section of the press and large numbers of people. His welcome provided an outlet for resentments about the Korean war. In a haughty and flamboyant speech to Congress, excerpted here,

the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the enemy built-up bases north of the Yalu, if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa, if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without, and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of the command from the military standpoint forbade victory.

We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential.

I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution.

Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said in effect that I was a warmonger. Nothing could be further from the truth.

I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition, as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. . . .

But once [war] was forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory, not prolonged indecision.

In war there can be no substitute for victory.

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace.

Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative. Why, my soldiers asked

of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer.

Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China. Others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific."

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

DOCUMENT 14

DEAN ACHESON, TESTIMONY ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST,

JUNE 1, 1951

In a statement to the Senate Committee on the Armed Services, excerpted here, Secretary Acheson articu-

lately reviewed the case of the administration against the sort of aggressive policy in the Far East which MacArthur wanted.

I should like briefly to address myself to the alternative course which was placed before this committee. This course would seek to bring the conflict in Korea to an end by enlarging the sphere of hostilities.

I will not try to review the military considerations involved in this proposed course, since these have been thoroughly discussed by the previous witnesses before your committees.

It is enough to say that it is the judgment of the President's military advisers that the proposed enlargement of our military action would not exercise a prompt and decisive effect in bringing the hostilities to an end. To this judgment there must be added a recognition of the grave risks and other disadvantages of this alternative course.

Against the dubious advantages of spreading the war in an initially limited manner to the mainland of China, there must be measured the risk of a general war with China, the risk of Soviet intervention, and of world war III, as well as the probable effects upon the solidarity of the free world coalition.

The advocates of this program make two assumptions which require careful examination. They assume that the Soviet Union will not necessarily respond to any action on our part. They also assume that in the build-up of strength relative to the Soviet Union and the Communist sphere, time is not necessarily on our side.

As to Soviet reactions, no one can be sure he is forecasting accurately what they would be, but there are certain facts at hand that bear on this question.

We know of Soviet influence in North Korea, of Soviet assistance to the North Koreans and to Communist China, and we know that understandings must have accompanied this assistance. We also know that there is a treaty between the Soviets and the Chinese Communists.

But even if the treaty did not exist, China is the Soviet Union's largest and most important satellite. Rus-

sian self-interest in the Far East and the necessity of maintaining prestige in the Communist sphere make it difficult to see how the Soviet Union could ignore a direct attack upon the Chinese mainland.

I cannot accept the assumption that the Soviet Union will go its way regardless of what we do. I do not think that Russian policy is formed that way any more than our own policy is formed that way. This view is certainly not well enough grounded to justify a gamble with the essential security of our Nation.

In response to the proposed course of action, there are a number of courses of counteraction open to the Soviets.

They could turn over to the Chinese large numbers of planes with "volunteer" crews for retaliatory action in Korea and outside. They might participate with the Soviet Air Force and the submarine fleet.

The Kremlin could elect to parallel the action taken by Peiping and intervene with a half-million or more ground-force "volunteers"; or it could go the whole way and launch an all-out war.

Singly, or in combination, these reactions contain explosive possibilities, not only for the Far East, but for the rest of the world as well.

We should also analyze the effect on our allies of our taking steps to initiate the spread of war beyond Korea. It would severely weaken their ties with us and in some instances it might sever them.

They are understandably reluctant to be drawn into a general war in the Far East—one which holds the possibilities of becoming a world war—particularly if it developed out of an American impatience with the progress of the effort to repel aggression, an effort which in their belief offers an honorable and far less catastrophic solution.

If we followed the course proposed, we would be increasing our risks and commitments at the same time that we diminished our strength by reducing the strength and determination of our coalition.

We cannot expect that our collective-security system will long survive if we take steps which unnecessarily and dangerously expose the people who are in the system with

us. I say would undisturbedly hesitate to be tied to a partner who leads them to a highly dangerous short cut across a difficult crevasse.

In relation to the total world threat, our safety requires that we strengthen, not weaken, the bonds of our collective-security system.

The power of our coalition to deter an attack depends in part upon the will and the mutual confidence of our partners. If we, by the measures proposed, were to weaken that effect, particularly in the North Atlantic area, we would be jeopardizing the security of an area which is vital to our own national security.

What this adds up to, it seems to me, is that we are being asked to undertake a large risk of general war with China, risk of war with the Soviet Union, and a demonstrable weakening of our collective-security system—all this in return for what?

In return for measures whose effectiveness in bringing the conflict to an early conclusion are judged doubtful by our responsible military authorities.

DOCUMENT 15

JOHN FOSTER DULLES, TESTIMONY ON THE POLICY OF LIBERATION,

JANUARY 15, 1953

Appearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower's designated Secretary of State, here attempted to clarify for Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin what was meant by the much talked about policy of "liberation."

THE CHAIRMAN [Sen. Wiley]. I am particularly interested in something I read recently, to the effect that you stated you were not in favor of the policy of containment. I think you advocated a more dynamic or positive policy.

Can you tell us more specifically what you have in mind? This, of course, is subject always to your own ob-

of qualifications.

MR. DULLES. There are a number of policy matters which I would prefer to discuss with the committee in executive session, but I have no objection to saying in open session what I have said before: namely, that we shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet communism dominates one-third of all the peoples that there are, and is in the process of trying at least to extend its rule to many others. . . .

Therefore, we must always have in mind the liberation of these captive peoples. Now, liberation does not mean a war of liberation. Liberation can be accomplished by processes short of war. We have, as one example, not an ideal example, but it illustrates my point, the defection of Yugoslavia, under Tito from the domination of Soviet communism.

Well, that rule of Tito is not one which we admire, and it has many aspects of despotism, itself; but at least it illustrates that it is possible to disintegrate this present monolithic structure. . . .

The present tie between China and Moscow is an unholy arrangement which is contrary to the traditions, the hopes, the aspirations of the Chinese people. Certainly we cannot tolerate a continuance of that, or a welding of the 450 million people of China into the servile instrument of Soviet aggression.

Therefore, a policy which only aims at containing Russia where it now is, is, in itself, an unsound policy; but it is a policy which is bound to fail because a purely defensive policy never wins against an aggressive policy. If our only policy is to stay where we are, we will be driven back. It is only by keeping alive the hope of liberation, by taking advantage of that wherever opportunity arises, that we will end this terrible peril which dominates the world. . . . But all of this can be done and must be done in ways which will not provoke a general war, or in ways which will not provoke an insurrection which would be crushed with bloody violence. . . .

DOCUMENT 16

LEWIS MUMFORD, LETTER ON
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,

MARCH 28, 1954

Lewis Mumford, a provocative writer on American architecture and city planning, and a historian of American and European civilization, expressed in this letter to the editor of the New York Times views which many troubled Americans shared.

The power of the hydrogen bomb has, it is plain, given pause even to the leaders of our Government. Their very hesitation to give away the facts in itself gives away the facts. Under what mandate, then, do they continue to hold as secret the results we may expect from the use of weapons of extermination—not merely on our own cities and people but on all living organisms; not merely on our present lives but on the lives of countless generations to come?

Are our leaders afraid that when the truth is known our devotion to the perfection of scientific weapons of total destruction and extermination will turn out to be a profoundly irrational one: repulsive to morality, dangerous to national security, inimical to life?

Do they suspect that the American people are still sane enough to halt the blind automatism that continues, in the face of Soviet Russia's equal scientific powers, to produce these fatal weapons?

Do they fear that their fellow-countrymen may well doubt the usefulness of instruments which, under the guise of deterring an aggressor or insuring a cheap victory, might incidentally destroy the whole fabric of civilization and threaten the very existence of the human race?

Our secret weapons of extermination have been produced under conditions that have favored irresponsible censorship and short-sighted political and military judgments. Under the protection of secrecy a succession of

fatal errors has been made, primarily as the result (since 1942) of our accepting total extermination as a method of warfare. These errors have been compounded by our counting upon such dehumanized methods to preserve peace and security.

In turn, our very need for secrecy in an abortive effort to monopolize technical and scientific knowledge, has produced pathological symptoms in the whole body politic: fear, suspicion, non-cooperation, hostility to critical judgment, above all delusions of power based on fantasies of unlimited extermination, as the only possible answer to the political threat of Soviet Russia. But demoralized men cannot be counted upon to control such automatic instruments of demoralization.

At a fatal moment our self-induced fears may produce the incalculable and irretrievable holocaust our own weapons have given us reason to dread. Only courage and intelligence of the highest order, backed by open discussion, will give us the strength to turn back from the suicidal path we have blindly followed since 1942.

Are there not enough Americans still possessed of their sanity to call a stop to these irrational decisions, which are automatically bringing us close to a total catastrophe?

There are many alternative courses to the policy to which we have committed ourselves, practically without debate. The worst of all these alternatives, submission to Communist totalitarianism, would still be far wiser than the final destruction of civilization.

As for the best of these alternatives, a policy of working firmly toward justice and cooperation, and free intercourse with all other peoples, in the faith that love begets love as surely as hatred begets hatred—would, in all probability, be the one instrument capable of piercing the strong political armor of our present enemies.

Once the facts of our policy of total extermination are publicly canvassed, and the final outcome, mass suicide, is faced, I believe that the American people are still sane enough to come to a wiser decision than our Government has yet made. They will realize that retaliation is not protection; that total extermination of both sides is not victory; that a constant state of morbid fear,

suspicion and hatred is not security; that, in short, what seems like unlimited power has become impotence.

In the name of sanity let our Government now pause and seek the counsel of sane men: men who have not participated in the errors we have made and are not committed, out of pride, to defending them. Let us cease all further experiments with even more horrifying weapons of destruction, lest our own self-induced fears further upset our mental balance.

Let us all, as responsible citizens, not the cowed subjects of an all-wise state, weigh the alternatives and canvass new lines of approach to the problems of power and peace.

Let us deal with our own massive sins and errors as a step toward establishing firm relations of confidence with the rest of mankind. And let us, first of all, have the courage to speak up on behalf of humanity, on behalf of civilization, on behalf of life itself against the methodology of barbarism to which we are now committed.

If as a nation we have become mad it is time for the world to take note of that madness. If we are still humane and sane, then it is time for the powerful voice of sanity to be heard once more in our land.

tion, of which the following are a sample:

In September 1947, Vice-Prime Minister Constantine Tsaldaris agreed to the dissolution of the government and the creation of a new ruling coalition. In doing so, said the *New York Times*, Tsaldaris had "surrendered to the desires of Dwight P. Griswold ... of [US] Ambassador MacVeagh, and also of the King".²³ Before Tsaldaris addressed the Greek legislature on the matter, MacVeagh stepped in to make a change to the speech.²⁴

Over the next several years, each of the frequent changes of prime minister came about only after considerable American input, if not outright demand.²⁵ One example of the latter occurred in 1950 when then American Ambassador Henry Grady sent a letter to Prime Minister Venizelos threatening to cut off US aid if he failed to carry out a government reorganization. Venizelos was compelled to step down.²⁶ The American influence was felt in regard to other high positions in Greek society as well. Andreas Papandreu, later to become prime minister himself, has written of this period that "Cabinet members and army generals, political party leaders and members of the Establishment, all made open references to American wishes or views in order to justify or to account for their own actions or positions."²⁷

Before undertaking a new crackdown on dissidents in July 1947, Greek authorities first approached Ambassador Macveagh. The ambassador informed them that the US government would have no objection to "preventive measures if they were considered necessary". Reassured, the Greeks went ahead and rounded up 4,000 people in one week.²⁸

An example of what could land a Greek citizen in prison is the case of the EAM member who received an 18-month sentence for printing remarks deemed insulting to Dwight Griswold. He had referred to the American as "the official representative of a foreign country".²⁹

"In the economic sphere," Andreas Papandreu noted, the United States "exercised almost dictatorial control during the early fifties requiring that the signature of the chief of the U.S. Economic Mission appear alongside that of the Greek Minister of Co-ordination on any important documents."³⁰

Earlier, American management of the economy may have been even tighter. A memorandum from Athens dated 17 November 1947, from the American Mission to Aid Greece to the State Department in Washington, read in part: "we have established practical control ... over national budget, taxation, currency issuance, price and wage policies, and state economic planning, as well as over imports and exports, the issuance of foreign exchange and the direction of military reconstruction and relief expenditures."³¹

There was, moreover, the creation of a new internal security agency, named and modeled after the CIA (KYP in Greek). Before long, KYP was carrying out all the endearing practices of secret police everywhere, including systematic torture.

By the early 1950s, Greece had been molded into a supremely reliable ally-client of the United States. It was staunchly anti-communist and well integrated into the NATO system. It sent troops to Korea to support the United States' pretence that it was not simply an American war.

It is safe to say that had the left come to power, Greece would have been much more independent of the United States. Greece would likely have been independent as well of the Soviet Union, to whom the Greek left owed nothing. Like Yugoslavia, which is also free of a common border with the USSR, Greece would have been friendly towards the Russians, but independent.

novel idea that Greece was a sovereign nation, the United States and its Greek cohorts, as we shall see, quickly and effectively stamped out the heresy.

4. The Philippines 1940s and 1950s America's oldest colony

I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed (to) Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them [the Philippine Islands] back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.

—William McKinley, President of the United States, 1899

William McKinley's idea of doing the very best by the Filipinos was to employ the United States Army to kill them in the tens of thousands, burn down their villages, subject them to torture, and lay the foundation for an economic exploitation which was proudly referred to at the time as "imperialism" by leading American statesmen and newspapers.

After the Spanish had been driven out of the Philippines in 1898 by a combined action of the United States and the Filipinos, Spain agreed to "cede" (that is, sell) the islands to the United States for \$20 million. But the Filipinos, who had already proclaimed their own independent republic, did not take kindly to being treated like a plot of uninhabited real estate. Accordingly, an American force numbering at least 50,000 proceeded to instill in the population a proper appreciation of their status.

Thus did America's longest-lasting and most conspicuous colony ever come into being. Nearly half a century later, the US Army again landed in the Philippines to find a nationalist movement fighting against a common enemy, this time the Japanese. While combating the Japanese during 1945, the American military took many measures aimed at quashing this resistance army, the Huks (a shortening of Hukbalahap—"People's Army Against Japan" in Tagalog). American forces disarmed many Huk units, removed the local governments which the Huks had established, and arrested and imprisoned many of their high-ranking members as well as leaders of the Philippine Communist Party. Guerrilla forces, primarily organized and led by American officers and composed of US and Filipino soldiers of the so-called US Army Forces in the Far East, undertook police-type actions which resulted in a virtual reign of terror against the Huks and suspected sympathizers; disparaging rumors were spread about the Huks to erode their support amongst the peasants; and the Japanese were allowed to assault Huk forces unmolested.

This, while the Huks were engaged in a major effort against the Japanese invaders and Filipino collaborators and frequently came to the aid of American soldiers.²

In much of this anti-Huk campaign, the United States made use of Filipinos who were collaborating with the Japanese, such as landlords, large estate owners, many police constables, and other officials. In the post-war period, the US restored to power and position many of those tainted with collaboration, much to the distaste of other Filipinos.³

The Huk guerrilla forces had been organized in 1942, largely at the initiative of the Communist Party, in response to the Japanese occupation of the islands. Amongst American policy makers, there were those who came to the routine conclusion that the Huks were thus no more than a tool of the International Communist Conspiracy, to be opposed as all such groups were to be opposed. Others in Washington and Manila, whose reflexes were less knee-jerk, but more cynical, recognized that the Huk movement, if its growing influence was not checked, would lead to sweeping reforms of Philippine society.

The centerpiece of the Huk political program was land reform, a crying need in this largely agricultural society. (On occasion, US officials would pay lip-service to the concept, but during 50 years of American occupation, nothing of the sort had been carried out.) The other side of the Huk coin was industrialization, which the United States had long thwarted in order to provide American industries with a veritable playground in the Philippines. From the Huks' point of view, such changes were but prologue to raising the islanders from their state of backwardness, from illiteracy, grinding poverty, and the diseases of poverty like tuberculosis and beri-beri. "The Communist Hukbalahap rebellion," reported the *New York Times*, "is generally regarded as an outgrowth of the misery and discontent among the peasants of Central Luzon [the main island]."⁴

A study prepared years later for the US Army echoed this sentiment, stating that the Huks "main impetus was peasant grievances, not Leninist designs."⁵ Nevertheless, the Huk movement was unmistakably a threat to the neo-colonial condition of the Philippines, the American sphere of influence, and those Philippine interests which benefited from the status quo.

By the end of 1945, four months after the close of World War II, the United States was training and equipping a force of 50,000 Filipino soldiers for the Cold War.⁶ In testimony before a congressional committee, Major General William Arnold of the US Army candidly stated that this program was "essential for the maintenance of internal order, not for external difficulties at all."⁷ None of the congressmen present publicly expressed any reservation about the international propriety of such a foreign policy.

At the same time, American soldiers were kept on in the Philippines, and in at least one infantry division combat training was re-established. This led to vociferous protests and demonstrations by the GIs who wanted only to go home. The inauguration of combat trainings by the *New York Times* disclosed, was "interpreted by soldiers and certain Filipino newspapers as the preparation for the repression of possible uprisings in the Philippines by disgruntled farm tenant groups." The story added that the soldiers had a lot to say "on the subject of American armed intervention in China and the Netherlands Indies [Indonesia], which was occurring at the same time."⁸

To what extent American military personnel participated directly in the suppression of dissident groups in the Philippines after the war is not known.

The Huks, though not trusting Philippine and US authorities enough to voluntarily surrender their arms, did test the good faith of the government by taking part in the April 1946 national elections as part of a "Democratic Alliance" of liberal and socialist peasant political groups. (Philippine independence was scheduled for three months later—the Fourth of July to be exact.) As matters turned out, the commander-in-chief of the Huks, Luis Taruc, and several other Alliance members and reform-minded candidates who won election to

under the transparent fiction that coercion had been used to influence voters. No investigation or review of the cases had even been carried out by the appropriate body, the Electoral Tribunal.⁹ (Two years later, Taruc was temporarily allowed to take his seat when he came to Manila to discuss a ceasefire with the government.)

The purpose of denying these candidates their seats was equally transparent: the government was thus able to push through Congress the controversial Philippine-US Trade Act—passed by two votes more than required in the House, and by nothing to spare in the Senate—which yielded to the United States bountiful privileges and concessions in the Philippine economy, including "equal rights ... in the development of the nation's natural resources and the operation of its public utilities."¹⁰ This "parity" provision was eventually extended to every sector of the Philippine economy.¹¹

The debasement of the electoral process was followed by a wave of heavy brutality against the peasants carried out by the military, the police, and landlord goon squads. According to Luis Taruc, in the months following the election, peasant villages were destroyed, more than 500 peasants and their leaders killed, and about three times that number jailed, tortured, maimed or missing. The Huks and others felt they had little alternative but to take up arms once again.¹²

Independence was not likely to change much of significance. American historian George E. Taylor, of impeccable establishment credentials, in a book which bears the indication of CIA sponsorship, was yet moved to state that independence "was marked by lavish expressions of mutual good will, by partly fulfilled promises, and by a restoration of the old relationship in almost everything except in name. ... Many demands were made of the Filipinos for the commercial advantage of the United States, but none for the social and political advantage of the Philippines."¹³

The American military was meanwhile assuring a home for itself in the Philippines. A 1947 agreement provided sites for 23 US military bases in the country. The agreement was to last for 99 years. It stipulated that American servicemen who committed crimes outside the bases while on duty could be tried only by American military tribunals inside the bases.

By the terms of a companion military assistance pact, the Philippine government was prohibited from purchasing so much as a bullet from any arms source other than the US, except with American approval. Such a state of affairs, necessarily involving training, maintenance and spare parts, made the Philippine military extremely dependent upon their American counterparts. Further, no foreigners other than Americans were permitted to perform any function for or with the Philippine armed forces without the approval of the United States.¹⁴

By early 1950, the United States had provided the Philippines with over \$200 million of military equipment and supplies, a remarkable sum for that time, and was in addition to the construction of various military facilities.¹⁵ The Joint US Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) reorganized the Philippine intelligence capability and defense department, put its chosen man, Ramon Magsaysay, at its head, and formed the Philippine army into battalion combat teams trained for counter-insurgency warfare.¹⁶ The Philippines was to be a laboratory experiment for this unconventional type of combat. The methods and the terminology, such as "search-and-destroy" and "pacification", were later to become infamous in Vietnam.

By September, when Lt. Col. Edward G. Lansdale arrived in the Philippines, the civil war had all the markings of a long, drawn-out affair, with victory not in sight for either side. Ostensibly, Lansdale was just another American military adviser attached to JUSMAG,

but his activity in was the thing of... counter-insurgency.

In his later reminiscences about this period in his life, Lansdale relates his surprise at hearing from informed Filipino civilian friends about how repressive the Quirino government was, that its atrocities matched those of (or attributed to) the Huks, that the government was "rotten with corruption" (down to the policeman in the street, Lansdale observed on his own), that Quirino himself had been elected the previous year through "extensive fraud", and that "the Huks were right", they were the "wave of the future", and violence was the only way for the people to get a government of their own. (The police, wrote a correspondent for the *Saturday Evening Post*, were "bands of uninformed thieves and rapists, more feared than bandits ... the army was little better.")¹⁷

Lansdale was undeterred. He had come to do a job. Accordingly, he told himself that if the Huks took over there would only be another form of injustice by another privileged few, backed by even crueller force. By the next chapter, he had convinced himself that he was working on the side of those committed to "defend human liberty in the Philippines".¹⁸

As a former advertising man, Lansdale was no stranger to the use of market research, motivation techniques, media, and deception. In CIA parlance, such arts fall under the heading of "psychological warfare". To this end, Lansdale fashioned a unit called the Civil Affairs Office. Its activities were based on the premise—one both new and suspect to most American military officers—that a popular guerrilla army cannot be defeated by force alone.

Lansdale's team conducted a careful study of the superstitions of the Filipino peasants living in Huk areas: their lore, taboos, and myths were examined for clues to the appropriate appeals that could wean them from supporting the insurgents. In one operation, Lansdale's men flew over these areas in a small plane hidden by a cloud cover and broadcast in Tagalog mysterious curses on any villagers who dared to give the Huks food or shelter. The tactic reportedly succeeded into starving some Huk units into surrender.¹⁹

Another Lansdale-initiated "psywar" operation played on the superstitious dread in the Philippine countryside of the *aswang*, a mythical vampire. A psywar squad entered a town and planted rumors that an *aswang* lived in the neighboring hill where the Huks were based, a location from which government forces were anxious to have them out. Two nights later, after giving the rumors time to circulate among Huk sympathizers in the town and make their way up the hill, the psywar squad laid an ambush for the rebels along a trail used by them. When a Huk patrol passed, the ambushers silently snatched the last man, punctured his neck vampire-fashion with two holes, held his body by the heels until the blood drained out, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks, as superstitious as any other Filipinos, discovered the bloodless comrade, they fled from the region.²⁰

Lansdale regularly held "coffee klatsches" with Filipino officials and military personnel in which new ideas were freely tossed back and forth, à la a Madison Avenue brain session. Out of this came the Economic Development Corps to lure Huks with a program of resettlement on their own patch of farm land, with tools, seeds, cash loans, etc. It was an undertaking wholly inadequate to the land problem, and the number that responded was very modest, but like other psywar techniques, a principal goal was to steal from the enemy his most persuasive arguments.²¹ Among other tactics introduced or refined by Lansdale were: production of films and radio broadcasts to explain and justify government actions; infiltration of government agents into the ranks of the Huks to provide information and sow dissent; attempts to modify the behavior of government soldiers so as to curtail their abuse

towards the peasants, with punishment meted out to violators), but on other occasions, government soldiers were allowed to run amok in villages—disguised as Huks.²²

This last, revealed L. Fletcher Prouty, was a technique "developed to a high art in the Philippines" in which soldiers were "set upon the unwary village in the grand manner of a Cecil B. De Mille production".²³ Prouty, a retired US Air Force colonel, was for nine years the focal point officer for contacts between the Pentagon and the CIA. He has described another type of scenario by which the Huks were tarred with the terrorist brush, serving to obscure the political nature of their movement and mar their credibility:

In the Philippines, lumbering interests and major sugar interests have forced tens of thousands of simple, backward villagers to leave areas where they have lived for centuries. When these poor people flee to other areas, it should be quite obvious that they in turn then infringe upon the territorial rights of other villagers or landowners. This creates violent rioting or at least sporadic outbreaks of banditry, that last lowly recourse of dying and terrorized people. Then when the distant government learns of the banditry and rioting, it must offer some safe explanation. The last thing that regional government would want to do would be to say that the huge lumbering or paper interests had driven the people out of their ancestral homeland. In the Philippines it is customary for the local/regional government to get a 10 percent rake-off on all such enterprise and for national politicians to get another 10 percent. So the safe explanation becomes "Communist-inspired subversive insurgency." The word for this in the Philippines is Huk.²⁴

The most insidious part of the CIA operation in the Philippines was the fundamental manipulation of the nation's political life, featuring stage-managed elections and disinformation campaigns. The high-point of this effort was the election to the presidency, in 1953, of Ramon Magsaysay, the cooperative former defense department head.

Lansdale, it was said, "invented" Magsaysay.²⁵ His CIA front organizations ran the Filipino's campaign with all the license, impunity, and money that one would expect from the Democratic or Republican National Committees operating in the US, or perhaps more to the point, Mayor Daley operating in Chicago. One of these front organizations, the National Movement for Free Elections, was praised in a *New York Times* editorial for its contribution to making the Philippines "the showcase of democracy in Asia".²⁶

The CIA, on one occasion, drugged the drinks of Magsaysay's opponent, incumbent president Elpidio Quirino, before he gave a speech so that he would appear incoherent. On another occasion, when Magsaysay insisted on delivering a speech which had been written by a Filipino instead of one written by Lansdale's team, Lansdale reacted in a rage, finally hitting the presidential candidate so hard that he knocked him out.²⁷

Magsaysay won the election, but not before the CIA had smuggled in guns for use in a coup in case their man lost.²⁸

Once Magsaysay was in office, the CIA wrote his speeches, carefully guided his foreign policy, and used its press "assets" (paid editors and journalists) to provide him with a constant claque of support for his domestic programs and his involvement in the US-directed anti-communist crusade in southeast Asia, as well as to attack anti-US newspaper columnists. So beholden was Magsaysay to the United States, disclosed presidential assistant Sherman Adams, that he "sent word to Eisenhower that he would do anything the United States wanted him to do—even though his own foreign minister took the opposite view".²⁹

One inventive practice of the CIA on behalf of Magsaysay was later picked up by Agency stations in a number of other Third World countries. This particular piece of chicanery consisted of selecting articles written by CIA writer-agents for the provincial press and republishing them in a monthly *Digest of the Provincial Press*. The *Digest* was then

S. Korea 1945-1953

Was it all that it appeared to be?

To die for an idea; it is unquestionably noble. But how much nobler it would be if men died for ideas that were true.

—H.L. Mencken, 1919

How is it that the Korean War escaped the protests which surrounded the war in Vietnam? Everything we've come to love and cherish about Vietnam had its forerunner in Korea: the support of a corrupt tyranny, the atrocities, the napalm, the mass slaughter of civilians, the cities and villages laid to waste, the calculated management of the news, the sabotaging of peace talks. But the American people were convinced that the war in Korea was an unambiguous case of one country invading another without provocation. A case of the bad guys attacking the good guys who were being saved by the even better guys; none of the historical, political and moral uncertainty that was the dilemma of Vietnam. The Korean War was seen to have begun in a specific manner: North Korea attacked South Korea in the early morning of 25 June 1950; while Vietnam ... no one seemed to know how it all began, or when, or why.

And there was little in the way of accusations about American "imperialism" in Korea. The United States, after all, was fighting as part of a United Nations Army. What was there to protest about? And of course there was McCarthyism, so prevalent in the early 1950s, which further served to inhibit protest.

There were, in fact, rather different interpretations to be made of what the war was all about, how it was being conducted, even how it began, but these quickly succumbed to the heat of war fever.

Shortly after the close of the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the United States occupied Korea in order to expel the defeated Japanese. A demarcation line between the Russian and American forces was set up along the 38th Parallel. The creation of this line in no way had the explicit or implicit intention of establishing two separate countries, but the cold war was soon to intrude.

Both powers insisted that unification of North and South was the principal and desired goal. However, they also desired to see this carried out in their own ideological image, and settled thereby into a routine of proposal and counter-proposal, accusation and counter-accusation, generously intermixed with deviousness, and produced nothing in the way of an agreement during the ensuing years. Although both Moscow and Washington and their hand-picked Korean leaders were not always displeased about the division of the country (on the grounds that half a country was better than none), officials and citizens of both sides continued to genuinely call for unification on a regular basis.

That Korea was still one country, with unification still the goal, at the time the war began, was underscored by the chief US delegate to the UN, Warren Austin, in a statement he made shortly afterwards:

The artificial barrier which has divided North and South Korea has no basis for existence either

Korea [South Korea] recognize such a line. Now the North Koreans, by armed attack upon the Republic of Korea, have denied the reality of any such line.¹

The two sides had been clashing across the Parallel for several years. What happened on that fateful day in June could thus be regarded as no more than the escalation of an ongoing civil war. The North Korean Government has claimed that in 1949 alone, the South Korean army or police perpetrated 2,617 armed incursions into the North to carry out murder, kidnapping, pillage and arson for the purpose of causing social disorder and unrest, as well as to increase the combat capabilities of the invaders. At times, stated the Pyongyang government, thousands of soldiers were involved in a single battle with many casualties resulting.²

A State Department official, Ambassador-at-large Philip C. Jessup, speaking in April 1950, put it this way:

There is constant fighting between the South Korean Army and bands that infiltrate the country from the North. There are very real battles, involving perhaps one or two thousand men. When you go to this boundary, as I did ... you see troop movements, fortifications, and prisoners of war.³

Seen in this context, the question of who fired the first shot on 25 June 1950 takes on a much reduced air of significance. As it is, the North Korean version of events is that their invasion was provoked by two days of bombardment by the South Koreans, on the 23rd and 24th, followed by a surprise South Korean attack across the border on the 25th against the western town of Haeju and other places. Announcement of the Southern attack was broadcast over the North's radio later in the morning of the 25th.

Contrary to general belief at the time, no United Nations group—neither the UN Military Observer Group in the field nor the UN Commission on Korea in Seoul—witnessed, or claimed to have witnessed, the outbreak of hostilities. The Observer Group's field trip along the Parallel ended on 23 June. Its statements about what took place afterward are either speculation or based on information received from the South Korean government or the US military.

Moreover, early in the morning of the 26th, the South Korean Office of Public Information announced that Southern forces had indeed captured the North Korean town of Haeju. The announcement stated that the attack had occurred that same morning, but an American military status report as of nightfall on the 25th notes that all Southern territory west of the Imjin River had been lost to a depth of at least three miles inside the border except in the area of the Haeju "counter attack".

In either case, such a military victory on the part of the Southern forces is extremely difficult to reconcile with the official Western account, maintained to this day, that has the North Korean army sweeping south in a devastating surprise attack, taking control of everything that lay before it, and forcing South Korean troops to evacuate further south.

Subsequently, the South Korean government denied that its capture of Haeju had actually taken place, blaming the original announcement, apparently, on an exaggerating military officer. One historian has ascribed the allegedly incorrect announcement to "an error due to poor communications, plus an attempt to stiffen South Korean resistance by claiming a victory". Whatever actually lay behind the announcement, it is evident that very little reliance, if any, can be placed upon statements made by the South Korean government concerning the start of the war.⁴

mention of the South Korean government's announcement, and which appear to be independent confirmations of the event. The London *Daily Herald*, in its issue of 26 June, stated that "American military observers said the Southern forces had made a successful relieving counter-attack near the west coast, penetrated five miles into Northern territory and seized the town of Haeju." This was echoed in *The Guardian* of London the same day: "American officials confirmed that the Southern troops had captured Haeju."

Similarly, the *New York Herald Tribune* reported, also on the 26th, that "South Korean troops drove across the 38th Parallel, which forms the frontier, to capture the manufacturing town of Haeju, just north of the line. The Republican troops captured quantities of equipment." None of the accounts specified just when the attack took place.

On the 25th, American writer John Gunther was in Japan preparing his biography of General Douglas MacArthur. As he recounts in the book, he was playing tourist in the town of Nikko with "two important members" of the American occupation, when "one of these was called unexpectedly to the telephone. He came back and whispered, 'A big story has just broken. The South Koreans have attacked North Korea!'" That evening, Gunther and his party returned to Tokyo where "Several officers met us at the station to tell us correctly and with much amplification what had happened ... there was no doubt whatever that North Korea was the aggressor."

And the telephone call? Gunther explains: "The message may have been garbled in transmission. Nobody knew anything much at headquarters the first few hours, and probably people were taken in by the blatant, corrosive lies of the North Korean radio."⁵

There is something a little incongruous about the picture of American military and diplomatic personnel, practicing anti-communists each one, being taken in on so important a matter by communist lies—blatant ones no less.

The head of South Korea, Syngman Rhee, had often expressed his desire and readiness to compel the unification of Korea by force. On 26 June the *New York Times* reminded its readers that "on a number of occasions, Dr. Rhee has indicated that his army would have taken the offensive if Washington had given the consent." The newspaper noted also that before the war began: "The warlike talk strangely [had] almost all come from South Korean leaders."

Rhee may have had good reason for provoking a full-scale war apart from the issue of unification. On 30 May, elections for the National Assembly were held in the South in which Rhee's party suffered a heavy setback and lost control of the assembly. Like countless statesmen before and after him, Rhee may have decided to play the war card to rally support for his shaky rule. A labor adviser attached to the American aid mission in South Korea, Stanley Earl, resigned in July, expressing the opinion that the South Korean government was "an oppressive regime" which "did very little to help the people" and that "an internal South Korean rebellion against the Rhee Government would have occurred if the forces of North Korea had not invaded".⁶

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, in his reminiscences, makes it plain that the North Koreans had contemplated an invasion of the South for some time and he reports their actual invasion without any mention of provocation on that day. This would seem to put that particular question to rest. However, Khrushchev's chapter on Korea is a wholly superficial account. It is not a serious work of history, nor was it intended to be. As he himself states:

... MEMOIRS OF THE ANGLICAN WAR AND UNAVOIDABLY SKETCHY. (He did not become Soviet leader until after the war was over.) His chapter contains no discussion of any of the previous fighting across the border, nothing of Rhee's belligerent statements, nothing at all even of the Soviet Union's crucial absence from the UN which, as we shall see, allowed the so-called United Nations Army to be formed and intervene in the conflict. Moreover, his reminiscences, as published, are an edited and condensed version of the tapes he made. A study based on a comparison between the Russian-language transcription of the tapes and the published English-language book reveals that some of Khrushchev's memories about Korea were indeed sketchy, but that the book fails to bring this out. For example, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung met with Stalin to discuss Kim's desire "to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet". The book then states unambiguously: "Kim went home and then returned to Moscow when he had worked everything out." In the transcript, however, Khrushchev says: "In my opinion, either the date of his return was set, or he was to inform us as soon as he finished preparing all of his ideas. Then, I don't remember in which month or year, Kim Il-sung came and related his plan to Stalin" (emphasis added).⁷

On 26 June, the United States presented a resolution before the UN Security Council condemning North Korea for its "unprovoked aggression". The resolution was approved, although there were arguments that "this was a fight between Koreans" and should be treated as a civil war, and a suggestion from the Egyptian delegate that the word "unprovoked" should be dropped in view of the longstanding hostilities between the two Koreas.⁸ Yugoslavia insisted as well that "there seemed to be lack of precise information that could enable the Council to pin responsibility", and proposed that North Korea be invited to present its side of the story.⁹ This was not done. (Three months later, the Soviet foreign minister put forward a motion that the UN hear representatives from both sides. This, too, was voted down, by a margin of 46 to 6, because of North Korea's "aggression", and it was decided to extend an invitation to South Korea alone.)¹⁰

On the 27th, the Security Council recommended that members of the United Nations furnish assistance to South Korea "as may be necessary to repel the armed attack". President Truman had already ordered the US Navy and Air Force into combat by this time, thus presenting the Council with a *fait accompli*,¹¹ a tactic the US was to repeat several times before the war came to an end. The Council made its historic decision with the barest of information available to it, and all of it derived from and selected by only one side of the conflict. This was, as journalist I.F. Stone put it, "neither honorable nor wise".

It should be kept in mind that in 1950 the United Nations was in no way a neutral or balanced organization. The great majority of members were nations very dependent upon the United States for economic recovery or development. There was no Third World bloc which years later pursued a UN policy much more independent of the United States. And only four countries of the Soviet bloc were members at the time, none on the Security Council.¹²

Neither could UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, of Norway, be regarded as neutral in the midst of cold war controversy. In his memoirs, he makes it remarkably clear that he was no objective outsider. His chapters on the Korean War are pure knee-reflex anti-communism and reveal his maneuvering on the issue.¹³ In 1949, it was later disclosed, Lie had entered into a secret agreement with the US State Department to dismiss from UN employment individuals whom Washington regarded as having questionable political leanings.¹⁴

The adoption of these resolutions by the Security Council was possible only because the Soviet Union was absent from the proceedings due to its boycott of the United Nations

over the refusal to seat Communist China in place of Taiwan. If the Russians had been present, they undoubtedly would have vetoed the resolutions. Their absence has always posed an awkward problem for those who insist that the Russians were behind the North Korean invasion. One of the most common explanations offered is that the Russians, as a CIA memorandum stated, wanted "to challenge the US specifically and test the firmness of US resistance to Communist expansion."¹⁵ Inasmuch as, during the existence of the Soviet Union, the same analysis was put forth by American political pundits for virtually every encounter between the United States and leftists anywhere in the world, before and after Korea, it would appear that the test was going on for an inordinately long period and one can only wonder why the Soviets never came to a conclusion.

"The finishing touch," wrote I.F. Stone, "was to make the 'United Nations' forces subject to MacArthur without making MacArthur subject to the United Nations. This came on July 7 in a resolution introduced jointly by Britain and France. This is commonly supposed to have established a United Nations Command. Actually it did nothing of the sort."¹⁶ The resolution recommended "that all members providing military forces and other assistance ... make such forces and other assistance available to a *unified command under the United States*" (emphasis added). It further requested "the United States to designate the commander of such forces."¹⁷ This would be the redoubtable MacArthur.

It was to be an American show. Military personnel of some 16 other countries took part in one way or another but, with the exception of the South Koreans, there could be little doubt as to their true status or function. Eisenhower later wrote in his memoirs that when he was considering US military intervention in Vietnam in 1954, also as part of a "coalition", he recognized that the burden of the operation would fall on the United States, but "the token forces supplied by these other nations, *as in Korea*, would lend real moral standing to a venture that otherwise could be made to appear as a brutal example of imperialism" (emphasis added).¹⁸

The war, and a brutal one it was indeed, was fought ostensibly in defense of the Syngman Rhee regime. Outside of books published by various South Korean governments, it is rather difficult to find a kind word for the man the United States brought back to Korea in 1945 after decades of exile in America during the Japanese occupation of his country. Flown into Korea in one of MacArthur's airplanes, Rhee was soon maneuvered into a position of prominence and authority by the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). In the process, American officials had to suppress a provisional government, the Korean People's Republic, that was the outgrowth of a number of regional governing committees set up by prominent Koreans and which had already begun to carry out administrative tasks, such as food distribution and keeping order. The KPR's offer of its services to the arriving Americans was dismissed out of hand.

Despite its communist-sounding name, the KPR included a number of conservatives; indeed, Rhee himself had been given the leading position of chairman. Rhee and the other conservatives, most of whom were still abroad when chosen, perhaps did not welcome the honor because the KPR, on balance, was probably too leftist for their tastes, as it was for the higher echelons of the USAMGIK. But after 35 years under the Japanese, any group or government set up to undo the effects of colonialism had to have a revolutionary tinge to it. It was the conservatives in Korea who had collaborated with the Japanese; leftists and other nationalists who had struggled against them; the make-up of the KPR necessarily reflected this, and it was reportedly more popular than any other political grouping.¹⁹

whatever the political leanings or intentions of the KPR, by denying it any "authority, status or form",²⁰ the USAMGIK was regulating Korean political life as if the country were a defeated enemy and not a friendly state liberated from a common foe and with a right to independence and self-determination.

The significance of shunting aside the KPR went beyond this. John Gunther, hardly a radical, summed up the situation this way: "So the first—and best—chance for building a united Korea was tossed away."²¹ And Alfred Crofts, a member of the American military government at the time, has written that "A potential unifying agency became thus one of the fifty-four splinter groups in South Korean political life."²²

Syngman Rhee would be Washington's man: eminently pro-American, strongly anti-Communist, sufficiently controllable. His regime was one in which landlords, collaborators, the wealthy, and other conservative elements readily found a home. Crofts has pointed out that "Before the American landings, a political Right, associated in popular thought with colonial rule, could not exist; but shortly afterward we were to foster at least three conservative factions."²³

Committed to establishing free enterprise, the USAMGIK sold off vast amounts of confiscated Japanese property, homes, businesses, industrial raw materials and other valuables. Those who could most afford to purchase these assets were collaborators who had grown rich under the Japanese, and other profiteers. "With half the wealth of the nation 'up for grabs', demoralization was rapid."²⁴

While the Russians did a thorough house-cleaning of Koreans in the North who had collaborated with the Japanese, the American military government in the South allowed many collaborators, and at first even the Japanese themselves, to retain positions of administration and authority, much to the consternation of those Koreans who had fought against the Japanese occupation of their country. To some extent, these people may have been retained in office because they were the most experienced at keeping the country running. Another reason has been suggested: to prevent the Korean People's Republic from assuming a measure of power.²⁵

And while the North soon implemented widespread and effective land reform and at least formal equality for women, the Rhee regime remained hostile to these ideals. Two years later, it enacted a land reform measure, but this applied only to former Japanese property. A 1949 law to cover other holdings was not enforced at all, and the abuse of land tenants continued in both old and new forms.²⁶

Public resentment against the US/Rhee administration was aroused because of these policies as well as because of the suppression of the KPR and some very questionable elections. So reluctant was Rhee to allow an honest election, that by early 1950 he had become enough of an embarrassment to the United States for Washington officials to threaten to cut off aid if he failed to do so and also improve the state of civil liberties. Apparently because of this pressure, the elections held on May 30 were fair enough to allow "moderate" elements to participate, and, as mentioned earlier, the Rhee government was decisively repudiated.²⁷

The resentment was manifested in the form of frequent rebellions, including some guerrilla warfare in the hills, from 1946 to the beginning of the war, and even during the war. The rebellions were dismissed by the government as "communist-inspired" and repressed accordingly, but, as John Gunther observed, "It can be safely said that in the eyes of Hodge [the commander of US forces in Korea] and Rhee, particularly at the beginning, almost any Korean not an extreme rightist was a communist and potential traitor."²⁸

General Hodge evidently permitted US troops to take part in the repression. Mark

Gayn, a correspondent in Korea for the *Chicago Sun*, wrote that American soldiers "fired on crowds, conducted mass arrests, combed the hills for suspects, and organized posses of Korean rightists, constabulary and police for mass raids."²⁹ Gayn related that one of Hodge's political advisers assured him (Gayn) that Rhee was not a fascist: "He is two centuries before fascism—a pure Bourbon."³⁰

Describing the government's anti-guerrilla campaign in 1948, pro-Western political scientist John Kie-Chiang Oh of Marquette University has written: "In these campaigns, the civil liberties of countless persons were often ignored. Frequently, hapless villagers, suspected of aiding the guerrillas, were summarily executed."³¹

A year later, when a committee of the National Assembly launched an investigation of collaborators, Rhee had his police raid the Assembly: 22 people were arrested, of whom 16 were later found to have suffered either broken ribs, skull injuries or broken eardrums.³²

At the time of the outbreak of war in June 1950, there were an estimated 14,000 political prisoners in South Korean jails.³³

Even during the height of the war, in February 1951, reported Professor Oh, there was the "Koch'ang Incident", again involving suspicion of aiding guerrillas, "in which about six hundred men and women, young and old, were herded into a narrow valley and mowed down with machine guns by a South Korean army unit."³⁴

Throughout the war, a continuous barrage of accusations was leveled by each side at the other, charging the enemy with engaging in all manner of barbarity and atrocity, against troops, prisoners of war, and civilians alike, in every part of the country (each side occupied the other's territory at times), trying to outdo each other in a verbal war of superlatives almost as heated as the combat. In the United States this produced a body of popular myths, not unlike those emerging from other wars which are widely supported at home. (By contrast, during the Vietnam War the inclination of myths to flourish was regularly countered by numerous educated protesters who carefully researched the origins of the war, monitored its conduct, and publicized studies sharply at variance with the official version(s), eventually influencing the mass media to do the same.)

There was, for example, the consensus that the brutality of the war in Korea must be laid overwhelmingly on the doorstep of the North Koreans. The Koch'ang Incident mentioned above may be relevant to providing some counterbalance to this belief. Referring to the incident, the British Korea scholar Jon Halliday observed:

This account not only serves to indicate the level of political violence employed by the UN side, but also confers inherent plausibility on DPRK [North Korea] and Southern opposition accusations of atrocities and mass executions by the UN forces and Rhee officials during the occupation of the DPRK in late 1950. After all, if civilians could be mowed down in the South on suspicion of aiding (not even *being*) guerrillas—what about the North, where millions could reasonably be assumed to be Communists, or political militants?³⁵(Emphasis in original.)

Oh's account is but one of a number of reports of slaughter carried out by the South Koreans against their own people during the war. The *New York Times* reported a "wave of [South Korean] Government executions in Seoul" in December 1950.³⁶ René Curforth, a correspondent for the BBC in Korea, later wrote of "the shooting without trial of civilians, designated by the police as 'communist'. These executions were done, usually at dawn, on any patch of waste ground where you could dig a trench and line up a row of prisoners in front of it."³⁷ And Gregory Henderson, a US diplomat who served seven years in Korea in the 1940s and '50s, has stated that "probably over 100,000 were killed without any trial

whatsoever by the forces in the South during the war.³⁸ Following some of the massacres of civilians in the South, the Rhee government turned around and attributed them to Northern troops.

One way in which the United States contributed directly to the war's brutality was by introducing a weapon which, although used in the last stage of World War II, and in Greece, was new to almost all observers and participants in Korea. It was called napalm. Here is one description of its effect from the *New York Times*.

A napalm raid hit the village three or four days ago when the Chinese were holding up the advance, and nowhere in the village have they buried the dead because there is nobody left to do so. ... The inhabitants throughout the village and in the fields were caught and killed and kept the exact postures they had held when the napalm struck—a man about to get on his bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage, a housewife strangely unmarked, holding in her hand a page torn from a Sears-Roebuck catalogue crayoned at Mail Order No. 3,811,294 for a \$2.98 "bewitching bed jacket—coral". There must be almost two hundred dead in the tiny hamlet.³⁹

The United States may also have waged germ warfare against North Korea and China, as was discussed earlier in the chapter on China.

At the same time, the CIA reportedly was targeting a single individual for termination—North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. Washington sent a Cherokee Indian, code-named Buffalo, to Hans V. Toft, a CIA officer stationed in Japan, after Buffalo had agreed to serve as Kim Il Sung's assassin. Buffalo was to receive a considerable amount of money if his mission succeeded. It obviously did not, and nothing further has been revealed about the incident.⁴⁰

Another widely-held belief in the United States during the war was that American prisoners in North Korean camps were dying off like flies because of Communist neglect and cruelty. The flames of this very emotional issue were fanned by the tendency of US officials to exaggerate the numbers involved. During November 1951, for example—long before the end of the war—American military announcements put the count of POW deaths at between 5,000 and 8,000.⁴¹ However, an extensive study completed by the US Army two years after the war revealed that the POW death toll for the entire war was 2,730 (out of 7,190 held in camps; an unknown number of other prisoners never made it to the camps, being shot in the field because of the inconvenience of dealing with them in the midst of combat, a practice engaged in by both sides).

The study concluded that "there was evidence that the high death rate was not due primarily to Communist maltreatment ... it could be accounted for largely by the ignorance or callousness of the prisoners themselves."⁴² "Callousness" refers here to the soldiers' lack of morale and collective spirit. Although not mentioned in the study, the North Koreans, on several occasions, claimed that many American POWs also died in the camps as a result of the heavy US bombing.

The study of course could never begin to catch up with all the scare headlines to which the Western world had been treated for three years. Obscured as well was the fact that several times as many Communist prisoners had died in US/South Korean camps—halfway through the war the official figure stood at 6,600⁴³—though these camps did hold many more prisoners than those in the North.

The American public was also convinced, and probably still is, that the North Koreans and Chinese had "brainwashed" US soldiers. This story arose to explain the fact that as many as 30 percent of American POWs had collaborated with the enemy in one way or

another, and "one man in every seven, or more than thirteen per cent, was guilty of serious collaboration—writing disloyal tracts ... or agreeing to spy or organize for the Communists after the war."⁴⁴ Another reason the brainwashing theme was promoted by Washington was to increase the likelihood that statements made by returning prisoners which questioned the official version of the war would be discounted.

In the words of Yale psychiatrist Robert J. Lifton, brainwashing was popularly held to be an "all-powerful, irresistible, unfathomable, and magical method of achieving total control over the human mind."⁴⁵ Although the CIA experimented, beginning in the 1950s, to develop just such a magic, neither they nor the North Koreans or Chinese ever possessed it. The Agency began its "behavior-control" or "mind-control" experiments on human subjects (probably suspected double agents), using drugs and hypnosis, in Japan in July 1950, shortly after the beginning of the Korean War. In October, they apparently used North Korean prisoners of war as subjects.⁴⁶ In 1975, a US Navy psychologist, Lt. Com. Thomas Narut, revealed that his naval work included establishing how to induce servicemen who may not be naturally inclined to kill, to do so under certain conditions. He referred to these men using the words "hitmen" and "assassin". Narut added that convicted murderers as well had been released from military prisons to become assassins.⁴⁷

Brainwashing, said the Army study, "has become a catch phrase, used for so many things that it no longer has any precise meaning" and "a precise meaning is necessary in this case".⁴⁸

The prisoners, as far as Army psychiatrists have been able to discover, were not subjected to anything that could properly be called brainwashing. Indeed, the Communist treatment of prisoners, while it came nowhere near fulfilling the requirements of the Geneva Convention, rarely involved outright cruelty, being instead a highly novel blend of leniency and pressure ... The Communists rarely used physical torture ... and the Army has not found a single verifiable case in which they used it for the specific purpose of forcing a man to collaborate or to accept their convictions.⁴⁹

According to the study, however, some American airmen, of the 90 or so who were captured, were subjected to physical abuse in an attempt to extract confessions about germ warfare. This could reflect either a greater Communist resentment about the use of such a weapon, or a need to produce some kind of corroboration of a false or questionable claim.

American soldiers were instead subjected to political indoctrination by their jailers. Here is how the US Army saw it:

In the indoctrination lectures, the Communists frequently displayed global charts dotted with our military bases, the names of which were of course known to many of the captives. "See those bases?" the instructor would say, tapping them on the chart with his pointer. "They are American—full of war materiel. You know they are American. And you can see they are ringing Russia and China. Russia and China do not have one base outside their own territory. From this it's clear which side is the warmonger. Would America have these bases and spend millions to maintain them were it not preparing to war on Russia and China?" This argument seemed plausible to many of the prisoners. In general they had no idea that these bases showed not the United States' wish for war, but its wish for peace, that they had been established as part of a series of treaties aimed not at conquest, but at curbing Red aggression.⁵⁰

The Chinese Communists, of course, did not invent this practice. During the American Civil War, prisoners of both the South and the North received indoctrination about the respective merits of the two sides. And in the Second World War, "democratization courses" were held in US and British POW camps for Germans, and reformed Germans were granted privileges. Moreover, the US Army was proud to state that Communist prisoners in

American camps during the Korean War were taught "what democracy stands for".⁵¹

The predicted Chinese aggression manifested itself about four months after the war in Korea began. The Chinese entered the war after American planes had violated their air space on a number of occasions, had bombed and strafed Chinese territory several times (always "in error"), when hydro-electric plants on the Korean side of the border, vital to Chinese industry, stood in great danger, and US or South Korean forces had reached the Chinese border, the Yalu River, or come within a few miles of it in several places.

The question must be asked: How long would the United States refrain from entering a war being waged in Mexico by a Communist power from across the sea, which strafed and bombed Texas border towns, was mobilized along the Rio Grande, and was led by a general who threatened war against the United States itself?

American airpower in Korea was fearsome to behold. As would be the case in Vietnam, its use was celebrated in the wholesale dropping of napalm, the destruction of villages "suspected of aiding the enemy", bombing cities so as to leave no useful facilities standing, demolishing dams and dikes to cripple the irrigation system, wiping out rice crops ... and in those moving expressions like "scorched-earth policy", "saturation bombing", and "operation killer".⁵²

"You can kiss that group of villages good-bye," exclaimed Captain Everett L. Hundley of Kansas City, Kansas after a bombing raid.⁵³

"I would say that the entire, almost the entire Korean Peninsula is just a terrible mess," testified Major General Emmett O'Donnell before the Senate when the war was one year old. "Everything is destroyed. There is nothing standing worthy of the name."⁵⁴

And here, the words of the venerable British military guide, *Brassey's Annual*, in its 1951 yearbook:

It is no exaggeration to state that South Korea no longer exists as a country. Its towns have been destroyed, much of its means of livelihood eradicated, and its people reduced to a sullen mass dependent upon charity and exposed to subversive influences. When the war ends no gratitude can be expected from the South Koreans, but it is to be hoped that the lesson will have been learned that it is worse than useless to destroy to liberate. Certainly, western Europe would never accept such a "liberation".⁵⁵

The worst of the bombing was yet to come. That began in the summer of 1952 and was Washington's way of putting itself in a better bargaining position in the truce discussions with the Communists, which had been going on for a full year while the battles raged. The extended and bitter negotiations gave rise to another pervasive Western belief—that it was predominantly Communist intransigence, duplicity, and lack of peaceful intentions which frustrated the talks and prolonged the war.

This is a lengthy and entangled chapter of the Korean War story, but one does not have to probe too deeply to discover the unremarkable fact that the barriers were erected by the anti-Communist side as well. Syngman Rhee, for example, was so opposed to any outcome short of total victory that both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations drew up plans for overthrowing him,⁵⁶ which is not to suggest that the American negotiators were negotiating in the best of faith. The last thing they wanted to be accused of was having allowed the commies to make suckers of them. Thus it was that in November of 1951 we could read in the *New York Times*:

The unadorned way that an apparently increasing number of them [American soldiers in Korea] see the situation right now is that the Communists have made important concessions, while the United Nations Command, as they view it, continues to make more and more demands. ... The United Nations truce team has created the impression that it switches its stand whenever the Communists indicate that they might go along with it.⁵⁷

At one point during this same period, when the Communists proposed that a ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops from the combat line should take place while negotiations were going on, the United Nations Command reacted almost as if this were a belligerent and devious act. "Today's stand by the Communists," said the UNC announcement, "was virtually a renunciation of their previously stated position that hostilities should continue during armistice talks."⁵⁸

Once upon a time, the United States fought a great civil war in which the North attempted to reunite the divided country through military force. Did Korea or China or any other foreign power send in an army to slaughter Americans, charging Lincoln with aggression?

Why did the United States choose to wage full-scale war in Korea? Only a year earlier, in 1949, in the Arab-Israeli fighting in Palestine and in the India-Pakistan war over Kashmir, the United Nations, with American support, had intervened to mediate an armistice, not to send in an army to take sides and expand the fighting. And both these conflicts were less in the nature of a civil war than was the case in Korea. If the US/UN response had been the same in these earlier cases, Palestine and Kashmir might have wound up as the scorched-earth desert that was Korea's fate. What saved them, what kept the US armed forces out, was no more than the absence of a communist side to the conflict.

6. Albania 1949-1953

The proper English spy

"To simultaneously plan and sabotage this ill-fated venture must have been a severe test of his energy and ingenuity," wrote one of Kim Philby's biographers.¹ The venture was the clandestine attempt, begun in 1949, by the United States and Great Britain to overthrow the pro-Soviet regime of Enver Hoxha through guerrilla-fomented uprisings.

It ended in disaster, in part because the Russians had apparently been alerted by Philby, the proper Englishman who had gone to all the right schools and penetrated the highest ranks of British and American intelligence, though he had been a Soviet spy since the age of 21.

Philby had moved to Washington the year before to act as the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) liaison to the CIA. In that capacity he served as a co-director of the CIA-SIS task force engaged in planning the Albanian operation. The choice had fallen upon Albania because it was regarded as the most vulnerable of the socialist states, the smallest and the weakest, not sharing a border with the Soviet Union, isolated between a US-controlled Greece and a Yugoslavia that was a renegade from the Soviet bloc. Moreover, a recent agreement between the Soviet Union and Albania involved aid for Albania in return for a Soviet right to build a submarine base with direct access to the Mediterranean. By the rules

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For more than a year they had received American training in infantry weapons and explosives and "political instruction" in small groups at a secluded site in the countryside and at a US military installation.

The intelligence wing of the Technical Service, the state president revealed, had drawn up lists and card indexes of persons who were to be "put out of the way" when the Soviet tanks began to roll. These records, which contained detailed descriptions and intimate biographical information, were of some 200 leading Social Democrats (including Zinn himself), 15 Communists, and various others, all of whom were deemed "politically untrustworthy" and opponents of West German militarization. Apparently, support for peaceful co-existence and détente with the Soviet bloc was sufficient to qualify one for inclusion on the hit-list, for one man was killed at the training site, charged with being an "East-West bridge builder". It was this murder that led to the exposure of the entire operation.

The United States admitted its role in the creation and training of the guerrilla army, but denied any involvement in the "illegal, infernal, and political activities" of the organization. But Zinn reported that the Americans had learned of the plotting in May and had not actually dissolved the group until September, the same month that German Security Police arrested a number of the group's leaders. At some point, the American who directed the training courses, Sterling Garwood, had been "supplied with carbon copies of the card-index entries". It appears that at no time did US authorities communicate anything of this matter to the West German Government.

As the affair turned out, those who had been arrested were quickly released and the United States thwarted any further investigation in this the American Zone of occupied Germany. Commented Herr Zinn: "The only legal explanation for these releases can be that the people in Karlsruhe [the Federal Court] declared that they acted upon American direction."⁹

To add to the furor, the national leader of the Social Democrats accused the United States of financing an opposition group to infiltrate and undermine his party. Erich Ollenhauer, whose name had also appeared on the Technical Service's list, implied that American "chândestine" agencies were behind the plot despite the disapproval of high-ranking US officials.¹⁰

The revelations about the secret army and its hit-list resulted in a storm of ridicule and denunciation falling upon the United States from many quarters in West Germany. In particular, the delicious irony of the Americans working hand-in-glove with "ex"-Nazis did not escape the much-castigated German people.

This operation in Germany, it was revealed many years later, was part of a much wider network—called "Operation Gladio"—created by the CIA and other European intelligence services, with similar secret armies all over Western Europe. (See Western Europe chapter.)

9. Iran 1953

Making it safe for the King of Kings

"So this is how we get rid of that madman Mossadegh," announced John Foster Dulles to a group of top Washington policy makers one day in June 1953.¹ The Secretary of State held in his hand a plan of operation to overthrow the prime minister of Iran prepared by Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt of the CIA. There was scarcely any discussion amongst the high-powered men in the room, no probing questions, no legal or ethical issues raised.

"This was a grave decision to have made," Roosevelt later wrote. "It involved tremen-

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dous risk. Surely it deserved thorough examination, the closest consideration, somewhere at the very highest level. It had not received such thought at this meeting. In fact, I was morally certain that almost half of those present, if they had felt free or had the courage to speak, would have opposed the undertaking."²

Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodore and distant cousin of Franklin, was expressing surprise more than disappointment at glimpsing American foreign-policy-making undressed.

The original initiative to oust Mossadegh had come from the British, for the elderly Iranian leader had spearheaded the parliamentary movement to nationalize the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the sole oil company operating in Iran. In March 1951, the bill for nationalization was passed, and at the end of April Mossadegh was elected prime minister by a large majority of Parliament. On 1 May, nationalization went into effect. The Iranian people, Mossadegh declared, "were opening a hidden treasure upon which lies a dragon."³

As the prime minister had anticipated, the British did not take the nationalization gracefully, though it was supported unanimously by the Iranian parliament and by the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people for reasons of both economic justice and national pride. The Mossadegh government tried to do all the right things to placate the British: It offered to set aside 2.5 percent of the net profits of the oil operation as compensation; it guaranteed the safety and the jobs of the British employees; it was willing to sell its oil without disturbance to the tidy control system so dear to the hearts of the international oil giants. But the British would have none of it. What they wanted was their oil company back. And they wanted Mossadegh's head. A servant does not affront his lord with impunity.

A military show of force by the British navy was followed by a ruthless international economic blockade and boycott, and a freezing of Iranian assets which brought Iran's oil exports and foreign trade to a virtual standstill, plunged the already impoverished country into near destitution, and made payment of any compensation impossible. Nonetheless, and long after they had moved to oust Mossadegh, the British demanded compensation not only for the physical assets of the AIOC, but for the value of their enterprise in developing the oil fields; a request impossible to meet, and, in the eyes of Iranian nationalists, something which decades of huge British profits had paid for many times over.

The British attempt at economic strangulation of Iran could not have gotten off the ground without the active co-operation and support of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and American oil companies. At the same time, the Truman administration argued with the British that Mossadegh's collapse could open the door to the proverbial communist takeover.⁴ When the British were later expelled from Iran, however, they had no alternative but to turn to the United States for assistance in toppling Mossadegh. In November 1952, the Churchill government approached Roosevelt, the *de facto* head of the CIA's Middle East division, who told the British that he felt that there was "no chance to win approval from the outgoing administration of Truman and Acheson. The new Republicans, however, might be quite different."⁵

John Foster Dulles was certainly different. The apocalyptic anti-communist saw in Mossadegh the epitome of all that he detested in the Third World: unequivocal neutralism in the cold war, tolerance of Communists, and disrespect for free enterprise, as demonstrated by the oil nationalization. (Ironically, in recent years Great Britain had nationalized several of its own basic industries, and the government was the majority owner of the AIOC.) To the likes of John Foster Dulles, the eccentric Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh was indeed a madman. And when the Secretary of State considered further that Iran was a nation exceedingly rich in the liquid gold, and that it shared a border with the Soviet Union more than

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1,000 miles long, he was not unduly plagued by indecision as to whether the Iranian prime minister should finally retire from public life.

As matters turned out, the overthrow of Mossadegh in August 1953 was much more an American operation than a British one. Twenty-six years later, Kermit Roosevelt took the unusual step of writing a book about how he and the CIA carried out the operation. He called his book *Countercomp* to press home the idea that the CIA coup was staged only to prevent a takeover of power by the Iranian Communist Party (The Tudeh) closely backed by the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was thus arguing that Mossadegh had to be removed to prevent a Communist takeover, whereas the Truman administration had felt that Mossadegh had to be kept in power to prevent one.

It would be incorrect to state that Roosevelt offers little evidence to support his thesis of the Communist danger. It would be more precise to say that he offers *no* evidence at all. Instead, the reader is subjected to mere assertions of the thesis which are stated over and over, apparently in the belief that enough repetition will convince even the most skeptical.

Thus are we treated to variations on the theme such as the following:

"The Soviet threat [was] indeed genuine, dangerous and imminent" ... Mossadegh "had formed an alliance" with the Soviet Union to oust the Shah ... "the obvious threat of Russian takeover" ... "the alliance between [Mossadegh] and the Russian-dominated Tudeh was taking on a threatening shape" ... Mossadegh's "increasing dependence on the Soviet Union" ... "the hand of the Tudeh, and behind them the Russians, is showing more openly every day" ... "Russian backing of the Tudeh and Tudeh backing of [Mossadegh] became ever more obvious" ... the Soviet Union was "ever more active in Iran. Their control over Tudeh leadership was growing stronger all the time. It was exercised often and, to our eyes, with deliberate ostentation" ...⁶

But none of this subversive and threatening activity was, apparently, ever open, obvious, or ostentatious enough to provide Roosevelt with a single example he could impart to a curious reader.

In actuality, although the Tudeh Party more or less faithfully followed the fluctuating Moscow line on Iran, the relation of the party to Mossadegh was much more complex than Roosevelt and other cold-war chroniclers have made it out to be. The Tudeh felt very ambiguous about the wealthy, eccentric, land-owning prime minister who, nonetheless, was standing up to imperialism. Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, described Mossadegh as "essentially a rich, reactionary, feudal-minded Persian",⁷ hardly your typical Communist Party fellow-traveler.

On occasion the Tudeh had supported Mossadegh's policies; more often it had attacked them bitterly, and in one instance, on 15 July 1951, a Tudeh-sponsored demonstration was brutally suppressed by Mossadegh, resulting in some 100 deaths and 500 injured. The Iranian leader, moreover, had campaigned successfully against lingering Soviet occupation of northern Iran after World War II, and in October 1947 had led Parliament in its rejection of a government proposal that a joint Irano-Soviet oil company be set up to exploit the oil of northern Iran.⁸

What, indeed, did Mossadegh have to gain by relinquishing any of his power to the Tudeh and/or the Soviet Union? The idea that the Russians even desired the Tudeh to take power is no more than speculation. There was just as much evidence, or as little, to conclude that the Russians, once again, were more concerned about their relationship with Western governments than with the fate of a local Communist Party in a country outside the socialist bloc of Eastern Europe.

A secret State Department intelligence report, dated 9 January 1953, in the closing days

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of the Truman administration, stated that Mossadegh had not sought any alliance with the Tudeh, and that "The major opposition to the National Front [Mossadegh's governing coalition] arises from the vested interests, on the one hand, and the Tudeh Party on the other."⁹

The Tudeh Party had been declared illegal in 1949 and Mossadegh had not lifted that ban although he allowed the party to operate openly, at least to some extent because of his democratic convictions, and had appointed some Tudeh sympathizers to government posts.

Many of the Tudeh's objectives paralleled those espoused by the National Front, the State Department report observed, but "An open Tudeh move for power ... would probably unite independents and non-Communists of all political leanings and would result ... in energetic efforts to destroy Tudeh by force."¹⁰

The National Front itself was a coalition of highly diverse political and religious elements including right-wing anti-Communists, held together by respect for Mossadegh's personal character and honesty, and by nationalistic sentiments, particularly in regard to the nationalization of oil.

In 1979, when he was asked about this State Department report, Kermit Roosevelt replied: "I don't know what to make of that ... Loy Henderson [US ambassador to Iran in 1953] thought that there was a serious danger that Mossadegh was going to, in effect, place Iran under Soviet domination."¹¹ Though he was the principal moving force behind the coup, Roosevelt was now passing the buck, and to a man who, as we shall see in the Middle East chapter, was given to alarmist statements about "communist takeovers".

One can but wonder what Roosevelt, or anyone else, made of a statement by John Foster Dulles before a Senate committee in July 1953, when the operation to oust Mossadegh was already in process. The Secretary of State, the press reported, testified "that there was 'no substantial evidence' to indicate that Iran was cooperating with Russia. On the whole, he added, Moslem opposition to communism is predominant, although at times the Iranian Government appears to rely for support on the Tudeh party, which is communistic."¹²

The young Shah of Iran had been relegated to little more than a passive role by Mossadegh and the Iranian political process. His power had been whittled away to the point where he was "incapable of independent action", noted the State Department intelligence report. Mossadegh was pressing for control of the armed forces and more say over expenditures of the royal court, and the inexperienced and indecisive Shah—the "King of Kings"—was reluctant to openly oppose the prime minister because of the latter's popularity.

The actual sequence of events instigated by Roosevelt which culminated in the Shah's ascendancy appears rather simple in hindsight, even naive, and owed not a little to luck. The first step was to reassure the Shah that Eisenhower and Churchill were behind him in his struggle for power with Mossadegh and were willing to provide whatever military and political support he needed. Roosevelt did not actually know what Eisenhower felt, or even knew, about the operation and went so far as to fabricate a message from the president to the Shah expressing his encouragement.¹³

At the same time, the Shah was persuaded to issue royal decrees dismissing Mossadegh as prime minister and replacing him with one Fazlollah Zahedi, a general who had been imprisoned during the war by the British for collaboration with the Nazis.¹⁴ Late in the night of 14/15 August, the Shah's emissary delivered the royal decree to Mossadegh's home,

The following day, 19 August, Roosevelt's Iranian agents staged a parade through Teheran. With a fund of some one million dollars having been established in a safe in the American embassy, the "extremely competent professional 'organizers'," as Roosevelt called them, had no difficulty in buying themselves a mob, probably using but a small fraction of the fund. (The various accounts of the CIA role in Iran have the Agency spending from \$10,000 to \$19 million to overthrow Mossadegh. The larger amounts are based on reports that the CIA engaged in heavy bribery of members of Parliament and other influential Iranians to enlist their support against the prime minister.)

Soon a line of people could be seen coming out of the ancient bazaar, led by circus and athletic performers to attract the public. The marchers were waving banners, shouting "Long live the Shah!" Along the edges of the procession, men were passing out Iranian currency adorned with a portrait of the Shah. The demonstrators gathered followers as they went, people joining and picking up the chants, undoubtedly for a myriad of political and personal reasons. The balance of psychology had swung against Mossadegh.

Along the way, some marchers broke ranks to attack the offices of pro-Mossadegh newspapers and political parties, Tudeh and government offices. Presently, a voice broke in over the radio in Teheran announcing that "The Shah's instruction that Mossadegh be dismissed has been carried out. The new Prime Minister, Fazlollah Zahedi, is now in office. And His Imperial Majesty is on his way home!"

This was a lie, or a "pre-truth" as Roosevelt suggested. Only then did he go to fetch Zahedi from his hiding place. On the way, he happened to run into the commander of the air force who was among the marching throng. Roosevelt told the officer to get hold of a tank in which to carry Zahedi to Mossadegh's house in proper fashion.²¹

Kermit Roosevelt would have the reader believe that at this point it was all over but the shouting and the champagne he was soon to uncork: Mossadegh had fled, Zahedi had assumed power, the Shah had been notified to return—a dramatic, joyful, and peaceful triumph of popular will. Inexplicably, he neglects to mention at all that in the streets of Teheran and in front of Mossadegh's house that day, a nine-hour battle raged, with soldiers loyal to Mossadegh on one side and those supporting Zahedi and the Shah on the other. Some 300 people were reported killed and hundreds more wounded before Mossadegh's defenders finally succumbed.²²

Roosevelt also fails to mention any contribution of the British to the whole operation, which considerably irritated the men in MI6, the CIA's counterpart, who claim that they, as well as AIOC staff, local businessmen and other Iranians, had indeed played a role in the events. But they have been tight-lipped about what that role was precisely.²³

The US Military Mission in Iran also claimed a role in the action, as Major General George C. Stewart later testified before Congress:

Now, when this crisis came on and the thing was about to collapse, we violated our normal criteria and among the other things we did, we provided the army immediately on an emergency basis, blankets, boots, uniforms, electric generators, and medical supplies that permitted and created the atmosphere in which they could support the Shah ... The guns that they had in their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars that they drove through the streets, and the radio communications that permitted their control, were all furnished through the military defense assistance program.²⁴

The latter part of the General's statement would, presumably, apply to the other side as well.

"It is conceivable that the Tudeh could have turned the fortunes of the day against the

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which was guarded by troops. Not surprisingly, he was received very coolly and did not get in to see the prime minister. Instead, he was obliged to leave the decree with a servant who signed a receipt for the piece of paper dismissing his master from power. Equally unsurprising, Mossadegh did not abdicate. The prime minister, who maintained that only Parliament could dismiss him, delivered a radio broadcast the following morning in which he stated that the Shah, encouraged by "foreign elements", had attempted a *coup d'état*. Mossadegh then declared that he was, therefore, compelled to take full power unto himself. He denounced Zahedi as a traitor and sought to have him arrested, but the general had been hidden by Roosevelt's team.

The Shah, fearing all was lost, fled with his queen to Rome via Baghdad without so much as packing a suitcase. Undeterred, Roosevelt went ahead and directed the mimeographing of copies of the royal decrees for distribution to the public, and sent two of his Iranian agents to important military commanders to seek their support. It appears that this crucial matter was left to the last minute, almost as an afterthought. Indeed, one of the two Iranians had been recruited for the cause only the same day, and it was only he who succeeded in winning a commitment of military support from an Iranian colonel who had tanks and armored cars under his command.¹⁵

Beginning on 16 August, a mass demonstration arranged by the National Front, supporting Mossadegh and attacking the Shah, and the United States, took place in the capital city, Teheran. Roosevelt characterizes the demonstrators simply as "the Tudeh, with strong Russian encouragement", once again failing to offer any evidence to support his assertion. The *New York Times* referred to them as "Tudeh partisans and Nationalist extremists", the latter term being one which could have applied to individuals comprising a wide range of political leanings.¹⁶

Among the demonstrators there were as well a number of individuals working for the CIA. According to Richard Cottam, an American academic and author reportedly in the employ of the Agency in Teheran at this time, these agents were sent "into the streets to act as if they were Tudeh. They were more than just provocateurs, they were shock troops, who acted as if they were Tudeh people throwing rocks at mosques and priests", the purpose of which was to stamp the Tudeh and, by implication, Mossadegh as being anti-religion.¹⁷

During the demonstrations, the Tudeh raised their familiar demand for the creation of a democratic republic. They appealed to Mossadegh to form a united front and to provide them with arms to defend against the coup, but the prime minister refused.¹⁸ Instead, on 18 August he ordered the police and army to put an end to the Tudeh demonstrations which they did with considerable force. According to the accounts of Roosevelt and Ambassador Henderson, Mossadegh took this step as a result of a meeting with Henderson in which the ambassador complained of the extreme harassment being suffered by US citizens at the hands of the Iranians. It is left unclear by both of the Americans how much of this harassment was real and how much manufactured by them for the occasion. In any event, Henderson told Mossadegh that unless it ceased, he would be obliged to order all Americans to leave Iran at once. Mossadegh, says Henderson, begged him not to do this for an American evacuation would make it appear that his government was unable to control the country, although at the same time the prime minister was accusing the CIA of being behind the issuance of the royal decrees.¹⁹ (The Tudeh newspaper at this time was demanding the expulsion of "interventionist" American diplomats.)²⁰

Whatever Mossadegh's motivation, his action was again in sharp contradiction to the idea that he was in alliance with the Tudeh or that the party was in a position to grab the reins of power. Indeed, the Tudeh did not take to the streets again.

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royalists," wrote Kenneth Love, a *New York Times* reporter who was in Teheran during the crucial days of August. "But for some reason they remained completely aloof from the conflict. ... My own conjecture is that the Tudeh were restrained by the Soviet Embassy because the Kremlin, in the first post-Stalin year, was not willing to take on such consequences as might have resulted from the establishment of a communist-controlled regime in Teheran."

Love's views, contained in a paper he wrote in 1960, may well have been inspired by information received from the CIA. By his own admission, he was in close contact with the Agency in Teheran and even aided them in their operation.²⁵

Earlier in the year, the *New York Times* had noted that "prevailing opinion among detached observers in Teheran" was that "Mossadegh is the most popular politician in the country". During a period of more than 40 years in public life, Mossadegh had "acquired a reputation as an honest patriot".²⁶

In July, the State Department Director of Iranian Affairs had testified that "Mossadegh has such tremendous control over the masses of people that it would be very difficult to throw him out."²⁷

A few days later, "at least 100,000" people filled the streets of Teheran to express strong anti-US and anti-Shah sentiments. Though sponsored by the Tudeh, the turnout far exceeded any estimate of party adherents.²⁸

But popularity and masses, of the unarmed kind, counted for little, for in the final analysis what Teheran witnessed was a military showdown carried out on both sides by soldiers obediently following the orders of a handful of officers, some of whom were staking their careers and ambitions on choosing the winning side; some had a more ideological commitment. The *New York Times* characterized the sudden reversal of Mossadegh's fortunes as "nothing more than a mutiny ... against pro-Mossadegh officers" by "the lower ranks," who revered the Shah, had brutally quelled the demonstrations the day before, but refused to do the same on 19 August, and instead turned against their officers.²⁹

What connection Roosevelt and his agents had with any of the pro-Shah officers beforehand is not clear. In an interview given at about the same time that he finished his book, Roosevelt stated that a number of pro-Shah officers were given refuge in the CIA compound adjoining the US Embassy at the time the Shah fled to Rome.³⁰ But inasmuch as Roosevelt mentions not a word of this rather important and interesting development in his book, it must be regarded as yet another of his assertions to be approached with caution.

In any event, it may be that the 19 August demonstration organized by Roosevelt's team was just the encouragement and spark these officers were waiting for. Yet, if so, it further illustrates how much Roosevelt had left to chance.

In light of all the questionable, contradictory, and devious statements which emanated at times from John Foster Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Loy Henderson and other American officials, what conclusions can be drawn about American motivation in the toppling of Mossadegh? The consequences of the coup may offer the best guide.

For the next 25 years, the Shah of Iran stood fast as the United States' closest ally in the Third World, to a degree that would have shocked the independent and neutral Mossadegh. The Shah literally placed his country at the disposal of US military and intelligence organizations to be used as a cold-war weapon, a window and a door to the Soviet Union—electronic listening and radar posts were set up near the Soviet border; American aircraft used Iran as a base to launch surveillance flights over the Soviet Union; espionage

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agents were infiltrated across the border; various American military installations dotted the Iranian landscape. Iran was viewed as a vital link in the chain being forged by the United States to "contain" the Soviet Union. In a telegram to the British Acting Foreign Secretary in September, Dulles said: "I think if we can in coordination move quickly and effectively in Iran we would close the most dangerous gap in the line from Europe to South Asia."³¹ In February 1953, Iran became a member of the Baghdad Pact, set up by the United States, in Dulles's words, "to create a solid band of resistance against the Soviet Union."³²

One year after the coup, the Iranian government completed a contract with an international consortium of oil companies. Amongst Iran's new foreign partners, the British lost the exclusive rights they had enjoyed previously, being reduced now to 40 percent. Another 40 percent now went to American oil firms, the remainder to other countries. The British, however, received an extremely generous compensation for their former property.³³

In 1958, Kermit Roosevelt left the CIA and presently went to work for Gulf Oil Co., one of the American oil firms in the consortium. In this position, Roosevelt was director of Gulf's relations with the US government and foreign governments, and had occasion to deal with the Shah. In 1960, Gulf appointed him a vice president. Subsequently, Roosevelt formed a consulting firm, Downs and Roosevelt, which, between 1967 and 1970, reportedly received \$116,000 a year above expenses for its efforts on behalf of the Iranian government. Another client, the Northrop Corporation, a Los Angeles-based aerospace company, paid Roosevelt \$75,000 a year to aid in its sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia and other countries.³⁴ (See the Middle East chapter for Roosevelt's CIA connection with King Saud of Saudi Arabia.)

Another American member of the new consortium was Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (now Exxon), a client of Sullivan and Cromwell, the New York law firm of which John Foster Dulles had long been the senior member. Brother Allen, Director of the CIA, had also been a member of the firm.³⁵ Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported some years later that the Rockefeller family, who controlled Standard Oil and Chase Manhattan Bank, had "helped arrange the CIA coup that brought down Mossadegh". Anderson listed a number of ways in which the Shah demonstrated his gratitude to the Rockefeller, including heavy deposits of his personal fortune in Chase Manhattan, and housing developments in Iran built by a Rockefeller family company.³⁶

The standard "textbook" account of what took place in Iran in 1953 is that—whatever else one might say for or against the operation—the United States saved Iran from a Soviet/Communist takeover. Yet, during the two years of American and British subversion of a bordering country, the Soviet Union did nothing that would support such a premise. When the British Navy staged the largest concentration of its forces since World War II in Iranian waters, the Soviets took no belligerent steps; nor when Great Britain instituted draconian international sanctions which left Iran in a deep economic crisis and extremely vulnerable, did the oil fields "fall hostage" to the Bolshevik Menace; this, despite "the whole of the Tudeh Party at its disposal" as agents, as Roosevelt put it.³⁷ Not even in the face of the coup, with its imprint of foreign hands, did Moscow make a threatening move; neither did Mossadegh at any point ask for Russian help.

One year later, however, the *New York Times* could editorialize that "Moscow ... counted its chickens before they were hatched and thought that Iran would be the next 'People's Democracy'". At the same time, the newspaper warned, with surprising arrogance, that "underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid by one of their number which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism."³⁸

A decade later, Allen Dulles solemnly stated that communism had "achieved control of

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the governmental apparatus" in Iran.³⁹ And a decade after that, *Fortune* magazine, to cite one of many examples, kept the story alive by writing that Mossadegh "plotted with the Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh, to overthrow Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and hook up with the Soviet Union."⁴⁰

And what of the Iranian people? What did being saved from communism do for them? For the preponderance of the population, life under the Shah was a grim tableau of grinding poverty, police terror, and torture. Thousands were executed in the name of fighting communism. Dissent was crushed from the outset of the new regime with American assistance. Kenneth Love wrote that he believed that CIA officer George Carroll, whom he knew personally, worked with General Farhat Dadjestan, the new military governor of Teheran, "on preparations for the very efficient smothering of a potentially dangerous dissident movement emanating from the bazaar area and the Tudeh in the first two weeks of November, 1953."⁴¹

The notorious Iranian secret police, SAVAK, created under the guidance of the CIA and Israel,⁴² spread its tentacles all over the world to punish Iranian dissidents. According to a former CIA analyst on Iran, SAVAK was instructed in torture techniques by the Agency.⁴³ Amnesty International summed up the situation in 1976 by noting that Iran had the "highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief. No country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran."⁴⁴

When to this is added a level of corruption that "startled even the most hardened observers of Middle Eastern thievery,"⁴⁵ it is understandable that the Shah needed his huge military and police force, maintained by unusually large US aid and training programs,⁴⁶ to keep the lid down for as long as he did. Said Senator Hubert Humphrey, apparently with some surprise:

Do you know what the head of the Iranian Army told one of our people? He said the Army was in good shape, thanks to U.S. aid—it was now capable of coping with the civilian population. That Army isn't going to fight the Russians. It's planning to fight the Iranian people.⁴⁷

Where force might fail, the CIA turned to its most trusted weapon—money. To insure support for the Shah, or at least the absence of dissent, the Agency began making payments to Iranian religious leaders, always a capricious bunch. The payments to the ayatollahs and mullahs began in 1953 and continued regularly until 1977 when President Carter abruptly halted them. One "informed intelligence source" estimated that the amount paid reached as much as \$400 million a year; others thought that figure too high, which it certainly seems to be. The cut-off of funds to the holy men, it is believed, was one of the elements which precipitated the beginning of the end for the King of Kings.⁴⁸

To whom do you turn for help when the police are assaulting you? The old question. To whom does a poor banana republic turn when a CIA army is advancing upon its territory and CIA planes are overhead bombing the country? The leaders of Guatemala tried everyone—the United Nations, the Organization of

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American States, other countries individually, the world press, even the United States itself, in the desperate hope that it was all a big misunderstanding, that in the end, reason would prevail. Nothing helped. Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles had decided that the legally-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz was "communist", therefore must go; and go it did, in June 1954.

In the midst of the American preparation to overthrow the government, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, lamented that the United States was categorizing "as 'communism' every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive liberal reforms."¹

Toriello was close to the truth, but Washington officials retained enough contact with reality and world opinion to be aware of the inappropriateness of coming out against nationalism, independence or reform. Thus it was that Secretary of State Dulles asserted that Guatemalans were living under a "Communist type of terrorism."² ... President Eisenhower warned about "the Communist dictatorship" establishing "an outpost on this continent to the detriment of all the American nations."³ ... the US Ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy, declared that "We cannot permit a Soviet Republic to be established between Texas and the Panama Canal."⁴ ... others warned that Guatemala could become a base from which the Soviet Union might actually seize the Canal ... Senator Margaret Chase Smith hinted, unmistakably, that the "unjustified increases in the price of coffee" imported from Guatemala were due to communist control of the country, and called for an investigation⁵ ... and so it went.

The Soviet Union could be excused if it was somewhat bewildered by all the rhetoric, for the Russians had scant interest in Guatemala; did not provide the country with any kind of military assistance, did not even maintain diplomatic relations with it, thus did not have the normally indispensable embassy from which to conduct such nefarious schemes. (During this period, the height of McCarthyist "logic", there were undoubtedly those Americans who reasoned: "All the better to deceive us!")

With the exception of one occasion, the countries of Eastern Europe had as little to do with Guatemala as did the Soviet Union. A month before the coup, that is, long after Washington had begun preparation for it, Czechoslovakia made a single arms sale to Guatemala for cash, something the Czechs would no doubt have done for any other country willing to pay the price. The weapons, it turned out, were, in the words of the *New York Times*, "worthless military junk."⁶ *Time* magazine pooch-pooched the newspaper's report and cited US military men giving a better appraisal of the weapons. It may be that neither *Time* nor the military men could conceive that one member of the International Communist Conspiracy could do such a thing to another member.⁶

The American propaganda mill made much of this arms transaction. Less publicized was the fact that Guatemala had to seek arms from Czechoslovakia because the United States had refused to sell it any since 1948 due to its reformist governments, and had pressured other countries to do the same despite Arbenz's repeated pleas to lift the embargo.⁷

Like the Soviets, Arbenz had reason to wonder about the American charges. The Guatemalan president, who took office in March 1951 after being elected by a wide margin, had no special contact or spiritual/ideological ties with the Soviet Union or the rest of the Communist bloc. Although American policymakers and the American press, explicitly and implicitly, often labeled Arbenz a communist, there were those in Washington who knew better, at least during their more dispassionate moments. Under Arbenz's administration, Guatemala had voted at the United Nations so closely with the United States on issues

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While the world watched

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #9:

48. "Ambassador Richard C. Patterson Devises the 'Duck Test', 1949."
49. "Eisenhower's Recollection of American Intervention in Guatemala, 1954."
50. "John Foster Dulles Reports on Guatemala, 1954."
51. "An American Scholar Explains the Overthrow of the Arbenz Regime, 1954."
52. "Eisenhower Prepares to Subvert the Castro Government in Cuba, 1960."
53. "Eisenhower on U.S. Policy Toward Indochina, April 7, 1954."
54. "President Eisenhower's Disarmament Proposals, July 21, 1955."
55. "*Killing Hope*: Iran, 1953."
56. "*Killing Hope*: Guatemala, 1953-54."
57. "Eisenhower's Farewell Address, January 17, 1961."

CHAPTER 28

DOCUMENT SET 2

Eisenhower, Dulles, and Hemispheric Security: Intervention in Guatemala

Your textbook emphasizes Eisenhower's role in improving Soviet-American relations and limiting the American commitment in Vietnam. It is clear, however, that the president and his militant anticommunist secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, were equally committed to a policy of sometimes brutal interventionism in the Third World. In no instance was their determination more evident than in the case of Guatemala, where in 1954, the left-leaning but independent regime of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz-Guzman defied the American-controlled United Fruit Company and challenged the hemispheric dominance of the United States. The following documents explore the Eisenhower-Dulles rationale for dislodging the democratically elected Arbenz government. As you analyze the evidence, be especially aware of the assumptions and motivations behind American policy.

The first document, the often-quoted "duck test" for the legitimacy of Third World regimes, establishes continuity between the conservative anticommunism of the Eisenhower administration and the Cold War liberalism of the Truman era. Former U.S. ambassador Richard C. Patterson, the author of these remarks, remained outspoken in his public warnings of a communist threat following his recall from Guatemala in 1949.

More subtle but equally alarmed was President Eisenhower, who was determined to prevent the establishment of a Soviet beachhead in Central America.

Like Dulles, the president viewed the Arbenz regime as a threat to hemispheric security. The excerpt from his memoirs clearly reveals his reason for approving CIA efforts to overthrow the elected government of Guatemala. Even more outspoken was Secretary Dulles, who addressed the American public in June 1954 in an effort to justify American intervention. Note the Eisenhower-Dulles interpretation of democracy and popular will. Try to determine where they place blame for the crisis.

In sharp contrast to the administration position is professor Philip B. Taylor's account of the events in Guatemala, written only a few months after the American intervention. Taylor, a professor of political science at Michigan State University, published his version of the counterrevolution in the *American Political Science Review*. Be aware of Taylor's background as you assess his interpretation of historical events, and compare his article with the administration's view.

Try to determine if the successful intervention in Guatemala was related to other policies of the Eisenhower administration. Be sensitive to the administration's overall approach to Third World challenges, as described in the textbook. Finally, in view of Eisenhower's acknowledgment of a role in the Bay of Pigs planning, think about the relationship between Guatemala in 1954 and subsequent American policies in dealing with hemispheric problems.

Questions for Analysis

1. What were the Eisenhower administration's basic assumptions about the nature of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala? What do the documents tell us about Eisenhower's and Dulles's own ideologies? How did their personal beliefs influence their handling of the crisis?
2. What were the desires of the Guatemalan people in 1954? What was the meaning of Dulles's assertion that the United States would maintain its support for the "just aspirations of the Guatemalan people"? How would the legitimacy of those aspirations be determined in the future? By whom?
3. Compare the Dulles-Eisenhower view of the historical origins of the crisis with Philip B. Taylor's account of the same events. Which analysis is correct? How are the writers of these documents using history? How would you explain their conflicting interpretations of the evidence?
4. What was the American response to Third World revolution in the 1950s? How would you account for that attitude? In what way did the Guatemalan incident exemplify weaknesses or strengths in the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration? What was the administration's major policy goal? Provide evidence for your argument from the documents.

5. What do the documents reveal concerning the motivations behind U. S. Latin American policies in the 1950s? How does the evidence clarify the geopolitical reasons for the actions of Eisenhower and Dulles? What were the economic, political, ideological, and strategic influences on the development of administration policy?
6. How would you describe and evaluate the methods employed by the Eisenhower administration to achieve its foreign-policy goals in the Third World? What new agencies, tools, and approaches were used? In what way did the assumptions, policies, and approaches used in Guatemala influence the future character and direction of American policy? Do the documents contain evidence of past-present linkage in American approaches to Third World challenges? What does the evidence reveal about how modern Americans view revolutionary forces in the Third World?

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1. Ambassador Richard C. Patterson Devises the "Duck Test," 1949

Many times it is impossible to prove legally that a certain individual is a communist; but for cases of this sort I recommend a practical method of detection—the "duck test." The duck test works this way: suppose you see a bird walking around in a farm yard. This bird wears no label that says "duck." But the

bird certainly looks like a duck. Also he goes to the pond and you notice he swims like a duck. Then he opens his beak and quacks like a duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, whether he's wearing a label or not.

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2. Eisenhower's Recollection of American Intervention in Guatemala, 1954

... The troubles had been long-standing, reaching back nine years to the Guatemalan revolution of 1944, which had resulted in the overthrow of the dictator General Jorge Ubico. Thereafter, the Communists busied themselves with agitating and with infiltrating labor unions, peasant organizations, and the press and radio. In 1950 a military officer, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, came to power and by his actions soon created the strong suspicion that he was merely a puppet manipulated by Communists.

The American republics wanted no Communist regime within their midst. They recognized that subversion by Communism was only another form of aggression, even more evil than that achieved by naked military force. However, in unstable regions where revolutions and rioting were not uncommon, where some governments were being maintained by dictatorial means, where resentments against the United States were sometimes nurtured by groups other than Communist cells, it was difficult to differ-

entiate positively between Communist influence and uncontrolled and politically rebellious groups. For example, on February 24, 1953, the Arbenz government announced its intention, under an agrarian reform law, to seize about 225,000 acres of unused United Fruit Company land. . . .

Expropriation in itself does not, of course, prove Communism; expropriation of oil and agricultural properties years before in Mexico had not been fostered by Communists.

Approximately six weeks after the announcement of the United Fruit Company land seizure, however, Guatemala withdrew from the five-nation Organization of Central American States, alleging aggression by Guatemala's neighbors. In this instance, the real reason was apparent: Guatemala could not risk participation in a debate on an anti-Communist resolution scheduled for presentation by El Salvador at a forthcoming meeting of the organization.

Arbenz denied that his government was Com-

munist, a denial that was issued in a speech at a May Day celebration featuring seventy thousand marchers. . . .

About that time [October 1953] a new ambassador, John E. Peurifoy, was appointed to Guatemala. He was familiar with the tactics of the Communists in Greece, where he had served. Peurifoy soon reached definite conclusions on the nature of the Arbenz government. . . .

Something had to be done quickly. The first task was to marshal and crystallize Latin American public opinion on the issue. The opportunity presented itself at the Tenth Inter-American Conference of the Organization of the American States (OAS) which met in Caracas, Venezuela, in March of 1954. At that meeting the United States urged the adoption of a joint condemnation of Communism, contending vigorously that it should not be permitted to control any state in the Western Hemisphere. Foster Dulles, representing the United States, argued that if Communism should succeed to this extent, it should be treated as a threat to the peace. On March 6 he introduced a draft resolution of a "Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American States against International Communist Intervention." . . .

On March 26, in a plenary session, the organization approved the resolution by a vote of seventeen to one, with Guatemala opposing, and Argentina and Mexico abstaining—Costa Rica was absent. As passed, it differed in only one respect from the draft: it called not for immediate action to meet the Communist threat but rather for a "meeting to consider the adoption of measures in accordance with existing treaties." . . .

In the two months from March to May, 1954, the agents of international Communism in Guatemala continued their efforts to penetrate and subvert their neighboring Central American states, using consular agents for their political purposes and fomenting political assassinations and strikes. In Guatemala itself the government answered protests by suspending constitutional rights, conducting mass arrests, and killing leaders in the political opposition.

In May things came to a head. On the 17th of that month Foster Dulles reported to the press that the United States had reliable information on a shipment of arms from behind the Iron Curtain. . . .

On May 19 Nicaragua broke diplomatic ties with Guatemala. Five days later we announced that the United States was airlifting arms to Honduras and Nicaragua to help counter the danger created by the

Czech shipment to Guatemala. Our initial shipment comprised only fifty tons of rifles, pistols, machine guns, and ammunition, hardly enough to create apprehension in neighboring states. . . .

Meanwhile, in Guatemala, Arbenz had declared a state of siege and launched a reign of terror. Then on June 18 armed forces under Carlos Castillo Armas, an exiled former colonel in the Guatemalan Army, crossed the border from Honduras into Guatemala, initially with a mere handful of men—reportedly about two hundred. As he progressed he picked up recruits. Simultaneously three obsolete bombers, presumably under his direction, buzzed Guatemala City and bombed the ordnance depot. Things seemed to be going well for Castillo's small band until June 22. On that date Allen Dulles reported to me that Castillo had lost two of the three old bombers with which he was supporting his "invasion." . . .

"What do you think Castillo's chances would be," I asked Allen Dulles, "without the aircraft?"

His answer was unequivocal: "About zero."

"Suppose we supply the aircraft. What would the chances be then?"

Again the CIA chief did not hesitate: "About 20 per cent."

I considered the matter carefully. I realized full well that United States intervention in Central America and Caribbean affairs earlier in the century had greatly injured our standing in all of Latin America. On the other hand, it seemed to me that to refuse to cooperate in providing indirect support to a strictly anti-Communist faction in this struggle would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Caracas resolution. I had faith in the strength of the inter-American resolve therein set forth. On the actual value of a shipment of planes, I knew from experience the important psychological impact of even a small amount of air support. In any event, our proper course of action—indeed my duty—was clear to me. We would replace the airplanes. . . .

The major factor in the successful outcome was the disaffection of the Guatemalan armed forces and the population as a whole with the tyrannical regime of Arbenz. The air support enjoyed by Castillo Armas, though meager, was important in relative terms; it gave the regular armed forces an excuse to take action in their own hands to throw out Arbenz. The rest of Latin America was not in the least displeased. . . .

By the middle of 1954 Latin America was free, for the time being at least, of any fixed outposts of Communism. . . .

A 3. John Foster Dulles Reports on Guatemala, 1954

Tonight I should like to talk with you about Guatemala. It is the scene of dramatic events. They expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system, and they test the ability of the American States to maintain the peaceful integrity of this hemisphere.

For several years international communism has been probing here and there for nesting places in the Americas. It finally chose Guatemala as a spot which it could turn into an official base from which to breed subversion which would extend to other American Republics.

This intrusion of Soviet despotism was, of course, a direct challenge to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most fundamental of our foreign policies. . . .

In Guatemala, international communism had an initial success. It began 10 years ago, when a revolution occurred in Guatemala. The revolution was not without justification. But the Communists seized on it, not as an opportunity for real reform, but as a chance to gain political power.

Communist agitators devoted themselves to infiltrating the public and private organizations of Guatemala. They sent recruits to Russia and other Communist countries for revolutionary training and indoctrination in such institutions as the Lenin School at Moscow. Operating in the guise of "reformers" they organized the workers and peasants under Communist leadership. Having gained control of what they call "mass organizations," they moved on to take over the official press and radio of the Guatemalan Government. They dominated the social security organization and ran the agrarian reform program. Through the technique of the "popular front" they dictated to the Congress and the President. . . .

Guatemala is a small country. But its power, standing alone, is not a measure of the threat. The master plan of international communism is to gain a solid political base in this hemisphere, a base that can be used to extend Communist penetration to the other peoples of the other American Governments. It was not the power of the Arbenz government that concerned us but the power behind it.

If world communism captures any American State, however small, a new and perilous front is established which will increase the danger to the entire free world and require even greater sacrifices from the American people.

This situation in Guatemala had become so dan-

gerous that the American States could not ignore it. At Caracas last March the American States held their Tenth Inter-American Conference. They then adopted a momentous statement. They declared that "the domination or control of the political institutions of any American State by the international Communist movement . . . would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the American States, endangering the peace of America." . . .

Throughout the period I have outlined, the Guatemalan Government and Communist agents throughout the world have persistently attempted to obscure the real issue—that of Communist imperialism—by claiming that the United States is only interested in protecting American business. . . . But this issue is relatively unimportant. All who know the temper of the U.S. people and Government must realize that our overriding concern is that which, with others, we recorded at Caracas, namely the endangering by international communism of the peace and security of this hemisphere.

The people of Guatemala have not been heard from. Despite the armaments piled up by the Arbenz government, it was unable to enlist the spiritual cooperation of the people.

Led by Col. Castillo Armas, patriots arose in Guatemala to challenge the Communist leadership—and to change it. Thus, the situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves.

Last Sunday, President Arbenz of Guatemala resigned and seeks asylum. Others are following his example. . . .

The need for vigilance is not past. Communism is still a menace everywhere. But the people of the United States and of the other American Republics can feel tonight that at least one grave danger has been averted. Also an example is set which promises increased security for the future. The ambitious and unscrupulous will be less prone to feel that communism is the wave of their future.

In conclusion, let me assure the people of Guatemala. As peace and freedom are restored to that sister Republic, the Government of the United States will continue to support the just aspirations of the Guatemalan people. A prosperous and progressive Guatemala is vital to a healthy hemisphere. The United States pledges itself not merely to political opposition to communism but to help to alleviate conditions in

Guatemala and elsewhere which might afford communism an opportunity to spread its tentacles throughout the hemisphere. Thus we shall seek in

positive ways to make our Americas an example which will inspire men everywhere.



4. An American Scholar Explains the Overthrow of the Arbenz Regime, 1954

... There is little doubt that communism got its start in Guatemala under [Juan José] Arévalo [who was elected for the 1945-1951 presidential term]; Arévalo's successor, Lt. Col. Arbenz, who served from March, 1951, until his ouster in July, 1954, was quite sympathetic to Communist activities, but under the best of contrary circumstances the ouster of Communists from their positions in the government would have been extremely difficult and would have stripped the government of its trained, though not necessarily efficient, bureaucrats. . . .

Among the exiles forced from Guatemala by the operations of the Arévalo-Arbenz government was Lt. Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, who had been condemned to death for his implication in an unsuccessful attempt against the government in late 1950. . . .

The Tenth Inter-American Conference met at Caracas, Venezuela in March, 1954. The United States had previously expressed its desire to have the conference record itself as being anti-Communist. . . .

It is significant that those who sprang to Dulles' support in the debates following the presentation of the [United States] resolution were not the democratic nations but the authoritarians, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Peru. . . .

Events in Guatemala leading to the civil war seem to have commenced with the State Department announcement on May 17, 1954, that a shipment of arms totaling 1,900 tons had arrived at Puerto Barrios, Guatemala. . . .

The United States employed the shipment to arouse sympathy for its subsequent anti-Arbenz actions. It was also employed as the basis for a nearly unprecedented request to the other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that they grant the United States the privilege of searching their merchant ships on the high seas for arms shipments to Guatemala. The request was rejected by all of the nations to which requests were made.

On May 20, the United States concluded a Mutual Security Treaty with Honduras (a similar treaty had been signed with Nicaragua on April 23), and on

May 24 it was announced that the United States Air Force was airlifting war material to the two nations. . . .

Col. Castillo Armas' troops entered Guatemalan territory from Honduras on June 19. A period of somewhat desultory fighting followed. Arbenz resigned on June 27 after an all-day conference with his military leaders, and the Army Chief of Staff, Col. Enrique Díaz, established a short-lived provisional government composed of three officers. One of these, Colonel Elfego Monzón, replaced Díaz on the 29th, after the direct intervention of Ambassador Peurifoy. Peurifoy and a Marine bodyguard, both armed, were present in the conference room at the time power changed hands. . . .

The conclusion that the United States played an important part in the struggle in Guatemala seems inescapable. . . . [I]t can be shown that the United States played a role in the United Nations which tended to deny to Guatemala the privileges apparently guaranteed it by its membership in that organization. . . .

In response to the urgent request of the Guatemalan representative on June 19, the U.N. Security Council met on the call of its president, United States representative Henry Cabot Lodge, on June 20. Guatemalan representative Eduardo Castillo-Arriola asked immediate U.N. investigation of his charge that the fighting had begun with the invasion of his country by forces stationed in Honduras and Nicaragua and backed by "foreign monopolies" with the knowledge of the United States State Department. . . .

The Council meeting [of June 25] voted to take no direct action until it had the opportunity to receive a report from the Peace Committee. The Guatemalan government, which prior to the second Council meeting had rejected O.A.S. Peace Committee investigation, now reconsidered and announced it would welcome it. The date was the afternoon of June 26. After confirming the Guatemalan change of attitude, the Committee on the 27th determined that it would send a five-member team to Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, starting the 28th.

It seems quite tenable to argue that the action [to

request a special O.A.S. Council meeting] was intended as a smoke-screen rather than as a sincere request. . . . The question why the United States should have requested the investigation after the horse had fled the stable, rather than before, seems almost rhetorical under the circumstances. Investigation, or the proposal of a real study of the situation, prior to the outbreak of fighting, would have been sincere. . . .

The O.A.S. Council met in special session on July 2 to approve 18-1, with one abstention, the motion presented by Honduras and seconded by the United States that the July 7 meeting be postponed *sine die*. . . .

And, of course, the inspection team of the Peace Committee did not reach its destination either. It was in Mexico City when the Castillo-Monzón negotiations opened, and it remained there. At the urgent request of the Monzón *junta*, it cancelled its trip at that point on July 2 and returned to Washington. The inaction of the U.N. Security Council and of the Inter-American Peace Committee (as agent for the O.A.S.) had combined with the successful operations of Castillo Armas to overthrow the Arbenz government. . . .

The shocked conscience of the world was probably represented best in the British House of Commons on July 14, 1954, by Clement Attlee, head of the Labor party, in foreign affairs debate:

"The fact is that this was a plain act of aggression, and one cannot take one line on aggression in Asia and another line in Central America. I confess that I was rather shocked at the joy and approval of the American Secretary of State on the success of this *putsch*.

. . . we cannot pass this off as just a Central American squabble, of which there are so many. There was a principle involved and that principle was the responsibility of the United Nations. . . . Therefore, I am afraid that Guatemala has left a rather unpleasant taste in one's mouth because, to illustrate the theme I was putting, it seems in some instances that the acceptance of the principles of the United Nations is subordinated to a hatred of Communism. . . ."

[The] entire situation leads to the conclusion that the United States failed to give evidence of faith in the processes of the United Nations; that it dragged its feet regarding effective O.A.S. action beyond the point of reason; that it was intimately involved in a situation of subversion of a constitutional government; and that it did not at any time undertake to make the record clear to the people either of the United States or of Latin America. . . .

A 5. Eisenhower Prepares to Subvert the Castro Government in Cuba, 1960

" . . . while President, he had directed that measures be taken to help organize, train and equip Cuban refugees so they could act at the proper time. . . .

"The former President said *he gave the order for the organization, training and equipping of the Cuban refugees on March 17, 1960.*"

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From The Shaping of American Diplomacy, William A. Williams, pp 1119 & 1120

American policy toward Indochina during the Eisenhower Administration

Remarks by President Eisenhower at a Press Conference, April 7, 1954.

Question. Mr. President, would you mind commenting on the strategic importance of Indo-China to the free world? I think there has been across the country some lack of understanding on just what it means to us.

President Eisenhower. Mr. Eisenhower said that the question could be approached both specifically and generally. First of all, he said, there is the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs.

Then, he continued, there is the possibility that many human beings could pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world; and, finally, there are broader considerations that might follow the "falling domino" principle.

If someone sets up a row of dominoes, and knocks over the first one, the President said, it is certain that the last one will go over very quickly. It would be the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.

With respect to Indo-China's specific value, Mr. Eisenhower explained, this area produces two items that the world uses, tin and tungsten. They are very important, he said, and Indo-China also produces other materials, including rubber.

With respect to the possibility that more people might pass under a dictatorship, Mr. Eisenhower pointed out that Asia has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship. He asserted that the U.S. simply can't afford greater losses.

The third possibility, said the President, is that the loss of Indo-China would set off the loss of Burma, of Thailand, of the Malay Peninsula and Indonesia. This would not only multiply the disadvantages the U.S. would suffer through loss of materials, or sources of materials, but it would involve millions and millions and millions of people, and would create a new geographical position, he said.

It would turn the so-called island defenses' chain of Japan, Formosa and the Philippines, Mr. Eisenhower said, and to the southward it would move in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.

In its economic aspects, the President added, it would take away that region that Japan must have as a trading area, or it would force Japan to turn toward China and Manchuria, or toward the Communist areas in order to live. The possible consequences of the loss to the free world are just incalculable, Mr. Eisenhower said.

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Remarks by Secretary Dulles at a Press Conference, May 11, 1954.

Question. Mr. Secretary, if I understood you correctly, you believed that Southeast Asia could, if necessary, be held without Indo-China. Does that represent a modification of what has been variously called the "domino" or "cork in the bottle" theory? The contents in both cases refer to remarks of President Eisenhower at one news conference in which he likened the situation in Southeast Asia to a series of dominoes—that if Indo-China fell, the others would fall.

Secretary Dulles. The situation in the area, as we found it, was that it was subject to the so-called "domino theory." That means that if one went, another would go. We are trying to change it so that that would not be the case. That is the whole theory of collective security. That is the theory of the North Atlantic Treaty. As nations come together, then the "domino theory," so-called, ceases to apply. What we are trying to do is create a situation in Southeast Asia where the domino situation will not apply. And

while I see it might be said that I felt that Southeast Asia could be secured even without perhaps Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, I do not want for a minute to underestimate the importance of those countries. Neither do I want for a minute to give the impression that we believe that they are going to be lost or that we have given up trying to prevent their being lost. On the contrary, we recognize that they are extremely important and that the problem of saving Southeast Asia is far more difficult if they are lost. But I do not want to give the impression either that if events we could not control—and which we do not anticipate—should lead to their being lost that we would consider the whole situation hopeless and we would give up in despair. We do not give up in despair. Also, we do not give up in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.

Question. You said the other day, Mr. Secretary, that it was the Government's policy to oppose a Communist advance in Indo-China by whatever means. What would be your attitude toward a victory of Ho Chi Minh or a coalition in a free election in Indo-China? Would you recognize that or would you consider that to also be barred by your formula?

Secretary Dulles. I said that I thought that the United States should not stand passively by and see the extension of Communism by any means into Southeast Asia. We are not standing passively by.

Question. I asked you what would be your attitude toward a victory of Ho Chi Minh or a coalition in a genuinely free election in Indo-China. Would you be prepared to recognize such a government?

Secretary Dulles. I have just said that I don't think the present conditions are conducive to a free election there, and I don't care now to answer the hypothetical situation of what might result if they did have elections.

And seven years later under Kennedy...

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Lansdale Memo for Taylor on Unconventional Warfare

Excerpts from memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, Pentagon expert on guerrilla warfare, to Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, President Kennedy's military adviser, on "Resources for Unconventional Warfare, S.E. Asia," undated but apparently from July, 1961. Copies were sent to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatrick, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, and Gen. C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

This memo is in response to your desire for early information on unconventional-warfare resources in Southeast Asia. The information was compiled within Defense and CIA.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS, JULY 21, 1955

The Conference at the Summit which the Big Four Powers staged in Geneva in July 1955 marked an interruption in the cold war waged between the Soviet Union and the West. High point of the conference was President Eisenhower's disarmament proposals, which came as a complete surprise to the other participants. The President's object was to test by deeds the Soviet's new profession of its desire to outlaw war. Significantly, no Russian leader directly answered the speech at that time. The principal stumbling block to an East-West disarmament agreement was the issue of German unification, which it was no longer entirely within the power of the Big Four to settle.

Disarmament is one of the most important subjects on our agenda. It is also extremely difficult. In recent years the scientists have discovered methods of making weapons many, many times more destructive of opposing armed forces—but also of homes, and industries, and lives—than ever known or imagined before. These same scientific discoveries have made much more complex the problem of limitation and control and reduction of armament.

After our victory as allies in World War II, my country rapidly disarmed. Within a few years our disarmament was at a very low level. Then events occurred which caused us to realize that we had disarmed too much. For our own security and to safeguard peace, we needed greater strength. Therefore we proceeded to rearm and to associate with others in a partnership for peace and for mutual security.

⁵⁰ *The New York Times*, July 22, 1955.

But we know that a mutually dependable system for less armament on the part of all nations would be a better way to safeguard peace and to maintain our security.

It would ease the fears of war in the anxious hearts of people everywhere. It would lighten the burdens upon the backs of the people. It would make it possible for every nation, great and small, developed and less developed, to advance the standards of living of its people, to attain better food, and clothing, and shelter, more of education and larger enjoyment of life.

Therefore the United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament. I have directed that an intensive and thorough study of this subject be made within our own Government. . . .

No sound and reliable agreement can be made unless it is completely covered by an inspection and reporting system adequate to support every portion of the agreement.

The lessons of history teach us that disarmament agreements without adequate reciprocal inspection increase the danger of war and do not brighten the prospect of peace.

Thus it is my view that the priority attention of our combined study of disarmament should be upon the subjects of inspection and reporting. . . .

We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. . . .

Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fear and danger of surprise attack.

I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement very quickly; as between ourselves—immediately. These steps would include:

10 give each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments. . . .

Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country . . . and by this step to convince the world that we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tension.

Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning. . . .

The quest for peace is the statesman's most exacting duty. Security of the nation entrusted to his care is his greatest responsibility. Practical progress in lasting peace is his fondest hope. Yet in pursuit of his hope he must not betray the trust placed in him as guardian of the people's security. A sound peace—with security, justice, well-being, and freedom for the people of the world—can be achieved, but only by patiently and thoughtfully following a hard and sure-tested road.

For more than a year they had received American training in infantry weapons and explosives, and "political instruction" in small groups at a secluded site in the countryside and at a US military installation.

The intelligence wing of the Technical Service, the state president revealed, had drawn up lists and card indexes of persons who were to be "put out of the way" when the Soviet tanks began to roll. These records, which contained detailed descriptions and intimate biographical information, were of some 200 leading Social Democrats (including Zinn himself), 15 Communists, and various others, all of whom were deemed "politically untrustworthy" and opponents of West German militarization. Apparently, support for peaceful co-existence and detente with the Soviet bloc was sufficient to qualify one for inclusion on the hit-list, for one man was killed at the training site, charged with being an "East-West bridge builder". It was this murder that led to the exposure of the entire operation.

The United States admitted its role in the creation and training of the guerrilla army, but denied any involvement in the "illegal, internal, and political activities" of the organization. But Zinn reported that the Americans had learned of the plotting in May and had not actually dissolved the group until September, the same month that German Security Police arrested a number of the group's leaders. At some point, the American who directed the training courses, Sterling Garwood, had been "supplied with carbon copies of the card-index entries". It appears that at no time did US authorities communicate anything of this matter to the West German Government.

As the affair turned out, those who had been arrested were quickly released and the United States thwarted any further investigation in this the American Zone of occupied Germany. Commented Herr Zinn: "the only legal explanation for these releases can be that the people in Karlsruhe [the Federal Court] declared that they acted upon American direction."⁹

To add to the furor, the national leader of the Social Democrats accused the United States of financing an opposition group to infiltrate and undermine his party. Erich Ollenhauer, whose name had also appeared on the Technical Service's list, implied that American "clandestine" agencies were behind the plot despite the disapproval of high-ranking US officials.¹⁰

The revelations about the secret army and its hit-list resulted in a storm of ridicule and denunciation falling upon the United States from many quarters in West Germany. In particular, the delicious irony of the Americans working hand-in-glove with "ex"-Nazis did not escape the much-castigated German people.

This operation in Germany, it was revealed many years later, was part of a much wider network—called "Operation Gladio"—created by the CIA and other European intelligence services, with similar secret armies all over Western Europe. (See Western Europe chapter.)

9. Iran 1953

Making it safe for the King of Kings

"So this is how we get rid of that madman Mossadegh," announced John Foster Dulles to a group of top Washington policy makers one day in June 1953.¹ The Secretary of State held in his hand a plan of operation to overthrow the prime minister of Iran prepared by Kermit (Kim) Roosevelt of the CIA. There was scarcely any discussion amongst the high-powered men in the room, no probing questions, no legal or ethical issues raised.

"This was a grave decision to have made," Roosevelt later wrote. "It involved tremen-

dous risk. Surely it deserved thorough examination, the closest consideration, somewhere at the very highest level. It had not received such thought at this meeting. In fact, I was morally certain that almost half of those present, if they had felt free or had the courage to speak, would have opposed the undertaking."²

Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodore and distant cousin of Franklin, was expressing surprise more than disappointment at glimpsing American foreign-policy-making undressed.

The original initiative to oust Mossadegh had come from the British, for the elderly Iranian leader had spearheaded the parliamentary movement to nationalize the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), the sole oil company operating in Iran. In March 1951, the bill for nationalization was passed, and at the end of April Mossadegh was elected prime minister by a large majority of Parliament. On 1 May, nationalization went into effect. The Iranian people, Mossadegh declared, "were opening a hidden treasure upon which lies a dragon."³

As the prime minister had anticipated, the British did not take the nationalization gracefully, though it was supported unanimously by the Iranian parliament and by the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people for reasons of both economic justice and national pride. The Mossadegh government tried to do all the right things to placate the British: It offered to set aside 25 percent of the net profits of the oil operation as compensation; it guaranteed the safety and the jobs of the British employees; it was willing to sell its oil without disturbance to the tidy control system so dear to the hearts of the international oil giants. But the British would have none of it. What they wanted was their oil company back. And they wanted Mossadegh's head. A servant does not affront his lord with impunity.

A military show of force by the British navy was followed by a ruthless international economic blockade and boycott, and a freezing of Iranian assets which brought Iran's oil exports and foreign trade to a virtual standstill, plunged the already impoverished country into near destitution, and made payment of any compensation impossible. Nonetheless, and long after they had moved to oust Mossadegh, the British demanded compensation not only for the physical assets of the AIOC, but for the value of their enterprise in developing the oil fields; a request impossible to meet, and, in the eyes of Iranian nationalists, something which decades of huge British profits had paid for many times.

The British attempt at economic strangulation of Iran could not have gotten off the ground without the active co-operation and support of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations and American oil companies. At the same time, the Truman administration argued with the British that Mossadegh's collapse could open the door to the proverbial communist takeover.⁴ When the British were later expelled from Iran, however, they had no alternative but to turn to the United States for assistance in toppling Mossadegh. In November 1952, the Churchill government approached Roosevelt, the *de facto* head of the CIA's Middle East division, who told the British that he felt that there was "no chance to win approval from the outgoing administration of Truman and Acheson. The new Republicans, however, might be quite different."⁵

John Foster Dulles was certainly different. The apocalyptic anti-communist saw in Mossadegh the epitome of all that he detested in the Third World: unequivocal neutralism in the cold war, tolerance of Communists, and disrespect for free enterprise, as demonstrated by the oil nationalization. (Ironically, in recent years Great Britain had nationalized several of its own basic industries, and the government was the majority owner of the AIOC.) To the likes of John Foster Dulles, the eccentric Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh was indeed a madman. And when the Secretary of State considered further that Iran was a nation exceedingly rich in the liquid gold, and that it shared a border with the Soviet Union more than

1,000 miles long, he was not unduly plagued by indecision as to whether the Iranian prime minister should finally retire from public life.

As matters turned out, the overthrow of Mossadeh in August 1953 was much more an American operation than a British one. Twenty-six years later, Kermit Roosevelt took the unusual step of writing a book about how he and the CIA carried out the operation. He called his book *Countercoup* to press home the idea that the CIA coup was staged only to prevent a takeover of power by the Iranian Communist Party (The Tudeh) closely backed by the Soviet Union. Roosevelt was thus arguing that Mossadeh had to be removed to prevent a Communist takeover, whereas the Truman administration had felt that Mossadeh had to be kept in power to prevent one.

It would be incorrect to state that Roosevelt offers little evidence to support his thesis of the Communist danger. It would be more precise to say that he offers *no* evidence at all. Instead, the reader is subjected to mere assertions of the thesis which are stated over and over, apparently in the belief that enough repetition will convince even the most skeptical. Thus are we treated to variations on the theme such as the following:

"The Soviet threat [was] indeed genuine, dangerous and imminent" ... Mossadeh "had formed an alliance" with the Soviet Union to oust the Shah ... "the obvious threat of Russian takeover" ... "the alliance between [Mossadeh] and the Russian-dominated Tudeh was taking on a threatening shape" ... Mossadeh's "increasing dependence on the Soviet Union" ... "the hand of the Tudeh, and behind them the Russians, is showing more openly every day" ... "Russian backing of the Tudeh and Tudeh backing of [Mossadeh] became ever more obvious" ... the Soviet Union was "ever more active in Iran. Their control over Tudeh leadership was growing stronger all the time. It was exercised often and, to our eyes, with deliberate ostentation" ...⁶

But none of this subversive and threatening activity was, apparently, ever open, obvious, or ostentatious enough to provide Roosevelt with a single example he could impart to a curious reader.

In actuality, although the Tudeh Party more or less faithfully followed the fluctuating Moscow line on Iran, the relation of the party to Mossadeh was much more complex than Roosevelt and other cold-war chroniclers have made it out to be. The Tudeh felt very ambiguous about the wealthy, eccentric, land-owning prime minister who, nonetheless, was standing up to imperialism. Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, described Mossadeh as "essentially a rich, reactionary, feudal-minded Persian",⁷ hardly your typical Communist Party fellow-traveler.

On occasion the Tudeh had supported Mossadeh's policies; more often it had attacked them bitterly, and in one instance, on 15 July 1951, a Tudeh-sponsored demonstration was brutally suppressed by Mossadeh, resulting in some 100 deaths and 500 injured. The Iranian leader, moreover, had campaigned successfully against lingering Soviet occupation of northern Iran after World War II, and in October 1947 had led Parliament in its rejection of a government proposal that a joint Irano-Soviet oil company be set up to exploit the oil of northern Iran.⁸

What, indeed, did Mossadeh have to gain by relinquishing any of his power to the Tudeh and/or the Soviet Union? The idea that the Russians even desired the Tudeh to take power is no more than speculation. There was just as much evidence, or as little, to conclude that the Russians, once again, were more concerned about their relationship with Western governments than with the fate of a local Communist Party in a country outside the socialist bloc of Eastern Europe.

A secret State Department intelligence report, dated 9 January 1953, in the closing days

of the Truman administration, stated that Mossadeh had not sought any alliance with the Tudeh, and that "The major opposition to the National Front [Mossadeh's governing coalition] arises from the vested interests, on the one hand, and the Tudeh Party on the other."⁹

The Tudeh Party had been declared illegal in 1949 and Mossadeh had not lifted that ban although he allowed the party to operate openly, at least to some extent because of his democratic convictions, and had appointed some Tudeh sympathizers to government posts.

Many of the Tudeh's objectives paralleled those espoused by the National Front, the State Department report observed, but "An open Tudeh move for power ... would probably unite independents and non-Communists of all political leanings and would result ... in energetic efforts to destroy Tudeh by force."¹⁰

The National Front itself was a coalition of highly diverse political and religious elements including right-wing anti-communists, held together by respect for Mossadeh's personal character and honesty, and by nationalistic sentiments, particularly in regard to the nationalization of oil.

In 1979, when he was asked about this State Department report, Kermit Roosevelt replied: "I don't know what to make of that ... Loy Henderson [US ambassador to Iran in 1953] thought that there was a serious danger that Mossadeh was going to, in effect, place Iran under Soviet domination."¹¹ Though he was the principal moving force behind the coup, Roosevelt was now passing the buck, and to a man who, as we shall see in the Middle East chapter, was given to alarmist statements about "communist takeovers".

One can but wonder what Roosevelt, or anyone else, made of a statement by John Foster Dulles before a Senate committee in July 1953, when the operation to oust Mossadeh was already in process. The Secretary of State, the press reported, testified "that there was 'no substantial evidence' to indicate that Iran was cooperating with Russia. On the whole, he added, Moslem opposition to communism is predominant, although at times the Iranian Government appears to rely for support on the Tudeh party, which is communistic."¹²

The young Shah of Iran had been relegated to little more than a passive role by Mossadeh and the Iranian political process. His power had been steadily eroded away to the point where he was "incapable of independent action", noted the State Department intelligence report. Mossadeh was pressing for control of the armed forces and more say over expenditures of the royal court, and the inexperienced and indecisive Shah—the "King of Kings"—was reluctant to openly oppose the prime minister because of the latter's popularity.

The actual sequence of events instigated by Roosevelt which culminated in the Shah's ascendancy appears rather simple in hindsight, even naive, and owed not a little to luck. The first step was to reassure the Shah that Eisenhower and Churchill were behind him in his struggle for power with Mossadeh and were willing to provide whatever military and political support he needed. Roosevelt did not actually know what Eisenhower felt, or even knew, about the operation and went so far as to fabricate a message from the president to the Shah expressing his encouragement.¹³

At the same time, the Shah was persuaded to issue royal decrees dismissing Mossadeh as prime minister and replacing him with one Fazlollah Zahedi, a general who had been imprisoned during the war by the British for collaboration with the Nazis.¹⁴ Late in the night of 14/15 August, the Shah's emissary delivered the royal decree to Mossadeh's home,

which was guarded by troops. Not surprisingly, he was received very coolly and did not get in to see the prime minister. Instead, he was obliged to leave the decree with a servant who signed a receipt for the piece of paper dismissing his master from power. Equally unsurprisingly, Mossadeh did not abdicate. The prime minister, who maintained that only Parliament could dismiss him, delivered a radio broadcast the following morning in which he stated that the Shah, encouraged by "foreign elements", had attempted a *coup d'état*. Mossadeh then declared that he was, therefore, compelled to take full power unto himself. He denounced Zahedi as a traitor and sought to have him arrested, but the general had been hidden by Roosevelt's team.

The Shah, fearing all was lost, fled with his queen to Rome via Baghdad without so much as packing a suitcase. Undeterred, Roosevelt went ahead and directed the mimeographing of copies of the royal decrees for distribution to the public, and sent two of his Iranian agents to important military commanders to seek their support. It appears that this crucial matter was left to the last minute, almost as an afterthought. Indeed, one of the two Iranians had been recruited for the cause only the same day, and it was only he who succeeded in winning a commitment of military support from an Iranian colonel who had tanks and armored cars under his command.¹⁵

Beginning on 16 August, a mass demonstration arranged by the National Front, supporting Mossadeh and attacking the Shah and the United States, took place in the capital city, Teheran. Roosevelt characterizes the demonstrators simply as "the Tudeh, with strong Russian encouragement", once again failing to offer any evidence to support his assertion. The *New York Times* referred to them as "Tudeh partisans and Nationalist extremists", the latter term being one which could have applied to individuals comprising a wide range of political leanings.¹⁶

Among the demonstrators there were as well a number of individuals working for the CIA. According to Richard Cottam, an American academic and author reportedly in the employ of the Agency in Teheran at this time, these agents were sent "into the streets to act as if they were Tudeh. They were more than just provocateurs, they were shock troops, who acted as if they were Tudeh people throwing rocks at mosques and priests", the purpose of which was to stamp the Tudeh and, by implication, Mossadeh as being anti-religion.¹⁷

During the demonstrations, the Tudeh raised their familiar demand for the creation of a democratic republic. They appealed to Mossadeh to form a united front and to provide them with arms to defend against the coup, but the prime minister refused.¹⁸ Instead, on 18 August he ordered the police and army to put an end to the Tudeh demonstrations which they did with considerable force. According to the accounts of Roosevelt and Ambassador Henderson, Mossadeh took this step as a result of a meeting with Henderson in which the ambassador complained of the extreme harassment being suffered by US citizens at the hands of the Iranians. It is left unclear by both of the Americans how much of this harassment was real and how much manufactured by them for the occasion. In any event, Henderson told Mossadeh that unless it ceased, he would be obliged to order all Americans to leave Iran at once. Mossadeh, says Henderson, begged him not to do this for an American evacuation would make it appear that his government was unable to control the country, although at the same time the prime minister was accusing the CIA of being behind the issuance of the royal decrees.¹⁹ (The Tudeh newspaper at this time was demanding the expulsion of "interventionist" American diplomats.)²⁰

Whatever Mossadeh's motivation, his action was again in sharp contradiction to the idea that he was in alliance with the Tudeh or that the party was in a position to grab the reins of power. Indeed, the Tudeh did not take to the streets again.

The following day, 19 August, Roosevelt's Iranian agents staged a parade through Teheran. With a fund of some one million dollars having been established in a safe in the American embassy, the "extremely competent professional 'organizers'", as Roosevelt called them, had no difficulty in buying themselves a mob, probably using but a small fraction of the fund. (The various accounts of the CIA role in Iran have the Agency spending from \$10,000 to \$19 million to overthrow Mossadeh. The larger amounts are based on reports that the CIA engaged in heavy bribery of members of Parliament and other influential Iranians to enlist their support against the prime minister.)

Soon a line of people could be seen coming out of the ancient bazaar, led by circus and athletic performers to attract the public. The marchers were waving banners, shouting "Long live the Shah!" Along the edges of the procession, men were passing out Iranian currency adorned with a portrait of the Shah. The demonstrators gathered followers as they went, people joining and picking up the chants, undoubtedly for a myriad of political and personal reasons. The balance of psychology had swung against Mossadeh.

Along the way, some marchers broke ranks to attack the offices of pro-Mossadeh newspapers and political parties, Tudeh and government offices. Presently, a voice broke in over the radio in Teheran announcing that "The Shah's instruction that Mossadeh be dismissed has been carried out. The new Prime Minister, Fazlollah Zahedi, is now in office. And His Imperial Majesty is on his way home!"

This was a lie, or a "pre-truth" as Roosevelt suggested. Only then did he go to fetch Zahedi from his hiding place. On the way, he happened to run into the commander of the air force who was among the marching throng. Roosevelt told the officer to get hold of a tank in which to carry Zahedi to Mossadeh's house in proper fashion.²¹

Kermit Roosevelt would have the reader believe that at this point it was all over but the shouting and the champagne he was soon to uncork: Mossadeh had fled, Zahedi had assumed power, the Shah had been notified to return—a dramatic, joyful, and peaceful triumph of popular will. Inexplicably, he neglects to mention at all that in the streets of Teheran and in front of Mossadeh's house that day, a nine-hour battle raged, with soldiers loyal to Mossadeh on one side and those supporting Zahedi and the Shah on the other. Some 300 people were reported killed and hundreds more wounded before Mossadeh's defenders finally succumbed.²²

Roosevelt also fails to mention any contribution of the British to the whole operation, which considerably irritated the men in MI6, the CIA's counterpart, who claim that they, as well as AIOC staff, local businessmen and other Iranians, had indeed played a role in the events. But they have been tight-lipped about what that role was precisely.²³

The US Military Mission in Iran also claimed a role in the action, as Major General George C. Stewart later testified before Congress:

Now, when this crisis came on and the thing was about to collapse, we violated our normal criteria and among the other things we did, we provided the army immediately on an emergency basis, blankets, boots, uniforms, electric generators, and medical supplies that permitted and created the atmosphere in which they could support the Shah ... The guns that they had in their hands, the trucks that they rode in, the armored cars that they drove through the streets, and the radio communications that permitted their control, were all furnished through the military defense assistance program.²⁴

The latter part of the General's statement would, presumably, apply to the other side as well.

"It is conceivable that the Tudeh could have turned the fortunes of the day against the

royalists," wrote Kennett Love, a *New York Times* reporter who was in Teheran during the crucial days of August. "But for some reason they remained completely aloof from the conflict. ... My own conjecture is that the Tudeh were restrained by the Soviet Embassy because the Kremlin, in the first post-Stalin year, was not willing to take on such consequences as might have resulted from the establishment of a communist-controlled regime in Teheran."

Love's views, contained in a paper he wrote in 1960, may well have been inspired by information received from the CIA. By his own admission, he was in close contact with the Agency in Teheran and even aided them in their operation.²⁵

Earlier in the year, the *New York Times* had noted that "prevailing opinion among detached observers in Teheran" was that "Mossadegh is the most popular politician in the country". During a period of more than 40 years in public life, Mossadegh had "acquired a reputation as an honest patriot."²⁶

In July, the State Department Director of Iranian Affairs had testified that "Mossadegh has such tremendous control over the masses of people that it would be very difficult to throw him out."²⁷

A few days later, "at least 100,000" people filled the streets of Teheran to express strong anti-US and anti-Shah sentiments. Though sponsored by the Tudeh, the turnout far exceeded any estimate of party adherents.²⁸

But popularity and masses, of the unarmed kind, counted for little, for in the final analysis what Teheran witnessed was a military showdown carried out on both sides by soldiers obediently following the orders of a handful of officers, some of whom were staking their careers and ambitions on choosing the winning side; some had a more ideological commitment. The *New York Times* characterized the sudden reversal of Mossadegh's fortunes as "nothing more than a mutiny ... against pro-Mossadegh officers" by "the lower ranks" who revered the Shah, had brutally quelled the demonstrations the day before, but refused to do the same on 19 August, and instead turned against their officers.²⁹

What connection Roosevelt and his agents had with any of the pro-Shah officers beforehand is not clear. In an interview given at about the same time that he finished his book, Roosevelt stated that a number of pro-Shah officers were given refuge in the CIA compound adjoining the US Embassy at the time the Shah fled to Rome.³⁰ But inasmuch as Roosevelt mentions not a word of this rather important and interesting development in his book, it must be regarded as yet another of his assertions to be approached with caution.

In any event, it may be that the 19 August demonstration organized by Roosevelt's team was just the encouragement and spark these officers were waiting for. Yet, if so, it further illustrates how much Roosevelt had left to chance.

In light of all the questionable, contradictory, and devious statements which emanated at times from John Foster Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Loy Henderson and other American officials, what conclusions can be drawn about American motivation in the toppling of Mossadegh? The consequences of the coup may offer the best guide.

For the next 25 years, the Shah of Iran stood fast as the United States' closest ally in the Third World, to a degree that would have shocked the independent and neutral Mossadegh. The Shah literally placed his country at the disposal of US military and intelligence organizations to be used as a cold-war weapon, a window and a door to the Soviet Union—electronic listening and radar posts were set up near the Soviet border; American aircraft used Iran as a base to launch surveillance flights over the Soviet Union; espionage

agents were infiltrated across the border; various American military installations dotted the Iranian landscape. Iran was viewed as a vital link in the chain being forged by the United States to "contain" the Soviet Union. In a telegram to the British Acting Foreign Secretary in September, Dulles said: "I think if we can in coordination move quickly and effectively in Iran we would close the most dangerous gap in the line from Europe to South Asia."³¹ In February 1955, Iran became a member of the Baghdad Pact, set up by the United States, in Dulles's words, "to create a solid band of resistance against the Soviet Union."³²

One year after the coup, the Iranian government completed a contract with an international consortium of oil companies. Amongst Iran's new foreign partners, the British lost the exclusive rights they had enjoyed previously, being reduced now to 40 percent. Another 40 percent now went to American oil firms, the remainder to other countries. The British, however, received an extremely generous compensation for their former property.³³

In 1958, Kermit Roosevelt left the CIA and presently went to work for Gulf Oil Co., one of the American oil firms in the consortium. In this position, Roosevelt was director of Gulf's relations with the US government and foreign governments, and had occasion to deal with the Shah. In 1960, Gulf appointed him a vice president. Subsequently, Roosevelt formed a consulting firm, Downs and Roosevelt, which, between 1967 and 1970, reportedly received \$116,000 a year above expenses for its efforts on behalf of the Iranian government. Another client, the Northrop Corporation, a Los Angeles-based aerospace company, paid Roosevelt \$75,000 a year to aid in its sales to Iran, Saudi Arabia and other countries.³⁴ (See the Middle East chapter for Roosevelt's CIA connection with King Saud of Saudi Arabia.)

Another American member of the new consortium was Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey (now Exxon), a client of Sullivan and Cromwell, the New York law firm of which John Foster Dulles had long been the senior member. Brother Allen, Director of the CIA, had also been a member of the firm.³⁵ Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported some years later that the Rockefeller family, who controlled Standard Oil and Chase Manhattan Bank, had "helped arrange the CIA coup that brought down Mossadegh". Anderson listed a number of ways in which the Shah demonstrated his gratitude to the Rockefellers, including heavy deposits of his personal fortune in Chase Manhattan, and housing developments in Iran built by a Rockefeller family company.³⁶

The standard "textbook" account of what took place in Iran in 1953 is that—whatever else one might say for or against the operation—the United States and Iran from a Soviet/Communist takeover. Yet, during the two years of American and British subversion of a bordering country, the Soviet Union did nothing that would support such a premise. When the British Navy staged the largest concentration of its forces since World War II in Iranian waters, the Soviets took no belligerent steps; nor when Great Britain instituted draconian international sanctions which left Iran in a deep economic crisis and extremely vulnerable, did the oil fields "fall hostage" to the Bolshevik Menace; this, despite "the whole of the Tudeh Party at its disposal" as agents, as Roosevelt put it.³⁷ Not even in the face of the coup, with its imprint of foreign hands, did Moscow make a threatening move; neither did Mossadegh at any point ask for Russian help.

One year later, however, the *New York Times* could editorialize that "Moscow ... counted its chickens before they were hatched and thought that Iran would be the next 'People's Democracy'." At the same time, the newspaper warned, with surprising arrogance, that "underdeveloped countries with rich resources now have an object lesson in the heavy cost that must be paid by one of their number which goes berserk with fanatical nationalism."³⁸

A decade later, Allen Dulles solemnly stated that communism had "achieved control of

the governmental apparatus" in Iran.³⁹ And a decade after that, *Fortune* magazine, to cite one of many examples, kept the story alive by writing that Mossadegh "plotted with the Communist party of Iran, the Tudeh, to overthrow Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and hook up with the Soviet Union."⁴⁰

And what of the Iranian people? What did being saved from communism do for them? For the preponderance of the population, life under the Shah was a grim tableau of grinding poverty, police terror, and torture. Thousands were executed in the name of fighting communism. Dissent was crushed from the outset of the new regime with American assistance. Kenneth Love wrote that he believed that CIA officer George Carroll, whom he knew personally, worked with General Farhat Dadsetan, the new military governor of Teheran, "on preparations for the very efficient smothering of a potentially dangerous dissident movement emanating from the bazaar area and the Tudeh in the first two weeks of November, 1953."⁴¹

The notorious Iranian secret police, SAVAK, created under the guidance of the CIA and Israel,⁴² spread its tentacles all over the world to punish Iranian dissidents. According to a former CIA analyst on Iran, SAVAK was instructed in torture techniques by the Agency.⁴³ Amnesty International summed up the situation in 1976 by noting that Iran had the "highest rate of death penalties in the world, no valid system of civilian courts and a history of torture which is beyond belief. No country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran."⁴⁴

When to this is added a level of corruption that "startled even the most hardened observers of Middle Eastern thievery,"⁴⁵ it is understandable that the Shah needed his huge military and police force, maintained by unusually large US aid and training programs,⁴⁶ to keep the lid down for as long as he did. Said Senator Hubert Humphrey, apparently with some surprise:

Do you know what the head of the Iranian Army told one of our people? He said the Army was in good shape, thanks to U.S. aid—it was now capable of coping with the civilian population. That Army isn't going to fight the Russians. It's planning to fight the Iranian people.⁴⁷

Where force might fail, the CIA turned to its most trusted weapon—money. To insure support for the Shah, or at least the absence of dissent, the Agency began making payments to Iranian religious leaders, always a capricious bunch. The payments to the ayatollahs and mullahs began in 1953 and continued regularly until 1977 when President Carter abruptly halted them. One "informed intelligence source" estimated that the amount paid reached as much as \$400 million a year; others thought that figure too high, which it certainly seems to be. The cur-off of funds to the holy men, it is believed, was one of the elements which precipitated the beginning of the end for the King of Kings.⁴⁸

10. Guatemala 1953-1954

While the world watched

To whom do you turn for help when the police are assaulting you? The old question.

To whom does a poor banana republic turn when a CIA army is advancing upon its territory and CIA planes are overhead bombing the country?

The leaders of Guatemala tried everyone—the United Nations, the Organization of

American States, other countries individually, the world press, even the United States itself, in the desperate hope that it was all a big misunderstanding, that in the end, reason would prevail. Nothing helped. Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles had decided that the legally-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz was "communist", therefore must go; and go it did, in June 1954.

In the midst of the American preparation to overthrow the government, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, lamented that the United States was categorizing "as 'communism' every manifestation of nationalism or economic independence, any desire for social progress, any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive liberal reforms."¹

Toriello was close to the truth, but Washington officials retained enough contact with reality and world opinion to be aware of the inappropriateness of coming out against nationalism, independence or reform. Thus it was that Secretary of State Dulles asserted that Guatemalans were living under a "Communist type of terrorism"² ... President Eisenhower warned about "the Communist dictatorship" establishing "an outpost on this continent to the detriment of all the American nations"³ ... the US Ambassador to Guatemala, John Peurifoy, declared that "We cannot permit a Soviet Republic to be established between Texas and the Panama Canal"⁴ ... others warned that Guatemala could become a base from which the Soviet Union might actually seize the Canal ... Senator Margaret Chase Smith hinted, unmistakably, that the "unjustified increases in the price of coffee" imported from Guatemala were due to communist control of the country, and called for an investigation⁵ ... and so it went.

The Soviet Union could be excused if it was somewhat bewildered by all the rhetoric, for the Russians had scant interest in Guatemala, did not provide the country with any kind of military assistance, did not even maintain diplomatic relations with it, thus did not have the normally indispensable embassy from which to conduct such nefarious schemes. (During this period, the height of McCarthyist "logic", there were undoubtedly those Americans who reasoned: "All the better to deceive us!")

With the exception of one occasion, the countries of Eastern Europe had as little to do with Guatemala as did the Soviet Union. A month before the coup, that is, long after Washington had begun preparation for it, Czechoslovakia made a large arms sale to Guatemala for cash, something the Czechs would no doubt have done by any other country willing to pay the price. The weapons, it turned out, were, in the words of the *New York Times*, "worthless military junk". *Time* magazine pooch-pooched the newspaper's report and cited US military men giving a better appraisal of the weapons. It may be that neither *Time* nor the military men could conceive that one member of the International Communist Conspiracy could do such a thing to another member.⁶

The American propaganda mill made much of this arms transaction. Less publicized was the fact that Guatemala had to seek arms from Czechoslovakia because the United States had refused to sell it any since 1948 due to its reformist governments, and had pressured other countries to do the same despite Arbenz's repeated pleas to lift the embargo.⁷

Like the Soviets, Arbenz had reason to wonder about the American charges. The Guatemalan president, who took office in March 1951 after being elected by a wide margin, had no special contact or spiritual/ideological ties with the Soviet Union or the rest of the Communist bloc. Although American policymakers and the American press, explicitly and implicitly, often labeled Arbenz a communist, there were those in Washington who knew better, at least during their more dispassionate moments. Under Arbenz's administration, Guatemala had voted at the United Nations so closely with the United States on issues

of "Soviet imperialism" that a State Department group occupied with planning Arbenz's overthrow concluded that propaganda concerning Guatemala's UN record "would not be particularly helpful in our case".⁸ And a State Department analysis paper reported that the Guatemalan president had support "not only from Communist-led labor and the radical fringe of professional and intellectual groups, but also among many anti-Communist nationalists in urban areas".⁹

Nonetheless, Washington repeatedly and adamantly expressed its displeasure about the presence of communists working in the Guatemalan government and their active participation in the nation's political life. Arbenz maintained that this was no more than proper in a democracy, while Washington continued to insist that Arbenz was too tolerant of such people—not because of anything they had done which was intrinsically threatening or offensive to the US or Western civilization, but simply because they were of the species communist, well known for its infinite capacity for treachery. Ambassador Peurifoy—a diplomat whose suit might have been pinstriped, but whose soul was a loud check—warned Arbenz that US-Guatemalan relations would remain strained so long as a single communist remained on the public payroll.¹⁰

The centerpiece of Arbenz's program was land reform. The need for it was clearly expressed in the all-too-familiar underdeveloped-country statistics: In a nation overwhelmingly rural, 2.2 percent of the landowners owned 70 percent of the arable land; the annual per capita income of agricultural workers was \$87. Before the revolution of 1944, which overthrew the Ubico dictatorship, "farm laborers had been roped together by the Army for delivery to the low-land farms where they were kept in debt slavery by the landowners."¹¹

The expropriation of large tracts of uncultivated acreage which was distributed to approximately 100,000 landless peasants, the improvement in union rights for the workers, and other social reforms, were the reasons Arbenz had won the support of Communists and other leftists, which was no more than to be expected. When Arbenz was criticized for accepting Communist support, he challenged his critics to prove their good faith by backing his reforms themselves. They failed to do so, thus revealing where the basis of their criticism lay.¹²

The party formed by the Communists, the Guatemalan Labor Party, held four seats in Congress, the smallest component of Arbenz's ruling coalition which commanded a total of 51 seats in the 1953-54 legislature.¹³ Communists held several important sub-cabinet posts but none was ever appointed to the cabinet. In addition, there were Communists employed in the bureaucracy, particularly in the administration of land reform.¹⁴

Lacking anything of substance they could accuse the Guatemalan left of, Washington officials were reduced to condemnation by semantics. Thus, communists, unlike normal human beings, did not take jobs in the government—they "infiltrated" the government. Communists did not support a particular program—they "exploited" it. Communists did not back Arbenz—they "used" him. Moreover, communists "controlled" the labor movement and land reform—but what type of person is it who devotes himself in an underdeveloped country to furthering the welfare of workers and peasants? None other than the type that Washington calls "communist".

The basic idea behind the employment of such language—which was standard Western fare throughout the cold war—was to deny the idea that communists could be people sincerely concerned about social change. American officials denied it to each other as well as to the world. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a CIA report about Guatemala, prepared in 1952 for the edification of the White House and the intelligence community:

Communist political success derives in general from the ability of individual Communists and fel-

low travelers to identify themselves with the nationalist and social aspirations of the Revolution of 1944. In this manner, they have been successful in infiltrating the Administration and pro-Administration political parties and have gained control of organized labor ... [Arbenz] is essentially an opportunist whose politics are largely a matter of historical accident ... The extension of [communist] influence has been facilitated by the applicability of Marxist 'cliches' to the anti-colonial and social aims of the Guatemalan Revolution.¹⁵

The first plan to topple Arbenz was a CIA operation approved by President Truman in 1952, but at the eleventh hour, Secretary of State Dean Acheson persuaded Truman to abort it.¹⁶ However, soon after Eisenhower became president in January 1953, the plan was resurrected.

Both administrations were pressured by executives of United Fruit Company, much of whose vast and uncultivated land in Guatemala had been expropriated by the Arbenz government as part of the land reform program. The company wanted nearly \$16 million for the land, the government was offering \$525,000, United Fruit's own declared valuation for tax purposes.¹⁷

United Fruit functioned in Guatemala as a state within a state. It owned the country's telephone and telegraph facilities, administered its only important Atlantic harbor, and monopolized its banana exports. A subsidiary of the company owned nearly every mile of railroad track in the country. The fruit company's influence amongst Washington's power elite was equally impressive. On a business and/or personal level, it had close ties to the Dulles brothers, various State Department officials, congressmen, the American Ambassador to the United Nations, and others. Anne Whitman, the wife of the company's public relations director, was President Eisenhower's personal secretary. Under-secretary of State (and formerly Director of the CIA) Walter Bedell Smith was seeking an executive position with United Fruit at the same time he was helping to plan the coup. He was later named to the company's board of directors.¹⁸

Under Arbenz, Guatemala constructed an Atlantic port and a highway to compete with United Fruit's holdings, and built a hydro-electric plant to offer cheaper energy than the US-controlled electricity monopoly. Arbenz's strategy was to limit the power of foreign companies through direct competition rather than through nationalization, a policy not feasible of course when it came to a fixed quantity like land. In his inaugural address, Arbenz stated that:

Foreign capital will always be welcome as long as it adjusts to local conditions, remains always subordinate to Guatemalan laws, cooperates with the economic development of the country, and strictly abstains from intervening in the nation's social and political life.¹⁹

This hardly described United Fruit's role in Guatemala. Amongst much else, the company had persistently endeavored to frustrate Arbenz's reform programs, discredit him and his government, and induce his downfall.

Arbenz was, accordingly, wary of multinationals and could not be said to welcome them into his country with open arms. This attitude, his expropriation of United Fruit's land, and his "tolerance of communists" were more than enough to make him a marked man in Washington. The United States saw these policies as being inter-related: that is, it was communist influence—not any economic or social exigency of Guatemalan life—which was responsible for the government's treatment of American firms.

In March 1953, the CIA approached disgruntled right-wing officers in the Guatemalan army and arranged to send them arms. United Fruit donated \$64,000 in cash. The following

month, uprisings broke out in several towns but were quickly put down by loyal troops. The rebels were put on trial and revealed the fruit company's role in the plot, but not the CIA's.²⁰

The Eisenhower administration resolved to do the job right the next time around. With cynical glee, almost an entire year was spent in painstaking, step-by-step preparation for the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Of the major CIA undertakings, few have been as well documented as has the coup in Guatemala. With the release of many formerly classified government papers, the following story has emerged.²¹

Headquarters for the operation was established in Opa Locka, Florida, on the outskirts of Miami. The Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza lent/leased his country out as a site for an airstrip and for hundreds of men—Guatemalan exiles and US and Central American mercenaries—to receive training in the use of weapons and radio broadcasting, as well as in the fine arts of sabotage and demolition. Thirty airplanes were assigned for use in the "Liberation", stationed in Nicaragua, Honduras and the Canal Zone, to be flown by American pilots. The Canal Zone was set aside as a weapons depot from which arms were gradually distributed to the rebels who were to assemble in Honduras under the command of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas before crossing into Guatemala. Soviet-marked weapons were also gathered for the purpose of planting them inside Guatemala before the invasion to reinforce US charges of Russian intervention. And, as important as arms, it turned out, hidden radio transmitters were placed in and around the perimeter of Guatemala, including one in the US Embassy.

An attempt was made to blow up the trains carrying the Czech weapons from portside to Guatemala City; however, a torrential downpour rendered the detonators useless, whereupon the CIA paramilitary squad opened fire on one train, killing a Guatemalan soldier and wounding three others; but the convoy of trains made it safely to its destination.

After the Czech ship had arrived in Guatemala, Eisenhower ordered the stopping of "suspicious foreign-flag vessels on the high seas off Guatemala to examine cargo".²² The State Department's legal adviser wrote a brief which concluded in no uncertain terms that "Such action would constitute a violation of international law." No matter. At least two foreign vessels were stopped and searched, one French and one Dutch. It was because of such actions by the British that the United States had fought the War of 1812.

The Guatemalan military came in for special attention. The US ostentatiously signed mutual security treaties with Honduras and Nicaragua, both countries hostile to Arbenz, and dispatched large shipments of arms to them in the hope that this would signal a clear enough threat to the Guatemalan military to persuade it to withdraw its support of Arbenz. Additionally, the US Navy dispatched two submarines from Key West, saying only that they were going "south". Several days later, the Air Force, amid considerable fanfare, sent three B-36 bombers on a "courtesy call" to Nicaragua.

The CIA also made a close study of the records of members of the Guatemalan officer corps and offered bribes to some of them. One of the Agency's clandestine radio stations broadcast appeals aimed at military men, as well as others, to join the liberation movement. The station reported that Arbenz was secretly planning to disband or disarm the armed forces and replace it with a people's militia. CIA planes dropped leaflets over Guatemala carrying the same message.

Eventually, at Ambassador Peurifoy's urging, a group of high-ranking officers called on Arbenz to ask that he dismiss all communists who held posts in his administration. The president assured them that the communists did not represent a danger, that they did not run the government, and that it would be undemocratic to dismiss them. At a second meeting, the officers also demanded that Arbenz reject the creation of the "people's militia".

Arbenz himself was offered a bribe by the CIA, whether to abdicate his office or something less is not clear. A large sum of money was deposited in a Swiss bank for him, but he, or a subordinate, rejected the offer.

On the economic front, contingency plans were made for such things as cutting off Guatemalan credit abroad, disrupting its oil supplies, and causing a run on its foreign reserves.²³ But it was on the propaganda front that American ingenuity shone at its brightest. Inasmuch as the Guatemalan government was being overthrown because it was communist, the fact of its communism would have to be impressed upon the rest of Latin America. Accordingly, the US Information Agency (USIA) began to place unattributed articles in foreign newspapers labeling particular Guatemalan officials as communist and referring to various actions by the Guatemalan government as "communist-inspired". In the few weeks prior to Arbenz's fall alone, more than 200 articles about Guatemala were written and placed in scores of Latin American newspapers.

Employing a method which was to become a standard CIA/USIA feature all over Latin America and elsewhere, as we shall see, articles placed in one country were picked up by newspapers in other countries, either as a result of CIA payment or unwittingly because the story was of interest. Besides the obvious advantage of multiplying the potential audience, the tactic gave the appearance that independent world opinion was taking a certain stand and further obscured the American connection.

The USIA also distributed more than 100,000 copies of a pamphlet entitled "Chronology of Communism in Guatemala" throughout the hemisphere, as well as 27,000 copies of anti-communist cartoons and posters. The American propaganda agency, moreover, produced three films on Guatemala, with predictable content, and newsreels favorable to the United States for showing free in cinemas.

Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York, a prelate possessed of anti-communism, a man who feared social change more than he feared God, was visited by the CIA. Would his Reverence arrange CIA contact with Archbishop Mariano Rossell Arellano of Guatemala? The Cardinal would be delighted. Thus it came to pass that on 9 April 1954, a pastoral letter was read in Guatemalan Catholic churches calling to the attention of the congregations the presence in the country of a devil called communism and demanding that the people "rise as a single man against this enemy of God and country", or at least not rally in Arbenz's defense. To appreciate the value of this, one must remember that Guatemala's peasant class was not only highly religious, but that very few of them were able to read. They would receive the Lord's Word only in this manner. For those who could read, many thousands of pamphlets carrying the Archbishop's message were air-dropped around the country.

In May, the CIA covertly sponsored a "Congress Against Soviet Intervention in Latin America" in Mexico City. The same month, Somoza called in the diplomatic corps in Nicaragua and told them, his voice shaking with anger, that his police had discovered a secret Soviet shipment of arms (which had been planted by the CIA) near the Pacific Coast, and suggested that the communists wanted to convert Nicaragua into "a new Korean situation". A few weeks later, an unmarked plane parachuted arms with Soviet markings onto Guatemala's coast.

On such fare did the people of Latin America dine for decades. By such tactics were they educated about "communism".

In late January 1954 the operation appeared to have suffered a serious setback when photostat copies of Liberation documents found their way into Arbenz's hands. A few days later, Guatemala's newspapers published copies of correspondence signed by Castillo Armas, Somoza and others under banner headlines. The documents revealed the existence

of some of the staging, training and invasion plans, involving, amongst others, the "Government of the North".²⁴

The State Department labeled the accusations of a US role "ridiculous and untrue" and said it would not comment further because it did not wish to give them a dignity they did not deserve. Said a Department spokesperson: "It is the policy of the United States not to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. This policy has repeatedly been reaffirmed under the present administration."

Time magazine gave no credence whatsoever to the possibility of American involvement in such a plot, concluding that the whole exposé had been "masterminded in Moscow".²⁵

The *New York Times* was not so openly cynical, but its story gave no indication that there might be any truth to the matter. "Latin American observers in New York," reported the newspaper, "said the 'plot' charges savored of communist influence." This article was followed immediately on the page by one headed "Red Labor Chiefs Meet. Guatemalan Confederation Opens Its Congress".²⁶

And the CIA continued with its preparations as if nothing had happened.

The offensive began in earnest on 18 June with planes dropping leaflets over Guatemala demanding that Arbenz resign immediately or else various sites would be bombed. CIA radio stations broadcast similar messages. That afternoon, the planes returned to machine-gun houses near military barracks, drop fragmentation bombs and strafe the National Palace.

Over the following week, the air attacks continued daily—strafing or bombing ports, fuel tanks, ammunition dumps, military barracks, the international airport, a school, and several cities; nine persons, including a three-year-old girl, were reported wounded; an unknown number of houses were set afire by incendiary explosives. During one night-time raid, a tape recording of a bomb attack was played over loudspeakers set up on the roof of the US Embassy to heighten the anxiety of the capital's residents. When Arbenz went on the air to try and calm the public's fear, the CIA radio team jammed the broadcast.

Meanwhile, the Agency's army had crossed into Guatemala from Honduras and captured a few towns, but its progress in the face of resistance by the Guatemalan army was unspectacular. On the broadcasts of the CIA's "Voice of Liberation" the picture was different: The rebels were everywhere and advancing; they were of large numbers and picking up volunteers as they marched; war and upheaval in all corners; fearsome battles and major defeats for the Guatemalan army. Some of these broadcasts were transmitted over regular public and even military channels, serving to convince some of Arbenz's officers that the reports were genuine. In the same way, the CIA was able to answer real military messages with fake responses. All manner of disinformation was spread and rumors fomented; dummy parachute drops were made in scattered areas to heighten the belief that a major invasion was taking place.

United Fruit Company's publicity office circulated photographs to journalists of mutilated bodies about to be buried in a mass grave as an example of the atrocities committed by the Arbenz regime. The photos received extensive coverage. Thomas McCann of the company's publicity office later revealed that he had no idea what the photos represented: "They could just as easily have been the victims of either side—or of an earthquake. The point is, they were widely accepted for what they were purported to be—victims of communism."²⁷

In a similar vein, Washington officials reported on political arrests and censorship in Guatemala without reference to the fact that the government was under siege (let alone who was behind the siege), that suspected plotters and saboteurs were the bulk of those being arrested, or that, overall, the Arbenz administration had a fine record on civil liberties. The performance of the American press in this regard was little better.

The primary purpose of the bombing and the many forms of disinformation was to make it appear that military defenses were crumbling, that resistance was futile, thus provoking confusion and division in the Guatemalan armed forces and causing some elements to turn against Arbenz. The psychological warfare conducted over the radio was directed by E. Howard Hunt, later of Watergate fame, and David Atlee Phillips, a newcomer to the CIA. When Phillips was first approached about the assignment, he asked his superior, Tracy Barnes, in all innocence, "But Arbenz became President in a free election. What right do we have to help someone topple his government and throw him out of office?"

"For a moment," wrote Phillips later, "I detected in his face a flicker of concern, a doubt, the reactions of a sensitive man." But Barnes quickly recovered and repeated the party line about the Soviets establishing "an easily expandable beachhead" in Central America.²⁸

Phillips never looked back. When he retired from the CIA in the mid-1970s, he founded the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, an organization formed to counteract the flood of unfavorable publicity sweeping over the Agency at the time.

American journalists reporting on the events in Guatemala continued to exhibit neither an investigative inclination nor a healthy conspiracy mentality. But what was obscure to the US press was patently obvious to large numbers of Latin Americans. Heated protests against the United States broke out during this week in June in at least eleven countries and was echoed by the governments of Ecuador, Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile which condemned American "intervention" and "aggression".

Life magazine noted these protests by observing that "world communism was efficiently using the Guatemalan show to strike a blow at the U.S." It scoffed at the idea that Washington was behind the revolt.²⁹ *Newsweek* reported that Washington "officials interpreted" the outcry "as an indication of the depth of Red penetration into the Americas".³⁰ A State Department memo at the time, however, privately acknowledged that much of the protest emanated from non-communist and even pro-American moderates.³¹

On 21 and 22 June, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Toriello made impassioned appeals to the United Nations for help in resolving the crisis. American UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge tried to block the Security Council from discussing a resolution to send an investigating team to Guatemala, characterizing Toriello's appeals as communist maneuvers. But under heavy pressure from UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the Council was convened. Before the vote, while Lodge worked on the smaller nations represented on the Council, Eisenhower and Dulles came down hard on France and Great Britain, both of whom favored the resolution. Said the President of the United States to his Secretary of State: "The British expect us to give them a free ride and side with them on Cyprus. And yet they won't even support us on Guatemala! Let's give them a lesson."³²

As matters turned out, the resolution was defeated by five votes to four, with Britain and France abstaining, although their abstentions were not crucial inasmuch as seven votes were required for passage. Hammarskjöld was so upset with the American machinations, which he believed undercut the strength of the United Nations, that he confided that he

might be forced "to reconsider my present position in the United Nations".³³

During this same period, the CIA put into practice a plan to create an "incident". Agency planes were dispatched to drop several harmless bombs on Honduran territory. The Honduran government then complained to the UN and the Organization of American States, claiming that the country had been attacked by Guatemalan planes.³⁴

Arbenz finally received an ultimatum from certain army officers: Resign or they would come to an agreement with the invaders. The CIA and Ambassador Peurifoy had been offering payments to officers to defect, and one army commander reportedly accepted \$60,000 to surrender his troops. With his back to the wall, Arbenz made an attempt to arm civilian supporters to fight for the government, but army officers blocked the disbursement of weapons. The Guatemalan president knew that the end was near.

The Voice of Liberation meanwhile was proclaiming that two large and heavily armed columns of invaders were moving towards Guatemala City. As the hours passed, the further advance of the mythical forces was announced, while Castillo Armas and his small band had actually not progressed very far from the Honduran border. The American disinformation and rumor offensive continued in other ways as well, and Arbenz, with no one he could trust to give him accurate information, could no longer be certain that there wasn't at least some truth to the radio bulletins.

Nothing would be allowed to threaten the victory so near at hand: A British freighter docked in Guatemala and suspected of having arrived with fuel for Arbenz's military vehicles, was bombed and sunk by a CIA plane after the crew had been warned to flee. It turned out that the ship had come to Guatemala to pick up a cargo of coffee and cotton.

A desperate Tortiello pleaded repeatedly with Ambassador Peurifoy to call off the bombings, offering even to reopen negotiations about United Fruit's compensation. In a long cable to John Foster Dulles, the foreign minister described the aerial attacks on the civilian population, expressed his country's defenselessness against the bombings, and appealed to the United States to use its good offices to put an end to them. In what must have been a deeply humiliating task, Tortiello stated all of this without a hint that the United States was, or could be, a party to any of it. The pleas were not simply too late. They had *always* been too late.

The Castillo Armas forces could not have defeated the much larger Guatemalan army, but the air attacks, combined with the belief in the invincibility of the enemy, persuaded Guatemalan military officers to force Arbenz to resign. No Communists, domestic or foreign, came to his aid. He asked the head of the officers, Army Chief of Staff Col. Carlos Diaz, only that he give his word not to negotiate with Castillo Armas, and Diaz, who despised the rebel commander as much as Arbenz did, readily agreed. What Diaz did not realize was that the United States would not be satisfied merely to oust Arbenz. Castillo Armas had been groomed as the new head of government, and that was not negotiable.

A CIA official, Enno Hobbing, who had just arrived in Guatemala to help draft a new constitution (sic) for the incoming regime, told Diaz that he had "made a big mistake" in taking over the government. "Colonel," said Hobbing, "you're just not convenient for the requirements of American foreign policy."

Presently, Peurifoy confronted Diaz with the demand that he deal directly with Castillo Armas. At the same time, the Ambassador showed the Guatemalan general a long list of names of some leaders, requiring that Diaz shoot them all within 24 hours.

"But why?" Diaz asked.

"Because they're communists," replied Peurifoy.³⁵

Although Diaz was not a communist sympathizer, he refused both requests, and indicated that the struggle against the invaders would continue.³⁶ Peurifoy left, livid with anger. He then sent a simple cable to CIA headquarters in Florida: "We have been doubled-crossed. BOMB!" Within hours, a CIA plane took off from Honduras, bombed a military base and destroyed the government radio station. Col. Castillo Armas, whose anti-communism the United States could trust, was soon the new leader of Guatemala.

The propaganda show was not yet over. At the behest of the CIA, Guatemalan military officers of the new regime took foreign correspondents on a tour of Arbenz's former residence where they could see for themselves rooms filled with school textbooks published in ... yes, the Soviet Union. The *New York Times* correspondent, Paul Kennedy, considered to be strongly anti-Arbenz, concluded that the "books had been planted" and did not bother to report the story.³⁷ *Time* made no mention of the books either, but somehow came upon the story that mobs had plundered Arbenz's home and found "stacks of communist propaganda and four bags of earth, one each from Russia, China, Siberia and Mongolia."³⁸ *Time's* article made it clear enough that it now knew of the American role in Arbenz's downfall (although certainly not the full story), but the magazine had nothing to say about the propriety of overthrowing a democratically elected government by force.

Castillo Armas celebrated the liberation of Guatemala in various ways. In July alone, thousands were arrested on suspicion of communist activity. Many were tortured or killed. In August a law was passed and a committee set up which could declare anyone a communist, with no right of appeal. Those so declared could be arbitrarily arrested for up to six months, could not own a radio or hold public office. Within four months the committee had registered 72,000 names. A committee official said it was aiming for 200,000.³⁹ Further implementation of the agrarian reform law was stopped and all expropriations of land already carried out were declared invalid.⁴⁰ United Fruit Company not only received all its land back, but the government banned the banana workers' unions as well. Moreover, seven employees of the company who had been active labor organizers were found mysteriously murdered in Guatemala City.⁴¹

The new regime also disenfranchised three-quarters of Guatemala's voters by barring illiterates from the electoral rolls and outlawed all political parties, labor confederations and peasant organizations. To this was added the closing down of opposition newspapers (which Arbenz had not done) and the burning of "subversive" books, including Victor Hugo's *Les Miserables*, Dostoyevsky novels, and the works of Guatemala's Nobel Prize-winning author Miguel Angel Asturias, a biting critic of United Fruit.⁴²

Meanwhile, John Foster Dulles, who was accused by Tortiello of seeking to establish a "banana curtain" in Central America,⁴³ was concerned that some "communists" might escape retribution. In cables he exchanged with Ambassador Peurifoy, Dulles insisted that the government arrest those Guatemalans who had taken refuge in foreign embassies and that "criminal charges" be brought against them to prevent them leaving the country, charges such as "having been covert Moscow agents". The Secretary of State argued that communists should be automatically denied the right of asylum because they were connected with an international conspiracy. The only way they should be allowed to leave, he asserted, was if they agreed to be sent to the Soviet Union. But Castillo Armas refused to accede to Dulles's wishes on this particular issue, influenced perhaps by the fact that he, as well as some of his colleagues, had been granted political asylum in an embassy at one time or another.⁴⁴

One of those who sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy was a 25-year-old

Argentine doctor named Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who had been living in Guatemala since sometime in 1953, had tried to spark armed resistance to the invading forces, but without any success. Guevara's experience in Guatemala had a profound effect upon his political consciousness. His first wife, Hilda Gadea, whom he met there, later wrote:

Up to that point, he used to say, he was merely a sniper, criticizing from a theoretical point of view the political panorama of our America. From here on he was convinced that the struggle against the oligarchic system and the main enemy, Yankee imperialism, must be an armed one, supported by the people.⁴⁵

In the wake of the coup, the United States confiscated a huge amount of documents from the Guatemalan government, undoubtedly in the hope of finally uncovering the hand of The International Communist Conspiracy behind Arbenz. If this is what was indeed discovered, it has not been made public.

On 30 June, while the dust was still settling, Dulles summed up the situation in Guatemala in a speech which was a monument to coldwar-speak:

[The events in Guatemala] expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system ... having gained control of what they call the mass organizations, [the communists] moved on to take over the official press and radio of the Guatemalan Government. They dominated the social security organization and ran the agrarian reform program ... dictated to Congress and to the President ... Arbenz ... was openly manipulated by the leaders of communism ... The Guatemalan regime enjoyed the full support of Soviet Russia ... [the] situation is being cured by the Guatemalians themselves.⁴⁶

When it came to rewriting history, however, Dulles's speech had nothing on these lines from a CIA memo written in August 1954 and only for internal consumption no less: "When the communists were forced by outside pressure to attempt to take over Guatemala completely, they forced Arbenz to resign [deleted]. They then proceeded to establish a Communist Junta under Col. Carlos Diaz."⁴⁷

And in October, John Peurifoy sat before a congressional committee and told them:

My role in Guatemala prior to the revolution was strictly that of a diplomatic observer ... The revolution that overthrew the Arbenz government was engineered and instigated by those people in Guatemala who rebelled against the policies and ruthless oppression of the Communist-controlled government.⁴⁸

Later, Dwight Eisenhower was to write about Guatemala in his memoirs. The former president chose not to offer the slightest hint that the United States had anything to do with the planning or instigation of the coup, and indicated that his administration had only the most tangential of connections to its execution.⁴⁹ (When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs were published in the West, the publisher saw fit to employ a noted Kremlinologist to annotate the work, pointing out errors of omission and commission.)

Thus it was that the educated, urbane men of the State Department, the CIA and the United Fruit Company, the pipe-smoking, comfortable men of Princeton, Harvard and Wall Street, decided that the illiterate peasants of Guatemala did not deserve the land which had been given to them, that the workers did not need their unions, that hunger and torture

were a small price to pay for being rid of the scourge of communism. The terror carried out by Castillo Armas was only the beginning. It was, as we shall see, to get much worse in time. It has continued with hardly a pause for 40 years.

In 1955, the *New York Times* reported from the United Nations that "The United States has begun a drive to scuttle a section of the proposed Covenant of Human Rights that poses a threat to its business interests abroad." The offending section dealt with the right of peoples to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. Said the newspaper: "It declares in effect that any country has the right to nationalize its resources ..."⁵⁰

11. Costa Rica mid-1950s Trying to topple an ally, part I

If ever the CIA maintained a love-hate relationship, it was with José Figueres, three times the head of state of Costa Rica.

On the one hand, Figueres, by his own admission in 1975, worked for the CIA "in 20,000 ways ... all over Latin America" for 30 years.¹ "I collaborated with the CIA when we were trying to topple Trujillo," he divulged, speaking of the Dominican Republic dictatorship.²

On the other hand, Figueres revealed that the Agency had twice tried to kill him.³ He did not elaborate, although he stated at the same time that he had tried for two years to get the Bay of Pigs invasion called-off. This may have precipitated one or both of the assassination attempts.

The CIA also tried to overthrow the Figueres government. In 1964, the first significant exposé of the Agency, *The Invisible Government*, disclosed that:

in the mid-1950s CIA agents intruded deeply into the political affairs of Costa Rica, the most stable and democratic republic in Latin America. Knowledgeable Costa Ricans were aware of the CIA's role. The CIA's purpose was to promote the ouster of José (Pepe) Figueres, the moderate socialist who became President in a fair and open election in 1953.⁴

Figueres remained in office until 1958, in this his first term as president; he had headed a liberal junta in the late 1940s.

The Agency's "major grievance was that Figueres had scrupulously recognized the right of asylum in Costa Rica—for non-Communists and Communists alike. The large influx of questionable characters complicated the agency's job of surveillance and forced it to increase its staff."⁵

The CIA's problems with Figueres actually went somewhat deeper. Costa Rica was a haven for hundreds of exiles fleeing from various Latin American right-wing dictatorships, such as in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and Figueres was providing groups of them with material and moral support in their plans to overthrow these regimes.⁶ To Figueres, this was entirely in keeping with his anti-totalitarian beliefs, directed against the left as well as the right. The problem was that the dictators targeted for overthrow were all members in good standing of the United States' anti-Communist, "Free-World" club.

States had no armaments industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations.

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for the development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society.

In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.

Akin to, and largely responsible for the sweeping changes in our industrial-military posture, has been the technological revolution during recent decades. In this revolution, research has become central; it also becomes more formalized, complex, and costly. A steadily increasing share is conducted for, by, or at the direction of, the Federal government.

Today, the solitary inventor, tinkering in his shop, has been overshadowed by task forces of scientists in laboratories and testing fields. In the same fashion, the free university, historically the fountainhead of free ideas and scientific discovery, has experienced a revolution in the con-

D O C U M E N T 1

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, FAREWELL
ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,

JANUARY 17, 1961

A few days before his departure from office, Eisenhower delivered this radio and television address which attracted unusual attention because of his warning against the dangers of "the military-industrial complex." In the drafting Eisenhower was assisted by Presidential aide Malcolm Moos.

Throughout America's adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace; to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity and integrity among people and among nations. To strive for less would be unworthy of a free and religious people. Any failure traceable to arrogance, or our lack of comprehension or readiness to sacrifice would inflict upon us grievous hurt both at home and abroad.

Progress toward these noble goals is persistently threatened by the conflict now engulfing the world. . . .

A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction.

Our military organization today bears little relation to that known by any of my predecessors in peacetime, or indeed by the fighting men of World War II or Korea.

Until the latest of our world conflicts the United

duct of research. Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes virtually a substitute for intellectual curiosity. For every old blackboard there are now hundreds of new electronic computers.

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—and is gravely to be regarded. Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.

It is the task of statesmanship to mold, to balance, and to integrate these and other forces, new and old, within the principles of our democratic system—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #10:

58. "*Killing Hope*: Syria, 1956-57."
59. "*Killing Hope*: The Middle East, 1957-58."
60. "*Killing Hope*: Indonesia, 1957-58."
61. "*Killing Hope*: Western Europe, 1950s & 1960s."
62. "*Killing Hope*: British Guiana, 1953-64."
63. "*Killing Hope*: Soviet Union, late 1940s to 1960s."
64. "*Killing Hope*: Italy, 1950s to 1970s."

(The American attitude toward Trujillo was later modified.) Moreover, Figueres had on occasion expressed criticism of the American policy of supporting such dictatorships, while neglecting the economic and social problems of the hemisphere.

These considerations could easily outweigh the fact that Figueres had established his anti-Communist credentials, albeit not of the "ultra" variety, and was no more a "socialist" than US Senator Hubert Humphrey. Although Figueres spoke out strongly at times against foreign investment, as president he was eminently accommodating to Central America's *bêtes noires*, the multinational fruit companies.⁷

In addition to providing support to Figueres's political opponents, the CIA, reported *The Invisible Government*, tried:

to stir up embarrassing trouble within the Communist Party in Costa Rica, and to attempt to link Figueres with the Communists. An effort to produce evidence that Figueres had been in contact with leading Communists during a trip to Mexico was unsuccessful. But CIA agents had better luck with the first part of their strategy—stirring up trouble for the Communists. They succeeded in planting a letter in a Communist newspaper. The letter, purportedly from a leading Costa Rican Communist, put him on record in opposition to the party line on the [1956] Hungarian revolution. Unaware that the letter was a CIA plant, the leading officials in the American Embassy held an urgent meeting to ponder its meaning. The political officer then dispatched a long classified report to Washington, alerting top policy makers to the possibility of a startling turn in Latin American Communist politics.⁹

In 1955 the Agency carried out an action against Figueres that was more immediately threatening. A deep personal and political animosity between Figueres and Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza had escalated into violence: an attempt against Somoza's life, launched from Costa Rica with Figueres's support, was countered by an invasion from Nicaragua by land and air. Figueres's biographer, Charles Ameringer, has related that:

Figueres accused the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency of aiding the Somoza movement against him. He claimed that the CIA felt indebted to Somoza for the help he had given in overthrowing the Arbenz regime. He asserted that the same pilots and planes (the F-47) that had participated in the attack upon Guatemala, "afterwards came from Nicaragua and machine-gunned eleven defenseless towns in our territory." According to Figueres, at the same time that the U.S. Department of State arranged the sale of fighter planes for Costa Rica's defense, CIA planes and pilots were flying sorties for the rebels.¹⁰

It is interesting to note that during this period, when virtually nothing had yet been revealed about such blatant CIA covert activities, the fact that the Agency had been caught red-handed tapping Figueres's telephone was worthy of condemnatory editorial comment by the *Washington Post* and a like statement by Senator Mike Mansfield on the floor of the Senate.¹¹

José Figueres did not regain the presidency of Costa Rica until 1970, at which time a renewed CIA effort to overthrow him was undertaken, for not very different reasons.

12. Syria 1956-1957

Purchasing a new government

"Neutrality," proclaimed John Foster Dulles in 1956, "has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and

shortsighted conception."¹

The short-sightedness of the neutralist government lay perhaps in its inability to perceive that its neutralism would lead to John Foster Dulles attempting to overthrow it.

Syria was not behaving like Washington thought a Third World government should. For one thing, it was the only state in the area to refuse all US economic or military assistance. Damascus did not much care for the strings which came attached—the acceptance of military aid usually meant the presence of American military advisers and technicians; furthermore, the US Mutual Security Act of 1955 specified that the recipient country agree to make a contribution to "the defensive strength of the free world", and declared it US policy "to encourage the efforts of other free nations ... to foster private initiative and competition [i.e., capitalism]."²

Another difficulty posed by Syria was that, although its governments of recent years had been more or less conservative and had refrained from unpleasant leftist habits like nationalizing American-owned companies, US officials—suffering from what might be called anti-Communist paranoia or being victims of their own propaganda—consistently saw the most ominous handwritings on the walls. To appreciate this, one has to read some of the formerly-secret-now-declassified documents of the National Security Council (NSC), based in part on reports received from the American embassy in Damascus during 1955 and 1956 ...

"If the popular leftward trend in Syria continues over any considerable period, there is a real danger that Syria will fall completely under left-wing control either by coup or usurpation of authority" ... "the fundamental anti-US and anti-West orientation of the Syrians is stimulated by inevitable political histrionics about the Palestine problem" ... "Four successive short-lived governments in Syria have permitted continuous and increasing Communist activities" ... "the Communists support the leftist cliques [in] the army" ... "apathy towards Communism on the part of politicians and army officers" is a threat to security ... "the Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party (ASRP)" and "the Communist Party of Syria are capable of bringing about further deterioration of Syrian internal security" ... danger of ASRP "coup d'état" and "increased Communist penetration of government and army" ... "Of all the Arab states Syria is at the present time the most wholeheartedly devoted to a neutralist policy with strong anti-Western overtones" ... "If the present trend continues there is a strong possibility that a Communist-dominated Syria will result, threatening the peace and stability of the area and endangering the achievement of our objectives in the Near East" ... we "should give priority consideration to developing courses of action in the Near East designed to affect the situation in Syria and to recommending specific steps to combat communist subversion" ...³

It would appear that the idea of military men who were leftist and/or apathetic to communists must truly have been an incongruous phenomenon to the American official mind. But nowhere in any of the documents is there mention of the leftists/Communists/ASRP having in fact done anything illegal or wicked, although the language employed is similar to what we saw in the Guatemala chapter: These people don't join anything, they "infiltrate", they "penetrate"; they "control", they're "opportunistic". In actuality, the behavior described is like that of other political animals: trying to influence key sectors of the society and win allies. But to the men holding positions of responsibility in the National Security Council and the State Department, the evil intent and danger of such people was so self-evident as not to require articulation.

There is one exception, perhaps expressed to explain away an uncomfortable observation:

In fact, the Communist Party does not appear to have as its immediate objective seizure of power. Rather it seeks to destroy national unity, to strengthen support for Soviet policies and opposition to Western policies and to exacerbate tensions in the Arab world. It has made significant progress toward these objectives.⁴

There is no indication of what the author had in mind by "national unity".

A leftist-oriented or communist-dominated Syrian government, reasoned the US ambassador to Syria, James Moose, Jr., would clearly threaten American interests in neighboring Turkey, which, in turn, could outflank all the states of the NATO alliance, and so forth and so on.⁵ It was clear that since the Syrian government could not be relied upon to do anything about this major impending disaster, something would have to be done about the Syrian government.

To this we add the usual Middle-Eastern intrigue: in this case, Iraq plotting with the British to topple the governments in both Syria and Nasser's Egypt; the British pressuring the Americans to join the conspiracy;⁶ and the CIA compromising—leave Nasser alone, at least for the time being, and we'll do something about Syria.⁷

An implausible scenario, scandalous, but in the time-honored tradition of the Middle East. The British were old hands at it. Dulles and the Americans, still exulting in their king-making in Iran, were looking to further remake the oil region in their own image.

Wilbur Crane Eveland was a staff member of the National Security Council, the high-level inter-agency group in Washington which, in theory, monitors and controls CIA clandestine activities. Because of Eveland's background and experience in the Middle East, the CIA had asked that he be lent to the Agency for a series of assignments there.

Archibald Roosevelt was, like his cousin Kermit Roosevelt, a highly-placed official of the CIA; both were grandsons of Teddy. Kermit had masterminded the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953. Archie had fond hopes of doing the same in Syria.

Michail Bey Ilyan had once served as Syria's foreign minister. In 1956 he was the leader of the conservative Populist Party.

At a meeting of these three men in Damascus, Syria on 1 July 1956, as described by Eveland in his memoirs, Roosevelt asked Ilyan "what would be needed to give the Syrian conservatives enough control to purge the communists and their leftist sympathizers. Ilyan responded by ticking off names and places: the radio stations in Damascus and Aleppo; a few key senior officers; and enough money to buy newspapers now in Egyptian and Saudi hands."

"Roosevelt probed further. Could these things, he asked Ilyan, be done with U.S. money and assets alone, with no other Western or Near Eastern country involved?"

"Without question, Ilyan replied, nodding gravely."

On 26 July, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser announced that his government was taking over the operation of the Suez Canal. The reaction of the British and French was swift and inflamed. The United States was less openly hostile, though it was critical and Egyptian government funds in the US were frozen. This unexpected incident put a crimp in the CIA's plans, for—as Ilyan explained to Eveland in despair—Nasser was now the hero of the Arab world, and collaboration with any Western power to overthrow an Arab government was politically indefensible.

Eventually the coup was scheduled for 25 October. The logistics, as outlined by Ilyan, called for senior colonels in the Syrian army to:

take control of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hamah. The frontier posts with Jordan, Iraq, and

Lebanon would also be captured in order to seal Syria's borders until the radio stations announced that a new government had taken over under Colonel Kabbani, who would place armored units at key positions throughout Damascus. Once control had been established, Ilyan would inform the civilians he'd selected that they were to form a new government, but in order to avoid leaks none of them would be told until just a week before the coup.

For this operation, money would have to change hands. Ilyan asked for and received half a million Syrian pounds (approximately \$167,000). The Syrian further stipulated that to guarantee their participation the Syrian plotters would require assurance from the highest level of the American government that the US would both back the coup and immediately grant recognition to the new government. This, Ilyan explained, could be communicated as follows: in April, President Eisenhower had said that the United States would oppose aggression in the Middle East, but not without congressional approval. Could the president repeat this statement, in light of the Suez crisis, he asked, on a specified date when Ilyan's colleagues would be told to expect it? Eisenhower's words would provide the guarantees they were seeking.

An affirmative reply to Ilyan's plan arrived in Damascus from Washington the next day. A proper occasion for the requested statement would have to be found and Secretary Dulles would be the one to use it. The scheme was for Dulles to make public reference to Eisenhower's statement between 16 and 18 October, thus giving Ilyan the week he needed to assemble his civilian team.

Before long, John Foster Dulles held a press conference. In light of recent Israeli attacks on Jordan, one of the reporters present asked whether the United States might come to Jordan's aid per "our declaration of April 9".

Yes, replied the Secretary of State, repeating the reference to the April statement. The date was 16 October.

But following close on the heels of this was a message from Ilyan in Damascus to Eveland in Beirut postponing the date of the coup for five days to 30 October because Colonel Kabbani had told Ilyan that his people weren't quite ready.

The postponement was crucial. Early in the morning of the 30th, a very distraught Michail Ilyan appeared at Eveland's door. "Last night," he cried, "the Israelis invaded Egypt and are right now heading for the Suez Canal! How could you have asked us to overthrow our government at the exact moment when Israel started a war with an Arab state?"⁸

The leftist-trend-in-Syria bell continued to ring in Washington. In January 1957, wrote President Eisenhower later, CIA Director Allen Dulles "submitted reports indicating that the new Syrian Cabinet was oriented to the left."⁹ Two months later, Dulles prepared a "Situation Report on Syria" in which he wrote of an "increasing trend toward a decidedly leftist, pro-Soviet government". Dulles was concerned with "organized leftist officers belonging to the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party".¹⁰ That same month, a State Department internal document stated:

The British are believed to favor active stimulation of a change in the present regime in Syria, in an effort to assure a pro-Western orientation on the part of future Syrian governments. ... The United States shares the concern of the British Government over the situation in Syria.¹¹

Then, in June, an internal Department of Defense memorandum spoke of a possible "leftist coup". This was to be carried out, according to the memo, against "the leftist Syrian Government".¹²

Thus it was that in Beirut and Damascus, CIA officers were trying their hands again at stage-managing a Syrian coup. On this occasion, Kermit Roosevelt, rather than cousin Archibald, was pulling the strings. He arranged for one Howard ("Rocky") Stone to be transferred to Damascus from the Sudan to be sure that the "engineering" was done by a "pro". Stone was, at thirty-two, already a legend in the CIA's clandestine service as the man who had helped Kim Roosevelt overthrow the Iranian government four years earlier, though what Stone's precise contribution was has remained obscure.

The proposed beneficiary of this particular plot was to be Adib Shishakly, former right-wing dictator of Syria, living covertly in Lebanon. Shishakly's former chief of security, Colonel Ibrahim Husseini, now Syrian military attaché in Rome, was secretly slipped into Lebanon under cover of a CIA-fabricated passport. Husseini was then to be smuggled across the Syrian border in the trunk of a US diplomatic car in order to meet with key Syrian CIA agents and provide assurances that Shishakly would come back to rule once Syria's government had been overthrown.

But the coup was exposed before it ever got off the ground. Syrian army officers who had been assigned major roles in the operation walked into the office of Syria's head of intelligence, Colonel Sarraj, turned in their bribe money and named the CIA officers who had paid them. Lieut. Col. Robert Molloy, the American army attaché, Francis Jeton, a career CIA officer, officially Vice Consul at the US Embassy, and the legendary Howard Stone, with the title of Second Secretary for Political Affairs, were all declared *personae non gratae* and expelled from the country in August.

Col. Molloy was determined to leave Syria in style. As his car approached the Lebanese border, he ran his Syrian motorcycle escort off the road and shouted to the fallen rider that "Colonel Sarraj and his commie friends" should be told that Molloy would "beat the shit out of them with one hand tied behind his back if they ever crossed his path again."

The Syrian government announcement which accompanied the expulsion order stated that Stone had first made contact with the outlawed Social Nationalist Party and then with the army officers. When the officers reported the plot, they were told to continue their contacts with the Americans and later met Shishakly and Husseini at the homes of US Embassy staff members. Husseini reportedly told the officers that the United States was prepared to give a new Syrian government between 300 and 400 million dollars in aid if the government would make peace with Israel.

An amusing aside to the affair occurred when the Syrian Defense Minister and the Syrian Ambassador to Italy disputed the claim that Husseini had anything to do with the plot. The Ambassador pointed out that Husseini had not been in Syria since 20 July and his passport showed no indication that he had been out of Italy since that time.

The State Department categorized the Syrian charge as "complete fabrications" and retaliated by expelling the Syrian ambassador and a Second Secretary and recalling the American ambassador from Syria. It marked the first time since 1915 that the United States had expelled a chief of mission of a foreign country.¹³

In the wake of the controversy, the *New York Times* reported that:

There are numerous theories about why the Syrians struck at the United States. One is that they acted at the instigation of the Soviet Union. Another is that the Government manufactured an anti-U.S. spy story to distract public attention from the significance of Syria's negotiations with Moscow.¹⁴

In the same issue, a *Times* editorial speculated upon other plausible-sounding explanations.¹⁵ Neither in its news report nor in its editorial did the *New York Times* seem to con-

sider even the possibility that the Syrian accusation might be true.

President Eisenhower, recalling the incident in his memoirs, offered no denial to the accusation. His sole comment on the expulsions was: "The entire action was shrouded in mystery but the suspicion was strong that the Communists had taken control of the government. Moreover, we had fresh reports that arms were being sent into Syria from the Soviet bloc."¹⁶

Syria's neutralism/"leftism" continued to obsess the United States. Five years later, when John F. Kennedy was in the White House, he met with British Prime Minister Macmillan and the two leaders agreed, according to a CIA report, on "Penetration and cultivation of disruptive elements in the Syrian armed forces, particularly in the Syrian army, so that Syria can be guided by the West."¹⁷

Decades later, Washington was still worried, though Syria had still not "gone communist".

13. The Middle East 1957-1958

The Eisenhower Doctrine claims another backyard for America

On 9 March 1957, the United States Congress approved a presidential resolution which came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was a piece of paper, like the Truman Doctrine and the Monroe Doctrine before it, whereby the US government conferred upon the US government the remarkable and enviable right to intervene militarily in other countries. With the stroke of a pen, the Middle East was added to Europe and the Western hemisphere as America's field of play.

The resolution stated that "the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." Yet, during this very period, as we have seen, the CIA initiated its operation to overthrow the government of Syria.

The business part of the resolution was contained in the succinct declaration that the United States "is prepared to use armed forces to assist" any Middle East country "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism". Nothing was set forth about non-communist or anti-communist aggression which might endanger world peace.

Wilbur Crane Eveland, the Middle East specialist working for the CIA at the time, had been present at a meeting in the State Department two months earlier called to discuss the resolution. Eveland read the draft, which stated that "many, if not all" of the Middle East states "are aware of the danger that stems from international communism". Later he wrote:

I was shocked. Who, I wondered, had reached this determination of what the Arabs considered a danger? Israel's army had just invaded Egypt and still occupied all of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. And, had it not been for Russia's threat to intervene on behalf of the Egyptians, the British, French, and Israeli forces might now be sitting in Cairo, celebrating Nasser's ignominious fall from power.¹

The simplistic and polarized view of the world implicit in the Eisenhower Doctrine ignored not only anti-Israeli sentiments but currents of nationalism, pan-Arabism, neutral-

ism and socialism prevalent in many influential quarters of the Middle East. The framers of the resolution saw only a cold-war battlefield and, in doing so, succeeded in creating one.

In April, King Hussein of Jordan dismissed his prime minister, Suleiman Nabulsi, amidst rumors, apparently well-founded, of a coup against the King encouraged by Egypt and Syria and Palestinians living in Jordan. It was the turning point in an ongoing conflict between the pro-West policy of Hussein and the neutralist leanings of the Nabulsi regime. Nabulsi had announced that in line with his policy of neutralism, Jordan would develop closer relations with the Soviet Union and accept Soviet aid if offered. At the same time, he rejected American aid because, he said, the United States had informed him that economic aid would be withheld unless Jordan "severs its ties with Egypt" and "consents to settlement of Palestinian refugees in Jordan", a charge denied by the State Department. Nabulsi added the commentary that "communism is not dangerous to the Arabs".

Hussein, conversely, accused "international communism and its followers" of direct responsibility for "efforts to destroy my country". When pressed for the specifics of his accusation, he declined to provide any.

When rioting broke out in several Jordanian cities, and civil war could not be ruled out, Hussein showed himself equal to the threat to his continued rule. He declared martial law, purged the government and military of pro-Nasser and leftist tendencies, and abolished all political opposition. Jordan soon returned to a state of relative calm.

The United States, however, seized upon Hussein's use of the expression "international communism" to justify rushing units of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean—a super aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and 15 destroyers, followed shortly by a variety of other naval vessels and a battalion of marines which put ashore in Lebanon—to "prepare for possible future intervention in Jordan".²

Despite the fact that nothing resembling "armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism" had taken place, the State Department openly invited the King to invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine.³ But Hussein, who had not even requested the show of force, refused, knowing that such a move would only add fuel to the fires already raging in Jordanian political life. He survived without it.

Sometime during this year the CIA began making secret annual payments to King Hussein, initially in the millions of dollars per year. The practice was to last for 20 years, with the Agency providing Hussein female companions as well. As justification for the payment, the CIA later claimed that Hussein allowed American intelligence agencies to operate freely in Jordan. Hussein himself provided intelligence to the CIA and distributed part of his payments to other government officials who also furnished information or cooperated with the Agency.⁴

A few months later, it was Syria which occupied the front stage in Washington's melodrama of "International Communism". The Syrians had established relations with the Soviet Union via trade, economic aid, and military purchases and training. The United States chose to see something ominous in this although it was a state of affairs engendered in no small measure by John Foster Dulles, as we saw in the previous chapter. American antipathy toward Syria was heightened in August following the Syrian government's exposure of the CIA-directed plot to overthrow it.

Washington officials and the American media settled easily into the practice of referring to Syria as a "Soviet satellite" or "quasi-satellite". This was not altogether objective or spontaneous reporting. Kennett Love, a *New York Times* correspondent in close contact to

the CIA (see Iran chapter), later disclosed some of the background:

The US Embassy in Syria connived at false reports issued in Washington and London through diplomatic and press channels to the effect that Russian arms were pouring into the Syrian port of Latakia, that "not more than 123 Migs" had arrived in Syria, and that Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Hameed Serraj, head of Syrian intelligence, had taken over control in a Communist-inspired coup. I travelled all over Syria without hindrance in November and December [1956] and found there were indeed "not more than 123 Migs". There were none. And no Russian arms had arrived for months. And there had been no coup, although some correspondents in Beirut, just a two-hour drive from Damascus, were dispatching without attribution false reports fed to them by embassy visitors from Damascus and a roving CIA man who worked in the guise of a US Treasury agent. Serraj, who was anti-Communist, had just broken the clumsy British-US-Iraqi-supported plot [to overthrow the Syrian government]. Syria was quiet but worried lest the propaganda presage a new *coup d'état* or a Western-backed invasion.⁵

As if to further convince any remaining skeptics, Eisenhower dispatched a personal emissary, Loy Henderson, on a tour of the Middle East. Henderson, not surprisingly, returned with the conclusion that "there was a fear in all Middle East countries that the Soviets might be able to topple the regimes in each of their countries through exploiting the crisis in Syria".⁶ He gave no indication as to whether the Syrians themselves thought they were going through a crisis.

As an indication of how artificial were the crises announced by the White House, how arbitrary were the doomsday pronouncements about the Soviet Union, let us consider the following from a Department of Defense internal memorandum of June 1957, about two months before Henderson went to the Middle East:

The USSR has shown no intention of direct intervention in any of the previous Mid-Eastern crises, and we believe it is unlikely that they would intervene, directly, to assure the success of a leftist coup in Syria.⁷

In early September, the day after Henderson returned, the United States announced that the Sixth Fleet was once again being sent to the Mediterranean and that arms and other military equipment were being rushed to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. A few days later, Saudi Arabia was added to the list. The Soviet Union replied with arms shipments to Syria, Egypt and Yemen.

The Syrian government accused the US of sending warships close to her coast in an "open challenge" and said that unidentified planes had been flying constantly over the Latakia area day and night for four days, Latakia being the seaport where Soviet ships arrived.

Syria further claimed that the US had "incited" Turkey to concentrate an estimated 50,000 soldiers on Syria's border. The Syrians ridiculed the explanation that the Turkish troops were only on maneuvers. Eisenhower later wrote that the troops were at the border with "a readiness to act" and that the United States had already assured the leaders of Turkey, Iraq and Jordan that if they "felt it necessary to take actions against aggression by the Syrian government, the United States would undertake to expedite shipments of arms already committed to the Middle Eastern countries and, further, would replace losses as quickly as possible." The president had no quarrel with the idea that such action might be taken to repel, in his words, the "anticipated aggression" of Syria, for it would thus be "basically defensive in nature" (emphasis added).⁸

The American role here may have been more active than Eisenhower suggests. One of his advisers, Emmet John Hughes, has written of how Under-Secretary of State Christian Herter, later to replace an ailing John Foster Dulles as Secretary, "reviewed in rueful detail

... some recent clumsy clandestine American attempts to spur Turkish forces to do some vague kind of battle with Syria".⁹

Dulles gave the impression in public remarks that the United States was anxious to somehow invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine, presumably as a "justification" for taking further action against Syria. But he could not offer any explanation of how this was possible. Certainly Syria was not going to make the necessary request.

The only solution lay in Syria attacking another Arab country which would then request American assistance. This appears to be one rationale behind the flurry of military and diplomatic activity directed at Syria by the US. A study carried out for the Pentagon some years later concluded that in "the 1957 Syrian crisis ... Washington seem[ed] to seek the initial use of force by target"¹⁰ (emphasis added; "target" refers to Syria).

Throughout this period, Washington officials alternated between striving to enlist testimonials from other Arab nations that Syria was indeed a variety of Soviet satellite and a threat to the region, and assuring the world that the United States had received a profusion of just such testimony. But Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia all denied that they felt threatened by Syria. Egypt, Syria's closest ally, of course concurred. At the height of the "crisis", King Hussein of Jordan left for a vacation in Europe. The Iraqi premier declared that his country and Syria had arrived at a "complete understanding". And King Saud of Saudi Arabia, in a message to Eisenhower, said that US concern over Syria was "exaggerated" and asked the president for "renewed assurances that the United States would refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Arab states". Saud added that "efforts to overturn the Syrian regime would merely make the Syrians more amenable to Soviet influence", a view shared by several observers on all sides.

At the same time, the *New York Times* reported:

From the beginning of the crisis over Syria's drift to the left, there has been less excitement among her Arab neighbors than in the United States. Foreign diplomats in the area, including many Americans, felt that the stir caused in Washington was out of proportion to the cause.

Eventually, Dulles may have been influenced by this lack of support for the American thesis, for when asked specifically to "characterize what the relation is between Soviet aims in the area and the part that Syria adds to them", he could only reply that "The situation internally in Syria is not entirely clear and fluctuates somewhat." Syria, he implied, was not yet in the grip of international Communism.

The next day, Syria, which had no desire to isolate itself from the West, similarly moderated its tone by declaring that the American warships had been 15 miles offshore and had continued "quietly on their way".¹¹

It appears that during this same restless year of 1957, the United States was also engaged in a plot to overthrow Nasser and his troublesome nationalism, although the details are rather sketchy. In January, when King Saud and Iraqi Crown Prince Abdul Illah were in New York at the United Nations, they were approached by CIA Director Allen Dulles and one of his top aides, Kermit Roosevelt, with offers of CIA covert planning and funding to topple the Egyptian leader whose radical rhetoric, inchoate though it was, was seen by the royal visitors as a threat to the very idea of monarchy. Nasser and other army officers had overthrown King Farouk of Egypt in 1952. Ironically, Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA have traditionally been given credit for somehow engineering this coup. However, it is by no means certain that they actually carried this out.¹²

"Abdul Illah," wrote Eveland, "insisted on British participation in anything covert, but the Saudis had severed relations with Britain and refused. As a result, the CIA dealt separately with each: agreeing to fund King Saud's part in a new area scheme to oppose Nasser and eliminate his influence in Syria; and to the same objective, coordinating in Beirut a covert working group composed of representatives of the British, Iraqi, Jordanian, and Lebanese intelligence services."¹³

The conspiracy is next picked up in mid-spring at the home of Ghosn Zogby in Beirut. Zogby, of Lebanese ancestry, was the chief of the CIA Beirut station. He and Kermit Roosevelt, who was staying with him, hosted several conferences of the clandestine planners. "So obvious," Eveland continued, "were their 'covert' gyrations, with British, Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese liaison personnel coming and going nightly, that the Egyptian ambassador in Lebanon was reportedly taking bets on when and where the next U.S. coup would take place." At one of these meetings, the man from the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) informed the gathering that teams had been fielded to assassinate Nasser.

Shortly afterwards, Eveland learned from a CIA official that John Foster Dulles, as well as his brother Allen, had directed Roosevelt to work with the British to bring down Nasser. Roosevelt now spoke in terms of a "palace revolution" in Egypt.¹⁴

From this point on we're fishing in murky waters, for the events which followed produced more questions than answers. With the six countries named above, plus Turkey and Israel apparently getting in on the act, and less than complete trust and love existing amongst the various governments, a host of plots, sub-plots and side plots inevitably sprang to life; at times it bordered on low comedy, though some would call it no more than normal Middle East "diplomacy".

Between July 1957 and October 1958, the Egyptian and Syrian governments and media announced the uncovering of what appear to be at least eight separate conspiracies to overthrow one or the other government, to assassinate Nasser, and/or prevent the expected merger of the two countries. Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the United States were most often named as conspirators, but from the entanglement of intrigue which surfaced it is virtually impossible to unravel the particular threads of the US role.¹⁵

Typical of the farcical goings-on, it seems that at least one of the plots to assassinate Nasser arose from the Dulles brothers taking Eisenhower's remark that he hoped "the Nasser problem could be eliminated" to be an order for assassination, when the president, so the story goes, was merely referring to improved US-Egyptian relations. Upon realizing the error, Secretary Dulles ordered the operation to cease.¹⁶ (Three years later, Allen Dulles was again to "misinterpret" a remark by Eisenhower as an order to assassinate Patrice Lumumba of the Congo.)

Official American pronouncements during this entire period would have had the world believe that the Soviet Union was the *eminece grise* behind the strife in Jordan, the "crisis" in Syria, and unrest generally in the Middle East; that the Soviet aim was to dominate the area, while the sole purpose of US policy was to repel this Soviet thrust and maintain the "independence" of the Arab nations. Yet, on three separate occasions during 1957—in February, April and September—the Soviet Union called for a four-power (US, USSR, Great Britain and France) declaration renouncing the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. The February appeal had additionally called for a four-power embargo on arms shipments to the region, withdrawal of all foreign troops, liquidation of all foreign bases, and a conference to reach a general Middle East settlement.

The Soviet strategy was clearly to neutralize the Middle East, to remove the threat it

had long felt from the potentially hostile control of the oil region by, traditionally, France and Great Britain, and now the United States, which sought to fill the "power vacuum" left by the decline of the two European nations as Middle East powers.

History does not relate what a Middle East free from big-power manipulation would have been like, for neither France, Great Britain, nor the United States was amenable to even calling the Soviet "bluff", if that was what it was. The *New York Times* summarized the attitude of the three Western nations to the first two overtures as one that "deprecated the Soviet proposals as efforts to gain recognition of a Soviet right to a direct voice in the affairs of the Middle East. They have told the Russians to take up their complaints through the United Nations."

Following the September proposal, John Foster Dulles, replying to a question at a press conference, said that "the United States is skeptical of these arrangements with the Soviet Union for 'hands-off'. What they are apt to mean is our hands off and their hands under the table." This appears to be the only public comment the US government saw fit to make on the matter.¹⁷

It may be instructive to speculate upon the reaction of the Western nations if the Soviet Union had announced a "Khrushchev Doctrine", ceding to itself the same scope of action in the Middle East as that stipulated in the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In January 1958, Syria and Egypt announced their plans to unite, forming the new nation of the United Arab Republic (UAR). The initiative for the merger had come from Syria who was motivated in no small part by her fear of further American power plays against her. Ironically, under the merger arrangement, the Communist Party, already outlawed in Egypt, was dissolved in Syria, an objective which a year and a half of CIA covert activity had failed to achieve.

Two weeks after the birth of the UAR, and in direct response to it, Iraq and Jordan formed the Arab Union, with the United States acting as midwife. This union was short lived, for in July a bloody coup in Iraq overthrew the monarchy, the new regime establishing a republic and promptly renouncing the pact. The trumpets of Armageddon could once more be heard distinctly in the Oval Office. "This somber turn of events," wrote Eisenhower in his memoirs, "could, without vigorous response on our part, result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East."¹⁸ Although the president would not be so crass as to mention a concern about oil, his anxiety attack was likely brought on by the fact that one of the greatest oil reserves in the world was now under rule of a government led by pro-Nasserites, which might well prove to be not as pliable an ally as the previous regime, and too independent of Washington.

The time for a mere show of force was over. The very next day, the marines, along with the American navy and air force, were sent in—not to Iraq, but to Lebanon.

Of all the Arab states, Lebanon was easily the United States' closest ally. She alone had supported the Eisenhower Doctrine with any enthusiasm or unequivocally echoed Washington's panic about Syria. To be more precise, it was the president of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, and the foreign minister, Charles Malik, a Harvard Ph.D. in philosophy, who had put all their cold-war eggs into the American basket. Chamoun had ample reason to be beholden to the United States. The CIA apparently played a role in his 1952 election,¹⁹ and in 1957 the Agency furnished generous sums of money to Chamoun to use in support of candidates in the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) June elections who would

back him and, presumably, US policies. Funds were also provided to specifically oppose, as punishment, those candidates who had resigned in protest over Chamoun's adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

As is customary in such operations, the CIA sent an "election specialist" along with the money to Beirut to assist in the planning. American officials in Washington and Lebanon proceeded on the assumption, they told each other, that Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia would also intervene financially in the elections. The American ambassador to Lebanon, Donald Heath, argued as well, apparently without ironic intention, that "With both the president and the new chamber of deputies supporting American principles, we'd also have a demonstration that representative democracy could work" in the Middle East.

To what extent the American funding helped, or even how the money was spent, is not known, but the result was a landslide for pro-government deputies; so much so, that it caused considerable protest within Lebanon, including the charge that Chamoun had stacked the parliament in order to amend the constitution to permit him to seek an otherwise prohibited second six-year term of office the following year.²⁰

By late April 1958, tensions in Lebanon had reached bursting point. The inordinate pro-American orientation of Chamoun's government and his refusal to dispel rumors that he would seek a second term incensed both Lebanese nationalists and advocates of the Arab nationalism which Nasser was promoting throughout the Middle East. Demands were made that the government return to the strict neutrality provided for in the National Pact of 1943 at the time of Lebanon's declaration of independence from France.

A rash of militant demonstrations, bombings and clashes with police took place, and when, in early May, the editor of an anti-government newspaper was murdered, armed rebellion broke out in several parts of the country, and US Information Agency libraries in Tripoli and Beirut were sacked. Lebanon contained all the makings of a civil war.

"Behind everything," wrote Eisenhower, "was our deep-seated conviction that the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble and that President Chamoun was motivated only by a strong feeling of patriotism."

The president did not clarify who or what he meant by "Communists". However, in the next paragraph he refers, without explanation, to the Soviet Union as "stirring up trouble" in the Middle East. And on the following page, the old soldier writes that "there was no doubt in our minds" about Chamoun's charge that "Egypt and Syria had been instigating the revolt and arming the rebels."²¹

In the midst of the fighting, John Foster Dulles announced that he perceived "international communism" as the source of the conflict and for the third time in a year the Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean; police supplies to help quell rioters, as well as tanks and other heavy equipment, were airlifted to Lebanon.

At a subsequent news conference, Dulles declared that even if international communism were not involved, the Eisenhower Doctrine was still applicable because one of its provisions stated that "the independence of these countries is vital to peace and the national interest of the United States." "That is certainly a mandate," he said, "to do something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter."²² Thus did one of the authors of the doctrine bestow upon himself a mandate.

Egypt and Syria, from all accounts, supported the rebels' cause with arms, men and money, in addition to inflammatory radio broadcasts from Cairo, although the extent of the material support is difficult to establish. A UN Observation Group went to Lebanon in June at the request of Foreign Minister Malik and reported that they found no evidence of UAR

intervention of any significance. A second UN report in July confirmed this finding. It is open to question, however, what degree of reliance can be placed upon these reports, dealing as they do with so thorny an evaluation and issued by a body in the business of promoting compromise.

In any event, the issue was whether the conflict in Lebanon represented a legitimate, home-grown civil war, or whether it was the doing of the proverbial "outside agitators". On this point, historian Richard Barnet has observed:

No doubt the Observation Group did minimize the extent of UAR participation. But essentially they were correct. Nasser was trying to exploit the political turmoil in Lebanon, but he did not create it. Lebanon, which had always abounded in clandestine arsenals and arms markets, did not need foreign weapons for its domestic violence. Egyptian intervention was neither the stimulus nor the mainstay of the civil strife. Once again a government that had lost the power to rule effectively was blaming its failure on foreign agents.²³

President Eisenhower—continuing his flip-flop thinking on the issue—wrote that it now seemed that Nasser "would be just as happy to see a temporary end to the struggle ... and contacted our government and offered to attempt to use his influence to end the trouble."²⁴

Camille Chamoun had sacrificed Lebanon's independence and neutrality on the altar of personal ambition and the extensive American aid that derived from subscribing to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Lebanese Muslims, who comprised most of Chamoun's opposition, were also galled that the Christian president had once again placed the country outside the mainstream of the Arab world, as he had done in 1956 when he refused to break relations with France and Great Britain following their invasion of Egypt.

Chamoun himself had admitted the significance of his pro-American alignment in a revealing comment to Wilbur Crane Eveland. Eveland writes that in late April,

I'd suggested that he might ease tensions by making a statement renouncing a move for reelection. Chamoun had snorted and suggested that I look at the calendar: March 23 was a month behind us, and no amendment to permit another term could legally be passed after that date. Obviously, as he pointed out, the issue of the presidency was not the real issue; renunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine was what his opponents wanted.²⁵

Instead of renouncing the doctrine, Chamoun invoked it. Although scattered fighting, at times heavy, was continuing in Lebanon, it was the coup in Iraq on 14 July that tipped the scales in favor of Chamoun making the formal request for military assistance and the United States immediately granting it. A CIA report of a plot against King Hussein of Jordan at about the same time heightened even further Washington's seemingly unceasing sense of urgency about the Middle East.

Chamoun had, by this time, already announced his intention to step down from office when his term expired in September. He was now concerned about American forces helping him to stay alive until that date, as well as their taking action against the rebels. For the previous two months, fear of assassination had kept him constantly inside the presidential palace, never so much as approaching a window. The murder of the Iraqi king and prime minister during the coup was not designed to make him feel more secure.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was put into motion not only in the face of widespread opposition to it within Lebanon, but in disregard of the fact that, even by the doctrine's own dubious provisions, the situation in Lebanon did not qualify: It could hardly be claimed that Lebanon had suffered "armed aggression from any country controlled by inter-

national communism". If further evidence of this were needed, it was provided by veteran diplomat Robert Murphy who was sent to Lebanon by Eisenhower a few days after the US troops had landed. Murphy concluded, he later wrote, that "communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection".²⁶

Yet, Eisenhower could write that the American Government "was moving in accord with the provisions of the Middle East Resolution [Eisenhower Doctrine], but if the conflict expanded into something that the Resolution did not cover, I would, given time, go to the Congress for additional authorization."²⁷ Apparently the president did not place too much weight on John Foster Dulles having already determined that the Resolution's mandate was open-ended.

Thus it was that American military forces were dispatched to Lebanon. Some 70 naval vessels and hundreds of aircraft took part in the operation, many remaining as part of the visible American presence. By 25 July, the US forces on shore totaled at least 10,600. By August 13, their number came to 14,000, more than the entire Lebanese Army and gendarmerie combined.²⁸

"In my [radio-TV] address," wrote Eisenhower, "I had been careful to use the term 'stationed in Lebanon rather than 'invading'."²⁹ This was likely a distinction lost upon many Lebanese, both high and low, supporters of the rebels and supporters of the government, including government tank forces who were prepared to block the entrance into Beirut of US troops; only the last-minute intercession on the spot by the American ambassador may have averted an armed clash.³⁰

At a meeting between Robert Murphy and Lebanese Commander-in-Chief General Faud Chehab—related by Eveland who was briefed by Murphy afterwards—the American diplomat was warned that the Lebanese people were "restless, resentful, and determined that Chamoun should resign and U.S. troops leave at once. Otherwise the general could not be responsible for the consequences. For fifteen years his officers had acted behind his back; now, he feared, they might revolt and attack the American forces."³¹

Murphy had listened patiently, Eveland relates, and then ...

escorted the general to a window overlooking the sea. Pointing to the supercarrier *Saratoga*, swinging at anchor on the horizon, the President's envoy had quietly explained that just one of its aircraft, armed with nuclear weapons, could obliterate Beirut and its environs from the face of the earth. To this, Murphy quickly added that he'd been sent to be sure that it wouldn't be necessary for American troops to fire a shot. Shehab [Chehab], he was certain, would ensure that there were no provocations on the Lebanese side. That, Murphy told me, ended the conversation. It now seemed that the general had "regained control" of his troops.³¹

None of the parties seem to have considered what would have been the fate of the thousands of American military personnel in a Beirut obliterated from the face of the earth.

Civil warfare in Lebanon increased in intensity in the two weeks following the American intervention. During this period, CIA transmitters in the Middle East were occupied in sending out propaganda broadcasts of disguised origin, a tactic frequently employed by the Agency. In the case of one broadcast which has been reported, the apparent aim was to deflect anti-US feelings onto the Soviet Union and other targets. But the residents of the Middle East were not the only ones who may have been taken in by the spurious broadcast, for it was picked up by the American press and passed on to an unwitting American public; the following appeared in US newspapers:

BEIRUT, July 23 (UPI)—A second mysterious Arab radio station went on the air yesterday call-

ing itself the "Voice of Justice" and claiming to be broadcasting from Syria. Its program heard here consisted of bitter criticism against Soviet Russia and Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Earlier the "Voice of Iraq" went on the air with attacks against the Iraqi revolutionary government. The "Voice of Justice" called Khrushchev the "hangman of Hungary" and warned the people of the Middle East they would suffer the same fate as the Hungarians if the Russians got a foothold in the Middle East.³²

On 31 July, the Chamber of Deputies easily chose General Chehab to succeed Chamoun as president in September, an event that soon put a damper on the fighting in Lebanon and marked the beginning of the end of the conflict which, in the final analysis, appears to have been more a violent protest than a civil war. Tension was further eased by the US announcement shortly afterwards of its intention to withdraw a Marine battalion as a prelude to a general withdrawal.

The last American troops left Lebanon in late October without having fired a shot in anger. What had their presence accomplished?

The authors of the Pentagon study referred to earlier concluded that "A balanced assessment of U.S. behavior in the Lebanon crisis is made difficult by the suspicion that the outcome might have been much the same if the United States had done nothing. Even Eisenhower expressed some doubt on this score."³³

American intervention against the new Iraqi government was more covert. A secret plan for a joint US-Turkish invasion of the country, code-named Operation CANNON-BONE, was drafted by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff shortly after the coup in 1958. Reportedly, only Soviet threats to intercede on Iraq's side forced Washington to hold back. But in 1960, the United States began to fund the Kurdish guerrillas in Iraq who were fighting for a measure of autonomy.³⁴

At the same time, the Iraqis, under Brig. General Abdul Karim Kassem, started to work towards the creation of an international organization to counter the power of the Western oil monopolies. This was to become OPEC, and was not received with joy in certain Western quarters. In February 1960, the Near East Division of the CIA's clandestine services requested that the Agency find a way to "incapacitate" Kassem for "promoting Soviet bloc political interests in Iraq". "We do not consciously seek subject's permanent removal from the scene," said the Near East Division. "We also do not object should this complication develop."

As matters turned out, the CIA mailed a monogrammed handkerchief containing an "incapacitating agent" to Kassem from an Asian country. If the Iraqi leader did in fact receive it, it certainly didn't kill him. That was left to his own countrymen who executed him three years later.³⁵

The significance of the Lebanese intervention, as well as the shows of force employed in regard to Jordan and Syria, extended beyond the immediate outcomes. In the period before and after the intervention, Eisenhower, Dulles and other Washington officials offered numerous different justifications for the American military action in Lebanon: protecting American lives; protecting American property; the Eisenhower Doctrine, with various interpretations; Lebanese sovereignty, integrity, independence, etc.; US national interest; world peace; collective self-defense; justice; international law; law and order; fighting "Nasserism" ... the need to "do something" ...³⁶

In summing up the affair in his memoirs, president Eisenhower seemed to settle upon

one rationale in particular, and this is probably the closest to the truth of the matter. This was to put the world—and specifically the Soviet Union and Nasser—on notice that the United States had virtually unlimited power, that this power could be transported to any corner of the world with great speed, that it could and would be used to deal decisively with any situation with which the United States was dissatisfied, for whatever reason.³⁷

At the same time, it was a message to the British and the French that there was only one Western superpower in the post-war world, and that their days as great powers in the Lands of Oil were over.

14. Indonesia 1957-1958

War and pornography

"I think it's time we held Sukarno's feet to the fire," said Frank Wisner, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans (cover operations), one day in autumn 1956.¹ Wisner was speaking of the man who had led Indonesia since its struggle for independence from the Dutch following the war. A few months earlier, in May, Sukarno had made an impassioned speech before the US Congress asking for more understanding of the problems and needs of developing nations like his own.²

The ensuing American campaign to unseat the flamboyant leader of the fifth most populous nation in the world was to run the gamut from large-scale military maneuvers to seedy sexual intrigue.

The previous year, Sukarno had organized the Bandung Conference as an answer to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the US-created political-military alliance of area states to "contain communism". In the Indonesian city of Bandung, the doctrine of neutralism had been proclaimed as the faith of the underdeveloped world. To the men of the CIA station in Indonesia the conference was heresy, so much so that their thoughts turned toward assassination as a means of sabotaging it.

In 1975, the Senate committee which was investigating the CIA heard testimony that Agency officers stationed in an East Asian country had suggested that an East Asian leader be assassinated "to disrupt an impending Communist [sic] Conference in 1955".³ (In all likelihood, the leader referred to was either Sukarno or Chou En-lai of China.) But, said the committee, cooler heads prevailed at CIA headquarters in Washington and the suggestion was firmly rejected.

Nevertheless, a plane carrying eight members of the Chinese delegation, a Vietnamese, and two European journalists to the Bandung Conference crashed under mysterious circumstances. The Chinese government claimed that it was an act of sabotage carried out by the US and Taiwan, a misfired effort to murder Chou En-lai. The chartered Air India plane had taken off from Hong Kong on 11 April 1955 and crashed in the South China Sea. Chou En-lai was scheduled to be on another chartered Air India flight a day or two later. The Chinese government, citing what it said were press reports from the *Times of India*, stated that the crash was caused by two time bombs apparently placed aboard the plane in Hong Kong. A clockwork mechanism was later recovered from the wrecked airliner and the Hong Kong police called it a case of "carefully planned mass murder". Months later, British police in Hong Kong announced that they were seeking a Chinese Nationalist for conspiracy to cause the crash, but that he had fled to Taiwan.⁴

In 1967 a curious little book appeared in India, entitled *I Was a CIA Agent in India*, by John Discoe Smith, an American. Published by the Communist Party of India, it was based on articles written by Smith for *Literaturnaya Gazeta* in Moscow after he had defected to the Soviet Union around 1960. Smith, born in Quincy, Mass. in 1926, wrote that he had been a communications technician and code clerk at the US Embassy in New Delhi in 1955, performing tasks for the CIA as well. One of these tasks was to deliver a package to a Chinese Nationalist which Smith later learned, he claimed, contained the two time bombs used to blow up the Air India plane. The veracity of Smith's account cannot be determined, although his employment at the US Embassy in New Delhi from 1954 to 1959 is confirmed by the *State Department Biographic Register*.⁵

Elsewhere the Senate committee reported that it had "received some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia", and that the planning had proceeded to the point of identifying an agent whom it was believed might be recruited for the job.⁶ (The committee noted that at one time, those at the CIA who were concerned with possible assassinations and appropriate methods were known internally as the "Health Alteration Committee".)

To add to the concern of American leaders, Sukarno had made trips to the Soviet Union and China (though to the White House as well), he had purchased arms from Eastern European countries (but only after being turned down by the United States),⁷ he had nationalized many private holdings of the Dutch, and, perhaps most disturbing of all, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had made impressive gains electorally and in union-organizing, thus earning an important role in the coalition government.

It was a familiar Third World scenario, and the reaction of Washington policy-makers was equally familiar. Once again, they were unable, or unwilling, to distinguish nationalism from pro-communism, neutralism from wickedness. By any definition of the word, Sukarno was no communist. He was an Indonesian nationalist and a "Sukarnoisist" who had crushed the PKI forces in 1948 after the independence struggle had been won.⁸ He ran what was largely his own show by granting concessions to both the PKI and the Army, balancing one against the other. As to excluding the PKI, with its more than one million members, from the government, Sukarno declared: "I can't and won't ride a three-legged horse."⁹

To the United States, however, Sukarno's balancing act was too precarious to be left to the vagaries of the Indonesian political process. It mattered not to Washington that the Communist Party was walking the legal, peaceful road, or that there was no particular "crisis" or "chaos" in Indonesia, so favored as an excuse for intervention. Intervention there would be.

It would not be the first. In 1955, during the national election campaign in Indonesia, the CIA had given a million dollars to the Masjumi party, a centrist coalition of Muslim organizations, in a losing bid to thwart Sukarno's Nationalist Party as well as the PKI. According to former CIA officer Joseph Burkholder Smith, the project "provided for complete write-off of the funds, that is, no demand for a detailed accounting of how the funds were spent was required. I could find no clue as to what the Masjumi did with the million dollars."¹⁰

In 1957, the CIA decided that the situation called for more direct action. It was not difficult to find Indonesian colleagues-in-arms for there already existed a clique of army officers and others who, for personal ambitions and because they disliked the influential position of the PKI, wanted Sukarno out, or at least out of their particular islands. (Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago, consisting of some 3,000 islands.)

The military operation the CIA was opting for was of a scale that necessitated significant assistance from the Pentagon, which could be secured for a political action mission only if approved by the National Security Council's "Special Group" (the small group of

top NSC officials who acted in the president's name, to protect him and the country by evaluating proposed covert actions and making certain that the CIA did not go off the deep end; known at other times as the 5412 Committee, the 303 Committee, the 40 Committee, or the Operations Advisory Group).

The manner in which the Agency went about obtaining this approval is a textbook example of how the CIA sometimes determines American foreign policy. Joseph Burkholder Smith, who was in charge of the Agency's Indonesian desk in Washington from mid-1956 to early 1958, has described the process in his memoirs: Instead of first proposing the plan to Washington for approval, where "premature mention ... might get it shot down" ...

we began to feed the State and Defense departments intelligence that no one could deny was a useful contribution to understanding Indonesia. When they had read enough alarming reports, we planned to spring the suggestion we should support the colonels' plans to reduce Sukarno's power. This was a method of operation which became the basis of many of the political action adventures of the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, the statement is false that CIA undertook to intervene in the affairs of countries like Chile *only after* being ordered to do so by ... the Special Group. ... In many instances, we made the action programs up ourselves after we had collected enough intelligence to make them appear required by the circumstances. Our activity in Indonesia in 1957-1958 was one such instance.¹¹ (Emphasis in original.)

When the Communist Party did well again in local elections held in July, the CIA viewed it as "a great help to us in convincing Washington authorities how serious the Indonesian situation was. The only person who did not seem terribly alarmed at the PKI victories was Ambassador Allison. This was all we needed to convince John Foster Dulles finally that he had the wrong man in Indonesia. The wheels began to turn to remove this last stumbling block in the way of our operation."¹² John Allison, wrote Smith, was not a great admirer of the CIA to begin with. And in early 1958, after less than a year in the post, he was replaced as ambassador by Howard Jones, whose selection "pleased" the CIA Indonesia staff.¹³

On 30 November 1957, several hand grenades were tossed at Sukarno as he was leaving a school. He escaped injury, but 10 people were killed and 48 children injured. The CIA in Indonesia had no idea who was responsible, but it quickly put out the story that the PKI was behind it "at the suggestion of their Soviet contacts in order to make it appear that Sukarno's opponents were wild and desperate men". As it turned out, the culprits were a Muslim group not associated with the PKI or with the Agency's military plotters.¹⁴

The issue of Sukarno's supposed hand-in-glove relationship with Communists was pushed at every opportunity. The CIA decided to make capital of reports that a good-looking blonde stewardess had been aboard Sukarno's aircraft everywhere he went during his trip in the Soviet Union and that the same woman had come to Indonesia with Soviet President Kliment Voroshilov and had been seen several times in the company of Sukarno. The idea was that Sukarno's well-known womanizing had trapped him in the spell of a Soviet female agent. He had succumbed to Soviet control, CIA reports implied, as a result of her influence or blackmail, or both.

"This formed the foundation of our flights of fancy," wrote Smith. "We had as a matter of fact, considerable success with this theme. It appeared in the press around the world, and when *Rosmond Table*, the serious British quarterly of international affairs, came to analyze the Indonesian revolt in its March 1958 issue, it listed Sukarno's being blackmailed by a Soviet female spy as one of the reasons that caused the uprising."

Seemingly, the success of this operation inspired CIA officers in Washington to carry

the theme one step further. A substantial effort was made to come up with a pornographic film or at least some still photographs that could pass for Sukarno and his Russian girl friend engaged in "his favorite activity". When scrutiny of available porno films (supplied by the Chief of Police of Los Angeles) failed to turn up a couple who could pass for Sukarno (dark and bald) and a beautiful blonde Russian woman, the CIA undertook to produce its own films, "the very films with which the Soviets were blackmailing Sukarno". The Agency developed a full-face mask of the Indonesian leader which was to be sent to Los Angeles where the police were to pay some porno-film actor to wear it during his big scene. This project resulted in at least some photographs, although they apparently were never used.¹⁵

Another outcome of the blackmail effort was a film produced for the CIA by Robert Maheu, former FBI agent and intimate of Howard Hughes. Maheu's film starred an actor who resembled Sukarno. The ultimate fate of the film, which was entitled "Happy Days", has not been reported.¹⁶

In other parts of the world, at other times, the CIA has done better in this line of work, having produced sex films of target subjects caught in *flagrante delicto* who had been lured to Agency safe-houses by female agents.

In 1960, Col. Truman Smith, US Army Ret., writing in *Reader's Digest* about the KGB, declared: "It is difficult for most of us to appreciate its menace, as its methods are so debased as to be all but beyond the comprehension of any normal person with a sense of right and wrong." One of the KGB methods the good colonel found so debased was the making of sex films to be used as blackmail. "People depraved enough to employ such methods," he wrote, "find nothing distasteful in more violent methods."¹⁷

Sex could be used at home as well to further the goals of American foreign policy. Under the cover of the US foreign aid program, at that time called the Economic Cooperation Administration, Indonesian policemen were trained and then recruited to provide information on Soviet, Chinese and PKI activities in their country. Some of the men singled out as good prospects for this work were sent to Washington for special training and to be softened up for recruitment. Like Sukarno, reportedly, these police officers invariably had an obsessive desire to sleep with a white woman. Accordingly, during their stay they were taken to Baltimore's shabby sex district to indulge themselves.¹⁸

The Special Group's approval of the political action mission was forthcoming in November 1957,¹⁹ and the CIA's paramilitary machine was put into gear. In this undertaking, as in others, the Agency enjoyed the advantage of the United States' far-flung military empire. Headquarters for the operation were established in neighboring Singapore, courtesy of the British; training bases set up in the Philippines; airstrips laid out in various parts of the Pacific to prepare for bomber and transport missions; Indonesians, along with Filipinos, Taiwanese, Americans, and other "soldiers of fortune" were assembled in Okinawa and the Philippines along with vast quantities of arms and equipment.

For this, the CIA's most ambitious military operation to date, tens of thousands of rebels were armed, equipped and trained by the US Army. US Navy submarines, patrolling off the coast of Sumatra, the main island, put over-the-beach parties ashore along with supplies and communications equipment. The US Air Force set up a considerable Air Transport force which air-dropped many thousands of weapons deep into Indonesian territory. And a fleet of 15 B-26 bombers was made available for the conflict after being "sanitized" to ensure that they were "non-attributable" and that all airborne equipment was "deniable".

In the early months of 1958, rebellion began to break out in one part of the Indonesian island chain, then another. CIA pilots took to the air to carry out bombing and strafing mis-

sions in support of the rebels. In Washington, Col. Alex Kawilarung, the Indonesian military attaché, was persuaded by the Agency to "defect". He soon showed up in Indonesia to take charge of the rebel forces. Yet, as the fighting dragged on into spring, the insurgents proved unable to win decisive victories or take the offensive, although the CIA bombing raids were taking their toll. Sukarno later claimed that on a Sunday morning in April, a plane bombed a ship in the harbor of the island of Ambon—all those aboard losing their lives—as well as hitting a church, which demolished the building and killed everyone inside. He stated that 700 casualties had resulted from this single run.

On 15 May, a CIA plane bombed the Ambon marketplace, killing a large number of civilians on their way to church on Ascension Thursday. The Indonesian government had to act to suppress public demonstrations.

Three days later, during another bombing run over Ambon, a CIA pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down and captured. Thirty years old, from Perrine, Florida, Pope had flown 55 night missions over Communist lines in Korea for the Air Force. Later he spent two months flying through Communist flak for the CIA to drop supplies to the French at Dien Bien Phu. Now his luck had run out. He was to spend four years as a prisoner in Indonesia before Sukarno acceded to a request from Robert Kennedy for his release.

Pope was captured carrying a set of incriminating documents, including those which established him as a pilot for the US Air Force and the CIA airline CAT. Like all men flying clandestine missions, Pope had gone through an elaborate procedure before taking off to "sanitize" him, as well as his aircraft. But he had apparently smuggled the papers aboard the plane, for he knew that to be captured as an "anonymous, stateless civilian" meant having virtually no legal rights and running the risk of being shot as a spy in accordance with custom. A captured US military man, however, becomes a commodity of value for his captors while he remains alive.

The Indonesian government derived immediate material concessions from the United States as a result of the incident. Whether the Indonesians thereby agreed to keep silent about Pope is not known, but on 27 May the pilot and his documents were presented to the world at a news conference, thus contradicting several recent statements by high American officials.²⁰ Notable amongst these was President Eisenhower's declaration on 30 April concerning Indonesia: "Our policy is one of careful neutrality and proper deportment all the way through so as not to be taking sides where it is none of our business."²¹

And on 9 May, an editorial in the *New York Times* had stated:

It is unfortunate that high officials of the Indonesian Government have given further circulation to the false report that the United States Government was sanctioning aid to Indonesia's rebels. The position of the United States Government has been made plain, again and again. Our Secretary of State was emphatic in his declaration that this country would not deviate from a correct neutrality ... the United States is not ready ... to step in to help overthrow a constituted government. Those are the hard facts. Jakarta does not help its case, here, by ignoring them.

With the exposure of Pope and the lack of rebel success in the field, the CIA decided that the light was no longer worth the candle, and began to curtail its support. By the end of June, Indonesian army troops loyal to Sukarno had effectively crushed the dissident military revolt.

The Indonesian leader continued his adroit balancing act between the Communists and the army until 1965, when the latter, likely with the help of the CIA, finally overthrew his regime.

15. Western Europe 1950s and 1960s

Fronts within fronts within fronts

At the British Labour Party conference in 1960, Michael Foot, the party's future leader and a member of its left wing, was accused of being a "fellow traveller" by then-leader Hugh Gaitskell. Foot responded with a reference to Gaitskell and others of the party's right wing: "But who," he asked, "are they travelling with?"¹

They, it turned out, had been travelling with the CIA for some years. Fellow passengers were Frenchmen, Germans, Dutch, Italians, and a host of other West Europeans; all taking part in a CIA operation to win the hearts and minds of liberals, social democrats, and assorted socialists, to keep them from the clutches of the Russian bear.

It was an undertaking of major proportions. For some 20 years, the Agency used dozens of American foundations, charitable trusts and the like, including a few of its own creation, as conduits for payments to all manner of organizations in the United States and abroad, many of which, in turn, funded other groups. So numerous were the institutions involved, so many were the interconnections and overlaps, that it is unlikely that anyone at the CIA had a grasp of the full picture, let alone exercised broad control over it or proper accounting. (See Appendix I for a partial organizational chart.)

The ultimate beneficiaries of this flow of cash were political parties, magazines, news agencies, journalists' unions, other unions and labor organizations, student and youth groups, lawyers' associations, and other enterprises already committed to "The Free World" which could be counted upon to spread the gospel further if provided with sufficient funding.

The principal front organization set up by the CIA in this period was the grandly named Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). In June 1950, prominent literati and scientists of the United States and Europe assembled in the Titiana Palace Theatre, in the American Zone of Berlin, before a large audience to launch the organization whose purpose was to "defend freedom and democracy against the new tyranny sweeping the world". The CCF was soon reaching out in all directions with seminars, conferences, and a wide program of political and cultural activities in Western Europe as well as India, Australia, Japan, Africa and elsewhere. It had, moreover, more than 30 periodicals under its financial wing, including, in Europe:

Socialist Commentary, *Censorship, Science and Freedom*, *Minerva*, *Soviet Survey* (or *Survey*), *China Quarterly*, and *Encounter* in Great Britain;

Preuves, *Censure Contre les Artes et la Pensée*, *Mundo Nuevo*, and *Cuadernos* in France (the last two in Spanish, aimed at Latin America);

Perspektiv in Denmark, *Argumenten* in Sweden, *Irodalmi Ujsag* in Hungary, *Der Monat* in Germany, *Forum* in Austria, *Tempo Presente* in Italy, and *Vision* in Switzerland.

There were as well CCF links to *The New Leader*, *Africa Report*, *East Europe* and *Atlas* in New York.²

Generally, the CCF periodicals were well-written political and cultural magazines which, in the words of former CIA executive Ray Cline, "would not have been able to survive financially without CIA funds".³

Amongst the other media-related organizations subsidized by the CIA in Europe at this time were the West German news agency DENA (later known as DPA),⁴ the international association of writers PEN, located in Paris, certain French newspapers,⁵ the International

Federation of Journalists, and Forum World Features, a news feature service in London whose stories were bought by some 140 newspapers around the world, including about 30 in the United States, amongst which were the *Washington Post* and four other major dailies. The Church committee of the US Senate reported that "major U.S. dailies" which took the service were informed that Forum World Features was "CIA-controlled". *The Guardian* and *The Sunday Times* of Great Britain also used the service, which earlier had been called Forum Service. By 1967, according to one of Forum's leading writers, the news service had become perhaps "the principal CIA media effort in the world", no small accomplishment when one considers that the CIA, in its heyday, was devoting a reported 29 percent of its budget to media and propaganda.⁶

Another important recipient of CIA beneficence was Axel Springer, the West German press baron who was secretly funneled about \$7 million in the early 1950s to help him build up his vast media empire. Springer, until he died in 1985, was the head of the largest publishing conglomerate in Western Europe, standing as a tower of pro-Western and anti-communist sentiment. The publisher of the influential West German weekly *Der Spiegel*, Rudolph Augstein, has observed: "No single man in Germany, before or after Hitler, with the possible exception of Bismarck or the two emperors, has had so much power as Springer." His relationship with the CIA reportedly continued until at least the early 1970s.⁷

The originator of the American program, the head of the CIA's International Organizations Division, Tom Braden, later wrote that the Agency placed one operative in the CCF and that another became an editor of the CCF's most important magazine, *Encounter*.⁸ Presumably there was at least one CIA agent or officer in each of the funded groups. Braden stated that "The agents could ... propose anti-Communist programs to the official leaders of the organizations." He added, however, that it was a policy to "protect the integrity of the organization by not requiring it to support every aspect of official American policy."⁹

The Cultural Freedom journals appealed to the non-Marxist left (Forum, by contrast, was conservative), generally eschewing the class struggle and excessive nationalization of industry. They subscribed to Daniel Bell's "the end of ideology" thesis, the *raison d'être* of which was that since no one could call for dying for capitalism with a straight face, the idea of dying for socialism or any other ideology had to be discredited. At the same time, the journals advocated a reformed capitalism, a capitalism with a human face.

To the cold warriors in Washington who were paying the bills, however, the idea of reforming capitalism was of minimal interest. What was of consequence was the commitment of the magazines to a strong, well-armed, and united Western Europe, allied to the United States, which would stand as a bulwark against the Soviet bloc; support for the Common Market and NATO; critical analysis of what was seen as the intellectual component of international communist subversion; skepticism of the disarmament, pacifism, and neutralism espoused by the likes of the prominent Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Great Britain. Criticism of US foreign policy took place within the framework of cold-war assumptions; for example, that a particular American intervention was not the most effective way of combating communism, not that there was anything wrong with intervention *per se* or that the United States was supporting the wrong side.

"Private" publications such as these could champion views which official US government organs like the Voice of America could not, and still be credible. The same was true of the many other private organizations on the CIA payroll at this time.

In 1960, CND and other elements of the Labour Party's left wing succeeded in winning over the party's conference to a policy of complete, unilateral nuclear disarmament and neutrality in the cold war. In addition, two resolutions supporting NATO were voted down. Although the Labour Party was not in power at the time, the actions carried considerable propaganda and psychological value. Washington viewed the turn of events with not a little anxiety, for such sentiments could easily spread to the major parties of other NATO countries.

The right wing of the Labour Party, which had close, not to say intimate, connections to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, *Encounter*, *New Leader*, and other CIA "assets" and fronts, undertook a campaign to reverse the disarmament resolution. The committee set up for the purpose issued an appeal for funds, and soon could report that many small donations had been received, together with a large sum from a source that wished to remain anonymous. Over the next year, there was sufficient funding for a permanent office, a full-time, paid chairman and paid staff, field workers, traveling expenses, tons of literature sent to a large mailing list within the movement, a regular bulletin sent free, etc.

Their opponents could not come close to matching this propaganda blitz. At the 1961 conference, the unilateralist and neutralist decisions were decisively overturned and the Labour Party returned to the NATO fold.¹⁰

Supporters of the CIA have invariably defended the Agency's sundry activities in Western Europe on the grounds that the Russians were the first to be so engaged there and had to be countered. Whatever truth there may be in this assertion, the fact remains, as Tom Braden has noted, that the American effort spread to some fields "where they [the Russians] had not even begun to operate."¹¹ Braden doesn't specify which fields, but it seems that political parties was one: The CIA had working/financial relationships with leading members of the West German Social Democratic Party, two parties in Austria, the Christian Democrats of Italy, and the Liberal Party, in addition to the Labour Party, in Britain,¹² and probably at least one party in every other Western European country, all of which purported to be independent of either superpower, something the various Communist parties, whether supported by the Soviet Union or not, could never get away with.

The media provides another case in point. Neither Braden, nor anyone else apparently, has cited examples of publications or news agencies in Western Europe—pro-Communist or anti-Nato, etc.—which, ostensibly independent in the cold war, were covertly funded by the Soviet Union.

More importantly, it should be borne in mind that all the different types of enterprises and institutions supported by the CIA in Western Europe were supported by the Agency all over the Third World for decades on a routine basis without a Russian counterpart in sight. The growing strength of the left in post-war Europe was motivation enough for the CIA to develop its covert programs, and this was a circumstance deriving from World War II and the economic facts of life, not from Soviet propaganda and manipulation.

Operation Gladio

The rationale behind it was your standard cold-war paranoia: There's a good chance the Russians will launch an unprovoked invasion of Western Europe. And if they defeated the Western armies and forced them to flee, certain people had to remain behind to harass the Russians with guerrilla warfare and sabotage, and act as liaisons with those abroad. The "stay-behinds" would be provided with funds, weapons, communication equipment and training exercises. The planning for this covert paramilitary network, code-named

"Operation Gladio" (Italian for "sword"), began in 1949, involving initially the British, the Americans and the Belgians. It eventually established units in every non-communist country in Europe—including Greece and Turkey and neutral Sweden and Switzerland—with the apparent exceptions of Ireland and Finland. The question of whether the units were more under the control of national governments or NATO remains purposefully unclear, although from an operational point of view, it appears that the CIA and various other intelligence services were calling the shots.

As matters turned out, in the complete absence of any Russian invasions, the operation was used almost exclusively to inflict political damage upon domestic leftist movements.

The Gladio story broke in Italy in the fall of 1990, stemming from a judicial investigation into a 1972 car-bombing which discovered that the explosives had come from one of the 139 secret weapons depots kept for Gladio's forces in Italy. Subsequently, the head of the Italian parliamentary inquiry into the matter revealed that "When Gladio was started, the Americans would often insist ... that the organization also had to be used to counter any insurgencies." Retired Greek Gen. Nikos Kouris told a similar story, declaring that a Greek force was formed with CIA help in 1955 to intervene in case of Communist threat, whether external or internal. "There were ex-military men, specially trained soldiers and also civilians. What held them together was one ideological common denominator: extreme rightism."

As in Germany (see Germany chapter), the Italian operation was closely tied to terrorists. A former Gladio agent, Roberto Cavallero, went public to charge that there was a direct link between Gladio and Italy's wave of terrorist bombings in the 1970s and early 1980s which left at least 300 dead. He said that Gladio had trained him and many others "to prepare groups which, in the event of an advance by left wing forces in our country, would fill the streets, creating a situation of such tension as to require military intervention." Cavallero was of course referring to electoral advances of the Italian Communist Party, not an invasion by the Soviet Union.

The single worst terrorist action was the bombing at the Bologna railway station in August 1980 which claimed 86 lives. The *Observer* of London later reported:

The Italian railway bombings were blamed on the extreme Left as part of a strategy to convince voters that the country was in a state of tension and that they had no alternative to voting the safe Christian Democrat ticket. All clues point to the fact that they were masterminded from within Gladio.

One of the men sought for questioning in Italy about the Bologna bombing, Roberto Fiore, has lived in London ever since and the British government has refused to extradite him. He is apparently under the protective wing of MI6 (Britain's CIA) for whom he has provided valuable intelligence.

The kidnapping and murder in 1978 of Aldo Moro, the leader of the Christian Democrats, which was attributed to the Red Brigades, appears now to have also been the work of Gladio agents provocateurs who infiltrated the organization. Just prior to his abduction, Moro had announced his intention to enter into a governmental coalition with the Communist Party. Colonel Oswald Le Winter of the CIA, who served as a US liaison officer with Gladio, has stated that the planning staff of the Red Brigades was made up of intelligence agents.

In Belgium, in 1983, to convince the public that a security crisis existed, Gladio operatives as well as police officers staged a series of seemingly random shootings in supermarkets which, whether intended or not, led to several deaths. A year later, a party of US Marines parachuted into Belgium with the intention of attacking a police station. One

Belgian citizen was killed and one of the Marines lost an eye in the operation, that was intended to jolt the local Belgian police into a higher state of alert, and to give the impression to the comfortable population at large that the country was on the brink of Red revolution. Guns used in the operation were later planted in a Brussels house used by a Communist splinter group.

As late as 1990, large stockpiles of weapons and explosives for Operation Gladio could still be found in some member countries, and Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti disclosed that more than 600 people still remained on the Gladio payroll in Italy.¹³

16. British Guiana 1953-1964

The CIA's international labor mafia

For a period of 11 years, two of the oldest democracies in the world, Great Britain and the United States, went to great lengths to prevent a democratically elected leader from occupying his office.

The man was Dr. Cheddi Jagan. The grandson of indentured immigrants from India, Jagan had become a dentist in the United States, then returned to his native Guiana. In 1953, at the age of 35, he and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) were elected by a large majority to head the government of the British colony. Jagan's victory was due in part to the fact that Indians comprised about 46 percent of the population; those of African origin made up about 36 percent.

The PPP's program in office was hardly revolutionary. It encouraged foreign investment in the mining sectors while attempting to institute liberal reforms such as strengthening the rights of unionists and tenant farmers, creating a public school system that would lessen church control of education, and removing a ban on the import of "undesirable" publications, films and records. But the British Conservative government was not disposed to live with such policies advocated by a man who talked suspiciously like a socialist. The government and the British media, as well as the American media, subjected the Jagan administration to a campaign of red-scare accusations and plain lies in the fashion of Senator McCarthy whose -ism was then all the rage in the United States.

Four and a half months after Jagan took office, the government of Winston Churchill flung him out. The British sent naval and army forces, suspended the constitution and removed the entire Guianese government. At the same time, the barristers drew up some papers which the Queen signed, so it was all nice and legal.¹

"Her Majesty's Government," said the British Colonial Secretary during a debate in Parliament, "are not prepared to tolerate the setting up of Communist states in the British Commonwealth."²

The American attitude toward this slap in the face of democracy can be surmised by the refusal of the US government to allow Jagan to pass in transit through the United States when he tried to book a flight to London to attend the parliamentary debate. According to Jagan, Pan Am would not even sell him a ticket. (Pan Am has a long history of collaboration with the CIA, a practice initiated by the airline's president, Juan Trippe, the son-in-law of Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius.)³

By this time the CIA had already gotten its foot in the door of the British Guiana labor

movement, by means of the marriage of the Agency to the American Federation of Labor in the United States. One of the early offsprings of this union was the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT from the Spanish). In the early 1950s, ORIT was instrumental in the conversion of the leading confederation of unions in Guiana, the Trades Union Council, from a militant labor organization to a vehicle of anti-communism. Wrote Serafino Romualdi, at one time the head of AIFLD (see below) and a long-time CIA collaborator: "Since my first visit to British Guiana in 1951, I did everything in my power to strengthen the democratic [i.e., anti-communist] trade union forces opposed to him [Jagan]."⁴

This was to have serious repercussions for Jagan in later years.

In 1957, running on a program similar to that of four years earlier, Jagan won the election again. This time the British deemed it wiser to employ more subtle methods for his removal and the CIA was brought into the picture, one of the rare instances in which the Agency has been officially allowed to operate in a British bailiwick. The CIA has done so, unofficially, on numerous occasions, to the displeasure of British authorities.

The CIA set to work to fortify those unions which already tended somewhat toward support of Jagan's leading political opponent, Forbes Burnham of the African Party. One of the most important of these was the civil servants' union, dominated by blacks.

Consequently, the CIA turned to Public Services International (PSI) in London, an international trade union secretariat for government employees, one of the international networks which exist to export the union know-how of advanced industrial countries to less-developed countries.

According to a study undertaken by *The Sunday Times* of London, by 1958 the PSI's "finances were low, and its stocks were low with its own parent body, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [set up by the CIA in 1949 to rival the Soviet-influenced World Federation of Trade Unions]. It needed a success of some kind. The financial crisis was resolved, quite suddenly, by the PSI's main American affiliate union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)." AFSCME's boss, Dr Arnold Zander, told the PSI executive that he had "been shopping" and had found a donor.

"The spoils were modest at first—only a couple of thousand pounds in 1958. It was, the kind donor had said, for Latin America. The money went towards a PSI 'recruiting drive' in the northern countries of Latin America by one William Doherty, Jr., a man with some previous acquaintance of the CIA." (Doherty was later to become the Executive Director of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, the CIA's principal labor organization in Latin America.)

"The donor was presumably pleased, because next year, 1959, Zander was able to tell the PSI that his union was opening a full-time Latin American section in the PSI's behalf. The PSI was charmed."

The PSI's representative, said Zander, would be William Howard McCabe (a CIA labor apprentice). The *Times* continued:

McCabe, a stocky, bullet-headed American, appeared to have no previous union history, but the PSI liked him. When he came to its meetings, he distributed cigarette lighters and photographs of himself doling out food parcels to the peasants. The lighters and the parcels were both inscribed "with the compliments of the PSI."⁵

In 1967, in the wake of numerous revelations about CIA covert financing, the new head of AFSCME admitted that the union had been heavily funded by the Agency until 1964 through a foundation conduit (see Appendix I). It was revealed that AFSCME's

International Affairs Department, which had been responsible for the British Guiana operation, had actually been run by two CIA "aides".⁶

CIA work within Third World unions typically involves a considerable educational effort, the basic premise of which is that all solutions will come to working people under a system of free enterprise, class co-operation and collective bargaining, and by opposing communism in collaboration with management and government, unless, of course, the government, as in this case, is itself "communist". The most promising students, those perhaps marked as future leaders, are singled out to be sent to CIA schools in the United States for further education.

The CIA, said *The Sunday Times*, also "appears to have had a good deal of success in encouraging politicians to break away from Jagan's party and government. Their technique of financing sympathetic figures was to take out heavy insurance policies for them."⁷

During the 1961 election campaign, the CIA's ongoing program was augmented by ad hoc operations from other American quarters. The US Information Service took the most unusual step of showing its films, depicting the evils of Castroism and communism, on street corners of British Guiana. And the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade brought its traveling road show down and spent a reported \$76,000 on electoral propaganda which lived up to the organization's name.⁸ One historian has described this as "a questionable activity for a private organization, which the State Department did nothing to discourage."⁹ On the other hand, the activities of US government agencies in British Guiana were no less questionable.

Despite the orchestrated campaign directed against him, Jagan was re-elected by a comfortable majority of legislative seats, though with only a plurality of the popular vote.

In October, at his request, Jagan was received at the White House in Washington. He had come to talk about assistance for his development program. President Kennedy and his advisers, however, were interested in determining where Jagan stood on the political spectrum before granting any aid. Oddly, the meeting, as described by Kennedy aide Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. who was present, seemed to be conducted as if the Kennedy men were totally unaware of American destabilization activities in British Guiana.

To Jagan's expressed esteem for the politics of British Labour leader Aneurin Bevan, those in the room "all responded agreeably".

To Jagan's professed socialism, Kennedy asserted that "We are not engaged in a crusade to force private enterprise on parts of the world where it is not relevant."

But when Jagan, perhaps naively, mentioned his admiration for the scholarly, leftist journal, *Monthly Review*, it appears that he crossed an ideological line, which silently and effectively sealed his country's fate. "Jagan," wrote Schlesinger later, "was unquestionably some sort of Marxist."¹⁰

No economic aid was given to British Guiana while Jagan remained in power, and the Kennedy administration pressured the British to delay granting the country its independence, which had been scheduled to occur within the next year or two.¹¹ Not until 1966, when Jagan no longer held office, did British Guiana become the independent nation of Guyana.

In February 1962, the CIA helped to organize and finance anti-Jagan protests which used the newly announced budget as a pretext. The resulting strikes, riots and arson were wholly out of proportion to the alleged instigation. A Commonwealth Commission of Enquiry later concluded (perhaps to the discomfort of the British Colonial Office which had appointed it) that:

There is very little doubt that, despite the loud protestations of the trades union leaders to the contrary, political affinities and aspirations played a large part in shaping their policy and formulating their programme of offering resistance to the budget and making a determined effort to change the government in office.¹²

The CIA arranged, as it has on similar occasions, for North American and Latin American labor organizations, with which it had close ties, to support the strikers with messages of solidarity and food, thus enhancing the appearance of a genuine labor struggle. The agency also contrived for previously unheard-of radio stations to go on the air and for newspapers to print false stories about approaching Cuban warships.¹³

The centerpiece of the CIA's program in British Guiana was the general strike (so called, although its support was considerably less than total) which began in April 1963. It lasted for 80 days, the longest general strike in history, it is said.¹⁴

This strike, as in 1962, was called by the Trades Union Council (TUC) which, as we have seen, was a member in good standing of the CIA's international labor mafia. The head of the TUC was one Richard Ishmael who had been trained in the US at the CIA's American Institute for Free Labor Development along with other Guianese labor officials.

The strike period was marked by repeated acts of violence and provocation, including attacks on Jagan's wife and some of his ministers. Ishmael himself was later cited in a secret British police report as having been part of a terrorist group which had carried out bombings and arson attacks against government buildings during the strike.¹⁵

No action was taken against Ishmael and others in this group by British authorities who missed no opportunity to exacerbate the explosive situation, hoping that it would culminate in Jagan's downfall.

Meanwhile, CIA agents were giving "advice to local union leaders on how to organize and sustain" the strike, the *New York Times* subsequently reported. "They also provided funds and food supplies to keep the strikers going and medical supplies for pro-Burnham workers injured in the turmoil. At one point, one of the agents even served as a member of a bargaining committee from a Guiana dike workers' union that was negotiating with Dr. Jagan." This agent was later denounced by Jagan and forbidden to enter the country.¹⁶ This is probably a reference to Gene Meakins, one of the CIA's main labor operatives, who had been serving as public relations advisor and education officer to the TUC. Meakins edited a weekly paper and broadcast a daily radio program by means of which he was able to generate a great deal of anti-Jagan propaganda.¹⁷

The *Sunday Times* study concluded that:

Jagan seems to have thought that the unions could hold out a month. But McCabe was providing the bulk of the strike pay, plus money for distress funds, for the strikers' daily 15 minutes on the radio and their propaganda, and considerable travelling expenses. All over the world, it seemed brother unions were clubbing together.

The mediator sent from London, Robert Willis, the general secretary of the London Typographical Society and a man not noted for his mercy in bargaining with newspaper management was shocked. "It was rapidly clear to me that the strike was wholly political", he said. "Jagan was giving in to everything the strikers wanted, but as soon as he did they erected more demands".¹⁸

Financial support for the strike alone, channeled through the PSI and other labour organizations by the CIA, reached the sum of at least one million dollars.

American oil companies provided a further example of the multitude of resources the US can bring to bear upon a given target. The companies co-operated with the strikers by

refusing to provide petroleum, forcing Jagan to appeal to Cuba for oil. During Jagan's remaining year in office, in the face of a general US economic embargo, he turned increasingly to the Soviet bloc. This practice of course provided ammunition to those critics of Jagan in British Guiana, the United States and Great Britain who insisted that he was a communist and thus fraught with all the dangers that communists are fraught with.

The strike was maintained primarily by black supporters of Forbes Burnham and by employers who locked out many of Jagan's Indian supporters. This inevitably exacerbated the already existing racial tensions, although *The Sunday Times* asserted that the "racial split was fairly amicable until the 1963 strike divided the country". Eventually, the tension broke out into bloodshed leaving hundreds dead and wounded and "a legacy of racial bitterness".¹⁹ Jagan was certainly aware, to some extent at least, of what was transpiring around him during the general strike. After it was over he charged that:

The United States, in spite of protestations to the contrary by some of its leaders, is not prepared to permit a Socialist government or a government committed to drastic and basic reforms to exist in this hemisphere, even when this government has been freely elected ... It is all too clear that the United States will only support a democratic government if it favors a classic private enterprise system.²⁰

In an attempt to surmount the hurdle of US obsession with the Soviet Union and "another Cuba in the Western hemisphere", Jagan proposed that British Guiana be "neutralized" by an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two powers had done in the case of Austria. Officials in Washington had no comment on the suggestion.²¹

Cheddi Jagan's government managed to survive all the provocations and humiliations. With elections on the agenda for 1964, the British and their American cousins turned once again to the gentlemanly way of the pen.

The British Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, who had been a leading party to the British-CIA agreement concerning Jagan, cited the strike and general unrest as proof that Jagan could not run the country or offer the stability that the British government required for British Guiana to be granted its independence. (Sandys was the founder, in 1948, of the European Movement, a CIA-funded cold-war organization.)²²

This was, of course, a contrived position. Syndicated American columnist Drew Pearson, writing about the meeting between President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan in the summer of 1963, stated that "the main thing they agreed on was that the British would refuse to grant independence to Guiana because of a general strike against pro-Communist Prime Minister, Cheddi Jagan. That strike was secretly inspired by a combination of U.S. Central Intelligence money and British intelligence. It gave London the excuse it wanted."²³

The excuse was used further to justify an amendment to the British Guiana constitution providing for a system of proportional representation in the election, a system that appeared certain to convert Jagan's majority of legislative seats into a plurality. Subsequently, the British-appointed Governor of British Guiana announced that he would not be bound to call on the leader of the largest party to form a government if it did not have a majority of seats, a procedure in striking contrast to that followed in Great Britain.

When, in October 1964, the Labour Party succeeded the Conservative Party to power in Great Britain, Jagan had hopes that the conspiracy directed against him would be squashed, for several high-ranking Labour leaders had stated publicly, and to Jagan personally, their opposition to the underhanded and anti-democratic policy of their Conservative Party foes. Within days of taking office, however, the Labour Party dashed these hopes.²⁴

"Bowling to United States wishes," the *New York Times* disclosed, the Labour Party "ruled out early independence for British Guiana" and was going ahead with the proportional representation elections. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, it was reported, had left the new British Foreign Secretary, Patrick Gordon-Walker, "in no doubt that the United States would resist a rise of British Guiana as an independent Castro-type state".²⁵ On a previous occasion, Rusk had urged Gordon-Walker's Conservative predecessor, Lord Home, to suspend the British Guiana constitution again and "revert to direct colonial government".²⁶

The intensive American lobbying effort against British Guiana (the actual campaign of subversion aside), led Conservative MP and former Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, to observe in the House of Commons: "There is an irony which we all recognize in the fact of America urging us all over the world towards colonial freedom except when it approaches her own doorstep."²⁷

The day before the election of 7 December, a letter appeared in a British Guiana newspaper—a bogus pro-Communist letter, a tactic the CIA has used successfully the world over. The letter was purportedly written by Jagan's wife Janet to Communist Party members, in which she stated: "We can take comfort in the thought that the PNC [Burnham's party] will not be able to stay in power long ... our communist comrades abroad will continue to help us win eventual total victory."

Ms. Jagan quickly retorted that she would not be so stupid as to write a letter like that, but, as in all such cases, the disclaimer trailed weakly and too late behind the accusation.²⁸

As expected, Jagan won only a plurality of the legislative seats, 24 of 53. The governor then called upon Forbes Burnham, who had come in second, to form a new government. Burnham had also been named as a terrorist in the British police report referred to earlier, as had several of his new government ministers.

Jagan refused to resign. British Army troops were put on full alert in the capital city of Georgetown. A week later, Her Majesty's Government waved its hand over a piece of paper, thereby enacting another amendment to the British Guiana constitution and closing a loophole which was allowing Jagan to stall for time. He finally surrendered to the inevitable.²⁹

In 1990, at a conference in New York City, Arthur Schlesinger publicly apologized to Cheddi Jagan, who was also present. Schlesinger said that it was his recommendation to the British that led to the proportional representation tactic. "I felt badly about my role thirty years ago," the former Kennedy aide admitted. "I think a great injustice was done to Cheddi Jagan."³⁰

Four years later, with Jagan again president—having won, in 1992, the country's first free election since he had been ousted—the Clinton administration prepared to nominate a new ambassador to Guyana: William Doherty, Jr. Jagan was flabbergasted and made his feelings known, such that Doherty was dropped from consideration.³¹

When it was time, in 1994, for the US government to declassify its British Guiana documents under the 30-year rule, the State Department and CIA refused to do so, reported the *New York Times*, because "it is not worth the embarrassment". The newspaper added:

Still-classified documents depict in unusual detail a direct order from the President to unseat Dr. Jagan, say Government officials familiar with the secret papers. Though many Presidents have ordered the CIA to undermine foreign leaders, they say the Jagan papers are a smoking gun: a clear written record, without veiled words or plausible denials, of a President's command to depose a Prime Minister.³²

"They made a mistake putting Burnham in," said Janet Jagan looking back at it all. "The regrettable part is that the country went backwards." And so it had. One of the better-off countries in the region 30 years ago, Guyana in 1994 was among the poorest. Its principal export was people.³³

17. Soviet Union late 1940s to 1960s

From spy planes to book publishing

Information ... hundreds of young Americans and émigré Russians gave their lives so that the United States could amass as much information as possible about the Soviet Union ... almost any information at all about the land Churchill had described as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma".

There is no evidence, however, that any of the information collected ever saved any lives, or served any other useful purpose for the world. Today, tons of files stuffed with reports, volumes of computer printouts, tapes, photographs, etc., lie in filing cabinets, gathering dust in warehouses in the United States and West Germany. Probably a good part of the material has already been shredded. Much of it has never been looked at, and never will be.

Beginning in the late 1940s, the US military, the CIA and the National Security Agency regularly sent aircraft along the borders of the Soviet Union to collect visual, photographic and electronic data of a military or industrial nature, particularly to do with Soviet missile and nuclear capability. The increasingly sophisticated planes and equipment, as well as satellites, submarines, and electronic listening posts in Turkey and Iran, produced vast amounts of computer input. At times, the planes would unintentionally drift over Soviet territory. At other times, they would do so intentionally in order to photograph a particular target, or to activate radar installations so as to capture their signals, or to evaluate the reaction of Soviet ground defenses against an attack. It was a dangerous game of aerial "chicken" and on many occasions the planes were met by anti-aircraft fire or Soviet fighter planes.

In both 1950 and 1951, an espionage airplane with a crew of ten was shot down, with no survivors. In 1969, a crew of 31 was lost, this time to North Korean fighters over the Sea of Japan. During the intervening years, there were dozens of air incidents involving American aircraft and Communist firepower, arising from hundreds, if not thousands, of espionage flights. Some of the spy planes made it safely back to base (which might be Turkey, Iran, Greece, Pakistan, Japan or Norway) after being attacked, and even hit; others were downed with loss of life or with crew members captured by the Soviets.¹

There has been considerable confusion concerning the number and the fate of US airmen captured by the Soviets after their planes made forced landings or were shot down during the 1950s and '60s. Russian president Boris Yeltsin stated in 1992 that nine US planes had been shot down in the early 1950s and twelve American survivors had been held prisoner, their ultimate fate not yet discovered. Five months later, Dmitri Volkogonov, former Soviet general and co-chairman of a Russian-US commission investigating the whole question of missing Americans, told a US Senate committee that 730 airmen had been captured on cold war spy flights, their fate likewise unclear.²

The most notable of these incidents was of course the downing of the U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960. The ultra high-flying U-2 had been developed because

of the vulnerability to being shot down of planes flying at normal altitudes. The disappearance of Powers and his U-2 somewhere in the Soviet Union ensured the United States government publicly in an entanglement of a false cover story, denials, and amendments to denials. Finally, when the Russians presented Powers and his plane to the world, President Eisenhower had no alternative but to admit the truth. He pointedly added, however, that flights such as the U-2's were "distasteful but vital", given the Russian "fetish of secrecy and concealment".³ One of Eisenhower's advisers, Emmet John Hughes, was later to observe that it thus took the administration only six days "to transform an unthinkable falsehood into a sovereign right."⁴

On several occasions, the United States protested to the Soviet Union about Soviet attacks on American planes which were not actually over Soviet territory, but over the Sea of Japan, for example. Though engaged in espionage, such flights, strictly speaking, appear to be acceptable under international law.

The most serious repercussion of the whole U-2 affair was that it doomed to failure the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit meeting which took place two weeks later in Paris, and upon which so much hope for peace and détente had been placed by people all over the world.

Was the U-2 affair the unfortunate accident of timing that history has made it out to be? Col. L. Fletcher Prouty, US Air Force, Ret. has suggested otherwise. From 1955 to 1963, Prouty served as the liaison between the CIA and the Pentagon on matters concerning military support of "special operations". In his book, *The Secret Team*, Prouty suggests that the CIA and certain of the Agency's colleagues in the Pentagon sabotaged this particular U-2 flight, the last one scheduled before the summit. They did this, presumably, because they did not relish a lessening of cold-war tensions, their *raison d'être*.

The method employed, Prouty surmises, was remarkably simple. The U-2's engine needed infusions of liquid hydrogen to maintain the plane's incredible altitude, which placed it outside the range of Soviet firepower and interceptor aircraft. If the hydrogen container were only partly filled upon takeoff from Turkey, it would be simply a matter of time—calculable to coincide with the plane being over Soviet territory—before the U-2 was forced to descend to a lower altitude. At this point, whether the plane was shot down or Powers bailed out, allowing it to crash, is not certain. The Soviet Union claimed that it had shot down the U-2 at its normal high altitude with a rocket, but this was probably a falsehood born of four years of frustrating failure to shoot a single U-2 from the sky. In any event, the Russians were able to present to the world a partially intact spy plane along with a fully intact spy pilot, complete with all manner of incriminating papers on him, and an unused suicide needle. The presence of identification papers was no oversight, says Prouty: deliberately, "neither pilot nor plane were sanitized on this flight as was required on other flights".⁵

Powers, in his book, doesn't discuss the liquid hydrogen at all. He believed his plane was disabled and forced to descend by the shock waves of a Soviet near-miss. But he recounts technical problems with the plane even before the presumed near-miss.⁶

In light of the furor raised by the shooting down of a South Korean commercial airliner by the Soviet Union in 1983, which the Russians claimed was spying, it is interesting to note that Prouty also makes mention of the United States at one time using "a seemingly clean national commercial airline" of an unspecified foreign country "to do some camera spying or other clandestine project".⁷

To the Russians, the spy planes were more than simply a violation of their air space, and they rejected the notion put forth by the US that the flights were just another form of espionage—"intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries", said Washington.⁸ (At the time there had been no indication of Soviet flights over the United

States).⁹ The Russians viewed the flights as particularly provocative because airplanes are a means of conducting warfare, they can be considered as the beginning of hostilities, and may even be carrying bombs. The Russians could not forget that the Nazis had preceded their invasion of the Soviet Union with frequent reconnaissance overflights. Neither could they forget that in April 1958, US planes carrying nuclear bombs had flown over the Arctic in the direction of the USSR due to a false warning signal on American radar. The planes were called back when only two hours flying time separated them from the Soviet Union.¹⁰

No American plane dropped bombs on the Soviet Union but many of them dropped men assigned to carry out hostile missions. The men who fell from the sky were Russians who had emigrated to the West where they were recruited by the CIA and other Western intelligence organizations.

The leading émigré organization was known as National Alliance of Russian Solidarity, or the National Union of Labor (NTS). It was composed largely of two distinct groups: the sons of the Russians who had gone to the West following the revolution, and those Russians who, through circumstance or choice, had wound up in Western Europe at the close of the Second World War. Members of both groups had collaborated with the Nazis during the war. Although NTS was generally classified in the right wing of the various émigré organizations, their collaboration had been motivated more by anti-Stalinism than by pro-Nazi sentiments.

NTS was based primarily in West Germany where, throughout the 1950s, the CIA was the organization's chief benefactor, often its sole support. At a CIA school set up in Germany, under the imposing name of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, as well as at schools in Great Britain and the United States, the Agency provided NTS members with extensive training before airdropping them into Soviet territory. The men landed on their native soil elaborately equipped, with everything from weapons to collapsible bicycles, frogmen suits, and rubber mats for crossing electrically-charged barbed-wire fences.

The Russians were returned to their homeland for a variety of reasons: to gather intelligence about military and technological installations; commit assassinations; obtain current samples of identification documents; assist Western agents to escape; engage in sabotage for which they were well trained (methods of derailing trains and wrecking bridges, actions against arms factories and power plants, etc.); or instigate armed political struggle against Communist rule by linking up with resistance movements—a wholly unrealistic goal given the feeble state of such movements, but one which some NTS fanatics swore by.

It will never be known just how many men the CIA infiltrated into the Soviet Union, not only by air but by border crossings and by boat as well; many hundreds at least. As to their fate ... the Soviet Union published a book in 1961 called *Caught In the Act* (= CIA), in which were listed the names and other details of about two dozen infiltrators the Russians claimed to have captured, often almost immediately upon arrival. Some were executed, others received prison sentences, one allegedly was an individual who had taken part in a mass execution of Jews in German-occupied Soviet territory. The book asserts that there were many more caught who were not listed. This may have been a self-serving statement, but it was a relatively simple matter for the Russians to infiltrate the émigrés' ranks in Western Europe and learn the entire operation.

The CIA, to be sure, was not naive about this practice. The Agency went so far as to torture suspected defectors in Munich—using such esoteric methods as applying turpentine to a man's testicles or sealing someone in a room and playing Indonesian music at deafening levels until he cracked.¹¹

The Russians further claimed that some of those smuggled in were furnished with special radio beacons to guide planes where to land other agents, and which could also be used to direct US bombers in the event of war.

Some of the émigrés made it back to Western Europe with their bits and pieces of information, or after attempting to carry out some other assignment. Others, provided with a complete set of necessary documents, were instructed to integrate themselves back into Soviet society and become "agents in place". Still others, caught up in the emotions of being "home", turned themselves in—once again, "the human factor", which no amount of training or indoctrination can necessarily circumvent.¹²

No American operation against the Soviet Union would be complete without its propaganda side: bringing the gospel to the heathen, in a myriad of ways that displayed the creativity of the CIA and its team of émigrés.

Novel mechanisms were developed to enable airplanes and balloons to drop anti-Communist literature over the Soviet Union. When the wind was right, countless leaflets and pamphlets were scattered across the land; or quantities of literature were floated downstream in waterproof packages.

Soviet citizens coming to the West were met at every turn by NTS people handing out their newspapers and magazines in Russian and Ukrainian. To facilitate contact, NTS at times engaged in black market operations and opened small shops which catered to Russians at cheap prices. From North Africa to Scandinavia, the CIA network confronted Soviet seamen, tourists, officials, athletes, even Soviet soldiers in East Germany, to present them with the Truth as seen by the "Free World", as well as to pry information from them, to induce them to defect, or to recruit them as spies. Hotel rooms were searched, phones tapped, bribes offered, or blackmail threatened in attempts to reach these ends. Actions were also undertaken to entrap or provoke Soviet diplomatic personnel so as to cause their expulsion and/or embarrass the Soviet Union.¹³

The propaganda offensive led the US government into the book publishing business. Under a variety of arrangements with American and foreign publishers, distributors, literary agents and authors, the CIA and the United States Information Agency (USIA) produced, subsidized or sponsored "well over a thousand books" by 1967 which were deemed to serve a propaganda need.¹⁴ Many of the books were sold in the United States as well as abroad. None bore any indication of US government involvement. Of some, said the USIA, "We control the things from the very idea down to the final edited manuscript."¹⁵

Some books were published, and at times written, only after the USIA or the CIA agreed to purchase a large number of copies. There is no way of determining what effect this financial incentive had upon a publisher or author concerning a book's tone and direction. In some cases, Washington released classified information to an author to assist him or her in writing the book. In 1967, following revelations about CIA domestic activities, this practice purportedly came to an end in the US although it continued abroad. A Senate committee in 1976 stated that during the preceding few years, the CIA had been connected with the publication of some 250 books, mostly in foreign languages.¹⁶ Some of these were most likely later reprinted in the United States.

The actual identity of most of the books, however, is still classified. Among those which have been revealed are: *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* by Walt Rostow, *The New Class* by Milovan Djilas, *Concise History of the Communist Party* by Robert A. Burton, *The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China* by Kurt Muller, *In Pursuit of World Order* by Richard N. Gardner, *Peking and People's Wars* by Major

General Sam Griffith, *The Yenan Way* by Eudocio Ravines, *Life and Death in Soviet Russia* by Valentin Gonzalez, *The Antibill* by Suzanne Labin, *The Politics of Struggle: The Communist Front and Political Warfare* by James D. Atkinson, *From Colonialism to Communism* by Hoang Van Chi, *Why Vietnam?* by Frank Trager, and *Terror in Vietnam* by Jay Mallin. In addition, the CIA financed and distributed throughout the world the animated cartoon film of George Orwell's *Animal Farm*.¹⁷

The most pervasive propaganda penetration of the socialist bloc was by means of the airwaves: Numerous transmitters, tremendous wattage, and often round-the-clock programming brought Radio Liberty and Radio Free Russia to the Soviet Union, Radio Free Europe and Radio in the American Sector to Eastern Europe, and the Voice of America to all parts of the world. With the exception of the last, the stations were ostensibly private organizations financed by "gifts" from American corporations, nickel-and-dime donations from the American public, and other private sources. In actuality, the CIA covertly funded almost all of the costs until 1971; exposure of the Agency's role in 1967 (although it had been widely assumed long before then) led to Congress eventually instituting open governmental financing of the stations.

The stations served the purpose of filling in some of the gaps and correcting the falsehoods of the Communist media, but could not escape presenting a picture of the world, both East and West, shot through with their own omissions and distortions. Their mission in life was to emphasize whatever could make the Communist regimes look bad. "To many in the CIA," wrote Victor Marchetti, former senior official of the Agency, "the primary value of the radios was to sow discontent in Eastern Europe and, in the process, to weaken the communist governments."¹⁸

Many of the Russians who worked for the various stations, which broadcast at length about freedom, democracy and other humanitarian concerns, were later identified by the US Justice Department as members of Hitler's notorious *Einsatzgruppen*, which rounded up and killed numerous Jews in the Soviet Union. One of these worthies was Stanislaw Stankievich, under whose command a mass murder of Jews in Byelorussia was carried out in which babies were buried alive with the dead, presumably to save ammunition. Stankievich wound up working for Radio Liberty. German war criminals as well were employed by the CIA in a variety of anti-Soviet operations.¹⁹

By every account, the sundry programs to collect strategic information about the Soviet Union, particularly via infiltration into the country and encountering Soviet nationals in the West, were a singular flop. The information reported was usually trivial, spotty, garbled, or out-of-date. Worse, it was often embellished, if not out-and-out fabricated. Many post-war émigrés in Western Europe made their living in the information business. It was their most saleable commodity. From a real or fictitious meeting with a Soviet citizen they would prepare a report which was often just ordinary facts with a bit of political color added on. At times, as many as four versions of the report would be produced, differing in style and quantity of "facts"; written by four different people, the reports would then be sold separately to US, British, French and West German intelligence agencies. The CIA's version contained everything in the other three versions, which were eventually transmitted to the Agency by the other countries without their source being revealed. Analysis of all the reports tended to bring the CIA to the conclusion that the NTS was giving them the fullest picture of all, and that the information all tallied. NTS looked good, and the files grew thick.²⁰

The CIA's Russian files in Washington, meanwhile, approached mountainous proportions with the data acquired from opening mail between the Soviet Union and the United

States, a practice begun in the early 1950s and continued at least into the 1970s.²¹ (Said a Post Office counsel in 1979: "If there was no national security mail cover program, the FBI might be inhibited in finding out if a nation was planning war against us.")²²

Former CIA officer Harry Rositzke, who was closely involved with anti-Soviet operations after the war, later wrote that the primary task of the émigrés infiltrated into the Soviet Union during the early years—and the same could probably be said of the spy planes—was to provide "early warning" of a Soviet military offensive against the West, an invasion which, in the minds of cold-warriors in the American government, appeared perpetually "imminent". This apprehension was reminiscent of the alarms sounded following the Russian Revolution (see Introduction to the Original Edition) and similarly flourished despite the fact of a Russia recently devastated by a major war and hardly in a position to undertake a military operation of any such magnitude. Nevertheless, wrote Rositzke, "It was officially estimated that Soviet forces were capable of reaching the English Channel in a matter of weeks. ... It was an axiom in Washington that Stalin was plotting war. When would it come?" He pointed out, however, that "The mere existence of radio-equipped agents on Soviet terrain with no early warnings to report had some cautionary value in tempering the war scare among the military estimators at the height of the Cold War."²³

A secret report of the National Security Resources Board of January 1951 warned: "As things are now going, by 1953 if not 1952, the Soviet aggressors will assume complete control of the world situation."²⁴

Rositzke, although a committed anti-Communist, recognized the unreality of such thinking. But, as he explained, his was a minority opinion in official Washington:

The facts available even at the time suggested the far greater likelihood that Moscow's postwar strategy, including the conversion of Eastern Europe into a western buffer, was basically defensive. I argued this thesis with some of the CIA analysts working on Soviet estimates and with some Pentagon audiences, but it was not a popular view at the time. It is nonetheless a simple fact that no scenario was written then, nor has it been written since, to explain *why* the Russians would want to conquer Western Europe by force or to bomb the United States. Neither action would have contributed in any tangible way to the Soviet national interest and would have hazarded the destruction of the Soviet state. This basic question was never raised, for the Cold War prism created in the minds of the diplomatic and military strategists a clear-cut world of black and white; there were no grays.²⁵

Several years were to pass, Rositzke pointed out, before it became clear to Washington that there were no warnings, early or otherwise, to report. This, however, had no noticeable effect upon the United States' military build-up or cold-war propaganda.

18. Italy 1950s to 1970s

Supporting the Cardinal's orphans and techno-fascism

After the multifarious extravaganza staged by the United States in 1948 to exorcise the spectre of Communism that was haunting Italy, the CIA settled in place for the long haul with a less flamboyant but more insidious operation.

A White House memorandum, prepared after the 1953 election, reported that "Neither the Moscow war stick nor the American economic carrot was being visibly brandished over

the voters in this election."¹ Covert funding was the name of the game. Victor Marchetti, former executive assistant to the Deputy Director of the CIA, has revealed that in the 1950s the Agency "spent some \$20 to \$30 million a year, or maybe more, to finance its programs in Italy." Expenditures in the 1960s, he added, came to about \$10 million annually.²

The CIA itself has admitted that between 1948 and 1968, it paid a total of \$65,150,000 to the Christian Democrats and other parties, to labor groups, and to a wide variety of other organizations in Italy.³ It also spent an undisclosed amount in support of magazines and book publishers and other means of news and opinion manipulation, such as planting news items in non-American media around the world which cast unfavorable light upon communism, then arranging for these stories to be reprinted in friendly Italian publications.⁴

It is not known when, if ever, the CIA ended its practice of funding anti-Communist groups in Italy. Internal Agency documents of 1972 reveal contributions of some \$10 million to political parties, affiliated organizations, and 21 individual candidates in the parliamentary elections of that year.⁵ At least \$6 million was passed to political leaders for the June 1976 elections.⁶ And in the 1980s, CIA Director William Casey arranged for Saudi Arabia to pay \$2 million to prevent the Communists from achieving electoral gains in Italy.⁷

Moreover, the largest oil company in the United States, Exxon Corp., admitted that between 1963 and 1972 it had made political contributions to the Christian Democrats and several other Italian political parties totaling \$46 million to \$49 million. Mobil Oil Corp. also contributed to the Italian electoral process to the tune of an average \$500,000 a year from 1970 through 1973. There is no report that these corporate payments derived from persuasion by the CIA or the State Department, but it seems rather unlikely that the firms would engage so extravagantly in this unusual sideline with complete spontaneity.⁸

Much of the money given by the CIA to Italian political parties since World War II said a former high-level US official, ended up "in villas, in vacation homes and in Swiss bank accounts for the politicians themselves."⁹

A more direct American intervention into the 1976 elections was in the form of propaganda. Inasmuch as political advertising is not allowed on Italian television, the US Ambassador to Switzerland, Nathaniel Davis, arranged for the purchase of large blocks of time on Monte Carlo TV to present a daily "news" commentary by the editorial staff of the Milan newspaper *Il Giornale Nuovo*, which was closely associated to the CIA. It was this newspaper that, in May 1981, set in motion that particular piece of international disinformation known as "The KGB Plot to Kill the Pope".

Another Italian newspaper, the *Daily American* of Rome, for decades the country's leading English-language paper, was for a long period in the 1950s to the '70s partly owned and/or managed by the CIA. "We 'had' at least one newspaper in every foreign capital at any given time," the CIA admitted in 1977, referring to papers owned outright or heavily subsidized, or infiltrated sufficiently to have stories printed which were useful to the Agency or suppress those it found detrimental.¹⁰

Ambassador Davis also arranged for news items which had been placed in various newspapers by the Agency to be read on Monte Carlo TV and Swiss TV, both of which were received in Italy. The programs were produced in Milan by Franklin J. Tonini of the US Diplomatic Corps, and Michael Ledeen, a reporter with *Il Giornale Nuovo*.¹¹ (Ledeen, an American, was later a consultant to the Reagan administration and a senior fellow at the conservative think-tank of Georgetown University in Washington, the Center for Strategic and International Studies.)

The relentless fight against the Italian Communist Party took some novel twists. One, in the 1950s, was the brainchild of American Ambassador Clare Booth Luce. The celebrated Ms. Luce (playwright and wife of *Time* magazine publisher Henry Luce) decided to make it known that no US Department of Defense procurement contracts would be awarded to Italian firms whose employees had voted to be represented by the Communist-controlled labor union. In the case of Fiat, this had dramatic results: The Communist union's share of the vote promptly fell from 60 to 38 percent.¹²

Then there was the case of Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini, another beneficiary of CIA largesse. The payments made to him reveal something of the Agency's mechanistic thinking about why people become radicals. It seems that the good Cardinal was promoting orphanages in Italy during the 1950s and 1960s and, says Victor Marchetti, "The thinking was that if such institutions were adequately supported, many young people would be able to live well there and so would not one day fall into Communist hands."¹³ The Cardinal, as a Monsignor, had been involved with the Vatican's operation to smuggle Nazis to freedom after World War II. He had a long history of association with Western governments and their intelligence agencies. In 1963, he became Pope Paul VI.¹⁴

In a 1974 interview, Marchetti also spoke of the training provided by the Agency to the Italian security services:

They are trained, for example, to confront disorders and student demonstrations, to prepare dossiers, to make the best possible use of bank data and tax returns of individual citizens, etc. In other words, to watch over the population of their country with the means offered by technology. This is what I call techno-fascism.¹⁵

William Colby, later Director of the CIA, arrived in Italy in 1953 and devoted the next five years of his life to financing and advising center/right organizations for the express purpose of inducing the Italian people to turn away from the leftist bloc, particularly the Communist Party, and keep it from taking power in the 1958 elections. In his account of that period he justifies this program on the grounds of supporting "democracy" or "center democracy" and preventing Italy from becoming a Soviet satellite. Colby perceived all virtue and truth to be bunched closely around the center of the political spectrum, and the Italian Communist Party to be an extremist organization committed to abolishing democracy and creating a society modeled after the (worst?) excesses of Stalinist Russia. He offers no evidence to support his conclusion about the Communists, presumably because he regards it as self-evident, as much to the reader as to himself. Neither, for that matter, does he explain what was this thing called "democracy" which he so cherishes and which the Communists were so eager to do away with.¹⁶

Colby comes across as a technocrat who carried out the orders of his "side" and mouthed the party line without serious examination. When Oriana Fallaci, the Italian journalist, interviewed him in 1976, she remarked at the close of a frustrating conversation, "Had you been born on the other side of the barricade, you would have been a perfect Stalinist." To which, Colby replied: "I reject that statement. But ... well ... it might be. No, no. It might not."¹⁷

American policy makers dealing with Italy in the decades subsequent to Colby's time there did not suffer any less than he from hardening of the categories. Colby, after all, took pains to point out his *liberal* leanings. These were men unable to view the Italian Communist Party in its indigenous political context, but only as a "national security" threat to the United States and NATO. Yet, all those years, the party was proceeding along a path revisionist enough to make Lenin turn in his grave if he were in one. The path was marked

by billboards proclaiming the "democratic advance to socialism" and the "national road to socialism", the abandonment of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The party pushed its "national" role as responsible opposition, participated in "the drive for productivity", affirmed its support for a multi-party system and for Italy remaining in the Common Market and in NATO, and was second to none in its condemnation of any form of terrorism. On many occasions, it was the principal political force in city governments including Rome, Florence and Venice, without any noticeable return to barbarism, and was a *de facto* participant in the running of the Italian state. (The Socialist Party, a prime target of the United States in the 1948 elections, was a formal member of the government for much of the 1960s to the 1990s.)

In the files of the State Department and the CIA lie any number of internal reports prepared by anonymous analysts testifying to the reality of the Communist Party's "historic compromise" and the evolution of its estrangement from the Soviet Union known as "Eurocommunism."

In the face of this, however—in the face of everything—American policy remained rooted in place, fixed in a time that was no longer, and probably never was; a policy that had nothing to do with democracy (by whatever definition) and everything to do with the conviction that a Communist government in Italy would not have been the supremely pliant cold-war partner that successive Christian Democrat regimes were for decades. It would not have been enough for such a government to be independent of Moscow. The problem with a Communist government was that it would probably have tried to adopt the same position towards Washington.

19. Vietnam 1950-1973

The hearts and minds circus

Contrary to repeated statements by Washington officials during the 1960s that the United States did not intervene in Vietnam until, and only because, "North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam", the US was deeply and continually involved in that woeful land from the year 1950 onwards.

The initial, fateful step was the decision to make large-scale shipments of military equipment (tanks, transport planes, etc.) to the French in Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1950. In April, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had told French officials that the United States government was set against France negotiating with their Northern-based Vietnamese foes, the Vietminh¹ (also spelled Viet Minh or Viet-Minh: the name was short for League for the Independence of Vietnam, a broadly-based nationalist movement led by Communists). Washington was not particularly sympathetic to France's endeavor to regain control of its colony of 100 years and had vacillated on the issue, but the rise to power of the Communists in China the previous autumn had tipped the scale in favor of supporting the French. To the Truman administration, the prospect of another Communist government in Asia was intolerable. There was a secondary consideration as well at the time: the need to persuade a reluctant France to support American plans to include Germany in West European defense organizations.

During World War II, the Japanese had displaced the French. Upon the defeat of Japan, the Vietminh took power in the North, while the British occupied the South, but

soon turned it back to the French. Said French General Jean Leclerc in September 1945: "I didn't come back to Indochina to give Indochina back to the Indochinese."² Subsequently, the French emphasized that they were fighting for the "free world" against communism, a claim made in no small part to persuade the United States to increase its aid to them.

American bombers, military advisers and technicians by the hundreds were to follow the first aid shipments, and over the next few years direct American military aid to the French war effort ran to about a billion dollars a year. By 1954, the authorized aid had reached the sum of \$1.4 billion and constituted 78 percent of the French budget for the war.³

The extensive written history of the American role in Indochina produced by the Defense Department, later to be known as "The Pentagon Papers", concluded that the decision to provide aid to France "directly involved" the United States in Vietnam and "set" the course for future American policy.⁴

There had been another path open. In 1945 and 1946, Vietminh leader Ho Chi Minh had written at least eight letters to President Truman and the State Department asking for America's help in winning Vietnamese independence from the French. He wrote that world peace was being endangered by French efforts to reconquer Indochina and he requested that the "four powers" (US, USSR, China, and Great Britain) intervene in order to mediate a fair settlement and bring the Indochinese issue before the United Nations.⁵ (This was a remarkable repeat of history. In 1919, following the First World War, Ho Chi Minh had appealed to US Secretary of State Robert Lansing for America's help in achieving basic civil liberties and an improvement in the living conditions for the colonial subjects of French Indochina. This plea, too, was ignored.)⁶

Despite the fact that Ho Chi Minh and his followers had worked closely with the American OSS (the forerunner of the CIA) during the recently ended world war, while the French authorities in Indochina had collaborated with the Japanese, the United States failed to answer any of the letters, did not reveal that it had received them, and eventually sided with the French. In 1950, part of the publicly stated rationale for the American position was that Ho Chi Minh was not really a "genuine nationalist" but rather a tool of "international communism", a conclusion that could be reached only by deliberately ignoring the totality of his life's work. He and the Vietminh had, in fact, been long-time admirers of the United States. Ho trusted the US more than he did the Soviet Union and reportedly had a picture of George Washington and a copy of the American Declaration of Independence on his desk. According to a former OSS officer, Ho sought his advice on framing the Vietminh's own declaration of independence. The actual declaration of 1945 begins with the familiar "All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."⁷

But it was the French who were to receive America's blessing. Ho Chi Minh was, after all, some kind of communist.

The United States viewed the French struggle in Vietnam and their own concurrent intervention in Korea as two links in the chain aimed at "containing" China. Washington was adamantly opposed to the French negotiating an end to the war which would leave the Vietminh in power, in the northern part of the country, and, at the same time, free the Chinese to concentrate exclusively on their Korean border. In 1952, the US exerted strong pressure upon France not to pursue peace feelers extended by the Vietminh, and a French delegation, scheduled to meet with Vietminh negotiators in Burma, was hastily recalled to Paris.

Bernard Fall, the renowned French scholar on Indochina, believed that the canceled negotiations "could perhaps have brought about a cease-fire on a far more acceptable

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #11:

65. "JFK's Inaugural Address, 1961."
66. "JFK, The Cuban Revolution and the Cold War."
67. "Castro Denounces US Policy Toward Cuba, 1960."
68. "JFK calls for an 'Alliance for Progress', 1961."
69. "Report on the 'Bay of Pigs', 1961."
70. "U.S. Plot to Assassinate Castro: A US Senate Investigation, 1960-65."
71. "JFK debates Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962."
72. "JFK on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Oct.22, 1962."
73. "Khrushchev appeals to Kennedy, 1962."
74. "JFK's 'Strategy of Peace' Speech, 1963."
75. "Pretexts to Justify U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba."

every stress of vast expansion of territory, of foreign wars, of bitter internal strife, of world relations.

It is to be hoped that the normal balance of Executive and legislative authority may be wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be that an unprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance of public procedure.

I am prepared under my constitutional duty to recommend the measures that a stricken Nation in the midst of a stricken world may require. These measures, or such other measures as the Congress may build out of its experience and wisdom, I shall seek, within my constitutional authority, to bring to speedy adoption.

But in the event that the Congress shall fail to take one of these two courses, and in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis — broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.

For the trust reposed in me I will return the courage and the devotion that befit the time. I can do no less.

We face the arduous days that lie before us in the warm courage of national unity; with the clear consciousness of seeking old and precious moral values; with the clean satisfaction that comes from the stern performance of duty by old and young alike. We aim at the assurance of a rounded and permanent national life.

We do not distrust the future of essential democracy. The people of the United States have not failed. In their need they have registered a mandate that they want direct, vigorous action. They have asked for discipline and direction under leadership. They have made me the present instrument of their wishes. In the spirit of the gift I take it.

In this dedication of a Nation we humbly ask the blessing of God. May He protect each and every one of us. May He guide me in the days to come.

7 JOHN F. KENNEDY'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1961)

We observe today not a victory of a party but a celebration of freedom — symbolizing an end as well as a beginning — signifying renewal as well as change. For I have sworn before you and Almighty God the same solemn oath our forebears prescribed nearly a century and three quarters ago.

The world is very different now. For man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. And yet the same revolutionary beliefs for which our forebears fought are

still at issue around the globe — the belief that the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.

We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution. Let the word go forth from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans — born in this century, tempered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our ancient heritage — and unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which this Nation has always been committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.

This much we pledge — and more.

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual origins we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. United, there is little we cannot do in a host of cooperative ventures. Divided, there is little we can do — for we dare not meet a powerful challenge at odds and split asunder.

To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny. We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom — and to remember that, in the past, those who foolishly sought power by riding the back of the tiger ended up inside.

To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required — not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.

To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge — to convert our good words into good deeds — in a new alliance for progress — to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.

To that world assembly of sovereign states, the United Nations, our last best hope in an age where the instruments of war have far outpaced the instruments of peace, we renew our pledge of support — to prevent it from becoming merely a forum for invective — to strengthen its shield of the new and the weak — and to enlarge the area in which its writ may run.

Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary, we offer not a pledge but a request: that both sides begin anew the quest for peace, before the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction.

We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.

But neither can two great and powerful groups of nations take comfort from our present course — both sides overburdened by the cost of modern weapons, both rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom, yet both racing to alter that uncertain balance of terror that stays the hand of mankind's final war.

So let us begin anew — remembering on both sides that civility is not a sign of weakness, and sincerity is always subject to proof. Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.

Let both sides explore what problems unite us instead of belaboring those problems which divide us. Let both sides, for the first time, formulate serious and precise proposals for the inspection and control of arms — and bring the absolute power to destroy other nations under the absolute control of all nations.

Let both sides seek to invoke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Together let us explore the stars, conquer the deserts, eradicate disease, tap the ocean depths and encourage the arts and commerce.

Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the command of Isaiah — to 'undo the heavy burdens and to let the oppressed go free'.

And if a beach-head of cooperation may push back the jungle of suspicion, let both sides join in a new endeavor; not a new balance of power, but a new world of law, where the strong are just and the weak secure and the peace preserved.

All this will not be finished in the first one hundred days. Nor will it be finished in the first one thousand days, nor in the life of this Administration, nor even perhaps in our life-time on this planet. But let us begin.

In your hands, my fellow citizens, more than mine, will rest the final success or failure of our course. Since this country was founded, each generation of Americans has been summoned to give testimony to its national loyalty. The graves of young Americans who answered the call to service surround the globe.

Now the trumpet summons us again — not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need — not as a call to battle, though embattled we are — but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, 'rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation' — a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself.

Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility — I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it — and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

And so, my fellow Americans: Ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world: Ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own.

8 RONALD REAGAN'S FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1981)

To a few of us here today this is a solemn and most momentous occasion, and yet in the history of our nation it is a commonplace occurrence. The orderly transfer of authority, as called for in the Constitution routinely takes place, as it has for almost two centuries, and few of us stop to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many in the world, this every-four-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a miracle.

Mr President, I want our fellow citizens to know how much you did to carry on this tradition. By your gracious cooperation in the transition process, you have shown a watching world that we are a united people pledged to maintaining a political system which guarantees individual liberty to a greater degree than any other, and I thank you and your people for all your help in maintaining the continuity which is the bulwark of our republic.

The business of our nation goes forward. These United States are confronted with an economic affliction of great proportions. We suffer from the longest and one of the worst sustained inflations in our national history. It distorts our economic decisions, penalizes thrift, and crushes the struggling young and the fixed-income elderly alike. It threatens to shatter the lives of millions of our people.

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Power (1956)

and the Mass Media in

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the Fifties (1982)

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-1960 (1982)

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the Age of Cold War

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(1960)

CHAPTER

6

John F. Kennedy, the Cuban Revolution, and the Cold War




To comprehend the nature of the United States' troubled relations with Cuba during the 1960s requires an understanding of at least three separate but inter-related topics: the history of U.S. relations with Latin America, especially the Caribbean; the response of the United States to social revolutions both in Latin America and throughout the Third World; and the United States' Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. The history of relations between the United States and Cuba serves in turn to highlight patterns that were common to post-war U.S. policy throughout the Third World, including Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

Throughout the early twentieth century, the United States had exercised a dominant influence in Latin America and particularly in the Caribbean, featuring armed interventions in Cuba, Colombia (Panama), the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Mexico. The United States forswore such military actions in 1933 with Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy; but following World War II that policy was increasingly honored in the breach as the United States intervened directly or indirectly in Guatemala (under Eisenhower), Cuba (Kennedy), the Dominican Republic (Johnson), Chile (Nixon), Nicaragua (Reagan), Grenada (Reagan), and Panama (Bush). Seen from this perspective, Kennedy's "fixation" with Cuba was simply part of a deeply rooted historical pattern.

U.S. leaders were especially troubled by the growth of social revolutions throughout Latin America, revolutions that they feared would threaten the nation's economic interests—property, investments, and markets—as well as its strategic control of the region. Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro, whose forces overthrew the dictatorship of Juan Batista in 1959, posed a special threat as a result of his seizure of industries owned by U.S. investors and by his rapid rise as a popular symbol of resistance to the United States.

It was the Cold War with the Soviet Union, however, that helped revive

ON
CUBA



President Kennedy addressed the American people on television and radio from the White House, 22 October 1962

Good evening, my fellow citizens. The Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9:00 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, DC, the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than twice as far — and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base — by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction — constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and hemisphere, the Joint Resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13.

This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that, and I quote, 'The armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes', and, and I quote the Soviet Government, 'There is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba', and that, and I quote the Government, 'The Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union'. That statement was false.

Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his Government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, 'pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba', that, and I quote him, 'training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive', and that 'if it were otherwise', Mr Gromyko went on, 'the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance'. That statement also was false.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious *status quo* which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history, unlike that of the Soviets

since the end of World War II, demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's eye of Soviet missiles located inside the USSR or in submarines.

In that sense missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger — although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles — in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy — this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil — is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the *status quo* which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

The 1930s taught us a clear lesson: Aggressive conduct, if allowed to grow unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required — and it is underway; and these actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth — but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following *initial* steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS [Organization of American States] in their communique of October 3 rejected secrecy on such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offens-

ive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that, in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.

Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis.

Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation, under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements — and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of UN observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction — by returning to his Government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba — by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis — and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

This nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace, and our own proposals for a peaceful world, at any time and in any forum — in the OAS, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful — without limiting our freedom of action.

We have in the past made strenuous efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We have proposed the elimination of all arms and military bases in a fair and effective disarmament treaty. We are prepared to discuss new proposals for the removal of tensions on both sides — including the possibilities of a genuinely independent Cuba, free to determine its own destiny.

We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union, for we are a peaceful people who desire to live in peace with all other peoples.

But it is difficult to settle or even discuss these problems in an atmosphere of intimidation. That is why this latest Soviet threat — or any other threat which is made either independently or in response to our actions this week — must and will be met with determination. Any hostile move anywhere in the world against the safety and freedom of peoples to whom we are committed — including in particular the brave people of West Berlin — will be met by whatever action is needed.

Finally, I want to say a few words to the captive people of Cuba, to whom this speech is being directly carried by special radio facilities. I speak to you as a friend, as one who knows of your deep attachment to your fatherland, as one who shares your aspirations for liberty and justice for all. And I have watched and the American people have watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolution was betrayed and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer Cuban leaders inspired by Cuban ideals. They are puppets and agents of an international conspiracy which has turned Cuba against your friends and neighbors in the Americas — and turned it into the first Latin American country to become a target for nuclear war, the first Latin American country to have these weapons on its soil.

These new weapons are not in your interest. They contribute nothing to your peace and well-being. They can only undermine it. But this country has no wish to cause you to suffer or to impose any system upon you. We know that your lives and land are being used as pawns by those who deny you freedom.

Many times in the past the Cuban people have risen to throw out tyrants who destroyed their liberty. And I have no doubt that most Cubans today look forward to the time when they will be truly free — free from foreign domination, free to choose their own leaders, free to select their own system, free to own their own land, free to speak and write and worship without fear or degradation. And then shall Cuba be welcomed back to the society of free nations and to the associations of this hemisphere.

My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead — months in which both our patience and our will will be tested, months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing.

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are; but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high — but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.

historic patterns of U.S. intervention and served to heighten and rationalize growing fears of social revolution. In Latin America as in Asia, the United States identified most revolutions with the foreign policies of the Soviet Union—in part because many Latin American revolutions were led by men and women who were socialists, if not communists; in part because the Soviet Union often supported such revolutions when it was in its interests to do so; but also because American leaders themselves seemed unable or unwilling to distinguish between indigenous social change and foreign subversion. Reflexive opposition to social revolutions thus became a cardinal theme of the Cold War era.

In 1954, for example, the United States engineered the overthrow of the democratically elected, reformist government of Guatemala. Established in 1944 following decades of dictatorship, the new Guatemalan government had introduced various reforms, including the nationalization of lands belonging to the powerful United Fruit Company. The protests of United Fruit, combined with (largely groundless) fears that Guatemala might become a beachhead of Soviet influence in the region, led the Eisenhower administration to launch a CIA-led coup that resulted in the overthrow of the Guatemalan government and the installation of a right-wing, pro-U.S. dictatorship. The success of the Guatemalan intervention served, in turn, as a model for the U.S. officials who planned the abortive 1961 Bay of Pigs landing in Cuba.

U.S.—Cuban relations were thus shaped by a long history of U.S. involvement in Cuban affairs, by strong opposition to the new economic programs of the Cuban revolution, and by a growing fear on the part of U.S. leaders that for the victory of the Cuban revolutionaries would also become a Cold War victory for the Soviet Union. The process was dialectic: Castro was a dedicated revolutionary. Given the history of U.S.—Cuban relations, given also the extent of U.S. property and investments in the island, it was altogether likely that the revolution would evolve in ways antagonistic to American interests. U.S. opposition, and especially its failed attempt to overthrow the new Cuban government, strongly reinforced the direction and pace of that evolution, helping to propel Castro and the Cubans into an ever tighter embrace of the Soviet Union. This development, in turn, tempted the Soviets to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba, thus setting the stage for the Cuban missile crisis.

✽ D O C U M E N T S

By October 1960, relations between the United States and the new Cuban government had already badly deteriorated. In the first document, a 1960 speech before the United Nations, the new Cuban leader Fidel Castro traces the history of U.S. relations with his nation, defends the Cuban revolution, denounces U.S. efforts to overthrow his government, and praises the Soviet Union. Castro's speech, which is excerpted from the *United Nations Review*, follows the UN practice of paraphrasing the speaker's remarks, rather than reporting them directly. On March 13, 1961, Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress (see the second selection), a boldly ambitious plan to stimulate economic development and democracy throughout Latin America while avoiding radical social revolutions of the Cuban variety. The alliance failed, partly because the Kennedy administration remained divided over the degree of support for social and economic reform versus military aid to right-wing (but pro-American) dictators, partly because Kennedy's successors weakened the program, and partly, too, because many of Latin America's

economic and political problems were simply beyond the ability of the United States to solve.

During the same month in which Kennedy introduced the Alliance for Progress, he and his advisers put the finishing touches on their plan for a CIA-backed invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles. In the wake of its failure, Kennedy appointed a top-secret board of inquiry under General Maxwell Taylor. The third document is excerpted from the board's report, dated June 13, 1961. U.S. efforts to overthrow Castro included numerous plots to assassinate the Cuban leader. In 1975, following Watergate, a Select Committee of the U.S. Senate chaired by Senator Frank Church of Idaho opened an investigation of these and other covert activities by U.S. intelligence agencies. The fourth document is excerpted from the Senate committee's report on *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (1975).

During the summer of 1962, the Soviet Union began to ship nuclear missiles to Cuba. The discovery of these missiles in October 1962 precipitated the Cuban missile crisis. The fifth document is taken from the transcripts of two meetings on October 16, 1962, in which Kennedy and his top advisers first discussed possible responses to the crisis. The sixth selection is the president's public address to the nation on October 22. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's initial, private response to Kennedy's action, dated October 26, 1962, is reprinted as the seventh document. The following day, Khrushchev wrote again, adopting a more formal, hard-line stance. One of the Kennedy administration's most critical decisions was to ignore the second letter and respond instead to the first.

Fidel Castro Denounces U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 1960

The Prime Minister of Cuba recalled to the Assembly that many speakers who had preceded him on the rostrum had quite correctly referred to the problem of Cuba as one of the problems facing the world. As far as the world is concerned, he said, the problem of Cuba had come to a head in the last two years, and as such it was a new problem. Before that, the world had few reasons for knowing that his country existed; for many it was an offshoot—in reality, a colony—of the United States.

He traced the history of Cuba and referred to the law passed by the United States Congress at the time of the American military occupation of Cuba during the war with Spain, which, he claimed, said that the Constitution of Cuba—which was then being drafted—must have a rider under which the United States would be granted the right to intervene in Cuba's political affairs and to lease certain parts of the country for naval bases or for their coal deposits. In other words, the right to intervene and to lease naval bases was imposed by force by the legislative body of another country, since Cuban senators were clearly told that if they did not accept, the occupation forces would not be withdrawn.

The colonization of Cuba, he asserted, began with the acquisition of the best land by United States firms, concessions of Cuban natural resources and public services—concessions of all kinds. Cuba eventually had to fight to attain its independence, which was finally achieved after seven bloody years of tyranny “of those in our country who were nothing but the cat's-paws of those who dominated the country economically.” The Batista Gov-

ernment of Cuba was appropriate for the United States monopolies, but not for the Cuban people.

How could any system inimical to the interests of the people stay in power unless by force? These were the governments that the guiding circles of United States policy preferred, he said, and that was why governments of force still ruled in Latin America.

Of course circumstances changed, and the United States Government was now said to oppose that of [Dominican Generalissimo Rafael] Trujillo, but not that of Paraguay or of Nicaragua. The latter was no longer a government of force, but "a monarchy that is as constitutional almost as that of the United Kingdom."

Mr. Castro traced some of the conditions which he said the successful revolution in Cuba had uncovered. Public services, he alleged, all belonged to United States monopolies and a major portion of the banking business, importing business, oil refineries, sugar production, the lion's share of arable land and the most important industries in all fields in Cuba belonged to North American companies. The balance of payments from 1950 to 1960 was favorable to the United States by one billion dollars.

What the Revolutionary Government had wanted to do was to devote itself to the settling of its own problems at home; to carry out a program for the betterment of its people. But when the Revolutionary Government began to pass laws to overcome the advantages obtained by the monopolies, difficulties arose. Then "we began to be called communists; then we began to be painted red," he said.

The first unfriendly act perpetrated by the Government of the United States, he said, was to throw open its doors to a gang of murderers, blood-thirsty criminals who had murdered hundreds of defenceless peasants, who had never tired of torturing prisoners for many, many years, who had killed right and left. These hordes were received by the United States with open arms. Why this unfriendly act on the part of the Government of the United States toward Cuba? At the time Cuba could not understand, but now saw the reason clearly. The policy was part of an attitude of the United States.

He also criticized and blamed the United States Government for the fact that bombs were dropped on the sugar fields of Cuba before the harvest was in, and he accused the United States Government for allowing the planes which dropped the bombs to leave United States territory.

But, he said, aerial incursions finally stopped. Then came economic aggression. It was said that agrarian reform would cause chaos in agricultural production. That was not the case. Had it been so, the United States would not have had to carry on its economic aggression. They could have trusted in the Revolutionary Government's ruining the country. Fortunately that did not happen. Cuba needed new markets for its products. Therefore it signed a trade treaty with the Soviet Union to sell it a million tons of sugar and to purchase a certain amount of Russian products. Surely no one could say that was incorrect.

What could Cuba do? Go to the United Nations and denounce this economic aggression? The United Nations has power to deal with these

matters; but it sought an investigation to be carried out by the Organization of American States. As a result, the United States was not condemned. No, the Soviet Union was condemned. All the Soviet Union had said was that if there was military aggression against Cuba, it would support the victims with rockets. Since when was the support of a weak country, conditioned on attack by a powerful country, regarded as interference. If there were no possibility that Cuba would be attacked, then there was no possibility that there would be Soviet support.

"We, the small countries," he added, "do not as yet feel too secure about the preservation of our rights. That is why, when we decide to be free, we know full well that we become free at our own risk."

The Cuban revolution, he continued, was changing. What was yesterday a land [of] misery, a land of illiterates, was gradually becoming one of the most enlightened, advanced and developed lands of the continent. Developing this theme, he gave figures about the building of schools, housing, and industries, told of the success of plans for conservation of natural resources, medical plans and other advances since the revolution.

In view of the tremendous reality of underdevelopment, the United States Government, at Bogotá, had come out with a plan for economic development, but he criticized it, saying that the governments of Latin America were being offered not the resources for economic development but resources for social development: houses for people who have no work, schools to which children could not go, and hospitals that would be unnecessary if there were enough food to eat. Cuba was not included in this proposed assistance, but they were not going to get angry about that because the Cubans were solving their own problems.

The Government of Cuba, he said, had always been ready to discuss its problems with the Government of the United States, but the latter had not been willing to do so. He quoted notes which had been addressed to the United States in January and February last, and a reply which said that the United States could not accept the conditions for negotiation laid down in those notes. The Government and the people of Cuba, he said, were much concerned "at the aggressive turn in American policy regarding Cuba" and denounced the efforts of the United States to promote "the organization of subversive movements against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba."

He also said the United States had taken over "in a military manner" Honduran territory—*Islas Cisnes* (Swan Islands)—in violation of treaties, set up a powerful broadcasting station for subversive groups and was promoting subversion and the landing of armed forces in Cuba.

Turning to the subject of the United States leased naval base in Cuba, Mr. Castro said there was fear and concern in Cuba "of a country that has followed an aggressive and wartime policy possessing a base in the very heart of our island, that turns our island into the possible victim of any international conflict. It forces us to run the risk of any atomic conflict without us having even the slightest intervention in the problem." . . .

The case of Cuba, continued Mr. Castro, was the case of all the underdeveloped colonial countries and the problems he had described in relation

to Cuba applied perfectly well to the whole of Latin America, where, he alleged, the economic resources were controlled by the North American monopolies. There is a United Nations report, he said, which explains how even private capital, instead of going to the countries which need it most for setting up basic industries, is preferably being channelled to the more industrialized countries. The development of Latin America, he added, would have to be achieved through public investment, planned and granted unconditionally without any political strings attached. In this, the problems of Latin America were like the problems of Africa and Asia.

"The world," he declared, "has been divided among the monopolistic interests, which do not wish to see the development of peoples but: to exploit the natural resources of the countries and to exploit the people."

President John F. Kennedy Calls for an Alliance for Progress, 1961

One hundred and thirty-nine years ago this week the United States, stirred by the heroic struggles of its fellow Americans, urged the independence and recognition of the new Latin American Republics. It was then, at the dawn of freedom throughout this hemisphere, that [Simon] Bolívar spoke of his desire to see the Americas fashioned into the greatest region in the world, "greatest," he said, "not so much by virtue of her area and her wealth, as by her freedom and her glory."

Never, in the long history of our hemisphere, has this dream been nearer to fulfillment, and never has it been in greater danger.

The genius of our scientists has given us the tools to bring abundance to our land, strength to our industry, and knowledge to our people. For the first time we have the capacity to strike off the remaining bonds of poverty and ignorance—to free our people for the spiritual and intellectual fulfillment which has always been the goal of our civilization.

Yet at this very moment of maximum opportunity, we confront the same forces which have imperiled America throughout its history—the alien forces which once again seek to impose the despotisms of the Old World on the people of the New.

I have asked you to come here today so that I might discuss these challenges and these dangers.

Common Ties Uniting the Republics

We meet together as firm and ancient friends, united by history and experience and by our determination to advance the values of American civilization. For this new world of ours is not merely an accident of geography. Our continents are bound together by a common history—the endless exploration of new frontiers. Our nations are the product of a common struggle—the revolt from colonial rule. And our people share a common heritage—the quest for the dignity and the freedom of man.

The revolutions which gave us birth ignited, in the words of Thomas

Paine, "a spark never to be extinguished." And across vast, turbulent continents these American ideals still stir man's struggle for national independence and individual freedom. But as we welcome the spread of the American Revolution to other lands, we must also remember that our own struggle—the revolution which began in Philadelphia in 1776 and in Caracas in 1811—is not yet finished. Our hemisphere's mission is not yet completed. For our unfulfilled task is to demonstrate to the entire world that man's unsatisfied aspiration for economic progress and social justice can best be achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions. If we can do this in our own hemisphere, and for our own people, we may yet realize the prophecy of the great Mexican patriot, Benito Juarez, that "democracy is the destiny of future humanity."

As a citizen of the United States let me be the first to admit that we North Americans have not always grasped the significance of this common mission, just as it is also true that many in your own countries have not fully understood the urgency of the need to lift people from poverty and ignorance and despair. But we must turn from these mistakes—from the failures and the misunderstandings of the past—to a future full of peril but bright with hope.

Throughout Latin America—a continent rich in resources and in the spiritual and cultural achievements of its people—millions of men and women suffer the daily degradations of hunger and poverty. They lack decent shelter or protection from disease. Their children are deprived of the education or the jobs which are the gateway to a better life. And each day the problems grow more urgent. Population growth is outpacing economic growth, low living standards are even further endangered, and discontent—the discontent of a people who know that abundance and the tools of progress are at last within their reach—that discontent is growing. In the words of José Figueres, "once dormant peoples are struggling upward toward the sun, toward a better life."

If we are to meet a problem so staggering in its dimensions, our approach must itself be equally bold, an approach consistent with the majestic concept of Operation Pan America. Therefore I have called on all the people of the hemisphere to join in a new Alliance for Progress—*Alianza para Progreso*—a vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools—*techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela*. . . .

To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress. Our Alliance for Progress is an alliance of free governments—and it must work to eliminate tyranny from a hemisphere in which it has no rightful place. Therefore let us express our special friendship to the people of Cuba and the Dominican Republic—and the hope they will soon rejoin the society of free men, uniting with us in our common effort.

This political freedom must be accompanied by social change. For unless necessary social reforms, including land and tax reform, are freely made, unless we broaden the opportunity of all of our people, unless the great mass of Americans share in increasing prosperity, then our alliance, our

revolution, our dream, and our freedom will fail. But we call for social change by free men—change in the spirit of Washington and Jefferson, of Bolívar and San Martín and Martí—not change which seeks to impose on men tyrannies which we cast out a century and a half ago. Our motto is what it has always been—progress yes, tyranny no—*progreso sí, tiranía no!*

But our greatest challenge comes from within—the task of creating an American civilization where spiritual and cultural values are strengthened by an ever-broadening base of material advance, where, within the rich diversity of its own traditions, each nation is free to follow its own path toward progress.

The completion of our task will, of course, require the efforts of all the governments of our hemisphere. But the efforts of governments alone will never be enough. In the end the people must choose and the people must help themselves.

And so I say to the men and women of the Americas—to the *campesino* in the fields, to the *obrero* in the cities, to the *estudiante* in the schools—prepare your mind and heart for the task ahead, call forth your strength, and let each devote his energies to the betterment of all so that your children and our children in this hemisphere can find an ever richer and a freer life.

Let us once again transform the American Continent into a vast crucible of revolutionary ideas and efforts, a tribute to the power of the creative energies of free men and women, an example to all the world that liberty and progress walk hand in hand. Let us once again awaken our American revolution until it guides the struggles of people everywhere—not with an imperialism of force or fear but the rule of courage and freedom and hope for the future of man.

A Board of Inquiry Reports on the Bay of Pigs, 1961

1. Although the Cuban situation had been the subject of serious study in the Special Group [a senior oversight committee], Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] and other government agencies since 1958, this study takes as its point of departure the basic policy paper, "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime," approved by the President on 17 March 1960. This document, developed by the Central Intelligence Agency and indorsed by the Special Group, provided a program divided into four parts to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime by covert means:
 - a. The creation of a responsible and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime located outside of Cuba.
 - b. The development of means for mass communication to the Cuban people as a part of a powerful propaganda offensive.
 - c. The creation and development of a covert intelligence and action

organization within Cuba which would be responsive to the orders and directions of the exile opposition.

- d. The development of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerrilla action.
2. Since the primary purpose of this study is to examine the paramilitary actions growing out of this program and its successive modifications, the paragraph referring to the paramilitary aspects of the plan is quoted in its entirety:
 - d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistics support of covert military operations on the island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the United States so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air supply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.
 3. It is apparent from the above excerpt that at the time of approval of this document the concept of paramilitary action was limited to the recruitment of a cadre of leaders and the training of a number of paramilitary cadres for subsequent use as guerrillas in Cuba.
 4. The CIA began at once to implement the decisions contained in the policy paper on 17 March 1960. A target of 300 men was set for the recruitment of guerrillas to be trained covertly outside the United States. "Radio Swan" was installed on Swan Island and ready for broadcasting on 17 May 1960. Steps were taken to develop the FRD (*Frente Revolucionario Democrático*) as the Cuban front organization composed of a broad spectrum of Cuban political elements other than Communists and Batistianos. On August 18th, a progress report was given to the President and the Cabinet, at which time a budget of some \$13 million was approved, as well as the use of Department of Defense personnel and equipment. However, it was specified at this time that no United States military personnel were to be used in a combat status.
 5. Sometime in the summer of 1960 the paramilitary concept for the operation began to change. It appears that leaders in the CIA Task Force set up in January 1960 to direct the project were the first to entertain the thought of a Cuban strike force to land on the Cuban coast in

supplementation of the guerrilla action contemplated under the March 17, 1960 paper. These CIA officers began to consider the formation of a small force of infantry (200-300 men) for contingency employment in conjunction with other paramilitary operations, and in June began to form a small Cuban tactical air force. Eventually it was decided to equip this force with B-26 aircraft which had been widely distributed to foreign countries including countries in Latin America.

6. There were ample reasons for this new trend of thought. The air drops into Cuba were not proving effective. There were increasingly heavy shipments of Communist arms to Cuba, accompanied by evidence of increasingly effective control of the civilian population by Castro. The Special Group became aware of these adverse factors which were discussed repeatedly in the Committee meetings during the fall of 1960. The minutes of the conferences indicate a declining confidence in the effectiveness of guerrilla efforts alone to overthrow Castro.

7. In this atmosphere the CIA began to implement the new concept, increasing the size of the Cuban force in training and reorienting the training toward preparation for its use as an assault force on the Cuban coast. On November 4th, CIA in Washington dispatched a cable to the project officer in Guatemala describing what was wanted. The cable directed a reduction of the guerrilla teams in training to 60 men and the introduction of conventional training for the remainder as an amphibious and airborne assault force. From that time on, the training emphasis was placed on the assault mission and there is no evidence that the members of the assault force received any further preparation for guerrilla-type operations. The men became deeply imbued with the importance of the landing operation and its superiority over any form of guerrilla action to the point that it would have been difficult later to persuade them to return to a guerrilla-type mission. The final training of the Cubans was done by

[1½ lines deleted from transcript]

10. in Guatemala where 400-500 Cubans had been assembled. . . . The Director of Central Intelligence [Allen Dulles] briefed the President [Eisenhower] on the new paramilitary concept on 29 November 1960 and received the indication that the President wished the project expedited. The concept was formally presented to the Special Group on December 8, 1960. At this meeting, [] in charge of the paramilitary section for the Cuba project, described the new concept as one consisting of an amphibious landing on the Cuban coast of 600-750 men equipped with weapons of extraordinarily heavy fire power. The landing would be preceded by preliminary air strikes launched from Nicaragua against military targets. Air strikes as well as supply flights would continue after the landing. The objective would be to seize, hold a limited area in Cuba, maintain a visible presence, and then to draw dissident elements to the landing force, which hopefully would trigger a general uprising. This amphibious landing would not

entirely eliminate the previous concept for infiltrating guerrilla teams. It was expected that some 60-80 men would be infiltrated prior to the amphibious landing. . . .

16. On November 18, 1960, President-elect [John F.] Kennedy had first learned of the existence of a plan for the overthrow of Castro through a call on him at Palm Beach by Mr. [Allen] Dulles and Mr. [Richard] Bissell [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Plans]. He received his first briefing on the developing plan as President on January 28 at a meeting which included the Vice President [Lyndon B. Johnson], Secretary of State [Dean Rusk], Secretary of Defense [Robert McNamara], the Director of Central Intelligence [John McCone], the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [General Maxwell Taylor], Assistant Secretary [of State Thomas] Mann, Assistant Secretary [of Defense Paul] Nitze, Mr. Tracy Barnes [Bissell's assistant], and Mr. McGeorge Bundy [the National Security Adviser].

After considerable discussion, the President authorized the following:

- a. A continuation and accentuation of current activities of the CIA, including increased propaganda, increased political action, and increased sabotage. Continued overflights of Cuba were specifically authorized.
- b. The Defense Department was to review CIA proposals for the active deployment of anti-Castro Cuban forces on Cuban territory and the results of this analysis were to be promptly reported to the CIA.
- c. The State Department was to prepare a concrete proposal for action with other Latin American countries to isolate the Castro regime and to bring against it the judgment of the Organization of American States. It was expected that this proposal

[2½ lines deleted from transcript]

19. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] supported the Trinidad Plan as one having "a fair chance of success" the plan encountered difficulties in other quarters. From its inception the plan had been developed under the ground rule that it must retain a covert character, that is, it should include no action which, if revealed, could not be plausibly denied by the United States and should look to the world as an operation exclusively conducted by Cubans. This ground rule meant, among other things, that no U.S. military forces or individuals could take part in combat operations. In due course it was extended to exclude pre-D-Day air strikes in support of the landing since such strikes could not have the appearance of being launched from Cuban soil before an airstrip had been seized by the landing force. This effort to treat as covert an operation which in reality could not be concealed or shielded from the presumption of U.S. involvement raised in due course many serious obstacles to the successful conduct of the operation which will be the subject of subsequent comment.

20. The President and his advisors were thoroughly aware of the difficulties of preserving the covert character of an operation as visible as a landing on a hostile shore and from the outset viewed the Trinidad Plan with caution. In particular, the State Department representatives opposed features of the plan because of the difficulty of concealing U.S. participation and also because of their fear of adverse reactions to the United States in Latin American countries and in the United Nations. They objected in particular to the conduct of any tactical air operations unless these aircraft were either actually or ostensibly based on Cuban soil.
21. On the other hand, working to overcome this reluctance to approve the Trinidad Plan was the need to decide quickly what to do with the Cuban Expeditionary Force. The President was informed that this force must leave Guatemala within a limited time and that, further, it could not be held together long in the United States if it were moved there. If the decision were taken to disband the force, that fact would soon become known and would be interpreted as a renunciation by the U.S. of the effort to free Cuba from Castro. Faced with two unattractive alternatives, the President and his advisors asked the CIA to come up with various proposals for the use of this force as alternatives to Trinidad.
22. These proposals were the subject of detailed consideration on March 11th when the President and the National Security Council met to consider the various plans then being entertained for Cuba. Mr. Bissell of CIA presented a paper entitled, "Proposed Operation Against Cuba" which summarized the action to date and presented four alternative courses of action. It concluded by recommending the Trinidad Plan which he described to be an operation in the form of an assault in force preceded by a diversionary landing as the action having the best chance of achieving the desired result. The assault in force was to consist of an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, to seize a beachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially if there were evidence of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognized and a legal basis provided for U.S. logistic support.
23. The military plan contemplated the holding of a perimeter around a beachhead area. It was believed that initial attacks by the Castro militia, even if conducted in considerable force, could be successfully resisted. The scale of the operation, a display of professional competence and determination on the part of the assault force would, it was hoped, demoralize the Castro militia, cause defections therefrom, impair the morale of the Castro regime and induce widespread rebellion.
24. After full discussion of this plan the President indicated that he was willing to go ahead with the overall project, but that he could not endorse a plan so "spectacular" as Trinidad. He directed that the CIA planners come up with other alternative methods of employing the Cuban forces. An acceptable plan should provide for a "quiet" landing, preferably at

night, without having the appearance of a World War II-type amphibious assault. The State Department requested that any beachhead seized should include an airfield capable of supporting B-26 operations, to which any tactical air operations could be attributed.

25. During the period 13-15 March the paramilitary staff of CIA worked intensively to devise a plan or plans having the desired characteristics, and presented a briefing to the JCS Working Group late in the morning of March 14. They produced for consideration three such alternatives as general concepts. They were based on three possible landing areas: (1) the Preston area on the north coast of Oriente Province; (2) the south coast of Las Villas between Trinidad and Cienfuegos; and (3) the eastern Zapata area near Cochinos Bay.

26. On March 14th these three alternatives were referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their evaluation. The Joint Staff prepared this evaluation, the results of which the respective service action officers presented to their respective Chiefs prior to the JCS meeting on 15 March. At this meeting, following a briefing by the Joint Staff Working Group, the Joint Chiefs approved the evaluation and reported to the Secretary of Defense that of the three, the Zapata concept was considered the most feasible and the most likely to accomplish the objective. They added that none of the alternative concepts were considered as feasible and likely to accomplish the objective as the Trinidad Plan.

28. On the same day as the Chiefs' action, March 15th, the President was briefed at the White House on the three alternative courses of action which the Chiefs had considered. After full discussion, the President again withheld approval of the plan and directed certain modifications to be considered. The CIA returned on the following day, March 16th, and presented a modification for the landing at Zapata which Mr. Bissell considered on balance more advantageous than the Trinidad Plan, wherein there would be airdrops at first light instead of the previous day in the late afternoon, with the landing in the night and all the ships withdrawn from the objective area by dawn without completing the unloading at that time. The President authorized them to proceed with the plan, but still without giving it his formal approval.

A Senate Committee Investigates U.S. Plots to Assassinate Castro, 1960-1965

We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965. Although some of the assassination plots did not advance beyond the stage of planning and preparation, one plot, involving the use of underworld figures, reportedly twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban dissident. The proposed assassination devices ran the gamut from high-powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which strain the imagination.

The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 1963—the very day that President [John F.] Kennedy was shot in Dallas—when a CIA official offered a poison pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same time an emissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to explore the possibility of improved relations.

The following narrative sets forth the facts of assassination plots against Castro as established before the Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. . . .

(a) Plots: Early 1960

(i) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image. Efforts against Castro did not begin with assassination attempts.

From March through August 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. According to the 1967 Report of the CIA's Inspector General, an official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled discussing a scheme to spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but the scheme was rejected because the chemical was unreliable. During this period, TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a speech. The Inspector General also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out. The depilatory was to be administered during a trip outside Cuba, when it was anticipated Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals, but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his trip.

(ii) Accident Plot. The first action against the life of a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is aware took place in 1960. A Cuban who had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelligence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably be in contact with Raul Castro [Fidel Castro's brother and Minister of Defense]. CIA Headquarters and field stations were requested to inform the Havana Station of any intelligence needs that the Cuban might fulfill. The case officer testified that he and the Cuban contemplated only acquiring intelligence information and that assassination was not proposed by them.

The cable from the Havana Station was received at Headquarters on the night of July 20. The duty officer, who was summoned to Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to Richard Bissell, CIA's Deputy Director for Plans and the man in charge of CIA's covert action directorate. The duty officer also contacted J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division within the Directorate for Plans.

Following their instructions, he sent a cable to the Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible removal top three leaders is

receiving serious consideration at HQS." The cable inquired whether the Cuban was sufficiently motivated to risk "arranging an accident" involving Raul Castro and advised that the station could "at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details." Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful completion," but no advance payment was permitted because of the possibility that the Cuban was a double agent. According to the case officer, this cable resented "quite a departure from the conventional activities we'd been asked to handle."

The case officer contacted the Cuban and told him of the proposal. The case officer avoided the word "assassinate" but made it clear that the CIA contemplated an "accident to neutralize this leader's [Raul's] influence." After being assured that his sons would be given a college education in the event of his death, the Cuban agreed to take a "calculated risk," limited to possibilities that might pass as accidental.

Immediately after returning to the station the case officer was told that a cable had just arrived stating: "Do not pursue ref. Would like to drop matter." This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes.

It was, of course, too late to "drop the matter" since the Cuban had already left to contact Raul Castro. When the Cuban returned, he told the case officer that he had not had an opportunity to arrange an accident.

(iii) Poison Cigars. A notation in the records of the Operations Division, CIA's Office of Medical Services, indicates that on August 16, 1960, an official was given a box of Castro's favorite cigars with instructions to treat them with lethal poison. The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so potent that a person would die after putting one in his mouth. The official reported that the cigars were ready on October 7, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to an unidentified person on February 13, 1961. The record does not disclose whether an attempt was made to pass the cigars to Castro.

(b) Use of Underworld Figures—Phase I (Pre-Bay of Pigs)

(i) The Initial Plan. In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist members of the criminal underworld with gambling syndicate contacts to aid in assassinating Castro. The origin of the plot is uncertain. According to the 1967 Inspector General's Report,

Bissell recalls that the idea originated with J. C. King, then Chief of W. H. Division, although King now recalls having only had limited knowledge of such a plan and at a much later date—about mid-1962.

Bissell testified that:

I remember a conversation which I would have put in early autumn or late summer between myself and Colonel Edwards [Director of the Office of Security], and I have some dim recollection of some earlier conversation I

had had with Colonel J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, and the subject matter of both of those conversations was a capability to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided upon.

The earliest concrete evidence of the operation is a conversation between DDP Bissell and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of the Office of Security. Edwards recalled that Bissell asked him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro. Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find someone to assassinate Castro and believed that Edwards raised the idea of contacting members of a gambling syndicate operating in Cuba.

Edwards assigned the mission to the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. The Support Chief recalled that Edwards had said that he and Bissell were looking for someone to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro.

Edwards and the Support Chief decided to rely on Robert A. Maheu to recruit someone "tough enough" to handle the job. Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who had entered into a career as a private investigator in 1954. A former FBI associate of Maheu's was employed in the CIA's Office of Security and had arranged for the CIA to use Maheu in several sensitive covert operations in which "he didn't want to have an Agency person or a government person get caught." Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA of \$500, but it was terminated after his detective agency became more lucrative. The Operational Support Chief had served as Maheu's case officer since the Agency first began using Maheu's services, and by 1960 they had become close personal friends.

Sometime in late August or early September 1960, the Support Chief approached Maheu about the proposed operation. As Maheu recalls the conversation, the Support Chief asked him to contact John Rosselli, an underworld figure with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he would participate in a plan to "dispose" of Castro. Maheu handled the details of setting up the operation and keeping the Support Chief informed of developments. After Rosselli and Maheu had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly prior to October 18, Rosselli introduced Maheu to two individuals on whom Rosselli intended to rely: "Sam Gold," who would serve as a "back-up man," or "key" man and "Joe," whom "Gold" said would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there. The Support Chief, who was using the name "Jim Olds," said he had met "Sam" and "Joe" once, and then only briefly.

The Support Chief testified that he learned the true identities of his associates one morning when Maheu called and asked him to examine the "Parade" supplement to the *Miami Times*. An article on the Attorney General's ten-most-wanted criminals list revealed that "Sam Gold" was Momo Salvatore Giancana, a Chicago-based gangster, and "Joe" was Santos Trafficante, the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cuba. The Support Chief reported his discovery to Edwards, but did not know whether Edwards reported this fact to his superiors. The Support Chief testified that this incident occurred after

"we were up to our ears in it," a month or so after Giancana had been brought into the operation, but prior to giving the poison pills to Rosselli. Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination, and that he met almost daily with Giancana over a substantial period of time. Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key role," Rosselli claimed that none of the Cubans eventually used in the operation were acquired through Giancana's contacts. . . .

Rosselli told the Support Chief that Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination. The Inspector General's Report suggests that this Cuban may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing "gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro. The Report speculated that the Cuban was interested in the assassination scheme as a means of financing the purchase of arms and communications equipment.

The Cuban claimed to have a contact inside a restaurant frequented by Castro. As a prerequisite to the deal, he demanded cash and \$1,000 worth of communications equipment. The Support Chief recalled that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division, gave him \$50,000 in Bissell's office to pay the Cuban if he successfully assassinated Castro. The Support Chief stated that Bissell also authorized him to give the Cuban the requested electronics equipment.

Bissell testified that he did not doubt that some cash was given to the Support Chief, and that he was aware that the poison pills had been prepared. Bissell did not recall the meeting described above, and considered it unlikely that the Support Chief would have been given the money in his office. The Inspector General's Report, relying on an Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an interview with the person who signed the voucher for the funds, placed the amount passed at \$10,000. If the Inspector General's conclusions were correct, the funds which Bissell allegedly authorized were probably the advance payment to the Cuban, and not the \$150,000 that was to be paid to him after Castro's death.

The record does clearly reflect, however, that communications equipment was delivered to the Cuban and that he was paid advance money to cover his expenses, probably in the amount of \$10,000. The money and pills were delivered at a meeting between Maheu, Rosselli, Trafficante, and the Cuban at the Fountainebleau Hotel in Miami. As Rosselli recalled, Maheu:

opened his briefcase and dumped a whole lot of money on his lap . . . and also came up with the capsules and he explained how they were going to be used. As far as I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling soups and things like that, but they could be used in water or otherwise, but they couldn't last forever. . . . It had to be done as quickly as possible.

The attempt met with failure. According to the Inspector General's Report, Edwards believed the scheme failed because Castro stopped visiting

the restaurant where the "asset" was employed. Maheu suggested an alternative reason. He recalled being informed that after the pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had to be received before in fact they were administered." He testified that he was informed by the Support Chief sometime after the operation that the Cubans had an opportunity to administer the pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra or Raul Castro, but that the "go signal" never came. Maheu did not know who was responsible for giving the signal. The Cuban subsequently returned the cash and the pills.

President Kennedy and His Advisers Debate Options in the Missile Crisis, 1962

Meeting of 11:50 A.M.-12:57 P.M.

LUNDAHL [Art Lundaahl, National Photographic Interpretation Center]: This is a result of the photography taken Sunday, sir.

JFK: Yeah.

LUNDAHL: There's a medium-range ballistic missile launch site and two new military encampments on the southern edge of Sierra del Rosario in west central Cuba.

JFK: Where would that be?

LUNDAHL: Uh, west central, sir. That. . . .

JFK: Yeah. . . .

LUNDAHL: Well, on site on one of the encampments contains a total of at least fourteen canvas-covered missile trailers measuring 67 feet in length, 9 feet in width. The overall length of the trailers plus the tow-bars is approximately 80 feet. The other encampment contains vehicles and tents but with no missile trailers. . . .

JFK: How far advanced is this? . . . How do you know this is a medium-range ballistic missile?

LUNDAHL: The length, sir.

JFK: The what? The length?

LUNDAHL: The length of it. Yes.

JFK: The length of the missile? Which part? I mean which. . . .

LUNDAHL: . . . the missile [word unintelligible] indicates which one is [words unintelligible]. . . .

JFK: Is this ready to be fired?

GRAYBEAL [Sidney Graybeal]: No, sir.

JFK: How long have we got. . . . We can't tell, I take it. . . .

GRAYBEAL: No, sir.

JFK: . . . how long before it can be fired?

GRAYBEAL: That depends on how ready the. . . .

JFK: But, what does it have to be fired from?

GRAYBEAL: It would have to be fired from a stable hard surface. This could be packed dirt; it could be concrete or, or asphalt. The surface has to

be hard, then you put a flame deflector, a deflector plate on there to direct the missile.

McNAMARA [Robert McNamara, secretary of defense]: Would you care to comment on the position of nuclear warheads—this is in relation to the question from the president—explain when these can be fired?

GRAYBEAL: Sir, we've looked very hard. We can find nothing that would spell nuclear warhead in term [sic] of any isolated area or unique security in this particular area. The mating of the nuclear warhead to the missile from some of the other short range missiles there would take about, uh, a couple of hours to do this.

McNAMARA: This is not defended, I believe, at the moment?

LUNDAHL: Not yet, sir. . . .

RUSK [Dean Rusk, secretary of state]: Don't you have to assume these are nuclear? . . .

McNAMARA: There's no question about that. The question is one of readiness of the, to fire and—and this is highly critical in forming our plans—that the time between today and the time when the readiness to fire capability develops is a very important thing. To estimate that we need to know where these warheads are, and we have not yet found any probable storage of warheads and hence it seems extremely unlikely that they are now ready to fire or may be ready to fire within a matter of hours or even a day or two. . . .

JFK: Secretary Rusk?

RUSK: Yes. [Well?], Mr. President, this is a, of course, a [widely?] serious development. It's one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could, uh, carry this far. Uh, they, uh, seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own [in the same?] [words unintelligible] with a Soviet base, thus making it [essential to or essentially?] Cuban point of view. The Cubans couldn't [word unintelligible] with it anyhow, so. . . . Now, uhm, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will eliminate this base. I don't think we [can?] sit still. The questioning becomes whether we do it by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we, uh, build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in, or or even the Cubans themselves, uh, take some, take some action on this. The thing that I'm, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It's so [eminently or heavily?] involved with 2 allies and confrontation in many places, that any action that we take, uh, will greatly increase the risks of direct action involving, uh, our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world. Uhm, so I think we, we have to think very hard about two major, uh, courses of action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we [make or think?], that is the, uh, overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved doing that. I don't think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that, uh, what we're doing is eliminating this particular base or

planes from coming in. Tell the British, who, and anyone else who's involved at this point, that, uh, if they're interested in peace, that they've got to stop their ships from Cuban trade at this point. Uh, in other words, isolate Cuba completely without at this particular moment a, uh, a forceful blockade. . . .

But I think that, by large, there are, there are these two broad alternatives: one, the quick strike; the other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that, uh. . . . Mr. Khrushchev may not himself really understand that or believe that at this point. I think we'll be facing a situation that could well lead to general war. . . .

McNAMARA: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I would like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them.

But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept as, uh, foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational. I'm not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because, if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they're launched there is almost certain to be, uh, chaos in part of the east coast of the area, uh, in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba.

Uh, secondly, I, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites plus the airfields plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but hidden by that time plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now, this is a fairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites; and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands, say two or three thousand. It seems to me these two propositions, uh, should underlie our, our discussion.

Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out and what may be some of the consequences? Uh, we could carry out an air strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an air strike within, within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the chiefs would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days, but we are prepared for that quickly. The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial day, if necessary. Uh, presumably

any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we're simply doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Uh, or we're going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by actual eliminate the island.

The other would be, if we have a few days—from the military point of view, if we have the whole time—uh, then I would think that, uh, there would be another course of action, a combination of things that, uh, we might wish to consider. Uhm, first, uh, that we, uh, stimulate the OAS procedure immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact has been violated [and actually?] what acts should [we take or be taken?] in, under the terms of the Rio Pact. . . .

I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro, perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through, uh, his representative at the U.N. Uh, I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador would be best, the better channel to get to Castro [apart?] privately and tell him that, uh, this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is being victimized here, and that, uh, the Soviets are preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.

You saw the [New York] Times story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, "We'll trade Cuba for Berlin." This ought to be brought to Castro's attention. It ought to be said to Castro that, uh, uh, this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable. The time has now come when he must take the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, prevent this missile base from becoming operational.

And I think there are certain military, uhm, uh, actions that we could, we might well want to take straight away. First, to, uh, to call up, uh, highly selective units [no more than?] 150,000. Unless we feel that it's better, more desirable to go to a general national emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. If we announce, at the time that we announce this development—and I think we do have to announce this development some time this week—uh, we announce that, uh, we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, and we will enforce our right to do so. We reject the mission of secrecy in this hemisphere in any matters of this sort. We, we reinforce our forces in Guantánamo. We reinforce our forces in the southeastern part of the United States—whatever is necessary from the military point of view to be able to give, to deliver an overwhelming strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And, uh, also, to take care of any, uh, MIGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or at the United States. Build up heavy forces, uh, if those are not already in position. . . .

I think also that we need a few days, uhm, to alert our other allies, for consultation with NATO. I'll assume that we can move on this line at the same time to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going into Cuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their

there would be some political discussions taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during. In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for an air, invasion, both by air and by sea. . . . Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some degree of mobilization. Uh, I would think of the mobilization coming not before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following, say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase, and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.

Now, this is very sketchily the military, uh, capabilities, and I think you may wish to hear General Taylor, uh, outline his choice. . . .

TAYLOR [General Maxwell Taylor, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]: Uh, we're impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance of getting a, a strike with all the benefits of surprise, uh, which would mean *ideally* that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground where we can take them out. Uh, that, that desire runs counter to the strong point the secretary made if the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could, becomes operational. Uh, practically, I think the, our knowledge of the timing of the readiness is going to be so, so, uh, difficult that we'll never have the, the exact permanent, uh, the perfect timing. . . . It's a little hard to say in terms of time how much I'm discussing. But we must do a good job the first time we go in there, uh, pushing a 100 percent just as far, as closely as we can with our, with our strike. . . .

I would also mention among the, the military actions we should take that once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible, we should, should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade. . . .

JFK: What is the, uh, advantage. . . . Must be some major reason for the Russians to, uh, set this up as a. . . . Must be that they're not satisfied with their ICBMs. What'd be the reason that they would, uh. . . .

TAYLOR: What it'd give 'em is primary, it makes the launching base, uh, for short range missiles against the United States to supplement their rather [deceptive?] ICBM system, for example. There's one reason. . . .

Rusk: Still, about why the Soviets are doing this, uh, Mr. McCone [John A. McCone, director of the Central Intelligence Agency] suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that, uh, he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don't really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that, uh, he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.

JFK: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?

TAYLOR?: We have Jupiter missiles. . . .

McNAMARA?: About fifteen, I believe it is. . . .

Rusk: Uhm, and that Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it's important for us to learn about living under medium-range

missiles, and he's doing that to sort of balance that, uh, that political, psychological [plank?]. I think also that, uh, Berlin is, uh, very much involved in this. Uhm, for the first time, I'm beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We've [hardly?] talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to, uh, keep our eye on that element. But, uh, they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In other words like the Suez-Hungary combination. If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have, uh, what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else. But, uh, I must say I don't really see the rationality of, uh, the Soviets' pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country.

JFK: Uh, eh, well, this, which. . . . What you're really talking about are two or three different, uh, [tense?] operations. One is the strike just on this, these three bases. One, the second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anything else connected with, uh, missiles. Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires really the, uh, the, uh, third and which is a larger step. And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the, uh, degree of consultation.

RFK [Robert F. Kennedy]: Mr. President.

JFK: Yes.

RFK: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I would say that, uh, you're dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second, uh, air, the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their missiles. You're covering most of Cuba. You're going to kill an awful lot of people, and, uh, we're going to take an awful lot of heat on it. . . .

JFK: I don't believe it takes us, at least, uh. . . . How long did it take to get in a position where we can invade Cuba? Almost a month? Two months?

McNAMARA: No, sir. . . .

JFK: I think we ought to, what we ought to do is, is, uh, after this meeting this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these various, uh, proposals. In the meanwhile, we'll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is needed from the fights, and, in addition, we will. . . . I don't think we got much time on these missiles. They may be. . . . So it may be that we just have to, we can't wait two weeks while we're getting ready to, to roll. Maybe just have to just take *them out*, and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be where we end up. I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to. . . . Because that's what we're going to do *anyway*. We're certainly going to do number one; we're going to take out these, uh, missiles. Uh, the questions will be whether, which, what I would describe as number two, which would be a general air strike. That we're not

ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the, is the, uh, the general invasion. At least we're going to do number one, so it seems to me that we don't have to wait very long. We, we ought to be making *those* preparations.

BUNDY [McGeorge Bundy, assistant for national security affairs]: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have *definitely* decided *against* a political track. I, myself, think we ought . . .

TAYLOR?: Well, we'll have . . .

BUNDY: . . . to work out a contingency on that.

TAYLOR?: We, we'll develop both tracks.

Meeting of 6:30-7:55 P.M.

McNAMARA: Mr. President, could I outline three courses of action we have considered and speak very briefly on each one? The first is what I would call the political course of action, in which we, uh, follow some of the possibilities that Secretary Rusk mentioned this morning by approaching Castro, by approaching Khrushchev, by discussing with our allies. An overt and open approach politically to the problem [attempting, or in order?] to solve it. This seemed to me likely to lead to no satisfactory result, and it almost stops subsequent military action. . . .

A second course of action we haven't discussed but lies in between the military course we began discussing a moment ago and the political course of action is a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance; a statement that we would immediately impose an, uh, a blockade against *offensive* weapons entering Cuba in the future; and an indication that with our open-surveillance reconnaissance which we would plan to maintain indefinitely for the future. . . .

But the third course of action is any one of these variants of military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles. The Chiefs are strongly opposed to so limited an air attack. But even so limited an air attack is a very extensive air attack. It's not twenty sorties or fifty sorties or a hundred sorties, but probably several hundred sorties. Uh, we haven't worked out the details. It's very difficult to do so when we lack certain intelligence that we hope to have tomorrow or the next day. But it's a substantial air attack. . . . I don't believe we have considered the consequences of any of these actions satisfactorily, and because we haven't considered the consequences, I'm not sure we're taking all the action we ought to take now to minimize those. I, I don't know quite what kind of a world we live in after we've struck Cuba, and we, we've started it. . . .

TAYLOR: And you'll miss some [missiles].

McNAMARA: And you'll miss some. That's right. Now after we've launched sorties, what kind of a world do we live in? How, how do we stop at that point? I don't know the answer to this. I think tonight State and we ought to work on the consequences of any one of these courses of actions, consequences which I don't believe are entirely clear. . . .

JFK: If the, uh, it doesn't increase very much their strategic, uh, strength,

why is it, uh, can any Russian expert tell us why they. . . . After all Khrushchev demonstrated a sense of caution [thousands?]. . . .

SPEAKER?: Well, there are several, several possible . . .

JFK: . . . Berlin, he's been cautious, I mean, he hasn't been, uh . . . BALL [George W. Ball, under secretary of state]: Several possibilities, Mr. President. One of them is that he has given us word now that he's coming over in November to, to the UN. If, he may be proceeding on the assumption, and this lack of a sense of *apparent* urgency would seem to, to support this, that this *isn't* going to be discovered at the moment and that, uh, when he comes over this is something he can do, a ploy. That here is Cuba armed against the United States, or possibly use it to try to trade something in Berlin, saying he'll disarm Cuba, if, uh, if we'll yield some of our interests in Berlin and some arrangement for it. I mean, that this is a, it's a trading ploy.

BUNDY: I would think one thing that I would still cling to is that he's not likely to give Fidel Castro nuclear warheads. I don't believe that has happened or is likely to happen.

JFK: Why does he put these in there though?

BUNDY: Soviet-controlled nuclear warheads [of the kind?]. . . .

JFK: That's right, but what is the advantage of that? It's just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs [Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles] in Turkey. Now that'd be goddam dangerous, I would think.

BUNDY: Well, we *did*, Mr. President. . . .

JFK: Yeah, but that was five years ago. . . .

BALL: Yes, I think, I think you, you look at this possibility that this is an attempt to, to add to his strategic capabilities. A second consideration is that it is simply a trading ploy, that he, he wants this in so that he could, he could [words unintelligible]. . . .

SPEAKER?: Isn't it puzzling, also, there are no evidence of any troops protecting the sites?

TAYLOR: Well, there're troops there. At least there're tents. . . .

McNAMARA: But they look like [words unintelligible]. It's as if you could walk over the fields into those vans.

JFK: Well, it's a goddam mystery to me. I don't know enough about the Soviet Union, but if anybody can tell me any other time since the Berlin blockade where the Russians have given us so clear provocation, I don't know when it's been, because they've been awfully cautious really. The Russians, I never. . . . Now, maybe our mistake was in not saying some time *before* this summer that if they do this we're [word unintelligible] to act. . . .

President Kennedy Addresses the Nation on the Missile Crisis, 1962

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

This Government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive

missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium range ballistic missiles, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City, or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America, or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles—capable of traveling more than twice as far—and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far north as Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas, in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this Nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations, and my own public warnings to the Soviets on September 4 and 13. This action also contradicts the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character, and that the Soviet Union had no need or desire to station strategic missiles on the territory of any other nation.

The size of this undertaking makes clear that it has been planned for some months. Yet only last month, after I had made clear the distinction between any introduction of ground-to-ground missiles and the existence of defensive anti-aircraft missiles, the Soviet Government publicly stated on September 11 that, and I quote, "the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes," that, and I quote the Soviet Government, "there is no need for the Soviet Government to shift its weapons . . . for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba," and that, and I quote their government, "the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." That statement was false.

Only last Thursday, as evidence of this rapid offensive buildup was already in my hand, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko told me in my office

that he was instructed to make it clear once again, as he said his government had already done, that Soviet assistance to Cuba, and I quote, "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba," that, and I quote him, "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means offensive, and if it were otherwise," Mr. Gromyko went on, "the Soviet Government would never become involved in rendering such assistance." That statement also was false.

Neither the United States of America nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril. Nuclear weapons are so destructive and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.

For many years, both the Soviet Union and the United States, recognizing this fact, have deployed strategic nuclear weapons with great care, never upsetting the precarious status quo which insured that these weapons would not be used in the absence of some vital challenge. Our own strategic missiles have never been transferred to the territory of any other nation under a cloak of secrecy and deception; and our history—unlike that of the Soviets since the end of World War II—demonstrates that we have no desire to dominate or conquer any other nation or impose our system upon its people. Nevertheless, American citizens have become adjusted to living daily on the bull's-eye of Soviet missiles located inside the U.S.S.R. or in submarines.

In that sense, missiles in Cuba add to an already clear and present danger—although it should be noted the nations of Latin America have never previously been subjected to a potential nuclear threat.

But this secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country, if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to our word. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere.

Our policy has been one of patience and restraint, as befits a peaceful and powerful nation, which leads a worldwide alliance. We have been determined not to be diverted from our central concerns by mere irritants and fanatics. But now further action is required—and it is under way; and these

actions may only be the beginning. We will not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in our mouth—but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.

Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted to me by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of the Congress, I have directed that the following *initial* steps be taken immediately:

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.

Second: I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buildup. The foreign ministers of the OAS, in their communique of October 6, rejected secrecy on such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensive military preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to the hemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat will be recognized.

Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced our base at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of our personnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a standby alert basis.

Fifth: We are calling tonight for an immediate meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Organization of American States, to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to invoke articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of all necessary action. The United Nations Charter allows for regional security arrangements—and the nations of this hemisphere decided long ago against the military presence of outside powers. Our other allies around the world have also been alerted.

Sixth: Under the Charter of the United Nations, we are asking tonight that an emergency meeting of the Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat to world peace. Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted.

Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations. I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination, and to join in an historic effort

to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction—by returning to his government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba—by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis—and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev Appeals to President Kennedy, 1962

[Moscow,] October 26, 1962.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 25. From your letter, I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and (some) sense of responsibility. I value this.

Now we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would judge that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means of the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with us, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace. I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have

participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your conclusions regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different estimates of these or those military means. Indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take for example a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number of troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for infantry to attack. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not quarrel now. It is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this. But I say to you: you, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand: can one attack, if one has on one's territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction. But one cannot attack with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can attack. Without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to the effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All the means located there, and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can attack you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that one can think that it is possible to attack thus. I say precisely attack, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the

incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this. We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you, we have differences on ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful coexistence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these (cargoes) are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted—and we are ready to enter such negotiations—and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions

against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly. You have asked what happened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke about it in Vienna—that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, pointing out that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we too possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged, but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the reciprocal claims, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is: we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. We were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The USA participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants in the aggression against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General [William Sidney] Graves, who, at that time, commanded the US expeditionary corps. Graves called it "The American Adventure in Siberia."

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counterrevolutionary emigrants, that you support them and would help them to realize their plans against the present government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hang over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban government to furnish it aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and the government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your

...this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the government of Cuba, evidently, would spare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you possess, but of all other armaments as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. People do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, too, who manifests alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and I readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples. These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours,
N. Khrushchev.

✠ E S A Y S

In the first essay, diplomatic historian Thomas G. Paterson of the University of Connecticut places John F. Kennedy's policies toward Cuba in a broad perspective, linking U.S. attempts to overthrow the Castro government with the subsequent missile crisis. A prominent critic of U.S. Cold War policies, Paterson suggests that Kennedy was responsible for the failure of U.S. policy toward Cuba, a program that posed a real risk of nuclear war and left as its legacy a bitter hostility that continues even today to shape U.S.-Cuban relations. The second essay, by Raymond L. Garthoff, focuses on the Cuban missile crisis and on the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Garthoff was a staff-level State Department adviser who was deeply involved in the deliberations over the U.S. response to the Soviet missiles. In this essay he draws on his own recollections as well as interviews and documents from U.S. and Soviet sources. Garthoff concludes that the Kennedy administration acted in a statesmanlike fashion, seeking a middle ground that avoided both a preemptive first strike, which had been urged by some military and CIA officials, and purely diplomatic approaches, which he believes would have been ineffective and unwise.

Kennedy's Fixation with Cuba

THOMAS G. PATERSON

"My God," muttered Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency, "these Kennedys keep the pressure on about Castro." Another CIA officer heard it straight from the Kennedy brothers: "Get off your ass about Cuba." Defense Secretary Robert McNamara remembered that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." As someone said, Cuba was one of the four-letter words of the 1960s.

President John F. Kennedy spent as much or more time on Cuba as on any other foreign policy issue. Cuba stood at the center of his administration's admitted greatest failure, the Bay of Pigs, and its alleged greatest success, the missile crisis. Contrary to some Kennedy memoirists and scholars who have claimed that Kennedy was often trapped by a bureaucracy he could not control and distracted by other time-consuming issues, the President was knowledgeable, engaged, and influential on matters Cuban.

Why did President Kennedy and his chief advisers indulge such a fixation

with Cuba and direct so many United States resources to an unrelenting campaign to monitor, harass, isolate, and ultimately destroy Havana's radical regime? One answer springs from a candid remark by Robert F. Kennedy. Looking back at the early 1960s, he wondered "if we did not pay a very great price for being more energetic than wise about a lot of things, especially Cuba." The Kennedys' famed eagerness for action became exaggerated in the case of Cuba. They always wanted to get moving on Cuba, and Castro dared them to try. The popular, intelligent, but erratic Cuban leader, who came down from the Sierra Maestra Mountains in January 1959 to overthrow the United States ally Fulgencio Batista, hurled harsh words at Washington and defiantly challenged the Kennedy model of evolutionary, capitalist development so evident in the Alliance for Progress. As charismatic figures charting new frontiers, the President and *Jefe Máximo* often personalized the Cuban-American contest. Kennedy harbored a "deep feeling against Castro," as one White House aide noted, and the Cuban thought the American "an intelligent and able leader of American imperialism." After the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro branded Kennedy a new Hitler. To Kennedy's great annoyance, Castro could not be wheedled or beaten.

Kennedy's ardent war against *Fidelismo* may also have stemmed from his feeling that Castro had double-crossed him. As a senator, Kennedy had initially joined many Americans in welcoming the Cuban Revolution as a decided advancement over the "oppressive" Batista dictatorship. Linking Castro to the legacy of Bolívar, Kennedy urged a "patient attitude" toward the new government, which he did not see as Communist. Denying repeatedly that he was a Communist, Castro had in fact proclaimed his allegiance to democracy and private property. But in the process of legitimizing his revolution and resisting United States pressure, Castro became increasingly radical. Americans grew impatient with the regime's highly charged anti-Yankeeism, postponement of elections, jailing of critics, and nationalization of property. The President rejected the idea that intense United States hostility to the Cuban Revolution may have contributed to Castro's tightening political grip and flirtation with the Soviet Union. Nor did Kennedy and other Americans wish to acknowledge the measurable benefits of the revolution—improvements in education, medical care, and housing and the elimination of the island's infamous corruption that once had been the American mafia's domain. Instead, Kennedy officials concluded that Cuba's was a "betrayed revolution."

Richard N. Goodwin, the young White House and State Department official with responsibilities for Latin America, provided another explanation for the Kennedy fixation with Cuba. He remarked that "the entire history of the Cold War, its positions and assumption, converged upon the 'problem of Cuba.'" Indeed, the Cold War dominated international politics, and in the zero-sum accounting of the time, a loss for "us" meant a gain for "them." As Cuban-American relations steadily deteriorated, Cuban-Soviet relations gradually improved. Not only did Americans come to believe that a once-loyal ally had jilted them for the tawdry embrace of the Soviets; they also grew alarmed that Castro sneered at the Monroe Doctrine by inviting the

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Our goal is not the victory of might but the vindication of right — not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace *and* freedom, here in this hemisphere and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

14 PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S 'STRATEGY OF PEACE' SPEECH (1963)

In June of 1963 President Kennedy gave a speech to the American Liberty University outlining his views on the relationship with the Soviet Union and his hopes and fears for the future. While much less dramatic in tone than the Cuban missile crisis speech, and acutely aware of the dangers and costs of the Cold War, the mistrust of the Soviet leadership is still very evident in the speech. Progress was made in some areas: the direct hot line between Moscow and Washington was established and a partial nuclear test ban treaty was signed in August 1963.

[...] I have, therefore, chosen this time and place to discuss a topic on which ignorance too often abounds and the truth is too rarely perceived — and that is the most important topic on earth: peace.

What kind of peace do I mean and what kind of peace do we seek? Not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war. Not the peace of the grave or the security of the slave. I am talking about the genuine peace — the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living — and the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and build a better life for their children — not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women — not merely peace in our time but peace in all time.

I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total war makes no sense in an age where great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the Allied air forces in the second world war. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.

Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need them is essential to the keeping of peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles — which can only destroy and can never create — is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace.

I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary rational end of rational men. I realize the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war — and frequently the words of the pursuer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.

Some say that it is useless to speak of peace or world law or world disarmament — and that it will be useless until the leaders of the Soviet Union adopt a more enlightened attitude. I hope they do. I believe we can help them do it.

But I also believe that we must re-examine our own attitudes — as individuals and as a nation — for our attitude is as essential as theirs. And every graduate of this school, every thoughtful citizen who despairs of war and wishes to bring peace, should begin by looking inward — by examining his own attitude towards the course of the cold war and toward freedom and peace here at home.

First: Examine our attitude towards peace itself. Too many of us think it is impossible. Too many think it is unreal. But that is a dangerous, defeatist belief. It leads to the conclusion that war is inevitable — that mankind is doomed — that we are gripped by forces we cannot control.

We need not accept that view. Our problems are man-made. Therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable — and we believe they can do it again.

I am not referring to the absolute infinite concepts of universal peace and goodwill of which some fantasies and fanatics dream. I do not deny the value of hopes and dreams but we merely invite discouragement and incredulity by making that our only and immediate goal.

Let us focus instead on a more practical, more attainable peace — based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions — on a series of concrete actions and effective agreement which are in the interests of all concerned.

There is no single, simple key to this peace — no grand or magic formula to be adopted by one or two powers. Genuine peace must be the product of many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic, not static, changing to meet the challenge of each new generation. For peace is a process — a way of solving problems.

With such a peace, there will still be quarrels and conflicting interests, as there are within families and nations. World peace, like community peace, does not require that each man love his neighbor — it requires only that they live together with mutual tolerance, submitting their disputes to a just and peaceful settlement. And history teaches us that enmities between nations, as between individuals, do not last forever. However fixed our likes and dislikes may seem, the tide of time and events will often bring surprising changes in the relations between nations and neighbors.

So let us persevere. Peace need not be impracticable — and war need not be inevitable. By defining our goal more clearly — by making it seem more manageable and less remote — we can help all people to see it, to draw hope from it, and to move irresistibly towards it.

And second: Let us re-examine our attitude towards the Soviet Union. It is discouraging to think that their leaders may actually believe what their propagandists write.

It is discouraging to read a recent authoritative Soviet text on military strategy and find, on page after page, wholly baseless and incredible claims — such as the allegation that ‘American imperialist circles are preparing to unleash different types of war ... that there is a very real threat of a preventative war being unleashed by American imperialists against the Soviet Union ... (and that) the political aims’, and I quote, ‘of the American imperialists are to enslave economically and politically the European and other capitalist countries ... (and) to achieve world domination ... by means of aggressive war.’

Truly, as it was written long ago: ‘The wicked flee when no man pursueth.’ Yet it is sad to read these Soviet statements — to realize the extent of the gulf between us. But it is also a warning — a warning to the American people not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable, accommodation as impossible and communication as nothing more than an exchange of threats.

No government or social system is so evil that its people must be considered as lacking in virtue. As Americans, we find Communism profoundly repugnant as a negation of personal freedom and dignity. But we can still hail the Russian people for their many achievements — in science and space, in economic and industrial growth, in culture, in acts of courage.

Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war. Almost unique among the major world powers, we have never been at war with each other. And no nation in the history of battle ever suffered more than the Soviet Union in the second world war. At least 20,000,000 lost their lives. Countless millions of homes and families were burned or sacked. A third of the nation’s territory, including two-thirds of its industrial base, was turned into a wasteland — a loss equivalent to the destruction of this country east of Chicago.

Today, should total war every break out again — no matter how — our two countries will be the primary targets. It is an ironic but accurate fact that the two strongest powers are the two in the most danger of devastation. All we have built, all we have worked for, would be destroyed in the first 24 hours. And even in the cold war — which brings burdens and dangers to so many countries, including this nation’s closest allies — our two countries bear the heaviest burdens. For we are both devoting massive sums of money to weapons that could be better devoted to combat ignorance, poverty and disease.

We are both caught up in a vicious and dangerous cycle with suspicion on one side breeding suspicion on the other, and new weapons begetting counter-weapons.

In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race. Agreements to this end are in the interests of the

Soviet Union as well as ours — and even the most hostile nations can be relied upon to accept and keep those treaty obligations and only those treaty obligations, which are in their own interest.

So, let us not be blind to our differences — but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal.

Third: Let us re-examine our attitude towards the cold war, remembering we are not engaged in a debate, seeking to pile up debating points. We are not here distributing blame or pointing the finger of judgment. We must deal with the world as it is, and not as it might have been had the history of the last eighteen years been different.

We must, therefore, persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace. And above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy — or of a collective death-wish for the world.

To secure these ends, America's weapons are non-provocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint. Our diplomats are instructed to avoid unnecessary irritants and purely rhetorical hostility.

For we can seek a relaxation of tensions without relaxing our guard. And, for our part, we do not need to use threats to prove that we are resolute. We do not need to jam foreign broadcasts out of fear our faith will be eroded. We are unwilling to impose our system on any unwilling people — but we are willing and able to engage in peaceful competition with any people on earth.

Meanwhile, we seek to strengthen the United Nations, to help solve its financial problems, to make it a more effective instrument for peace, to develop it into a genuine world security system — a system capable of resolving disputes on the basis of law, of insuring the security of the large and the small, and of creating conditions under which arms can finally be abolished.

At the same time we seek to keep peace inside the non-Communist world, where many nations, all of them our friends, are divided over issues which weaken Western unity, which invite Communist intervention, or which threaten to erupt into war.

Our efforts in West New Guinea, in the Congo, in the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent have been persistent and patient despite criticism from both sides. We have also tried to set an example for others — by seeking to adjust small but significant differences with our own closest neighbors in Mexico and Canada.

Speaking of other nations, I wish to make one point clear. We are bound to many nations by alliances. These alliances exist because our concern and theirs substantially overlap. Our commitment to defend Western Europe and West Berlin, for example, stands undiminished because of the identity of our vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations and other peoples, not merely because they are our partners, but also because their interests and ours converge.

Our interests converge, however, not only in defending the frontiers of freedom, but in pursuing the paths of peace.

It is our hope — and the purpose of allied policies — to convince the Soviet Union that she, too, should let each nation choose its own future, so long as that choice does not interfere with the choices of others. The communist drive to impose their political and economic system on others is the primary cause of world tension today. For there can be no doubt that, if all nations could refrain from interfering in the self-determination of others, the peace would be much more assured.

This will require a new effort to achieve world law — a new context for world discussions. It will require increased understanding between the Soviets and ourselves. And increased understanding will require increased contact and communication.

One step in this direction is the proposed arrangement for a direct line between Moscow and Washington, to avoid on each side the dangerous delays, misunderstanding, and misreadings of the other's actions which might occur in a time of crisis.

We have also been talking in Geneva about other first-step measures of arms control, designed to limit the intensity of the arms race and reduce the risks of accidental war.

Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament — designed to take place by stages, permitting parallel political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this Government since the 1920s. It has been urgently sought by the past three Administrations. And however dim the prospects are today, we intend to continue this effort — to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and the possibilities of disarmament are.

The only major area of these negotiations where the end is in sight — yet where a fresh start is badly needed — is in a treaty to outlaw nuclear tests. The conclusion of such a treaty — so near and yet so far — would check the

spiraling arms race in one of its most dangerous areas. It would place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963 — the further spread of nuclear weapons. It would increase our security — it would decrease the prospects of war.

Surely this goal is sufficiently important to require our steady pursuit, yielding neither to the temptation to give up the whole effort nor the temptation to give up our insistence on vital and responsible safeguards.

I am taking this opportunity, therefore, to announce two important decisions in this regard:

First: Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow towards early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history — but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind.

Second: To make clear our good faith and solemn convictions on the matter, I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do so. We will not be the first to resume. Such a declaration is no substitute for a formal binding treaty — but I hope it will help us achieve one. Nor would such a treaty be a substitute for disarmament — but I hope it will help us achieve it.

Finally, my fellow Americans, let us examine our attitude towards peace and freedom here at home. The quality and spirit of our own society must justify and support our efforts abroad. We must show it in the dedication of our own lives — as many of you who are graduating today will have an opportunity to do, by serving without pay in the Peace Corps abroad or in the proposed National Service Corps here at home.

But wherever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the age-old faith that peace and freedom walk together. In too many of our cities today, the peace is not secure because freedom is incomplete.

It is the responsibility of the executive branch at all levels of government — local, state and national — to provide and protect that freedom for all of our citizens by all means within our authority. It is the responsibility of the legislative branch at all levels, wherever the authority is not now adequate, to make it adequate. And it is the responsibility of all citizens in all sections of this country to respect the rights of others and respect the law of the land.

All this is not unrelated to world peace. 'When a man's ways please the Lord', the scriptures tell us, 'he maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him'. And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights — the right to live out our lives without fear of devastation — the right to breathe air as nature provided it — the right of future generations to a healthy existence?

While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both.

No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can — if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers — offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough — more than enough — of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just.

We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on — not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace. Thank you.

15 THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION (1964)

After the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the United States began a large-scale military operation in Vietnam. The resolution authorized the President to take all necessary measures to prevent further attacks on the United States and its allies in the Gulf of Tonkin region. The resolution also authorized the President to use such force as he may determine to be necessary to assist the government of South Vietnam in its struggle against communist forces. By the resolution, the President was authorized to use such force as he may determine to be necessary to assist the government of South Vietnam in its struggle against communist forces. In 1963 the United States had over 150,000 troops supporting South Vietnam, however, the military situation did not improve by the month. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August 1964 authorized the President to use such force as he may determine to be necessary to assist the government of South Vietnam in its struggle against communist forces. The resolution also authorized the President to use such force as he may determine to be necessary to assist the government of South Vietnam in its struggle against communist forces. In 1963 the United States had over 150,000 troops supporting South Vietnam, however, the military situation never improved and America began withdrawing in 1969, a withdrawal that was completed in 1973. The South fell to the communist forces in 1975.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

UNCLASSIFIED

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 21 May 64
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

L. L. Lemnitzer
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1 Enclosure
Memo for Chief of Operations, Cuba Project

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A

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PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order. Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are intended to provide a point of departure for the development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification for US military intervention in Cuba).

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):

- (1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
- (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base.
- (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
- (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).

Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A

7

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- (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
- (6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
- (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some damage to installations.

- (8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
- (9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
- (10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- naphthalene.
- (11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

c. Commence large scale United States military operations.

3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:

a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.

4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

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The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from US resources in about three months.

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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.

b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will be transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

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stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.

c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.

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ENCLOSURE B

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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated* that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 March 1962, as follows:

" - - - determination that a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months will require a decision by the United States to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for positive US military action."

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313

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U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #12:

75. "The NACLA Handbook: U.S. Military & Police Aid Programs."
76. "The NACLA Handbook: U.S. Military Operations in Latin America, 1950-1970."
77. "The NACLA Handbook: Police Aid For Tyrants, 1961-1971."
78. "The NACLA Handbook: U.S. Arms Sales to the Third World, 1950-1972."
79. "The NACLA Handbook: U.S. Bases & Forces Abroad, 1972."
80. "Killing Hope: Haiti, 1959-63."
81. "Killing Hope: Guatemala, 1960."
82. "Killing Hope: Ecuador, 1960-63."
83. "Killing Hope: Brazil, 1961-64."
84. "Killing Hope: Peru, 1960-65."
85. "Killing Hope: Dominican Republic, 1960-66."
86. "Killing Hope: Cuba, 1959-1980s."
87. "Killing Hope: France/Algeria, 1960s."
88. "Killing Hope: The Congo, 1960-64."

INTRODUCTION

On April 13, 1971, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird told newsmen that the United States would maintain naval and air forces in Southeast Asia indefinitely as a deterrent to future "aggression" in the region. While many Congressmen expressed shock and dismay at Laird's announcement, the Secretary's statement came as no surprise to those analysts who knew of the Pentagon's multi-billion dollar program for the construction of new military bases in Asia and the Pacific. The permanent installations now under construction or recently completed in Okinawa, Taiwan, Vietnam, Korea, Thailand, Laos, Australia and the British Indian Ocean Territory constitute visible proof that the United States intends to maintain a significant military establishment in Asia for some time to come.

Similarly, when the New York Times reported on October 8, 1970 that the United States had prepared for military intervention in Jordan during the September 1970 crisis there, observers of the American military machine had long since come to the same conclusion on the basis of troop movements reported in the world press.

It is clear, from these and many similar incidents, that a careful analysis of public information on the disposition of American military forces enables the trained observer to predict, with a high degree of accuracy, Pentagon operations at home and abroad. At the present time, such skills are the exclusive prerogatives of military correspondents, White House "insiders," and professional analysts associated with the military "think-tanks" and research organizations. If such skills were widely shared by the public, however, it is possible that interventions such as those which occurred in the Dominican Republic (1965), Cambodia (1970) and Laos (1971) could have been prevented by mass political activity.

In order to provide the public with greater access to information on America's worldwide military operations, it is necessary to disseminate as widely as possible the data that is already available to professional analysts. Contrary to public information, such "hard" information on Pentagon activity is available to the public—if one knows where to look for it. For the past three years, NACLA has been collecting, storing and disseminating information on the overseas operations of the U.S. War Machine. Much of this information has appeared in print in the United States—in the NACLA Newsletter and NACLA's Latin America Report, and other publications—and has been translated for publication abroad.

Now, in this handbook, we have brought together all of this documentation in a single, uniform publication. All of the material has been brought up to date, and—to the best of our ability—checked for accuracy and clarity. Furthermore, we have provided a research methodology guide to help our readers to pursue their own studies of the military establishment.

This handbook is designed as a "first generation" guide to the worldwide U.S. military apparatus, reflecting our current knowledge of this subject. We hope it will help people around the world to better understand how the military is organized, how it is armed and equipped, and how it functions to promote and protect U.S. interests abroad. Any such study of the military apparatus is, of course, hampered by government secrecy and the complexity of the subject; we recognize, therefore, that there are gaps in our knowledge and topics that are only partially understood. We hope, however, that our readers will view this study as a collective undertaking and will contribute their insights and knowledge to future editions of this handbook. Please send your suggestions, comments and criticisms to: NACLA-West Military Project, P.O. Box 226, Berkeley, Calif. 94701.

—Mike Klare & Nancy Stein
NACLA-West Military Project

Note: We wish to acknowledge the generous support of the Louis M. Rabinowitz Foundation in helping to bring this project to fruition.

Part II:
**THE OVERSEAS
APPARATUS**



U.S. Military & Police Aid Programs

THE MERCENARIZATION OF THE THIRD WORLD

In its effort to secure and maintain mastery over the resources of the greater part of the Third World, the United States has often encountered the resistance of rebellious peoples who have resorted to armed insurgency as the only means of obtaining control over their own lives. Occasionally, it has been necessary for the United States to intervene with its own troops to suppress these insurgencies (Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, Laos, the Dominican Republic, Cambodia). Most often, however, the U.S. Government has found it advisable to employ foreign mercenaries and the armies of client regimes in order to attain its objectives. In Vietnam, for instance, American funds have been used to pay the expenses of Korean, Thai, Laotian, Cambodian and Philippine troops as well as the one million man army of the Saigon regime. In addition, the United States has paid the governments of Thailand and Korea a bribe of several hundreds of millions of dollars each to obtain the use of their soldiers as cannon-fodder in South Vietnam.¹ Furthermore, various minority peoples inhabiting the highlands of central Indochina have been mobilized into CIA-funded "irregular" armies to bear the brunt of the fighting in the border areas of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. Similar tactics have been employed by the United States in Bolivia, the Congo, and the Bay of Pigs.

The substitution of mercenaries for American troops in counterinsurgency warfare has many advantages for the U.S. Military Establishment: domestic opposition to foreign operations is reduced because our involvement is less visible and less costly; opposition abroad is reduced because people are not confronted with the overt presence of our expeditionary forces; and, finally, foreign troops cost the United States much less to maintain than our own troops. These benefits were summarized by former Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford in an unusually candid statement to the Congress on January 15, 1969: "Clearly, the overriding goal of our collective defense efforts in Asia must be to assist our allies in building a capability to defend themselves. Besides costing substantially less (an Asian soldier costs about 1/15th as much as his American counterpart), there are compelling political and psychological advantages on both sides of the Pacific for such a policy."² [Emphasis added.]


The cost of mercenarization has been staggering: Pentagon figures indicate that between 1946 and 1970 the United States provided \$35 billion in weapons, supplies, training and cash to foreign armies under the Military Assistance Program. Another \$8.1 billion was provided to the armies of Vietnam, Thailand and Laos through the regular Department of Defense appropriations. Military equipment given away from "excess" U.S. stocks accounted for an additional \$1.4 billion in military aid, while naval vessels transferred for an indefinite period represent another \$1.7 billion. Local currencies worth \$1.5 billion were secured through the "Food for Peace" program (Public Law 480) for supplementary purchases of military hardware abroad. In addition, the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the Export-Import Bank provided foreign countries with credits of \$3.6 billion for purchase of U.S.

arms. (For a breakdown of aid funding by country, and sources of data, see table of U.S. Military Assistance Programs 1946-1970.) Commodities delivered through the Military Assistance Program (MAP) have included 4,385 F-84 aircraft, 206 patrol boats, 21,725 tanks, 132,501 jeeps, 181,135 submachine guns, 2,425,000 rifles, 5,211 155mm. howitzers, and 2,782 Nike missiles.³

Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 and subsequent legislation, certain key nations are designated "Forward Defense Countries" and have first call on all MAP funds. In Fiscal 1972, the five Forward Defense Countries--South Korea, Taiwan, Cambodia, Turkey and Greece--received 79 percent of MAP grants. (Military aid to our Vietnam "allies" is channeled through the regular Department of Defense appropriation.) The remaining 21 percent was divided, in the Fiscal 1972 program, between an additional 41 countries (some received funds for training purposes only).⁴

Besides providing arms and equipment, the United States has assumed responsibility for the training of its clients' armies. Almost the entire officer class of Korea, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Laos and Thailand received its advanced education at American military schools or at in-country academies financed, directed and staffed by the Department of Defense. According to Pentagon statistics, a total of 319,043 foreign officers and enlisted men received some training under the MAP program at service schools in the United States or at U.S. bases abroad (for a breakdown by country, see table of Training of Foreign Military Personnel 1950-1970). Many top-ranking officers of Third World armies are graduates of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, the Infantry School at Fort Benning, or one of 140 other military training centers in the United States. Upon returning to their own countries, these men often constitute the only pool of skilled technicians in such fields as telecommunications, aircraft maintenance, electronics, and all forms of engineering. In addition to learning technical skills, these men are indoctrinated in the abominations of communism and the merits of capitalism. Visits to such attractions as Disneyland, Colonial Williamsburg, and selected suburban communities are designed to inculcate an appreciation for the American Way of Life and a consciousness of the rewards available to those who advance American interests in their own countries.⁵

Map: Keith Buchanan



U.S. Military Missions Abroad

Authorized personnel strengths of United States Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), Military Missions, and Military Groups abroad, as of July 1, 1971^a

Region and country	U.S. Personnel	Foreign Personnel	Total
EUROPE			
HQ, European Command ..	56	0	56
Belgium/Luxembourg	8	6	14
Denmark	8	6	14
France	8	7	15
Germany	33	9	42
Italy	15	3	18
Netherlands	8	6	14
Norway	7	5	12
Portugal	14	7	21
Spain	55	21	76
Total	212	70	282

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

Greece	68	37	105
India	9	7	16
Iran	204	24	228
Jordan	14	3	17
Pakistan	10	8	18
Saudi Arabia	137	4	141
Turkey	181	101	282
Total	623	184	807

AFRICA

Congo (Kinshasa)	38	6	44
Ethiopia	103	34	137
Liberia	17	5	22
Libya	5	1	6
Morocco	33	7	40
Nigeria	2	1	3
Tunisia	15	3	18
Total	213	57	270

Region and country	U.S	Foreign	Total
EAST ASIA^b			
HQ, Pacific Command ...	82	0	82
Cambodia	113	0	113
China (Taiwan)	216	26	242
Indonesia	49	20	69
Japan	10	6	16
Korea	716	279	995
Philippines	58	6	64
Total	1,244	337	1,581

LATIN AMERICA

HQ, Southern Command ..	28	0	28
Argentina	33	6	39
Bolivia	38	7	45
Brazil	60	30	90
Chile	28	5	33
Colombia	50	6	56
Costa Rica	4	1	5
Dominican Republic ...	33	2	35
El Salvador	16	2	18
Guatemala	27	3	30
Honduras	14	3	17
Nicaragua	17	2	19
Panama	7	1	8
Paraguay	17	3	20
Peru	7	4	11
Uruguay	19	5	24
Venezuela	50	3	53
Total	448	83	531

GRAND TOTAL 2,740 731 3,471

^aSource: U.S. Department of Defense press release, August 13, 1971.

^bExcludes the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), and covert U.S. military missions in Laos and Burma.




Arguing that police forces constitute the "first line of defense" against insurgency and subversion, the United States has established an elaborate program of police assistance under the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety (OPS). Between 1961 and 1971, the United States spent over \$283 million on the OPS program to supply Third World police forces with modern communications equipment, intelligence systems and antiriot gear. As in the case of the Military Assistance Program, this aid has been supplemented by training programs in the United States and abroad (see "Police Aid for Tyrants," below).

The Military Assistance Program is administered by a resident military assistance advisory group (MAAG) or military mission in each recipient country. These groups provide instruction to the local troops who will use the equipment furnished by MAP, and generally oversee the process of mercenarization. (See table of U.S. Military Missions Abroad for a breakdown of MAAG strength by country.) In-country supervision of the police assistance program is performed by resident Public Safety Advisors attached to the AID mission in recipient countries. (For more on the role of MAAGs, see "Arming the Generals," below.)

THE NIXON DOCTRINE

In order to further reduce the U.S. military presence abroad, the Nixon Administration seeks to modernize and strengthen our mercenary armies in the Third World. This policy, the so-called "Nixon Doctrine," clearly requires a vast increase in MAP spending. Vietnamization alone will cost an estimated \$6 billion, while modernization of the Korean army is expected to cost another \$1. to \$2 billion. Accordingly, the Administration has been requesting progressively greater MAP appropriations during the past few years: MAP grant aid doubled between 1970 and 1971, from \$388 million to \$775 million, and other elements of the aid program experienced a corresponding increase. (For a discussion of rising arms sales, see "Arm Now - Pay Later," below.) In describing the Administration's defense posture to Congress in 1970, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird stated:

The basic policy of decreasing direct U.S. military involvement cannot be successful unless we provide our friends and allies, whether through grant aid or credit sales, with the material assistance necessary to assure the most effective possible contribution by the manpower they are willing and able to commit to their own and the common defense. Many of them simply do not command the resources or technical capabilities to assume greater responsibility for their own defense without such assistance. The



TRAINING OF FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL

Students Trained in the United States and at U.S. Bases Abroad, 1950-70^A

Region & country	Number trained in U.S.	Number trained Abroad	Total number trained
EAST ASIA, Total	89,342	54,551	143,893
Cambodia	215	122	337
China, Rep. of	19,732	4,088	23,820
Indochina (1950-54)	408	26	434
Indonesia	2,873	414	3,287
Japan	9,643	5,637	15,280
Korea	21,063	9,374	30,437
Malaysia	225	18	243
Philippines	8,729	4,845	13,574
Thailand	8,110	2,994	11,104
Vietnam, Rep. of	16,364	5,196	21,560
Classified countries ^b ..	1,980	21,837	23,817
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA, Total	42,238	8,204	50,442
Afghanistan	292	-	292
Ceylon	39	-	39
Greece	11,538	2,037	13,575
Iran	8,597	1,719	10,316
Iraq	372	32	404
Jordan	478	12	490
Lebanon	191	1,188	1,379
Saudi Arabia	1,035	218	1,253
Syria	23	-	23
Turkey	15,479	2,435	17,914
Yemen	5	-	5
Classified countries ^c ..	4,189	563	4,752
EUROPE, Total	52,592	11,068	63,660
Austria	393	11	404
Belgium	3,768	1,430	5,198
Denmark	3,836	874	4,710
France	12,600	1,742	14,342
Germany (West)	1,190	434	1,624
Italy	8,144	1,219	9,363
Luxembourg	63	113	176
Netherlands	4,744	1,553	6,297
Norway	4,049	1,483	5,532
Portugal	2,106	609	2,715
Spain	6,868	1,233	8,101
United Kingdom	3,719	148	3,867
Yugoslavia	625	219	844
NATO Agencies	465	-	465
Classified countries ...	22	-	22

Region & country	Number trained in U.S.	Number trained Abroad	Total number trained
AFRICA, Total	5,415	1,363	6,778
Congo	215	126	341
Ethiopia	2,716	116	2,832
Ghana	118	-	118
Guinea	4	-	4
Liberia	420	-	420
Libya	436	41	477
Mali	64	5	69
Morocco	770	929	1,699
Nigeria	326	-	326
Senegal	17	-	17
Sudan	118	8	126
Tunisia	191	138	329
Upper Volta	20	-	20
LATIN AMERICA, Total	23,878	30,392	54,270
Argentina	2,382	426	2,808
Bolivia	410	2,248	2,658
Brazil	6,009	847	6,856
Chile	2,553	1,821	4,374
Colombia	2,126	2,503	4,629
Costa Rica	33	496	529
Cuba (1950-60)	307	214	521
Dominican Republic	609	1,984	2,593
Ecuador	1,538	2,746	4,284
El Salvador	185	886	1,071
Guatemala	626	1,654	2,280
Haiti	444	60	504
Honduras	189	1,389	1,578
Mexico	393	202	595
Nicaragua	615	3,379	3,994
Panama	38	3,110	3,148
Paraguay	287	753	1,040
Peru	2,890	2,117	5,007
Uruguay	933	790	1,723
Venezuela	1,311	2,767	4,078
WORLDWIDE, Total	213,465	105,578	319,043

^aSource: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C.: 1971).

^bInclude Laos, Burma.

^cInclude Israel, Egypt.


challenging aspects of our new policy can, therefore, best be achieved when each partner does its share and contributes what it best can to the common effort. In the majority of cases, this means indigenous manpower organized into properly equipped and well-trained armed forces with the help of materiel, training, technology and specialized skills furnished by the United States through the Military Assistance Program or as Foreign Military Sales.⁶ [Emphasis added.]

According to Laird, the MAP program is "the essential ingredient" of the Nixon Doctrine plan to "honor our obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units." When looked at in these terms, Laird asserted, "a MAP dollar is of far greater value than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces."⁷

FOOTNOTES:

1. See: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Hearings, 91st Congress [Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1971], Volume I, Part 3, Kingdom of Thailand, and Volume II, Part 6, Republic of Korea.
2. U.S. Department of Defense, The 1970 Defense Budget and Defense Program for Fiscal Years 1970-74, Statement of Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 76.
3. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 14.
4. Ibid., pp. 1-5.
5. See: Drew Middleton, "Thousands of Military Men Studying in the U.S.," The New York Times, November 1, 1970.
6. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971, Hearings, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970, p. 307.
7. U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget, Statement by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (Washington, D.C., 1970).

Map: Keith Buchanan



U.S. Military Operations / Latin America

ARMING THE GENERALS

Note: The following essay is a revised version of "U.S. Military Operations / Latin America," from the October 1968 issue of NACLA Newsletter; By Michael Klare

In his report to the President on a 1969 fact-finding mission to Latin America, Nelson Rockefeller warned the nation that:

Rising frustrations throughout the Western Hemisphere over poverty and political instability have led increasing numbers of people to pick the United States as a scapegoat and to seek out Marxist solutions to their socio-economic problems. At the moment there is only one Castro among the 26 nations of the hemisphere; there could well be more in the future. And a Castro on the mainland, supported militarily and economically by the Communist world, would present the gravest kind of threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and pose an extremely-difficult problem for the United States.¹

Although Rockefeller's report was ostensibly concerned with the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in Latin America, it is obvious that the driving force behind his presentation is the fear of "more Castros" in the hemisphere. Thus a considerable portion of the report is devoted to a discussion of proposals for improvements in the Military Assistance Program and other internal security programs sponsored by the United States.

Ever since the triumph of the Cuban Revolution, in fact, Pentagon strategists have been developing contingency plans for counterinsurgency operations against the next Castros. Unlike current U.S. planning for Southeast Asia, our plans for Latin America do not envision a significant overt American military presence; the emphasis, indeed, is on low-cost, low-visibility assistance and training programs designed to upgrade the capacity of local forces to overcome guerrilla movements. Between 1960 and 1970, the United

States spent some \$1 billion dollars on military modernization programs in Latin America; most of this money, as we shall see, was concentrated in the area of counterinsurgency and internal security capabilities.

American military policy in Latin America is based on the premise that while economic and social progress is an important task for the hemisphere, no true development can take place in a climate of instability and rebellion. Before the poorer countries can begin the process of modernization, in this view, they must first be able to maintain an atmosphere of "law and order." For many Latin American nations, Rockefeller indicated in 1959, "the question is less one of democracy or lack of it, than it is simply of orderly ways of getting along."² [Emphasis added.] In some countries, the armed forces have found it necessary to seize power in order to ensure the maintenance of public order. The United States, in Rockefeller's view, should forget "the philosophical disagreements it may have with particular regimes," and extend support to the military strongmen who now rule two-thirds of the Latin American republics.³

Current U.S. programs for support of the Latin American military, and other U.S. military activities in the hemisphere, are discussed in detail below.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF U.S. MILITARY AID

The Military Assistance Program (MAP) constitutes the major instrument of U.S. military policy in Latin America. The origins of this program, according to Professor Edwin Lieuwen of the University of New Mexico, "can be traced to the eve of World War II, when Washington, in order to counter the threat of Fascist and Nazi subversion, began to establish military missions."⁴ Under the Lend Lease Act of March 11, 1941, Latin American armies were supplied with American

arms and equipment in return for access to the region's strategic raw materials and the right to use certain air and naval bases. After the United States entered the war, we continued supplying weapons while Latin America provided temporary bases, stepped up production of strategic materials, and collaborated in antisubmarine and other defense operations.⁵

Military aid to Latin America was suspended in the immediate postwar era; as the Cold War intensified, however, the supply of arms to Latin America's armed forces once again became an objective of United States foreign policy. Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, funds were made available for the strengthening of Latin American armies in the interests of "Hemispheric defense." A country became eligible for these funds upon ratification of bilateral mutual defense assistance pacts with the United States. Such agreements were concluded with Ecuador, Cuba, Colombia, Peru and Chile in 1952; with Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay in 1953; with Nicaragua and Honduras in 1954; with Haiti and Guatemala in 1955; and with Bolivia in 1958. (The United States has temporarily suspended MAP aid to some nations following coups, and has permanently cut off aid to Cuba and Haiti.) As part of their contribution to the hemispheric defense effort, MAP recipients are pledged to supply the United States with minerals and other strategic raw materials needed by the U.S. war machine.⁶

Throughout the 1950's, the ostensible objective of U.S. military aid to Latin America was to strengthen the region's defense against external (presumably Soviet) attack. Thus as recently as 1960 the principal goal of the MAP program was the development of a strong antisubmarine warfare capability in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. Charles H. Shuff, the then Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, told a Congressional committee

in 1959 that "the most positive threat to hemispheric security is submarine action in the Caribbean sea and along the coast of Latin America."⁷ However, when the Kennedy Administration took office in 1961, the threat of armed revolution became the major concern of U.S. military planning in the Third World and the goals of the MAP program were modified accordingly. As noted by Professor Lieuwen, "the basis for military aid to Latin America abruptly shifted from hemispheric defense to internal security, from the protection of coastlines and from antisubmarine warfare to internal defense against Castro-Communist guerrilla warfare."⁸

Funds for counterinsurgency training and supplies were made available to Latin American armies beginning with the fiscal year 1963 MAP program. In the following year, Director of Military Assistance General Robert J. Wood announced that "the primary purpose of the proposed fiscal year 1965 Military Assistance Program for Latin America is to counter the threat to the entire region by providing equipment and training which will bolster the internal security capabilities of the recipient countries."⁹ And during the 1967 debate on the Foreign Assistance Act, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara asserted that "the primary objective [of the MAP program] in Latin America is to aid, where necessary, in the continued development of indigenous military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, in conjunction with police and other security forces, the needed domestic security."¹⁰

Of the \$45.5 million requested for MAP grant aid in fiscal 1968, the Pentagon proposed to spend \$34.7 million, or 76 percent, on hardware and services related to counterinsurgency.¹¹ According to Defense Secretary McNamara, "the [1968] grant program will provide no tanks, artillery, fighter aircraft, or combat ships. The emphasis is on



Drawing: Mingo, Marcha (Montevideo)

vehicles and helicopters for internal mobility, communications equipment for better coordination of in-country security efforts, and spare parts for maintenance of existing inventories."¹² These priorities have continued to shape the MAP program under the Nixon Administration; thus in 1970 the present Director of Military Assistance, Gen. Robert H. Warren, told a Congressional committee that the objectives of the fiscal 1971 aid program were "to help Latin American nations maintain military and paramilitary forces capable of providing, with police forces, internal security essential to orderly political, social and economic development."¹³

Total U.S. military aid to Latin America during the period 1950-1970 amounted to \$1.3 billion; this amount includes direct grants totalling \$778 million, credits provided under the Foreign Military Sales program for the purchase of U.S. arm valued at \$253 million, indefinite loans of U.S. naval vessels worth \$201 million, and transfers of "excess" U.S. arms worth another \$63 million. (For a country-by-country breakdown of these expenditures, see the Appendix.) As one would expect, the major recipients of military aid have been the larger countries whose armed forces have come to bear the indelible stamp of U.S. military doctrine, equipment and ideology. Thus Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela and Peru, which together account for about 60 percent of the gross national product of Latin America, received \$915 million in U.S. aid between 1950 and 1970, or 70 percent of MAP expenditures in the region (see Table 1).

TABLE 1:
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EXPENDITURES
IN LATIN AMERICA, 1950-1970^a

Includes grants furnished under the Military Assistance Program, credits provided by the Foreign Military Sales program, indefinite loans of U.S. naval vessels, and deliveries of excess U.S. defense articles.

[By fiscal year; dollars in millions]

Country	Amount	Country	Amount
Argentina.....	131.0	Jamaica.....	1.1
Bolivia.....	25.3	Mexico.....	10.6
Brazil.....	378.4	Nicaragua.....	13.1
Chile.....	151.9	Panama.....	4.1
Colombia.....	114.1	Paraguay.....	11.6
Costa Rica.....	1.8	Peru.....	147.8
Dominican Rep....	28.0	Uruguay.....	45.9
Ecuador.....	57.0	Venezuela.....	106.1
El Salvador.....	6.9	Region.....	27.8
Guatemala.....	18.7		
Haiti (to 1963)..	4.4	TOTAL.....	1,294.2
Honduras.....	8.6		

^aSource: U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Statistics and Reports, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945 - June 30, 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1971).

^bIncludes \$12.4 million to Cuba (1950-60).

When, however, MAP recipients are ranked by the percentage of their total defense outlays supplied by the United States, a different pattern emerges; as can be seen in Table 2, the most favored recipients of U.S. aid, on a proportional basis, are the smaller and poorer nations of South and Central America--most of which have experienced guerrilla uprisings in the past decade.

Although the MAP grant program has been declining steadily over the past few years (from a high of \$73 million in fiscal 1968 to \$15.7 million in 1971), arms sales to Latin America have been increasing at a spectacular rate: from an average of \$30 million per year in the 1960's, U.S. sales to Latin American governments under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program rose to \$72 million in fiscal 1971 and an estimated \$144 million in 1972.¹⁴ Among the major customers for U.S. arms were Argentina (with purchases of \$79 million between 1950 and 1970), Brazil (\$85 million), Peru (\$50 million), and Venezuela (\$103 million).¹⁵ In order to increase military exports to Latin America through the FMS program, President Nixon was obliged, in May 1971, to waive the \$75 million ceiling on arms transfers to the region that had been imposed by Congress in 1968 (under Section 33 of the Foreign Military Sales Act). (For a further discussion of the arms sales program, see "Arm Now - Pay Later.")

TRAINING


After the supply of arms and equipment, the most important function of the U.S. military ap-

TABLE 2:
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF
LATIN AMERICAN DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, 1964-67

[In rank order, dollars in millions]

Country	Total defense expenditures, 1964-67 ^a	U.S. aid as a percentage of defense spending
Panama.....	4	32.5
Bolivia.....	57	21.9
Uruguay.....	51	18.0
Paraguay.....	30	17.0
Ecuador.....	100	16.0
Honduras.....	27	12.9
Gautemala.....	56	12.5
Colombia.....	302	10.2
Peru.....	367	9.8
Chile.....	321	9.7
El Salvador.....	38	9.0
Dominican Republic....	133	6.3
Argentina.....	843	2.7
Brazil.....	2,380	2.1
Venezuela.....	712	0.6

Source: U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 1969 (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 18.



paratus in Latin America is to provide training to indigenous military personnel. In recent years, about two-thirds of the MAP grant program has been devoted to this purpose. Training also constitutes the principal day-to-day activity of U.S. officers attached to the military missions in seventeen Latin American countries. The high priority given to training programs was underscored by Defense Secretary McNamara in 1962 as follows:

Probably the greatest return on our military assistance investment comes from the training of selected officers and key specialists at our military schools and training centers in the United States and overseas. These students are handpicked by their countries to become instructors when they return home. They are the coming leaders.... I need not dwell upon the value of having in positions of leadership men who have first-hand knowledge of how Americans do things and how they think. It is beyond price to us to make such friends of such men.¹⁶ [Emphasis added.]

The United States maintains three training programs for Latin American personnel: first, "in-country" training provided by mobile training teams (MTT's) which are sent to a country on a temporary basis to offer instruction in specialized military skills; second, training at the U.S. military schools in the Panama Canal Zone; and third, training at service schools in the United States. Between 1950 and 1970, 54,270 Latin American officers and enlisted men received training under the MAP program (see Table 3). The various training programs are discussed in detail below.

TABLE 3:
LATIN AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL TRAINED UNDER
THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, 1950-70^a

Country	Number trained in U.S.	Number trained abroad ^b	Total number trained
Argentina.....	2,382	426	2,808
Bolivia.....	410	2,248	2,658
Brazil.....	6,009	847	6,856
Chile.....	2,553	1,821	4,374
Colombia.....	2,126	2,503	4,629
Costa Rica.....	33	496	529
Cuba (1950-60)...	307	214	521
Dominican Rep....	609	1,984	2,593
Ecuador.....	1,538	2,746	4,284
El Salvador.....	185	886	1,071
Guatemala.....	626	1,654	2,280
Haiti.....	444	60	504
Honduras.....	189	1,389	1,578
Mexico.....	393	202	595
Nicaragua.....	615	3,379	3,994
Panama.....	38	3,110	3,148
Paraguay.....	287	753	1,040
Peru.....	2,890	2,117	5,007
Uruguay.....	933	790	1,723
Venezuela.....	1,311	2,767	4,078
TOTAL.....	23,878	30,392	54,270

^aSource: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C., 1971).

^bMostly in the Panama Canal Zone.

SOUTHCOM

All U.S. training programs in Latin America are supervised by the U.S. Forces Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), located at Quarry Heights in the Panama Canal Zone. SOUTHCOM is the "unified command" headquarters which oversees all Army, Navy and Air Force activities in South and Central America. Ordinarily, the most important activity of SOUTHCOM personnel is the supervision of the seventeen U.S. military missions in Latin America and administration of the MAP program. The advisory missions, or Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's), range in size from 5 men in Costa Rica to 90 in Brazil; as of July 1, 1971, there were 531 officers, enlisted men and civilian employees assigned to the MAAG's and missions in Latin America. These men provide training in various military and technical skills, and advise the host country military in the development of counterinsurgency and internal security programs.

In addition to its administrative and training functions, SOUTHCOM maintains a communications and logistics network which directs and supplies all U.S. military forces in Latin America. This network is designed to support any U.S. troops that would be deployed in future interventions or "police actions" in the region.

U.S. Army School of the Americas

The U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA), located at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone, is the only Army training institution catering exclusively to Latin American personnel. It is also the only military school to provide instruction in a foreign language. An element of SOUTHCOM, the School has trained over 26,000 Latin American officers and enlisted men in various military specialties. Most of the courses at the School emphasize counterinsurgency and other internal security functions. According to the September 1968 issue of *Army Digest* magazine, the School's Irregular Warfare Committee "teaches various measures required to defeat an insurgent on the battlefield, as well as military civic action functions in an insurgent environment."¹⁷ Military cadets who receive their advanced training at USARSA undertake a week-long maneuver known as the "Balboa Crossing" in which they "trek across the isthmus from Pacific to Atlantic shores on a simulated seach-and-destroy mission, putting into practice what they have learned about guerrilla warfare and jungle living."¹⁸

USARSA boasts that "alumni have risen to such key positions as Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff in Bolivia, Director of Mexico's War College, Minister of War and Chief of Staff in Colombia, Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Argentina, and Undersecretary of War in Chile." The United States profits from this arrangement as well: according to *Army Digest*, "training Latin Americans in U.S. military skills, leadership techniques and doctrine also paves the way for cooperation and support of U.S. Army missions, attaches, military assistance advisory groups and commissions operating in Latin America."¹⁹

Inter-American Air Forces Academy


Closely related to the Army's School of the Americas is the Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) at Albrook Air Force Base in the Canal Zone. Like USARSA, the Academy offers instruction in Spanish and caters primarily to Latin American personnel. By the end of 1970, some 10,000 officers and enlisted men had received training at the Academy. Instruction is provided in aircraft maintenance, electronics, radio, instrument training and repair, engine and weapons mechanics, and medical specialties. As at Fort Gulick, the emphasis is on counterinsurgency and civic action programs. Beginning in 1963, the Academy offered a course on "Special Air Operations" jointly with USARSA and the 24th Special Operations Wing (the Air Force equivalent of the Army's Special Forces); the course includes study of such skills as close air support on the battlefield, supply operations for counter-guerrilla forces, and airborne operations.²⁰

Eighth U.S. Special Forces

Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone is the headquarters of the Eight U.S. Special Forces--the

famed "Green Berets." This elite unit consists of some 1,100 officers and enlisted men, who in turn constitute approximately 25 Mobile Training Teams of up to 30 men each. These MTT's have traveled throughout Latin America, supplementing the work of the resident U.S. military missions by providing intensive training in counter-guerrilla operations. Since the formation of the 8th Special Forces in 1962, such teams have visited every Latin American country except Cuba, Haiti and Mexico. As noted by MIT's Center for International Studies, MTT activity always peaks when a pro-U.S. regime is threatened by insurgent uprisings.²¹

Visitors to Fort Gulick are told that "the principle mission of the Special Forces is to advise, train and aid the Latin American military and paramilitary forces to conduct counterinsurgency activities, and to do so in support of the objectives of the United States of America within the framework of the Cold War."²² In fulfillment of this mission, 16 Green Berets headed by Maj. Ralph W. "Pappy" Shelton traveled to Bolivia in April 1967 to train and supervise the Bolivian Army ranger battalion that was used to hunt down the guerrilla band of Ernesto Che Guevara.²³



TRICONTINENTAL (Havana)

Inter-American Defense College

The Inter-American Defense College (IADC) was established in 1962 as a senior service school similar to the U.S. National War College, Great Britain's Imperial Defense College, and the NATO Defense College. Located at Fort Lesley McNair in Washington, D.C., IADC occupies a building that was refurbished for its use by the MAP program at a cost of \$1 million. The College is administered by the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), which is composed of military representatives of the 22 member nations of the Organization of American States.

The emphasis at IADC is on the quality, not the quantity, of its students, who come from all Latin American countries except Cuba. Admission requirements include the rank of lieutenant colonel or above, graduation from an advanced command and general staff college, and military command experience. IADC, according to an official brochure, is "a military institution of high level studies, devoted to conducting courses on the Inter-American System and the political, social, economic, and military factors that constitute essential components of Inter-American defense." The nine-month course of study stresses Cold War ideology and the need for joint action against "Castro-Communist" guerrillas. The curriculum also includes several sessions on the theory and practice of military civic action and related counterinsurgency activities. Most instruction is given in Spanish; as of June 1970, some 230 students had graduated from IADC.²⁴

International Police Academy

The International Police Academy (IPA), located in the Georgetown section of Washington, D.C., is sometimes referred to as the "West Point" of the international law enforcement community. Administered by the Office of Public Safety (OPS) of the Agency for International Development, IPA provides instruction in various police and paramilitary skills to foreign police commanders. Originally known as the Inter-American Police Academy and located in the Panama Canal Zone, IPA was moved to Washington in 1964 and its scope broadened to include students from throughout the Third World (Latin Americans still constitute a majority of the student body, however). By 1969, over 3,000 foreign police officials had graduated from IPA.

Although IPA provides instruction on such conventional subjects as fingerprint identification and firearms maintenance, the emphasis is on internal security and riot control. Students at the Academy spend three days at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., for a series of briefings on "civil-military relationships in counterinsurgency operations and police support in unconventional warfare."²⁵ Prior to graduation, IPA students test their knowledge of anti-riot tactics in a facility known as



the Police Operations Control Center (POCC). One journalist who visited IPA reported: "At the front of the POCC is a magnetic game board on which has been constructed the map of a mythical city, Rio Bravos... From the control booth, faculty field commanders alert the students to a communist-inspired riot at the city's university, or to a bombing attempt by communist subversives from the neighboring country, Maoland. The students deploy their forces on the board and plan strategies, much as they would from a real police control center."²⁶

Service Schools in the United States

Over 140 Army, Navy, and Air Force installations in the United States provide training for foreign military personnel under the MAP program (see Appendix for a list of these facilities). Although precise figures on the numbers of Latin Americans attending each of these schools is not available, it is known that the Army has tailored the curricula of two of the schools to emphasize military operations in underdeveloped areas. These installations are the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, N.C., and the Civil Affairs and Military Government School at Fort Gordon, Ga.

The Special Warfare School (part of the John Kennedy Center for Military Assistance) offers courses on counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. Most of the students are U.S. military personnel who have been assigned to military missions or Special Forces units in the Third World; however, it is known that several hundred Latin American officers have also received training at the School.²⁷ In 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin reported that Latin American military personnel were receiving training at Fort Bragg "in riot control, counter guerrilla operations and tactics, intelli-

gence and counterintelligence, and other subjects which will contribute to the maintenance of public order."²⁸

The Civil Affairs School is the principal center in the United States for training in the administration of military civic action programs. As at Fort Bragg, most students are U.S. military personnel assigned to a military mission, military assistance advisory group, or mobile training team in the Third World. The civic action course includes instruction in the theory of economic development, organization and logistics for civic action projects, and psychological operations in counterinsurgency.²⁹

* * * *

U.S. military assistance to Latin American armed forces has often provoked criticism from the world press, particularly when U.S.-equipped armies have seized power from democratically-elected governments. In response to this criticism, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated in 1964 that "the essential role of the Latin American military as a stabilizing force outweighs any risks involved in providing military assistance for internal security purposes."³⁰ McNamara acknowledged that discontent would not disappear from Latin America until the underlying problems of poverty and underdevelopment were overcome; it was for this purpose, he indicated, that the United States had launched the Alliance for Progress. But U.S. policy is firm on one point: "the goals of the Alliance," he insisted, "can only be achieved within a framework of law and order."³¹ [Emphasis added.] Current U.S. policy, as we have seen, calls for the use of the Latin American military as the prime instrument of "law and order." American bases in Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone and the U.S. mainland constitute a logistical and communications apparatus that would be used to support any future intervention operations. SOUTHCOM's Canal Zone facilities have already been described; in the following section, we will look at some of the installations in Puerto Rico that contribute to America's intervention capability in Latin America.

PUERTO RICO INSTALLATIONS

Puerto Rico performs for the U.S. Navy the same pivotal role performed for the Army by the Panama Canal Zone. The island "Commonwealth" is the headquarters of the Commander, South Atlantic Force (COMSOLANT) and of the 10th Naval District commanding the Caribbean Sea Frontier. The Navy's offices in San Juan and at the Roosevelt Roads Naval base command all Navy activity in the Caribbean and in the Atlantic Ocean south of the Tropic of Cancer. Other Navy bases, at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Chaguaramas in Trinidad and St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands, are also under the jurisdiction of the Puerto Rico commands. The naval blockade of Cuba and Navy support operations dur-

ing the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic were both directed from Puerto Rico.³²

Roosevelt Roads is an all-purpose Naval base located on the east coast of Puerto Rico. It has three harbors, the largest of which can berth dozens of major warships at one time (thus serving as the South Atlantic equivalent of Pearl Harbor in the Pacific). The facilities at Roosevelt Roads can accommodate any warship in the world, including the giant aircraft carrier Enterprise, which trained here before sailing to the waters off Vietnam. The base also encompasses a large Naval Air Station, which house several squadrons of jet interceptors and reconnaissance aircraft.


Vieques is an island located just off the east coast of Puerto Rico which is largely devoted to military use. Of the island's 35,000 acres, some 26,000 have been appropriated by the U.S. Navy for training facilities and other installations, including a huge underground ammunition storage depot. Vieques acquires special prominence periodically during the year as the site of the Atlantic Fleet's training exercises. A New York Times dispatch of April 10, 1965 describes one of these exercises as follows: "about 4,000 Marines and Army paratroopers fought a sham war today across the sun-baked brown hills of Vieques.... The troops, supported by a Navy amphibious force and Air Force, Marine and Navy planes, continued Quick Kick VII, a combined airborne-amphibious assault." It is clear from this and other reports that these exercises are designed to prepare the Atlantic Fleet for future interventions in Latin America which would require an amphibious landing.

Culebra is a small island located off the eastern tip of Puerto Rico which is used by the Navy for bombing and shelling practice exercises, and for tests of new non-nuclear munitions. In the past few years, Culebra residents have organized a campaign to expell the Navy gunners from their island. After a Congressional investigation and many protests by the Culebrans, the Navy agreed in 1971 to find alternative sites for its shelling exercises.

Ramey Air Force Base is the principal Military Airlift Command (MAC) base in Latin America. The base normally houses a full complement of heavy transport aircraft capable of airlifting almost every type of military equipment, plus large numbers of troops, to airstrips in the Caribbean and South America. During the Dominican crisis of 1965, Ramey provided logistical support to General Wessin y Wessin's blockaded troops at San Isidro airbase, and later was used to ferry U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic. Massive airlift operations of this type have come to assume a crucial place in U.S. intervention strategy, and it is safe to assume that Ramey will play a pivotal role in any future "police actions" in the Western Hemisphere.

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15. Ibid., p. 23.
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The U.S. 'Public Safety' Program

POLICE AID FOR TYRANTS

By Nancy Stein & Mike Klare

Note: The following essay is based on these articles from NACLA's Latin America & Empire Report: "U.S. Police Operations - Latin America" (January 1970), "U.S. Police Assistance Programs in Latin America" (May-June 1970), "The Mercenarization of the Third World" (November 1970), "AID Police Programs, 1971-72" (July-August 1971).

The United States is rapidly becoming the world's policeman in the most precise sense of the word. It has achieved this status not only by placing its troops on the front lines of combat, as in Indochina, but by taking upon itself the task of organizing, training, equipping and indoctrinating the police forces of the Third World. U.S. funds have been used to construct the National Police Academy in Brazil, to renovate and expand the South Vietnamese prison system, and to install a national police communications network in Colombia. The Agency for In-

ternational Development (AID) estimates that over one million foreign policemen have received some training or supplies through its "Public Safety" program--a figure which includes 100,000 Brazilian police and the entire 95,000-man National Police Force of South Vietnam. Such local forces have received training not only in routine police matters, but also in paramilitary and counterinsurgency techniques developed in response to the threat of civil unrest.

United States policy for the underdeveloped areas calls for a modest acceleration of economic growth, to be achieved wherever possible through the normal profit-making activities of U.S. corporations and lending institutions. It is obvious, however, that an atmosphere of insecurity and rebelliousness does not provide an attractive climate for investment. Throughout the rapidly urbanizing areas of the Third World, civil disorders have become a common phenomenon as landless peasants stream to the cities in search of economic and cultural opportunities. Since most of the poorer countries cannot satisfy the aspirations of these new city-dwellers under existing social and economic systems, built-up tensions are increasingly giving way to attacks on the status quo. Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who witnessed such attacks first-hand during his 1969 tour of Latin America, told President Nixon:

With urbanization in the Western Hemisphere have come crowded living conditions and a loss of living space. The urban man tends to become both depersonalized and fragmented in his human relationships. Unemployment is high, especially among the young.... These sprawling urban areas of the hemisphere spawn restlessness and anger which are readily exploited by the varying forces that thrive on trouble....²

Rockefeller further warned that while Latin American armies have "gradually improved their capabilities for dealing with Castro-type agrarian



guerrillas," it appeared that "radical revolutionary elements in the hemisphere [are] increasingly turning toward urban terrorism in their attempts to bring down the existing order."³

Since the late 1950's the principal instrument used by the United States to maintain stability in its Third World domains is the Military Assistance Program, which is designed to improve the counterinsurgency capabilities of the local armed forces (see "Arming the Generals," above). In dealing with urban discontent and political unrest, however, the military has proved itself less than effective. Thus Professor David Burks of Indiana University told a Senate committee:

... I think we have to face a reality. The reality is that when the insurgents appear, the governments will call upon the army to eliminate the insurgents. And, in most cases that I have examined, this was not too difficult to do. But there comes a point--and this came in Cuba in 1957 and 1958 when Castro was in the Sierra Maestra--there can come a point when the army cannot handle this kind of situation simply because the military establishment tends to use too much force, tends to use the wrong techniques and tends, therefore, to polarize the population and gradually force the majority of those who are politically active to support the revolutionary or insurgent force....⁴

The military, according to Burks, are just not trained or indoctrinated for this function. The police force, on the other hand, "is with the people all the time carrying on the normal functions of control or apprehension of ordinary criminals and can, therefore, move very quickly whenever an insurgent problem develops."⁵ This argument is shared by the Agency for International Development, whose chief officer declared in 1964: "... the police are a most sensitive point of contact between government and people, close to the focal points of unrest, and more acceptable than the army as keepers of order over long periods of time."⁶

Another reason advanced for the support of police forces (and one which is rarely mentioned in public), is that the police constitute a highly trained and indoctrinated force, whereas the rank and file of the armed forces are often filled with relatively undisciplined and unmotivated draftees--many of whom are Indians, peasants, or members of other oppressed groups.

At the core of these arguments is the hope that an effective police force, backed by massive U.S. aid, can prevent or postpone the need for direct military intervention by the United States or its allies--as was required to salvage the Saigon regime. At the 1965 graduation ceremonies of AID's International Police Academy, General Maxwell Taylor told Third World police cadets:

The outstanding lesson [of the Indochina conflict] is that we should never let another



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Vietnam-type situation arise again. We were too late in recognizing the extent of the subversive threat. We appreciate now that every young, emerging country must be constantly on the alert, watching for those symptoms which, if allowed to develop unrestrained, may eventually grow into a disastrous situation such as that in South Vietnam. We have learned the need for a strong police force and a strong police intelligence organization to assist in identifying early the symptoms of an incipient subversive situation.⁷

Acting on the premise that police forces constitute the "first line of defense against subversion," the United States is flooding the Third World with anti-riot equipment and police advisers under AID's Public Safety program. During hearings on the Foreign Assistance appropriations for 1965, AID Administrator David Bell described the rationale behind U.S. police assistance programs as follows:

Maintenance of law and order including internal security is one of the fundamental responsibilities of government....

Successful discharge of this responsibility is imperative if a nation is to establish and maintain the environment of stability and security so essential to economic,

social, and political progress....

Plainly, the United States has very great interests in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere of law and order under humane, civil concepts and control.... Where there is a need, technical assistance to the police of developing nations to meet their responsibilities promotes and protects these U.S. interests.⁸

The United States Government, through AID's Office of Public Safety (OPS), assists Third World police forces in these three ways:

(1) By offering advanced training to senior police officers at the International Police Academy (IPA) in Washington, D.C., and at other police schools in the United States. Between 1961 and 1971, some 6,800 Third World police officials received training in the United States, of whom about 60 percent were Latin Americans. (See Table 2 for a breakdown of police training by country, and Table 3 for a list of police training programs in the United States. For a description of IPA, see "Arming the Generals.")

(2) By stationing "Public Safety Advisors" in selected Third World countries to provide training for rank-and-file police officers and to advise top police officials at the country's national police headquarters. As of June 30, 1968, there were 400 Public Safety Advisors stationed abroad, of whom half were assigned to



Vietnam and 90 to Latin America (see Table 2). Most Public Safety Advisors are recruited from the CIA, the FBI, the Special Forces, Military Police, or domestic law enforcement agencies.

(3) By making direct grants of specialized police equipment, including riot gasses, pistols, shotguns, gas masks, radios and walkie-talkies, patrol cars, jeeps, and computers. About half of OPS's total spending is allocated to this supply effort. In an emergency, AID is empowered to make emergency shipments of riot equipment and other police matériel to support a favored regime.

Total aid provided by OPS between 1961 and 1971 amounted to \$282.8 million, of which some two-thirds was allocated to Southeast Asia, primarily South Vietnam and Thailand. As can be seen in Table 1, U.S. assistance has been concentrated in a handful of countries in each region, most of which have experienced insurgent uprisings in the past decade.

The available documentation on U.S. Public Safety programs abroad suggests that OPS focuses its efforts on certain key elements of the local police system--particularly training, intelligence, communications, riot-control, and counter-insurgency--in order to gain maximum influence in areas of greatest concern to the United States. Thus a description of the AID program in East Asia (Thailand, Laos, Korea and the Philippines) indicates:

Specifically, the Public Safety programs will focus on the development of key institutional elements, such as communications networks and training systems; on better administration and management leading to the effective use of resources; the improvement of rural paramilitary police ability to prevent and deal with guerrilla activities; the provision of effective police services at the hamlet level; the improvement of urban policing, including the humane control of civil disturbances and riots.⁹

TABLE I:
A.I.D. OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY EXPENDITURES
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, FISCAL 1961-1971.

[Dollars in thousands]

Region & country:	Expenditures:
EAST ASIA, Total	196,452
Thailand	82,663
South Vietnam	85,099
NEAR EAST & SO. ASIA, Total	13,939
Pakistan	8,478
AFRICA, Total	21,104
Congo (Kinshasa)	4,077
Liberia	3,286
Somali Republic	4,560
LATIN AMERICA, Total	51,262
Brazil	8,475
Colombia	6,237
Dominican Republic	3,809
Guatemala	4,024
GRAND TOTAL, All countries	282,762

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics & Reports Division, A.I.D. Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1971, and earlier editions.

U.S. Police Assistance Program

Office Of Public Safety Expenditures, 1961-71

[By fiscal year; dollars in thousands]

Region and country	Total, 1961-69	1970	1971	Total, 1961-71
GRAND TOTAL	236,332	25,171	21,259	282,762
EAST ASIA, Total	160,669	19,199	16,584	196,452
Burma	195	-	-	195
Cambodia	2,583	-	-	2,583
Indonesia	10,121	-	-	10,121
Korea	6,704	391	337	7,432
Laos	3,184	547	480	4,211
Philippines	2,386	825	937	4,148
Thailand	71,316	5,981	5,366	82,663
Vietnam, Republic of	64,180	11,455	9,464	85,099
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA, Total	12,873	794	272	13,939
Greece	129	-	-	129
Iran	1,712	-	-	1,712
Jordan	2,365	100	71	2,536
Lebanon	149	-	-	149
Nepal	188	-	-	188
Pakistan	7,583	694	201	8,478
Turkey	200	-	-	200
United Arab Republic	312	-	-	312
CENTO/Region	235	-	-	235
AFRICA, Total	19,155	943	1,006	21,104
Central African Republic	241	-	-	241
Chad	527	-	-	527
Congo (Kinshasa)	3,133	380	564	4,077
Dahomey	323	-	-	323
Ethiopia	2,875	49	-	2,924
Ivory Coast	743	-	-	743

Police Aid

Region and country	1961-69	1970	1971	1961-71
Kenya	679	18	-	697
Liberia	2,752	276	258	3,286
Libya	444	-	-	444
Malagasy Republic	454	-	-	454
Niger	398	-	-	398
Rwanda	1,073	-	-	1,073
Somali Republic	4,416	144	-	4,560
Tunisia	640	76	77	793
Upper Volta	219	-	-	219
Region/other countries	238	-	107	345
LATIN AMERICA, Total	43,630	4,235	3,397	51,262
Argentina	120	-	-	120
Bolivia	1,598	209	133	1,940
Brazil	7,416	614	445	8,475
Chile	2,265	106	15	2,386
Colombia	5,723	267	247	6,237
Costa Rica	1,235	230	179	1,644
Dominican Republic	3,116	386	307	3,809
Ecuador	3,219	153	151	3,523
El Salvador	1,826	83	66	1,975
Guatemala	2,482	1,129	413	4,024
Guyana	955	149	124	1,228
Honduras	1,188	107	148	1,443
Jamaica	451	75	75	601
Mexico	745	-	-	745
Panama	1,467	131	163	1,761
Peru	4,115	27	-	4,142
Uruguay	1,032	285	619	1,936
Venezuela	2,627	284	195	3,106
Other countries	582	-	117	699
Regional costs	1,468	-	-	1,468

^aIncludes commodities delivered, training in the United States, and in-country training and advice provided by U.S. Public Safety Advisors. Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, A.I.D. Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1971, and previous editions.

By concentrating its efforts on these strategic aspects of police work, OPS is able to exert considerable influence over the direction of the local police apparatus despite the modest size of the funding input. Thus AID's presentation to Congress on the Fiscal Year 1967 OPS program in the Dominican Republic notes that while the proposed grant of \$720,000 represents but 4.7 percent of the Dominican police budget, "for U.S. objectives it provides the necessary leverage."¹⁰ [Emphasis added.] Not surprisingly, AID's "program objectives" in the Dominican Republic, as in

other Third World countries, stress the suppression of civil disturbances and revolutionary activity--i.e., those aspects of police work which provide protection for U.S. business interests--rather than the reform of brutal and corrupt police administrations.¹¹

In providing assistance to Third World police agencies, OPS notes that most countries maintain a unified "civil security service" which, "in addition to regular police include paramilitary units within civil police organizations and para-

Table 2: Public Safety Training & Advisory Programs

Region & country	Foreign Police Personnel trained in the U.S., 1961-71 ^a	Resident Public Safety Advisors, as of June 30, 1968 ^b	Region & country	Personnel trained	Advisors stationed
TOTAL, All countries	6,812	407	Sierra Leone	3	4
EAST ASIA, Total	1,430	276	Somali Republic	125	5
Indonesia	231	-	Sudan	8	-
Korea	40	6	Tanzania	30	-
Laos	56	4	Tunisia	105	1
Philippines	193	8	Upper Volta	12	-
Thailand	491	58	Other countries	67	3
Vietnam (South)	382	200	LATIN AMERICA, Total	3,833	90
Other countries	33	-	Argentina	84	-
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA, Total	714	14	Bolivia	105	3
Greece	34	-	Brazil	613	17
Iran	216	-	Chile	103	1
Jordan	58	5	Colombia	404	7
Lebanon	15	-	Costa Rica	136	4
Pakistan	125	6	Dominican Republic	174	15
Saudi Arabia	67	-	Ecuador	221	6
Turkey	41	-	El Salvador	214	4
UAR/Egypt	97	-	Guatemala	329	2
CENTO/other countries	61	3	Guyana	39	2
AFRICA, Total	843	27	Honduras	87	2
Central African Rep.	7	-	Jamaica	61	2
Chad	8	2	Nicaragua	65	-
Congo (Kinshasa)	109	5	Panama	295	3
Dahomey	19	-	Paraguay	17	-
Ethiopia	114	2	Peru	151	9
Ghana	32	-	Uruguay	113	3
Kenya	12	1	Venezuela	564	10
Liberia	106	3	Other countries	58	-
Libya	22	-			
Mali	8	-			
Morocco	14	-			
Niger	12	-			
Nigeria	30	-			

^aSource: U.S. Agency for International Development, A.I.D. Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1971, and earlier editions.

^bSource: A.I.D. Operations Report, Data as of June 30, 1968.

military forces such as gendarmeries, constabularies, and civil guards which perform police functions and have as their primary mission maintaining internal security." The Public Safety program, according to AID, is designed to assist the entire police/paramilitary apparatus; thus,

Individual Public Safety programs, while varying from country to country, are focused in general on developing within the civil security forces a balance of (1) a capability for regular police operations, with (2) an investigative capability for detecting and identifying criminal and/or subversive individuals and organizations and neutralizing their activities, and with (3) a capability for controlling militant activities ranging from demonstrations, disorders, or riots through small-scale guerrilla operations.¹²

In many countries, OPS funds are being used for "improving records and identification facilities," and for the development of "national police command centers." Clearly, AID's intention in these efforts is to establish centralized data banks on political activists and to upgrade the anti-riot and paramilitary forces. In the Dominican Republic, for instance, six of the 15 Public Safety Advisors present in 1966-67 were in fact CIA operatives whose job was to work with the local intelligence organization.¹³ In Venezuela, to cite another example, OPS funds were used to create a unified operations center in Caracas to coordinate riot-control activities.¹⁴ In South Vietnam, OPS has launched a national identification campaign designed to register every inhabitant over 15 years of age. All citizens are to be provided with an unbreakable ID card which they must show to police officers on request; anyone

Table 3: Police Training Centers In The U.S.

[Condensed from: U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Public Safety, Program Guide: Public Safety Training (Washington, D.C., 1968)]

Institution	Course and Description
International Police Academy, Washington, D.C.	Senior Course [for high-level police commanders] - instruction in police organization, management, operation, planning and research; communications; investigation; counterinsurgency.
	General Course [for middle-level police commanders] - training in police administration, organization and operations; internal security; counter-insurgency and counter subversion; riot control; scientific and technical aids; firearms, narcotics law enforcement; border patrol and customs. (In English and French.)
	Inter-American General Course - same as above, in Spanish.
Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, Quantico, Va.	National Academy course of instruction - scientific and technical topics involving police records, firearms and ballistics, investigation procedures, police tactics.
U.S. Post Office Department Scientific Investigation Lab, Washington, D.C.	Questioned Document Examination - scientific examination of documents.
International Police Services School, Washington, D.C.	Police Records Management.
International Police Academy and other Government agencies	Special Actions & Riot Control [in French] - training for civil disturbances and control of peaceful assemblages, including handling of weapons and equipment
	Police Telecommunications Management
	Police Radio Communications
U.S. Coast Guard Training Center, Yorktown, Va., and Coast Guard Academy, New London, Conn.	Maritime Law Enforcement
Criminal Investigation Lab, Fort Gordon, Ga.	Firearms Identification
Southern Illinois University	Penology and Corrections - [four courses] - Management of Correctional Institutions; Correctional Institution Design and Construction; Correctional Relationships with Juvenile and Criminal Courts; Probation and Parole Systems.

caught without one is considered a "Vietcong suspect" and subject to arrest. By the end of 1970, South Vietnam's National Police command had amassed a full set of fingerprints, biographical information, photographs and data on the political beliefs of nearly 12,000,000 people. With the help of this information plus an elaborate system of roadblocks and checkpoints, the National Police detained over 153,000 people in 1970 as part of the CIA-funded Operation Phoenix.¹⁵

In South Vietnam, U.S. aid to the Saigon police apparatus extends all the way to the prison system, which is partially subsidized by OPS funds. Top Vietnamese prison officials have received training in correctional techniques at U.S. expense, and AID funds have been used to expand Vietnam's prison facilities. AID's involvement in the Saigon prison system was highlighted in 1970, when Congressmen visiting the Con Son prison complex were shown the notorious "Tiger Cells" for political prisoners.¹⁶

A less explicit, but nonetheless important aspect of police assistance is the psychological warfare function. Police equipment supplied to Third World forces is designed not only to aid in the suppression of existing threats to the status quo, but also to intimidate the public and thus prevent future disturbances. Large numbers of patrol cars, a cop on every corner, visible machine guns and shotguns, helicopters and checkpoints--all contribute to a climate of fear and hopelessness in the general population. This sense of helplessness is perhaps best described in Frantz Fanon's study of the Algerian independence struggle, The Wretched of the Earth:

In the innermost recesses of [the Algerian's] brains, the [French] settlers' tanks and airplanes occupy a huge place. When they are told, "action must be taken," they see bombs raining down on them, armored cars coming at them on every path, machine gunning and police action ... and they sit quiet, they are beaten from the start.¹⁷

As noted above, the Office of Public Safety is empowered to provide emergency aid to threatened Third World regimes. A State Department memorandum, issued in November 1962, gives OPS "a series of powers and responsibilities which will enable it to act rapidly, vigorously, and effectively ... powers greater than any other technical office or division of AID."¹⁸ These powers were spelled out by Administrator Bell in 1964 as follows: "In order to deal with the dynamics of internal security situations, the Public Safety program has developed and utilized methods to deliver to threatened countries, in a matter of days, urgently needed assistance including equipment, training and technical advice."¹⁹ When a crisis develops in a client state, OPS officials work "around the clock" to insure that needed supplies--including tear gas



and riot batons--reach the police forces of the beleaguered regime.

Several instances of rapid intervention by Public Safety personnel can be identified. In 1962, when the government of Venezuela (then headed by President Romulo Betancourt) came under heavy pressure from the guerrilla forces of the FALN (Armed Forces of National Liberation), John F. Kennedy launched a crash program to upgrade the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Caracas police. A Public Safety Advisor named John Logan was secretly flown to the Venezuelan capital to train an elite team of local policemen in anti-riot techniques. According to journalist Peter T. Chew, Logan "persuaded Venezuelan police to favor the old-fashioned shotgun and showed how shotguns, firing buckshot and gas grenades, could be effectively used against terrorists."²⁰ When, in following years, U.S. trained Venezuelan police entered the Congress to arrest dissident Congressmen and Senators and occupied the national university, the chief OPS official on the scene told Washington in a secret memo that "two privileged sanctuaries where communist activities were planned--and to a large extent carried out from--have been eliminated."²¹

OPS instructors were twice rushed into the Dominican Republic to provide emergency training in riot-control techniques. The first such intervention occurred in 1962, when Spanish-speaking detectives from the "Mexican squad" of the Los Angeles Police Department were brought in to train the notorious "Cascos Blancos" (white helmets)--the Santo Domingo riot force. When the Cascos Blancos were disarmed by popular action during the 1965 uprising, OPS personnel were called in to reconstitute the riot patrol.²²

In their annual presentation to the Congress, AID officials affirm that Public Safety assistance is "not given to support dictatorships." This rule, however, has been violated periodically: Administrator Bell told a Senate Committee "it is obviously not our purpose or intent to assist a head of state who is repressive. On the other hand, we are working in a lot of countries where the governments are controlled by people who have shortcomings."²³ [Emphasis added.] Not wanting to embarrass the United States Government or any of its friends, Mr. Bell did not identify the rulers with "shortcomings" --but he did go on to justify our support of them by insisting that, "The police are a very strongly anti-communist force right now. For that reason it is a very important force to us."²⁴

Although it is obviously absurd to expect AID to identify its repressive clients, a quick look at any breakdown of OPS expenditures (see Table 1) will provide ample information on the flow of U.S. funds to authoritarian regimes. Thus Brazil, the major recipient of OPS funds in Latin America, has been condemned by the International Commission of Jurists and other humanitarian organizations for its brutal treatment of political prisoners. And the current regimes in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, both large recipients of U.S. aid, have been condemned by the Organization of American States as violators of human rights.²⁵

As information about AID's support for repressive police forces has become more abundant, protest and criticism have increased. In 1971, after holding a series of hearings on repression in Brazil, Senator Frank Church commented:

... the U.S. aid program to Brazilian military and police agencies ... serve mainly to identify the U.S. with a repressive government. The hearings revealed an altogether too close identification of the U.S. with the current Brazilian government, and they raise a serious question about the wisdom of assistance to the Brazilian police and military.²⁶

Another series of hearings, conducted by the House Committee on Government Operations, disclosed evidence of U.S. complicity in the torture and murder of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese civilians under the OPS-funded Phoenix campaign.²⁷

Much criticism has focused on police collaboration with clandestine right-wing terrorist organizations (which operate, in practice, with unofficial government approval) such as "La Mano Blanca" (The White Hand) and "Ojo por Ojo" (An Eye for an Eye) in Guatemala, "La Banda" (The Gang) in the Dominican Republic, and the "Death Squad" in Brazil. These groups, largely composed of off-duty policemen, attack and assassinate left-wing politicians and other public figures feared by the ruling junta, and do so without (directly) implicating the uniformed services. The New York Times estimates that in Brazil, 500-1,000 people--including many political activ-

ists--have been executed by the Death Squads in the past six years; according to the Miami Herald, the chief criminal judge of Sao Paulo, Nelson Fonseca, told newsmen in 1970 that "the members of the Death Squad are policemen ... and everyone knows it."²⁸ The terrorist groups keep the population intimidated and frightened, and allow the "legitimate" police agencies to disassociate themselves from political violence. OPS, in turn, can also disassociate itself from such violence while nevertheless furnishing arms which ultimately wind up in the hands of the terrorists.

* * * * *

Despite the growing criticism of the Public Safety program, it is clear that the program is unlikely to be discontinued in the near future. The Nixon Administration, with its emphasis on the development of local counterinsurgency forces, has asked Congress for an increase in OPS funding. Moreover, as civil discontent and revolutionary activity increase in the Third World, U.S. business interests will certainly press for increased aid to local police forces. Thus Nelson Rockefeller, in his report to President Nixon on the 1969 tour of Latin America, urged that the United States "respond to requests for assistance of the police and security forces of the hemisphere nations by providing them with the essential tools to do their job." Accordingly, he specified,


The United States should meet reasonable requests from other hemisphere governments for trucks, jeeps, helicopters and like equipment to provide mobility and logistical support for these forces; for radios, and other command control equipment for proper communications among the forces; and for small arms for security forces.²⁹

Although such measures may provide some added longevity to pro-U.S. regimes in the Third World, they do not treat the basic problems of underdevelopment and poverty which lead to discontent and thus cannot postpone indefinitely a popular insurrection. By becoming identified with the forces of repression, moreover, the United States engenders the hostility of the masses, and feeds, therefore, the currents of anti-Americanism which are sweeping through the Third World.

Footnotes

1. This article is largely based on AFD documents which have been published in the NACLA Newsletter and NACLA's Latin America Report. See, in particular, "AID Assistance to Civil Security Forces," NACLA Newsletter, September, 1970; "How U.S. AID Shapes the Dominican Police,"

- NACLA Newsletter, April, 1971; "AID Police Programs for Latin America," NACLA Newsletter, July-August, 1971; and "Command & Control - U.S. Police Operations in Latin America," NACLA's Latin America Report, January, 1972.
2. Nelson A. Rockefeller, "Quality of Life in the Americas," Report of a U.S. Presidential Mission for the Western Hemisphere, Department of State Bulletin, December 8, 1969, p. 503.
 3. Ibid., p. 506.
 4. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, Survey of the Alliance for Progress, Compilation of Studies and Hearings, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 1969, p. 414.
 5. Ibid.
 6. U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance Appropriations, 1965, Hearings, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, 1964, p. 7. (Hereinafter cited as Foreign Assistance 1965.)
 7. Maxwell D. Taylor, Address at Graduation Exercise, International Police Academy, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of State press release, December 17, 1965.
 8. Foreign Assistance 1965, p. 72.
 9. U.S. Agency for International Development, Program and Project Data Presentation to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1972 (Washington, D.C., 1971). (Hereinafter cited as Project Data Presentation 1972.)
 10. U.S. Agency for International Development, Project Data Summary FY 1966: Dominican Republic (Washington, D.C., 1965):
 11. Ibid. See also Project Data Presentation 1972.
 12. "A.I.D. Assistance to Civil Security Forces," U.S. Department of State press release, February 11, 1970.
 13. See interview with David Fairchild, former AID administrator in the Dominican Republic, in NACLA Newsletter, November, 1970, p. 8.
 14. From an unpublished AID report quoted in John George, "Police Assistance," a paper prepared for the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. The Venezuela excerpt was published as "U.S. Police Program in Venezuela - An Inside View," in NACLA's Latin America Report, January, 1972, pp. 16-18.
 15. Project Data Presentation 1972. See also: U.S. Agency for International Development, The Role of Public Safety in Support of the National Police of Vietnam (Washington, D.C., 1969).
 16. Project Data Presentation 1972. See also: The New York Times, July 7, 1970.
 17. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 63.
 18. Cited by Holmes Alexander in "The Inside Story of Venezuela," undated article inserted in Foreign Assistance 1965, p. 76.
 19. Foreign Assistance 1965, p. 74.
 20. Peter T. Chew, "America's Global Peace Officers," The Kiwanis Magazine, April, 1969, p. 24.
 21. "U.S. Police Program in Venezuela," NACLA's Latin America Report, January, 1972, p. 18.
 22. John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 122. See also: "How U.S. AID Shapes the Dominican Police," NACLA Newsletter, April, 1971, pp. 19-28.
 23. Foreign Assistance 1965, p. 82.
 24. Ibid., p. 75.
 25. "U.S. to End Police Aid to Brazil," The New York Times, July 15, 1971.
 26. The Washington Post, July 25, 1971.
 27. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam, Hearings, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971.
 28. The Miami Herald, July 24, 1970.
 29. Rockefeller, op. cit., pp. 516-17.



U.S. Arms Sales to the Third World

ARM NOW PAY LATER

One of the fastest growing markets for industrial products in the world today is the defense systems of Third World nations. Total military spending by the underdeveloped nations is growing at a rate of nine percent a year--twice that of developed countries, and also twice the rate of economic growth in the Third World.¹ One survey of worldwide defense spending indicates that Third World expenditures on military hardware increased from \$3.3 billion in 1968 to an estimated \$5.5 billion in 1972--an increase of 67 percent in five years.² Since most countries seek to acquire increasingly complex and sophisticated weapons, the production of such equipment tends to be concentrated in a handful of the most advanced industrial nations: between 1950 and 1969, four countries--the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France--supplied 87 percent of the major weapons systems acquired by underdeveloped countries.³ The United States, faced with mounting balance-of-payments deficits, has sought to encourage and exploit the growing appetite for advanced weapons in the Third World by mounting an aggressive and well-organized sales campaign.

The Pentagon's arms sales effort, known as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, was developed as an adjunct to the grant system of Military Assistance Program (MAP). Thus FMS shared the MAP program's Cold War goal of strengthening "Free World" defenses against anticipated Soviet invasions. George Thayer, who discusses the U.S. sales effort in his book *The War Business*, has written that: "Our arms aid program was originally conceived to promote the defensive strength of the West against the communist threat and to promote the concept of cooperative logistics--i.e., the use of common weapons systems--among allies. It was grounded

in the knowledge that most of our allies were militarily vulnerable and in the belief that the Soviet Union was about to march into Western Europe and several other areas. Thus, the United States began to ship large quantities of weapons to its allies who, it was hoped, would help stem the Soviet tide."⁴ Since, in the immediate postwar era, most of our allies were unable to shoulder the burden of their own and the common defense, the United States gave generously of its own resources to remilitarize Western Europe and the "forward defense areas" on the borders of the Soviet Union in Asia. Between 1945 and 1961, the United States gave away weapons worth a total of \$25 billion, while arms sales in the same period amounted to only \$2.5 billion, or ten percent of the grant effort.

When President Kennedy took office in 1961, the goals of the FMS program changed radically. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, who sought to expand the Pentagon's conventional warfare capabilities, recognized that overseas deployment of U.S. troops (and other war-related activities in Southeast Asia) would contribute to an ever-increasing balance-of-payments deficit. In order to compensate for increased U.S. military spending abroad, therefore, he sought to persuade our allies in Western Europe and Asia to make substantial purchases of U.S. weapons.⁵ At the same time, McNamara discovered that Congress was increasingly unwilling to subsidize the defense expenditures of our less-fortunate allies (MAP grant aid to Third World countries dropped from \$1.3 billion in fiscal 1963 to \$678 million in 1967), and thus he established an elaborate program of credits and loans to enable poor countries to borrow funds for the purchase of U.S. arms at attractive interest rates.⁶ McNamara's new arms sales policies were summarized in 1963 in Department of Defense Directive

Number 5132.3, which affirmed: "Consistent with overall security objectives, maximum effort will be made to promote the program of selling U.S.-produced military equipment and services to friendly nations."⁷

In order to facilitate overseas purchases of U.S. arms, McNamara in 1961 established a Pentagon sales agency, the International Logistics Negotiations (ILN) Office, and appointed Henry J. Kuss, Jr. to head the FMS promotion campaign. Often compared to Sir Basil Zaharoff, the original "Merchant of Death," Kuss was promoted to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1964 for his success in boosting military sales. "Henry wore a homburg," one of his associates later recalled, "but he wasn't a Zaharoff... McNamara simply appointed him vice-president and general manager in charge of pushing arms in the far corners of the globe--and Henry pushed them."⁸ While heading the ILN office, Kuss converted the Pentagon's military aid missions abroad into agents for the U.S. arms industry--a function they still serve (see below). The results of this campaign were striking: between 1961 and 1967, U.S. arms sales increased sixfold--from \$300 million to \$1.8 billion annually.

During the Kuss regime, the Pentagon's sales campaign was directed primarily at the developed nations of Western Europe, as well as Japan, Canada and Australia. Between 1962 and 1968, FMS sales to developed countries amounted to \$10.5 billion while sales to underdeveloped nations came to only \$1.1 billion.¹⁰ As the 1960's progressed, however, the market for American military products in the developed nations began to shrink: worried that the increased sophistication of modern arms would lead to the

monopolization of weapons development by the Soviet Union and the United States, many European nations (and later Japan) expanded their own arms industries in order to be assured that they would not be "frozen out" of advanced military technologies. U.S. sales to developed countries reached a peak of \$1.6 billion in fiscal 1966, and then dropped to an average of \$900 million annually in the succeeding five years (see Chart A). In order to make up for this decline in foreign sales, the Pentagon began to encourage substantial arms purchases by the Third World nations dependent upon the U.S. for economic and military aid: no longer would our underdeveloped allies receive *gratis* the weapons we wanted them to have--instead they would be obliged to further tax their citizenry in order to pay for the military equipment we persuaded them to buy. As a result of a vigorous promotional campaign, FMS sales to underdeveloped countries rose from \$96 million in fiscal 1965 to \$1 billion in 1971--a 1,000 percent increase. (see Chart A).

Increased U.S. weapons sales to the Third World is a major component of President Nixon's military policy. Under pressure from an aroused public and a war-weary Congress, the Administration has been obliged to withdraw American combat troops from Asia and to reduce the rate of defense spending at home. In order to protect American interests abroad from the threat of armed liberation movements, Nixon has forced our client regimes in the Third World to purchase substantial quantities of U.S. arms and to supply mercenaries for U.S.-led counterinsurgency operations. The Administration's plan was spelled out by Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard in 1970 as follows:

Table 1: Foreign Military Sales Trends, 1965-71

[By fiscal year; dollars in millions]

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	Total, 1965-71
FMS Sales to developed nations	1,147	1,556	966	784	1,170	688	834	7,145
FMS sales to underdeveloped nations	96	204	128	299	515	227	1,048	2,517
FMS sales to int'l organizations	6	25	34	30	34	19	15	163
TOTAL FMS SALES ^a	1,248	1,785	1,128	1,113	1,720	933	1,898	9,825
Commercial sales ^b	274	312	345	335	329	567	416	2,578
GRAND TOTAL, SALES	1,522	2,097	1,473	1,448	2,049	1,500	2,314	12,403
Total Military Assistance grants ^c	1,236	1,062	814	719	589	538	702	5,622
MAP grants to developing nations	1,042	965	678	640	584	538	702	5,149

^aSource: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C.: 1971).

^bSource: Department of States Bulletin, February 22, 1971, p. 226.

^cSource: U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of Statistics and Reports, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Preliminary FY 1971 and Trend Data (Washington, D.C.: 1971).

The Nixon Doctrine places the Military Assistance Program and Foreign Military Sales in a special position in our foreign policy. It is now more important than ever that these two instruments of U.S. policy be put to optimum use in helping to reduce both the monetary and the manpower burden we now carry in honoring international obligations. I believe that the best hope of reducing our overseas involvements and expenditures lies in getting allied and friendly nations to do even more in their own defense. To realize that hope, however, requires that we must continue, if requested, to give or sell them the tools they need for this bigger load we are urging them to assume.

That is why, in the interests of maintaining an adequate defense posture at minimum cost, the growing use of credit-assisted sales of military equipment, as well as increased military assistance, seem clearly indicated for the immediate future.¹¹

On the basis of this argument, Nixon in 1971 sought approval for the largest FMS program in United States history: \$510 million in credits and loan guarantees was requested to help finance total arms purchases estimated at \$2.15 billion--a 700 percent increase over the pre-1961 average of \$300 million a year and twice the average rate during the 1960's.



In its effort to increase arms sales to the developing areas, the Nixon Administration has had to overcome the resistance of a handful of Congressmen who--in an attempt to prevent more Vietnam-type wars--have sought to limit military exports to Third World nations. Led by Senators J.W. Fulbright and Stuart Symington of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee, these dissidents have been able to impose several restraints upon the FMS program. The Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 limits annual arms exports to Latin America and Africa to \$75 million and \$40 million respectively, and suspends all U.S. economic and military aid to underdeveloped countries which divert an "excessive" amount of their resources to the acquisition of weapons. Amendments to the Foreign Military Sales Act and Foreign Assistance Act have further restricted the transfer of advanced military equipment (particularly supersonic aircraft) to Third World countries.¹²

The 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act and subsequent legislation constitute a significant obstacle to President Nixon's effort to increase arms sales to the Third World, and Administration officials have campaigned vigorously to overcome these restrictions. In a 1969 statement to the Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Charles A. Meyer reported that "Latin Americans have become puzzled and even suspicious of our motives. Strong nationalist resentment has arisen over what is seen as United States efforts to infringe on the sovereign rights of a country to determine its own military requirements." While these countries would prefer to obtain American equipment for their armed forces, he argued, Congressional restraints on the sale of sophisticated weapons are forcing them to turn to more expensive European substitutes.¹³ Since major sales agreements are normally accompanied by the provision of on-site training and technical assistance, the switch to European (or Soviet) producers would involve a corresponding decline in American influence upon the indigenous military. Backed by these arguments, the Administration is pressuring Congress to raise the ceilings on arms exports to Latin America and Africa. Meanwhile, not content to await the outcome of this legislative campaign, President Nixon in 1971 exercised his option, under Section 33c of the Foreign Military Sales Act, to waive the \$75 million ceiling on arms transfers to Latin America.¹⁴

U.S. ARMS SALES PROGRAMS

In its drive to secure increased exports of military hardware to the Third World, the Department of Defense can employ a variety of methods for consummating and financing such sales.

FMS Credit Sales: Under the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Pentagon is authorized to extend credit to underdeveloped nations for the

U.S. ARMS SALES ABROAD^a

Defense Dept. Deliveries by Country, 1950-70^b

[By fiscal year; dollars in millions]

Region & country	Deliveries, 1950-1970	Region & country	Deliveries, 1950-1970
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC, Total	994.6	Liberia	1.2
Australia	605.1	Libya	23.5
China, Republic of	69.1	Mali	0.1
Indochina (1946-54)	7.9	Morocco	21.0
Indonesia	0.6	Nigeria	0.4
Japan	197.5	South Africa	2.8
Korea (South)	4.5	Sudan	1.5
Malaysia	15.1	Tunisia	2.9
New Zealand	65.4	United Arab Republic	0.4
Philippines	6.2		
Singapore	20.1	LATIN AMERICA, Total	395.2
Thailand	1.3	Argentina	79.4
Vietnam	**	Bolivia	0.9
Region*	1.8	Brazil	84.9
		Chile	32.8
NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA, Total	1,458.5	Colombia	11.3
Ceylon	0.3	Costa Rica	0.9
Greece	29.1	Cuba (1950-60)	4.5
India	#	Dominican Republic	1.9
Iraq	12.9	Ecuador	4.3
Iran	450.7	El Salvador	1.5
Israel	#	Guatemala	2.7
Jordan	#	Haiti	0.2
Lebanon	#	Honduras	1.1
Pakistan	#	Jamaica	**
Saudi Arabia	#	Mexico	10.8
Turkey	5.2	Nicaragua	2.3
Region*	960.3	Panama	**
		Paraguay	0.4
EUROPE, Total	5,745.8	Peru	49.7
Austria	51.8	Uruguay	2.5
Belgium	115.0	Venezuela	103.1
Denmark	69.3		
France	312.3	CANADA	797.2
Germany	3,138.8	INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	214.1
Italy	374.8		
Luxembourg	1.9	GRAND TOTAL	9,661.4
Netherlands	100.4		
Norway	146.1		
Portugal	7.9		
Spain	72.0		
Sweden	30.5		
Switzerland	103.8		
United Kingdom	1,209.5		
Yugoslavia	11.6		
AFRICA, Total	55.9		
Congo (Kinshasa)	1.5		
Ethiopia	0.7		
Ghana	0.1		

^aSource: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts (Washington, D.C., 1971), pp. 22-23.

^bRepresents completed Department of Defense sales only; excludes sales by private concerns and prepaid orders if delivery had not been made by June 30, 1970.

Classified data.

* Includes figures for classified countries.

** Less than \$50,000.

Table 2: Military Sales by Region, 1950-72

[By Fiscal Year; dollars in millions]

	Total, 1950-64	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970 ^c	Estimated		Total, 1950-72		Grand Total 1950-72
								1971	1972	Cash Sales	Credit Sales	
								EAST ASIA & PACIFIC	445	268	174	
NEAR EAST & S. ASIA	222	154	355	354	346	607	246	1,031	711	1,864	2,153	4,017
EUROPE & CANADA	4,015	793	1,181	525	522	863	472	500	1,029	9,786	110	9,896
AFRICA	9	6	2	38	3	21	7	21	18	73	53	125
LATIN AMERICA	267	22	47	43	48	36	16	72	144	313	377	690
INT'L ORGANIZATIONS	136	6	25	34	30	34	19	-	-	257	23	280
Unallocated credit	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	15	15
TOTAL FMS SALES	5,095	1,248	1,785	1,128	1,113	1,720	933	1,898	2,146	13,838	3,193	17,031

^aSource: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, *Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts* (Washington, D.C.: 1971), p. 21.

^bDepartment of Defense sales only - excludes direct sales by U.S. private firms.

^cNo FMS credits appropriated in fiscal year 1970.

purchase of American arms. Such funds must be appropriated by Congress, and when repaid, returned to the U.S. Treasury. Credit terms are generally favorable: interest rarely exceeds 6 percent annually, and up to 10 years are allowed for repayment. (Recently, the Pentagon has requested approval of "concessionary" credit terms--3 percent interest and 20 years to pay-- in order to further encourage purchases by Third World nations.)¹⁵ Between 1950 and 1970, the Pentagon provided a total of \$1.86 billion in credits under the FMS program, and another \$1.34 billion is programmed for 1971-1972. (See Table 2 for a breakdown of FMS credits by region; credits to individual countries are provided in *NACLA Newsletter*, Vol. V, No. 2, April, 1971.)

FMS Loan Guaranties: In order to generate additional funds for purchase of U.S. weapons the Pentagon is authorized to guaranty loans by private banks and lending institutions to foreign governments for the purpose of obtaining American military goods. Under the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Department of Defense must maintain a reserve equivalent to 25 percent of all outstanding loans; funds for this purpose are voted annually by Congress. In the past, such guaranties have amounted to approximately \$100 million annually (entailing an appropriation of \$25 million for the reserve fund).

FMS Cash Sales: Under the Foreign Military Sales Act and other legislation, the Department of Defense is authorized to arrange direct government-to-government sales of American military hardware. Such sales totalled \$11.13 billion between 1950 and 1970, and were expected to reach \$13.84 billion by the end of fiscal 1972.

As can be seen in Table 2, Western Europe, Canada and Japan have been the largest customers for our military products.

Export-Import Bank Loans: Since 1963, the U.S. Government's Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has been authorized to serve as an agent for the Department of Defense by providing funds for the purchase of U.S. arms. Principal Eximbank borrowers have been the advanced nations of Western Europe--but Third World countries have also obtained funds from the bank under a program known as "Country-X" loans, in which the identity of the borrower was known only to the Department of Defense.¹⁶ Country-X loans were prohibited by the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968, and now the Eximbank is only allowed to make loans to developed countries. So far, six countries have made use of this service: Britain (\$810 million), Australia (\$614 million), Italy (\$153 million), Spain (\$120 million), New Zealand (\$55 million), and Austria (\$31 million); together, these countries have borrowed a total of \$1.78 billion from the Eximbank.¹⁷

Direct Commercial Sales: Under existing legislation, direct sales of military hardware by private U.S. firms to foreign governments are under the purview of the Department of State and Treasury. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 requires that firms wishing to engage in such trade must obtain a license from the State Department's Office of Munitions Control. Once a license has been issued (presumably after it has received the blessing of the Department of Defense), the Office has no authority to supervise a sales agreement or to publish reports of such transactions.¹⁸ Total commercial sales for 1962-69 amounted to \$3.5 billion,

while sales for 1970-71 came to an estimated \$983 million.¹⁹ Europe, Canada and Japan accounted for the bulk of such purchases.

Licensed Overseas Production: The 1954 Mutual Security Act and associated legislation enable the State Department's Office of Munitions Control to permit private U.S. firms to sell licenses for the overseas production of American arms by foreign firms or governments. Such transactions can involve merely the sale of blueprints, or the construction of entire munitions factories (an example of the latter is the arrangement whereby Colt Industries, Inc. will supply equipment for and supervise construction of an M-16 rifle assembly plant in South Korea). Recent licensing agreements involve the production of Sikorsky CH-53G Sea Stallion helicopters in West Germany, and McDonnell-Douglas F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers in Japan. (see Appendix).

"Third Country" Arrangements: Occasionally, the United States will permit a foreign government to sell its U.S.-supplied weapons to another country, or a private U.S. firm to arrange for the licensed production of U.S. arms in one country for sale to another country. Thus, Boeing-Vertol CH-47C Chinook helicopters now being assembled in Italy are eventually destined for sale to Iran. Such third-country transactions are often employed when direct American sales would prove embarrassing to the U.S. Government. United States regulations require that all third-country deals receive the approval of the U.S. Government; needless to say, such

mandates are extremely difficult to enforce while in many cases, there is no desire to enforce them. Thus a study team organized by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported in 1967 that some North American F-86 Sabre fighters manufactured under license in Canada for use by the West German air force and later "sold" to Iran had ultimately wound up in the hands of Pakistan—despite an "official" U.S. policy of halting arms transfers to that country.²⁰

Actual sales and credit agreements under these various programs for the years 1965-71 are summarized in Table 1, "Trends in Foreign Military Sales," and in Table 2, "Foreign Military Sales Summary by Region." During this period, FSM sales to underdeveloped countries rose steadily from \$96 million in fiscal 1965 to \$1.05 billion in 1971, amounting to a total of \$2.5 billion for the entire period (the dramatic increase in FMS sales to Third World nations is indicated in Chart A). Military Assistance Program grant aid declined in these years from \$1.24 billion in fiscal 1965 to \$680 million in 1971; total MAP aid during this period amounted to \$5.6 billion, or less than half the amount of sales. (The shift in emphasis from grant aid to FMS sales is vividly demonstrated in Table B.) As can be seen in the Appendix, the principal beneficiaries of the growing sales program are the aerospace companies which produce the jet fighters, transport planes, light aircraft, and helicopters currently sought by foreign armed forces. (For a list of major U.S. arms transfers 1968-1972, see Appendix.)

THE U.S. SALES APPARATUS

In order to provide greater coordination of U.S. military export programs at the command level, President Nixon on August 11, 1971, created the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) as the sixth Defense-wide management organization (other such organizations are the Defense Supply Agency, Defense Communications Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency). DSAA assumed most of the functions of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance and Sales (the successor to the International Logistics Negotiations Office originally headed by Henry Kuss), which had shared authority over the FMS program with the sales agencies of the separate services. The new head of DSAA, Army Lt. Gen. George M. Seignious II, has direct access to the Secretary of Defense as well as increased authority over the service sales agencies. The new Agency's charter (embodied in Department of Defense Directive Number 5105.38) specifies that, among other functions, DSAA will:

-- Conduct international logistics and sales negotiations with foreign countries, as directed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary

Chart A: FMS SALES TO DEVELOPED COUNTRIES VS. FMS SALES TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

[By fiscal year; amounts in millions]

1965	\$1,147	\$96
1966	\$1,556	\$204
1967	\$966	\$128
1968	\$784	\$299
1969	\$1,170	\$515
1970	\$688	\$227 (No credits appropriated)
1971	\$834	\$1,048

■ FMS sales to developed nations
 ■ FMS sales to underdeveloped nations

of Defense (Installations and Logistics).
 -- Maintain liason with and assist U.S. industry in the export of military supplies, equipment and services.
 -- Manage governmental and government-supported private sources of credit financing of foreign military sales.²¹

If the Director of DSAA is the Pentagon's "Vice-President and General Manager for sales," then the principal salesmen in the field are the military advisors assigned to U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) in 45 countries. MAAG personnel are specifically charged with the responsibility to "further the sale of U.S.-produced military equipment to meet valid requirements."²² MAAG functions under the FMS program include supplying the Pentagon with data on host country capabilities, resources and requirements, and acting as a go-between for the host country and the U.S. Government in processing and implementing sales transactions. Specifically, the MAAG's are enjoined with the responsibility to:

- Analyze and survey potential needs and requirements of the country, keeping higher logistics headquarters informed, and requesting [data on the] availability (or future availability) of U.S. material that could be sold to meet these needs.
- As appropriate, develop plans and programs to demonstrate and promote the sale of such available (and future available) material to the country.
- Work directly with military departments and appropriate military area commands in arranging for receipt and transfer of military sales material, training and services.
- Provide assistance to the country in preparation of purchase or loan requests.²³


The wealth of information supplied to Pentagon salesmen in Washington by MAAG personnel gives the United States a distinct competitive advantage when negotiating for the sale of American equipment. As noted by the Arms Control Project of MIT's Center for International Studies, "it can also be suggested that any state interested in selling its arms to other countries is at a tremendous advantage when it has military advisors capable of providing sales information in such detail assigned to advise its potential sales customers."²⁴ Under current Department of Defense regulations, U.S. military advisors are also mandated to cooperate with private industry in promoting the sales of American arms abroad. Thus the Air Force manual on Military Assistance Sales indicates: "When directed by appropriate authority, [MAAG personnel will] cooperate with representatives of specified U.S. firms in furthering sales of U.S.-produced military equipment to meet valid country requirements."²⁵ Not only are the MAAG's enjoined to provide private firms with information, but also to actively promote such commercial sales: the same manual notes that it is U.S. Air Force (USAF) policy "to encourage direct transactions

between eligible recipients and U.S. manufacturers or suppliers, for defense articles and services which are not available from USAF stocks or resources."²⁶ Concluding that significant host country purchases of U.S. arms will win Washington's approval and thus advance their careers, many MAAG officers develop a personal interest in the FMS program, and thus, as noted by the MIT Arms control Project, generate independent momentum for the sales effort.²⁷

In their efforts to further the sale of American weapons to the Third World, MAAG personnel benefit from the program which sends thousands of Third World military personnel to armed forces schools in the United States and the Panama Canal Zone every year for training in various military specialties. Between 1950 and 1970, 319,000 foreign military officers and enlisted men received training at schools in the United States and at U.S. bases abroad. Of this number, the great majority came from Third World countries: thus Latin America accounted for 54,000 men, East Asia 144,000 and the Near East 50,000.²⁸ Although ostensibly this program is designed to improve the defense capabilities of underdeveloped countries, a very real--if unspoken--goal is to inculcate a familiarity with, and appetite for, American-produced weapons. In supporting this program, Pentagon officials calculate that when such students return to their country, they will request purchases of the American equipment they had become accustomed to using in training exercises. It is argued, for instance, that Latin American pilots

Chart B: MILITARY ASSISTANCE GRANT AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES VS. FMS SALES TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1965-71

[By fiscal year; amounts in millions]



who receive technical instruction at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at Albrook Air Force Base in the Canal Zone will naturally seek to fly in American planes (the kinds they are most familiar with) when they rejoin their own air forces.²⁹

In summarizing the Government's arguments on behalf of the Foreign Military Sales program, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul C. Warnke commented in 1968 that "in a perfect world we wouldn't have to deal with arms sales. But we are no more in a position to discontinue our supply of arms to our friends than we are in a position to disarm unilaterally, and I think in effect if we were to foreclose our sales of military equipment... to our friends throughout the world, we are disarming ourselves." Warnke went on to suggest:

In many instances these are the cheapest defense dollars that we spend. By equipping

the indigenous people to contribute to their own defense and hence to the defense of the free world, we make it unnecessary for ourselves to get directly involved in [Vietnam-type] situations. Hopefully, we will be able at some point to talk with the Soviets both about the mutual disarmament and about control over arms races. Until that day comes, however, I believe it is absolutely essential that we retain the ability to supply those countries that are willing to work with us toward a program of collective security.³⁰

Since, as we have seen, the United States Government is determined to expand weapons sales to the Third World in order to further enrich the U.S. arms industry while arming America's client regimes, it is unlikely that the day will come soon when the United States will cooperate in the control of overseas arms races.

Michael Klare

NOTES


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U.S. Bases & Forces Abroad

As of January 1, 1972, the United States had some 875,000 servicemen stationed abroad, out of a total armed strength of approximately 2.5 million men. In addition to uniformed personnel, there are some 26,000 U.S. civilians, 300,000 dependents and 225,000 foreign nationals attached to U.S. overseas installations. (See list of U.S. Military Bases Abroad in Appendix for breakdown by country of U.S. troops stationed overseas.)

The United States currently maintains over 2,250 military installations and bases abroad (not including bases in South Vietnam and Laos, which number in the hundreds), of which some 400 are designated "major" bases. "Major" installations are defined by the Pentagon as bases "which are large in number of acres occupied or personnel accommodated, or which represent a high acquisition cost to the United States Government, or which are used in support of a principal U.S. military activity or mission." Major bases include large airfields, shipyards and fleet facilities, principal headquarters and command centers, large communications facilities, and troop training and housing complexes. "Minor" installations include navigational aids and radar posts, small communications facilities, and small administrative buildings supporting incidental activities; military missions and military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs) are also included in this category.

As part of an ongoing NACLA study of overseas U.S. military bases, programs and activities, we include here two documents on U.S. forces abroad: "The Sun Never Sets on America's Empire," from Commonweal (May 22, 1970); and a list of U.S. Military Bases Abroad. Since no such listings can ever be considered complete, we invite readers to submit additional information, corrections, etc. on U.S. bases and operations abroad.



remained under AID and other civilian cover, but this was nonetheless a violation of the agreement. Moreover, Christopher Robbins, in his study of Air America, has noted that US "Military advisers and CIA personnel moved across the border into Thailand, where they were flown in every day [to Laos] like commuters by Air America, whose entire helicopter operation was based in Udorn [Thailand]." ³⁴ Air America, by the early 1970s, had no less than 4,000 employees in Thailand. ³⁵

Thus it was that the fighting dragged on, though only sporadically. In April 1964, the coalition government, such as it was, was overthrown by the right wing, with the CIA's man Phoumi Nosavan emerging as part of a rightist government headed by the perennial survivor Souvanna Phouma to give it a neutralist fig leaf. ³⁶ The Pathet Lao were once again left out in the cold. For them it was the very last straw. The fighting greatly intensified, the skirmishes were now war, and the Pathet Lao offensive soon scored significant advances. Then the American bombing began.

Between 1965 and 1973, more than two million tons of bombs rained down upon the people of Laos, ³⁷ considerably more than the US had dropped on both Germany and Japan during the Second World War, albeit for a shorter period. For the first few years, the bombing was directed primarily at the provinces controlled by the Pathet Lao. Of the bombing, Fred Branfman, a former American community worker in Laos, wrote: "village after village was leveled, countless people buried alive by high explosives, or burnt alive by napalm and white phosphorous, or riddled by anti-personnel bomb pellets" ³⁸ ... "The United States has undertaken," said a Senate report, "... a large-scale air war over Laos to destroy the physical and social infrastructure of Pathet Lao held areas and to interdict North Vietnamese infiltration ... throughout all this there has been a policy of subterfuge and secrecy ... through such things as saturation bombing and the forced evacuation of population from enemy held or threatened areas—we have helped to create untold agony for hundreds of thousands of villagers." ³⁹

The American military, however, kept proper records. AID could report to Congress that wounds suffered by civilian war casualties were as follows:

1. Type: Soft tissue, 39 percent. Compound fracture, 30 percent. Amputation, 12 percent. Intra-abdominal, 10 percent. Intra-thoracic, 3 percent. Intra-cranial, 1 percent.
2. Location: Lower extremities, 60 percent. Upper extremities, 15 percent. Trunk, 18 percent. Head, 7 percent. ⁴⁰

There was no happy way out for the Laotian people. In October 1971, one could read in *The Guardian* of London ...

although US officials deny it vehemently, ample evidence exists to confirm charges that the Meo villages that do try to find their own way out of the war—even if it is simply by staying neutral and refusing to send their 13-year-olds to fight in the CIA army—are immediately denied American rice and transport, and ultimately bombed by the US Air Force. ⁴¹

The fledgling society that the United States was trying to make extinct—the CIA dropped millions of dollars in forged Pathet Lao currency as well, in an attempt to wreck the economy ⁴²—was one which Fred Branfman described thus:

The Pathet Lao rule over the Plain of Jars began in May 1964 brought its people into a post-colonial era. For the first time they were taught pride in their country and people, instead of admiration for a foreign culture; schooling and massive adult literacy campaigns were conducted in Laotian instead of French; and mild but thorough social revolution—ranging from land reform to greater equality for women—was instituted. ⁴³

Following on the heels of events in Vietnam, a ceasefire was arrived at in Laos in 1973, and yet another attempt at coalition government was undertaken. (This one lasted until 1975 when, after renewed fighting, the Pathet Lao took over full control of the country.) Laos had become a land of nomads, without villages, without farms; a generation of refugees; hundreds of thousands dead, many more maimed. When the US Air Force closed down its radio station, it signed off with the message: "Good-bye and see you next war." ⁴⁴

Thus it was that the worst of Washington's fears had come to pass: All of Indochina—Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos—had fallen to the Communists. During the initial period of US involvement in Indochina in the 1950s, John Foster Dulles, Dwight Eisenhower and other American officials regularly issued doomsday pronouncements of the type known as the "Domino Theory", warning that if Indochina should fall, other nations in Asia would topple over as well. In one instance, President Eisenhower listed no less than Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and Indonesia amongst the anticipated "falling dominos". ⁴⁵

Such warnings were repeated periodically over the next decade by succeeding administrations and other supporters of US policy in Indochina as a key argument in defense of such policy. The fact that these ominous predictions turned out to have no basis in reality did not deter Washington officialdom from promulgating the same dogma up until the 1990s about almost each new world "trouble-spot", testimony to their unshakable faith in the existence and inter-workings of the International Communist Conspiracy.

22. Haiti 1959-1963

The Marines land, again

"Duvalier has performed an economic miracle," remarked a Haitian of his country's dictator. "He has taught us to live without money ... to eat without food ... to live without life." ¹

And when Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier's voodoo magic wore thin, he could always count on the US Marines to continue his people's education.

During the night of 12-13 August 1959, a boat landed on the northern coast of Haiti with a reported 30 men, Haitians and Cubans and perhaps others aboard. The men had set sail from Cuba some 50 miles away. Their purpose was to overthrow the tyrannical Haitian government, a regime whose secret police, it was said, outnumbered its army.

In short order, the raiding party, equipped with heavy weapons, captured a small army post and began to recruit and arm villagers for the cause. ² The government reported that about 200 persons had joined them. ³ Haitian exiles in Venezuela, in an apparently coordinated effort, broadcast appeals to their countrymen to aid the invaders. They set at 120 the number of men who had landed in Haiti, although this appears to be an exaggeration. ⁴

The initial reaction of the Duvalier government was one of panic, and the police began rounding up opposition sympathizers. ⁵ It was at this point that the US military mission, in Haiti to train Duvalier's forces, stepped in. The Americans instituted an air and sea reconnaissance to locate the rebels. Haitian soldiers, accompanied by US Marines, were airlifted to the area and went into the field to do battle with them. ⁶ Two other US Navy planes and

a helicopter arrived from Puerto Rico.⁷

According to their commander, Col. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., the American Marines took part in the fighting, which lasted until 22 August.⁸ The outcome was a complete rout of the rebel forces.

Information about the men who came from Cuba derives almost exclusively from the Haitian government and the American military mission. These sources claim that the raiding party was composed of about 30 men and that, with the exception of one or two Haitians who led them, they were all Cubans. Another report, referred to in the *New York Times*, stated that there were ten Haitians and two Venezuelans amongst the 30 invaders.⁹ The latter ratio is probably closer to the truth, for there was a considerable number of Haitian exiles living in Cuba, many of whom had gained military experience during the recent Cuban revolution; for obvious reasons of international politics and fighting incentive, such men were the most likely candidates to be part of an invasion of their homeland.

The Castro government readily admitted that the raiding party had come from Cuba but denied that the government had known or approved of it. This claim would seem rather suspect were it not for the fact that the Cuban coast guard had thwarted a similar undertaking in April.¹⁰

The first members of the American military mission had arrived in Haiti in January, largely in response to another invasion attempt the previous July (originating probably in the Dominican Republic). Regardless of all the horror stories about the Haitian regime—such as the one Col. Heinl tells of his 12-year-old son being arrested when he was overheard expressing sympathy for a group of hungry peasants he saw—Duvalier was Washington's man. After all was said and done, he could be counted upon to keep his Black nation, which was usually accorded the honor of being Latin America's poorest, from turning Red. Heinl has recounted the instructions he received from a State Department Under Secretary in January:

Colonel, the most important way you can support our objectives in Haiti is to help keep Duvalier in power so he can serve out his full term in office, and maybe a little longer than that if everything works out.¹¹

The Kennedy administration, which came to power in January 1961, had little use for Papa Doc, and supported his overthrow as well as his possible assassination. According to the later testimony of CIA official Walter Elder before a Senate investigating committee, the Agency furnished arms to Haitian dissidents seeking to topple the dictator. Elder added that while the assassination of Duvalier was not contemplated, the arms were provided "to help [the dissidents] take what measures were deemed necessary to replace the government," and it was realized, he said, that Duvalier might be killed in the course of the overthrow.¹²

But as Cuba increasingly became the United States' *bête noire*, the CIA's great obsession, Washington's policy changed. Haiti's cooperation was needed for the success of US efforts to have Cuba expelled from the Organization of American States in 1963. From that point on, Duvalier enjoyed the full diplomatic and economic support of the US. When the Haitian leader died on 12 April 1971, the American Ambassador Clinton Knox was the only diplomat present at the midnight swearing-in of 19-year-old Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier as the new President for Life, who was to receive the same economic, political and military support as had "Papa Doc", with only the occasional hiccup of a protest from Washington when the level of repression became difficult to ignore.¹³

23. Guatemala 1960

One good coup deserves another

In November 1960, as John F. Kennedy was preparing to succeed Dwight Eisenhower, the obsessive priority of American foreign policy—to invade Cuba—proceeded without pause. On the beaches and in the jungles of Guatemala, Nicaragua and Florida, the Bay of Pigs invasion was being rehearsed.

On the 13th of the month, five days after Kennedy's victory, Guatemalan military personnel broke out in armed rebellion against the government of General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, seizing two military bases and the port city of Puerto Barrios. Reports of the number of officers involved in the uprising vary from 45 to 120, the latter figure representing almost half the Guatemalan Army's officer corps. The officers commanded as many as 3,000 troops, a significant percentage of the armed forces. Their goals, it later developed, were more nationalistic than ideological. The officers were fed up with the corruption in the Ydigoras regime and in the army, and were particularly incensed about the use of their country by a foreign power as a springboard for an invasion of Cuba, some of them being admirers of Fidel Castro for his nationalist policies. One of the dissident officers later characterized the American training base in Guatemala as "a shameful violation of our national sovereignty. And why was it permitted? Because our government is a puppet."¹

The rebellion was crushed within a matter of days, reportedly by the sole power of the Guatemalan Air Force. Some years later, a different picture was to emerge.

The rebels were a force to be reckoned with. The ease with which they had taken over the two garrisons and the real possibility of their mutiny spreading to other bases set alarms ringing at the CIA base, a large coffee plantation in a remote corner of southwestern Guatemala, where the Agency and the US Air Force were training the army of Cuban exiles who were to launch the attack upon their homeland. The CIA feared, and rightly so, that a new regime would send them, the Cubans, and the whole operation packing.

In Washington, President Eisenhower ordered US naval and air units to patrol the Caribbean coast and "shoot if necessary" to prevent any "communist-led" invasion of Guatemala or Nicaragua.² Eisenhower, like Ydigoras, saw the hand of international communism, particularly Cuba, behind the uprising, although no evidence of this was ever presented.³ It was all most ironic in light of the fact that it was the conspiracy of the two leaders to overthrow Cuba that was one of the reasons for the uprising; and that the US naval fleet ordered into action was deployed from Guantánamo Naval Base in Cuba, an American military installation present in that country against the vociferous objections of the Cuban government.

In Guatemala, meanwhile, the CIA decided upon a solution to the dilemma that was both remarkably simple and close at hand: American and Cuban pilots took off from their training ground and bombed and strafed rebel headquarters outside Guatemala City, and bombed the town and airfield of Puerto Barrios. Caught completely by surprise, and defenseless against this superior force, the rebels' insurrection collapsed.⁴

Back at the coffee plantation, the CIA resumed the function which had been so rudely interrupted, the preparation for the overthrow of the Cuban government.

No announcement about the bombings was made in Washington, nor did a report appear in the American press.

The CIA actions were probably not widely known about in Guatemala either, but it

became public knowledge that President Ydigoras had asked Washington for the naval and air support, and had even instructed the Guatemalan Ambassador in Washington to "Get in touch immediately with [Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs] Thomas Mann to coordinate your action."⁵ Thus it was that the Guatemalan president, needing afterward to distance himself a little from so much Yanqui protection, was moved to state that countries like Guatemala are at a disadvantage because "Cuba is a satellite of powerful Russia", but "we are not a satellite of the United States."⁶

The final irony was that some of the dissident officers who went into hiding became more radicalized by their experience. During their revolt they had spurned offers of support from some of the peasants—though this would necessarily have been very limited in any case—because fighting for social change was not at all what the officers had in mind at the time. But as fugitives, thrown into greater contact with the peasants, they eventually came to be moved by the peasants' pressing need for land and for a way out of their wretched existence.⁷ In 1962, several of the officers were to emerge as leaders of a guerrilla movement which incorporated "November Thirteen" as part of its name. In their opening statement, the guerrillas declared:

Democracy vanished from our country long ago. No people can live in a country where there is no democracy. That is why the demand for changes is mounting in our country. We can no longer carry on in this way. We must overthrow the Ydigoras government and set up a government which represents human rights, seeks ways and means to save our country from its hardships, and pursues a serious self-respecting foreign policy.⁸

A simple sentiment, stated even simpler, but, as we shall see, a movement fated to come up against the wishes of the United States. For if Washington could casually do away with an elected government in Guatemala, as it had in 1954, it could be moved by a guerrilla army only as rocks by waves or the moon by howling wolves.

24. France/Algeria 1960s

L'état, c'est la CIA

When John F. Kennedy assumed office in January 1961, he was confronted with a CIA at the zenith of its power and credibility. In the Agency's first 14 years, no formal congressional investigation of it had taken place, nor had any "watchdog" committee been established; four investigations of the CIA by independent task forces during this period had ensured that everything relating to things covert remained just that; with the exception of the U-2 incident the year before, no page-one embarrassments, scandals, or known failures; what had received a measure of publicity—the coups in Guatemala and Iran—were widely regarded as CIA success stories. White House denials, and a compliant media had kept the Agency's misadventure in Indonesia in 1958 from the public scrutiny it deserved.

It is probable that the CIA had more staff officers overseas, under official and unofficial covers, than the State Department, and this in addition to its countless paid agents. Often the CIA Chief of Station had been in a particular country longer than the American ambassador, had more money at his disposal, and exerted more influence. When it suited their purposes, Agency officers would completely bypass the ambassador and normal proto-

col to deal directly with the country's head of state and other high officials.

The CIA had its own military capabilities, including its own air force; for all intents and purposes, its own foreign service with, indeed, its own foreign policy, though never at cross-purposes with fundamental US cold-war, anti-communist ideology and goals.

Seemingly without fear of exposure or condemnation, the Agency felt free to carry out sundry Dr. Strangelove experiments involving control of the human mind and all manner of biochemical weapons, including the release of huge amounts of bacteria into the air in the United States which resulted in much illness and a number of deaths.

It was all very heady stuff for the officers of the CIA, playing their men's games with their boys' toys. They recognized scarcely any limitation upon their freedom of action. British colonial governors they were, and all the world was India.

Then, in mid-April, came the disaster at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. The international repercussions had barely begun to subside when the Agency was again catapulted into world headlines. On 22 April four French generals in Algeria seized power in an attempt to maintain the country's union with France. The *putsch*, which held out but four days, was a direct confrontation with French President Charles de Gaulle, who had dramatically proclaimed a policy leading "not to an Algeria governed from France, but to an Algerian Algeria".

The next day, the leftist Italian newspaper, *Il Paese*, stated that "It is not by chance that some people in Paris are accusing the American secret service headed by Allen Dulles of having participated in the plot of the four 'ultra' generals."¹

Whether *Il Paese* was the original source of this charge remains a mystery. Dulles himself later wrote that the Italian daily was "one of the first to launch it" (emphasis added). He expressed the opinion that "This particular myth was a Communist plant, pure and simple."²

The *New York Times* reported that the rumors apparently began circulating by word of mouth on the day of the *putsch*,³ a report echoed by the *Washington Star* which added that some of the rumors were launched "by minor officials at the Elysée Palace itself" who gave reporters "to understand that the general's plot was backed by strongly anti-communist elements in the United States Government and military services."⁴

Whatever its origins, the story spread rapidly around the world, and the French Foreign Office refused to refute the allegation. *Le Monde* asserted in a front-page editorial on 28 April that "the behavior of the United States during the recent crisis was not particularly skillful. It seems established that American agents more or less encouraged Challe [the leader of the *putsch*] ... President Kennedy, of course, knew nothing of all this."⁵

Reports from all sources were in agreement that if the CIA had indeed been involved in the *putsch*, it had been so for two reasons: (1) the concern that if Algeria were granted its independence, "communists" would soon come to power, being those in the ranks of the National Liberation Front (NLF) which had been fighting the French Army in Algeria for several years—the legendary Battle of Algiers. It was with the NLF that de Gaulle was expected to negotiate a settlement; (2) the hope that it would precipitate the downfall of de Gaulle, an end desired because the French President was a major stumbling block to US aspirations concerning NATO: among other things, he refused to incorporate French troops into an integrated military command, and he opposed exclusive American control over the alliance's nuclear weapons.

By all accounts, it appears that the rebel officers had counted on support from important military and civilian quarters in France to extend the rebellion to the home country and overthrow de Gaulle. Fanciful as this may sound, the fact remains that the French government took the possibility seriously—French Premier Michel Debré went on television to

warn the nation of an imminent paratroop invasion of the Paris area and to urge mass opposition.⁶

Reaction in the American press to the allegations had an unmistakably motley quality. *Washington Post* columnist Marquis Childs said that the French were so shocked by the generals' coup that they had to find a scapegoat. At the same time he quoted "one of the highest officials of the French government" as saying:

Of course, your government, neither your State Department nor your President, had anything to do with this. But when you have so many hundreds of agents in every part of the world, it is not to be wondered at that some of them should have got in touch with the generals in Algiers.⁷

Time magazine discounted the story, saying too that the United States was being made a scapegoat and that the CIA had become a "favorite target in recent weeks."⁸

James Reston wrote in the *New York Times* that the CIA:

was involved in an embarrassing liaison with the anti-Gaullist officers who staged last week's insurrection in Algiers ... [the Bay of Pigs and Algerian events have] increased the feeling in the White House that the CIA has gone beyond the bounds of an objective intelligence-gathering agency and has become the advocate of men and policies that have embarrassed the Administration.⁹

However, C.L. Sulzberger, who had been the man at the *New York Times* closest to the CIA since its founding, stated flatly that "No American in Algeria had to do with any insurrectional leader ... No consular employee saw any rebel." (A few days later, though, Secretary of State Dean Rusk disclosed that an emissary of the rebellious French generals had visited the US Consulate in Algiers to request aid but had been summarily rebuffed.)

The affair, wrote Sulzberger, was "a deliberate effort to poison Franco-American relationships" begun in Moscow but abetted by "anti-American French officials" and "naive persons in Washington ... When one checks, one finds all this began in a Moscow *Izvestia* article April 25."¹⁰ This last, as we have seen, was incorrect.

Dean of American columnists, Walter Lippmann, who had seen de Gaulle in Paris shortly before the *putsch*, wrote:

the reason why the French Government has not really exculpated the CIA of encouraging the Algerian rebel generals is that it was already so angry with the CIA for meddling in French internal politics. The French grievance, justified or not, has to do with recent French legislation for the French nuclear weapon, and the alleged effort of CIA agents to interfere with that legislation.¹¹

Newsweek repeated the claim that it was "French officials" who had been "the main sources" of the rumors in the first place. When challenged by the American administration the French denied their authorship and tended to soften the charges. Some French officials eventually declared the matter to be closed, though they still failed to explicitly rule out the allegations about American involvement.¹²

In early May 1961, *L'Express*, the widely-read French liberal weekly, published what was perhaps the first detailed account of the mysterious affair. Their Algerian correspondent, Claude Krief, reported:¹³

Both in Paris and Washington the facts are now known, though they will never be publicly admitted. In private, the highest French personalities make no secret of it. What they say is this: "The CIA played a direct part in the Algiers coup, and certainly weighed heavily on the decision taken by ex-general Challe to start his *putsch*."

Not long before, Challe had held the position of NATO Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe, as a result of which he had been in daily contact with US military officers.¹⁴ Krief wrote that certain American officials in NATO and the Pentagon had encouraged Challe, and that the general had several meetings with CIA officers who told him that "to get rid of de Gaulle would render the Free World a great service". Krief noted that Challe, despite an overweening ambition, was very cautious and serious-minded: "All the people who know him well, are deeply convinced that he had been encouraged by the CIA to go ahead."

At a luncheon in Washington the previous year, Jacques Soustelle, the former Governor-General of Algeria who had made public his disagreement with de Gaulle's Algeria policy, had met with CIA officials, including Richard Bissell, head of covert operations. Soustelle convinced the Agency officials, according to Krief, that Algeria would become, through de Gaulle's blundering, "a Soviet base". This luncheon became something of a *cause célèbre* in the speculation concerning the CIA's possible role. The *New York Times* and others reported that it had been given by the Agency for Soustelle.¹⁵ US officials, however, insisted that the luncheon had been arranged by someone at the French Embassy at Soustelle's request. This French official, they said, had been present throughout the meeting and thus there could have been no dark conspiracy.¹⁶ Why the French Embassy would host a luncheon for a prominent and bitter foe of de Gaulle, a man who only two months earlier had been kicked out of de Gaulle's cabinet for his "ultra" sympathies, was not explained. Nor, for that matter, why in protocol-minded Washington of all places, the CIA would attend. In any event, it seems somewhat fatuous to imply that this was the only chance Soustelle and the CIA had to talk during his stay in the United States, which lasted more than a week.

A clandestine meeting in Madrid also received wide currency within the controversy. Krief dates it 12 April 1961, and describes it as a meeting of "various foreign agents, including members of the CIA and the Algiers conspirators, who disclosed their plans to the CIA men". The Americans were reported to have angrily complained that de Gaulle's policy was "paralyzing NATO and rendering the defense of Europe impossible", and assured the generals that if they and their followers succeeded, Washington would recognize the new Algerian Government within 48 hours.

It may well be that the French Government did have evidence of the CIA's complicity. But in the unnatural world of international diplomacy, this would not necessarily lead to an unambiguous public announcement. Such a move could result in an open confrontation between France and the United States, a predicament both sides could be expected to take pains to avoid. Moreover, it might put the French in the position of having to do something about it. And what could they do? Breaking relations with the United States was not a realistic option; neither were the French in any position to retaliate economically or militarily. But French leaders were too angry to simply let the matter pass into obscurity. Thus, to complete the hypothetical scenario, they took the backdoor approach with all its shortcomings.

In a similar vein, the United States knew that the Russians, for at least one year, were intercepting telephone calls in the US of government and congressional officials, but said nothing publicly because it was unable to end the practice for technical reasons.¹⁷ And this concerned an "enemy", not an ally.

Between 1958 and the middle of the 1960s, there occurred some 30 serious assassination attempts upon the life of Charles de Gaulle, in addition to any number of planned attempts which didn't advance much beyond the planning stage.¹⁸ A world record for a

25. Ecuador 1960-1963

A textbook of dirty tricks

If the *Guinness Book of World Records* included a category for "cynicism", one could suggest the CIA's creation of "leftist" organizations which condemned poverty, disease, illiteracy, capitalism, and the United States in order to attract committed militants and their money away from legitimate leftist organizations.

The tiny nation of Ecuador in the early 1960s was, as it remains today, a classic of banana-republic underdevelopment; virtually at the bottom of the economic heap in South America; a society in which one percent of the population received an income comparable to United States upper-class standards, while two-thirds of the people had an average family income of about ten dollars per month—people simply outside the money economy, with little social integration or participation in the national life; a tale told many times in Latin America.

In September 1960, a new government headed by José María Velasco Ibarra came to power. Velasco had won a decisive electoral victory, running on a vaguely liberal, populist, something-for-everyone platform. He was no Fidel Castro, he was not even a socialist, but he earned the wrath of the US State Department and the CIA by his unyielding opposition to the two stated priorities of American policy in Ecuador: breaking relations with Cuba, and clamping down hard on activists of the Communist Party and those to their left.

Over the next three years, in pursuit of those goals, the CIA left as little as possible to chance. A veritable textbook on covert subversion techniques unfolded. In its pages could be found the following, based upon the experiences of Philip Agee, a CIA officer who spent this period in Ecuador.¹

Almost all political organizations of significance, from the far left to the far right, were infiltrated, often at the highest levels. Amongst other reasons, the left was infiltrated to channel young radicals away from support to Cuba and from anti-Americanism; the right, to instigate and co-ordinate activities along the lines of CIA priorities. If, at a point in time, there was no organization that appeared well-suited to serve a particular need, then one would be created.

Or a new group of "concerned citizens" would appear, fronted with noted personalities, which might place a series of notices in leading newspapers denouncing the penetration of the government by the extreme left and demanding a break with Cuba. Or one of the noted personalities would deliver a speech prepared by the CIA, and then a newspaper editor, or a well-known columnist, would praise it, both gentlemen being on the CIA payroll.

Some of these fronts had an actual existence; for others, even their existence was phoney. On one occasion, the CIA Officer who had created the non-existent "Ecuadorean Anti-Communist Front" was surprised to read in his morning paper that a real organization with that name had been founded. He changed the name of his organization to "Ecuadorean Anti-Communist Action".

Wooing the working class came in for special emphasis. An alphabet-soup of labor organizations, sometimes hardly more than names on stationery, were created, altered, combined, liquidated, and new ones created again, in an almost frenzied attempt to find the right combination to compete with existing left-oriented unions and take national leadership away from them. Union leaders were invited to attend various classes conducted by the CIA in Ecuador or in the United States, all expenses paid, in order to impart to them the dangers of communism to the union movement and to select potential agents.

head of state, it is said. In at least one of the attempts, the CIA may have been a co-conspirator against the French president. By the mid-1960s, differences between de Gaulle and Washington concerning NATO had almost reached the breaking point; in February 1966, he gave NATO and the United States a deadline to either place their military bases in France under French control or dismantle them.

In 1975, the *Chicago Tribune* featured a front-page story which read in part:

Congressional leaders have been told of Central Intelligence Agency involvement in a plot by French dissidents to assassinate the late French President Charles De Gaulle. Within the last two weeks, a CIA representative disclosed sketchy details of the scheme ... Sometime in the mid-1960s—probably in 1965 or 1966—dissidents in the De Gaulle government are said to have made contact with the CIA to seek help in a plot to murder the French leader. Which party instigated the contact was not clear ... According to the CIA briefing officers, discussions were held on how best to eliminate De Gaulle, who by then had become a thorn in the side of the Johnson administration because of his ouster of American military bases from French soil and his demands that United States forces be withdrawn from the Indochina War. Thus the following plan is said to have evolved after discussions between CIA personnel and the dissident French. There is, however, no evidence the plot got beyond the talking stage.

A hired assassin, armed with a poison ring, was to be slipped into a crowd of old soldiers of France when General De Gaulle was to be the host at a reception for them. The killer would make his appearance late in the day when it could be presumed De Gaulle's hand would be weary and perhaps even numb from shaking hundreds of hands. The assassin would clasp the general's hand in lethal friendship and De Gaulle would fail to detect the tiny pin prick of poison as it penetrated his flesh. The executioner would stroll off to become lost in the crowd as the poison began coursing through De Gaulle's veins either to his heart or brain, depending on the deadly poison used. How quickly death would come was not divulged, if that was even discussed at the time ...

In the outline presented to the congressional leaders, there is no hint of what the CIA's actual role might have been had the plot reached fruition.¹⁹

The dissidents involved in the alleged plot were embittered French army officers and former Algerian settlers who still bore deep resentment toward de Gaulle for having "sold out French honor" by his retreat from the North African colony.

There was no mention in the reported CIA testimony about any involvement of Lyndon Johnson, although it was well known that there was no love lost between Johnson and de Gaulle. The French leader was firmly convinced that the United States was behind the failure of his trip to South America in 1964. He believed that the CIA had used its network of agents in South America to prevent a big turnout of crowds.²⁰ There is some evidence to indicate that the General was not just paranoid. In 1970, Dr Alfred Stepan, a professor of political science at Yale, testified before Congress about his experience in South America in 1964 when he was a journalist for *The Economist*.

When De Gaulle was going to make his trip through Latin America, many of the Latin Americans interviewed [officers of various embassies] said that they were under very real pressure by various American groups not to be very warm towards De Gaulle, because we considered Latin America within the United States area of influence.²¹

After the appearance of the *Chicago Tribune* story, CIA Director William Colby confirmed that "foreigners" had approached the Agency with a plot to kill de Gaulle. The Agency rejected the idea, Colby said, but he did not know if the French government had been advised of the plot.²² It is not clear whether the incident referred to by Colby was related to the one discussed in the *Tribune*.

In the early evening of Monday, 9 November 1970, Charles de Gaulle died peacefully at the age of 80, sitting in his armchair watching a sentimental television serial called "Nanou".

This effort was not without its irony either. CIA agents would sometimes jealously vie with each other for the best positions in these CIA-created labor organizations; and at times Ecuadorean organizations would meet in "international conferences" with CIA labor fronts from other countries, with almost all of the participants blissfully unaware of who was who or what was what.

In Ecuador, as throughout most of Latin America, the Agency planted phoney anti-communist news items in co-operating newspapers. These items would then be picked up by other CIA stations in Latin America and disseminated through a CIA-owned news agency, a CIA-owned radio station, or through countless journalists being paid on a piece-work basis, in addition to the item being picked up unwittingly by other media, including those in the United States. Anti-communist propaganda and news distortion (often of the most far-fetched variety) written in CIA offices would also appear in Latin American newspapers as unsigned editorials of the papers themselves.

In virtually every department of the Ecuadorean government could be found men occupying positions, high and low, who collaborated with the CIA for money and/or their own particular motivation. At one point, the Agency could count amongst this number the men who were second and third in power in the country.

These government agents would receive the benefits of information obtained by the CIA through electronic eavesdropping or other means, enabling them to gain prestige and promotion, or consolidate their current position in the rough-and-tumble of Ecuadorean politics. A high-ranking minister of leftist tendencies, on the other hand, would be the target of a steady stream of negative propaganda from any or all sources in the CIA arsenal; staged demonstrations against him would further increase the pressure on the president to replace him.

The Postmaster-General, along with other post office employees, all members in good standing of the CIA Payroll Club, regularly sent mail arriving from Cuba and the Soviet bloc to the Agency for its perusal, while customs officials and the Director of Immigration kept the Agency posted on who went to or came from Cuba. When a particularly suitable target returned from Cuba, he would be searched at the airport and documents prepared by the CIA would be "found" on him. These documents, publicized as much as possible, might include instructions on "how to intensify hatred between classes", or some provocative language designed to cause a split in Communist Party ranks. Generally, the documents "vetted" the worst fears of the public about communist plans to take over Ecuador under the masterminding of Cuba or the Soviet Union; at the same time, perhaps, implicating an important Ecuadorean leftist whose head the Agency was after. Similar revelations, staged by CIA stations elsewhere in Latin America, would be publicized in Ecuador as a warning that Ecuador was next.

Agency financing of conservative groups in a quasi-religious campaign against Cuba and "atheistic communism" helped to seriously weaken President Velasco's power among the poor, primarily Indians, who had voted overwhelmingly for him, but who were even more deeply committed to their religion. If the CIA wished to know how the president was reacting to this campaign it need only turn to his physician, its agent, Dr. Felipe Ovalle, who would report that his patient was feeling considerable strain as a result.

CIA agents would bomb churches or right-wing organizations and make it appear to be the work of leftists. They would march in left-wing parades displaying signs and shouting slogans of a very provocative anti-military nature, designed to antagonize the armed forces and hasten a coup.

The Agency did not always get away clean with its dirty tricks. During the election

campaign, on 19 March 1960, two senior colonels who were the CIA's main liaison agents within the National Police participated in a riot aimed at disrupting a Velasco demonstration. Agency officer Bob Weatherwax was in the forefront directing the police during the riot in which five Velasco supporters were killed and many wounded. When Velasco took office, he had the two colonels arrested and Weatherwax was asked to leave the country.

CIA-supported activities were carried out without the knowledge of the American ambassador. When the Cuban Embassy publicly charged the Agency with involvement in various anti-Cuban activities, the American ambassador issued a statement that "had every-one in the [CIA] station smiling". Stated the ambassador: "The only agents in Ecuador who are paid by the United States are the technicians invited by the Ecuadorean government to contribute to raising the living standards of the Ecuadorean people."

Finally, in November 1961, the military acted. Velasco was forced to resign and was replaced by Vice-President Carlos Julio Arosemana. There were at this time two prime candidates for the vice-presidency. One was the vice-president of the Senate, a CIA agent. The other was the rector of Central University, a political moderate. The day that Congress convened to make their choice, a notice appeared in a morning paper announcing support for the rector by the Communist Party and a militant leftist youth organization. The notice had been placed by a columnist for the newspaper who was the principal propaganda agent for the CIA's Quito station. The rector was compromised rather badly, the denials came too late, and the CIA man won. His Agency salary was increased from \$700 to \$1,000 a month.

Arosemana soon proved no more acceptable to the CIA than Velasco. All operations continued, particularly the campaign to break relations with Cuba, which Arosemana steadfastly refused to do. The deadlock was broken in March 1962 when a military garrison, led by Col. Aurelio Naranjo, gave Arosemana 72 hours to send the Cubans packing and fire the leftist Minister of Labor. (There is no need to point out here who Naranjo's financial benefactor was.) Arosemana complied with the ultimatum, booting out the Czech and Polish delegations as well as at the behest of the new cabinet which had been forced upon him.

At the CIA station in Quito there was a champagne victory celebration. Elsewhere in Ecuador, people angry about the military's domination and desperate about their own lives, took to arms. But on this occasion, like others, it amounted to naught ... a small band of people, poorly armed and trained, infiltrated by agents, their every move known in advance—confronted by a battalion of paratroopers, superbly armed and trained by the United States. That was in the field. In press reports, the small band grew to hundreds; armed not only to the teeth, but with weapons from "outside the country" (read Cuba), and the whole operation very carefully planned at the Communist Party Congress the month before.

On 11 July 1963 the Presidential Palace in Quito was surrounded by tanks and troops. Arosemana was out, a junta was in. Their first act was to outlaw communism; "communists" and other "extreme" leftists were rounded up and jailed, the arrests campaign being facilitated by data from the CIA's Subversive Control Watch List. (Standard at many Agency stations, this list would include not only the subject's name, but the names and addresses of his relatives and friends and the places he frequented—anything to aid in tracking him down when the time came).

Civil liberties were suspended; the 1964 elections canceled; another tale told many times in Latin America.

And during these three years, what were the American people told about this witch's

brew of covert actions carried out, supposedly, in their name? Very little, if anything, if the *New York Times* is any index. Not once during the entire period, up to and including the coup, was any indication given in any article or editorial on Ecuador that the CIA or any other arm of the US government had played any role whatever in any event which had occurred in that country. This is the way the writings read even if one looks back at them with the advantage of knowledge and hindsight and reads between the lines.

There is a solitary exception. Following the coup, we find a tiny announcement on the very bottom of page 20 that Havana radio had accused the United States of instigating the military takeover.² The Cuban government had been making public charges about American activities in Ecuador regularly, but this was the first one to make the *New York Times*. The question must be asked: Why were these charges deemed unworthy of reporting or comment, let alone investigation?

26. The Congo 1960-1964

The assassination of Patrice Lumumba

Within days of its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, the land long known as the Belgian Congo, and later as Zaire, was engulfed in strife and chaos as multiple individuals, tribes, and political groups struggled for dominance or independence. For the next several years the world press chronicled the train of Congolese governments, the endless confusion of personalities and conspiracies, exotic place names like Stanleyville and Leopoldville, shocking stories of European hostages and white mercenaries, the brutality and the violence from all quarters with its racist overtones.

Into this disorder the Western powers were "naturally" drawn, principally Belgium to protect its vast mineral investments, and the United States, mindful of the fabulous wealth as well, and obsessed, as usual, with fighting "communism".

Successive American administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, looking through cold-war binoculars perceived an East-West battleground. The CIA station in the Congo cabled Washington in August that "Embassy and station believe Congo experiencing classic communist effort [to] takeover government." CIA Director Allen Dulles warned of a "communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences ... for the interests of a free world". At the same time, Dulles authorized a crash-program fund of up to \$100,000 to replace the existing government of Patrice Lumumba with a "pro-western group".¹

It's not known what criteria the CIA applied to determine that Lumumba's government was going communist, but we do know how the *Washington Post* arrived at the same conclusion:

Western diplomats see ... the part [of the Congo] controlled by volatile Premier Patrice Lumumba sliding slowly but surely into the Communist bloc. ... Apart from the fevered activity of Communist bloc nations here, the pattern of events is becoming apparent to students of Communist policy. Premier Lumumba's startling changes of position, his open challenge of the United Nations and Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, his constant agitation of the largely illiterate Congolese can be explained in no other way, veteran observers say.²

Years later, Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon told a Senate investigating committee (the Church committee) that the National Security Council and President Eisenhower

had believed in 1960 that Lumumba was a "very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world."³ This statement moved author Jonathan Kwitny to observe:

How far beyond the dreams of a barefoot jungle postal clerk in 1956, that in a few short years he would be *dangerous to the peace and safety of the world!* The perception seems insane, particularly coming from the National Security Council, which really does have the power to end all human life within hours.⁴

Patrice Lumumba became the Congo's first prime minister after his party received a plurality of the votes in national elections. He called for the nation's economic as well as political liberation and did not shy away from contact with socialist countries. At the Independence Day ceremonies he probably managed to alienate all the attending foreign dignitaries with his speech, which read in part:

Our lot was eighty years of colonial rule ... We have known tiring labor exacted in exchange for salary which did not allow us to satisfy our hunger ... We have known ironies, insults, blows which we had to endure morning, noon, and night because we were "Negroes" ... We have known that the law was never the same depending on whether it concerned a white or a Negro ... We have known the atrocious sufferings of those banished for political opinions or religious beliefs ... We have known that there were magnificent houses for the whites in the cities and tumble-down straw huts for the Negroes.⁵

In 1960, it must be borne in mind, this was indeed radical and inflammatory language in such a setting.

On 11 July, the province of Katanga—home to the bulk of the Congo's copper, cobalt, uranium, gold, and other mineral wealth—announced that it was seceding. Belgium, the principal owner of this fabulous wealth, never had any intention of giving up real control of the country, and it now supported the move for Katanga's independence, perceiving the advantage of having its investments housed in their own little country, not accountable to nor paying taxes to the central government in Leopoldville. Katanga, moreover, was led by Moïse Tshombe, a man eminently accommodating to, and respectful of, whites and their investments.

The Eisenhower administration supported the Belgian military intervention on behalf of Katanga; indeed, the American embassy had previously requested such intervention. Influencing this policy, in addition to Washington's ideological aversion to Lumumba, was the fact that a number of prominent administration officials had financial ties to the Katanga wealth.⁶

The Belgian intervention, which was a very violent one, was denounced harshly by the Soviet Union, as well as many countries from the Afro-Asian bloc, leading the UN Security Council on the 14th to authorize the withdrawal of Belgian troops and their replacement by a United Nations military force. This was fine with the United States, for the UN under Dag Hammarskjöld was very closely allied to Washington. The UN officials who led the Congo operation were Americans, in secret collaboration with the State Department, and in exclusion of the Soviet bloc; the latter's citizens who worked at the UN Secretariat were kept from seeing the Congo cables. Hammarskjöld himself was quite hostile toward Lumumba.⁷

The UN force entered Katanga province and replaced the Belgian troops, but made no effort to end the secession. Unable to put down this uprising on his own, as well as one in another province, Lumumba had appealed to the United Nations as well as the United States to supply him with transport for his troops. When they both refused, he turned to the

Soviet Union for aid, and received it,⁸ though military success still eluded him.

The Congo was in turmoil in many places. In the midst of it, on 5 September, President Joseph Kasavubu suddenly dismissed Lumumba as prime minister—a step of very debatable legality, taken with much American encouragement and assistance, as Kasavubu “sat at the feet of the CIA men”.⁹ The action was taken, said the Church committee later, “despite the strong support for Lumumba in the Congolese Parliament.”¹⁰

During the early 1960s, according to a highly-placed CIA executive, the Agency “regularly bought and sold Congolese politicians”.¹¹ US diplomatic sources subsequently confirmed that Kasavubu was amongst the recipients.¹²

Hammarskjöld publicly endorsed the dismissal before the Security Council, and when Lumumba tried to broadcast his case to the Congolese people, UN forces closed the radio station. Instead, he appeared before the legislature, and by dint of his formidable powers of speech, both houses of Parliament voted to reaffirm him as prime minister. But he could taste the fruits of his victory for only a few days, for on the 14th, army strongman Joseph Mobutu took power in a military coup.

Even during this period, with Lumumba not really in power, “CIA and high Administration officials continued to view him as a threat” ... his “talents and dynamism appear [to be the] overriding factor in reestablishing his position each time it seems half lost” ... “Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the ability to stir masses of people to action” ... “if he ... started to talk to a battalion of the Congolese Army he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes” ...¹³

In late September, the CIA sent one of its scientists, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, to the Congo carrying “lethal biological material” (a virus) specifically intended for use in Lumumba’s assassination. The virus, which was supposed to produce a fatal disease indigenous to the Congo area of Africa, was transported via diplomatic pouch.¹⁴

In 1975, the Church committee went on record with the conclusion that Allen Dulles had ordered Lumumba’s assassination as “an urgent and prime objective” (Dulles’s words).¹⁵ After hearing the testimony of several officials who believed that the order to kill the African leader had emanated originally from President Eisenhower, the committee decided that there was a “reasonable inference” that this was indeed the case.¹⁶

As matters evolved in the Congo, the virus was never used, for the CIA’s Congo station was unable to come up with “a secure enough agent with the right access” to Lumumba before the potency of the biological material was no longer reliable.¹⁷

The Church committee observed, however, that the CIA station in Leopoldville

continued to maintain close contact with Congolese who expressed a desire to assassinate Lumumba. CIA officers encouraged and offered to aid these Congolese in their efforts against Lumumba, although there is no evidence that aid was ever provided for the specific purpose of assassination.¹⁸

Fearing for his life, Lumumba was on the run. For a while he was protected from Mobutu by the United Nations, which, under considerable international pressure, had been forced to put some distance between itself and Washington.¹⁹ But on 1 December, Lumumba was taken into custody by Mobutu’s troops. A 28 November CIA cable indicates that the Agency was involved in tracking down the charismatic Congo leader. The cable spoke of the CIA station working with the Congolese government to get the roads blocked and troops alerted to close a possible escape route of Lumumba’s.²⁰

The United States had also been involved in the takeover of government by Mobutu—

whom author and CIA-confidant Andrew Tully described as having been “discovered” by the CIA.²¹ Mobutu detained Lumumba until 17 January 1961 when he transferred his prisoner into the hands of Moïse Tshombe of Katanga province, Lumumba’s bitter enemy. Lumumba was assassinated the same day.

In 1978, former CIA Africa specialist John Stockwell related in his book how a ranking Agency officer had told him of driving around with Lumumba’s body in the trunk of his car, “trying to decide what to do with it”.²² What he did do with it has not yet been made public.

During the period of Lumumba’s imprisonment, US diplomats in the Congo were pursuing a policy of “deploring” his beatings and trying to secure “humane treatment” for him, albeit due to “considerations of international opinion and not from tender feelings toward him”.²³ The immediate and the long-term effect of Lumumba’s murder was to make him the martyr and symbol of anti-imperialism all over Africa and elsewhere in the Third World which such American officials had feared. Even Mobutu later felt compelled to build a memorial to his victim.

Without a clearcut “communist” enemy like Lumumba, the Kennedy administration, which came to power on 20 January 1961, was very divided on the Katanga question. Although the United States wound up supporting—in the name of Congolese stability—the UN military operation in the summer to suppress the secession, Tshombe had outspoken support in the US Congress, and sentiment amongst officials at the State Department and the White House mirrored this division. The sundry economic and diplomatic ties of these officials appear to have been more diverse and contradictory than under the Eisenhower administration, and this is reflected in the lack of a unified policy. However, according to Kennedy adviser and biographer, Arthur Schlesinger, opinions on both sides of the issue were expressed in terms of hindering supposed malevolent Soviet/communist designs in the Congo.²⁴

In an even more marked policy division, US Air Force C-130s were flying Congolese troops and supplies against the Katangese rebels, while at the same time the CIA and its covert colleagues in the Pentagon were putting together an air armada of heavy transport aircraft, along with mercenary units, to aid the very same rebels.²⁵ (This marked at least the third instance of the CIA acting in direct military opposition to another arm of the US government.)²⁶

Washington officials were more in unison when dealing with another prominent leftist—Antoine Gizenga, who had been Vice-Prime Minister under Lumumba. Following the latter’s dismissal, according to the Church committee, the CIA station chief in the Congo, Lawrence Devlin, urged “a key Congolese leader” (presumably Mobutu) to “arrest” or undertake a “more permanent disposal of Lumumba, Gizenga, and Mulele.” (Pierre Mulele was another Lumumba lieutenant.)²⁷ Gizenga was in fact arrested shortly after Mobutu took power, but a UN contingent from Ghana, whose leader, Kwame Nkrumah, was Lumumba’s ally, intervened and freed him.²⁸

In the continuous musical-chairs game of Congolese politics, the first of August 1961 found Gizenga as the Vice-Prime Minister under one Cyrille Adoula. By the end of the month, Gizenga was as well, and simultaneously, the leader of a rebel force that had set up a regime in the Stanleyville area which it proclaimed as the legitimate government of the entire Congo. He fancied himself the political and spiritual successor to Lumumba.

The Soviet Union may have believed Gizenga, for apparently they were sending him arms and money, using Sudan, which borders the Congo on the north, as a conduit. When

the CIA learned that a Czech ship was bound for Sudan with a cargo of guns disguised as Red Cross packages for refugee relief in the Congo, the Agency turned to its most practiced art, bribery, to persuade a crane operator to let one of the crates drop upon arrival. On that day, the dockside was suddenly covered with new Soviet Kalashnikov rifles. Through an equally clever play at the Khartoum (Sudan) airport, the CIA managed to separate a Congolese courier from his suitcase of Soviet money destined for Gizenga.²⁹

The State Department, meanwhile, was, in its own words,

urging Adoula to ... dismiss Gizenga and declare him in rebellion against the national government so that police action can now be taken against him. We are also urging the U.N. to take military action to break his rebellion ... We are making every effort to keep Gizenga isolated from potential domestic and foreign support ... We have taken care to insure that this [US] aid has been channelled through the central government in order to provide the economic incentive to encourage support for that government.³⁰

The CIA was supplying arms and money to Adoula's supporters, as well as to Mobutu's,³¹ Adoula, who had a background of close ties to both the American labor movement and the CIA international labor movement (via the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions—see British Guiana chapter), was chosen to be prime minister instead of Gizenga by a parliamentary conference during which the parliamentarians were bribed by the CIA and even by the United Nations. A subsequent CIA memorandum was apparently paying tribute to this when it stated: "The U.N. and the United States, in closely coordinated activities, played essential roles in this significant success over Gizenga."³²

In January 1962, United Nations forces with strong American backing ousted Gizenga and his followers from Stanleyville, and a year later finally forced Tshombe to end his secession in Katanga. These actions were carried out in the name of "uniting the Congo", as if this were a matter to be decided by other than Congolese. Never before had the UN engaged in such offensive military operations, and the world organization was criticized in various quarters for having exceeded its charter. In any event, the operations served only to temporarily slow down the dreary procession of changing leaders, attempted coups, autonomous armies, shifting alliances, and rebellions.

Adding an ironic and absurd touch to the American Congo policy, three months after the successful action against Gizenga, Allen Dulles (thanks to the Bay of Pigs, now the former Director of the CIA) informed a television audience that the United States had "over-rated the danger" of Soviet involvement ... "It looked as though they were going to make a serious attempt at takeover in the Belgian Congo, well it did not work out that way at all."³³

Nonetheless, by the middle of 1964, when rebellion—by the heirs of Lumumba and Gizenga—was more widespread and furious than ever and the collapse of the central government appeared as a real possibility, the United States was pouring in a prodigious amount of military aid to the Leopoldville regime. In addition to providing arms and planes, Washington dispatched some 100 to 200 military and technical personnel to the Congo to aid government troops, and the CIA was conducting a paramilitary campaign against the insurgents in the eastern part of the country.³⁴

The government was now headed by none other than Moïse Tshombe, a man called "Africa's most unpopular African" for his widely-recognized role in the murder of the popular Lumumba and for his use of white mercenaries, many of them South Africans and Rhodesians, during his secession attempt in Katanga. Tshombe defended the latter action by

explaining that his troops would not fight without white officers.³⁵

Tshombe once again called upon his white mercenary army, numbering 400 to 500 men, and the CIA called upon its own mercenaries as well, a band which included Americans, Cuban-exile veterans of the Bay of Pigs, Rhodesians, and South Africans, the latter having been recruited with the help of the South African government. "Bringing in our own animals" was the way one CIA operative described the operation. The Agency's pilots carried out regular bombing and strafing missions against the insurgents, although some of the Cubans were reported to be troubled at being ordered to make indiscriminate attacks upon civilians.³⁶ Looking back at the affair in 1966, the *New York Times* credited the CIA with having created "an instant air force" in the Congo.³⁷

When China protested to the United States about the use of American pilots in the Congo, the State Department issued an explicit denial, then publicly reversed itself, but insisted that the Americans were flying "under contract with the Congolese government". The next day, the Department said that the flights would stop, after having obtained assurances from "other arms of the [U.S.] Government", although it still held to the position that the matter was one between the Congolese government and civilian individuals who were not violating American law.³⁸

The Congolese against whom this array of military might was brought to bear were a coalition of forces. Some of the leading figures had spent time in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union or China and were receiving token amounts of arms and instruction from those countries; but they were never necessarily in the communist camp any more than the countless Third Worlders who have gone to university in the United States and have been courted afterwards are necessarily in the Western/capitalist camp. (This does not hold for professional military officers who, unlike students, tend to be a particularly homogeneous group—conservative, authoritarian, and anti-communist.)

Africa scholar M. Crawford Young has observed that amongst the coalition leadership, "The destruction of the [Leopoldville] regime, a vigorous reassertion of Congolese control over its own destiny, and a vague socialist commitment were recurrent themes. But at bottom it appeared far more a frame of mind and a style of expression, than an interrelated set of ideas."³⁹ The rebels had no revolutionary program they could, or did, proclaim.

Co-existing with this element within the coalition were currents of various esoteric churches, messianic sects, witch-finding movements, and other occult inspirations as well as plain opportunists. Many believed that the magic of their witch doctors would protect them against bullets. One of their leaders, Pierre Mulele, was a quasi-Catholic who baptized his followers in his own urine to also make them immune to bullets. The insurgents were further divided along tribal lines and were rent by debilitating factionalism. No single group or belief could dominate.⁴⁰

"Rebel success created the image of unified purpose and revolutionary promise," wrote Young. "Only in its subsequent phase of decay and disintegration" did the coalition's "dramatic lack of cohesion" and "disparity in purpose and perception" become fully evident.⁴¹

The *New York Times* addressed the question of the coalition's ideology as follows:

There is evidence that most supporters of the Stanleyville regime have no ideological commitment but are mainly Congolese who are disillusioned with the corruption and irresponsibility that has characterized the Leopoldville regimes. The rebel leaders have received advice and money from Communists but few if any of the rebels consider themselves Communists. It is probable that few have heard of Karl Marx.⁴²

In the coalition-controlled area of Stanleyville, between 2,000 and 3,000 white foreign-

ers found themselves trapped by the war. One of the rebel leaders, Christopher Gbenye, conditioned their safe release upon various military concessions, principally a cessation of American bombing, but negotiations failed to produce an agreement.⁴³

Instead, on 24 November 1964, the United States and Belgium staged a dramatic rescue mission in which over 500 Belgian paratroopers were dropped at dawn into Stanleyville, but from American transport planes. Much chaos followed, and the reports are conflicting, but it appears that more than 2,000 hostages were rescued, in the process of which the fleeing rebels massacred about 100 others and dragged several hundred more into the bush.

American and Belgian officials took great pains to emphasize the purely "humanitarian" purpose of the mission. However, the rescuers simultaneously executed a key military maneuver when they "seized the strategic points of the city and coordinated their operation with the advancing columns of Tshombe's mercenary army that was moving swiftly towards the city."⁴⁴ Moreover, in the process of the rescue, the rescuers killed dozens of rebels and did nothing to curtail Tshombe's troops when they reached Stanleyville and began an "orgy of looting and killing."⁴⁵

Tshombe may have provided a reminder of the larger-than-humanitarian stake at hand in the Congo when, in the flush of the day's success, he talked openly with a correspondent of *The Times* of London who reported that Tshombe "was confident that the fall of Stanleyville would give a new impetus to the economy and encourage investors. It would reinforce a big development plan announced this morning in collaboration with the United States, Britain and West Germany."⁴⁶

The collapse of the rebels' stronghold in Stanleyville marked the beginning of the end for their cause. By spring 1965 their fortune was in sharp decline, and the arrival of about 100 Cuban revolutionaries, amongst whom was Che Guevara himself, had no known effect upon the course of events. Several months later, Guevara returned to Cuba in disgust at the low level of revolutionary zeal exhibited by the Congolese guerrillas and the local populace.⁴⁷

The concluding tune for the musical chairs was played in November, when Joseph Mobutu overthrew Tshombe and Kasavubu. Mobutu, later to adopt the name Mobutu Sese Seko, has ruled with a heavy dictatorial hand ever since.

In the final analysis, it mattered precious little to the interests of the US government whether the forces it had helped defeat were really "communist" or not, by whatever definition. The working premise was that there was now fixed in power, over a more-or-less unified Congo, a man who would be more co-operative with the CIA in its African adventures and with Western capital, and less accessible to the socialist bloc, than the likes of Lumumba, Gizenga, et al. would have been. The CIA has chalked this one up as a victory.

What the people of the Congo (now Zaire) won is not clear. Under Mobutu, terror and repression became facts of daily life, civil liberties and other human rights were markedly absent. The country remains one of the poorest to be found anywhere despite its vast natural riches. Mobutu, however, is reputed to be one of the richest heads of state in the world. (See Zaire chapter.)

William Arwood, US Ambassador to Kenya in 1964-65, who played a part in the hostage negotiations, also saw the US role in the Congo in a positive light. Bemoaning African suspicions toward American motives there, he wrote: "It was hard to convince people that we had provided the Congo with \$420 million in aid since independence just to

prevent chaos; they couldn't believe any country could be that altruistic."⁴⁸

Arwood's comment is easier to understand when one realizes that the word "chaos" has long been used by American officials to refer to a situation over which the United States has insufficient control to assure that someone distinctly pro-Western will remain in, or come to, power. When President Eisenhower, for example, decided to send troops into Lebanon in 1958, he saw it as a move, he later wrote, "to stop the trend towards chaos."⁴⁹

27. Brazil 1961-1964

Introducing the marvelous new world of Death Squads

When the leading members of the US diplomatic mission in Brazil held a meeting one day in March 1964, they arrived at the consensus that President João Goulart's support of social and economic reforms was a contrived and thinly veiled vehicle to seize dictatorial power.¹

The American ambassador, Lincoln Gordon, informed the State Department that "a desperate lunge [by Goulart] for totalitarian power might be made at any time."²

The Brazilian army chief of staff, General Humberto de Alencar Castelo (or Castello) Branco, provided the American Embassy with a memorandum in which he stated his fear that Goulart was seeking to close down Congress and initiate a dictatorship.³

Within a week after the expression of these concerns, the Brazilian military, with Castelo Branco at its head, overthrew the constitutional government of President Goulart, the culmination of a conspiratorial process in which the American Embassy had been intimately involved. The military then proceeded to install and maintain for two decades one of the most brutal dictatorships in all of South America.

What are we to make of all this? The idea that men of rank and power lie to the public is commonplace, not worthy of debate. But do they as readily lie to each other? Is their need to rationalize their misdeeds so great that they provide each other a moral shoulder to lean on? "Men use thoughts only to justify their injustices," wrote Voltaire, "and speech only to conceal their thoughts."

The actual American motivation in supporting the coup was something rather less heroic than preserving democracy, even mundane as such matters go. American opposition to Goulart, who became president in 1961, rested upon a familiar catalogue of complaints:

US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara questioned Brazil's neutral stand in foreign policy. The Brazilian ambassador in Washington, Roberto Campos, responded that "neutrality" was an inadequate term and explained that "what was involved was really a deep urge of the Brazilian people to assert their personality in world affairs."⁴

American officials did not approve of some of the members of Goulart's cabinet, and said so. Ambassador Campos pointed out to them that it was "quite inappropriate" for the United States "to try to influence the composition of the cabinet."⁵

Attorney-General Robert Kennedy met with Goulart and expressed his uneasiness about the Brazilian president allowing "communists" to hold positions in government agencies. (Bobby was presumably acting on the old and very deep-seated American belief that once you welcome one or two communists into your parlor, they take over the whole house and sign the deed over to Moscow.) Goulart did not see this as a danger. He replied that he

was in full control of the situation, later remarking to Campos that it was as if he had been told that he had no capacity for judging the men around him.⁶

The American Defense Attaché in Brazil, Col. Vernon Walters, reported that Goulart showed favoritism towards "ultra-nationalist" military officers over "pro-U.S." officers. Goulart saw it as promoting those officers who appeared to be most loyal to his government. He was, as it happens, very concerned about American-encouraged military coups and said so explicitly to President Kennedy.⁷

Goulart considered purchasing helicopters from Poland because Washington was delaying on his request to purchase them from the United States. Ambassador Gordon told him that he "could not expect the United States to like it".⁸

The Goulart administration, moreover, passed a law limiting the amount of profits multinationals could transmit out of the country, and a subsidiary of ITT was nationalized. Compensation for the takeover was slow in coming because of Brazil's precarious financial position, but these were the only significant actions taken against US corporate interests.

Inextricably woven into all these complaints, yet at the same time standing apart, was Washington's dismay with Brazil's "drift to the left" ... the communist/leftist influence in the labor movement ... leftist "infiltration" wherever one looked ... "anti-Americanism" among students and others (the American Consul General in São Paulo suggested to the State Department that the United States "found competing student organizations") ... the general erosion of "U.S. influence and the power of people and groups friendly to the United States"⁹ ... one might go so far as to suggest that Washington officials felt unloved, were it not for the fact that the coup, as they well knew from much past experience, could result only in intensified anti-Americanism all over Latin America.

Goulart's predecessor, Jânio da Silva Quadros, had also irritated Washington. "Why should the United States trade with Russia and her satellites but insist that Brazil trade only with the United States?" he asked, and proceeded to negotiate with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries to (re)establish diplomatic and commercial relations. He was, in a word, independent.¹⁰

Quadros was also more-or-less a conservative who clamped down hard on unions, sent federal troops to the northeast hunger dens to squash protest, and jailed disobedient students.¹¹ But the American ambassador at the time, John Moors Cabot, saw fit to question Brazil's taking part in a meeting of "uncommitted" (non-aligned) nations. "Brazil has signed various obligations with the United States and American nations," he said. "I am sure Brazil is not going to forget her obligations ... It is committed. It is a fact. Brazil can uncommit itself if it wants."¹²

In early 1961, shortly after Quadros took office, he was visited by Adolf Berle, Jr., President Kennedy's adviser on Latin American affairs and formerly ambassador to Brazil. Berle had come as Kennedy's special envoy to solicit Quadros's backing for the impending Bay of Pigs invasion. Ambassador Cabot was present and some years later described the meeting to author Peter Bell. Bell has written:

Ambassador Cabot remembers a "stormy conversation" in which Berle stated the United States had \$300 million in reserve for Brazil and in effect "offered it as a bribe" for Brazilian cooperation ... Quadros became "visibly irritated" after Berle refused to heed his third "no". No Brazilian official was at the airport the next day to see the envoy off.¹³

Quadros, who had been elected by a record margin, was, like Goulart, accused of seeking to set up a dictatorship because he sought to put teeth into measures unpopular with the oligarchy, the military, and/or the United States, as well as pursuing a "pro-communist"

foreign policy. After but seven months in office he suddenly resigned, reportedly under military pressure, if not outright threat. In his letter of resignation, he blamed his predicament on "reactionaries" and "the ambitions of groups of individuals, some of whom are foreigners ... the terrible forces that arose against me."¹⁴

A few months later, Quadros reappeared, to deliver a speech in which he named Berle, Cabot, and US Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon as being among those who had contributed to his downfall. Dillon, he said, sought to mix foreign policy with Brazil's needs for foreign credits.¹⁵ (Both Berle and Cabot had been advocates of the 1954 overthrow of Guatemalan President Arbenz, whose sins, in Washington's eyes, were much the same as those Goulart was now guilty of.)¹⁶ At the same time, Quadros announced his intention to lead a "people's crusade" against the "reactionaries, the corrupt and the Communists".¹⁷

As Quadros's vice president, Goulart succeeded to the presidency in August 1961 despite a virtual coup and civil war initiated by segments of the military to block him because he was seen as some sort of dangerous radical. Only the intervention of loyalist military units and other supporters of the constitutional process allowed Goulart to take office.¹⁸ The military opposition to Goulart arose, it should be noted, before he had the opportunity to exhibit his alleged tendencies toward dictatorship. Indeed, as early as 1954, the military had demonstrated its antipathy toward him by forcing President Vargas to fire him from his position as Minister of Labor.¹⁹ The American doubts about Goulart also predated his presidency. In 1960, when Goulart was elected vice president, "concern at the State Department and the Pentagon turned to panic" according to an American official who served in Brazil.²⁰

Goulart tried to continue Quadros's independent foreign policy. His government went ahead with resumption of relations with socialist countries, and at a meeting of the Organization of American States in December 1961 Brazil abstained on a vote to hold a special session aimed at discussing "the Cuban problem", and stood strongly opposed to sanctions against the Castro government.²¹ A few months later, speaking before the US Congress, Goulart affirmed Brazil's right to take its own stand on some of the cold-war issues. He declared that Brazil identified itself "with the democratic principles which unite the peoples of the West", but was "not part of any politico-military bloc".²²

Time magazine, in common with most US media, had (has) a difficult time understanding the concept and practice of independence amongst America's allies. In November 1961, the magazine wrote that Brazil's domestic politics were "confused" and that the country was "also adrift in foreign affairs. Goulart is trying to play the old Quadros game of international 'independence', which means wooing the East while panhandling from the West." *Time* was critical of Goulart in that he had sought an invitation to visit Washington and on the same day he received it he "called in Communist Poland's visiting Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, [and] awarded him the Order of the Southern Cross—the same decoration that Quadros hung on Cuba's Marxist mastermind, Che Guevara".²³

Former *Time* editor and Latin America correspondent, John Gerassi, commented that every visiting foreign dignitary received this medal, the *Cruzeiro do Sul*, as part of protocol. He added:

Apparently *Time* thinks that any President who wants to visit us must necessarily hate our enemies as a consequence, and is "confused" whenever this does not occur. But, of course, *Time* magazine is so unused to the word "independent" that an independent foreign policy must be very confusing indeed. In South America, where everyone would like to follow an independent foreign policy but where only Brazil has, at times, the courage, no one was confused.²⁴

Goulart, a millionaire land-owner and a Catholic who wore a medal of the Virgin around his neck, was no more a communist than was Quadros, and he strongly supported the United States during the "Cuban Missile Crisis" of October 1962. He offered Ambassador Gordon a toast "To the Yankee Victory!"²⁵ Perhaps unaware that only three weeks earlier, during federal and state elections in Brazil, CIA money had been liberally expended in support of anti-Goulart candidates. Former CIA officer Philip Agee has stated that the Agency spent between 12 and 20 million dollars on behalf of hundreds of candidates.²⁶ Lincoln Gordon says the funding came to no more than 5 million.²⁷

In addition to the direct campaign contributions, the CIA dipped into its bag of dirty tricks to torment the campaigns of leftist candidates.²⁸ At the same time, the Agency for International Development (AID), at the express request of President Kennedy, was allocating monies to projects aimed at benefiting chosen gubernatorial candidates.²⁹ While Goulart was president, no new US economic assistance was given to the central government, while regional assistance was provided on a markedly ideological basis. When the military took power, this pattern was sharply altered.³⁰

Agee adds that the CIA carried out a consistent propaganda campaign against Goulart which dated from at least the 1962 election operation and which included the financing of mass urban demonstrations, "proving the old themes of God, country, family and liberty to be as effective as ever" in undermining a government.³¹

CIA money also found its way to a chain of right-wing newspapers, Diarias Associadas, to promote anti-communism; for the distribution of 50 thousand books of similar politics to high school and college students; and for the formation of women's groups with their special Latin mother's emphasis on the godlessness of the communist enemy. The women and other CIA operatives also went into the rumor-mongering business, spreading stories about outrages Goulart and his cronies were supposed to be planning, such as altering the constitution so as to extend his term, and gossip about Goulart being a cuckold and a wife-beater.³²

All this to overthrow a man who, in April 1962, had received a ticker-tape parade in New York City, was warmly welcomed at the White House by President Kennedy, and had addressed a joint session of Congress.

The intraservice confrontation which had attended Goulart's accession to power apparently kept a rein on coup-minded officers until 1963. In March of that year the CIA informed Washington, but not Goulart, of a plot by conservative officers.³³ During the course of the following year, the plots thickened. Brazilian military officers could not abide by Goulart's attempts at populist social reforms, though his program was timid, his rhetoric generally mild, and his actions seldom matched either. (He himself pointed out that General Douglas MacArthur had carried out a more radical distribution of land in Japan after the Second World War than anything planned by the Brazilian Government.) The military men were particularly incensed at Goulart's support of a weakening of military discipline and his attempts to build up a following among non-commissioned officers.³⁴ This the president was genuinely serious about because of his "paranoia" about a coup.

Goulart's wooing of NCOs and his appeals to the population over the heads of a hostile Congress and state governors (something President Reagan later did on several occasions) were the kind of tactics his enemies labeled as dictatorial.

In early 1964, disclosed *Fortune* magazine after the coup, an emissary was sent by some of the military plotters "to ask U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon what the U.S. position would be if civil war broke out". The emissary "reported back that Gordon was cau-

tious and diplomatic, but he left the impression that if the [plotters] could hold out for forty-eight hours they would get U.S. recognition and help."³⁵

The primary American contact with the conspirators was Defense Attaché Vernon Walters who arrived in Brazil after having been apprised that President Kennedy would not be averse to the overthrow of João Goulart.³⁶ Walters, who later became Deputy Director of the CIA, had an intimacy with leading Brazilian military officers, particularly General Castelo Branco, going back to World War II when Walters had served as interpreter for the Brazilian Expeditionary Force then fighting in Italy with the Allies. Brazil was the only Latin American country to send ground combat troops to the war, and it allowed the United States to build huge aircraft staging bases on its territory.³⁷ The relationship between US and Brazilian officers was continued and enhanced after the war by the creation of the Higher War College (*Escola Superior de Guerra*) in Rio de Janeiro in 1949. Latin America historian Thomas E. Skidmore has observed:

Under the U.S.-Brazilian military agreements of the early 1950s, the U.S. Army received exclusive rights to render assistance in the organization and operation of the college, which had been modeled on the National War College in Washington. In view of the fact that the Brazilian War College became a rallying point for leading military opponents of civilian populist politicians, it would be worth examining the extent to which the strongly anti-Communist ideology—bordering on an anti-political attitude—[of certain officers] was reinforced (or moderated?) by their frequent contacts with United States officers.³⁸

There was, moreover, the ongoing US Military Assistance Program, which Ambassador Gordon described as a "major vehicle for establishing close relationships with personnel of the armed forces" and "a highly important factor in influencing [the Brazilian] military to be pro-US."³⁹

A week before the coup, Castelo Branco, who emerged as the leader of the conspirators, gave Walters a copy of a paper he had written which was in effect a justification for a military coup, another variation on the theme of upholding the constitution by preventing Goulart from instituting a dictatorship.⁴⁰

To Lincoln Gordon and other American officials, civil war appeared a real possibility as the result of a coup attempt. As the scheduled day approached, contingency plans were set up.

A large quantity of petroleum would be sent to Brazil and made available to the insurgent officers, an especially vital commodity if Goulart supporters in the state oil union were to blow up or control the refineries.⁴¹

A US Navy task force would be dispatched to Brazilian coastal waters, the presence of which would deliver an obvious message to opponents of the coup.⁴²

Arms and ammunition would be sent to Branco's forces to meet their fighting needs.⁴³ Concerned that the coup attempt might be met by a general strike, Washington discussed with Gordon the possible need "for the U.S. to mount a large material program to assure the success of the takeover."⁴⁴ The conspirators had already requested economic aid from the United States, in the event of their success, to get the government and economy moving again, and had received a generally favorable response.⁴⁵

At the same time, Gordon sent word to some anti-Goulart state governors emphasizing the necessity, from the American point of view, that the new regime have a claim to legitimacy. The ambassador also met with former president Juscelino Kubitschek to urge him to take a stronger position against Goulart and to use his considerable influence to "swing a large congressional group and thereby influence the legitimacy issue".⁴⁶

Of the American contingency measures, indications are that it was the naval show of force—which, it turned out, included an aircraft carrier, destroyers, and guided missiles—which most encouraged the Brazilian military plotters or convinced those still wavering in their commitment.⁴⁷

Another actor in the unfolding drama was the American Institute for Free Labor Development. The AIFLD came formally into being in 1961 and was technically under the direction of the American labor movement (AFL-CIO), but was soon being funded almost exclusively by the US government (AID) and serving consistently as a CIA instrument in most countries of Latin America. In May 1963, the AIFLD founded the *Instituto Cultural Trabalhista* in Brazil which, over the next few years, gave courses to more than 7,000 union leaders and members.⁴⁸ Other Brazilians went to the United States for training. When they returned to Brazil, said AIFLD executive William Doherty, Jr., some of them:

became intimately involved in some of the clandestine operations of the revolution before it took place on April 1. What happened in Brazil on April 1 did not just happen—it was planned—and planned months in advance. Many of the trade union leaders—some of whom were actually trained in our institute—were involved in the revolution, and in the overthrow of the Goulart regime.⁴⁹

Doherty did not spell out any details of the AIFLD role in the coup (or revolution as he called it), although *Reader's Digest* later reported that one of the AIFLD-trained labor leaders set up courses for communication workers in combating communism in the labor movement in Brazil, and "After every class he quietly warned key workers of coming trouble and urged them to keep communications going no matter what happened."⁵⁰ Additionally, Richard Martinez, an unwitting CIA contract employee who was sent to Brazil to work with the Agency's Post, Telegraph and Telephone Workers International (formerly Doherty's domain), has revealed that his field workers in Brazil burned down Communist Party headquarters at the time of the coup.⁵¹

The coup began on 31 March 1964 with the advance upon Rio de Janeiro and tanks. Officers obtained the support of some units of enlisted men by telling them they were heading for the city to secure it against Goulart's enemies. But at the main air force base Goulart enlisted men, hearing of the move toward Rio, seized the base and put their officers under arrest. Indecision and cold feet intervened, however, and what might have reversed the course of events instead came to nought. Other military units loyal to Goulart took actions elsewhere, but these too fizzled out.⁵²

Here and there a scattering of workers went out on strike; several short-lived, impotent demonstrations took place, but there was little else. A number of labor leaders and radicals were rounded up on the orders of certain state governors; those who were opposed to what was happening were not prepared for violent resistance; in one incident a group of students staged a protest—some charged up the stairs of an Army organization, but the guard fired into their midst, killing two of them and forcing the others to fall back.⁵³

Most people counted on loyal armed forces to do their duty, or waited for the word from Goulart. Goulart, however, was unwilling to give the call for a civil war; he did not want to be responsible, he said, for bloodshed amongst Brazilians, and fled to Uruguay.⁵⁴

Lincoln Gordon cabled Washington the good news, suggesting the "avoidance of a jubilant posture". He described the coup as "a great victory for the free world", adding, in a remark that might have had difficulty getting past the lips of even John Foster Dulles, that without the coup there could have been a "total loss to the West of all South American Republics". Following a victory parade in Rio on 2 April by those pleased with the coup—the March of Family with God for Liberty—Gordon informed the State Department that the

"only unfortunate note was the obviously limited participation in the march of the lower classes."⁵⁵

His cable work done, the former Harvard professor turned his attention back to trying to persuade the Brazilian Congress to bestow a seal of "legitimacy" upon the new government.⁵⁶

Two years later, Gordon was to be questioned by a senator during hearings to consider his nomination as Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. "I am particularly concerned," said the senator, "with the part you may have played, if any, in encouraging, promoting, or causing that overthrow."

Said Lincoln Gordon: "The answer to that, senator, is very simple. The movement which overthrew President Goulart was a purely, 100 percent—not 99.44—but 100 percent purely Brazilian movement. Neither the American Embassy nor I personally played any part in the process whatsoever."⁵⁷

Gordon's boss, Dean Rusk, was not any more forthcoming. When asked about Cuban charges that the United States was behind the coup, the Secretary of State responded: "Well, there is just not one iota of truth in this. It's just not so in any way, shape, or form."⁵⁸ While Attorney General Robert Kennedy's view of the affair, stated to Gordon, was: "Well, Goulart got what was coming to him. Too bad he didn't follow the advice we gave him when I was there."⁵⁹

Gordon artfully combined fast talk with omission of certain key facts about Brazilian politics—his summary of Goulart's rise and fall made no mention at all of the military's move to keep him from taking office in 1961—to convince the assembled senators that Goulart was indeed seeking to set up a personal dictatorship.⁶⁰

Depending on the setting, either "saving Brazil from dictatorship" or "saving Brazil from communism" was advanced as the rationale for what took place in 1964. (General Andrew O'Meara, head of the US Southern [Latin America] Command, had it both ways. He told a House committee that "The coming to power of the Castelo Branco government in Brazil last April saved that country from an immediate dictatorship which could only have been followed by Communist domination.")⁶¹

The rescue-from-communism position was especially difficult to support, the problem being that the communists in Brazil did not, after all, do anything which the United States could point to. Moreover, the Soviet Union was scarcely in the picture. Early in 1964, reported a Brazilian newspaper, Russian leader Khrushchev told the Brazilian Communist Party that the Soviet government did not wish either to give financial aid to the Goulart regime or to tangle with the United States over the country.⁶² In his reminiscences—albeit, as mentioned earlier, not meant to be a serious work of history—Khrushchev does not give an index reference to Brazil.

A year after the coup, trade between Brazil and the USSR was running at \$120 million per year and a Brazilian mission was planning to go to Moscow to explore Soviet willingness to provide a major industrial plant.⁶³ The following year, the Russians invited the new Brazilian president-to-be, General Costa e Silva, to visit the Soviet Union.⁶⁴

During the entire life of the military dictatorship, extending into the 1980s, Brazil and the Soviet bloc engaged in extensive trade and economic cooperation, reaching billions of dollars per year and including the building of several large hydroelectric plants in Brazil. A similar economic relationship existed between the Soviet bloc and the Argentine military dictatorship of 1976-83, so much so that in 1982, when Soviet leader Brezhnev died, the Argentine government declared a national day of mourning.⁶⁵

It was only by ignoring facts like these during the cold war that the anti-communist propaganda machine of the United States could preach about the International Communist Conspiracy and claim that the coup in Brazil had saved the country from communism. For a typical example of this propaganda, one must read "The Country That Saved Itself," which appeared in *Reader's Digest* several months after the coup. The innumerable lies about what occurred in Brazil, fed by the magazine to its millions of readers, undoubtedly played a role in preparing the American public for the great anti-communist crusade in Vietnam just picking up steam at the time. The article began:

Seldom has a major nation come closer to the brink of disaster and yet recovered than did Brazil in its recent triumph over Red subversion. The communist drive for domination—marked by propaganda, infiltration, terror—was moving in high gear. Total surrender seemed imminent—and then the people said No! 66

The type of independence shown by the Brazilian military government in its economic relations with the Soviet Union was something Washington could accept from a conservative government, even the occasional nationalization of American property, when it knew that the government could be relied upon to keep the left suppressed at home and to help in the vital cold-war, anti-communist campaigns abroad. In 1965, Brazil sent 1,100 troops to the Dominican Republic in support of the US invasion, the only country in Latin America to send more than a token force. And in 1971 and 1973, the Brazilian military and intelligence apparatuses contributed to the American efforts in overthrowing the governments of Bolivia and Chile.

The United States did not rest on its laurels. CIA headquarters immediately began to generate hemisphere-wide propaganda, as only the Agency's far-flung press-asset network could, in support of the new Brazilian government and to discredit Goulart.⁶⁷ Dean Rusk, concerned that Goulart might be received in Uruguay as if he were still Brazil's president on the grounds that he had not resigned, cabled the American Embassy in Montevideo that "it would be useful if you could quietly bring to the attention of appropriate officials the fact that despite his allegations to the contrary Goulart has abandoned his office."⁶⁸

At the same time, the CIA station in Uruguay undertook a program of surveillance of Brazilian exiles who had fled from the military takeover, to prevent them from instigating any kind of insurgency movement in their homeland. It was a simple matter for the Agency to ask their (paid) friend, the head of Uruguayan intelligence, to place his officers at the residences of Goulart and other key Brazilians. The officers kept logs of visitors while posing as personal security men for the exiles, although it is unlikely that the exiles swallowed the story.⁶⁹

In the first few days following the coup, "several thousand" Brazilians were arrested, "communist and suspected communist" all.⁷⁰ AIFLD graduates were promptly appointed by the new government to purge the unions.⁷¹ Though Ambassador Gordon had assured the State Department before the coup that the armed forces "would be quick to restore constitutional institutions and return power to civilian hands,"⁷² this was not to be. Within days, General Castelo Branco assumed the presidency and over the next few years his regime instituted all the features of military dictatorship which Latin America has come to know and love: Congress was shut down, political opposition was reduced to virtual extinction, habeas corpus for "political crimes" was suspended, criticism of the president was forbidden by law, labor unions were taken over by government interveners, mounting protests were met by police and military firing into crowds, the use of systematic "disappearance" as a form of repression came upon the stage of Latin America, peasants' homes were burned down, priests were brutalized ... the government had a name for its program: the "moral

rehabilitation" of Brazil ... then there was the torture and the death squads, both largely undertakings of the police and the military, both underwritten by the United States.⁷³

In the chapters on Guatemala and Uruguay, we shall see how the US Office of Public Safety (OPS), the CIA and AID combined to provide the technical training, the equipment, and the indoctrination which supported the horrors in those countries. It was no less the case in Brazil. Dan Mitriane of the OPS, whom we shall encounter in his full beauty in Uruguay, began his career in Brazil in the 1960s. By 1969, OPS had established a national police force for Brazil and had trained over 100,000 policemen in the country, in addition to 523 receiving more advanced instruction in the United States.⁷⁴ About one-third of the students' time at the police academies was devoted to lectures on the "communist menace" and the need to battle against it.⁷⁵ The "bomb school" and techniques of riot control were other important aspects of their education.

Tortures range from simple but brutal blows from a truncheon to electric shocks. Often the torture is more refined: the end of a reed is placed in the anus of a naked man hanging suspended downwards on the *pau de arara* [parrot's perch] and a piece of cotton soaked in petrol is lit at the other end of the reed. Pregnant women have been forced to watch their husbands being tortured. Other wives have been hung naked beside their husbands and given electric shocks on the sexual parts of their body, while subjected to the worst kind of obscenities. Children have been tortured before their parents and vice versa. At least one child, the three month old baby of Virgilio Gomes da Silva was reported to have died under police torture. The length of sessions depends upon the resistance capacity of the victims and have sometimes continued for days at a time.

Amnesty International⁷⁶

Judge Agamenon Duarte indicated that the CCC [Commandos to Hunt Communists, a death squad armed and aided by the police] and the CIA are implicated in the murder of Father Henrique Neto. He admitted that ... the American Secret Service (CIA) was behind the CCC.

*Journal do Brazil*⁷⁷

Chief of Staff of the Brazilian Army, General Breno Borges Forte, at the Tenth Conference of American Armies in 1973:

The enemy is undefined ... it adapts to any environment and uses every means, both licit and illicit, to achieve its aims. It disguises itself as a priest, a student or a campesino, as a defender of democracy or an advanced intellectual, as a pious soul or as an extremist protestor; it goes into the fields and the schools, the factories and the churches, the universities and the magistracy; if necessary, it will wear a uniform or civil garb; in sum, it will take on any role that it considers appropriate to deceive, to lie, and to take in the good faith of Western peoples.⁷⁸

In 1970, a US Congress study group visited Brazil. It gave this summary of statements by American military advisers there:

Rather than dwell on the authoritarian aspects of the regime, they emphasize assertions by the Brazilian armed forces that they believe in, and support, representative democracy as an ideal and would return government to civilian control if this could be done without sacrifice to security and development. This withdrawal from the political arena is not seen as occurring in the near future. For that reason they emphasize the continued importance of the military assistance training program as a means of exerting U.S. influence and retaining the current pro-U.S. attitude of the Brazilian armed forces. Possible disadvantages to U.S. interests in being so closely identified with an authoritarian regime are not seen as particularly important.⁷⁹

revelations that there had been detailed plans for the assassination of Peruvian officials and for the overthrow of the government, and that arms had been smuggled into Peru from Bolivia and Ecuador, presumably for these purposes.⁵

Of such stuff is the battle for the hearts and minds of Latin Americans made.

The political history of Peru has been of the classic South American mold—an oligarchy overthrown by a military coup replaced by another oligarchy ... periodically punctuated by an uprising, sporadic violence from the forgotten below to remind those above that they are still alive, albeit barely. Veteran Latin America newsmen John Gerassi described the state of those below in the Peru of the early 1960s:

In Lima, the capital, whose colonial mansions enveloped by ornate wooden balconies help make it one of the most beautiful cities in the world, half of the 1.3 million inhabitants live in rat-infested slums. One, called El Montón, is built around, over, and in the city dump. There, when I visited it, naked children, some too young to know how to walk, competed with pigs for a few bits of food scraps accidentally discarded by the garbage men ... [The peasants] chew cocaine-producing coca leaves to still hunger pains, and average 500 calories a day. Where there is grass, the Peruvian Andes Indian eats it—and also the sheep he kills when it gets so hungry that it begins tearing another sheep's wool off for its food. The peons who work the land of the whites average one sol (4 cents) a day, and ... labor from sunup to sundown.⁶

During this period, a movement led by Hugo Blanco organized peasants into unions, staged strikes and seized land. The movement engaged in little which could be termed guerrilla warfare, using its meagre arms to defend the squatters, and was easily and brutally put down by the police and army, apparently without significant American assistance other than the "routine" arming and training of such forces.

By 1965, however, several guerrilla groups had evolved in the eastern slopes of the Andes, cognizant of the bare truth that organizing peasants was, by itself, painfully inadequate; some would say suicidal. Inspired by the Cuban revolution, impressed with the social gains which had followed, and, in some cases, trained by the Cubans, these sons of the middle class met in May to plan a common strategy. Guerrilla warfare began in earnest the following month. By the end of the year, however, a joint Peruvian-American counter-insurgency operation had broken the back of three rebel groups, two of them in less than two months. Those guerrillas who remained alive and active were reduced to futile and impotent skirmishes over the next year or so.⁷

The role of the CIA in this definitive military mop-up has been concisely depicted by the former high official of the Agency, Victor Marchetti:

Green Berets participated ... in what was the CIA's single large-scale Latin American intervention of the post-Bay of Pigs era. This occurred in the mid-1960s, when the agency secretly came to the aid of the Peruvian government, then plagued by guerrilla troubles in its remote eastern regions. Unable to cope adequately with the insurgent movement, Lima had turned to the U.S. government for aid, which was immediately and covertly forthcoming.

The agency financed the construction of what one experienced observer described as "a miniature Fort Bragg" in the troubled Peruvian jungle region, complete with mess halls, classrooms, barracks, administrative buildings, parachute jump towers, amphibious landing facilities, and all the other accoutrements of paramilitary operations. Helicopters were furnished under cover of official military aid programs, and the CIA flew in arms and other combat equipment. Training was provided by the agency's Special Operations Division personnel and by Green Beret instructors on loan from the Army.⁸

The CIA never rests ... a footnote: the *New York Times* reported in 1966 ...

When the CIA learned last year that a Brazilian youth had been killed in 1963, allegedly in an auto accident, while studying on a scholarship at the Lumumba University in Moscow, it mounted a massive publicity campaign to discourage other South American families from sending their youngsters to the Soviet Union.⁸⁰

28. Peru 1960-1965

Fort Bragg moves to the jungle

It was a CIA dream come true. A commando raid by anti-Castro Cubans upon the Cuban Embassy in Lima had uncovered documentary proof that Cuba had paid out "hundreds of thousands" of dollars in Peru for propaganda to foster favorable attitudes toward the Cuban revolution and to promote Communist activities within the country.

This was no standard broad-brush, cold-war accusation, for the documents disclosed all manner of details and names—the culprits who had been on the receiving end of the tainted money; men in unions and universities and in politics; men who had secretly visited Cuba, all expenses paid.¹ To top it all off, these were men the CIA looked upon as enemies.

The only problem—and it wasn't really a problem—was that some of the documents were counterfeit. The raid had certainly taken place, on 8 November 1960 to be exact. And documents had indeed been seized, at gunpoint. But the most incriminating of the documents, presented a month later with the authentic ones, had been produced by the experts of the CIA's Technical Services Division.²

It was a propaganda windfall. The story received wide media coverage in Latin America and the United States, accompanied by indignant anti-Communist articles and editorials. The *Wall Street Journal* was moved to run an extremely long, slightly hysterical piece, obviously based on Washington handouts, strikingly unquestioned, which warned that "mountainous stacks of intelligence data from the 20 nations stretching from Mexico to Argentina tell of a widening Communist push into the hemisphere."³

To be sure, the Cubans insisted that the documents were not genuine, but that was only to be expected. The affair was to cast a shadow over Castro's foreign relations for some time to come.

The most propitious outcome, from the CIA's standpoint, was that within days after the disclosure the Peruvian government broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. This was a major priority of the Agency in Lima, as in most other CIA stations in Latin America, and led further to the Cuban news agency, *Prensa Latina*, being barred from operating in Peru. The news agency's dispatches, the Peruvian authorities now decided, were "controlled from Moscow."⁴

A week later, there was further welcome fallout from the incident. The government enacted legislation making it easier to arrest members of the Communist Party, although this was repealed a year later. During its deliberations the Peruvian legislature accepted a sworn statement from one Francisco Ramos Montejo, a recent defector from the Cuban Embassy who had been present during the raid, who "confirmed" that all the documents were genuine. Ramos, who was now living in Miami and working for the CIA, added fresh

In February 1966, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara summed up this effort in a Senate hearing: "In Peru, the Government has already made good progress against guerrilla concentrations, and U.S. trained and supported Peruvian army and air force units have played prominent roles in this counter-guerrilla campaign."⁹

Typically, and ironically, such training would have included instilling in the Peruvian officers the motivation for doing battle with the insurgents in the first place. As US military affairs scholar Michael Klare has pointed out:

Many Latin American military officers would rather command elite units like jet fighter squadrons, naval flotillas, or armored brigades than slug it out with the guerrillas in long, unspectacular jungle campaigns. U.S. training programs are designed, therefore, to emphasize the importance of counter-guerrilla operations (and to suggest, thereby, that the United States will reward those officers who make a good showing at this kind of warfare).¹⁰

The extent to which American military personnel engaged directly in combat is not known. They did, however, set up their headquarters in the center of an area of heavy fighting, in the village of Mazanari, and in September 1965 the *New York Times* reported that when the Peruvian army opened a major drive against the guerrillas, "At least one United States Army counter-insurgency expert was said to have helped plan and direct the attack."¹¹

In the urban areas a concurrent round-up of guerrilla supporters was carried out, based materially on CIA intelligence: the list of "subversives" regularly compiled by Agency stations throughout the world for just such occasions.¹² The CIA is usually in a much better position to collect this information than the host government, due to its superior experience in the field, funds available for hiring informants, technical equipment for eavesdropping, and greater motivation.

While this was taking place the war in Vietnam and the militant protest against it had already captured the front pages of American newspapers, and the isolated *New York Times* dispatch referred to above easily passed into oblivion. Yet, the American objective in Peru—to crush a movement aimed at genuine land reform and the social and political changes inevitably stemming from such—was identical to its objective in Vietnam. And the methods employed were similar: burning down peasants' huts and villages to punish support for the guerrillas, defoliating the countryside to eliminate guerrilla sanctuaries, saturation bombing with napalm and high explosives, even throwing prisoners out of helicopters.¹³

The essential difference, one which spelled disaster for the Peruvian insurgents, was that their ranks were not augmented in any appreciable number by the Indian peasants, a group with little revolutionary consciousness and even less daring; four centuries of dehumanization had robbed them of virtually all hope and the sense of a right to revolt; and when this sense stirred even faintly, such as under Hugo Blanco, it was met head-on by the brick wall of official violence.

As common in the Third World as it is ludicrous, the bulk of the armed forces employed to keep the peasants pacified were soldiers of peasant stock themselves. It is a measure of the ultimate cynicism of the Peruvian and American military authorities that soldiers were stationed outside their home areas to lessen their resistance when the order was given to shoot.¹⁴

But it all worked. It worked so well that more than a decade was to pass before desperate men took to arms again in Peru.

29. Dominican Republic 1960-1966

Saving democracy from communism by getting rid of democracy

On the night of 30 May 1961, Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, mass murderer, torturer par excellence, absolute dictator, was shot to death on a highway in the outskirts of the capital city, Ciudad Trujillo.

The assassination set off a chain of events over the next five years which featured sustained and remarkably gross intervention into the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic by the United States, the likes of which had not been seen in Latin America since the heyday of American gunboat diplomacy.

The United States had been an accomplice in the assassination itself of the man it had helped to climb to power and to endure for some 30 years. It marked one of the rare occasions that the US government acted to overthrow a right-wing despot, albeit anti-communism was still the motivating force.

Whatever repugnance individual Washington policy makers may have felt toward Trujillo's incredible violations of human rights over the years, his fervent adherence to American policies, his repression of the left, and, as a consequence, the vigorous support he enjoyed in Congress (where Trujillo's money was no stranger) and in other influential American circles, were enough to keep successive United States administrations looking the other way.

When, in January 1959, Fulgencio Batista fell before the forces of Fidel Castro in near-Cuba, a reconsideration of this policy was thrust upon Washington's agenda. This historic event seemed to suggest that support of right-wing governments might no longer be the best way of checking the rise of revolutionary movements in Latin America, but rather might be fostering them. Indeed, in June a force of Dominican exiles launched an invasion of their homeland from Cuba. Although the invasion was a complete failure, it could only serve to heighten Washington's concern about who was swimming around in "The American Lake".

"Batista is to Castro as Trujillo is to _____," was the implicit assumption, and Washington wanted to ensure that it could help fill in the blank," is the way one analysis formulated the problem. "As a result, the United States began to cast about for a way to get rid of Trujillo and at the same time to ensure a responsible successor."¹ Ironically, it was to Trujillo's Dominican Republic that Batista had fled.

The decision to topple Trujillo was reinforced in early 1960 when the United States sought to organize hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime. This policy ran head-on into the familiar accusation that the United States opposed only leftist governments, never those of the right, no matter how tyrannical. The close association with Trujillo, widely regarded as Washington's "protégé", was proving increasingly to be an embarrassment. The circumstances were such that President Eisenhower was led to observe that "It's certain that American public opinion won't condemn Castro until we have moved against Trujillo."² (The president's apparent belief in the independence of the American mind may have been overly generous, for Washington was supporting right-wing dictatorships in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Haiti and elsewhere before and after Trujillo's assassination, yet the American public fell readily into line in condemning Castro.)

As early as 1958, the then-CIA chief of station in the Dominican Republic, Lear Reed, along with several Dominicans, had plotted an assassination of Trujillo, one which never got off the ground.³ What the Agency's motivation was, and whether it was acting on its

own or at the behest of higher echelons in Washington, is not known. However, in February 1960 the National Security Council's Special Group in Washington gave consideration to a program of covert aid to anti-Trujillo Dominicans.⁴ Two months later, Eisenhower approved a contingency plan which provided, in part, that if the situation deteriorated still further: "the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and—if necessary—military support."⁵

Seemingly unaware of the currents swirling about him, Trujillo continued to live up to his gangster reputation. In June, his henchmen blew up a car carrying Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt, an outspoken critic of the Dominican dictator. As a result, Washington came under renewed pressure from several of the more democratic Caribbean countries for action against Trujillo. Betancourt, who had survived the blast, told US Secretary of State Christian Herter: "if you don't eliminate him, we will invade."⁶

For a full year, the dissidents and various American officials played cloak-and-dagger games: There were meetings in New York and Washington, in Ciudad Trujillo and Venezuela; Americans living in the Dominican Republic were enlisted for the cause by the CIA; schemes to overthrow Trujillo were drawn up at different times by the State Department, the CIA, and the dissidents, some approved by the Special Group. A training camp was set up in Venezuela for Dominican exiles flown there from the United States and Puerto Rico by the CIA; the dissidents made numerous requests for weapons, from sniper rifles to remote-control detonating devices, for the understood purpose of assassinating Trujillo and other key members of his regime. Several of the requests were approved by the State Department or the CIA; support for the dissidents was regularly reiterated at high levels of the US government ... yet, after all was said and done, none of the ambitious plans was even attempted (the actual assassination was essentially a spur-of-the-moment improvised affair), only three pistols and three carbines were ever passed to the anti-Trujillistas, and it is not certain that any of these guns were used in the assassination.⁷

In the final analysis, the most significant aid received by the dissidents from the United States was the assurance that the "Colossus to the North" would not intervene militarily to prevent the assassination and would support them afterwards if they set up a "suitable" government. In Latin America this is virtually a *sine qua non* for such undertakings, notably in the Dominican Republic where American marines have landed on four separate occasions in this century, the last intervention having created a centralized Dominican National Guard which the US placed under the control of a young officer it had trained named Rafael Trujillo.

The gap between the word and the deed of the American government concerning the assassination appears to have been the consequence of a growing uncertainty in Washington about what would actually take place in the wake of Trujillo's demise—would a pro-Castro regime emerge from the chaos? A secondary consideration, perhaps, was a reluctance to engage in political assassination, both as a matter of policy and as a desire to avoid, as one State Department official put it, "further tarnishing in the eyes of the world" of the "U.S. moral posture."⁸ This was particularly the expressed feeling of President John Kennedy and others in his administration who had assumed office in January 1961, although they were later to undertake several assassination attempts against Castro.

The dismal failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April further dampened the enthusiasm of Washington officials for Caribbean adventures (except against Cuba in revenge) and induced them to request a postponement of the assassination. The plotters, however, were well past the point of no return.

The Dominicans who pulled the triggers and their fellow conspirators were in no way revolutionaries. They came from the ranks of the conservative, privileged sectors of Dominican society and were bound together primarily by an intense loathing of Trujillo, a personal vendetta—each of them, or someone close to them, had suffered a deep humiliation at the hands of the diabolical dictator, if not torture or murder.

Their plan as to what would follow the elimination of Trujillo was only half-baked, and even this fell apart completely. As matters turned out, the day after the assassination, Rafael ("Ramfis") Trujillo, Jr. rushed home from his playboy's life in Paris to take over the reins of government. Little had been resolved, either in the Dominican Republic or in Washington. The Kennedy administration was confronted with the same ideological questions which had caused them so much indecision before the assassination, as they had the Eisenhower administration. To wit: What is the best way of preventing the establishment of left-wing governments intent upon radical social change? The traditional iron fist of right-wing dictatorship, or a more democratic society capable of meeting many of the legitimate demands of the populace? How much democracy? Would too much open the door for even greater, and unacceptable, demands and provide the left with a legal platform from which to sway ("dupe", Washington would call it) the public? And if it is a dictatorship that is to be supported, how are liberal American leaders to explain this to the world and to their own citizens?

John F. Kennedy and his men from Harvard tended to treat such policy questions in a manner more contemplative than American political figures are usually inclined to do: on occasion, it might be said, they even agonized over such questions. But in the end, their Latin American policy was scarcely distinguishable from that of conservative Republican administrations. A leader who imposed "order" with at least the facade of democracy, who kept the left submerged without being notoriously brutal about it; in short, the anti-communist liberal, still appeared to be the safest ally for the United States.

"There are three possibilities," Kennedy said, "in descending order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first but we really can't renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third."⁹

Rafael Trujillo, Jr. was clearly not ideal. Besides bearing the inescapable stigma of his name and family, he proceeded to carry out a bloodbath of revenge over the next six months.¹⁰ But, unlike his father in his last years, Ramfis could be prodded by Washington into making a few token reforms, and both parties might have been content to continue in this fashion indefinitely had not many people of the Dominican Republic felt terribly cheated by the turn of events. Their elation over the assassination had soured in the face of business-as-usual.

Resentment spilled over into the streets. By October, the protests were occurring daily and were being put down by tanks; students were shot dead by government troops. The United States began to make moves, for the situation in the streets and high places of the government was anarchic enough, Washington feared, to provide an opening for the proverbial (and seemingly magical) "communist takeover", although, in fact, the left in the Dominican Republic was manifestly insignificant from years of repression.

American diplomats met in the capital city with the Trujillo clan and Dominican military leaders and bluntly told them that US military power would, if necessary, be used to compel the formation of a provisional government headed by Joachin Balaguer until elections could be held. Balaguer had been closely tied to the Trujillo family for decades, was serving as president under Trujillo at the time of the assassination, and had remained in the

same capacity under Ramfis, but he was not regarded as a threat to continue the tyranny. As Kennedy put it: "Balaguer is our only tool. The anticommunist liberals aren't strong enough. We must use our influence to take Balaguer along the road to democracy."¹¹ Just how committed John F. Kennedy was to democracy in the Dominican Republic we shall presently see.

To make certain that the Dominicans got the message, a US naval task force of eight ships with 1,800 Marines aboard appeared off the Dominican coast on 19 November, just outside the three-mile limit but in plain sight of Ciudad Trujillo. Spanish-language broadcasts from the offshore ships warned that the Marines were prepared to come ashore; while overhead, American jet fighters streaked along the coastline. Brigadier General Pedro Rodriguez Echevarria, a key military figure, was persuaded by the United States to put aside any plans for a coup he may have been harboring and to support the American action. Rodriguez proceeded—whether of his own initiative is not clear—to order the bombing of the air base outside the capital where Trujillistas had been massing troops. Over the next two days, Ramfis returned to the pleasure temples of Europe while other prominent Trujillistas left for the good life in Florida.¹²

However, when Balaguer proved to be a major obstacle to beginning the process of democratization and indicated that he did not regard his regime as temporary, the United States added its own special pressure to that of Balaguer's domestic opposition to force him to resign after only two months in office. Washington then turned around and issued another stern warning to General Rodriguez, threatened Dominican leaders with a large loss of aid if they supported a coup, and mounted another naval show-of-force to help other military officers block the general's attempt to seize power.¹³

While a seven-man "Council of State" then administered the affairs of government, the US continued to treat the Dominican Republic as its private experiment in the prevention of communism. The American Ambassador, John Bartlow Martin, pressed the Council to curb left-wing activity. By his own admission, Martin urged the use of "methods once used by the police in Chicago": harassment of suspects by repeated arrests, midnight raids on their homes, beatings, etc.¹⁴

When street disturbances erupted, US Attorney General Robert Kennedy arranged for riot-control equipment to be sent to Santo Domingo (the original name of the capital, now restored). The equipment came complete with two Spanish-speaking Los Angeles detectives to impart to their Dominican counterparts the fine art of quelling such uprisings that they had acquired in the Mexican barrios of east Los Angeles. In a few weeks, Ambassador Martin could report that the Council had "re-won the streets, thanks almost entirely to those two detectives."¹⁵

This riot-control unit remained as a permanent part of the Santo Domingo police force. Known as the *Cascos Blancos* (white helmets), they came to be much hated by the populace. Shortly afterwards, the US military undertook a long-range program to transform the country's armed forces into what was hoped would be an efficient anti-guerrilla organization, though guerrillas were as rare on the Caribbean island as members of the Trujillo family.¹⁶

Finally, in December 1962, elections were held, under terms dictated in large part by Ambassador Martin to the two major candidates. His purpose was to introduce into the Dominican Republic some of the features that Americans regard as necessary to a viable and democratic electoral system, but Martin's fiat was inescapably a highly condescending intrusion into the affairs of a supposedly sovereign nation. His instructions extended down to the level of what the loser should say in his concession speech.

Further, under an "Emergency Law", the United States and the Council arranged for

the deportation of some 125 Trujillistas and "Castro communists" to the United States, from where they were not allowed to leave until after the election in order "to help maintain stability so elections could be held".¹⁷

The winner, and first more-or-less-democratically elected president of the Dominican Republic since 1924, was Juan Bosch, a writer who had spent many years in exile while Trujillo reigned. Here at last was Kennedy's liberal anti-communist, non-military and legally elected by a comfortable majority as well. Bosch's government was to be the long-sought-after "showcase of democracy" that would put the lie to Fidel Castro. He was given the grand treatment in Washington shortly before he took office in February 1963.

Bosch was true to his beliefs. He called for land reform, including transferring some private land to the public sector as required; low-rent housing; modest nationalization of business; an ambitious project of public works, serving mass needs more than vested interests; a reduction in the import of luxury items; at the same time, he favored incentives to private enterprise and was open to foreign investment provided it was not excessively exploitative of the country—all in all, standard elements in the program of any liberal Third World leader serious about social change. He was likewise serious about the thing called civil liberties: Communists, or those labeled as such, or anyone else, were not to be persecuted unless they actually violated the law.

A number of American officials and congressmen expressed their discomfort with Bosch's plans, as well as his stance of independence from the United States. Land reform and nationalization are always touchy issues in Washington, the stuff that "creeping socialism" is made of. In several quarters of the US press Bosch was red-baited and compared with Castro, and the Dominican Republic with Cuba. (Castro, for his part, branded Bosch a "Yankee puppet".) Some of the press criticism was clearly orchestrated, in the manner of many CIA campaigns.¹⁸

In both the United States and the Dominican Republic, the accusations most frequently cast at Bosch were the ones typically used against Latin American leaders who do not vigorously suppress the left (cf. Arbenz and Goulart): Bosch was allowing "communists" to "infiltrate" into the country and into the government, and he was not countering "communist subversion"; the latter referring to no more than instances of people standing up for their long-denied rights. Wrote a reporter for the *Miami News*: "Communist penetration of the Dominican Republic is progressing with incredible speed and efficiency." He did not, however, name a single communist in the Bosch government. As it happens, the reporter, Hal Hendrix, was a valuable press asset and a "secret operative" of the CIA in the 1960s.¹⁹

The CIA made a further contribution to the anti-Bosch atmosphere. Ambassador Martin has reported that the Agency "gave rumors [about communists in the Dominican Republic] a credibility far higher than I would have ... In reporting a Castro/Communist plot, however wildly implausible, it is obviously safer to evaluate it as 'could be true' than as nonsense."²⁰

John F. Kennedy also soured on Bosch, particularly for his refusal to crack down on radicals. Said the president to Ambassador Martin one day:

I'm wondering if the day might not come when he'd [Bosch] like to get rid of some of the left. Tell him we respect his judgment, we're all for him, but the time may come when he'll want to deport 30 or 50 people, when it'd be better to deport them than to let them go. I suppose he'd have to catch them in something.²¹

When the United States failed to commit any new economic assistance to the Dominican Republic and generally gave the indication that Juan Bosch was a doomed ven-

ture, right-wing Dominican military officers could only be encouraged in their craving to be rid of the president and his policies. Sam Halper, former Caribbean Bureau Chief of *Time* magazine, later reported that the military coup ousting Bosch went into action "as soon as they got a wink from the U.S. Pentagon."²²

In July, a group of officers formally presented Bosch with a statement of principle-cum-ultimatum: Their loyalty to his regime was conditioned upon his adoption of a policy of rigorous anti-communism. Bosch reacted by going on television and delivering a lecture about the apolitical role required of the military in a democratic society, surely an occult subject to these products of 31 years of Trujilloism.

The beleaguered president could see that a premature demise lay ahead for his government. His speech on television had sounded very much like a farewell. The failure of Washington to intervene on his behalf could only enlarge the writing on the wall. Indeed, Bosch and some of his aides strongly suspected that the US military and the CIA were already conspiring with the Dominican officers. Several American military officers had disregarded diplomatic niceties by expressing their reservations about Bosch's politics loud enough to reach his ears.²³

A week before the inevitable coup, the CIA/AIFLD-created union federation in the Dominican Republic, CONATRAL, which had been set up to counter and erode Bosch's support in the labor movement, placed an ad in a leading newspaper urging the people to put their faith in the army to defend them against communism.²⁴

The end came in September, a scant seven months after Bosch had taken office. He had not had the time to accomplish much that was worthwhile in this hopelessly corrupt society before the military boots marched, as they have always marched in Latin America.

The United States, which can discourage a military coup in Latin America with a frown, did nothing to stand in the way of the Dominican officers. There would be no display of American military might this time—although Bosch asked for it—"unless a Communist takeover were threatened," said the State Department.²⁵

"Democracy," said *Newsweek* magazine, "was being saved from Communism by getting rid of democracy."²⁶

There were the customary expressions of regret in Washington about the death of democracy, and there was the *de rigueur* withholding of recognition of the new regime. But two months later, when opposition to the yet-again repressive dictatorship began to manifest itself noticeably, the junta yelled "communist" and was quickly embraced by the United States with recognition and the other perquisites which attach to being a member in good standing of the "Free World."²⁷

Nineteen months later, a revolution broke out in the Dominican Republic which promised to put the exiled Bosch back in power at the hands of a military-civilian force that would be loyal to his program. But for the fifth time in the century, the American Marines landed and put an abrupt end to such hopes.

In the early morning of Saturday, 24 April 1965, a group of young army officers of middle rank, acting in concert with civilian Bosch partisans, declared themselves in revolt against the government. The "constitutionalists", as they called themselves, were soon joined by other officers and their units. Spurred by ecstatic radio proclamations, thousands of Dominicans poured into the streets shouting "Viva Bosch" and grabbed up the arms handed out by the rebel military forces.

The television station was taken over and for two days a "potpourri of politicians, sol-

diers, women, children, adventurers, hoodlums and anyone who wished to, shouted against the status quo."²⁸

The participants in the uprising were a mixed bag, not all of them sympathetic to Bosch or to social reform; some were on the right, with their own varied motivations. But the impetus clearly lay with the constitutionalists, and the uprising was thus viewed with alarm by the rest of the military and the US Embassy as a movement to restore Bosch to power with all that that implied.

Philip Geyelin of the *Wall Street Journal* (and formerly with the CIA), who had access to the official embassy cables and the key actors in the drama, has written:

What the record reveals, in fact, is that from the very outset of the upheaval, there was a concerted U.S. Government effort, if not actually a formal decision, to checkmate the rebel movement by whatever means and at whatever cost.

By Sunday, April 25 ... the Santo Domingo embassy had clearly cast its lot with the "loyalist" military cabal and against the rebellion's original aim: the return of Juan Bosch ... Restoration of the Bosch regime would be "against U.S. interests", the embassy counseled. Blocking Bosch could mean further bloodshed, the embassy conceded. Nonetheless, Washington was advised, the embassy military attaches had given "loyalist" leaders a go-ahead to do "everything possible" to prevent what was described as the danger of a "Communist take-over."²⁹

The attachés as well as the US Consul made emergency visits to several still-uncommitted Dominican military commanders to persuade them, apparently with notable success, to support the government.³⁰

A bloody civil war had broken out in the streets of Santo Domingo. During the first few days, the momentum of battle swung to one side, then the other. By the night of 28 April, however, the military and police inside Santo Domingo had collapsed, and the constitutionalists were preparing to attack the military's last bastion, San Isidro, their main base about 10 miles away.³¹

"The Generals at San Isidro were dejected, several were weeping, and one was hysterically urging 'retreat'," read the cable sent by the American ambassador, W. Tapley Bennett, to Washington in the early evening of the 28th. (Bennett, as we shall see, was given to hyperbole of the worst sort, but the Dominican military certainly were isolated and demoralized.) Bennett added, whether in the same cable or another one is not clear, that if US troops did not immediately land, American lives would be lost and "Castro-type elements" would be victorious.³²

Within hours, the first 500 US Marines were brought in by helicopter from ships stationed a few miles off the coast. Two days later, American forces ashore numbered over 4,000. At the peak, some 23,000 troops, Marine and Army, were to take up positions in the beleaguered country, with thousands more standing by on a 35-ship task force offshore.

The American action was in clear violation of several international agreements, including the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) which prohibited intervention "directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state".

During the entire course of the US military occupation, American pronouncements would have had the world believe that its forces were in the Dominican Republic in a "neutral" capacity: to protect the lives of Americans and other foreigners, establish a ceasefire, ensure free elections, etc. As we have seen, however, the United States had committed itself to one side from the start of hostilities. This continued to be the case. The morning after the landing of the first Marines, Ambassador Bennett was instructed by the State Department

that US military officers should be used "to help San Isidro develop operational plans to take the rebel stronghold downtown".³³

Within a few days, American troops were deployed in an armed corridor through the center of Santo Domingo so as to divide the constitutionalists' zone and cut off their main body from access to the rest of the country, bottling them up in a small downtown area with their backs to the sea. Other American forces were stationed throughout the countryside. The rebel offensive against San Isidro had been prevented. It was the end of their revolution.

The American forces came to the aid of the Dominican military in a number of ways, supplying them with equipment, food and even their salaries, but it was the direct military involvement that was most telling. On one striking occasion, the sea of American troops parted to allow the Dominican military to pass through and brutally attack and mop up the northern section of the rebel zone while the main rebel force in the south remained helplessly blocked behind the American line. This "smashing victory," the *New York Times* reported, was "visibly aided by United States troops". Other American journalists also reported that US troops took part in the fighting, although Washington officials angrily denied it.³⁴

The rebels were reduced to little more than sniping attacks on American soldiers, for which they paid a heavy price. US forces blasted apart a building in downtown Santo Domingo from which sniper fire was coming; advancing into a constitutionalist zone, again after sniper fire, they killed some 67 rebels and bystanders; American paratroops were seen firing at rebels who were retreating, and the constitutionalists' Minister of Justice and Police was "reported to have been killed by United States machine-gun fire as he attempted to capture the empty Presidential Palace in midtown with a squad of his troops."³⁵

When the Johnson administration was not denying such actions outright, it was claiming that they were either contrary to orders, "individual indiscretions", or "isolated incidents".

A covert team of Green Berets arrived at one point to help ensure the safety of American civilians. But when they discovered that some of the Americans were assisting rebel forces, "their main objective shifted from protecting their fellow countrymen to spying on them".³⁶

The Green Berets also found the time to lay the groundwork for the assassination of one of the leading constitutionalist leaders, Col. Francisco Caamaño. The plot was canceled at the last moment due to the excessive risk involved.³⁷

Another group of American visitors was that of some leaders of the National Student Association, ostensibly come to the Dominican Republic to talk with their counterparts about educational matters, but actually there at the behest of the CIA to gather information on local students. This was still two years before the exposé of the long-lasting relationship between the CIA and the prominent student organization.³⁸

Throughout this period, the communication guns of the US government were aimed at the people of the United States, the Dominican Republic and the world to convince them that "communists" were a dominant element amongst the constitutionalists, that they represented a threat to take over the movement, or that they had already taken it over, with frightening consequences for all concerned.

At various times the Johnson administration released lists of "communists and Castroites" in the ranks of the rebels. These lists totaled 53 or 58 or 77 names and became a cause célèbre as well as an object of media ridicule. Besides the laughably small numbers involved (in a rebellion of tens of thousands with numerous leaders), several of those on the lists, it turned out, were in prison while others were out of the country.

The American Embassy in Santo Domingo assured reporters that if they went to rebel headquarters, they would see the named communist in the flesh. The newsmen went and looked but could find no identifiable communists (however one identifies a communist). Subsequently, administration officials explained that the reason that newsmen had seen such little evidence of communist activity was that the American landings had scared the Reds into hiding.

Eventually, American officials admitted their doubt that they could prove that communists had gained control of the constitutionalists, although President Johnson had pressed the CIA and FBI into an intensive search for evidence. (A CIA cable to Washington on 25 April reported that the Communist Party [Partido Socialista Dominicano] had been "unaware of the coup attempt".)³⁹

Former CIA officer Philip Agee, stationed in Uruguay at the time, wrote later that the new password at his station became "Fifty-eight trained communists". The proper reply was "Ten thousand marines".⁴⁰

The embassy, and Ambassador Bennett in particular, poured forth "a rising stream of hysterical rumors, atrocity stories, and alarmist reports"⁴¹ about the rebels, reminiscent of the Bolshevik horror stories which had filled the pages of the American press following the Russian Revolution: embassies being ransacked ... "Castroite-style mass executions" ... rebels parading in the streets with the heads of their victims on poles ...

President Johnson made reference to the "atrocities" in public statements, but none of the stories were ever proven, for none were true; no one ever located any of the many headless Dominicans; and American officials, in a monument to *chutzpah*, later denounced the press for reporting such unverified rumors.⁴²

Meanwhile, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the US Information Agency were conducting their own intensive propaganda campaign in the Dominican Republic to give credence to the American position and discredit Dominican groups opposed to it. Experts on psychological warfare arrived to ply their trade, radio stations and newspapers were covertly set up, rebel radio stations jammed, leaflets airdropped in the countryside. The USIA also secretly subsidized the publication of pro-administration material aimed for distribution in the United States.⁴³

From all the wild charges and the frequent contradictory statements made by American officials, the expression "credibility gap" entered the American popular language and soon came to haunt the Johnson presidency.⁴⁴

Historian Richard Barnett has noted another interesting side to the American propaganda effort:

To justify the intervention, which had aroused violent opposition from traditional friends of the United States because of its crudeness and the swathe of lies in which it was wrapped ... [Washington] began a direct assault on the concept of non-intervention, the rhetorical foundation stone of Latin-American policy enshrined in numerous treaties, declarations, and Pan-American Day speeches ... Under Secretary Thomas Mann told newspaper correspondents that the OAS and UN charters were drawn up in "19th-century terms" ... Averell Harriman remarked in Montevideo that the principle of non-intervention was becoming "obsolete". By a vote of 315 to 52 the House of Representatives passed a resolution ... justifying the unilateral use of force on foreign territory by any nation which considers itself threatened by "international communism, directly or indirectly." ... The President [declared in a speech]: "The first reality is that old concepts and old labels are largely obsolete. In today's world, with enemies of freedom talking about 'Wars of national liberation', the old distinction between 'Civil War' and 'International War' has already lost much of its meaning ... The moment of decision must become the moment of action."

"This is the essence of the Johnson Doctrine," wrote Barnett, "a virtually unlimited claim of legitimacy for armed intervention in civil strife."⁴⁵

The last American troops did not leave the Dominican Republic until September 1966. The interim period witnessed a succession of ceasefires, broken truces, and protracted negotiations under provisional governments.

In June 1966, elections were held in which Joaquin Balaguer defeated Juan Bosch by a surprisingly large margin. Yet, it was not all that surprising. For five long years the people of the Dominican Republic had lived under a cloud of chaos and violence. The experience had instilled in them a deep longing for a return to "normalcy", to order, without foreign intervention, without soldiers patrolling their streets, without curfews, tear gas and bloodshed. With the US Army still very much in evidence and the American distaste for Bosch well known ... with the ubiquitous American propaganda hammering home fear of The Red Menace and associating the constitutionalists, and thus Bosch, with communism ... with the Dominican military still largely Trujillista in personnel and ideology ... a victory for Bosch would be seen by many voters as a danger that all the horrors would rain down upon their heads once more. Bosch, who had returned several months prior to the election, was himself so fearful for his personal safety that he never left his home during the campaign.

Joaquim Balaguer remained in office for the next 12 years, ruling his people in the grand Latin American style: The rich became richer and the poor had babies, hungry babies democracy remained an alien concept; the police and military regularly kidnapped, tortured and murdered opponents of the government and terrorized union organizers.⁴⁶

But the man was not, personally, the monster that Trujillo was. There was relative calm and peace. No "communist threat" hovered over the land. The pot was sweetened for foreign investors, and American corporations moved in with big bucks. There was stability and order. And the men who ran the United States looked and were satisfied. Perhaps some of them had come to the realization that the anti-communist liberal government was an impossible ideal; for any movement seeking genuine democracy and social reform would invariably attract individuals whom the United States would invariably categorize as "communist"; the United States would then feel driven to discredit, subvert and eventually overturn the movement. A Catch 22.

30. Cuba 1959 to 1980s

The unforgivable revolution

The existence of a revolutionary socialist government with growing ties to the Soviet Union only 90 miles away, insisted the United States Government, was a situation which no self-respecting superpower should tolerate, and in 1961 it undertook an invasion of Cuba.

But less than 50 miles from the Soviet Union sat Pakistan, a close ally of the United States, a member since 1955 of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the US-created anti-communist alliance. On the very border of the Soviet Union was Iran, an even closer ally of the United States, with its relentless electronic listening posts, aerial surveillance, and infiltration into Russian territory by American agents. And alongside Iran, also bordering the Soviet Union, was Turkey, a member of the Russians' mortal enemy, NATO, since 1951.

In 1962 during the "Cuban Missile Crisis", Washington, seemingly in a state of near-panic, informed the world that the Russians were installing "offensive" missiles in Cuba. The US promptly instituted a "quarantine" of the island—a powerful show of naval and marine forces in the Caribbean would stop and search all vessels heading towards Cuba; any found to contain military cargo would be forced to turn back.

The United States, however, had missiles and bomber bases already in place in Turkey and other missiles in Western Europe pointed toward the Soviet Union. Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev later wrote:

The Americans had surrounded our country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like to have enemy missiles pointing at you; we'd be doing nothing more than giving them a little of their own medicine. ... After all, the United States had no moral or legal quarrel with us. We hadn't given the Cubans anything more than the Americans were giving to their allies. We had the same rights and opportunities as the Americans. Our conduct in the international arena was governed by the same rules and limits as the Americans.¹

Lest anyone misunderstand, as Khrushchev apparently did, the rules under which Washington was operating, *Time* magazine was quick to explain. "On the part of the Communists," the magazine declared, "this equating [referring to Khrushchev's offer to mutually remove missiles and bombers from Cuba and Turkey] had obvious tactical motives. On the part of neutralists and pacifists [who welcomed Khrushchev's offer] it betrayed intellectual and moral confusion." The confusion lay, it seems, in not seeing clearly who were the good guys and who were the bad guys, for "The purpose of the U.S. bases [in Turkey] was not to blackmail Russia but to strengthen the defense system of NATO, which had been created as a safeguard against Russian aggression. As a member of NATO, Turkey welcomed the bases as a contribution to her own defense." Cuba, which had been invaded only the year before, could have, it seems, no such concern. *Time* continued its sermon:

Beyond these differences between the two cases, there is an enormous moral difference between U.S. and Russian objectives ... To equate U.S. and Russian bases is in effect to equate U.S. and Russian purposes ... The U.S. bases, such as those in Turkey, have helped keep the peace since World War II, while the Russian bases in Cuba threatened to upset the peace. The Russian bases were intended to further conquest and domination, while U.S. bases were erected to preserve freedom. The difference should have been obvious to all.²

Equally obvious was the right of the United States to maintain a military base on Cuban soil—Guantanamo Naval Base by name, a vestige of colonialism staring down the throats of the Cuban people, which the US, to this day, refuses to vacate despite the vehement protest of the Castro government.

In the American lexicon, in addition to good and bad bases and missiles, there are good and bad revolutions. The American and French Revolutions were good. The Cuban Revolution is bad. It must be bad because so many people have left Cuba as a result of it.

But at least 100,000 people left the British colonies in America during and after the American Revolution. These Tories could not abide by the political and social changes, both actual and feared, particularly that change which attends all revolutions worthy of the name: Those looked down upon as inferiors no longer know their place. (Or as the US Secretary of State put it after the Russian Revolution: the Bolsheviks sought "to make the ignorant and incapable mass of humanity dominant in the earth.")³

The Tories fled to Nova Scotia and Britain carrying tales of the godless, dissolute, barbaric American revolutionaries. Those who remained and refused to take an oath of allegiance to the new state governments were denied virtually all civil liberties. Many were jailed, murdered, or forced into exile. After the American Civil War, thousands more fled to South America and other points, again disturbed by the social upheaval. How much more is such an exodus to be expected following the Cuban Revolution?—a true social revolution, giving rise to changes much more profound than anything in the American experience. How many more would have left the United States if 90 miles away lay the world's wealthiest nation welcoming their residence and promising all manner of benefits and rewards?

After the Cuban Revolution in January 1959, we learned that there are also good and bad hijackings. On several occasions Cuban planes and boats were hijacked to the United States but they were not returned to Cuba, nor were the hijackers punished. Instead, some of the planes and boats were seized by US authorities for non-payment of debts claimed by American firms against the Cuban government.⁴ But then there were the bad hijackings—planes forced to fly from the United States to Cuba. When there began to be more of these than flights in the opposite direction, Washington was obliged to reconsider its policy.

It appears that there are as well good and bad terrorists. When the Israelis bombed PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985, Ronald Reagan expressed his approval. The president asserted that nations have the right to retaliate against terrorist attacks "as long as you pick out the people responsible".⁵

But if Cuba had dropped bombs on any of the headquarters of the anti-Castro exiles in Miami or New Jersey, Ronald Reagan would likely have gone to war, though for 25 years the Castro government had been on the receiving end of an extraordinary series of terrorist attacks carried out in Cuba, in the United States, and in other countries by the exiles and their CIA mentors. (We shall not discuss the consequences of Cuba bombing CIA headquarters.)

Bombing and strafing attacks of Cuba by planes based in the United States began in October 1959, if not before.⁶ In early 1960, there were several fire-bomb air raids on Cuban cane fields and sugar mills, in which American pilots also took part—at least three of whom died in crashes, while two others were captured. The State Department acknowledged that one plane which crashed, killing two Americans, had taken off from Florida, but insisted that it was against the wishes of the US government.⁷

In March a French freighter unloading munitions from Belgium exploded in Havana taking 75 lives and injuring 200, some of whom subsequently died. The United States denied Cuba's accusation of sabotage but admitted that it had sought to prevent the shipment.⁸

And so it went ... reaching a high point in April of the following year in the infamous CIA-organized invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Over 100 exiles died in the attack. Close to 1,200 others were taken prisoner by the Cubans. It was later revealed that four American pilots flying for the CIA had lost their lives as well.⁹

The Bay of Pigs assault had relied heavily on the Cuban people rising up to join the invaders,¹⁰ but this was not to be the case. As it was, the leadership and ranks of the exile forces were riddled with former supporters and henchmen of Fulgencio Batista, the dictator overthrown by Castro, and would not have been welcomed back by the Cuban people under any circumstances.

Despite the fact that the Kennedy administration was acutely embarrassed by the unmitigated defeat—indeed, *because* of it—a campaign of smaller-scale attacks upon Cuba was initiated almost immediately. Throughout the 1960s, the Caribbean island was subject-

ed to countless sea and air commando raids by exiles, at times accompanied by their CIA supervisors, inflicting damage upon oil refineries, chemical plants and railroad bridges, cane fields, sugar mills and sugar warehouses; infiltrating spies, saboteurs and assassins ... anything to damage the Cuban economy, promote disaffection, or make the revolution look bad ... taking the lives of Cuban militia members and others in the process ... pirate attacks on Cuban fishing boats and merchant ships, bombardments of Soviet vessels docked in Cuba, an assault upon a Soviet army camp with 12 Russian soldiers reported wounded ... a hotel and a theatre shelled from offshore because Russians and East Europeans were supposed to be present there ...¹¹

These actions were not always carried out on the direct order of the CIA or with its foreknowledge, but the Agency could hardly plead "rogue elephant". It had created an operations headquarters in Miami that was truly a state within a city—over, above, and outside the laws of the United States, not to mention international law, with a staff of several hundred Americans directing many more Cuban agents in just such types of actions, with a budget in excess of \$50 million a year, and an arrangement with the local press to keep operations in Florida secret except when the CIA wanted something publicized.¹²

Title 18 of the US Code declares it to be a crime to launch a "military or naval expedition or enterprise" from the United States against a country with which the United States is not (officially) at war. Although US authorities now and then aborted an exile plot or impounded a boat—sometimes because the Coast Guard or other officials had not been properly clued in—no Cubans were prosecuted under this act. This was no more than to be expected inasmuch as Attorney General Robert Kennedy had determined after the Bay of Pigs that the invasion did not constitute a military expedition.¹³

The commando raids were combined with a total US trade and credit embargo, which continues to this day, and which genuinely hurt the Cuban economy and chipped away at the society's standard of living. So unyielding has the embargo been that when Cuba was hard hit by a hurricane in October 1963, and Casa Cuba, a New York social club, raised a large quantity of clothing for relief, the United States refused to grant it an export license on the grounds that such shipment was "contrary to the national interest".¹⁴

Moreover, pressure was brought to bear upon other countries to conform to the embargo, and goods destined for Cuba were sabotaged: machinery damaged, chemicals added to lubricating fluids to cause rapid wear on diesel engines, a manufacturer in West Germany paid to produce ball-bearings off-center, another to do the same with balanced wheel gears—"You're talking about big money," said a CIA officer involved in the sabotage efforts, "when you ask a manufacturer to go along with you on that kind of project because he has to reset his whole mold. And he is probably going to worry about the effect on future business. You might have to pay him several hundred thousand dollars or more."¹⁵

One manufacturer who defied the embargo was the British Leyland Company, which sold a large number of buses to Cuba in 1964. Repeated expressions of criticism and protest by Washington officials and congressmen failed to stem deliveries of some of the buses. Then, in October, an East German cargo ship carrying another 42 buses to Cuba collided in thick fog with a Japanese vessel in the Thames. The Japanese ship was able to continue on, but the cargo ship was beached on its side; the buses would have to be "written off", said the Leyland company. In the leading British newspapers it was just an accident story.¹⁶ In the *New York Times* it was not even reported. A decade was to pass before the American columnist Jack Anderson disclosed that his CIA and National Security Agency sources had confirmed that the collision had been arranged by the CIA with the cooperation of British intelligence.¹⁷ Subsequently, another CIA officer stated that he was skeptical about the col-

lision story, although admitting that "it is true that we were sabotaging the Leyland buses going to Cuba from England, and that was pretty sensitive business."¹⁸

What undoubtedly was an even more sensitive venture was the use of chemical and biological weapons against Cuba by the United States. It is a remarkable record.

In August 1962, a British freighter under Soviet lease, having damaged its propeller on a reef, crept into the harbor at San Juan, Puerto Rico for repairs. It was bound for a Soviet port with 80,000 bags of Cuban sugar. The ship was put into dry dock and 14,135 sacks of sugar were unloaded to a warehouse to facilitate the repairs. While in the warehouse, the sugar was contaminated by CIA agents with a substance that was allegedly harmless but unpalatable. When President Kennedy learned of the operation he was furious because it had taken place in US territory and if discovered could provide the Soviet Union with a propaganda field-day and could set a terrible precedent for chemical sabotage in the cold war. He directed that the sugar not be returned to the Russians, although what explanation was given to them is not publicly known.¹⁹ Similar undertakings were apparently not canceled. The CIA official who helped direct worldwide sabotage efforts, referred to above, later revealed that "There was lots of sugar being sent out from Cuba, and we were putting a lot of contaminants in it."²⁰

The same year, a Canadian agricultural technician working as an adviser to the Cuban government was paid \$5,000 by "an American military intelligence agent" to infect Cuban turkeys with a virus which would produce the fatal Newcastle disease. Subsequently, 8,000 turkeys died. The technician later claimed that although he had been to the farm where the turkeys had died, he had not actually administered the virus, but had instead pocketed the money, and that the turkeys had died from neglect and other causes unrelated to the virus. This may have been a self-serving statement. The *Washington Post* reported that "According to U.S. intelligence reports, the Cubans—and some Americans—believe the turkeys died as the result of espionage."²¹

Authors Warren Hinkle and William Turner, citing a participant in the project, have reported in their book on Cuba that:

During 1969 and 1970, the CIA deployed futuristic weather modification technology to ravage Cuba's sugar crop and undermine the economy. Planes from the China Lake Naval Weapons Center in the California desert, where hi tech was developed, overflew the island, seeding rain clouds with crystals that precipitated torrential rains over non-agricultural areas and left the cane fields arid (the downpours caused killer flash floods in some areas).²²

In 1971, also according to participants, the CIA turned over to Cuban exiles a virus which causes African swine fever. Six weeks later, an outbreak of the disease in Cuba forced the slaughter of 500,000 pigs to prevent a nationwide animal epidemic. The outbreak, the first ever in the Western hemisphere, was called the "most alarming event" of the year by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization.²³

Ten years later, the target may well have been human beings, as an epidemic of dengue fever swept the Cuban island. Transmitted by blood-eating insects, usually mosquitoes, the disease produces severe flu symptoms and incapacitating bone pain. Between May and October 1981, over 300,000 cases were reported in Cuba with 158 fatalities, 101 of which were children under 15.²⁴ In 1956 and 1958, declassified documents have revealed, the US Army loosed swarms of specially bred mosquitoes in Georgia and Florida to see whether disease-carrying insects could be weapons in a biological war. The mosquitoes bred for the tests were of the *Aedes Aegypti* type, the precise carrier of dengue fever as well as other

diseases.²⁵ In 1967 it was reported by *Science* magazine that at the US government center in Fort Detrick, Maryland, dengue fever was amongst those "diseases that are at least the objects of considerable research and that appear to be among those regarded as potential BW [biological warfare] agents."²⁶ Then, in 1984, a Cuban exile on trial in New York testified that in the latter part of 1980 a ship travelled from Florida to Cuba with

a mission to carry some germs to introduce them in Cuba to be used against the Soviets and against the Cuban economy, to begin what was called chemical war, which later on produced results that were not what we had expected, because we thought that it was going to be used against the Soviet forces, and it was used against our own people, and with that we did not agree.²⁷

It's not clear from the testimony whether the Cuban man thought that the germs would somehow be able to confine their actions to only Russians, or whether he had been misled by the people behind the operation.

The full extent of American chemical and biological warfare against Cuba will never be known. Over the years, the Castro government has in fact blamed the United States for a number of other plagues which afflicted various animals and crops.²⁸ And in 1977, newly-released CIA documents disclosed that the Agency "maintained a clandestine anti-crop warfare research program targeted during the 1960s at a number of countries throughout the world."²⁹

It came to pass that the United States felt the need to put some of its chemical and biological warfare (CBW) expertise into the hands of other nations. As of 1969, some 550 students, from 36 countries, had completed courses at the US Army's Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama. The CBW instruction was provided to the students under the guise of "defense" against such weapons—just as in Vietnam, as we have seen, torture was taught. As will be described in the chapter on Uruguay, the manufacture and use of bombs was taught under the cover of combating terrorist bombings.³⁰

The ingenuity which went into the chemical and biological warfare against Cuba was apparent in some of the dozens of plans to assassinate or humiliate Fidel Castro. Devised by the CIA or Cuban exiles, with the cooperation of American mafiosi, the plans ranged from poisoning Castro's cigars and food to a chemical designed to make his hair and beard fall off and LSD to be administered just before a public speech. There were also of course the more traditional approaches of gun and bomb, one being an attempt to drop bombs on a baseball stadium while Castro was speaking; the B-26 bomber was driven away by anti-aircraft fire before it could reach the stadium.³¹ It is a combination of such Cuban security measures, informers, incompetence, and luck which has served to keep the bearded one alive to the present day.

Attempts were also made on the lives of Castro's brother Raul and Che Guevara. The latter was the target of a bazooka fired at the United Nations building in New York in December 1964.³² Various Cuban exile groups have engaged in violence on a regular basis in the United States with relative impunity for decades. One of them, going by the name of Omega 7 and headquartered in Union City, New Jersey, was characterized by the FBI in 1980 as "the most dangerous terrorist organization in the United States."³³ Attacks against Cuba itself began to lessen around the end of the 1960s, due probably to a lack of satisfying results combined with ageing warriors, and exile groups turned to targets in the United States and elsewhere in the world.

During the next decade, while the CIA continued to pour money into the exile community, more than 100 serious "incidents" took place in the United States for which Omega 7 and other groups claimed responsibility. (Within the community, the distinction between a terrorist and a non-terrorist group is not especially precise; there is much overlapping identity and frequent creation of new names.) There occurred repeated bombings of the Soviet UN Mission, its Washington Embassy, its automobiles, a Soviet ship docked in New Jersey, the offices of the Soviet airline Aeroflot, with a number of Russians injured from these attacks; several bombings of the Cuban UN Mission and its Interests Section in Washington, many attacks upon Cuban diplomats, including at least one murder; a bomb discovered at New York's Academy of Music in 1976 shortly before a celebration of the Cuban Revolution was to begin; a bombing two years later of the Lincoln Center after the Cuban ballet had performed ...³⁴

The single most violent act of this period was the blowing up of a Cubana Airlines plane shortly after it took off from Barbados on 6 October 1976, which took the lives of 73 people including the entire Cuban championship fencing team. CIA documents later revealed that on 22 June, a CIA officer abroad had cabled a report to Agency headquarters that he had learned from a source that a Cuban exile group planned to bomb a Cubana airliner flying between Panama and Havana. The group's leader was a baby doctor named Orlando Bosch. After the plane crashed in the sea in October, it was Bosch's network of exiles that claimed responsibility. The cable showed that the CIA had the means to penetrate the Bosch organization, but there's no indication in any of the documents that the Agency undertook any special monitoring of Bosch and his group because of their plans, or that the CIA warned Havana.³⁵

In 1983, while Orlando Bosch sat in a Venezuelan prison charged with masterminding the plane bombing, the City Commission of Miami proclaimed a "Dr. Orlando Bosch Day."³⁶ In 1968, Bosch had been convicted of a bazoorka attack on a Polish ship in Miami.

Cuban exiles themselves have often come in for harsh treatment. Those who have visited Cuba for any reason whatever, or publicly suggested, however timidly, a rapprochement with the homeland, they too have been the victims of bombings and shootings in Florida and New Jersey. American groups advocating a resumption of diplomatic relations or an end to the embargo have been similarly attacked, as have travel agencies handling trips to Cuba and a pharmaceutical company in New Jersey which shipped medicines to the island. Dissent in Miami has been effectively silenced, while the police, city officials, and the media look the other way, when not actually demonstrating support for the exiles' campaign of intimidation.³⁷ In Miami and elsewhere, the CIA—ostensibly to uncover Castro agents—has employed exiles to spy on their countrymen, to keep files on them, as well as on Americans who associate with them.³⁸

Although there has always been the extreme lunatic fringe in the Cuban exile community (as opposed to the normal lunatic fringe) insisting that Washington has sold out their cause, over the years there has been only the occasional arrest and conviction of an exile for a terrorist attack in the United States, so occasional that the exiles can only assume that Washington's heart is not wholly in it. The exile groups and their key members are well known to the authorities, for the anti-Castroites have not excessively shied away from publicity. At least as late as the early 1980s, they were training openly in southern Florida and southern California; pictures of them flaunting their weapons appeared in the press.³⁹ The CIA, with its countless contacts-cum-informers amongst the exiles, could fill in many of the missing pieces for the FBI and the police, if it wished to. In 1980, in a detailed report on Cuban-exile terrorism, *The Village Voice* of New York reported:

Two stories were squeezed out of New York police officials ... "You know, it's funny," said one cautiously, "there have been one or two things ... but let's put it this way. You get just so far on a case and suddenly the dust is blown away. Case closed. You ask the CIA to help, and they say they aren't really interested. You get the message." Another investigator said he was working on a narcotics case involving Cuban exiles a couple of years ago, and telephone records he obtained showed a frequently dialed number in Miami. He said he traced the number to a company called Zodiac, "which turned out to be a CIA front." He dropped his investigation.⁴⁰

In 1961, amid much fanfare, the Kennedy administration unveiled its showcase program, the Alliance for Progress. Conceived as a direct response to Castro's Cuba, it was meant to prove that genuine social change could take place in Latin America without resort to revolution or socialism. "If the only alternatives for the people of Latin America are the status quo and communism," said John F. Kennedy, "then they will inevitably choose communism."⁴¹

The multi-billion dollar Alliance program established for itself an ambitious set of goals which it hoped to achieve by the end of the decade. These had to do with economic growth, more equitable distribution of national income, reduced unemployment, agrarian reform, education, housing, health, etc. In 1970, the Twentieth Century Fund of New York—whose list of officers read like a *Who's Who* in the government/industry revolving-door world—undertook a study to evaluate how close the Alliance had come to realizing its objectives. One of the study's conclusions was that Cuba, which was not one of the recipient countries, had

come closer to some of the Alliance objectives than most Alliance members. In education and public health, no country in Latin America has carried out such ambitious and nationally comprehensive programs. Cuba's centrally planned economy has done more to integrate the rural and urban sectors (through a national income distribution policy) than the market economies of the other Latin American countries.⁴²

Cuba's agrarian reform program as well was recognized as having been more widespread than that of any other Latin American country, although the study took a wait-and-see attitude towards its results.⁴³

These and other economic and social gains were achieved despite the US embargo and the inordinate amount of resources and labor Cuba was obliged to devote to defense and security because of the hovering giant to the north. Moreover, though not amongst the stated objectives of the Alliance, there was another area of universal importance in which Cuba stood apart from many of its Latin neighbors: there were no legions of *desaparecidos*, no death squads, no systematic torture.

Cuba had become what Washington had always feared from the Third World—a good example.

Parallel to the military and economic belligerence, the United States has long maintained a relentless propaganda offensive against Cuba. A number of examples of this occurring in other countries can be found in other chapters of this book. In addition to its vast overseas journalistic empire, the CIA has maintained anti-Castro news-article factories in the United States for decades. The Agency has reportedly subsidized at times such publications in Miami as *Avance*, *El Mundo*, *El Prensa Libre*, *Bohemia* and *El Diario de Las Americas*, as well as AIP, a radio news agency that produced programs sent free of charge to more than 100 small stations in Latin America. Two CIA fronts in New York, Foreign Publications, Inc, and Editors Press Service, also served as part of the propaganda network.⁴⁴

Was it inevitable that the United States would attempt to topple the Cuban government? Could relations between the two neighboring countries have taken a different path? Based on the American record of invariable hostility towards even moderately leftist governments, the answer would appear to be that there's no reason to believe that Cuba's revolutionary government could have been an exception. Washington officials, however, were not immediately ill-disposed towards the Cuban Revolution. There were those who even expressed their tentative approval or optimism. This was evidently based on the belief that what had taken place in Cuba was little more than another Latin American change in government, the kind which had occurred with monotonous regularity for over a century, where the names and faces change but subservience to the United States remains fixed. (The fact that John Foster Dulles was dying of cancer at this time could only contribute to the atmosphere of tolerance. Dulles left the State Department in early February 1959, a month after the revolution. One of his last acts was to withdraw the US military mission from Cuba.)

Then Castro revealed himself to be cut from a wholly different cloth. It was not to be business as usual in the Caribbean. He soon became outspoken in his criticism of the United States. He referred acrimoniously to the 60 years of American control of Cuba; how, at the end of those 60 years, the masses of Cubans found themselves impoverished; how the United States used the sugar quota as a threat. He spoke of the unacceptable presence of the Guantánamo base; and he made it clear enough to Washington that Cuba would pursue a policy of independence and neutralism in the cold war. It was for just such reasons that Castro and Che Guevara had forsaken the prosperous bourgeois careers awaiting them in law and medicine to lead the revolution in the first place. Serious compromise was not on their agenda; nor on Washington's, which was not prepared to live with such men and such a government. Soon, Castro and his regime were consigned to the "communist" slot, a word known to instantly cut off the flow of blood to the brain cells of the user.

A National Security Council meeting of 10 March 1959 included on its agenda the feasibility of bringing "another government to power in Cuba".⁴⁵ This was before Castro had nationalized any US property. The following month, after meeting with Castro in Washington, Vice President Richard Nixon wrote a memo in which he stated that he was convinced that Castro was "either incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discipline" and that the Cuban leader would have to be treated and dealt with accordingly. Nixon later wrote that his opinion at this time was a minority one within the Eisenhower administration.⁴⁶ But before the year was over, CIA Director Allen Dulles had decided that an invasion of Cuba was necessary. In March of 1960, it was approved by President Eisenhower.⁴⁷ Then came the embargo, leaving Castro no alternative but to turn more and more to the Soviet Union, thus confirming in the minds of Washington officials that Castro was indeed a communist. Some speculated that he had been a covert Red all along.

In this context, it's interesting to note that the Cuban Communist Party had long supported Batista, had served in his cabinet, and had been unopposed to Castro and his followers until their accession to power appeared imminent.⁴⁸ To add to the irony, during 1957-58 the CIA was channeling funds to Castro's movement; this while the US continued to support Batista with weapons to counter the rebels; in all likelihood, another example of the Agency hedging its bets.⁴⁹

If Castro had toned down his early rhetoric and observed the usual diplomatic niceties, but still pursued the policies of self-determination and socialism which he felt were best for Cuba (or inescapable if certain changes were to be realized), he could only have postponed the day of reckoning, and that not for long. Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala, Mossadegh of Iran, Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana, and other Third World leaders have gone out of their

way to avoid stepping on Washington's very sensitive toes unnecessarily, and were much less radical in their programs and in their stance toward the United States than Castro; nonetheless, all of them fell under the CIA axe.

In 1974, by way of marking 15 years of American hostility towards Cuba, Castro observed that "Cuba is the only country in the world where John Foster Dulles is still Secretary of State."⁵⁰

31. Indonesia 1965

Liquidating President Sukarno ... and 500,000 others

Armed with wide-bladed knives called *parangs*, Moslem bands crept at night into the homes of communists, killing entire families. ... Travellers ... tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies. River transportation has at places been seriously impeded.

Time magazine, December 1965 1

Nearly 100 Communists, or suspected Communists, were herded into the town's botanical garden and mowed down with a machine gun ... the head that had belonged to the school principal, a P.K.I. [Communist Party] member, was stuck on a pole and paraded among his former pupils, convened in special assembly.

New York Times, May 1966 2

Estimates of the total number of Indonesians murdered over a period of several years following an aborted coup range from 500,000 to one million.³

In the early morning hours of 1 October 1965, a small force of junior military officers abducted and killed six generals and seized several key points in the capital city of Jakarta. They then went on the air to announce that their action was being taken to forestall a *putsch* by a "Generals' Council" scheduled for Army Day, the fifth of October. The *putsch*, they said, had been sponsored by the CIA and was aimed at capturing power from President Sukarno. By the end of the day, however, the rebel officers in Jakarta had been crushed by the army under the direction of General Suharto, although some supportive army groups in other cities held out for a day or two longer.⁴

Suharto—a man who had served both the Dutch colonialists and the Japanese invaders⁵—and his colleagues charged that the large and influential PKI was behind the junior officers' "coup attempt", and that behind the party stood Communist China. The triumphant armed forces moved in to grab the reins of government, curb Sukarno's authority (before long he was reduced to little more than a figurehead), and carry out a bloodbath to eliminate once and for all the PKI with whom Sukarno had obliged them to share national power for many years. Here at last was the situation which could legitimate these long-desired actions.

Anti-Communist organizations and individuals, particularly Muslims, were encouraged to join in the slaying of anyone suspected of being a PKI sympathizer. Indonesians of Chinese descent as well fell victim to crazed zealots. The Indonesian people were stirred up in part by the display of photographs on television and in the press of the badly decomposed bodies of the slain generals. The men, the public was told, had been castrated and

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #13:

89. "President Kennedy's Analysis of the Diem Regime, 1963."
90. "A Realistic Evaluation of South Vietnam, 1963."
91. "An Assessment of Conditions in Vietnam, 1964."
92. "Sustained Reprisal, 1965."
93. "A Major Policy Review, 1965."
94. "George Ball's Dissenting opinion, 1965."
95. "President Johnson's Defense of U.S. Policy, 1965."
96. "Analysis of Johnson's Policy Gamble, 1965."
97. "Vietnamese Declare Their Independence, 1945."
98. "Debate over US Support of French in Vietnam, 1949."
99. "The Geneva Agreement, 1954."
100. "Debate over the Expansion of the War, 1965."
101. "War Stories by Vietnam Veterans, 1981."
102. "The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 1964."

CHAPTER 29

DOCUMENT SET 1

Critical Decisions: "Waist Deep in the Big Muddy"

Of the many divisive issues in the "turbulent sixties," none was more disruptive than the escalating American commitment in Vietnam. To understand the disillusionment that followed, it is important to be aware of the early decisions of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations that led to that escalation. The following documents review the origins of American involvement in Southeast Asia and explore the process by which significant state policies are arrived at, in this instance the fateful choices made to expand the war in 1965.

Setting the stage for escalation, the Kennedy administration increased the American presence in Vietnam, deploying American advisers in a counterinsurgency program consistent with the flexible response strategy described in your textbook. By September 1963, however, administration leaders had concluded that the American surrogate, Ngo Dinh Diem, was a liability. Newsman Walter Cronkite's interview with Kennedy revealed the president's concern about the ominous developments in Saigon. Following Diem's assassination in October, some weaknesses in his regime became evident, as noted in assistant secretary of state Roger Hilsman's memoir of the Kennedy years.

One year later, the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam forced president Lyndon B. Johnson to give serious attention to a change in American policy. Armed with the sweeping authority granted by the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, Johnson prepared for escalation in early 1965. Examine national security adviser McGeorge Bundy's policy paper against the back-

ground provided by the Defense Department's John T. McNaughton in his memo of November 1964. Identify the reasons why Bundy recommended the substantial escalation, implemented by Johnson in February 1965.

The president's approval of a substantial bombing program aimed at North Vietnam reflected rising anxiety within the administration over the failure of ARVN forces to mount an effective resistance to the Viet Cong guerrilla activities in the south. As you examine the February decision, be especially aware of the administration's interpretation of the war's origins.

In July the American military requested a substantial increase in American troop commitment, resulting in a thorough policy review in Washington. The dynamics of the White House decision-making process are revealed in Jack Valenti's account of the internal debate over a decision that would result in the Americanization of the war. Consider the reasoning of all parties in the discussion.

Johnson's acceptance of the majority recommendation was to have tragic consequences. As you examine the president's personal justification for a firm American commitment, be alert to the factors uppermost in his mind. Evaluate Johnson's argument in the light of Townsend Hoopes's frank recollection of the president's procedures and objectives. Think about the policy process as well as personal experience as factors in a decision with grave implications for Asians and Americans alike.

Questions for Analysis

1. Using the textbook material on Kennedy's foreign-policy ideas, develop an explanation for the deepening American involvement in Vietnam during his administration. What do the documents reveal about his intentions at the time of his death? Do you find him optimistic or pessimistic? What was the basis for his views? Was his assessment justified?
2. What do the documents reveal about the progress of American/ARVN counterinsurgency efforts by late 1964? Why did the problems of South Vietnam remain unresolved? What were the available policy alternatives?
3. What was the American interpretation of the origins of the Vietnam War? Why was this problem such an important issue for American policy makers? What is your assessment of the American analysis?
4. One interpretation of the Vietnam War is the "quagmire thesis," which suggests that the United States slipped accidentally or unknowingly into a commitment from which it could not extricate itself. In view of the evidence from the documents, does this explanation of American involvement seem accurate? Why or why not?
5. In February 1965, President Johnson authorized a significant escalation in the war by approving air strikes in North Vietnam. How was the new policy defended? Was it a responsive action or a preplanned measure? Do the documents reveal the intent of the new bombing policy? Explain.

6. Perhaps the crucial decision of the early war years came in July 1965, when the Johnson administration decided on a major increase in American troop commitment in South Vietnam. The documents contain a record of policy discussions held on July 21–22, 1965, during which the proposed escalation was debated, as well as the dissenting recommendation of under secretary of state George W. Ball. What were the issues at stake? How did the administration regard Ball's critique? Why did President Johnson ultimately approve the new troop limits? Did the policy review and advisory process serve the president well? Why or why not?
7. When President Johnson attempted to explain his policy on Vietnam to the public, what was his rationale for the American presence? What experiences, motives, and assumptions influenced the thinking of the president and his advisers? How was history used to justify the administration's policy decisions? Evaluate the official argument for American involvement.
8. As you review the chain of events from September 1963 to July 1965, do you draw from the documents any conclusions with regard to the reasons for the ultimate failure of American policy in Vietnam? What were the prospects for victory by 1965? How was the term *victory* defined? What handicapped the American effort? Was there any fatal flaw in American policy? Explain.

1. President John F. Kennedy's Analysis of Prospects for the Diem Regime, 1963

MR. CRONKITE. Mr. President, the only hot war we've got running at the moment is of course the one in Viet-Nam, and we have our difficulties here, quite obviously.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY. I don't think that unless a greater effort is made by the Government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it—the people of Viet-Nam—against the Communists. We are prepared to continue to assist them, but I don't think that the war can be won unless the people support the effort, and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months the Government has gotten out of touch with the people.

The repressions against the Buddhists, we felt, were very unwise. Now all we can do is to make it very clear that we don't think this is the way to win.

It is my hope that this will become increasingly obvious to the Government, that they will take steps to try to bring back popular support for this very essential struggle.

. . . [I]n the final analysis it is the people and the Government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear. But I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. Forty-seven Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.

We took all this—made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate—we may not like it—in the defense of Asia.

2. Roger Hilsman Recalls a Realistic Evaluation of the Situation in South Vietnam, 1963

. . . The Viet Cong took advantage of the preoccupation of the new regime with matters in Saigon to consolidate their holdings in the countryside and

move into new ones. The new regime also set about to replace the incompetent and politically dangerous among the Diem-Nhu political appointees at the dis-

trict and province levels and to reward its own men—and the Viet Cong also made the most of the resulting confusion. . . .

[T]he greatest shocks were not how effectively the Viet Cong moved to take advantage of the Diem-Nhu regime's past mistakes but the discovery of just how wild the statistics really were on which the United States had based so much optimism. On October 22, 1963, before the coup, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research had analyzed the statistics and concluded, not only that the trend was downhill, but that the statistics had started downhill in July, before the attack on the pagodas. . . .

But when the coup drew back the curtain, both sides of the argument were amazed at what the true picture really was. First, the Viet Cong had not really been "compressed" into the delta, but were merely lying low in the other regions while they concentrated on infiltrating strategic hamlets and gaining control from within. . . .

Second, a high percentage of attacks initiated by the government—the statistic on which so much American optimism had been based—had been mounted against "targets" where the Viet Cong were known *not* to be, as a means of inflating the statistics without risk of the casualties that would rouse Diem's ire. . . .

Third, the statistics on the number of strategic hamlets and on the number of villages under effective government control were completely false. Vice-President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, for example, informed us that of the 8600 strategic hamlets claimed under the Diem regime, only about 20 per cent actually met the standards. . . .

"*Ah, les statistiques!*" one of the Vietnamese generals exclaimed to an American friend. "Your Secretary of Defense loves statistics. We Vietnamese can give him all he wants. If you want them to go up, they will go up. If you want them to go down, they will go down."

3. Richard McNaughton's Assessment of Conditions in Vietnam, 1964

1. U.S. aims:

(a) To protect U.S. reputation as a counter-subversion guarantor.

(b) To avoid domino effect especially in Southeast Asia.

(c) To keep South Vietnamese territory from Red hands.

(d) To emerge from crisis without unacceptable taint from methods.

2. Present situation:

The situation in South Vietnam is deteriorating. Unless new actions are taken, the new government will probably be unstable and ineffectual, and the VC will

probably continue to extend their hold over the population and territory. It can be expected that, soon (6 months? two years?), (a) government officials at all levels will adjust their behavior to an eventual VC take-over, (b) defections of significant military forces will take place, (c) whole integrated regions of the country will be totally denied to the GVN, (d) neutral and/or left-wing elements will enter the government, (e) a popular front regime will emerge which will invite the U.S. out, and (f) fundamental concessions to the VC and accommodations to the DRV will put South Vietnam behind the Curtain. . . .

4. McGeorge Bundy Recommends "Sustained Reprisal," 1965

I. Introductory

We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of *sustained reprisal* against North Vietnam—a policy in which air and naval ac-

tion against the North is justified by and related to the whole Viet Cong campaign of violence and terror in the South.

While we believe the risks of such a policy are

acceptable, we emphasize that its costs are real. It implies significant U.S. air losses even if no full air war is joined, and it seems likely that it would eventually require an extensive and costly effort against the whole air defense system of North Vietnam. U.S. casualties would be higher—and more visible to American feelings—than those sustained in the struggle in South Vietnam.

Yet measured against the costs of defeat in Vietnam, this program seems cheap. And even if it fails to turn the tide—as it may—the value of the effort seems to us to exceed its cost. . . .

III. Expected Effect of Sustained Reprisal Policy

1. We emphasize that our primary target in advocating a reprisal policy is the improvement of the situation in *South* Vietnam. Action against the North is usually urged as a means of affecting the will of Hanoi to direct and support the VC. We consider this an important but longer-range purpose. The immediate and critical targets are in the South—in the minds of the South Vietnamese and in the minds of the Viet Cong cadres.

2. Predictions of the effect of any given course of action upon the states of mind of people are difficult. It seems very clear that if the United States and the Government of Vietnam join in a policy of reprisal,

there will be a sharp immediate increase in optimism in the South, among nearly all articulate groups. The Mission believes—and our own conversations confirm—that in all sectors of Vietnamese opinion there is a strong belief that the United States could do much more if it would, and that they are suspicious of our failure to use more of our obviously enormous power. At least in the short run, the reaction to reprisal policy would be very favorable. . . .

8. We cannot assert that a policy of sustained reprisal will succeed in changing the course of the contest in Vietnam. It may fail, and we cannot estimate the odds of success with any accuracy—they may be somewhere between 25% and 75%. What we can say is that even if it fails, the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries, including our own. Beyond that, a reprisal policy—to the extent that it demonstrates U.S. willingness to employ this new norm in counter-insurgency—will set a higher price for the future upon all adventures of guerrilla warfare, and it should therefore somewhat increase our ability to deter such adventures. We must recognize, however, that that ability will be gravely weakened if there is failure for any reason in Vietnam. . . .

(July)

5. A Major Policy Review, 1965

. . . JOHNSON: Would you please begin, Bob. [McNamara summarized the Pentagon recommendation to plan to support 200,000 troops in Vietnam by the first of 1966 by calling up the same number of reserves. By mid-1966 approximately 600,000 additional men would be available.]

BALL: Isn't it possible that the VC will do what they did against the French—stay away from confrontation and not accommodate us?

WHEELER: Yes, that is possible, but by constantly harassing them, they will have to fight somewhere. . . .

BALL: Mr. President, I can foresee a perilous voyage, very dangerous. I have great and grave apprehensions that we can win under these conditions. But let me be clear. If the decision is to go ahead, I am committed.

JOHNSON: But, George, is there another course in the national interest, some course that is better than the one McNamara proposes? We know it is

dangerous and perilous, but the big question is, can it be avoided? . . .

BALL: Take what precautions we can, Mr. President. Take our losses, let their government fall apart, negotiate, discuss, knowing full well there will be a probable take-over by the Communists. This is disagreeable, I know. . . .

LODGE: There is not a tradition of a national government in Saigon. There are no roots in the country. Not until there is tranquility can you have any stability. I don't think we ought to take this government seriously. There is simply no one who can do anything. We have to do what we think we ought to do regardless of what the Saigon government does. . . .

BALL: We cannot win, Mr. President. This war will be long and protracted. The most we can hope for is a messy conclusion. There remains a great danger of intrusion by the Chinese. But the biggest problem is the problem of the long war. . . . As casualties

increase, the pressure to strike at the very jugular of North Vietnam will become very great. I am concerned about world opinion. . . . If the war is long and protracted, as I believe it will be, then we will suffer because the world's greatest power cannot defeat guerrillas. Then there is the problem of national politics. Every great captain in history was not afraid to make a tactical withdrawal if conditions were unfavorable to him. The enemy cannot even be seen in Vietnam. He is indigenous to the country. I truly have serious doubt that an army of westerners can successfully fight orientals in an Asian jungle. . . . The least harmful way to cut losses in SVN is to let the government decide it doesn't want us to stay there. Therefore, we should put such proposals to the SVN that they can't accept. Then, it would move to a neutralist position. I have no illusions that after we were asked to leave South Vietnam, that country would soon come under Hanoi control. . . .

RUSK: If the Communist world finds out we will not pursue our commitment to the end, I don't know where they will stay their hand. I have to say I am more optimistic than some of my colleagues. I don't believe the VC have made large advances among the Vietnamese people. It is difficult to worry about massive casualties when we say we can't find the enemy. I feel strongly that one man dead is a massive casualty, but in the sense that we are talking, I don't see large casualties unless the Chinese come in.

LODGE: I feel there is a greater threat to start World War III if we don't go. Can't we see the similarity to our own indolence at Munich [the Munich conference of 1938 when Hitler, with the acquies-

cence of the West, seized part of Czechoslovakia]. I simply can't be as pessimistic as Ball. We have great seaports in Vietnam. We don't need to fight on roads. We have the sea. Let us visualize meeting the VC on our own terms. We don't have to spend all our time in the jungles. If we can secure our bases, the Vietnamese can secure, in time, a political movement to, one, apprehend the terrorist, and two, give intelligence to the government. . . . The Vietnamese have been dealt more casualties than, per capita, we suffered in the Civil War. The Vietnamese soldier is an uncomplaining soldier. He has ideas he will die for. . . .

JOHNSON: Doesn't it really mean that if we follow Westmoreland's requests we are in a new war? Isn't this going off the diving board?

MCNAMARA: If we carry forward all these recommendations, it would be a change in our policy. We have relied on the South to carry the brunt. Now we would be responsible for satisfactory military outcome. . . .

JOHNSON: But I don't know how we are going to get the job done. There are millions of Chinese. I think they are going to put their stack in. Is this the best place to do it? We don't have the allies we had in Korea. Can we get our allies to cut off supplying the North?

MCNAMARA: No, sir, we can't prevent Japan, Britain, and the others from chartering ships to Haiphong [the North Vietnamese port].

JOHNSON: Are we starting something that in two or three years we simply can't finish?

BROWN: It is costly to us to strangle slowly. But the chances of losing are less if we move in. . . .

B.

6. George Ball's Dissenting Opinion, 1965

(July)

(1) A Losing War: The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms, no matter how many hundred thousand *white, foreign* (U.S.) troops we deploy.

No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war—which is at the same time a civil war between Asians—in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the South Vietnamese) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. . . .

(2) The Question to Decide: Should we limit our

liabilities in South Vietnam and try to find a way out with minimal long-term costs?

The alternative—no matter what we may wish it to be—is almost certainly a protracted war involving an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces, mounting U.S. casualties, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.

(3) Need for a Decision Now: So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the U.S. and a large part of the population of

South Vietnam, organized and directed from North Vietnam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.

The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of U.S. troops are committed to direct combat, they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.

Once we suffer large casualties, we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives. *Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after we have paid terrible costs. . . .*

B. 7. President Lyndon Johnson's Defense of the American Presence in Vietnam, 1965 (July)

. . . Three times in my lifetime, in two world wars and in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands to fight for freedom. We have learned at a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does not bring safety and weakness does not bring peace.

It is this lesson that has brought us to Viet-Nam. This is a different kind of war. There are no marching armies or solemn declarations. Some citizens of South Viet-Nam, at times with understandable grievances, have joined in the attack on their own government.

But we must not let this mask the central fact that this is really war. It is guided by North Viet-Nam, and it is spurred by Communist China. Its goal is to conquer the South, to defeat American power, and to extend the Asiatic dominion of communism.

There are great stakes in the balance.

Most of the non-Communist nations of Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, resist the growing might and the grasping ambition of Asian Communism.

Our power, therefore, is a very vital shield. If we are driven from the field in Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever again have the same confidence in American promise or in American protection.

In each land the forces of independence would be considerably weakened and an Asia so threatened by Communist domination would certainly imperil the security of the United States itself.

We did not choose to be the guardians at the gate, but there is no one else.

Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring peace, because we learned from Hitler at Munich that success only feeds the appetite of aggression. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another country, bringing with it perhaps even larger and crueler conflict, as we have learned from the lessons of history.

Moreover, we are in Viet-Nam to fulfill one of the most solemn pledges of the American nation. Three Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—over 11 years have committed themselves and have promised to help defend this small and valiant nation.

Strengthened by that promise, the people of South Viet-Nam have fought for many long years. Thousand of them have died. Thousands more have been crippled and scarred by war. We just cannot now dishonor our word, or abandon our commitment, or leave those who believed us and who trusted us to the terror and repression and murder that would follow.

This, then, my fellow Americans, is why we are in Viet-Nam.

B. 8. Townsend Hoopes Analyzes Johnson's Policy Gamble, 1965

. . . [T]he President's close advisers (excepting Ball) unanimously urged direct U.S. military intervention

in Vietnam, in order to avoid further deterioration of "our credibility vis-à-vis the Communists." The Presi-

dent reluctantly accepted the recommendation, because it was nearly unanimous, because it reinforced his own instincts about Communism and the needs of U.S. prestige, because he lacked the experience and self-confidence in foreign affairs to devise a valid alternative through (or by overriding) his constitutional advisers, and because he was quickly resolved not to become "the first American President to lose a war." But operating always on the instinctive premise that foreign policy is merely a subordinate element of domestic politics, he perceived political safety in continuity. He thus imposed the condition that intervention had to be made to look as though nothing was changing, as though it all flowed inexorably from commitments made by Eisenhower in 1954 and Kennedy in 1961, as though Lyndon Johnson were essentially a victim of history. . . .

To a President convinced he must take new actions, yet obsessed by a need to preserve the posture of continuity, no major and overt actions were possible. He could not ask Congress for a declaration of war without shattering the posture (and without providing a rather specific explanation as to why "vital" U.S. interests were, after ten years of involvement, suddenly at stake). Inhibited by a formula of his own devising, he could only exploit the actions of the other side, seize available pretexts and provocations, and thus start a process that would lead in a series of acceptable steps to the required enlargement of the U.S. military effort.

The Administration positioned itself for such a development. On February 7, 1965, when the Viet Cong attacked American installations at Pleiku, destroying additional U.S. aircraft, killing seven and wounding 109, a retaliatory air strike was immediately ordered. Three days later, an American billet in the coastal city of Qui Nhon was similarly assaulted.

Another air strike was carried out. McGeorge Bundy, who was in Vietnam at the time, later told a newsman, "Pleikus are streetcars," i.e., if one waits watchfully, they come along. Thereafter, the air strikes were almost imperceptibly transformed into a systematic program of bombing the North, but without formal acknowledgment of the shift until long after it was established fact. On March 6, two reinforced U.S. Marine battalions were sent ashore at Da Nang on what was described as "limited duty" related to the perimeter defense of airfields. . . .

By moving with secret purpose behind a screen of bland assurances designed to minimize or mislead, by admitting nothing until pressed by the facts and then no more than was absolutely necessary, by stretching to the limit (and perhaps beyond) the intent of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, the President carried a bemused and half-aware nation far beyond the Eisenhower and Kennedy positions to a radically different involvement in the intractable Vietnam conflict. It would have to be conceded that the performance was a piece of artful, even masterful, political craftsmanship. Unfortunately for Lyndon Johnson and the American people, it could be vindicated only by a quick and decisive military victory. But when the mists of summer confusion lifted, there were 170,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, U.S. air forces were bombing the North with mounting intensity, and the enemy showed no sign of surrender or defeat. There was the President and there was the country—waist-deep in the Big Muddy. And the integrity, the trust, the credibility without which the leadership of great democratic nations cannot govern were all gravely strained by a pattern of actions that seemed an inextricable blend of high-mindedness, inadvertence, and either massive self-delusion or calculated deceit.



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The 1960s Civil Rights Movement

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Life of Martin Luther King, Jr.

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of No Return (1973)

1954–1980 (1981)

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's Ladder: The Arrival of Negroes

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: The Supreme Court and School

l Rights Years, 1954–1965 (1965)

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CHAPTER

9

Vietnam and the Crisis of American Empire



The Vietnam War was the most traumatic event in postwar American history. It cost the lives of more than 50,000 Americans and of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians. It shattered the presidency of Lyndon Johnson, dealt the Democratic party a defeat from which it still has not recovered, and divided the American people more deeply than at any other time since the Civil War.

On one level, the war in Vietnam was the product of the Cold War and the projection of the ideas, interests, and strategies associated with that struggle onto a postcolonial world of nationalism and social revolution. It was also the logical outgrowth of America's postwar effort to maintain what Truman adviser Clark M. Clifford had once described as "our conception of a decent world order" or what Henry Luce had earlier called "an American century." The U.S. defeat in Vietnam, combined with the growing economic ascendancy of Japan and Western Europe, would mark the beginning of the end of the postwar "American era."

Among the many questions that continue to preoccupy historians and other students of the Vietnamese War, three in particular stand out: How (and why) did the United States come to tie its own fate to the creation and maintenance of an American-dominated, anticommunist regime in Southeast Asia? Given that commitment, how (and with what consequences) did the United States conduct the war? And finally, what are the lessons of Vietnam, especially in a world no longer dominated by the Cold War but in which the forces of nationalism and social revolution remain very powerful?

DOCUMENTS

As World War II drew to a close and Japanese control over Vietnam waned, the Vietminh, whose forces represented a powerful fusion of communism and nationalism, seized power throughout much of the country. With an eye toward winning U.S. support, they issued a Declaration of Independence (the first document),

which began with a familiar passage. The French effort to regain control of Vietnam and the resulting First Indochina War (1946-1954) posed a dilemma for U.S. policymakers: should the United States accept the victory of a movement that, like that in China, was both communist and nationalist, or should it support the French colonial regime led by Bao Dai? In the second document, State Department officials Raymond B. Fosdick and W. Walton Butterworth argue the two sides of the dilemma. The U.S. government, of course, followed the advice of the latter.

The French defeat was sealed on July 21, 1954, by the Geneva Agreements (the third document), which temporarily divided Vietnam along the 17th parallel, established procedures for the nation's reunification, and sought to insulate it from further outside intervention. Despite the Geneva Accords, the United States soon replaced France as the dominant Western power in Vietnam. Its efforts to create and sustain a new, anticommunist government, however, drew the United States deeper and deeper into conflict with the National Liberation Front (NLF, or Vietcong) in the South and with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). In 1964, when American warships were fired upon in the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnam coast (where they had been conducting electronic surveillance and providing cover for South Vietnamese attacks), President Lyndon Johnson seized the opportunity to push through Congress the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (document four), which he would later use to justify the continuing U.S. war in Vietnam.

Although U.S. military advisers had been present in Vietnam since the 1950s, American combat troops did not arrive until early 1965. Not until July 28, 1965, moreover, did the Johnson administration decide to greatly expand the U.S. effort. The fifth document is composed of two memoranda, one by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara urging escalation and one by Under Secretary of State George Ball arguing that the United States should seek a compromise solution. Despite superior weapons and resources, U.S. military forces could never fully subdue their Vietnamese enemies. American soldiers, unprepared to wage a guerrilla war in a foreign land amidst an unfamiliar people, and lacking the broad popular support that had sustained troops in earlier wars, became increasingly frustrated, angry, and disillusioned, as is revealed in interviews collected by Mark Baker in *NAM: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There*, excerpted as the sixth document. A decade after the fall of Vietnam, Americans continued to debate the war's legacy. The Reagan administration in particular sought to overcome what it called the Vietnam syndrome and to prove that "America was back." Thomas J. Valley, a Marine Corps veteran who later campaigned against the war, strongly criticizes this approach in the final documentary selection.

The Vietnamese Declare Their Independence, 1945

"We hold truths that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."

This immortal statement is extracted from the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776. Understood in the broader sense, this means: "All peoples on the earth are born equal; every person has the right to live to be happy and free."

The Declaration of Human and Civic Rights proclaimed by the French Revolution in 1791 likewise proclaims: "Every man is born equal and enjoys free and equal rights."

These are undeniable truths.

Yet, during and throughout the last eighty years, the French imperialists, abusing the principles of "Freedom, equality and fraternity," have violated the integrity of our ancestral land and oppressed our countrymen. Their deeds run counter to the ideals of humanity and justice.

In the political field, they have denied us every freedom. They have enforced upon us inhuman laws. They have set up three different political regimes in Northern, Central and Southern Viet Nam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) in an attempt to disrupt our national, historical and ethical unity.

They have built more prisons than schools. They have callously ill-treated our fellow-countrymen. They have drowned our revolutions in blood.

They have sought to stifle public opinion and pursued a policy of obscurantism on the largest scale; they have forced upon us alcohol and opium in order to weaken our race.

In the economic field, they have shamelessly exploited our people, driven them into the worst misery and mercilessly plundered our country.

They have ruthlessly appropriated our rice fields, mines, forests and raw materials. They have arrogated to themselves the privilege of issuing banknotes, and monopolised all our external commerce. They have imposed hundreds of unjustifiable taxes, and reduced our countrymen, especially the peasants and petty tradesmen, to extreme poverty.

They have prevented the development of native capital enterprises; they have exploited our workers in the most barbarous manner.

In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese fascists, in order to fight the Allies, invaded Indochina and set up new bases of war, the French imperialists surrendered on bended knees and handed over our country to the invaders.

Subsequently, under the joint French and Japanese yoke, our people were literally bled white. The consequences were dire in the extreme. From Quang Tri up to the North, two millions of our countrymen died from starvation during the first months of this year.

On March 9th, 1945, the Japanese disarmed the French troops. Again the French either fled or surrendered unconditionally. Thus, in no way have they proved capable of "protecting" us; on the contrary, within five years they have twice sold our country to the Japanese.

Before March 9th, many a time did the Viet Minh League invite the French to join in the fight against the Japanese. Instead of accepting this offer, the French, on the contrary, let loose a wild reign of terror with rigour worse than ever before against Viet Minh's partisans. They even slaughtered a great number of our "condemned politicians" imprisoned at Yen Bay and Cao Bang.

Despite all that, our countrymen went on maintaining, vis-a-vis the French, a humane and even indulgent attitude. After the events of March

9th, the Viet Minh League helped many French to cross the borders, rescued others from Japanese prisons and, in general, protected the lives and properties of all the French in their territory.

In fact, since the autumn of 1940, our country ceased to be a French colony and became a Japanese possession.

After the Japanese surrender, our people, as a whole, rose up and proclaimed their sovereignty and founded the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

The truth is that we have wrung back our independence from Japanese hands and not from the French.

The French fled, the Japanese surrendered. Emperor Bao Dai abdicated, our people smashed the yoke which pressed hard upon us for nearly one hundred years, and finally made our Viet Nam an independent country. Our people at the same time overthrew the monarchical regime established tens of centuries ago, and founded the Republic.

For these reasons, we the members of the Provisional Government representing the entire people of Viet Nam, declare that we shall from now on have no more connections with imperialist France; we consider null and void all the treaties France has signed concerning Viet Nam, and we hereby cancel all the privileges that the French arrogated to themselves on our territory.

The Vietnamese people, animated by the same common resolve, are determined to fight to the death against all attempts at aggression by the French imperialists.

We are convinced that the Allies who have recognized the principles of equality of peoples at the Conferences of Teheran and San Francisco cannot but recognize the independence of Viet Nam.

A people which has so stubbornly opposed the French domination for more than 80 years, a people who, during these last years, so doggedly ranged itself and fought on the Allied side against Fascism, such a people has the right to be free, such a people must be independent.

For these reasons, we, the members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, solemnly declare to the world:

"Viet Nam has the right to be free and independent and, in fact, has become free and independent. The people of Viet Nam decide to mobilise all their spiritual and material forces and to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their right of Liberty and Independence."

State Department Advisers
Debate U.S. Support for the
French in Vietnam, 1949

[November 4, 1949]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. [Philip C.] Jessup [Ambassador-at-Large]

In his memorandum of November 1 on Indochina, Mr. [Charles] Yost argues that "a further major advance of Communism will be considered as,

and will in fact be, a defeat for the United States, whether or not we are directly involved." He therefore recommends, among other steps, support of the Bao Dai government (after the March 8 agreements are ratified) economic assistance to Bao Dai, etc.

It seems to me this point of view fails to take into consideration the possible, and I think the probable, consequences of such a decision. In grasping one horn of the dilemma, it ignores the other. My belief is that the Bao Dai regime is doomed. The compromises which the French are so reluctantly making cannot possibly save it. The Indochinese are pressing toward complete nationalism and nothing is going to stop them. They see all too clearly that France is offering them a kind of semi-colonialism; and to think that they will be content to settle for less than Indonesia has gained from the Dutch or India from the British is to underestimate the power of the forces that are sweeping Asia today.

What kind of independence is France offering the Indochinese today in the March 8th agreements?

(1) The foreign policy of Indochina is to be under the final control of France.

(2) French military bases are to be established and the Indochinese Army in time of war is to be under French direction.

(3) France is to be in charge of the so-called General Services:

(a) Control of immigration

(b) Communications

(c) Industrial development of Indochina

(4) Customs receipts are to be divided between France and Indochina in accordance with a formula to be agreed upon.

(5) Extraterritorial courts for French citizens are to be continued.

This shabby business is a mockery of all the professions we have made in the Indonesian case. It probably represents an improvement over the brutal colonialism of earlier years, but it is now too late in the history of the world to try to settle for the price of this cheap substitute. For the United States to support France in this attempt will cost us our standing and prestige in all of Southeast Asia. A lot of that prestige went down the drain with Chiang Kai-shek [President of the then-recently exiled Republic of China]; the rest of it will go down with the Bao Dai regime if we support it. Ambassador [to China, John] Stuart calls our relationship to this regime "shameful" and I am inclined to agree with him.

Ev[erett] Case argued yesterday that it is too late to do anything else except support Bao Dai. I disagree. It is never too late to change a mistaken policy, particularly when the policy involves the kind of damage that our adherence to the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] brought us. Why get our fingers burned twice?

Ho Chi Minh as an alternative is decidedly unpleasant, but as was pointed out at our meeting with FE yesterday, there may be unpredictable and unseen factors in this situation which in the end will be more favorable to us than now seems probable. The fundamental antipathy of the Indochinese to China is one of the factors. Faced with a dilemma like this the best possible course is to wait for the breaks. Certainly we should not play our cards in such a

way that once again, as in China, we seem to be allied with reaction. Whether the French like it or not, independence is coming to Indochina. Why, therefore, do we tie ourselves to the tail of their battered kite?

RAYMOND B. FOSDICK
[Consultant to the State Department on *Far Eastern Affairs*]

[To:] Mr. [Raymond B.] Fosdick
November 17, 1949

[From:] Mr. [W. Walton] Butterworth [Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs]

Your November 4 Memorandum to Ambassador Jessup Regarding Indochina.

Mr. Jessup has referred to me your memorandum to him of November 4, 1949 regarding Indochina which I have read with much interest.

In general, the considerations which you raise have been very much in the foreground of our thinking. I do not believe, however, that we can necessarily conclude, as you apparently have, that the Bao Dai regime is doomed. There is no doubt in my mind that Bao Dai's chances of establishing a viable non-Communist state are not brilliant, but I feel that under certain circumstances, which admittedly may never arise, he might be successful.

I think I can make our position clear by the following analogy: Because the odds are heavily against a horse entered in a given race, is no reason to withdraw that horse from the race although I agree that there is likewise no reason in these circumstances to back that horse heavily.

I agree that we should not support France in Indochina because such action will damage our standing and prestige in all of Southeast Asia, but I feel that without committing ourselves to another operation similar in some respects to that which took place in China, we must allow Bao Dai his opportunity to succeed and we must do nothing deliberately to eliminate his opportunity.

The Geneva Agreements, 1954

Final declaration, dated the 21st July, 1954, of the Geneva Conference on the problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in which the representatives of Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam, France, Laos, the People's Republic of China, the State of Viet-nam, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America took part.

1. The Conference takes note of the Agreements ending hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-nam and organizing international control and the supervision of the execution of the provisions of these agreements.
2. The Conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-nam; the Conference expresses its conviction that

the execution of the provisions set out in the present Declaration and in the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities will permit Cambodia, Laos [and] Viet-nam henceforth to play their part, in full independence and sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations.

3. The Conference takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of their intention to adopt measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the national community, in particular by participating in the next general elections, which, in conformity with the constitution of each of these countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in conditions of respect for fundamental freedoms.

4. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-nam prohibiting the introduction into Viet-nam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions. The Conference also takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, whether in war material, in personnel or in instructors except for the purpose of the effective defence of their territory and, in the case of Laos, to the extent defined by the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Laos.

5. The Conference takes note of the clauses in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-nam to the effect that no military base under the control of a foreign State may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. The Conference also takes note of the declarations of the Governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers.

6. The Conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the Agreement relating to Viet-nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary. The Conference expresses its conviction that the execution of the provisions set out in the present Declaration and in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities creates the necessary basis for the achievement in the near future of a political settlement in Viet-nam.

7. The Conference declares that, so far as Viet-nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a result of free general elections by secret

ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration of peace has been made and that all the necessary conditions obtain for free expression of the national will, general elections shall be held in July 1956, under the supervision of an international commission composed of representatives of the Member States of the International Supervisory Commission, referred to in the Agreement on the cessation of hostilities. Consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards.

8. The provisions of the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities intended to ensure the protection of individuals and of property must be most strictly applied and must, in particular, allow everyone in Viet-nam to decide freely in which zone he wishes to live.

9. The competent representative authorities of the Northern and Southern zones of Viet-nam, as well as the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals against persons who have collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, or against members of such persons' families.

10. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the Government of the French Republic to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops from the territory of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-nam, at the request of the governments concerned and within periods which shall be fixed by agreement between the parties except in the cases where, by agreement between the two parties, a certain number of French troops shall remain at specified points and for a specified time.

11. The Conference takes note of the declaration of the French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the problems connected with the re-establishment and consolidation of peace in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-nam, the French Government will proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-nam.

12. In their relations with Cambodia, Laos and Viet-nam, each member of the Geneva Conference undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the independence, the unity and the territorial integrity of the above-mentioned States, and to refrain from any interference in their internal affairs.

13. The members of the Conference agree to consult one another on any question which may be referred to them by the International Supervisory Commission, in order to study such measures as may prove necessary to ensure that the Agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-nam are respected.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 1964

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in [North] Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

President Lyndon Johnson's Advisers Debate Expanding the War, 1965

Robert S. McNamara

[26 June 1965; revised 1 July 1965]

Introduction

Our objective is to create conditions for a favorable settlement by demonstrating to the VC [Viet Cong]/DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam—North Vietnam] that the odds are against their winning. Under present conditions, however, the chances of achieving this objective are small—and the VC are winning now—largely because the ratio of guerrilla to anti-guerrilla forces is unfavorable to the government. With this in mind, we must choose among three courses of action with respect to South Vietnam: (1) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that can be arranged; (2) continue at about the present level, with US forces limited to say, 75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks while recognizing that our position will probably grow weaker; or (3) expand substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and the North Viet-

namese in the North and at the same time launch a vigorous effort on the political side to get negotiations started. An outline of the third of these approaches follows.

I. Expanded Military Moves

The following military moves should be taken together with the political initiatives in Part II below.

A. Inside South Vietnam. Increase US/SVN military strength in SVN enough to prove to the VC that they cannot win and thus to turn the tide of the war. . . .

B. Against North Vietnam. While avoiding striking population and industrial targets not closely related to the DRV's supply of war material to the VC, we should announce to Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow into and out of North Vietnam. . . .

II. Expanded Political Moves

Together with the above military moves, we should take the following political initiatives in order (a) to open a dialogue with Hanoi, Peking, and the VC looking toward a settlement in Vietnam, (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military involvement and support of North Vietnam until the time when settlement can be achieved, and (c) to cement the support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. While our approaches may be rebuffed until the tide begins to turn, they nevertheless should be made. . . .

III. Evaluation of the Above Program

A. Domestic US Reaction. Even though casualties will increase and the war will continue for some time, the United States public will support this course of action because it is a combined military-political program designed and likely to bring about a favorable solution to the Vietnam problem.

B. Communist Reaction to the Expanded Programs.

1. Soviet. The Soviets can be expected to continue to contribute materiel and advisors to the North Vietnamese. Increased US bombing of Vietnam, including targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, SAM [surface-to-air missile] sites and airfields, and mining of North Vietnamese harbors, might oblige the Soviet Union to enter the contest more actively with volunteers and aircraft. This might result in minor encounters between US and Soviet personnel.

2. China. So long as no US or GVN [Government of Vietnam—South Vietnam] troops invade North Vietnam and so long as no US or GVN aircraft attack Chinese territory, the Chinese probably will not send regular

ground forces or aircraft into the war. However, the possibility of a more active Soviet involvement in North Vietnam might precipitate a Chinese introduction of land forces, probably dubbed volunteers, to preclude the Soviets' taking a pre-eminent position in North Vietnam.

3. North Vietnam. North Vietnam will not move towards the negotiating table until the tide begins to turn in the south. When that happens, they may seek to counter it by sending large numbers of men into South Vietnam.

4. Viet Cong. The VC, especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to depend increasingly upon the PAVN [People's Army of Vietnam, regular forces of North Vietnam] forces as the war moves into a more conventional phase; but they may find ways of continuing almost indefinitely their present intensive military, guerrilla and terror activities, particularly if reinforced with some regular PAVN units. A key question on the military side is whether POL [petroleum-oil-lubricants], ammunition, and cadres can be cut off and if they are cut off whether this really renders the Viet Cong impotent. A key question on the political side is whether any arrangement acceptable to us would be acceptable to the VC.

C. Estimate of Success.

1. Militarily. The success of the above program from a military point of view turns on whether the increased effort stems the tide in the South; that in turn depends on two things—on whether the South Vietnamese hold their own in terms of numbers and fighting spirit, and on whether the US forces can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a role in which they have not been tested. The number of US troops is too small to make a significant difference in the traditional 10-1 government-guerrilla formula, but it is not too small to make a significant difference in the kind of war which seems to be evolving in Vietnam—a "Third Stage" or conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate and attack the enemy. (South Vietnam has 141 battalions as compared with an estimated equivalent number of VC battalions. The 44 US/3d country battalions mentioned above are the equivalent of 100 South Vietnamese battalions.)

2. Politically. It is frequently alleged that such a large expansion of US military personnel, their expanded military role (which would put them in close contact and offer some degree of control over South Vietnamese citizens), and the inevitable expansion of US voice in the operation of the GVN economy and facilities, command and government services will be unpopular; it is said that they could lead to the rejection of the government which supported this American presence, to an irresistible pressure for expulsion of the Americans, and to the greatly increased saleability of Communist propaganda. Whether these allegations are true, we do not know.

The political initiatives are likely to be successful in the early stages only to demonstrate US good faith; they will pay off toward an actual settlement only after the tide begins to turn (unless we lower our sights substantially). The tide almost certainly cannot begin to turn in less than a few months, and may not for a year or more; the war is one of attrition and will be a long one. Since troops once committed as a practical matter cannot be

removed, since US casualties will rise, since we should take call-up actions to support the additional forces in Vietnam, the test of endurance may be as much in the United States as in Vietnam.

3. *Generally (CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] estimate).* Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e., aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and until two conditions prevail: (1) they are forced to accept a situation in the war in the South which offers them no prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the case), we believe that they will persevere and accept extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions outlined above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.

Hanoi might do so in several ways. Going for a conference as a political way of gaining a respite from attack would be one. Alternatively it might reduce the level of insurgent activity in the hopes that this would force the US to stop its punishment of the North but not prevent the US and GVN from remaining subject to wearying harassment in the South. Or, Hanoi might order the VC to suspend operations in the hopes that in a period of temporary tranquility, domestic and international opinion would force the US to disengage without destroying the VC apparatus or the roots of VC strength. Finally, Hanoi might decide that the US/GVN will to fight could still be broken and the tide of war turned back in favor of the VC by launching a massive PAVN assault on the South. This is a less likely option in the circumstances we have posited, but still a contingency for which the US must be prepared.

George W. Ball

[1 July 1965]

1. *A Losing War:* The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong [formally, the National Liberation Front]. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms no matter how many hundred thousand *white foreign* (US) troops we deploy.

No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war—which is at the same time a civil war between Asians—in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN [South Vietnam]) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point:

(a) The sneak attack on the Danang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. *This raid was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants.*

(b) The B-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off.

(c) The search-and-destroy mission of the 173rd Airborne Brigade which spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment.

2. *The Question to Decide:* Should we limit our liabilities in South Vietnam and try to find a way out with minimal long-term cost?

The alternative—no matter what we may wish it to be—is almost certainly a protracted war involving an open-ended commitment of US forces, mounting US casualties, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.

3. *Need for a Decision Now:* So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the United States and a large part of the population of South Viet-Nam, organized and directed from North Viet-Nam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.

The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of US troops are committed to direct combat they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.

Once we suffer large casualties we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot—without national humiliation—stop short of achieving our complete objectives. *Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives—even after we had paid terrible costs.*

4. *A Compromise Solution:* Should we commit US manpower and prestige to a terrain so unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy—or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so?

5. *Costs of Compromise Solution:* The answer involves a judgment as to the costs to the United States of such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries in the area of South Viet-Nam, the credibility of our commitments, and our prestige around the world. In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial US forces to combat in South Viet-Nam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a long-term catastrophe. I believe we have tended greatly to exaggerate the costs involved in a compromise settlement. An appreciation of probable costs is contained in the attached memorandum.

6. With these considerations in mind, I strongly urge the following program:

A. Military Program

1. Complete all deployments already announced (15 battalions) but decide not to go beyond the total of 72,000 men represented by this figure.
2. Restrict the combat role of American forces to the June 9 announcement, making it clear to General Westmoreland that this announcement is to be strictly construed.
3. Continue bombing in the North but avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area and any targets nearer to the Chinese border than those already struck.

B. Political Program

1. In any political approaches so far, we have been the prisoners of whatever South Vietnamese Government was momentarily in power. If we are ever to move toward a settlement it will probably be because the South Vietnamese Government pulls the rug out from under us and makes its own deal *or* because we go forward quietly without advance pre-arrangement with Saigon.
2. So far we have not given the other side a reason to believe that there is *any* flexibility in our negotiating approach. And the other side has been unwilling to accept what *in their terms* is complete capitulation.
3. Now is the time to start some serious diplomatic feelers, looking towards a solution based on some application of the self-determination principle.
4. I would recommend approaching Hanoi rather than any of the other probable parties (the National Liberation Front, Moscow or Peiping). Hanoi is the only one that has given any signs of interest in discussion. Peiping has been rigidly opposed. Moscow has recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi. The National Liberation Front has been silent.
5. There are several channels to the North Vietnamese but I think the best one is through their representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. Initial feelers with Bo should be directed toward a discussion both of the four points we have put forward and the four points put forward by Hanoi as a basis for negotiation. We can accept all but one of Hanoi's four points and hopefully we should be able to agree on some ground rules for serious negotiation—including no pre-conditions.
6. If the initial feelers lead to further secret exploratory talks we can inject the concept of self-determination that would permit the Viet Cong some hope of achieving some of their political objectives through local elections or some other device.
7. The contact on our side should be handled through a non-governmental cutout (possibly a reliable newspaperman who can be repudiated.)
8. If progress can be made at this level the basis can be laid for a multi-national conference. At some point obviously the government of South Viet-Nam will have to be brought on board but I would postpone this step until after a substantial feeling out of Hanoi.
9. Before moving to any formal conference we should be prepared to agree that once the conference is started (a) the United States will stand down its bombing of the North, (b) the South Vietnamese will initiate no

offensive operations in the South, and (c) the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] will stop terrorism and other aggressive acts in the South.

10. Negotiations at the conference should aim at incorporating our understanding with Hanoi in the form of a multi-national agreement guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet Union and possibly other parties, and providing for an international mechanism to supervise its execution.

War Stories as Told by the Combatants, Collected 1981

Boot Camp

The bus pulls into the receiving area. There's a guy with a Smokey Bear hat out there really looking lean and mean. He gets on the bus and starts reeling this shit off, "All right, you'll grab your bag. You'll get off the bus. You'll fall into the yellow footprints painted on the pavement . . ."

It was really funny, a take-off from *Gomer Pyle*. The guy within arm's reach of the Marine was laughing just like everybody else. Smokey Bear whipped around and smacked him right in the face, knocked him halfway through the window. His head bounced off the luggage rack and he reeled back out in the aisle.

Smiles froze on faces. My heart stopped. We realized, "Hey, this guy isn't fooling around. He's going to come through this bus and kick all our asses." People started flying out of the door.

I came down with a couple of guys who were Puerto Rican street gang material from the big city and they thought they were bad news. They fell down the steps on top of me. We all stumble into the right footprints on the ground and Smokey marches us into some barracks and stands us at attention. He's yelling and screaming, really intimidating. You dumped all of your stuff out on a table and he went by and just threw everything away. We were too scared to say anything to him.

I was next to this big Puerto Rican dude. Smokey catches the dude looking at him out of the corner of his eye. He says, "Are you eye-fucking me, boy? I don't want your scuzzy eyes looking at me. You think this is funny? I hope you fuck up. I hate you Puerto Rican cocksuckers."

Eyes in the back of his head, Smokey sees a guy's eyes flick and he's there to punch him in the chest, five feet to the wall and back again. My knees were shaking. "What the fuck have I gotten myself into?"

Then they march us into some barracks. Bare mattresses and springs. It's like a concentration camp. They turn the lights on and leave us there. My stomach is in a knot. I'm lying there thinking, "What happened to my world?" Reality has suddenly turned to liquid shit before my very eyes. Kids

From *NAAM: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There* by Mark Baker. Copyright 1982. Reprinted with the permission of William Morrow & Co., Inc., Publishers, New York.

were crying, rolling in their bunks. I'm so depressed, I can't believe this is happening to me.

We're there for a couple of hours. You're in your civilian clothes and you've been in them for a couple of days. You feel like shit. When they march you out, all of a sudden it's by the numbers. All your hair's gone. You don't even know who you are. You get a duffel bag and they're dumping things in it. Everybody hates you and they're fucking with you left and right. You get your shots. You stand at attention. People are passing out on their feet. Going rigid and falling on their faces and the corpsmen are laughing at them. Nobody talks to you, they scream. Nothing they give you fits. You look like shit and you feel like shit. A bunch of drill instructors put you back in receiving and that's when the shit really hits the fan.

"Going Down South"

"Going down South" they called it in Okinawa. Braniff Airlines comes down all painted in their designer colors, puce and canary yellow. There were stewardesses on the plane, air conditioning. You would think we were going to Phoenix or something. But you know that you're going to Vietnam with a plane full of Marines.

It's about a two-and-a-half-hour flight down there. I was looking out the window as we were landing in Da Nang and there ain't nothing. It's just sticks, hovels with tin roofs. It's Dogpatch. That's what they called the area where we were.

The door opens and there's a blast of hot air that drops you to your knees. The head stewardess gets up and says, "Well, we're here in Da Nang. We hope you boys have a good tour. We'll see you one year from now." Those words kicked in an echo chamber in my mind—One Year From Now. Oh shit.

The First Guys I Saw Killed

I remember the first guys I saw killed. We were providing security for Army engineers on an island formed where two rivers split apart. The island was an R&R resort for the VC. The engineers were bulldozing it flat, making the whole place into a big parking lot to deny the VC that area. We'd go on sweeps and they would follow us in with the bulldozers. I was weapons platoon commander which meant I just sort of tagged along with one CO. It was all horseshit.

We were walking along and there was an explosion, we got popped. Then just dead silence.

"Corpsman up!" I was right next to the corpsman, so I went running with him. There was a guy up the trail who had been hit and a guy right next to us. The man closer to us was writhing on the ground, his back arching up. He was gasping, hoarse, dragging air into his lungs. There was a perfect round hole about the size of a pencil, right in the middle of his sternum.

Then he just stopped moving. The corpsman started giving him mouth-to-mouth resuscitation and I was giving him heart massage. No response. So the doc gave him a tracheotomy, opened his throat and stuck in a black tube. I started breathing through that and the corpsman gave him heart massage and we switched off.

We did it for about five minutes to no avail. The kid was gone, dead. Except for that little hole, there was no blood—just that little hole in his chest.

I looked at him—blond, All-American, crewcut with these pale ice-blue eyes. I stood up and looked back into those eyes. Those eyes looked right through me, right through my skull and out the back of my head. I turned around and looked at the sky in the direction that his eyes were looking to see what he was staring at. I thought I was going to see something.

It ran through my mind for a moment, "Did his mother feel something, did his father feel something, did anybody? Was she reaching for a can of peas in the supermarket and feel a tug or a jolt and not know what it was? Does anybody close to him know that he just died?"

He Bought the Farm

I was following a blood trail. He was losing more and more blood. It was twenty minutes after the fire fight, so some of the blood was dry right by the first bushes I came to. The color really changes as you follow along. It gets more bubbly, frothy-looking and wetter. Which means that you're gaining on the guy.

The tension really increases. I'd seen all those stories of these fucking heroes who are badly wounded and stay behind to keep the heat off their buddies. American war movies are filled with those scenes. You figured the Vietnamese are about the same.

As the trail got fresher my steps got slower. In the beginning there was a lot of blood, but I guess he probably stemmed the flow. When I came to him, he had this tourniquet on his left leg. That's where he got shot pretty bad. He'd done a good job with the tourniquet. You would figure that—well, maybe not, I guess he was an ignorant North Vietnamese soldier—he could have just put up a white flag and I would have left him alone, you know just captured him. He could have surrendered or something. I wasn't out there to fuck with him at that point.

I heard a noise and me and a couple of guys nearby all fired at one time and put about 300 rounds in that one bush. That was it. He bought the farm. We were pretty upset when we saw the guy. He didn't have a piece in his hand, he didn't have a weapon on him. About fifteen feet from his body was an AK.

He had on black tennis shoes, black canvas with the ball on the ankles like you used to wear when you were a kid. I had seen the print of his sneakers every once in a while on the ground.

An American P.O.W.

They harped on this business of, "Cooperate and we'll let you go home. Know the truth and you'll know what you have to do. As soon as you demonstrate your good faith, we'll let you go home." Demonstrating good faith was doing whatever they told you to do. In this case, they wanted me to write a political statement and sign it, which I refused to do. Eventually they wrote one for me and I refused to sign it, too.

Then the really severe physical torture started. Initially they were kind of crude, just being beaten with a heavy stick. Later on they became more sophisticated with their torture, particularly after I was moved to North Vietnam. One of their most effective tortures is one we called the rope trick. They tie your body in an extremely uncomfortable position and leave you like that for a couple of days.

Pain is a natural defense mechanism of the body. You touch something that's hot and the signals go up to the brain. The brain sends a message back to the muscles to pull back within a split second. It's an electrical system. Just like any electrical system, the human nervous system has circuit breakers built into it, because the brain can stand just so much pain sensation before it causes damage. When the pain gets too great, these circuit breakers shut off any feeling of pain. I'm sure you've heard cases of people losing limbs in a car wreck or other accident and they say they feel nothing. Several days later when the pain begins to return, the doctor is pleased because that means they are getting better. The pain has actually subsided before they can feel it. That same principle applies to torture.

A beating is not effective torture because after the first few blows, you don't feel anything. To force a person into an extremely uncomfortable position and then make him stay that way causes excruciating pain—but not quite enough to activate the circuit breakers.

One time I was put into a cage that was about eighteen inches square and five feet long. I'm broader than that in the shoulders and well over five feet tall, so you can imagine the cramping effect that had. I was chained hand and foot with wrist locks jammed tightly together, crammed into this cage and left there for three months. I had refused to bow to them. After three months they took me out and beat the living hell out of me and eventually taught me to bow. But I made them work for it.

Interrogating a Captured Vietnamese

When we had to interrogate some of the prisoners, we used to take three gooks up in a helicopter about a thousand feet. We're with an intelligence officer, G2 section from the general staff. He's in civilian clothes. We got our Kit Carson up with us to do the translation.

He grabs the first one and says, "Talk." We say, "*Crackadill, sakmile, crackadill.*" *Crackadill* was "to kill."

The first gook wouldn't talk. Intelligence give you the signal, thumb

toward the door, and you push the guy out. The other two gooks look to see this guy going out the helicopter door.

If the second guy didn't look like he wants to say something or he's lying, the intelligence officer says, "This guy out the door." You'd kick him out, because you're supposed to do what these intelligence officers tell you to do. They're speaking for the Army. The last prisoner is crying and he's like a typewriter. He's talking Vietnamese like crazy. That's human nature. This guy is running his mouth. You can't keep him from talking. You'd have to gag him to make him shut up. The Kit Carson is translating all this thing.

Before we get back to the base camp, after this guy do all the talking and the intelligence officer document everything, they kick him out the door anyway. Even the good gook, they'd give the word on him and throw him out the door.

We went up with three prisoners and we come back with zero prisoners. Nobody looks around and asks, "You went up with three prisoners, what happened to them?" We come back, and the intelligence officer goes back to wherever they go back to and carry the information to the command.

We're Supposed to Be Saving These People

I know Marines that made more gooks than they killed, just by treating them bad. It's funny when you don't expect to get mercy from anyone, you're very reluctant to show it. So you really breed hideous people over there, for the cause of National Defense. If you sit down here on the couch, it seems ugly. At the time, they weren't ugly. They were the things to do. Considering what else is going on this was nothing.

I Blew Up a Village One Time

I blew up a village one time. It was a village outside of which my squad got ambushed. Myself and my three squad leaders went in with three demolition packs, twenty pounds of C4 apiece.

We crimped the blasting caps onto the time fuses with our teeth. Stick them in the C4, load up the hooch with whatever there was. Smoke a cigarette to light up the fuse. Time it.

"Okay, we're lighting now."

"Hey, mine's not lit."

"You better get it fast, man, 'cause mine's lit."

"You got about five or six seconds. Go." Then we hauled ass out of there and BLAM. That was fun.

All the people were gone by then, so it was nothing but pigs and chickens. We got in line and shot the shit out of the livestock, pigs squealing across in front of us. It was a way of blowing off steam. We did My Lai with farm animals.

They Got Pears

We were running security on a road in a free-fire zone. In Vietnam you had a friendly zone and you had a free-fire zone. Anything that crossed into the free-fire zone was fair game. Any gook—woman, man, boy, girl—it was game to you. Anybody come along with a cart or just walking and we would go through their stuff.

We was in the field twenty days or so. Up in the depots in the rear they got steaks. We didn't get steaks. We ate mainly C-rations, lousy C-rations and dry things that came out of cans.

These gooks are riding by in a Lambretta, which is like a motorbike except you sit people in the back. We say, "Hey, let's stop these gooks." So we came out of the bush and we pulled them over to the side.

"What you got there? Hey, you VC? What do you got?" It was a baby-san and a papa-san. I guess she was a teenager, maybe about fifteen or sixteen. The papa-san was forty, a mature man.

They had a can of pears! American pears in a big green can marked with a big U.S. on it in large print. We say, "Isn't this some shit. Here we are in the field, we don't know what pears is. They got pears! and we don't have pears." I'll never forget the guys' faces in the unit from the GIs up to the captain. We are shit in the field, and the guys in the rear have given these gooks pears, man.

Right away a guy took a bayonet and he opened up the pears. We're fighting, literally fighting, to eat pears. Food! It wasn't fresh, but it was something other than the shit they put together chemically and pressed into a can. It was like the man brought me steak and potatoes and I was back in my mother's house eating Sunday dinner.

Most of the guys didn't get any pears. I got a few pears and I got to drink the juice in the can. So we turned around and we said, "Hey, ain't this something? These gooks is riding around with pears. How did you get pears?"

"GI give them to me." He worked in a mess hall back in the rear somewhere.

"The GIs gave you pears? Oh, yeah? For that, we're going to screw your daughter." So we went running, taking the daughter. She was crying. I think she was a virgin. We pulled her pants down and put a gun to her head.

Guys are taking turns screwing her. It was like an animal pack. "Hey, he's taking too long to screw her." Nobody was turning their back or nothing. We just stood on line and we screwed her.

I was taking her body by force. Guys were standing over her with rifles, while I was screwing her. She says, "Why are you doing this to me? Why?" Some of the gooks could talk very good. "Hey, you're black, why are you doing this to me?"

We turned back to the father and we said, "So, you got pears. GIs are nice enough to give them to you." All the Vietnamese carried this ID card. Big old plastic ID card with a picture on it that says that they are okay in

the Republic of Vietnam. So we ripped up the ID card. "Hey, we got a VC here, fellas. A VC stealing government stuff, huh? So you must be an infiltrator." We shot him.

As I said we was in that *free-fire zone*. We just started pumping rounds into him until the guy just busts open. He didn't have a face anymore.

Baby-san, she was crying. So a guy just put a rifle to her head and pulled the trigger just to put her out of the picture. Then we start pumping her with rounds. After we got finished shooting her, we start kicking them and stomping on them. That's what the hatred, the frustration was. After we raped her, took her cherry from her, after we shot her in the head, you understand what I'm saying, we literally start stomping her body.

And everybody was laughing about it. It's like seeing the lions around a just-killed zebra. You see them in these animal pictures, *Wild Kingdom* or something. The whole pride comes around and they start feasting on the body. We kicked the face in, kicked in the ribs and everything else.

Then we start cutting the ears off. We cut her nose off. The captain says, "Who's going to get the ears? Who's going to get the nose? So-and-so's turn to get the ears." A good friend of mine—a white guy from California—he flipped out in the Nam. The dude would fall down and cry, fall down and beg somebody to let him have the ears. Captain says, "Well, let So-and-so get the ears this time. You had the last kill. Let him get it this time." So we let this guy get the ears. We cut off one of her breasts and one guy got the breast. But the trophy was the ears. I had got a finger from the papa-san. That was about it, what I got from the incident. We let the bodies stay there mutilated.

Coming Home

I got back to the World, but this wasn't the World that I had left. I was born again. Like the Christians say, "Be born again." I did not fit into the real world anymore. For that twelve months in the Nam, I used to sit down and imagine what I would do in the World when I got back. I'll be with this woman, I'm going to do this and that. I came back to the World and I see people rioting about Nam. People hated GIs for being in the Nam. They was blaming us. I flipped out. I couldn't believe it.

I was in a VA hospital the first time I heard anybody saying, "Those fucking guys over in Vietnam. Look what they're doing." Man, it did something to me. Like I was guilty. I was a criminal. You had sentenced me to die. These are the same people from when I left the year before. I'm back but I don't belong. I wanted to go back to the Nam. I would have re-upped, but I was all wounded. This world was alienating, what people was talking about, what people was liking.

When my mom came to see me, she was a different person. I didn't hate her or nothing like that. But it was a different person. I couldn't communicate with her. I just looked at her. We talked and it was over.

I would just sit in the room in the hospital and my mind would flash back. I would have dreams about the Nam, the Nam and action. I could

see myself fighting, when I'm actually sitting in a VA hospital on the bed. I could see myself back in the Nam.

This is not the World. Lord, how can they do this to me? How can they bring me back to a World where I don't know what they're talking about? The United States is saying one thing. The people are saying something else. President Nixon is talking about the Silent Majority. The people are in the streets protesting. Who are these people out here protesting while there are guys in the Nam going through psychological and physical hell? Walking in monsoon when it rains for months at a time. Being sniped at. Being killed. Stepping in booby traps. Catching jungle rot. Getting eaten up by leeches. How can they say the war is unjust? How can you walk out of Nam and leave guys out in the field or missing in action?

I wasn't thinking they were un-American, but man, somebody pulled the rug out from under us. Somebody stabbed us in the back. The average person in the peace struggle didn't understand. We got stabbed in the back by the Army, while we were in the Army. We got stabbed in the back when we got back to the United States by the Peace people. We got stabbed in the back by President Nixon. He's talking nonsense. Henry Kissinger is talking about peace and ending the war. All this is garbage.

Wrong, Rambo! A Vietnam Veteran Looks Back, 1985

August 13, 1969. I was a 19-year-old member of India Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. As we moved through a strip of Vietnam known to the Americans as the Arizona Territory, we walked into an L-shaped ambush sprung by the North Vietnamese Army.

The enemy's opening fire instantly killed our battalion commander and his radio operator. Pinned to the ground in a rice paddy, the rest of us faced a choice: lie low and wait to be picked off one at a time, or charge the enemy guns, and, with luck, some of us would shoot our way to safety.

Our wounded captain gave the order to charge. Somehow we outfought the enemy and turned them back. But not without a heavy price: Half of India Company lay dead or wounded.

The next day, those of us who survived rested in the tranquil refuge of China Beach, just 23 miles from where the battle had taken place, and began to write letters to the families of those who didn't. Searching for reasons to explain their sons' sacrifice, I sat on China Beach and questioned why America had come to Vietnam. I didn't have the answers. I decided then that those who had died in Vietnam had died for nothing.

After my tour in Vietnam was up, I came back to the States and fought to end the war. There had to be another way to be for freedom in the world than through tragedies like Vietnam. By ending the war, we could bring the survivors home from a place where they never should have been.

On the 14th of August, 1985, however, 16 years to the day since my first time there, I returned to China Beach. I came not as a Marine in combat

gear, but as a civilian, a guest of the Vietnamese government, a member of the first group of American veterans to travel the land we fought upon with veterans of the Vietnamese army.

China Beach hadn't changed much. I thought again of those who had died. I thought of those who had come home wounded in body or spirit, many of them to die later in the States. I thought of how long it took our country to honor their service, finally on a black marble wall in Washington, on Veterans Day just three years ago tomorrow.

More than anything else, though, I no longer felt, as I had 16 years before, that my friends had died for nothing. For in their dying, we, as a nation, became wiser about ourselves, about the world and our role in it.

The members of India Company, and millions of other Americans, fought to change Vietnam. But, in the end, Vietnam changed little. What changed was America. Most Americans no longer accept the illusion that we can defy history, as we tried to in Vietnam. We should mourn the loss of American lives in Vietnam. We needn't mourn the loss of the illusions that brought us there.

Today, as a veteran, I am bothered that some would dishonor the memory of those who died in Vietnam by reviving America's shattered illusions. "Are you gonna let us win this time?" Rambo demands to know as impressionable kids watch in air-conditioned awe. As the Rambo illusion would have it, our gallant soldiers would've won in Vietnam if only they'd been turned loose by the bureaucratic wimps on the home front.

Wrong, Rambo, dead wrong. The bureaucrats didn't put us into a winnable war and then tie our hands. What they did was actually far worse. They put us into a war that was as unwinnable as it was immoral. They put us into a war that even they could not explain, and, so, young men died for old men's pride.

The fact is, the Vietnam War was probably settled long before we ever got there. Ho Chi Minh's forces gained dominance with their victory at Dien Bien Phu, a good decade before the first US Marine landed. And our ally, what we knew for 20 years as South Vietnam, wasn't a real nation but a make-believe government with little popular support. An illusion.

The illusion of American invincibility should have been left behind in Vietnam. But, then, there's Rambo, whose appeal, unfortunately, is not limited to youthful moviegoers alone. The Rambo mystique even invades Washington: While policy makers fall over themselves to flex American muscle in the world, macho journalists, from the safety of their typewriters, lob verbal grenades at tiny Third World countries.

The truth is, these veterans of tough-talk know as much about war as the gullible teen-agers flocking to suburban mall theaters for a glimpse of Rambo.

On China Beach this August, I wondered if we could have handled Vietnam differently. We tried to beat history—to stop the inevitable from happening, and we were wrong. We should learn from Vietnam that history can't be beaten.

But neither can history be ignored. We cannot allow the need to avoid

Thomas J. Vallely, "Dishonoring the Vietnam Tragedy," *Boston Globe*, November 10, 1985.

another Vietnam let us selfishly retreat from the realistic problems of the world. America *does* have a role to play in the world, as a moral force, a beacon of hope, a model of democratic idealism. We cannot turn our backs to injustice, whatever its form, be it terrorism, tyranny, poverty, hunger or torture.

We will come closer to knowing how we should engage the world if we understand what happened to us in Vietnam. We entered that war in defiance of history, we stayed there in defiance of morality. If we, as a nation, are to live up to our moral responsibilities and stand up for freedom around the globe, we had better be able to answer the questions I asked myself as a Marine at China Beach.

W E S S A Y S

In the first selection, political scientist and Southeast Asia specialist George McT. Kahin of Cornell University describes the critical sequence of events by which the United States supplanted the French and established its own client regime in South Vietnam. In the second essay, U. S. diplomatic historian George Herring of the University of Kentucky describes the final collapse of South Vietnam and discusses the war's legacy in both Southeast Asia and the United States.

The Cold War and American Intervention in Vietnam

GEORGE MCT. KAHIN

The middle months of 1954 marked a major turning point in the American relationship with Vietnam. It was during this period that the United States made the most fundamental decision of its thirty-year involvement—the critical prerequisite to the subsequent incremental steps that culminated in President [Lyndon] Johnson's famous escalation a decade later. Although this first major increase in American intervention was essentially political, it had important and clearly understood military implications. It was sustainable initially only by the threat of U. S. armed intervention and ultimately by its actual execution. So for the second time Washington attempted to establish an anticommunist government in Vietnam; but now it acted alone, no longer in association with France, and its effort was focused primarily on just the southern half of the country.

In this new departure the Eisenhower administration intervened directly in Vietnam, displacing France as the major external power. Rather than working through the French to support the Bao Dai regime, which claimed authority over all Vietnam, the United States took on the mission of establishing a separate noncommunist state in just the southern regroupment zone prescribed by the Geneva Agreements. The administration believed that, without the encumbrance of the old French colonial presence to undermine

From Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam by George McT. Kahin. Copyright © 1986 by George McT. Kahin. Reprinted by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

its nationalist legitimacy, a revamped Bao Dai regime, with Ngo Dinh Diem as its prime minister, could, if given sufficient American support, stand a good chance of competing effectively with the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the government in the North led by Ho Chi Minh]. In addition, though their hopes on this score were apparently not so strong, senior U.S. officials thought it possible that this American-backed government would ultimately be able to absorb the North into a single anticommunist state. However unrealistic this second proposition, it was still the presidentially endorsed U.S. objective at least as late as 1958. In April of that year the National Security Council [NSC] reiterated its aim to "work toward the weakening of the Communists in the North and South Viet Nam in order to bring about the eventual peaceful reunification of a free and independent Viet Nam under anti-Communist leadership."

To understand this major shift in the United States' approach to Vietnam, one must assess the changed pattern of factors influencing American policy in the immediate post-Geneva period. The original, European-oriented calculations that had propelled the United States into its limited intervention in the early postwar years increasingly yielded place to considerations rooted primarily in the new ascendancy of communist power in China. Europe did still continue to exert an important influence on American Vietnam policy right through the Geneva Conference, however, because of the pivotal importance of the projected European Defense Community [EDC] to Washington's Soviet containment strategy. But when the French Parliament defeated EDC soon after the close of the conference, European objectives ceased to have a significant effect on American policy toward Vietnam.

Although the French rejection of EDC only temporarily delayed German rearmament, it entailed the loss of most of France's once-formidable leverage with the United States, which had derived from Washington's uncertainty regarding French domestic politics and the extent to which France could be counted on to cooperate with American economic and military objectives in Europe. The potential of communism in France had by now dramatically ebbed, and the balance of her internal politics no longer threatened her continued presence in an American-led military alignment aimed at containing Soviet power in Europe. Indeed, the large noncommunist majority in the Chamber of Deputies saw such an alignment as clearly in their country's self-interest. The shoe was now on the other foot, for, as France began to face mounting militant nationalist pressures in her North African colonies during the fall of 1954, she badly needed American backing to maintain her ascendancy there.

Other factors important to the previous American preoccupation with Vietnam were, however, still operative: the enduring myth that communism was global and monolithic; the conviction that China was expansionist; and American domestic political pressures centering on the "loss of China" syndrome, whereby all administrations feared being accused of losing additional territory to communist control. But it was, of course, against the Democrats—not [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower's Republicans—that the


While we proceed to safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests. And the elimination of war and arms is clearly in the interest of both.

No treaty, however much it may be to the advantage of all, however tightly it may be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks of deception and evasion. But it can — if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcement and it is sufficiently in the interests of its signers — offer far more security and far fewer risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.

The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war. We do not want a war. We do not now expect a war. This generation of Americans has already had enough — more than enough — of war and hate and oppression. We shall be prepared if others wish it. We shall be alert to try to stop it. But we shall also do our part to build a world of peace where the weak are safe and the strong are just.

We are not helpless before that task or hopeless of its success. Confident and unafraid, we labor on — not toward a strategy of annihilation but toward a strategy of peace. Thank you.

15 THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION (1964)



Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and


Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.



My fellow Americans: One week ago, half a world away, our Nation was faced by the challenge of deliberate and unprovoked acts of aggression in southeast Asia.

The cause of peace clearly required that we respond with a prompt and unmistakable reply.

As Commander in Chief the responsibility was mine — and mine alone. I gave the orders for that reply, and it has been given.

But, as President, there rested upon me still another responsibility — the responsibility of submitting our course to the representatives of the people, for them to verify it or veto it.

I directed that to be done last Tuesday.

Within 24 hours the resolution before me now had been placed before each House of Congress. In each House the resolution was promptly examined in committee and reported for action.

In each House there followed free and serious debate.

In each House the resolution was passed on Friday last — with a total of 502 votes in support and 2 opposed.

Thus, today, our course is clearly known in every land.

There can be no mistake — no miscalculation — of where America stands or what this generation of Americans stand for.

The unanimity of the Congress reflects the unanimity of the country.

The resolution is short. It is straightforward. I hope that it will be read around the world.

The position of the United States is stated plainly. To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply.

To any in southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it.

In that region there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek — no territory, no military position, no political ambition.

Our one desire — our one determination — is that the people of southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way.

This resolution stands squarely within the four corners of the Constitution of the United States. It is clearly consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

This is another new page in the outstanding record of accomplishments the 88th Congress is writing.

Americans of all parties and philosophies can be justly proud — and justly grateful. Proud that democracy has once again demonstrated its capacity to act swiftly and decisively against aggressors. Grateful that there is in our National Government understanding, accord, and unity between the executive and legislative branches — without regard to partisanship.

This is a great strength that we must always preserve.

This resolution confirms and reinforces powers of the Presidency. I pledge to all Americans to use those powers with all the wisdom and judgment God grants to me.

It is everlastingly right that we should be resolute in reply to aggression and steadfast in support of our friends.

But it is everlastingly necessary that our actions should be careful and should be measured.

We are the most powerful of all nations — we must strive also to be the most responsible of nations.

So, in this spirit, and with this pledge, I now sign this resolution.

16 THE NIXON DOCTRINE (1969)

The Nixon Doctrine reflected a shift in emphasis in American support for its overseas allies. The doctrine emerged out of a number of statements by President Nixon and other members of his administration, principally Nixon's statement to congress on the Pacific island of Guam during his Asian tour of July 1969, extracts of which are reproduced below. The new emphasis was to be on the US helping its allies to help themselves more in Vietnam than was done in American withdrawal from direct involvement in the fighting, while continuing to provide direct assistance along with technical and economic aid. Another element of the doctrine, not addressed in the Guam statement, concerned American desire for the increasingly prosperous European allies to contribute more towards the cost of their own security. The Nixon Doctrine expressed that the United States was prepared to bear in the Cold War had its limits.

[...]

I think what would be of greatest interest to you before we go to your questions is to give you the perspective that I have with regard to Asia and America's role in Asia.

[...]

The United States is going to be facing, we hope before too long — no one can say how long, but before too long — a major decision: What will be its role in Asia and in the Pacific after the end of the war in Vietnam? We will be facing that decision, but also the Asian nations will be wondering about what that decision is.

When I talked to Prime Minister Gorton [of Australia], for example, he indicated, in the conversations he had had with a number of Asian leaders, they all wondered whether the United States, because of its frustration over the war in Vietnam, because of its earlier frustration over the war in Korea —



U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #14:

103. "The Nixon Doctrine, 1969."
104. "The Javits Act: 'War-Powers Resolution', 1973."
105. "*Killing Hope*: Chile, 1964-1973."
106. "President Carter and 'Crisis of the American Spirit', 1979."
107. "*Killing Hope*: Iraq, 1972-1975."

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
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
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When I talked to Prime Minister Gorton [of Australia], for example, he indicated, in the conversations he had had with a number of Asian leaders, they all wondered whether the United States, because of its frustration over the war in Vietnam, because of its earlier frustration over the war in Korea —



whether the United States would continue to play a significant role in Asia, or whether the United States, like the French before, and then the British, and, of course, the Dutch — whether we would withdraw from the Pacific and play a minor role.

This is a decision that will have to be made, of course, as the war comes to an end. But the time to develop the thinking which will go into that decision is now. I think that one of the weaknesses in American foreign policy is that too often we react rather precipitately to events as they occur. We fail to have the perspective and the long-range view which is essential for a policy that will be viable.

As I see it, even though the war in Vietnam has been, as we all know, a terribly frustrating one, and, as a result of that frustration, even though there would be a tendency for many Americans to say, 'After we are through with that, let's not become involved in Asia', I am convinced that the way to avoid becoming involved in another war in Asia is for the United States to continue to play a significant role.

I think the way that we could become involved would be to attempt withdrawal, because, whether we like it or not, geography makes us a Pacific power. And when we consider, for example, that Indonesia at its closest point is only 14 miles from the Philippines, when we consider that Guam, where we are presently standing, of course, is in the heart of Asia, when we consider the interests of the whole Pacific as they relate to Alaska and Hawaii, we can all realize this.

Also, as we look over the historical perspective, while World War II began in Europe, for the United States it began in the Pacific. It came from Asia. The Korean war came from Asia. The Vietnamese war came from Asia.

So, as we consider our past history, the United States' involvement in war so often has been tied to our Pacific policy, or our lack of a Pacific policy, as the case might be.

As we look at Asia today, we see that the major world power which adopts a very aggressive attitude and a belligerent attitude in its foreign policy, Communist China, of course, is in Asia, and we find that the two minor world powers — minor, although they do have significant strength as we have learned — that most greatly threaten the peace of the world, that adopt the most belligerent foreign policy, are in Asia, North Korea and, of course, North Vietnam.

When we consider those factors we, I think, realize that if we are thinking down the road, down the long road — not just 4 years, 5 years, but 10, 15 or 20 — that if we are going to have peace in the world, that potentially the greatest threat to that peace will be in the Pacific.

I do not mean to suggest that the Mid-east is not a potential threat to the peace of the world and that there are not problems in Latin America that concern us, or in Africa and, of course, over it all, we see the great potential

conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the East-West conflict between the two super powers.

But as far as those other areas are concerned, the possibility of finding some kind of solution, I think, is potentially greater than it is in the Asian area.

Pursuing that line of reasoning a bit further then, I would like to put it in a more positive sense: When we look at the problems in Asia, the threat to peace that is presented by the growing power of Communist China, the belligerence of North Korea and North Vietnam, we should not let that obscure the great promise that is here.

As I have often said, the fastest rate of growth in the world is occurring in non-Communist Asia. Japan, in the last 10 years, has tripled its GNP [Gross National Product]; South Korea has doubled its GNP; Taiwan has doubled its GNP; Thailand has doubled its GNP. The same is true of Singapore and of Malaysia.

The record in some of the other countries is not as impressive. But consider the Philippines where there are very grave problems, as you will learn when you are there, political problems and others. One of the brighter spots is that when I was in the Philippines in 1953, it was a major importer of rice. Today, as a result of 'miracle rice', it no longer has to import it. Some progress is being made in an area like that.

When we look at India and Pakistan and the terribly difficult and traumatic experience they have had, because of their conflict with each other more than with the problems they have had from the outside, the picture tends to be rather black.

But India's rate of growth as a result of 2 good crop years, and a reasonably good one this year, has been at 6 per cent. If we can get the population problem — if they can — under better control the promise for the future, of course, is rather bright.

As far as Pakistan is concerned, they are emphasizing growth in manufacturing. They are growing at the rate of 10 per cent per year in manufacturing and from 1965 to 1970 their agricultural production will go up 21 per cent.

When you visit these two countries, even in the brief visits that we have, when you see the poverty which strikes you in the face, if you have not seen it before, with a tremendous impact, you will wonder whether there is a great deal to hope for. But all I can say is that having seen what it was in 1953 and seeing what it was again in 1967, the amount of progress that has taken place, even in those countries where the rate has not been as high as others, is a very, very formidable thing to see.

So, what I am trying to suggest is this: As we look at Asia, it poses, in my view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to the peace of the world, and, for that reason the United States should continue to play a significant role. It also poses, it seems to me, the greatest hope for progress in the world — progress in the world

because of the ability, the resources, the ability of the people, the resources physically that are available in this part of the world. And for these reasons, I think we need policies that will see that we play a part and a part that is appropriate to the conditions that we will find.

Now, one other point I would make very briefly is that in terms of this situation as far as the role we should play, we must recognize that there are two great, new factors which you will see, incidentally, particularly when you arrive in the Philippines — something you will see there that we didn't see in 1953, to show you how quickly it has changed: a very great growth of nationalism, nationalism even in the Philippines, vis-à-vis the United States, as well as other countries in the world. And, also, at the same time that national pride is becoming a major factor, regional pride is becoming a major factor.

The second factor is one that is going to, I believe, have a major impact on the future of Asia, and it is something that we must take into account. Asians will say in every country that we visit that they do not want to be dictated to from the outside, Asia for the Asians. And that is what we want, and that is the role we should play. We should assist, but we should not dictate.

At this time, the political and economic plans that they are gradually developing are very hopeful. We will give assistance to those plans. We, of course, will keep the treaty commitments that we have.

But as far as our role is concerned, we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.

This is going to be a difficult line to follow. It is one, however, that I think, with proper planning, we can develop.

17 THE JAVITS ACT: 'WAR-POWERS RESOLUTION' (1973)

During the Vietnam War, successive Presidents had effectively escalated the conflict in different stages through their own initiatives with little or no consultation with the Congress. The powers of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces had been a cause of concern in certain quarters for some time and the defeat in Vietnam and the fall in presidential prestige as the Watergate scandal emerged allowed Congress to put a curb on them. President Nixon vetoed the Act, claiming it undermined America's ability to respond effectively to international crises, but his veto was overturned by Congress. The war powers resolution remains a source of tension between President and Congress.

SECTION 1

This joint resolution may be cited as the 'war-powers resolution'.

SECTION 2

(A) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States armed forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations. [...]

SECTION 4

(A) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States armed forces are introduced

- (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
- (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for developments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
- (3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States armed forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation; the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President pro Tempore of the Senate a report, in writing, setting forth
 - (a) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of the United States armed forces;
 - (b) the Constitutional and legislative authority under which such introduction took place; and
 - (c) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.

(B) The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may request in the fulfillment of its Constitutional responsibilities with respect to committing the nation to war and to the use of United States armed forces abroad.

(C) Whenever United States armed forces are introduced into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (A) of this section, the President shall, so long as such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less often than once every six months.


SECTION 5

[...]

(B) Within 60 calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to Section 4 (A) (1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States armed forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States armed forces, (2) has extended by law such 60-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such 60-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional 30 days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States armed forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(C) Notwithstanding subsection (B), at any time that United States armed forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

18 PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE SOVIET UNION AS AN 'EVIL EMPIRE' (1983)



During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas — that's their name for religion — or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything

embassy in Montevideo, stating that they wished to go to a Socialist country to pursue their revolutionary activities. They were, they said, under constant surveillance and harassment from the Uruguayan police. The Czech ambassador was horrified by their request and threw them out, saying that there was no police persecution in Uruguay. When the revolutionaries camped in his garden the ambassador called the police.²⁹

34. Chile 1964-1973

A hammer and sickle stamped on your child's forehead

When Salvador Allende, a committed Marxist, came within three percent of winning the Chilean presidency in 1958, the United States decided that the next election, in 1964, could not be left in the hands of providence, or democracy.

Washington took it all very gravely. At the outset of the Kennedy administration in 1961, an electoral committee was established, composed of top-level officials from the State Department, the CIA and the White House. In Santiago, a parallel committee of embassy and CIA people was set up.¹

"U.S. government intervention in Chile in 1964 was blatant and almost obscene," said one intelligence officer strategically placed at the time. "We were shipping people off right and left, mainly State Dept. but also CIA, with all sorts of covers." All in all, as many as 100 American operatives were dedicated to the operation.²

They began laying the groundwork for the election years ahead, a Senate investigating committee has disclosed, "by establishing operational relationships with key political parties and by creating propaganda and organizational mechanisms capable of influencing key sectors of the population." Projects were undertaken "to help train and organize 'anti-communists' among peasants, slum dwellers, organized labor, students, the media, etc."³

After channeling funds to several non-leftist parties, the electoral team eventually settled on a man of the center, Eduardo Frei, the candidate of the Christian Democratic Party, as the one most likely to block Allende's rise to power. The CIA underwrote more than half the party's total campaign costs,⁴ one of the reasons that the Agency's overall electoral operation reduced the U.S. Treasury by an estimated \$20 million⁵—much more per voter than that spent by the Johnson and Goldwater campaigns combined in the same year in the United States. The bulk of the expenditures went toward propaganda. As the Senate committee described it:

In addition to support for political parties, the CIA mounted a massive anti-communist propaganda campaign. Extensive use was made of the press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers, and wall painting. It was a "scare campaign", which relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads and was directed especially to women. Hundreds of thousands of copies of the anti-communist pastoral letter of Pope Pius XI were distributed by Christian Democratic organizations. They carried the designation, "printed privately by citizens without political affiliation, in order more broadly to disseminate its content." "Disinformation" and "black propaganda"—material which purported to originate from another source, such as the Chilean Communist Party—were used as well.⁶

The scare campaign played up to the fact that women in Chile, as elsewhere in Latin America, are traditionally more religious than men, more susceptible to being alarmed by

the specter of "godless, atheist communism". One radio spot featured the sound of a machine gun, followed by a woman's cry: "They have killed my child—the communists." The announcer then added in impassioned tones: "Communism offers only blood and pain. For this not to happen in Chile, we must elect Eduardo Frei president."⁷

Other scare tactics centered around warnings of Russian control, and that the left would confiscate everything near, dear and holy.

The committee report continued:

The propaganda campaign was enormous. During the first week of intensive propaganda activity (the third week of June 1964), a CIA-funded propaganda group produced twenty radio spots per day in Santiago and on 44 provincial stations; twelve-minute news broadcasts five times daily on three Santiago stations and 24 provincial outlets; thousands of cartoons, and much paid press advertising. By the end of June, the group produced 24 daily newscasts in Santiago and the provinces, 26 weekly "commentary" programs, and distributed 3,000 posters daily.⁸

One poster which appeared in the thousands showed children with a hammer and sickle stamped on their foreheads.⁹

Newspaper articles from elsewhere in Latin America which supported the political lines of the CIA campaign were collected and reprinted in Chile. Undoubtedly, many of these articles had been written in the first place by CIA stations in the particular countries. There were also endorsements of Frei solicited from famous personages abroad, advertisements such as a "message from the women of Venezuela,"¹⁰ and a vitriolic anti-communist radio broadcast by Juanita Castro, sister of Fidel, who was on a CIA-organized speaking tour of South America: "If the Reds win in Chile," she said, "no type of religious activity will be possible... Chilean mother, I know you will not allow your children to be taken from you and sent to the Communist bloc, as in the case of Cuba."¹¹

The Senate committee also revealed that:

In addition to buying propaganda piecemeal, the [CIA] Station often purchased it wholesale by subsidizing Chilean media organizations friendly to the United States. Doing so was propaganda writ large. Instead of placing individual items, the CIA supported—or even founded—friendly media outlets which might not have existed in the absence of Agency support.

From 1953 through 1970 in Chile, the Station subsidized wire services, magazines written for intellectual circles, and a right-wing weekly newspaper.¹²

Of one subsidized newspaper, a State Department veteran of the campaign recalls that "The layout was magnificent. The photographs were superb. It was a Madison Avenue product far above the standards of Chilean publications."¹³

The same could be said about the electioneering itself. Besides running political action projects on its own in a number of important voting blocks, the CIA directed the Christian Democrats' campaign along American-style lines, with voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives, and professional management firms to carry out public opinion surveys.¹⁴ To top it all off, they sent for a ringer—an election specialist from the staff of that eminent connoisseur and guardian of free elections, Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago.¹⁵ What the function of Daley's man in Chile was, can only be guessed at.

Several of the grassroots programs funded by the CIA were those run by Roger Vekemans, a Belgian Jesuit priest who arrived in Chile in 1957 and founded a network of social-action organizations, one of which grew to have 100 employees and a \$30 million annual budget. By his own declaration in 1963, Vekemans received \$5 million from the CIA as well as a like amount from AID to guide his organizations' resources in support of the

Christian Democrats and Eduardo Frei, with whom Vekemans had close relations.¹⁶ The Jesuit's programs served the classic function of channeling revolutionary zeal along safe reformist paths. Church people working for the CIA in the Third World have typically been involved in gathering information about the activities and attitudes of indigenous peasants and workers, spotting the troublemakers, recruiting likely agents, preaching the gospel of anti-communism, acting as funding conduits, and serving as a religious "cover" for various Agency operations. An extreme anti-communist, Vekemans was a front-line soldier in the struggle of the Christian Democrats and the Catholic Church against the "liberation theology," then gaining momentum amongst the more liberal clergy in Latin America and which would lead to the historic dialogue between Christianity and Marxism.¹⁷

The operation worked. It worked beyond expectations. Frei received 56 percent of the vote to Allende's 39 percent. The CIA regarded "the anti-communist scare campaign as the most effective activity undertaken", noted the Senate committee.¹⁸ This was the tactic directed toward Chilean women in particular. As things turned out, Allende won the men's vote by 67,000 over Frei (in Chile men and women vote separately), but amongst the women Frei came out ahead by 469,000 ... testimony, once again, to the remarkable ease with which the minds of the masses of people can be manipulated, in any and all societies.

What was there about Salvador Allende that warranted all this feverish activity? What threat did he represent, this man against whom the great technical and economic resources of the world's most powerful nation were brought to bear? Allende was a man whose political program, as described by the Senate committee report, was to "redistribute income [two percent of the population received 46 percent of the income] and reshape the Chilean economy, beginning with the nationalization of major industries, especially the copper mines; greatly expanded agrarian reform; and expanded relations with socialist and communist countries."¹⁹

A man committed to such a program could be expected by American policy makers to lead his country along a path independent of the priorities of US foreign policy and the multinationals. (As his later term as president confirmed, he was independent of any other country as well.)

The CIA is an ongoing organization. Its covert activities are ongoing, each day, in each country. Between the 1964 and 1970 presidential elections many of the programs designed to foster an anti-leftist mentality in different sections of the population continued; much of the propaganda and engineering mechanisms remained in place to support candidates of the 1965 and 1969 congressional elections; in the latter election, financial support was given to a splinter socialist party in order to attract votes away from Allende's Socialist Party; this reportedly deprived the party of a minimum of seven congressional seats.²⁰

The Senate committee described some of the other individual covert projects undertaken by the CIA during this period:

- * Wrestling control of Chilean university student organizations from the communists;
- * Supporting a women's group active in Chilean political and intellectual life;
- * Combatting the communist-dominated *Central Unica de Trabajadores Chilenos* (CUTCh) and supporting democratic [i.e., anti-communist] labor groups; and,
- * Exploiting a civic action front group to combat communist influence within cultural and intellectual circles.²¹

In 1968, at the same time the CIA was occupied in subverting unions dominated by the Chilean Communist Party, a US Senate committee was concluding that the Latin American labor movement had largely abandoned its revolutionary outlook: "Even the Communist-dominated unions, especially those which follow the Moscow line, now generally accept the peaceful road as a viable alternative."²²

"I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own people."²³

Thus spoke Henry Kissinger, principal adviser to the President of the United States on matters of national security. The date was 27 June 1970, a meeting of the National Security Council's 40 Committee, and the people Kissinger suspected of imminent irresponsibility were the Chileans whom he feared might finally elect Salvador Allende as their president.

The United States did not stand by idly. At this meeting approval was given to a \$300,000 increase in the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation which was already underway. The CIA trained its disinformation heavy artillery on the Chilean electorate, firing shells marked: "An Allende victory means violence and Stalinist repression."²⁴ Black propaganda was employed to undermine Allende's coalition and support by sowing dissent between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, the main members of the coalition, and between the Communist Party and the CUTCh.²⁵

Nonetheless, on 4 September Allende won a plurality of the votes. On 24 October, the Chilean Congress would meet to choose between him and the runnerup, Jorge Alessandri of the conservative National Party. By tradition, Allende was certain to become president.

The United States had seven weeks to prevent him from taking office. On 15 September, President Nixon met with Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell. Helms' handwritten notes of the meeting have become famous: "One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile! ... not concerned with risks involved ... \$10,000,000 available, more if necessary ... make the economy scream ..."²⁶

Funds were authorized by the 40 Committee to bribe Chilean congressmen to vote for Alessandri,²⁷ but this was soon abandoned as infeasible, and under intense pressure from Richard Nixon, American efforts were concentrated on inducing the Chilean military to stage a coup and then cancel the congressional vote altogether.²⁸ At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger made it clear to the CIA that an assassination of Allende would not be unwellcome. One White House options-paper discussed various ways this could be carried out.²⁹

A fresh propaganda campaign was initiated in Chile to impress upon the military, amongst others, the catastrophe which would befall the nation with Allende as president. In addition to the standard communist horror stories, it was made known that there would be a cutoff of American and other foreign assistance; this was accompanied by predictions/rumors of the nationalization of everything down to small shops, and of economic collapse. The campaign actually affected the Chilean economy adversely and a major financial panic ensued.³⁰

In private, Chilean military officers were warned that American military aid would come to a halt if Allende were seated.³¹

During this interim period, according to the CIA, over 700 articles, broadcasts, editorials and similar items were generated in the Latin American and European media as a direct result of Agency activity. This is apart from the "real" media stories inspired by the planted ones. Moreover, journalists in the pay of the CIA arrived in Chile from at least ten different countries to enhance their material with on-the-spot credibility.³²

The following portion of a CIA cable of 25 September 1970 offers some indication of the scope of such media operations:

Sao Paulo, Tegucigalpa, Buenos Aires, Lima, Montevideo, Bogota, Mexico City report continued replay of Chile theme materials. Items also carried in *New York Times* and *Washington Post*. Propaganda activities continue to generate good coverage of Chile developments along our theme guidance.³³

The CIA also gave "inside" briefings to American journalists about the situation in Chile. One such briefing provided to *Time* enlightened the magazine as to Allende's intention to support violence and destroy Chile's free press. This, observed the Senate report, "resulted in a change in the basic thrust" of the *Time* story.³⁴

When Allende criticized the leading conservative newspaper *El Mercurio* (heavily funded by the CIA), the Agency "orchestrated cables of support and protest from foreign newspapers, a protest statement from an international press association, and world press coverage of the association's protest."³⁵

A cable sent from CIA headquarters to Santiago on 19 October expressed concern that the coup still had

no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be [the military's] claim to a coup to save Chile from communism.

One of headquarters' suggestions was the fabrication of:

Firm intelligence that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state ... With appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intelligence report which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros [the police].³⁶

Meanwhile, the Agency was in active consultation with several Chilean military officers who were receptive to the suggestion of a coup. (The difficulty in finding such officers was described by the CIA as a problem in overcoming "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military".)³⁷ They were assured that the United States would give them full support short of direct military involvement. The immediate obstacle faced by the officers was the determined opposition of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, René Schneider, who insisted that the constitutional process be followed. He would have to be "removed".

In the early morn of 22 October the CIA passed "sterilized" machine guns and ammunition to some of the conspirators. (Earlier they had passed tear gas.) That same day, Schneider was mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap (or "kidnap") on his way to work. The CIA station in Santiago cabled its headquarters that the general had been shot with the same kind of weapons it had delivered to the military plotters, although the Agency later claimed to the Senate that the actual assassins were not the same ones it had passed the weapons to.³⁸

The assassination did not avail the conspirators' purpose. It only served to rally the army around the flag of constitutionalism; and time was running out. Two days later, Salvador Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. On 3 November he took office as president.

The stage was set for a clash of two experiments. One was Allende's "socialist" experiment aimed at lifting Chile from the mire of underdevelopment and dependency and the poor from deprivation. The other was, as CIA Director William Colby later put it, a "prototype or laboratory experiment to test the techniques of heavy financial investment in an

effort to discredit and bring down a government."³⁹

Although there were few individual features of this experiment which were unique for the CIA, in sum total it was perhaps the most multifarious intervention ever undertaken by the United States. In the process it brought a new word into the language: destabilization.

"Not a nut or bolt [will] be allowed to reach Chile under Allende", warned then-American Ambassador Edward Korry before the confirmation.⁴⁰ The Chilean economy, so extraordinarily dependent upon the United States, was the country's soft underbelly, easy to pound. Over the next three years, new US government assistance programs for Chile plummeted almost to the vanishing point; similarly with loans from the US Export-Import Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, in which the United States held what amounted to a veto; and the World Bank made no new loans at all to Chile during 1971-73. US government financial assistance or guarantees to American private investment in Chile were cut back sharply and American businesses were given the word to tighten the economic noose.⁴¹

What this boycott translated into were things like the many buses and taxis out of commission in Chile due to a lack of replacement parts; and similar difficulties in the copper, steel, electricity and petroleum industries. American suppliers refused to sell needed parts despite Chile's offer to pay cash in advance.⁴²

Multinational ITT, which didn't need to be told what to do, stated in a 1970 memorandum: "A more realistic hope among those who want to block Allende is that a swiftly deteriorating economy will touch off a wave of violence leading to a military coup."⁴³

In the midst of the near disappearance of economic aid, and contrary to its warnings, the United States increased its military assistance to Chile during 1972 and 1973 as well as training Chilean military personnel in the United States and Panama.⁴⁴ The Allende government, caught between the devil and the deep blue sea, was reluctant to refuse this "assistance" for fear of antagonizing its military leaders.

Perhaps nothing produced more discontent in the population than the shortages, the little daily annoyances when one couldn't get a favorite food, or flour or cooking oil, or toilet paper, bed sheets or soap, or the one part needed to make the TV set or the car run; or, worst of all, when a nicotine addict couldn't get a cigarette. Some of the scarcity resulted from Chile being a society in transition: various changeovers to state ownership, experiments in workers' control, etc. But this was minor compared to the effect of the aid squeeze and the practices of the omnipresent American corporations. Equally telling were the extended strikes in Chile, which relied heavily on CIA financial support for their prolongation.⁴⁵

In October 1972, for example, an association of private truck owners instituted a work-stoppage aimed at disrupting the flow of food and other important commodities, including in their embargo even newspapers which supported the government (subtlety was not the order of the day in this ultra-polarized country). On the heels of this came store closures, countless petit-bourgeois doing their bit to turn the screws of public inconvenience—and when they were open, many held back on certain goods, like cigarettes, to sell them on the black market to those who could afford the higher prices. Then most private bus companies stopped running; on top of this, various professional and white-collar workers, largely unsympathetic to the government, walked out, with or without CIA help.

Much of this campaign was aimed at wearing down the patience of the public, convincing them that "socialism can't work in Chile". Yet there had been worse shortages for most

of the people before the Allende government—shortages of food, housing, health care, and education, for example. At least half the population had suffered from malnutrition. Allende, who was a medical doctor, explained his free milk program by pointing out that “Today in Chile there are over 600,000 children mentally retarded because they were not adequately nourished during the first eight months of their lives, because they did not receive the necessary proteins.”⁴⁶

Financial aid was not the CIA's only input into the strike scene. More than 100 members of Chilean professional associations and employers' guilds were graduates of the school run by the American Institute for Free Labor Development in Front Royal, Virginia—“The Little Anti-Red Schoolhouse”. AIFLD, the CIA's principal Latin America labor organization, also assisted in the formation of a new professional association in May 1971: the Confederation of Chilean Professionals. The labor specialists of AIFLD had more than a decade's experience in the art of fomenting economic turmoil (or keeping workers quiescent when the occasion called for it).⁴⁷

CIA propaganda merchants had a field day with the disorder and the shortages, exacerbating both by instigating panic buying. All the techniques, the whole of the media saturation, the handy organizations created for each and every purpose, so efficiently employed in 1964 and 1970, were facilitated by the virtually unlimited license granted the press: headlines and stories which spread rumors about everything from nationalizations to bad meat and undrinkable water ... “Economic Chaos! Chile on Brink of Doom!” in the largest type one could ever expect to see in a newspaper ... raising the specter of civil war, when not actually calling for it, literally ... alarmist stories which anywhere else in the world would have been branded scurrilous ... the worst of London's daily tabloids or the National Enquirer of the United States appear as staid as a journal of dentistry by comparison.⁴⁸

In response, on a few occasions, the government briefly closed down a newspaper or magazine, on the left as well as on the right, for endangering security.⁴⁹

The Agency's routine support of the political opposition was extended to include the extreme rightist organization *Patria y Libertad*, which the CIA reportedly helped to form, and whose members it trained in guerrilla warfare and bombing techniques at schools in Bolivia and Los Fresnos, Texas. *Patria y Libertad* marched in rallies in full riot gear, engaged repeatedly in acts of violence and provocation, and its publications openly called for a military coup.⁵⁰

The CIA was engaged in courting the military for the same end. Providing military equipment meant the normal presence of US advisers and the opportunity for Americans to work closely with the Chileans. Since 1969, the Agency had been establishing “intelligence assets” in all three branches of the Chilean armed services, and included “command-level officers, field- and company-grade officers, retired general staff officers and enlisted men.” Employing its usual blend of real and fabricated information, along with forged documents, the CIA endeavored to keep the officers “on the alert”. One approach was to convince them that, with Allende's approval, the police investigations unit was acting in concert with Cuban intelligence to gather information prejudicial to the army high command.⁵¹

Newspapers in Santiago supported by the CIA, particularly *El Mercurio*, often concentrated on influencing the military. They alleged communist plots to disband or destroy the armed services, Soviet plans to establish a submarine base in Chile, North Korea setting up a training base, and so forth. The papers stirred up hatred against the government in the ranks, and in some cases entire columns were published which were calculated to change the opinion of a single officer, in one case an officer's wife.⁵²

The Agency also subsidized a number of books and other kinds of publications in

Chile. One was a short-lived anti-government newsletter directed at the military.⁵³ Later the CIA made use of a weekly humor and political magazine, *SEPA*, aimed at the same audience. The cover of the 20 March 1973 issue featured the headline: “Robert Moss. An English Recipe for Chile—Military Control.” Moss was identified by the magazine as a British sociologist. A more relevant description would have been that he was a “news” specialist associated with known CIA media fronts. One of these, Forum World Features of London (see Western Europe chapter), published Moss's book, *Chile's Marxist Experiment*, in 1973, which was widely circulated by the junta to justify its coup.⁵⁴

Moss was associated with a CIA-funded think-tank in Santiago which went by the supremely innocuous name of the Institute of General Studies. The IGS, amongst other activities, conducted seminars for Chilean military officers in which it was explained, in technical, apolitical terms, why Allende was a disaster for the economy and why a *laissez-faire* system offered a solution to Chile's ills. There is no way of measuring to what extent such lectures influenced future actions of the military, although after the coup the junta did appoint several IGS people to top government posts.⁵⁵

The CIA's Santiago station was meanwhile collecting the operational intelligence necessary in the event of a coup: “arrest lists, key civilian installations and personnel that needed protection, key government installations which need to be taken over, and government contingency plans which would be used in case of a military uprising.”⁵⁶ The CIA later asserted that this information was never passed to the Chilean military, a claim that does not give one the feeling of having been united with the probable. It should be noted in this context that in the days immediately following the coup the Chilean military went directly to the residences of many Americans and other foreigners living in Santiago who had been sympathetic to the Allende government.⁵⁷

The government contingency plans were presumably obtained by the Agency through its infiltration of the various parties which made up Allende's *Unidad Popular* (UP) coalition. CIA agents in the upper echelons of Allende's own Socialist Party were “paid to make mistakes in their jobs.”⁵⁸ In Washington, burglary was the Agency's tactic of choice for obtaining documents. Papers were taken from the homes of several employees of the Chilean Embassy; and the embassy itself, which had been bugged for some time, was burgled in May 1972 by some of the same men who the next month staged the Watergate break-in.⁵⁹

In March 1973, the UP won about 44 percent of the vote in congressional elections, compared to some 36 percent in 1970. It was said to be the largest increase an incumbent party had ever received in Chile after being in power more than two years. The opposition parties had publicly expressed their optimism about capturing two-thirds of the congressional seats and thus being able to impeach Allende. Now they faced three more years under him, with the prospect of being unable, despite their best and most underhanded efforts, to prevent his popularity from increasing even further.

During the spring and summer the destabilization process escalated. There was a whole series of demonstrations and strikes, with an even longer one by the truckers. *Time* magazine reported: “While most of the country survived on short rations, the truckers seemed unusually well equipped for a lengthy holdout.” A reporter asked a group of truckers who were camping and dining on “a lavish communal meal of steak, vegetables, wine and empanadas” where the money for it came from. “From the CIA,” they answered laughingly.⁶⁰

There was as well daily sabotage and violence, including assassination. In June, an

abortive attack upon the Presidential Palace was carried out by the military and *Patria y Libertad*.

In September the military prevailed. "It is clear," said the Senate investigating committee, "the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning of the group which carried out the successful September 11 coup throughout the months of July, August, and September 1973."⁶¹

The American role on that fateful day was one of substance and shadow. The coup began in the Pacific coast port of Valparaiso with the dispatch of Chilean naval troops to Santiago, while US Navy ships were present offshore, ostensibly to participate in joint maneuvers with the Chilean Navy. The American ships stayed outside of Chilean waters, but remained on the alert. A US WB-575 plane—an airborne communications control system—piloted by US Air Force officers, cruised in the Chilean sky. At the same time, 32 American observation and fighter planes were landing at the US air base in Mendoza, Argentina, not far from the Chilean border.⁶²

In Valparaiso, while US military officers were meeting with their Chilean counterparts, a young American, Charles Horman, who lived in Santiago and was stranded near Valparaiso by the coup, happened to engage in conversation with several Americans, civilian and military. A retired naval engineer told him: "We came down to do a job and it's done." One or two American military men also gave away clues they shouldn't have. A few days later, Horman was arrested in his Santiago residence. They knew where to find him. He was never seen again.⁶³

Thus it was that they closed the country to the outside world for a week, while the tanks rolled and the soldiers broke down doors; the stadiums rang with the sounds of execution and the bodies piled up along the streets and floated in the river; the torture centers opened for business; the subversive books were thrown to the bonfires; soldiers slit the trouser legs of women, shouting that "In Chile women wear dresses!"; the poor returned to their natural state; and the men of the world in Washington and in the halls of international finance opened up their check-books.

One year later, President Gerald Ford was moved to declare that what the United States had done in Chile was "in the best interest of the people in Chile and certainly in our own best interest."⁶⁴ The remark could have been punctuated with a pinch of snuff.

What the United States had done in Chile, thought Gerald Ford, or so he said, "was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties."⁶⁵ The reporters present were kind, or obsequious, enough not to ask Ford what he thought of the junta's Chile where all opposition, of any kind, in any form, in any medium, was forbidden.

It was of course *de rigueur* for some other officials and congressmen to assert that what the United States had really done in Chile was repel the Soviet threat to the Western hemisphere. But Soviet behavior toward the Allende government simply did not tally with any such hypothesis; the language of US intelligence reports confirms that: "Soviet overtures to Allende ... characterized by caution and restraint"; "Soviet desire to avoid" another Cuba-type commitment; Russians "advising Allende to put his relations with the United States in order ... to ease the strain between the two countries."⁶⁶

Much has been made of the multinational-corporation angle, particularly the nationalization of the US copper-mining companies without compensation (the *Unidad Popular* calculated that due to "excess profits" over many years the companies actually owed Chile

money). But that decision was not announced until September 1971, a full year after the White House had decided to overthrow and/or assassinate Allende. Some indication of Washington's actual interest in the issue may be derived from a comment made in November 1973 by Orlando Saenz, one of the junta's main economic advisers, who declared: "Now the Government of the US considers this is a problem for the American mining companies."⁶⁷ And before the coup, the CIA and other US government agencies were "counseling the White House to rebuff Allende's attempts to work out a settlement on the compensations to be paid for nationalized American property."⁶⁸

Moreover, a Washington official who followed Henry Kissinger throughout the Chile policy put it thusly: Kissinger, he said, "never gave a shit about the business community. What really underlay it was ideology."⁶⁹

A CIA study of 7 September 1970, three days after Allende's electoral victory, concluded in part:

The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile.

The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government.

An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S. and a definite psychological advantage for the Marxist idea.⁷⁰

Washington knows no heresy in the Third World but independence. In the case of Salvador Allende independence came clothed in an especially provocative costume—a Marxist-constitutionally elected who continued to honor the constitution. This would not do. It shook the very foundation stones upon which the anti-communist tower is built: the doctrine, painstakingly cultivated for decades, that "communists" can take power only through force and deception, that they can retain that power only through terrorizing and brainwashing the population. There could be only one thing worse than a Marxist in power—an *elected* Marxist in power.

35. Greece 1964-1974

"Fuck your Parliament and your Constitution," said the President of the United States

"It's the best damn Government since Pericles," the American two-star General declared.¹ (The news report did not mention whether he was chewing on a big fat cigar.)

The government, about which the good General was so ebullient, was that of the Colonels' junta which came to power in a military coup in April 1967, followed immediately by the traditional martial law, censorship, arrests, beatings, torture, and killings, the victims totaling some 8,000 in the first month. This was accompanied by the equally traditional declaration that this was all being done to save the nation from a "communist takeover". Corrupting and subversive influences in Greek life were to be removed. Among these were miniskirts, long hair, and foreign newspapers; church attendance for the young would be compulsory.²

So brutal and so swift was the repression, that by September, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands were before the European Commission of Human Rights to accuse Greece of violating most of the Commission's conventions. Before the year was over,

houses of Congress and indeed increased their margins in the 1990 off-year elections.

The economic changes of the Reagan era have been no less dramatic. Reagan entered the White House pledged to stem inflation, lower taxes, reduce government spending, and cut federal regulation of the economy. He succeeded in many of these efforts, although not always in ways that he and his supporters had predicted and not necessarily in ways that produced all the benefits that they claimed would follow. He halted inflation not through the new and widely publicized "supply side" economics of the far Right but through the classic Republican strategy of high interest rates and the cold bath of a major recession. He lowered taxes, especially on the well-to-do, although it is unclear whether this reduction spurred increased investment or only fueled an orgy of conspicuous consumption by the rich. He presided over a wave of deregulation during which regulatory structures in place for decades were eliminated or radically revised. Whether deregulation has heightened competition and lowered prices as its proponents predicted remains unclear. The most striking failure of deregulation, however, the crisis in the savings-and-loan industry, will saddle the federal government with a staggering load of debt that Americans will be compelled to pay off through their taxes for decades to come. Finally, and perhaps ironically, Reagan conspicuously failed to reduce government spending. Indeed, steep increases in defense costs, coupled with lower taxes, contributed to the largest annual deficits in American history. Elected as a conservative, Reagan pursued a form of Keynesian economics that would have had older conservatives such as Robert Taft and Herbert Hoover spinning in their graves. In the short run, these policies paid rich political dividends: a huge military buildup without cuts in entitlements such as Social Security and Medicare, combined with a tax cut that left many Americans with more money for private consumption. In the long run, Reagan's programs spawned an enormous increase in the nation's indebtedness that, like the savings-and-loan scandal, will be paid for by Americans for generations to come.

Reagan's success as president must also be understood, however, in light of the powerful tensions coursing through American society and culture during the 1970s and 1980s: the polarizing impact of race, the rise of religious fundamentalism, and the ambivalent revolt against modernity. Race was perhaps the single most important force driving political realignment, as white southern Democratic conservatives and blue-collar ethnics continued to shift their allegiances from the Democratic to the Republican party. Reagan also succeeded in appealing to the revival of religious fundamentalism, which swept the nation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Indeed, much of his success as a national leader seemed to derive from a paradox: on the one hand, Reagan was himself the product of a technologically progressive, corporate, and media-driven modern culture; on the other hand, he continually evoked the images of an earlier, pre-modern America of individualism and traditional values. There can be no doubt that in doing so he deftly captured the ambivalence felt by many Americans, or that this was in part the secret of his great and continuing popularity.

✻ D O C U M E N T S

By 1979 the Democratic administration of President Jimmy Carter was beset by a host of problems, many of which he had inherited but few of which he had successfully resolved. Chief among them were an economy wracked by inflation and

high unemployment, and an energy crisis that was in part the product of the explosive politics of the Middle East and that signaled the end of an era of cheap energy. In Washington political gridlock had set in, virtually paralyzing the efforts of either Congress or the administration to act decisively. In his July 15, 1979, speech to the nation (the first document), Carter addressed not only the problems of economics and energy but also the larger crisis of confidence that he believed pervaded the nation. Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan skillfully capitalized on the economic and political failures of the Carter administration, as is clear from his September 9, 1980, campaign speech before the International Business Council (the second document). Although Carter and Reagan alike invoked traditional American values, Carter, reflecting the chastened mood of the seventies, had emphasized sacrifice and restraint, while Reagan, in what would become the dominant theme of the 1980s, stressed economic growth and renewal. Reagan's electoral victory in 1980 was the product of many forces: deep divisions in the Democratic party over civil rights, the rise of religious fundamentalism and other signs of a revolt against modernity, and a powerful campaign by business leaders to overturn the policies of the Kennedy and Johnson years.

These impulses were mobilized, however, by a loose group of conservative activists who styled themselves "the New Right." In the third document, excerpted from his book *The New Right: We're Ready to Lead* (1980), New Right leader Richard A. Viguerie discusses the reasons for conservative victories. The revival of religious fundamentalism played a key role in Reagan's success. Although Reagan's legislative agenda consistently favored economic and defense issues over the cultural politics of the religious Right, he skillfully appealed for the support of fundamentalists, as in his March 8, 1983, address to the National Association of Evangelicals (the fourth document). A strikingly different vision of America was invoked by the Reverend Jesse Jackson, who in his 1988 address to the Democratic National Convention (the fifth document) compared America to a patchwork quilt representing people of diverse colors and creeds, from many different walks of life.

One measure of Ronald Reagan's success was the 1988 election of Vice President George Herbert Walker Bush as his successor. In his inaugural address, excerpts from which compose the sixth document, Bush celebrated the Republican triumph with a promise to create a "kinder" and "gentler" America.

President Jimmy Carter and the Crisis of the American Spirit, 1979

It's clear that the true problems of our Nation are much deeper—deeper than gasoline lines or energy shortages, deeper even than inflation or recession. And I realize more than ever that as President I need your help. So, I decided to reach out and listen to the voices of America.

I invited to Camp David people from almost every segment of our society—business and labor, teachers and preachers, Governors, mayors, and private citizens. And then I left Camp David to listen to other Americans, men and women like you. It has been an extraordinary 10 days, and I want to share with you what I've heard.

First of all, I got a lot of personal advice. Let me quote a few of the typical comments that I wrote down.

This from a southern Governor: "Mr. President, you are not leading this Nation—you're just managing the Government."

"You don't see the people enough any more."

"Some of your Cabinet members don't seem loyal. There is not enough discipline among your disciples."

"Don't talk to us about politics or the mechanics of government, but about an understanding of our common good."

"Mr. President, we're in trouble. Talk to us about blood and sweat and tears."

"If you lead, Mr. President, we will follow."

Many people talked about themselves and about the condition of our Nation. This from a young woman in Pennsylvania: "I feel so far from government. I feel like ordinary people are excluded from political power."

And this from a young Chicano: "Some of us have suffered from recession all our lives."

"Some people have wasted energy, but others haven't had anything to waste."

And this from a religious leader: "No material shortage can touch the important things like God's love for us or our love for one another."

And I like this one particularly from a black woman who happens to be the mayor of a small Mississippi town: "The big-shots are not the only ones who are important. Remember, you can't sell anything on Wall Street unless someone digs it up somewhere else first."

This kind of summarized a lot of other statements: "Mr. President, we are confronted with a moral and a spiritual crisis."

Several of our discussions were on energy, and I have a notebook full of comments and advice. I'll read just a few.

"We can't go on consuming 40 percent more energy than we produce. When we import oil we are also importing inflation plus unemployment."

"We've got to use what we have. The Middle East has only 5 percent of the world's energy, but the United States has 24 percent."

And this is one of the most vivid statements: "Our neck is stretched over the fence and OPEC has a knife."

"There will be other cartels and other shortages. American wisdom and courage right now can set a path to follow in the future."

This was a good one: "Be bold, Mr. President. We may make mistakes, but we are ready to experiment."

And this one from a labor leader got to the heart of it: "The real issue is freedom. We must deal with the energy problem on a war footing."

And the last that I'll read: "When we enter the moral equivalent of war, Mr. President, don't issue us BB guns."

These 10 days confirmed my belief in the decency and the strength and the wisdom of the American people, but it also bore out some of my longstanding concerns about our Nation's underlying problems.

I know, of course, being President, that government actions and legislation can be very important. That's why I've worked hard to put my campaign promises into law—and I have to admit, with just mixed success. But after listening to the American people I have been reminded again that all the legislation in the world can't fix what's wrong with America. So, I want to speak to you first tonight about a subject even more serious than energy

or inflation. I want to talk to you right now about a fundamental threat to American democracy.

I do not mean our political and civil liberties. They will endure. And I do not refer to the outward strength of America, a nation that is at peace tonight everywhere in the world, with unmatched economic power and military might.

The threat is nearly invisible in ordinary ways. It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our Nation.

The erosion of our confidence in the future is threatening to destroy the social and the political fabric of America.

The confidence that we have always had as a people is not simply some romantic dream or a proverb in a dusty book that we read just on the Fourth of July. It is the idea which founded our Nation and has guided our development as a people. Confidence in the future has supported everything else—public institutions and private enterprise, our own families, and the very Constitution of the United States. Confidence has defined our course and has served as a link between generations. We've always believed in something called progress. We've always had a faith that the days of our children would be better than our own.

Our people are losing that faith, not only in government itself but in the ability as citizens to serve as the ultimate rulers and shapers of our democracy. As a people we know our past and we are proud of it. Our progress has been part of the living history of America, even the world. We always believed that we were part of a great movement of humanity itself called democracy, involved in the search for freedom and that belief has always strengthened us in our purpose. But just as we are losing our confidence in the future, we are also beginning to close the door on our past.

In a nation that was proud of hard work, strong families, close-knit communities, and our faith in God, too many of us now tend to worship self-indulgence and consumption. Human identity is no longer defined by what one does, but by what one owns. But we've discovered that owning things and consuming things does not satisfy our longing for meaning. We've learned that piling up material goods cannot fill the emptiness of lives which have no confidence or purpose.

The symptoms of this crisis of the American spirit are all around us. For the first time in the history of our country a majority of our people believe that the next 5 years will be worse than the past 5 years. Two-thirds of our people do not even vote. The productivity of American workers is actually dropping, and the willingness of Americans to save for the future has fallen below that of all other people in the Western world.

As you know, there is a growing disrespect for government and for churches and for schools, the news media, and other institutions. This is not a message of happiness or reassurance, but it is the truth and it is a warning. These changes did not happen overnight. They've come upon us gradually over the last generation, years that were filled with shocks and tragedy.

We were sure that ours was a nation of the ballot, not the bullet, until

the murders of John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. We were taught that our armies were always invincible and our causes were always just, only to suffer the agony of Vietnam. We respected the Presidency as a place of honor until the shock of Watergate.

We remember when the phrase "sound as a dollar" was an expression of absolute dependability, until 10 years of inflation began to shrink our dollar and our savings. We believed that our Nation's resources were limitless until 1973 when we had to face a growing dependence on foreign oil.

These wounds are still very deep. They have never been healed. Looking for a way out of this crisis, our people have turned to the Federal Government and found it isolated from the mainstream of our Nation's life. Washington, D.C., has become an island. The gap between our citizens and our Government has never been so wide. The people are looking for honest answers, not easy answers; clear leadership, not false claims and evasiveness and politics as usual.

What you see too often in Washington and elsewhere around the country is a system of government that seems incapable of action. You see a Congress twisted and pulled in every direction by hundreds of well-financed and powerful special interests.

You see every extreme position defended to the last vote, almost to the last breath by one unyielding group or another. You often see a balanced and a fair approach that demands sacrifice, a little sacrifice from everyone, abandoned like an orphan without support and without friends.

Often you see paralysis and stagnation and drift. You don't like it, and neither do I. What can we do?

First of all, we must face the truth, and then we can change our course. We simply must have faith in each other, faith in our ability to govern ourselves, and faith in the future of this Nation. Restoring that faith and that confidence to America is now the most important task we face. It is a true challenge of this generation of Americans. . . .

All the traditions of our past, all the lessons of our heritage, all the promises of our future point to another path, the path of common purpose and the restoration of American values. That path leads to true freedom for our Nation and ourselves.

Presidential Candidate Ronald Reagan Calls for New Economic Policies, 1980

Almost two months ago, in accepting the Presidential nomination of my party, I spoke of the historically unique crisis facing the United States. At that time I said:

"Never before in our history have Americans been called upon to face three grave threats to our very existence, any one of which could destroy us. We face a disintegrating economy, a weakened defense and an energy policy based on the sharing of scarcity." . . .

Speech delivered before the International Business Council (Chicago, Illinois, September 9, 1980). In *Vital Speeches of the Day*, Vol. XLVI, no. 24 (October 1, 1980), 738-741 (excerpts).

I'd like to speak to you today about a new concept of leadership, one that has both the words and the music. One based on faith in the American people, confidence in the American economy, and a firm commitment to see to it that the Federal Government is once more responsive to the people.

That concept is rooted in a strategy for growth, a program that sees the American economic system as it is—a huge, complex, dynamic system which demands not piecemeal Federal packages, or pious hopes wrapped in soothing words, but the hard work and concerted programs necessary for real growth.

We must first recognize that the problem with the U.S. economy is swollen, inefficient government, needless regulation, too much taxation, too much printing-press money. We don't need any more doses of Carter's eight- or 10-point programs to "fix" or fine tune the economy. For three and one-half years these ill-thought-out initiatives have constantly sapped the healthy vitality of the most productive economic system the world has ever known. Our country is in a downward cycle of progressive economic deterioration that must be broken if the economy is to recover and move into a vigorous growth cycle in the 1980's.

We must move boldly, decisively and quickly to control the runaway growth of Federal spending, to remove the tax disincentives that are throttling the economy, and to reform the regulatory web that is smothering it. We must have and I am proposing a new strategy for the 1980's.

Only a series of well-planned economic actions, taken so that they complement and reinforce one another, can move our economy forward again. We must keep the rate of growth of government spending at reasonable and prudent levels.

We must reduce personal income tax rates and accelerate and simplify depreciation schedules in an orderly, systematic way to remove disincentives to work, savings, investment and productivity.

We must review regulations that affect the economy and change them to encourage economic growth.

We must establish a stable, sound and predictable monetary policy. And we must restore confidence by following a consistent national economic policy that does not change from month to month.

I am asked: 'Can we do it all at once?' My answer is: 'We must.'

I am asked: 'Can we do it immediately?' Well, my answer is: 'No, it took Mr. Carter three and one-half years of hard work to get us into this economic mess. It will take time to get us out.'

I am asked: 'Is it easy?' Again, my answer is: 'No. It is going to require the most dedicated and concerted peacetime action ever taken by the American people for their country.'

But we can do it, we must do it, and I intend that we will do it.

We must balance the budget, reduce tax rates and restore our defenses.

These are the challenges. Mr. Carter says he can't meet these challenges; that he can't do it. I believe him. He can't. But, I refuse to accept his defeatist and pessimistic view of America. I know we can do these things, and I know we will.

But don't just take my word for it. I have discussed this with any number

39. Iraq 1972-1975

Covert action should not be confused with missionary work

Into the land of ancient Mesopotamia reached the long arm of the CIA, and the Kurdish people of the Zagros and Taurus mountains, but a few decades removed from the life of nomads, joined the Agency's list of clients.

In May of 1972, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger, went to the Soviet Union to meet their Russian counterparts. Afterward, Kissinger told a press conference in Moscow that the two nations had agreed to defuse the tensions in the Middle East and "to contribute what they can to bringing about a general settlement ... such a settlement would also contribute to a relaxation of the armaments race in that area. ... Speaking for our side," he added, "I can say we will attempt to implement these principles in the spirit in which they were promulgated."¹

Kissinger and Nixon were moved by the spirit for perhaps 24 hours. On their way home, they stopped in Teheran to visit their friend, the Shah of Iran. It seems that Iran and Iraq were embroiled once again in their perennial feud—a border dispute and the like—and the Shah asked his pal Richard for a little favor. Could he help arm the Kurds in Iraq who were fighting for autonomy? Just generally heat things up so as to sap the Iraqi resources and distract them from Iran?²

Anything for a friend and loyal ally, said Richard Milhous, two weeks before the Watergate burglary and still on top of the world.

The Shah was quite capable of arming the Kurds himself, and in fact was doing so to some extent, but the Kurds didn't trust him. They trusted the United States and wanted to be armed by them. Several years later, the congressional committee known as the Pike Committee, which investigated various CIA operations, put it thusly: "The U.S. acted in effect as a guarantor that the Kurds would not be summarily dropped by the Shah."³

Before long, the CIA was reaching into its warehouses and a range of Soviet and Chinese small arms and rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition were on their way to the Kurdish rebels, the Communist origin of the weapons being a standard means of ensuring the standard "plausible denial". Ultimately, the military aid was to total some \$16 million.

The Kurds are a distinct ethnic group, Muslim but, unlike most other Iraqis, not Arab. Their people are to be found primarily in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. For decades, the Iraqi Kurds had been engaged in intermittent warfare against the government in pursuance of a goal of "autonomy", a concept not terribly well-defined by them, it being clear only that it fell short of being an independent state, perhaps.

The political history of the Iraqi Kurds in their recent past was a baffling piece of patchwork. Ten years earlier, they had been in close alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party, such that when the ruling Ba'ath party began to persecute the Communists, they took refuge amongst the Kurds. The Kurdish leader, Mustafa al-Barzani, a man in his seventies, had spent a dozen years in the Soviet Union and spoke Russian. Now, in 1972, the Communists were allies of the Ba'ath in an attempt to suppress the "imperialist agent Barzani", and Kurdish propaganda emphasized Soviet military support of the Iraqi government, including claims that Russians were flying bombing missions against the Kurds. At the same time the Kurds painted themselves as "social democrats" of the European variety, going so far as to apply for membership in the Socialist International.⁴ Nonetheless, Barzani stated frequently that "he trusted no other major power" than the United States and assert-

ed that if his cause were successful, the Kurds were "ready to become the 51st state".⁵ All this on top of desiring to establish a Muslim society.

In October 1973, when the Yom Kippur surprise attack on Israel took place, and Iraq was preoccupied as an ally of Egypt and Syria, the Kurds were willing to launch a major attack, at Israel's suggestion, that might have been very beneficial to their own cause as well as taking some pressure off Israel by tying down the Iraqi army. But Kissinger refused to let the Kurds move. On 16 October he had the CIA send them a cable which read: "We do not repeat not consider it advisable for you to undertake the offensive military actions that Israel has suggested to you." The Kurds obeyed.⁶

The Pike Report regarded this incident as an example of the apparent "no win" policy of the United States and Iran. The committee stated:

The progressively deteriorating position of the Kurds reflected the fact that none of the nations who were aiding them seriously desired that they realize their objective of an autonomous state. A CIA memo of March 22, 1974 states Iran's and the United States' position clearly: "We would think that Iran would not look with favor on the establishment of a formalized autonomous government. Iran, like ourselves, has seen benefit in a stalemate situation ... in which Iraq is intrinsically weakened by the Kurds' refusal to relinquish [their] semi-autonomy. Neither Iran nor ourselves wish to see the matter resolved one way or the other."⁷

"This policy," said the report, "was not imparted to our clients, who were encouraged to continue fighting. Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise."⁸

The day after the CIA memo referred to above, 23 March 1974, Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko, who had befriended Barzani when the latter lived in the Soviet Union, arrived in Iraq to help the government reach a settlement with the Kurds. On the advice of Iran and the United States, however, Barzani refused to come to any terms.⁹ Earlier that month, the Iraqi government had actually passed a law offering a limited amount of autonomy to the Kurds, but they had rejected that as well, whether or not at the request of their "allies" is not known.

The congressional committee discovered that "The CIA had early information which suggested that the Shah would abandon the Kurds the minute he came to an agreement with Iraq over border disputes." Agency documents characterized the Shah's view of the Kurds as "a card to play" in this dispute with Iraq. And a CIA memo characterized the Kurds as "a uniquely useful tool for weakening Iraq's potential for international adventurism".¹⁰

The last may have been a reference to Iraq signing a pact of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in April 1972, under which it received military aid and granted the Soviet Navy certain port privileges. Then, in June, super oil-rich Iraq had nationalized the Western-owned consortium, the Iraq Petroleum Company (23.75 percent US), a move warmly applauded by the Soviets, after which the two countries proceeded to conclude a trade and economic accord.¹¹

As it was, it was oil that brought Iran and Iraq together. In 1973, the Shah wanted to strengthen Iran's position with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and a crucial part of the inducement to Iraq and other Arab neighbors was Iran's willingness to double-cross the troublesome Kurds.¹² None of these countries wanted their own minorities to be getting any ideas from a Kurdish success.

It was not until March 1975 that the Shah was ready to make his move. Events moved swiftly then. The Shah met with the vice-president of Iraq and, by agreement, the Shah cut off all supplies to the Kurds, including the American part. The next day the Iraqis unleashed their biggest offensive ever. Several days later the stunned Kurds sent a desperate message to

the CIA: "There is confusion and dismay among our people and forces. Our people's fate in unprecedented danger. Complete destruction hanging over our head. No explanation for all this. We appeal you and USG [United States government] intervene according to your promises ..."¹³

The same day, the Kurds appealed to Kissinger as well:

Your Excellency, having always believed in the peaceful solution of disputes including those between Iran and Iraq, we are pleased to see that their two countries have come to some agreement ... However, our hearts bleed to see that an immediate byproduct of their agreement is the destruction of our defenseless people ... Our movement and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way with silence from everyone. We feel your Excellency that the United States has a moral and political responsibility towards our people who have committed themselves to your country's policy.¹⁴

The hapless Kurds received no response to their pleas, from either the CIA or Henry Kissinger. By the end of the month their forces had been decimated. Several hundred Kurdish leaders were executed.

In conclusion, the Pike report noted:

Over 200,000 refugees managed to escape into Iran. Once there, however, neither the United States nor Iran extended adequate humanitarian assistance. In fact, Iran was later to forcibly return over 40,000 of the refugees and the United States government refused to admit even one refugee into the United States by way of political asylum even though they qualified for such admittance.¹⁵

When Henry Kissinger was interviewed by the staff of the Pike Committee about the United States' role in this melodrama, he responded with his now-famous remark: "Covert action should not be confused with missionary work."¹⁶

40. Australia 1973-1975

Another free election bites the dust

When the leader of a Communist country was removed from office by the Politburo, this was confirmation to the Western mind of the totalitarian, or, at best, the arbitrary, nature of the Communist system.

What then are we to make of the fact that in 1975 Edward Gough Whitlam, the legally elected prime minister of Australia, was summarily dismissed by a single non-elected individual, one functioning under the title of "Governor-General"?

Whitlam took office in December 1972 as the head of the first Labor Party government in Australia in 23 years. In short order he set about proving to the opposition parties the correctness of their historical prediction that Labor in power would be "irresponsible and dangerous"¹—to whom, of course, had always been the question.

The war in Vietnam was an immediate example. Australian military personnel serving there under the command of the United States were called home, conscription was halted, and young men jailed for refusing military service were released.² Moreover, the Whitlam government recognized North Vietnam, several of his ministers publicly denounced American bombing of Hanoi and called for rallies to oppose it, and protesting dock work-

U.S. Foreign Policy

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109. "Right Wing Activist Explains Conservative Successes, 1980."
110. "President Reagan on America's Spiritual Reawakening, 1983."
111. "Ronald Reagan's First Inaugural Address, 1981."
112. "President Reagan's Soviet Union as 'Evil Empire', 1983."
113. "Reagan Sets a Tone for Central American Policy, 1985."
114. "The Inter-Religious Task Force Attacks the Administration Program in Nicaragua, 1985-86."
115. "The Tower Commission Assesses Oliver North's Scheme, 1987."
116. "Congressional Panel's Conclusion on the Iran-Contra Affair: *The Majority View*, 1987."
117. "Iran-Contra Affair: *A Minority Opinion*, 1987."
118. "Elliot Abrams on the Iran-Contra Scandal, 1989."
119. "Killing Hope: Afghanistan, 1979-92."
120. "Killing Hope: El Salvador, 1980-94"
121. "Reagan on Russia as an 'Evil Empire, 1983."
122. "A Congressional Committee Reports on 'Irangate', 1987."
123. "Soviet Leader Gorbachev Charts a New Direction, 1988."
124. "The *New York Times* Announces the 'End of the Cold War', 1989."
125. "President Bush Proclaims a New World Order, 1990."
126. "The Paris Joint Declaration, 1990."
127. "*Killing Hope*: Iraq, 1990-91."

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And we must restore confidence by following a consistent national economic policy that does not change from month to month.

I am asked: 'Can we do it all at once?' My answer is: 'We must.'

I am asked: 'Can we do it immediately?' Well, my answer is: 'No, it took Mr. Carter three and one-half years of hard work to get us into this economic mess. It will take time to get us out.'

I am asked: 'Is it easy?' Again, my answer is: 'No. It is going to require the most dedicated and concerted peacetime action ever taken by the American people for their country.'

But we can do it, we must do it, and I intend that we will do it.

We must balance the budget, reduce tax rates and restore our defenses. These are the challenges. Mr. Carter says he can't meet these challenges; that he can't do it. I believe him. He can't. But, I refuse to accept his defeatist and pessimistic view of America. I know we can do these things, and I know we will.

But don't just take my word for it. I have discussed this with any number

of distinguished economists and businessmen, including such men as George Shultz, William Simon, Alan Greenspan, Charles Walker and James Lynn. The strategy is based on solid economic principles and basic experience in both government and the marketplace. It has worked before and will work again.

Let us look at how we can meet this challenge.

One of the most critical elements of my economic program is the control of government spending. Waste, extravagance, abuse and outright fraud in Federal agencies and programs must be stopped. The billions of the taxpayers' dollars that are wasted every year throughout hundreds of Federal programs, and it will take a major, sustained effort over time to effectively counter this.

Federal spending is now projected to increase to over \$900 billion a year by fiscal year 1985. But, through a comprehensive assault on waste and inefficiency, I am confident that we can squeeze and trim 2 percent out of the budget in fiscal year 1981, and that we will be able to increase this gradually to 7 percent of what otherwise would have been spent in fiscal year 1985.

Now this is based on projections that have been made by groups in the government. Actually I believe we can do even better. My goal will be to bring about spending reductions of 10 percent by fiscal year 1984. . . .

This strategy for growth does not require altering or taking back necessary entitlements already granted to the American people. The integrity of the Social Security System will be defended by my administration and its benefits will once again be made meaningful.

This strategy does require restraining the Congressional desire to "add-on" to every old program and to create new programs funded by deficits.

This strategy does require that the way Federal programs are administered will be changed so that we can benefit from the savings that will come about when, in some instances, administrative authority can be moved back to the states.

The second major element of my economic program is a tax rate reduction plan. This plan calls for an across-the-board, three-year reduction in personal income tax rates—10 percent in 1981, 10 percent in 1982 and 10 percent in 1983. My goal is to implement three reductions in a systematic and planned manner.

More than any single thing, high rates of taxation destroy incentive to earn, to save, to invest. And they cripple productivity, lead to deficit financing and inflation, and create unemployment.

We can go a long way toward restoring the economic health of this country by establishing reasonable, fair levels of taxation.

But even the extended tax rate cuts which I am recommending still leave too high a tax burden on the American people. In the second half of the decade ahead we are going to need, and we must have, additional tax rate reductions. . . .

Another vital part of this strategy concerns government regulation. The subject is so important and so complex that it deserves a speech in itself—and I plan to make one soon. For the moment, however, let me say this:

Government regulation, like me, makes a good servant out a bad master. No one can argue with the intent of this regulation—to improve health and safety and to give us cleaner air and water—but too often regulations work against rather than for the interests of the people. When the real take-home pay of the average American worker is declining steadily, and 8 million Americans are out of work, we must carefully re-examine our regulatory structure to assess to what degree regulations have contributed to this situation. In my administration there should and will be a thorough and systematic review of the thousands of Federal regulations that affect the economy.

Along with spending control, tax reform and deregulation, a sound, stable and predictable monetary policy is essential to restoring economic health. The Federal Reserve Board is, and should remain, independent of the Executive Branch of government. But the President must nominate those who serve on the Federal Reserve Board. My appointees will share my commitment to restoring the value and stability of the American dollar.

A fundamental part of my strategy for economic growth is the restoration of confidence. If our business community is going to invest and build and create new, well-paying jobs, they must have a future free from arbitrary, government action. They must have confidence that the economic "rules-of-the-game" won't be changed suddenly or capriciously.

In my administration, a national economic policy will be established, and we will begin to implement it, within the first 90 days.

Thus, I envision a strategy encompassing many elements—none of which can do the job alone, but all of which together can get it done. This strategy depends for its success more than anything else on the will of the people to regain control of their government. . . .

The time has come for the American people to reclaim their dream. Things don't have to be this way. We can change them. We must change them. Mr. Carter's American tragedy must and can be transcended by the spirit of the American people, working together.

Let's get America working again.

The time is now.

A New Right Activist

Explains Conservative Successes, 1980

Our success is built on four elements—single issue groups, multi-issue conservative groups, coalition politics and direct mail.

Conservative single issue groups have been accused of not only fragmenting American politics but threatening the very existence of our two-party system. Congressman David Obey of Wisconsin, a liberal Democrat, has even charged that government has nearly been brought to a standstill by single issue organizations. Nonsense!

From *The New Right: We're Ready to Lead* by Richard A. Viguerie. Copyright 1980. Reprinted by permission of Richard A. Viguerie.

In the first place, all the New Right has done is copy the success of the old left.

Liberal single issue groups were around long before we were, and the liberals still have as many or more than we do.

Civil rights was a single issue that Hubert Humphrey used to rise to national office. The Vietnam War was a single issue that George McGovern used to rise to national prominence. The environment, consumerism, anti-nuclear power—these are all single issues around which liberals have organized and exercised power and influence.

In the area of public interest law, liberal groups such as the Environmental Defense Fund, the National Prison Project, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the National Veterans Law Center, the Women's Legal Defense Fund have drastically changed the direction of the Federal government.

Ralph Nader is nothing if not a collection of single issues. The liberals who are upset now about conservative single issue groups were not upset about the groups pushing for legalization of marijuana . . . homosexual rights . . . or ERA. . . .

Single issue groups naturally emerge because the political parties run away from issues. Single issue groups are the result of not the reason for the decline of political parties.

If one of the two major political parties had concerned itself more with issues like right to life, high taxes, the growth of the federal government, the right to keep and bear arms, a strong national defense, prayer in the schools, strengthening the family, sex on TV and in the movies, there probably would not have been an explosion of conservative single issue groups. . . .

The second key to our success is the multi-issue group which is part of the conservative movement and makes no bones about it. Such a group is conservative first, last and always. It takes strong positions on every important conservative vs. liberal issue.

The multi-issue conservative movement group also takes a broad overview of where we are going and the best way to get there.

It usually does not have as many members or supporters as single issue groups because its ranks are made up of individuals who are solidly conservative across the board.

The National Right to Work Committee can find over a million people who strongly oppose compulsory unionism.

The National Rifle Association can find nearly two million people who oppose federal gun registration.

Right to Life groups can find over a million people who oppose abortion. But a conservative group which is pro-Right to Work, pro-Right to Life and pro-gun simply can't find a million contributors who agree on 20 different conservative issues.

For example, a local union leader may dislike the National Right to Work Committee but also oppose additional gun controls.

A pro-life supporter may not care one way or the other about compulsory unionism. And so forth.

But it is a sign of conservative strength that several of our broad spectrum groups do have, if not a million members, several hundred thousand.

Multi-issue broad spectrum groups such as The Conservative Caucus, the American Conservative Union, the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, the Heritage Foundation and the National Conservative Political Action Committee, to name but a few, are trying and succeeding in covering all the bases and all the issues for the conservative movement. . . .

Which brings me to the third part of the New Right's success—coalition politics.

Coalition politics is as old as the United States of America. You could call the original Thirteen Colonies a collection of issue groups who banded together to fight and defeat a common enemy—Great Britain.

The Republican Party was originally a coalition of issue groups—Free-Soil party members, pro-business northern Whigs, and some Democrats opposed to slavery.

FDR's New Deal was basically a coalition of groups—Southern farmers, blacks, Jews, organized labor, big city Democrats and the unemployed.

In fact, a liberal coalition based on the New Deal, the Fair Deal and the Great Society has dominated the nation for almost five decades.

But in the last 12 years, since Hubert Humphrey lost the Presidency to Richard Nixon in 1968, that coalition has begun to unravel. Conservatives didn't have the institutions to fill the gap then, but we do now. . . .

Coalition politics includes working within the Republican and Democratic parties to nominate conservative candidates, promote conservative positions and create conservative majorities in both parties. . . .

I want to talk now about the fourth reason for the New Right's success—direct mail.

Like all successful political movements, we must have a method of communicating with each other, and for conservatives in the 1970's it was direct mail.

Frankly, the conservative movement is where it is today because of direct mail. Without direct mail, there would be no effective counterforce to liberalism, and certainly there would be no New Right. . . .

We sell our magazines, our books, and our candidates through the mail. We fight our legislative battles through the mail. We alert our supporters to upcoming battles through the mail. We find new recruits for the conservative movement through the mail.

Without the mail, most conservative activity would wither and die.

Most political observers agree that liberals have effective control of the mass media—a virtual monopoly on TV, radio, newspapers and magazines. . . .

However, there is one method of mass commercial communication that the liberals do not control—direct mail. In fact, conservatives excel at direct mail. . . .

Raising money is only one of several purposes of direct-mail advertising letters. A letter may ask you to vote for a candidate, volunteer for campaign work, circulate a petition among your neighbors, write letters and postcards to your Senators and Congressmen, urging them to pass or defeat legislation

and also ask you for money to pay for the direct mail advertising campaign. . . .

Where would conservatives be without direct mail? We would be where we were 20 years ago, on the defensive, isolated, fighting losing battles. . . . There is another key to New Right success—our positive attitude toward the news media.

From the time I started in politics in the mid 1950's until the early 1970's, most conservatives and the national media were like cats and dogs, or oil and water—they just didn't mix.

Then in the early 1970's some of the national media began to notice our political activities.

I have to be honest and say that I shared the traditional conservatives' position on the press. Which was avoid them, recognize that they are all liberals, and be convinced that their basic purpose is to attack conservatives.

I remember one day a fairly well known writer for a major newspaper called and wanted an appointment to come and talk to me.

I was a little short of terrified. I told my secretary that we'd get back to him.

I then called some of my conservative associates and asked what I should do. Almost all advised me to avoid the reporter.

The advice went something like this—that newspaper is no friend of the conservative movement, that reporter will try to do you in, etc., etc.

But then I got to thinking. I and my conservative friends are not playing in the big leagues—but we want to.

We're not having a major influence on national policies—but we want to.

We're not close to our goal of governing America—but we want to. I called the reporter back and said, "Why don't you come over and, if you've got time, why don't we go to lunch?"

Well, I spent an enjoyable three hours with the reporter. He wrote a basically fair and accurate story (although it wasn't as fair and objective as my mother would have written.)

And from that day forward, I felt that I and other conservatives had to change our view of the press.

I can think of no better example of the difference between the New Right and the old right.

We realize that reporters and editors are not monsters, or even hopeless ideologues.

The vast majority are good, decent men and women who are trying to do a professional job and are looking for the kind of news which will put their stories on the front page or the nightly TV newscasts.

During the next few years, the New Right's relationship with the press improved. We felt comfortable with the press and they began to cover our activities.

However, in the spring of 1977 I realized that my associates in the New Right and I needed a more professional approach to the media.

We were dealing with the media in a casual, almost accidental way. We

needed someone to introduce us to the major media, to teach us how to call and conduct a press conference, how to have a press breakfast, how to get our thoughts across in a few seconds on TV, how to hold activities that the press would be interested in covering. . . .

Single issue groups—multi-issue groups—coalition politics—direct mail—these have been the four cornerstones of conservative growth and success in the 1970's. They will help us build a new majority in America in the 1980's.

As Congressman Newt Gingrich of Georgia has put it: "The way you build a majority in this country is you go out and put together everybody who's against the guy who's in. And instead of asking the question, What divides us?, you ask the question, What unites us?"

And what unites most conservatives, Republican, Democratic and Independent, is a desire for less government and more freedom for every American.

President Reagan on America's Spiritual Reawakening, 1983

Reverend clergy all, Senator Hawkins, distinguished members of the Florida congressional delegation, and all of you:

I can't tell you how you have warmed my heart with your welcome. I'm delighted to be here today.

Those of you in the National Association of Evangelicals are known for your spiritual and humanitarian work. And I would be especially remiss if I didn't discharge right now one personal debt of gratitude. Thank you for your prayers. Nancy and I have felt their presence many times in many ways. And believe me, for us they've made all the difference. . . .

So, I tell you there are a great many God-fearing, dedicated, noble men and women in public life, present company included. And, yes, we need your help to keep us ever mindful of the ideas and the principles that brought us into the public arena in the first place. The basis of those ideals and principles is a commitment to freedom and personal liberty that, itself, is grounded in the much deeper realization that freedom prospers only where the blessings of God are avidly sought and humbly accepted.

The American experiment in democracy rests on this insight. Its discovery was the great triumph of our Founding Fathers, voiced by William Penn when he said: "If we will not be governed by God, we must be governed by tyrants." Explaining the inalienable rights of men, Jefferson said, "The God who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time." And it was George Washington who said that "of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports."

And finally, that shrewdest of all observers of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, put it eloquently after he had gone on a search for the secret of America's greatness and genius—and he said: "Not until I went into the churches of America and heard her pulpits aflame with righteousness did I understand the greatness and the genius of America. . . .

America is good. And if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great."

Well, I'm pleased to be here today with you who are keeping America great by keeping her good. Only through your work and prayers and those of millions of others can we hope to survive this perilous century and keep alive this experiment in liberty, this last, best hope of man.

I want you to know that this administration is motivated by a political philosophy that sees the greatness of America in you, her people, and in your families, churches, neighborhoods, communities—the institutions that foster and nourish values like concern for others and respect for the rule of law under God.

Now, I don't have to tell you that this puts us in opposition to, or at least out of step with, a prevailing attitude of many who have turned to a modern-day secularism, discarding the tried and time-tested values upon which our very civilization is based. No matter how well intentioned, their value system is radically different from that of most Americans. And while they proclaim that they're freeing us from superstitions of the past, they've taken upon themselves the job of superintending us by government rule and regulation. Sometimes their voices are louder than ours, but they are not yet a majority.

An example of that vocal superiority is evident in a controversy now going on in Washington. And since I'm involved, I've been waiting to hear from the parents of young America. How far are they willing to go in giving to government their prerogatives as parents?

Let me state the case as briefly and simply as I can. An organization of citizens, sincerely motivated and deeply concerned about the increase in illegitimate births and abortions involving girls well below the age of consent, sometime ago established a nationwide network of clinics to offer help to these girls and, hopefully, alleviate this situation. Now, again, let me say, I do not fault their intent. However, in their well-intentioned effort, these clinics have decided to provide advice and birth control drugs and devices to underage girls without the knowledge of their parents.

For some years now, the Federal Government has helped with funds to subsidize these clinics. In providing for this, the Congress decreed that every effort would be made to maximize parental participation. Nevertheless, the drugs and devices are prescribed without getting parental consent or giving notification after they've done so. Girls termed "sexually active"—and that has replaced the word "promiscuous"—are given this help in order to prevent illegitimate birth or abortion.

Well, we have ordered clinics receiving Federal funds to notify the parents such help has been given. One of the Nation's leading newspapers has created the term "squeal rule" in editorializing against us for doing this, and we're being criticized for violating the privacy of young people. A judge has recently granted an injunction against an enforcement of our rule. I've watched TV panel shows discuss this issue, seen columnists pontificating on our error, but no one seems to mention morality as playing a part in the subject of sex.

Is all of Judeo-Christian tradition wrong? Are we to believe that something so sacred can be looked upon as a purely physical thing with no potential for emotional and psychological harm? And isn't it the parents' right to give counsel and advice to keep their children from making mistakes that may affect their entire lives?

Many of us in government would like to know what parents think about this intrusion in their family by government. We're going to fight in the courts. The right of parents and the rights of family take precedence over those of Washington-based bureaucrats and social engineers.

But the fight against parental notification is really only one example of many attempts to water down traditional values and even abrogate the original terms of American democracy. Freedom prospers when religion is vibrant and the rule of law under God is acknowledged. When our Founding Fathers passed the first amendment, they sought to protect churches from government interference. They never intended to construct a wall of hostility between government and the concept of religious belief itself.

The evidence of this permeates our history and our government. The Declaration of Independence mentions the Supreme Being no less than four times. "In God We Trust" is engraved on our coinage. The Supreme Court opens its proceedings with a religious invocation. And the Members of Congress open their sessions with a prayer. I just happen to believe the schoolchildren of the United States are entitled to the same privileges as Supreme Court Justices and Congressmen.

Last year, I sent the Congress a constitutional amendment to restore prayer to public schools. Already this session, there's growing bipartisan support for the amendment, and I am calling on the Congress to act speedily to pass it and to let our children pray.

Perhaps some of you read recently about the Lubbock school case, where a judge actually ruled that it was unconstitutional for a school district to give equal treatment to religious and nonreligious student groups, even when the group meetings were being held during the students' own time. The first amendment never intended to require government to discriminate against religious speech.

Senators Denton and Hatfield have proposed legislation in the Congress on the whole question of prohibiting discrimination against religious forms of student speech. Such legislation could go far to restore freedom of religious speech for public school students. And I hope the Congress considers these bills quickly. And with your help, I think it's possible we could also get the constitutional amendment through the Congress this year.

More than a decade ago, a Supreme Court decision literally wiped off the books of 50 States statutes protecting the rights of unborn children. Abortion on demand now takes the lives of up to 1-1/2 million unborn children a year. Human life legislation ending this tragedy will some day pass the Congress, and you and I must never rest until it does. Unless and until it can be proven that the unborn child is not a living entity, then its right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness must be protected.

You may remember that when abortion on demand began, many, and,

indeed, I'm sure many of you, warned that the practice would lead to a decline in respect for human life, that the philosophical premises used to justify abortion on demand would ultimately be used to justify other attacks on the sacredness of human life—infanticide or mercy killing. Tragically enough, those warnings proved all too true. Only last year a court permitted the death by starvation of a handicapped infant.

I have directed the Health and Human Services Department to make clear to every health care facility in the United States that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protects all handicapped persons against discrimination based on handicaps, including infants. And we have taken the further step of requiring that each and every recipient of Federal funds who provides health care services to infants must post and keep posted in a conspicuous place a notice stating that "discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infants in this facility is prohibited by Federal law." It also lists a 24-hour, toll-free number so that nurses and others may report violations in time to save the infant's life.

In addition, recent legislation introduced in the Congress by Representative Henry Hyde of Illinois not only increases restrictions on publicly financed abortions, it also addresses this whole problem of infanticide. I urge the Congress to begin hearings and to adopt legislation that will protect the right of life to all children, including the disabled or handicapped.

Now, I'm sure that you must get discouraged at times, but you've done better than you know, perhaps. There's a great spiritual awakening in America, a renewal of the traditional values that have been the bedrock of America's goodness and greatness.

One recent survey by a Washington-based research council concluded that Americans were far more religious than the people of other nations; 95 percent of those surveyed expressed a belief in God and a huge majority believed the Ten Commandments had real meaning in their lives. And another study has found that an overwhelming majority of Americans disapprove of adultery, teenage sex, pornography, abortion, and hard drugs. And this same study showed a deep reverence for the importance of family ties and religious belief.

I think the items that we've discussed here today must be a key part of the Nation's political agenda. For the first time the Congress is openly and seriously debating and dealing with the prayer and abortion issues—and that's enormous progress right there. I repeat: America is in the midst of a spiritual awakening and a moral renewal. And with your Biblical keynote, I say today, "Yes, let justice roll on like a river, righteousness like a never-failing stream."

Now, obviously, much of this new political and social consensus I've talked about is based on a positive view of American history, one that takes pride in our country's accomplishments and record. But we must never forget that no government schemes are going to perfect man. We know that living in this world means dealing with what philosophers would call the phenomenology of evil or, as theologians would put it, the doctrine of sin.

There is sin and evil in the world, and we're enjoined by Scripture and the Lord Jesus to oppose it with all our might. Our nation, too, has a legacy

of evil with which it must deal. The glory of this land has been its capacity for transcending the moral evils of our past. For example, the long struggle of minority citizens for equal rights, once a source of disunity and civil war, is now a point of pride for all Americans. We must never go back. There is no room for racism, anti-Semitism, or other forms of ethnic and racial hatred in this country.

I know that you've been horrified, as have I, by the resurgence of some hate groups preaching bigotry and prejudice. Use the mighty voice of your pulpits and the powerful standing of your churches to denounce and isolate these hate groups in our midst. The commandment given us is clear and simple: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

But whatever sad episodes exist in our past, any objective observer must hold a positive view of American history, a history that has been the story of hopes fulfilled and dreams made into reality. Especially in this century, America has kept alight the torch of freedom, but not just for ourselves but for millions of others around the world.

Jesse Jackson Celebrates Common Ground and the Rainbow Coalition, 1988

When I look out at this convention, I see the face of America, red, yellow, brown, black and white, we're all precious in God's sight—the real rainbow coalition. . . .

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. lies only a few miles from us tonight.

Tonight he must feel good as he looks down upon us. We sit here together, a rainbow, a coalition—the sons and daughters of slave masters and the sons and daughters of slaves sitting together around a common table, to decide the direction of our party and our country. His heart would be full tonight. . . .

Tonight there is a sense of celebration because we are moved, fundamentally moved, from racial battlegrounds by law, to economic common ground, tomorrow we will challenge to move to higher ground. Common ground!

Think of Jerusalem—the intersection where many trails met. A small village that became the birthplace for three great religions—Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Why was this village so blessed? Because it provided a crossroads where different people met, different cultures, and different civilizations could meet and find common ground.

When people come together, flowers always flourish and the air is rich with the aroma of a new spring.

Take New York, the dynamic metropolis. What makes New York so special?

It is the invitation of the Statue of Liberty—give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses who yearn to breathe free.

Not restricted to English only.

Many people, many cultures, many languages—with one thing in common, the yearning to breathe free.

Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?

In the long history of the world, only a few generations have been granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. I do not shrink from this responsibility — I welcome it. I do not believe that any of us would exchange places with any other people or any other generation. The energy, the faith, the devotion which we bring to this endeavor will light our country and all who serve it — and the glow from that fire can truly light the world.

And so, my fellow Americans: Ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country.

My fellow citizens of the world: Ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can do for the freedom of man.

Finally, whether you are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you. With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own.

8 RONALD REAGAN'S FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1981)

To a few of us here today this is a solemn and most momentous occasion, and yet in the history of our nation it is a commonplace occurrence. The orderly transfer of authority as called for in the Constitution routinely takes place, as it has for almost two centuries, and few of us stop to think how unique we really are. In the eyes of many in the world, this every-four-year ceremony we accept as normal is nothing less than a miracle.

Mr President, I want our fellow citizens to know how much you did to carry on this tradition. By your gracious cooperation in the transition process, you have shown a watching world that we are a united people pledged to maintaining a political system which guarantees individual liberty to a greater degree than any other, and I thank you and your people for all your help in maintaining the continuity which is the bulwark of our republic.

The business of our nation goes forward. These United States are confronted with an economic affliction of great proportions. We suffer from the longest and one of the worst sustained inflations in our national history. It distorts our economic decisions, penalizes thrift, and crushes the struggling young and the fixed-income elderly alike. It threatens to shatter the lives of millions of our people.

Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, human misery, and personal indignity. Those who do work are denied a fair return for their labor by a tax system which penalizes successful achievement and keeps us from maintaining full productivity.

But great as our tax burden is, it has not kept pace with public spending. For decades we have piled deficit upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children's future for the temporary convenience of the present. To continue this long trend is to guarantee tremendous social, cultural, political, and economic upheavals.

You and I, as individuals, can, by borrowing, live beyond our means, but for only a limited period of time. Why, then, should we think that collectively, as a nation, we're not bound by that same limitation? We must act today in order to preserve tomorrow. And let there be no misunderstanding: We are going to begin to act, beginning today.

The economic ills we suffer have come upon us over several decades. They will not go away in days, weeks, or months, but they will go away. They will go away because we as Americans have the capacity now, as we've had in the past, to do whatever needs to be done to preserve this last and greatest bastion of freedom.

In this present crisis, government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem. From time to time we've been tempted to believe that society has become too complex to be managed by self-rule, that government by an élite group is superior to government for, by, and of the people. Well, if no one among us is capable of governing himself, then who among us has the capacity to govern someone else? All of us together, in and out of government, must bear the burden. The solutions we seek must be equitable, with no one group singled out to pay a higher price.

We hear much of special interest groups. Well, our concern must be for a special interest group that has been too long neglected. It knows no sectional boundaries or ethnic and racial divisions, and it crosses political party lines. It is made up of men and women who raise our food, patrol our streets, man our mines and factories, teach our children, keep our homes, and heal us when we're sick — professionals, industrialists, shopkeepers, clerks, cabbies, and truck drivers. They are, in short, 'we the people', this breed called Americans.

Well, this administration's objective will be a healthy, vigorous, growing economy that provides equal opportunities for all Americans, with no barriers born of bigotry or discrimination. Putting America back to work means putting all Americans back to work. Ending inflation means freeing all Americans from the terror of runaway living costs. All must share in the productive work of this 'new beginning', and all must share in the bounty of a revived economy. With the idealism and fair play which are the core of our system and our strength, we can have a strong and prosperous America, at peace with itself and the world.

So, as we begin, let us take inventory. We are a nation that has a government — not the other way around. And this makes us special among the nations of the earth. Our government has no power except that granted it by the people. It is time to check and reverse the growth of government, which shows signs of having grown beyond the consent of the governed.

It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the federal establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the federal government and those reserved to the states or to the people. All of us need to be reminded that the federal government did not create the states; the states created the federal government.

Now, so there will be no misunderstanding, it's not my intention to do away with government. It is rather to make it work — work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back. Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it; foster productivity, not stifle it.

If we look to the answer as to why for so many years we achieved so much, prospered as no other people on earth, it was because here in this land we unleashed the energy and individual genius of man to a greater extent than has ever been done before. Freedom and the dignity of the individual have been more available and assured here than in any other place on earth. The price for this freedom at times has been high, but we have never been unwilling to pay that price.

It is no coincidence that our present troubles parallel and are proportionate to the intervention and intrusion in our lives that result from unnecessary and excessive growth of government. It is time for us to realize that we're too great a nation to limit ourselves to small dreams. We're not, as some would have us believe, doomed to an inevitable decline. I do not believe in a fate that will fall on us no matter what we do. I do believe in a fate that will fall on us if we do nothing. So, with all the creative energy at our command, let us begin an era of national renewal. Let us review our determination, our courage, and our strength. And let us renew our faith and our hope.

We have every right to dream heroic dreams. Those who say that we're in a time when there are no heroes, they just don't know where to look. You can see heroes every day going in and out of factory gates. Others, a handful in number, produce enough food to feed all of us and then the world beyond. You meet heroes across a counter, and they're on both sides of that counter. There are entrepreneurs with faith in themselves and faith in an idea who create new jobs, new wealth and opportunity. They're individuals and families whose taxes support the government and whose voluntary gifts support church, charity, culture, art, and education. Their patriotism is quiet, but deep. Their values sustain our national life.

Now, I have used the words 'they' and 'their' in speaking of these heroes. I could say 'you' and 'your', because I'm addressing the heroes of whom I speak — you, the citizens of this blessed land. Your dreams, your hopes,

your goals are going to be the dreams, the hopes, and the goals of this administration, so help me God.

We shall reflect the compassion that is so much a part of your makeup. How can we love our country and not love our countrymen; and loving them, reach out a hand when they fall, heal them when they're sick, and provide opportunity to make them self-sufficient so they will be equal in fact and not just in theory?

Can we solve the problems confronting us? Well, the answer is an unequivocal and emphatic 'yes'. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, I did not take the oath I've just taken with the intention of presiding over the dissolution of the world's strongest economy.

In the days ahead I will propose removing the roadblocks that have slowed our economy and reduced productivity. Steps will be taken aimed at restoring the balance between the various levels of government. Progress may be slow, measured in inches and feet, not miles, but we will progress. It is time to reawaken this industrial giant, to get government back within its means, and to lighten our punitive tax burden. And these will be our first priorities, and on these principles there will be no compromise.

On the eve of our struggle for independence a man who might have been one of the greatest among the Founding Fathers, Dr Joseph Warren, president of the Massachusetts Congress, said to his fellow Americans, 'Our country is in danger, but not to be despaired of ... On you depend the fortunes of America. You are to decide the important questions upon which rests the happiness and the liberty of millions yet unborn. Act worthy of yourselves.'

Well, I believe we, the Americans of today, are ready to act worthy of ourselves, ready to do what must be done to ensure happiness and liberty for ourselves, our children, and our children's children. And as we renew ourselves here in our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world. We will again be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom.

To those neighbors and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our historic ties and assure them of our support and firm commitment. We will match loyalty with loyalty. We will strive for mutually beneficial relations. We will not use our friendship to impose on their sovereignty, for our own sovereignty is not for sale.

As for the enemies of freedom, those who are potential adversaries, they will be reminded that peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it, now or ever.

Our forbearance should never be misunderstood. Our reluctance for conflict should not be misjudged as a failure of will. When action is required to preserve our national security, we will act. We will maintain sufficient

strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do so we have the best chance of never having to use that strength.

Above all, we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women. It is a weapon our adversaries in today's world do not have. It is a weapon that we as Americans do have. Let that be understood by those who practice terrorism and prey upon their neighbors.

I'm told that tens of thousands of prayer meetings are being held on this day, and for that I'm deeply grateful. We are a nation under God, and I believe God intended for us to be free. It would be fitting and good, I think, if on each Inaugural Day in future years it should be declared a day of prayer.

This is the first time in our history that this ceremony has been held, as you've been told, on this West Front of the Capitol. Standing here, one faces a magnificent vista, opening up on this city's special beauty and history. At the end of this open mall are those shrines to the giants on whose shoulders we stand.

Directly in front of me, the monument to a monumental man, George Washington, father of our country. A man of humility who came to greatness reluctantly. He led America out of revolutionary victory into infant nationhood. Off to one side, the stately memorial to Thomas Jefferson. The Declaration of Independence flames with his eloquence. And then, beyond the Reflecting Pool, the dignified columns of the Lincoln Memorial. Whoever would understand in his heart the meaning of America will find it in the life of Abraham Lincoln.

Beyond those monuments to heroism is the Potomac River, and on the far shore the sloping hills of Arlington National Cemetery, with its row upon row of simple white markers bearing crosses or Stars of David. They add up to only a tiny fraction of the price that has been paid for our freedom.

Each one of those markers is a monument to the kind of hero I spoke of earlier. Their lives ended in places called Belleau Wood, the Argonne, Omaha Beach, Salerno, and halfway around the world on Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Pork Chop Hill, the Chosin Reservoir, and in a hundred rice paddies and jungles of a place called Vietnam.

Under one such marker lies a young man, Martin Treptow, who left his job in a small town barbershop in 1917 to go to France with the famed Rainbow Division. There, on the western front, he was killed trying to carry a message between battalions under heavy artillery fire.

We're told that on his body was found a diary. On the flyleaf under the heading 'My Pledge', he had written these words: 'America must win this war. Therefore I will work, I will save, I will sacrifice, I will endure, I will fight cheerfully and do my utmost, as if the issue of the whole struggle depended on me alone.'

The crisis we are facing today does not require of us the kind of sacrifice that Martin Treptow and so many thousands of others were called upon to make. It does require, however, our best effort and our willingness to believe in ourselves and to believe in our capacity to perform great deeds, to believe that together with God's help we can and will resolve the problems which now confront us.

And after all, why shouldn't we believe that? We are Americans.

God bless you, and thank you.

9 BILL CLINTON'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1993)

My fellow citizens: Today, we celebrate the mystery of American renewal.

This ceremony is held in the depth of winter. But, by the words we speak and the faces we show the world, we force the spring — a spring reborn in the world's oldest democracy, that brings forth the vision and courage to reinvent America.

When our founders boldly declared America's independence to the world and our purposes to the Almighty, they knew that America, to endure, would have to change; not change for change's sake, but change to preserve America's ideals — life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. Though we march to the music of our time, our mission is timeless.

Each generation of Americans must define what it means to be an American.

On behalf of our nation, I salute my predecessor, President Bush, for his half-century of service to America, and I thank the millions of men and women whose steadfastness and sacrifice triumphed over depression, fascism, and communism.

Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom, but threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues.

Raised in unrivaled prosperity, we inherit an economy that is still the world's strongest, but is weakened by business failures, stagnant wages, increasing inequality and deep divisions among our own people.

When George Washington first took the oath I have just sworn to uphold, news traveled slowly across the land by horseback and across the oceans by boat. Now, the sights and sounds of this ceremony are broadcast instantaneously to billions around the world.

Communications and commerce are global; investment is mobile; technology is almost magical; and ambition for a better life is now universal. We earn our livelihood in America today in peaceful competition with people all across the earth.


SECTION 5

[...]

(B) Within 60 calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to Section 4 (A) (1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States armed forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States armed forces, (2) has extended by law such 60-day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States. Such 60-day period shall be extended for not more than an additional 30 days if the President determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States armed forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.

(C) Notwithstanding subsection (B), at any time that United States armed forces are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its possessions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.

18 PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE SOVIET UNION AS AN 'EVIL EMPIRE' (1983)



During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas — that's their name for religion — or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything

is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930s. We see it too often today.

This doesn't mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.

A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on people's minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, 'I love my little girls more than anything —' And I said to myself, 'Oh, no, don't. You can't — don't say that.' But I had underestimated him. He went on: 'I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God.'

There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important.

Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness — pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.

It was C.S. Lewis who, in his unforgettable 'Screwtape Letters', wrote: 'The greatest evil is not done now in those sordid "dens of crime" that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried and minuted) in clear, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice.'

Well, because these 'quiet men' do not 'raise their voices', because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they're always making 'their final territorial demand', some would have us accept them at their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that simple-minded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom.

So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I've always believed that old Screwtape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride — the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves about it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration's efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and one day, with God's help, their total elimination.

While America's military strength is important, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith.

Whittaker Chambers, the man whose own religious conversion made him a witness to one of the terrible traumas of our time, the Hiss-Chambers case, wrote that the crisis of the Western World exists to the degree in which the

West is indifferent to God, the degree to which it collaborates in communism's attempt to make man stand alone without God. And then he said, for Marxism-Leninism is actually the second oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, 'Ye shall be as gods.'

The Western World can answer this challenge, he wrote, 'but only provided that its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins is as great as communism's faith in Man.'


I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: 'He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might He increased strength ... But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary ...'

Yes, change your world. One of our Founding Fathers, Thomas Paine, said, 'We have it within our power to begin the world over again.' We can do it, doing together what no one church could do by itself.


God bless you, and thank you very much.

POST-COLD WAR

19 PRESIDENT BUSH PROCLAIMS A NEW WORLD ORDER (1990)



We gather tonight, witness to events in the Persian Gulf as significant as they are tragic. In the early morning hours of August 2nd, following negotiations and promises by Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein not to use force, a powerful Iraqi army invaded its trusting and much weaker neighbor, Kuwait. Within 3 days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to check that aggression.



CHAPTER 31

DOCUMENT SET 2

Confronting the Evil Empire by Proxy: Central America as a Battleground

Although the main target of Reagan administration foreign policy was the Soviet Union, one of the key battlegrounds for the ideological struggle against the "Evil Empire" was Central America. Your textbook stresses the president's overt and covert attempts to unhorse the Sandinista government in Nicaragua through support of the Contra resistance, itself a product of CIA activities in the unstable area. As the documents suggest, the overall thrust of the Reagan policy was reminiscent of the Eisenhower-Dulles era; the outcome, however, was much less satisfying from the administration's point of view. When you review these materials, think about continuity in American hemispheric policy, with particular emphasis on the exercise of executive authority.

Start with the brief excerpt from President Reagan's 1985 State of the Union message as an indicator of the goals and assumptions that underlay American policy toward Nicaragua and the Contras. Compare the Reagan approach to the Dulles initiative in Guatemala, discussed in Chapter 28. Watch for themes in the history of American response to revolution in the Western Hemisphere, and think about the relationship between the president's broad objectives, his management style, and the eventual result of an extensive program of covert activity.

It was ultimately the CIA-NSC program of freelance adventurism that created problems for militant anticommunists on the Reagan team. The consequence of concern for American hostages in the Middle East and

determination to aid the Contras was a scandal of major proportions that severely damaged the administration for much of the president's second term. As you examine the Tower Commission Report and the majority and minority reports of the congressional Iran-Contra panels, be conscious of similarities and differences between this crisis and the Watergate affair of the Nixon years (see Chapter 30). Assess the constitutional principles at stake in the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and National Security Advisor John Poindexter, as described in your textbook.

One reason the National Security managers decided to circumvent legislative prohibitions of Contra aid was that they supported President Reagan's anti-Sandinista zeal, despite the fact that the administration never succeeded in generating substantial public support for his policy. Review such diverse sources as the article by former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliot Abrams and the newsletter of the Inter-Religious Task Force on Central America to identify the shortcomings of U. S. Central American policy and the reasons for public reservations in the United States. Consider the authors' personal agendas as you evaluate their criticisms.

These documents place an important contemporary problem in its historical context. Your task is to identify continuities with the past and to analyze the central constitutional and policy issues raised by American interventionism.

Questions for Analysis

1. What was the rationale for the administration's policy of support for the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua? What relationship existed between President Reagan's assumptions and those of Oliver North and John Poindexter, as revealed in the documents? To what extent did their objectives justify the means employed to achieve them?
2. Compare the Watergate affair with the Iran-Contra scandal, with emphasis on the legitimate uses of power and the constitutional issues involved. Does justice appear to have been served in the handling of the North and Poindexter cases? Why or why not? What evidence bearing on constitutional interpretation may be extracted from the Tower report and the Senate-House panel reports?
3. Using your textbook as a resource, evaluate Reagan's management/administrative style. How do the documents clarify the Iran-Contra affair and its causes? What were the implications of the president's approach to his office?
4. Why was President Reagan unable to mobilize public support for his policy toward the Contras? What does the evidence suggest about the reasons for public skepticism of the Reagan program in Central America? In what way do the documents reflect the use or misuse of history? What was the result?

5. Using the documents as your major resource, develop a hypothesis with regard to responsibility for the Iran-Contra scandal. What conclusions can be drawn from the evidence concerning the question of who knew what when? Why are these important questions?
6. Examining the evidence from a long-term historical perspective, what do you regard as the strengths and weaknesses in American policy toward Latin America? How do the documents demonstrate the problems and opportunities presented by revolutionary movements in the Third World? What is your evaluation of American policies? Defend your position with evidence drawn from the documents.
7. How do the documents reflect the nature of the American governmental process in the Reagan era? What relationship between the branches of government is evident in these materials? What are its implications for the future? How does the evidence clarify the meaning of textbook references to fears and uncertainties?

1. President Ronald Reagan Sets a Tone for Central American Policy, 1985

We must stand by all our democratic allies. And we must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth.

The Sandinista dictatorship of Nicaragua, with full Cuban-Soviet bloc support, not only persecutes its people, the church, and denies a free press but

arms and provides bases for communist terrorists attacking neighboring states. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense and totally consistent with the OAS and UN Charters. It is essential that the Congress continue all facets of our assistance to Central America. I want to work with you to support the democratic forces whose struggle is tied to our own security.

2. The Inter-Religious Task Force Attacks the Administration Program in Nicaragua, 1985, 1986

The level of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua reached new heights in 1985.

On Feb. 21 the facade of "interdiction" fell when Pres. Reagan admitted that the U.S. goal in Nicaragua was to change the "present structure" there and make the Sandinistas cry "uncle."

Last June, after several weeks of intensive lobbying, the Reagan Administration succeeded in persuading the House of Representatives to reverse itself and resume direct aid to the contras. Although the aid was characterized as "humanitarian," Congressional debate revealed that the envisioned support went far beyond any recognized sense of the term and contravened existing international legal standards. . . .

Over the past year the contras do not appear to have gained any significant ground. They cannot cap-

ture or hold any towns or territory and are dependent on their ability to seek safe haven from Honduras and (increasingly) Costa Rica. However, even the resumption of lethal military aid (which recent events suggest the Administration is laying the groundwork for) is not likely to alter the military balance. . . .

Meanwhile, the war continued to take tolls on the lives and economy of Nicaragua. A military offensive in the north was fairly successful, causing thousands of contras to flee into Honduras or to scatter in small bands within Nicaragua. . . .

Allegations of atrocities by the U.S.-backed contras continued to be documented with the issuance of two reports last March. A report by former New York State assistant attorney general Reed Brody documented a "distinct pattern" of murders, kidnap-

pings, assaults and torture by the contras. Similar findings were reported by Americas Watch in a report which at the same time found that serious human rights violations on the part of the Nicaraguan government had declined since 1982.

In addition, a Congressional report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus confirmed that almost the entire command structure of the FDN was made up of former Somoza National Guard. The report listed the main contributors of private funds going to the contras. The list includes the Unification Church (owner of the Washington Times); the Christian Broadcasting Network; the Veterans of Foreign Wars; the Knights of Malta; CAUSA International (also the Unification Church); Soldier of Fortune Magazine; and several southern-based mercenary groups.

Direct U.S. involvement was also revealed this past year. In March, the *Wall Street Journal* reported the involvement of U.S. personnel in attacks on Nicaragua and violations of its airspace.

Later in the year it was reported that the National Security Council (NSC), a White House agency, helped raise money for the rebels from private sources. Moreover, the NSC, with full knowledge and acquiescence of the White House, helped plan anti-Sandinista military operations despite Congressional prohibitions on such aid. All the while Pres. Reagan continued to deny that the U.S. was violating international law.

Yet the violation of international law was precisely the issue when Nicaragua's presentation before the World Court at the Hague opened on Sept. 12. Nicaragua charged that U.S. support for the contras attempting to overthrow its government was "state terrorism" and in violation of international law.

While the U.S. refused to participate in the case, former CIA analyst David MacMichael testified that CIA strategy was aimed at provoking a violent military response and domestic repression by Nicaragua. While a decision is still pending, observers agreed that by legal standards Nicaragua has a strong case. . . .

By a vote of 222 to 210 the U.S. House of Representatives rejected on March 20 [1986] President Reagan's plan to extend \$100 million military and "humanitarian aid" to the contras. . . .

Explanations for the President's defeat varied; ranging from the level of "anti-communist" rhetoric emanating from the White House, the lack of a coherent policy evoking memories of Vietnam, to the opposition of U.S. allies in Latin America to the request. . . .

But the reaction of the public also played a significant role in the defeat. President Reagan went on national television the Sunday night before the vote in an effort to appeal to the American public. But in most Congressional offices phone calls opposing the President outnumbered those who supported him.

Only two weeks earlier, on March 3, nearly 200 religious leaders formed human crosses on the steps of the Capitol, commemorating people killed by the contras in Nicaragua, and accused President Reagan of preferring "terrorism to the pursuit of peace." . . .

The likely passage of any military aid to the contras, even if it is "fenced," takes the United States one step further down the road to the logical conclusion of a failed policy—the ultimate commitment of U.S. military personnel. This point was underscored by recent revelations that the contras, in need of major training, would have to be trained by U.S. advisers were military aid passed. . . .

3. The Tower Commission Assesses Oliver North's Contra Aid Scheme, 1987

. . . As a general matter, LtCol North kept VADM Poindexter exhaustively informed about his activities with respect to the Iran initiative. Although the Board did not find a specific communication from LtCol North to VADM Poindexter on the diversion question, VADM Poindexter said that he knew that a diversion had occurred. Mr. Regan told the Board that he asked VADM Poindexter on November 24, 1986, if he knew of LtCol North's role in a diversion of funds to support the Contras. VADM Poindexter

replied that, "I had a feeling that something bad was going on, but I didn't investigate it and I didn't do a thing about it. *** I really didn't want to know. I was so damned mad at Tip O'Neill for the way he was dragging the Contras around I didn't want to know what, if anything, was going on. I should have, but I didn't." Attorney General Meese told the Board that after talking to LtCol North, he asked VADM Poindexter what he knew about the diversion. "He said that he did know about it *** Ollie North had given

him enough hints that he knew what was going on, but he didn't want to look further into it. But that he in fact did generally know that money had gone to the Contras as a result of the Iran shipment."

The President said he had no knowledge of the diversion prior to his conversation with Attorney General Meese on November 25, 1986. No evidence has come to light to suggest otherwise. Contemporaneous Justice Department staff notes of LtCol North's interview with Attorney General Meese on November 23, 1986, show North telling the Attorney General that only he, Mr. McFarlane, and VADM Poindexter were aware of the diversion. . . .

On December 21, 1982, Congress passed the first "Boland amendment" prohibiting the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency from spending funds to overthrow Nicaragua or provoke conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras. The following year, \$24 million was authorized for the Contras. On October 3, 1984, Congress cut off all funding for the Contras and prohibited DoD, CIA, and any other agency or entity "involved in intelligence activities" from directly or indirectly supporting military operations in Nicaragua. . . .

The Bid for Private Funding. Because of Congressional restrictions, the Executive Branch turned to private sources to sustain the Contras militarily. In 1985 and 1986, Mr. McFarlane and the NSC staff repeatedly denied any direct involvement in efforts to obtain funds from these sources. Yet evidence before the Board suggests that LtCol North was well aware of these efforts and played a role in coordinating them. The extent of that role remains unclear.

In a memorandum to Mr. McFarlane dated April 11, 1985, LtCol North expressed concern that remaining Contra funds would soon be insufficient. He advised that efforts be made to seek \$15 to \$20 million in additional funds from the current donors which will "allow the force to grow to 30-35,000." The exact purpose to which these private funds were to be put was unambiguous. A number of memoranda from LtCol North make clear that the funds were for munitions and lethal aid. . . .

Who Knew What?

The Director of the CIA CATF recalls that by 1985, the CIA knew the Contras were receiving

significant arms deliveries, some running in value in excess of \$6 million, and were spending at a rate in excess of \$1 million a month. CIA officials sought to locate the source of the funding. The Director of the CIA CATF told us:

[W]hat we found out was really only one or two people. It was tremendously compartmented inside the resistance organization and no one knew the ultimate source of the money, and very, very few people even know how much there was coming in and out.

Mr. Abrams recalls:

[W]e did not engage in nor did we really know anything about this private network. We knew that it existed. We knew it in part because somebody was giving the Contras guns. . . . They were instructed to kind of stay away, as the Agency people were, on the grounds that if you got too close, you would end up being accused of facilitating and so forth.

Richard Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense, recalls, "[S]everal of us in those groups said, Ollie. . . . you're not involved in all this, are you? And he said . . . I have broken no laws."

LtCol North and VADM Poindexter do not seem to have sought the President's approval. In his response to a May 16, 1986, message from Poindexter on the status of the Contra project, LtCol North went on to discuss White House knowledge of his activities. LtCol North speculated that the President must know, indirectly, of his Contra activities.

I have no idea what Don Regan does or does not know re my private U.S. operation but the President obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people to thank them for their 'support for Democracy' in CentAm.

Later that day VADM Poindexter replied to LtCol North: "Don Regan knows very little of your operation and that is just as well."

4. The Congressional Panels' Conclusions on the Iran-Contra Affair: The Majority View, 1987

Dishonesty and Secrecy

The Iran-Contra Affair was characterized by pervasive dishonesty and inordinate secrecy.

North admitted that he and other officials lied repeatedly to Congress and to the American people about the Contra covert action and Iran arms sales, and that he altered and destroyed official documents. North's testimony demonstrates that he also lied to members of the Executive branch, including the Attorney General, and officials of the State Department, CIA and NSC. . . .

Poindexter and North cited fear of leaks as a justification for these practices. But the need to prevent public disclosure cannot justify the deception practiced upon Members of Congress and the Executive branch officials by those who knew of the arms sale to Iran and the Contra support network. The State and Defense Departments deal each day with the most sensitive matters affecting millions of lives here and abroad. The Congressional Intelligence Committees receive only the most highly classified information, including information of covert activities. Yet, according to North and Poindexter, even the senior officials of these bodies could not be entrusted with the NSC staff's secret because they might leak. . . .

The Administration never sought to hide its desire to assist the Contras so long as such aid was authorized by statute. On the contrary, it wanted the Sandinistas to know that the United States supported the Contras. After enactment of the Boland Amendment, the Administration repeatedly and publicly called upon Congress to resume U.S. assistance. Only the NSC staff's Contra support activities were kept under wraps. The Committees believe these actions were concealed in order to prevent Congress from learning that the Boland Amendment was being circumvented.

It was stated on several occasions that the confusion, secrecy and deception surrounding the aid program for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters was produced in part by Congress' shifting positions on Contra aid.

But Congress' inconsistency mirrored the chameleon-like nature of the rationale offered for granting assistance in the first instance. Initially, Congress was told that our purpose was simply to interdict the flow of weapons from Nicaragua into El Salvador. Then Congress was told that our purpose was to harass the

Sandinistas to prevent them from consolidating their power and exporting their revolution. Eventually, Congress was told that our purpose was to eliminate all foreign forces from Nicaragua, to reduce the size of the Sandinista armed forces, and to restore the democratic reforms pledged by the Sandinistas during the overthrow of the Somoza regime. . . .

Disdain for Law

In the Iran-Contra Affair, officials viewed the law not as setting boundaries for their actions, but raising impediments to their goals. When the goals and the law collided, the law gave way:

The covert program of support for the Contras evaded the Constitution's most significant check on Executive power: The President can spend funds on a program only if he can convince Congress to appropriate the money.

When Congress enacted the Boland Amendment, cutting off funds for the war in Nicaragua, Administration officials raised funds for the Contras from other sources—foreign Governments, the Iran arms sales, and private individuals; and the NSC staff controlled the expenditures of these funds through power over the Enterprise. Conducting the covert program in Nicaragua with funding from the sale of U.S. Government property and contributions raised by Government officials was a flagrant violation of the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution.

In addition, the covert program of support for the Contras was an evasion of the letter and spirit of the Boland Amendment. The President made it clear that while he opposed restrictions on military or paramilitary assistance to the Contras, he recognized that compliance with the law was not optional. "[W]hat I might personally wish or what our Government might wish still would not justify us violating the law of the land," he said in 1983. . . .

Who Was Responsible?

Who was responsible for the Iran-Contra Affair? Part of our mandate was to answer that question, not in a legal sense (which is the responsibility of the Independent Counsel), but in order to reaffirm that those who serve the Government are accountable for their actions. Based on our investigation, we reach the following conclusions:

At the operational level, the central figure in the Iran-Contra Affair was Lt. Col. North, who coordi-

nated all of the activities and was involved in all aspects of the secret operations. North, however, did not act alone.

North's conduct had the express approval of Adm. John Poindexter, first as Deputy National Security Adviser and then as National Security Adviser. North also had at least the tacit support of Robert McFarlane, who served as National Security Adviser until December 1985.

In addition, for reasons cited earlier, we believe that the late Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, encouraged North, gave him direction and promoted the concept of an extra-legal covert organization. Casey, for the most part, insulated CIA career employees from knowledge of what he and the NSC staff were doing. Casey's passion for covert operations—dating back to his World War II intelligence days—was well known. . . .

5. A Minority Opinion of the Scandal, 1987

President Reagan and his staff made mistakes in the Iran-Contra Affair. It is important at the outset, however, to note that the President himself has already taken the hard step of acknowledging his mistakes and reacting precisely to correct what went wrong. . . .

The bottom line, however, is that the mistakes of the Iran-Contra Affair were just that—mistakes in judgment, and nothing more. There was no constitutional crisis, no systematic disrespect for "the rule of law," no grand conspiracy, and no Administration-wide dishonesty or coverup. . . .

Nicaragua

The Nicaraguan aspect of the Iran-Contra Affair had its origins in several years of bitter political warfare over U.S. policy toward Central America between the Reagan Administration and the Democratic House of Representatives. . . .

By the late spring of 1984, it became clear that the [Nicaraguan] Resistance would need some source of money if it were to continue to survive while the Administration tried to change public and Congressional opinion. To help bridge the gap, some Administration officials began encouraging foreign governments and U.S. private citizens to support the Contras. NSC staff members played a major role in these efforts, but were specifically ordered to avoid direct solicitations. The President clearly approved of private benefactor and third-country funding, and neither he *nor his designated agents* could constitutionally be prohibited from encouraging it. To avoid political retribution, however, the Administration did not inform Congress of its actions. . . .

Because the Boland Amendment is an appropriations rider, it is worth noting that there is no evidence that any substantial amounts of appropriated taxpayer funds were used in support of these efforts. In

addition, the NSC staff believed—as we do—that the prohibition did not cover the NSC. At no time, in other words, did members of the President's staff think their activities were illegal. Nevertheless, the NSC staff did make a concerted effort to conceal its actions from Congress. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the President or other senior Administration officials knew about this concealment. . . .

The Boland Amendment

We do believe . . . that virtually all of the NSC staff's activities were legal, with the possible exception of the diversion of Iran arms sale proceeds to the Resistance. We concede that reasonable people may take a contrary view of what Congress intended the Boland Amendments to mean. . . .

Notwithstanding our legal opinions, we think it was a fundamental mistake for the NSC staff to have been secretive and deceptive about what it was doing. The requirement for building long-term political support means that the Administration would have been better off if it had conducted its activities in the open. . . .

Summary: Nicaragua

. . . (1) The Constitution protects the power of the President, either acting himself or through agents of his choice, to engage in whatever diplomatic communications with other countries he may wish. It also protects the ability of the President and his agents to persuade U.S. citizens to engage voluntarily in otherwise legal activity to serve what they consider to be the national interest. That includes trying to persuade other countries to contribute their own funds for causes both countries support. To whatever extent the Boland Amendments tried to prohibit such activity, they were clearly unconstitutional.

(2) If the Constitution prohibits Congress from restricting a particular Presidential action directly, it cannot use the appropriation power to achieve the same unconstitutional effect. Congress does have the power under the Constitution, however, to use appropriations riders to prohibit the entire U.S. Government from spending any money, including salaries, to provide covert or overt military support to the Contras. Thus, the Clark Amendment prohibiting all U.S. support for the Angolan Resistance in 1976 was constitutional. Some members of Congress who supported the Boland Amendment may have thought they were enacting a prohibition as broad as the Clark Amendment. The specific language of the Boland Amendment was considerably more restricted, however. . . .

Summary: Diversion

We consider the ownership of the funds the Iranians paid to the Secord-Hakim "Enterprise" to be in legal doubt. There are respectable legal arguments to be made both for the point of view that the funds belong to the U.S. Treasury and for the contention that they do not. If the funds do not belong to the United States, then the diversion amounted to third-country or private funds being shipped to the Contras. If they did belong to the United States, there would be legal questions (although not, technically, Boland Amendment questions) about using U.S.-owned funds for purposes not specifically approved by law. The answer does not seem to us to be so obvious, however, as to warrant treating the matter as if it were criminal.

6. Elliot Abrams Assesses the Impact of the Iran-Contra Scandal on Central American Policy, 1989

. . . Reagan made the establishment of democratic institutions the centerpiece of his Central America policy. In El Salvador, in Guatemala, and in relatively peaceful Honduras, it became U.S. policy to push for transitions, via free elections, to democratic governments; and furthermore to encourage those countries to improve their judicial systems, reduce military violence, expand freedom of the press—in short, to build not only democratic governments but democratic societies as well.

This was the tacit agreement: the U.S. would protect Central America from Communism by bottling up and ultimately toppling the Sandinista regime if the Right—civilian and military—would throw its support to a process of democratization, which we for our part would help in every possible way.

Not everyone was automatically or immediately willing to accept this deal. The local militaries were suspicious, the local right-wing parties were hostile, and American conservatives were dubious. For each, the administration had an answer.

For American conservatives there was an appeal to principle: the goal was not to support one or another political party, but the democratic process itself. If non-Communist leftists like the Christian Democrats entered, and won, elections, so be it; parties of the Right, too, would have an equal chance to do the same. . . .

As for the battle against Communism in Nicaragua,

the Reagan administration, after a false start or two, had begun fulfilling its promise. . . .

By mid-1987, there were 15,000 well-equipped *contras* in the field in Nicaragua, giving the Sandinistas real trouble and moving freely throughout the countryside. In particular, the *contras'* American Redeye missiles rendered the Sandinistas' Soviet-made helicopter gunships marginal to the struggle. Contrary to the claims of congressional liberals, the Sandinistas were very well aware of the wide support for the *contras* among the populace, and of the threat they constituted to the survival of the Communist regime.

It was at this promising point—when Communism was under effective assault in Nicaragua, and democracy was being built in the neighboring countries—that the Iran-*contra* affair erupted.

Thanks to the ensuing scandal, the liberal opponents of Reagan's strategy of backing guerrilla wars against Communism were given a new, unexpected chance to teach once again their version of the "lessons of Vietnam": that a policy of anti-Communism leads to crises, scandals, adventurism, and even threatens the very integrity of our political system. But instead of combining the admission of serious mistakes with a tough defense of itself and with a frank explanation to the American people of the aims of its Central American strategy, the Reagan administration spun into a panic. High officials were thrown

overboard. Two separate investigations into official misconduct (one by the Tower Commission and one by Congress) were launched, and just as quickly overshadowed, as the President, appointing an "independent counsel" before either of these investigations had been concluded, permitted the issue to become one of criminality.

Until now, congressional votes on *contra* aid had always been won or lost by very slim margins. Even Reagan's most important victory, the \$100 million in military aid that had been authorized in the fall of 1986, had been wrung out of the Congress by a handful of votes. Now, as a result of the scandal, the tenuous majority that had backed *contra* aid was gone. Nevertheless Central America was still there, and the administration felt duty-bound to try to maintain its policy somehow.

In this weakened condition, the White House entered into negotiations in July 1987 with its former ally Jim Wright, now the Speaker of the House, a Texas Democrat with a pro-*contra* constituency. The product of these negotiations was the Wright-Reagan plan, under which Ronald Reagan agreed for the first time to link *contra* aid to Sandinista promises of reform, rather than to the *contras'* real battlefield needs.

It is hard to blame Central American leaders too much for the panic which characterized their initial reaction to this plan. They represented small, weak nations whose internal peace and stability could be upset in a weekend by Castro or Ortega. And if they sat and faced the future much surer about Castro's intentions and Ortega's than about our own, then their panic was not unfounded.

But the particular form of panic to which they succumbed was a disastrous one. For in a single day, the four Central American democratic leaders swept away the foundations of the policy which had been sustaining them, and presented to Daniel Ortega a very great gift. This they did at a summit meeting in Esquipulas, Guatemala, when they adopted the "peace plan" set forth by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, under which the *contras* would be disarmed and disbanded in exchange for Ortega's paper pledges of Jeffersonian democracy.


Now the road to democracy no longer required *contras* to eliminate Communists, but instead required agreements with Communists to eliminate the *contras*. Not even Iran-*contra* was so serious a blow to the Reagan administration's Central America policy as this. . . .

7. Berke Breathed on the Rule of Law in America, 1989

BLOOM COUNTY by Berke Breathed



8. How the "System" Worked: A Skeptic's View, 1989



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In a postwar survey, a United Nations inspection team declared that the allied bombardment had had a "near apocalyptic impact" on Iraq and had transformed the country into a "pre-industrial age nation" which "had been until January a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society."¹¹⁹

It will never be known how many hundreds of thousands of Iraqis died from the direct and indirect effects of the war; the count is added to every day. With the United States refusing to end the embargo against Iraq, everything has continued: malnutrition, starvation, lack of medicines and vaccines, contaminated drinking water, human excrement piling up, typhoid, a near-epidemic of measles, several other diseases ... Iraq's food supply had been 70 percent dependent on imports, now billions of dollars were frozen in overseas accounts, and with prohibitive restrictions on selling its oil ... an inability to rebuild because vital parts could not be imported, industry closing its doors, mass unemployment, transportation and communications broken down¹²⁰ ... By September 1994, with the US government still refusing to release its death grip on the embargo, still hoping that the suffering would reach critical mass and the Iraqi people would overthrow Saddam, the Iraqi government announced that since the sanctions had begun in August 1990 about 400,000 children had died of malnutrition and disease.¹²¹

After the war, when the Iraqi government was repressing a Kurdish revolt—which the US had encouraged, then failed to support—Bush said: "I feel frustrated any time innocent civilians are being slaughtered."¹²²

This was the second time the United States had led the Kurdish lambs to slaughter with a broken commitment. (See Iraq 1972-75 chapter.)

The United States had also encouraged the Shiite Muslims in Iraq to rebel, then did not back them, presumably because Washington only wanted to drive Saddam up the wall some more, make him irrational enough to incite a coup against him; but Washington was not looking to foster a pro-Iranian regime and inspire Muslim fundamentalists elsewhere in the Middle East.

American mental hospitals and prisons are home to many people who claim to have heard a voice telling them to kill certain people, people they'd never met before, people who'd never done them any harm, or threatened any harm.

American soldiers went to the Persian Gulf to kill the same kind of people after hearing a voice command them: the voice of George Herbert Walker Bush.

53. Afghanistan 1979-1992

America's Jihad

His followers first gained attention by throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil. CIA and State Department officials I have spoken with call him "scary," "vicious," "a fascist," "definite dictatorship material".¹

This did not prevent the United States government from showering the man with large amounts of aid to fight against the Soviet-supported government of Afghanistan. His name was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He was the head of the Islamic Party and he hated the United

States almost as much as he hated the Russians. His followers screamed "Death to America" along with "Death to the Soviet Union", only the Russians were not showering him with large amounts of aid.²

The United States began supporting Afghan Islamic fundamentalists in 1979 despite the fact that in February of that year some of them had kidnapped the American ambassador in the capital city of Kabul, leading to his death in the rescue attempt. The support continued even after their brother Islamic fundamentalists in next-door Iran seized the US Embassy in Teheran in November and held 55 Americans hostage for over a year. Hekmatyar and his colleagues were, after all, in battle against the Soviet Evil Empire; he was thus an important member of those forces Ronald Reagan called "freedom fighters".

On 27 April 1978, a coup staged by the People's Democratic Party (PDP) overthrew the government of Mohammad Daoud. Daoud, five years earlier, had overthrown the monarchy and established a republic, although he himself was a member of the royal family. He had been supported by the left in this endeavor, but it turned out that Daoud's royal blood was thicker than his progressive water. When the Daoud regime had a PDP leader killed, arrested the rest of the leadership, and purged hundreds of suspected party sympathizers from government posts, the PDP, aided by its supporters in the army, revolted and took power.

Afghanistan was a backward nation: a life expectancy of about 40, infant mortality of at least 25 percent, absolutely primitive sanitation, widespread malnutrition, illiteracy of more than 90 percent, very few highways, not one mile of railway, most people living in nomadic tribes or as impoverished farmers in mud villages, identifying more with ethnic groups than with a larger political concept, a life scarcely different from many centuries earlier.

Reform with a socialist bent was the new government's ambition: land reform (while still retaining private property), controls on prices and profits, and strengthening of the public sector, as well as separation of church and state, eradication of illiteracy, legalization of trade unions, and the emancipation of women in a land almost entirely Muslim.

Afghanistan's thousand-mile border with the Soviet Union had always produced a special relationship. Even while it was a monarchy, the country had been under the strong influence of its powerful northern neighbor which had long been its largest trading partner, aid donor, and military supplier. But the country had never been gobbled up by the Soviets, a fact that perhaps lends credence to the oft-repeated Soviet claim that their hegemony over Eastern Europe was only to create a buffer between themselves and the frequently-invading West.

Nevertheless, for decades Washington and the Shah of Iran tried to pressure and bribe Afghanistan in order to roll back Russian influence in the country. During the Daoud regime, Iran, encouraged by the United States, sought to replace the Soviet Union as Kabul's biggest donor with a \$2 billion economic aid agreement, and urged Afghanistan to join the Regional Cooperation for Development, which consisted of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. (This organization was attacked by the Soviet Union and its friends in Afghanistan as being a "branch of CENTO" the 1950s regional security pact that was part of the US policy of "containment" of the Soviet Union.) At the same time, Iran's infamous secret police, SAVAK, was busy fingering suspected Communist sympathizers in the Afghan government and military. In September 1975, prodded by Iran which was conditioning its aid on such policies, Daoud dismissed 40 Soviet-trained military officers and moved to reduce future Afghan dependence on officer training in the USSR by initiating training arrangements with India and Egypt. Most important, in Soviet eyes, Daoud gradually broke off his alliance with the PDP, announcing that he would start his own party and ban all other political

activity under a projected new constitution.³

Selig Harrison, the *Washington Post's* South Asia specialist, wrote an article in 1979 entitled "The Shah, Not the Kremlin, Touched off Afghan Coup", concluding:

The Communist takeover in Kabul [April 1978] came about when it did, and in the way that it did, because the Shah disturbed the tenuous equilibrium that had existed in Afghanistan between the Soviet Union and the West for nearly three decades. In Iranian and American eyes, Teheran's offensive was merely designed to make Kabul more truly nonaligned, but it went far beyond that. Given the unusually long frontier with Afghanistan, the Soviet Union would clearly go to great lengths to prevent Kabul from moving once again toward a pro-western stance.⁴

When the Shah was overthrown in January 1979, the United States lost its chief ally and outpost in the Soviet-border region, as well as its military installations and electronic monitoring stations aimed at the Soviet Union. Washington's cold warriors could only eye Afghanistan even more covetously than before.

After the April revolution, the new government under President Noor Mohammed Taraki declared a commitment to Islam within a secular state, and to non-alignment in foreign affairs. It maintained that the coup had not been foreign inspired, that it was not a "Communist takeover", and that they were not "Communists" but rather nationalists and revolutionaries. (No official or traditional Communist Party had ever existed in Afghanistan.)⁵ But because of its radical reform program, its class-struggle and anti-imperialist-type rhetoric, its support of all the usual suspects (Cuba, North Korea, etc.), its signing of a friendship treaty and other cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union, and an increased presence in the country of Soviet civilian and military advisers (though probably less than the US had in Iran at the time), it was labeled "communist" by the world's media and by its domestic opponents.

Whether or not the new government in Afghanistan should properly have been called communist, whether or not it made any difference what it was called, the lines were now drawn for political, military, and propaganda battle: a *jihad* (holy war) between fundamentalist Muslims and "godless atheistic communists"; Afghan nationalism vs. a "Soviet-run" government; large landowners, tribal chiefs, businessmen, the extended royal family, and others vs. the government's economic reforms. Said the new prime minister about this elite, who were needed to keep the country running, "every effort will be made to attract them. But we want to re-educate them in such a manner that they should think about the people, and not, as previously, just about themselves—to have a good house and a nice car while other people die of hunger."⁶

The Afghan government was trying to drag the country into the 20th century. In May 1979, British political scientist Fred Halliday observed that "probably more has changed in the countryside over the last year than in the two centuries since the state was established." Peasant debts to landlords had been canceled, the system of usury (by which peasants, who were forced to borrow money against future crops, were left in perpetual debt to money-lenders) was abolished, and hundreds of schools and medical clinics were being built in the countryside. Halliday also reported that a substantial land-redistribution program was underway, with many of the 200,000 rural families scheduled to receive land under this reform already having done so. But this last claim must be approached with caution. Revolutionary land reform is always an extremely complex and precarious undertaking even under the best of conditions, and ultra-backward, tradition-bound Afghanistan in the midst of nascent civil war hardly offered the best of conditions for social experiments.

The reforms also encroached into the sensitive area of Islamic subjugation of women by

outlawing child marriage and the giving of a woman in marriage in exchange for money or commodities, and teaching women to read, at a time when certain Islamic sectors were openly calling for the reinforcement of *pardah*, the seclusion of women from public observation.

Halliday noted that the People's Democratic Party saw the Soviet Union as the only realistic source of support for the long-overdue modernization.⁷ The illiterate Afghan peasants' ethnic cousins across the border in the Soviet Union were, after all, often university graduates and professionals.

The argument of the Mousjahedeen ("holy warriors") rebels that the "communist" government would curtail their religious freedom was never borne out in practice. A year and a half after the change in government, the conservative British magazine *The Economist* reported that "no restrictions had been imposed on religious practice."⁸ Earlier, the *New York Times* stated that the religious issue "is being used by some Afghans who actually object more to President Taraki's plans for land reforms and other changes in this feudal society."⁹ Many of the Muslim clergy were in fact rich landowners.¹⁰ The rebels, concluded a BBC reporter who spent four months with them, are "fighting to retain their feudal system and stop the Kabul government's left-wing reforms which [are] considered anti-Islamic."¹¹

The two other nations which shared a long border with Afghanistan, and were closely allied to the United States, expressed their fears of the new government. To the west, Iran, still under the Shah, worried about "threats to oil-passage routes in the Persian Gulf". Pakistan, to the south, spoke of "threats from a hostile and expansionist Afghanistan."¹² A former US ambassador to Afghanistan saw it as part of a "gradually closing pincer movement aimed at Iran and the oil regions of the Middle East."¹³ None of these alleged fears turned out to have any substance or evidence to back them up, but to the anti-communist mind this might prove only that the Russians and their Afghan puppets had been stopped in time.

Two months after the April 1978 coup, an alliance formed by a number of conservative Islamic factions was waging guerrilla war against the government.¹⁴ By spring 1979, fighting was taking place on many fronts, and the State Department was cautioning the Soviet Union that its advisers in Afghanistan should not interfere militarily in the civil strife. One such warning in the summer by State Department spokesman Hodding Carter was another of those Washington monuments to *chutzpah*: "We expect the principle of non-intervention to be respected by all parties in the area, including the Soviet Union."¹⁵ This while the Soviets were charging the CIA with arming Afghan exiles in Pakistan; and the Afghan government was accusing Pakistan and Iran of also aiding the guerrillas and even of crossing the border to take part in the fighting. Pakistan had recently taken its own sharp turn toward strict Muslim orthodoxy, which the Afghan government deplored as "fanatic";¹⁶ while in January, Iran had established a Muslim state after overthrowing the Shah. (As opposed to the Afghan fundamentalist freedom fighters, the Iranian Islamic fundamentalists were regularly described in the West as terrorists, ultra-conservatives, and anti-democratic.)

A "favorite tactic" of the Afghan freedom fighters was "to torture victims [often Russians] by first cutting off their noses, ears, and genitals, then removing one slice of skin after another", producing "a slow, very painful death".¹⁷ The Mousjahedeen also killed a Canadian tourist and six West Germans, including two children, and a U.S. military attaché was dragged from his car and beaten; all due to the rebels' apparent inability to distinguish Russians from other Europeans.¹⁸

In March 1979, Taraki went to Moscow to press the Soviets to send ground troops to help the Afghan army put down the Mousjahedeen. He was promised military assistance, but ground

troops could not be committed. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin told the Afghan leader:

The entry of our troops into Afghanistan would outrage the international community, triggering a string of extremely negative consequences in many different areas. Our common enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet troops appear in Afghanistan. This will give them the excuse they need to send armed bands into the country.¹⁹

In September, the question became completely academic for Nour Mohammed Taraki, for he was ousted (and his death soon announced) in an intra-party struggle and replaced by his own deputy prime minister, Hafizullah Amin. Although Taraki had sometimes been heavy-handed in implementing the reform program, and had created opposition even amongst the intended beneficiaries, he turned out to be moderate compared to Amin who tried to institute social change by riding roughshod over tradition and tribal and ethnic autonomy.

The Kremlin was unhappy with Amin. The fact that he had been involved in the overthrow and death of the much-favored Taraki was bad enough. But the Soviets also regarded him as thoroughly unsuitable for the task that was Moscow's *sine qua non*: preventing an anti-communist Islamic state from arising in Afghanistan. Amin gave reform an exceedingly bad name. The KGB station in Kabul, in pressing for Amin's removal, stated that his usurpation of power would lead to "harsh repressions and, as a reaction, the activation and consolidation of the opposition."²⁰ Moreover, as we shall see, the Soviets were highly suspicious about Amin's ideological convictions.

Thus it was, that what in March had been unthinkable, in December became a reality. Soviet troops began to arrive in Afghanistan around the 8th of the month—to what extent at Amin's request or with his approval, and, consequently, whether to call the action an "invasion" or not, has been the subject of much discussion and controversy.

On the 23rd the *Washington Post* commented "There was no charge [by the State Department] that the Soviets have invaded Afghanistan, since the troops apparently were invited."²¹

However, at a meeting with Soviet-bloc ambassadors in October, Amin's foreign minister had openly criticized the Soviet Union for interfering in Afghan affairs. Amin himself insisted that Moscow replace its ambassador.²² Yet, on 26 December, while the main body of Soviet troops was arriving in Afghanistan, Amin gave "a relaxed interview" to an Arab journalist. "The Soviets," he said, "supply my country with economic and military aid, but at the same time they respect our independence and our sovereignty. They do not interfere in our domestic affairs." He also spoke approvingly of the USSR's willingness to accept his veto on military bases.²³

The very next day, a Soviet military force stormed the presidential palace and shot Amin dead.²⁴

He was replaced by Babrak Karmal, who had been vice president and deputy prime minister in the 1978 revolutionary government.

Moscow denied any part in Amin's death, though they didn't pretend to be sorry about it, as Brezhnev made clear:

The actions of the aggressors against Afghanistan were facilitated by Amin who, on seizing power, started cruelly repressing broad sections of Afghan society, party and military cadres, members of the intelligentsia and of the Moslem clergy, that is, the very sections on which the April revolution relied. And the people under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party, headed by Babrak Karmal, rose against Amin's tyranny and put an end to it. Now in Washington and some other capitals they are mourning Amin. This exposes their hypocrisy with

particular clarity. Where were these mourners when Amin was conducting mass repressions, when he forcibly removed and unlawfully killed Taraki, the founder of the new Afghan state?²⁵

After Amin's ouster and execution, the public thronged the streets in "a holiday spirit". "If Karmal could have overthrown Amin without the Russians," observed a Western diplomat, "he would have been seen as a hero of the people."²⁶

The Soviet government and press repeatedly referred to Amin as a "CIA agent", a charge which was greeted with great skepticism in the United States and elsewhere.²⁷ However, enough circumstantial evidence supporting the charge exists so that it perhaps should not be dismissed entirely out of hand.

During the late 1950s and early '60s, Amin had attended Columbia University Teachers College and the University of Wisconsin.²⁸ This was a heyday period for the CIA—using impressive bribes and threats—to regularly try to recruit foreign students in the United States to act as agents for them when they returned home. During this period, at least one president of the Afghanistan Students Association (ASA), Zia H. Noorzay, was working with the CIA in the United States and later became president of the Afghanistan state treasury. One of the Afghan students whom Noorzay and the CIA tried in vain to recruit, Abdul Latif Hotaki, declared in 1967 that a good number of the key officials in the Afghanist government who studied in the United States "are either CIA trained or indoctrinated. Some are cabinet level people."²⁹ It has been reported that in 1963 Amin became head of the ASA, but this has not been corroborated.³⁰ However, it is known that the ASA received part of its funding from the Asia Foundation, the CIA's principal front in Asia for many years, and that at one time Amin was associated with this organization.³¹

In September 1979, the month that Amin took power, the American *charge d'affaires* in Kabul, Bruce Amstutz, began to hold friendly meetings with him to reassure him that he need not worry about his unhappy Soviet allies as long as the US maintained a strong presence in Afghanistan. The strategy may have worked, for later in the month, Amin made a special appeal to Amstutz for improved relations with the United States. Two days later in New York, the Afghan Foreign Minister quietly expressed the same sentiments to State Department officials. And at the end of October, the US Embassy in Kabul reported that Amin was "painfully aware of the exiled leadership the Soviets [were] keeping on the shelf" (a reference to Karmal who was living in Czechoslovakia).³² Under normal circumstances, the Amin-US meetings might be regarded as routine and innocent diplomatic contact, but these were hardly normal circumstances—the Afghan government was engaged in a civil war, and the United States was supporting the other side.

Moreover, it can be said that Amin, by his ruthlessness, was doing just what an American agent would be expected to do: discrediting the People's Democratic Party, the party's reforms, the idea of socialism or communism, and the Soviet Union, all associated in one package. Amin also conducted purges in the army officer corps which seriously undermined the army's combat capabilities.

But why would Amin, if he were actually plotting with the Americans, request Soviet military forces on several occasions? The main reason appears to be that he was being pressed to do so by high levels of the PDPA and he had to comply for the sake of appearances. Babrak Karmal has suggested other, more Machiavellian, scenarios.³³

The Carter administration jumped on the issue of the Soviet "invasion" and soon launched a campaign of righteous indignation, imposing what President Carter called "penalties"—from halting the delivery of grain to the Soviet Union to keeping the US team

out of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

The Russians countered that the US was enraged by the intervention because Washington had been plotting to turn the country into an American base to replace the loss of Iran.³⁴

Unsurprisingly, on this seemingly clear-cut anti-communist issue, the American public and media easily fell in line with the president. The *Wall Street Journal* called for a "military" reaction, the establishment of US bases in the Middle East, "reinstatement of draft registration", development of a new missile, and giving the CIA more leeway, adding: "Clearly we ought to keep open the chance of covert aid to Afghan rebels."³⁵ The last, whether the newspaper knew it or not, had actually been going on for some time. In February 1980, the *Washington Post* disclosed that while the United States was now supplying weapons to the guerrillas.

US covert aid prior to the December invasion, according to sources, was limited to tunneling small amounts of medical supplies and communications equipment to scattered rebel tribes, plus what is described as "technical advice" to the rebels about where they could acquire arms on their own.³⁶

US foreign service officers had been meeting with rebel leaders to determine their needs at least as early as April 1979,³⁷ and the CIA had been training guerrillas in Pakistan and beaming radio propaganda into Afghanistan since the year before.³⁸

Intervention in the Afghan civil war by the United States, Iran, Pakistan, China and others gave the Russians grave concern about who was going to wield power next door. They consistently cited these "aggressive imperialist forces" to rationalize their own intervention into Afghanistan, which was the first time Soviet ground troops had engaged in military action anywhere in the world outside its post-World War II Eastern European borders. The potential establishment of an anti-communist Islamic state on the borders of the Soviet Union's own republics in Soviet Central Asia that were home to some 40 million Muslims could not be regarded with equanimity by the Kremlin any more than Washington could be unruffled about a communist takeover in Mexico.

As we have seen repeatedly, the United States did not limit its defense perimeter to its immediate neighbors, or even to Western Europe, but to the entire globe. President Carter declared that the Persian Gulf area was "now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan", that this area was synonymous with US interests, and that the United States would "defend" it against any threat by all means necessary. He called the Soviet action "the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War", a statement that required overlooking a great deal of post-war history. But 1980 was an election year.

Brezhnev, on the other hand, declared that "the national interests or security of the United States of America and other states are in no way affected by the events in Afghanistan. All attempts to portray matters otherwise are sheer nonsense."³⁹

The Carter administration was equally dismissive of Soviet concerns. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski later stated that "the issue was not what might have been Brezhnev's subjective motives in going into Afghanistan but the objective consequences of a Soviet military presence so much closer to the Persian Gulf."⁴⁰

The stage was now set for 12 long years of the most horrific kind of warfare, a daily atrocity for the vast majority of the Afghan people who never asked for or wanted this war. But the Soviet Union was determined that its borders must be unthreatening. The Afghan government was committed to its goal of a secular, reformed Afghanistan. The United States was determined that, at a minimum, this should be the Soviets' Vietnam, that they

should slowly bleed as the Americans had; at a maximum ... that was perhaps not as well thought out, but American policymakers could not fail to understand—though they dared not say it publicly and explicitly—that support of the Mujahideen (many of whom carried pictures of the Ayatollah Khomeini with them) could lead to a fundamentalist Islamic state being established in Afghanistan every bit as repressive as in next-door Iran, which in the 1980s was Public Enemy Number One in America. Neither could the word "terrorist" cross the lips of Washington officials in speaking of their new allies/clients, though these same people shot down civilian airliners and planted bombs at the airport. In 1986, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose emotional invectives against "terrorists" were second to none, welcomed Abdul Haq, an Afghan rebel leader who admitted that he had ordered the planting of a bomb at Kabul airport in 1984 which killed at least 28 people.⁴¹ Such, then, were the scruples of cold-war anti-communists in late 20th century. As Anastasio Somoza had been "our son of a bitch", the Mujahideen were now "our fanatic terrorists".

At the beginning there had been some thought given to the morality of the policy. "The question here," a senior official in the Carter administration said, "was whether it was morally acceptable that, in order to keep the Soviets off balance, which was the reason for the operation, it was permissible to use other lives for our geopolitical interests."⁴²

But such sentiments could not survive. Afghanistan was a cold-warrior's dream: The CIA and the Pentagon, finally, had one of their proxy armies in direct confrontation with the forces of the Evil Empire. There was no price too high to pay for this Super Nintendo game, neither the hundreds of thousands of Afghan lives, nor the destruction of Afghan society, nor three billion (sic) dollars of American taxpayer money poured into a bottomless hole, much of it going only to make a few Afghans and Pakistanis rich. Congress was equal-ly enthused—without even the moral uncertainty that made them cautious about arming the Nicaraguan contras—and became a veritable bipartisan horn of plenty as it allocated more and more money for the effort each year. Rep. Charles Wilson of Texas expressed a not-atypical sentiment of official Washington when he declared:

There were 58,000 dead in Vietnam and we owe the Russians one ... I have a slight obsession with it, because of Vietnam. I thought the Soviets ought to get a dose of it ... I've been of the opinion that this money was better spent to hurt our adversaries than other money in the Defense Department budget.⁴³

The CIA became the grand coordinator; purchasing or arranging the manufacture of Soviet-style weapons from Egypt, China, Poland, Israel and elsewhere, or supplying their own; arranging for military training by Americans, Egyptians, Chinese and Iranians; hitting up Middle-Eastern countries for donations, notably Saudi Arabia which gave many hundreds of millions of dollars in aid each year, totaling probably more than a billion; pressuring and bribing Pakistan—with whom recent American relations had been very poor—to rent out its country as a military staging area and sanctuary; putting the Pakistani Director of Military Operations, Brigadier Mian Mohammad Afzal, onto the CIA payroll to ensure Pakistani cooperation.⁴⁴ Military and economic aid which had been cut off would be restored. Pakistan was told by the United States, if they would join the great crusade. Only a month before the Soviet intervention, anti-American mobs had burned and ransacked the US embassy in Islamabad and American cultural centers in two other Pakistani cities.⁴⁵

The American ambassador in Libya reported that Muammar Qaddafi was sending the rebels \$250,000 as well, but this, presumably, was not at the request of the CIA.⁴⁶

Washington left it to the Pakistanis to decide which of the various Afghan guerrilla

groups should be the beneficiaries of much of this largesse. As one observer put it: "According to conventional wisdom at the time, the United States would not repeat the mistake of Vietnam—micro-managing a war in a culture it did not understand."⁴⁷

Not everyone in Pakistan was bought out. The independent Islamabad daily newspaper, the *Muslim*, more than once accused the United States of being ready to "fight to the last Afghan" ... "We are not flattered to be termed a 'frontline state' by Washington." ... "Washington does not seem to be in any mood to seek an early settlement of a war whose benefits it is reaping at no cost of American manpower."⁴⁸

It's not actually clear whether there was any loss of American lives in the war. On several occasions in the late '80s, the Kabul government announced that Americans had been killed in the fighting,⁴⁹ and in 1985 a London newspaper reported that some two dozen American Black Muslims were in Afghanistan, fighting alongside the Moudjahdeen in a *jihad* that a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran says all believers in Islam must do at least once in their lives.⁵⁰ Several of the Black Muslims returned to the United States after being wounded.

Soviet aggression ... Soviet invasion ... Soviet swallowing up another innocent state as part of their plan to conquer the world, or at least the Middle East ... this was the predominant and lasting lesson taught by Washington official pronouncements and the mainstream US media about the war, and the sum total of knowledge for the average American, although Afghanistan had retained its independence during 60 years of living in peace next door to the Soviet Union. Zbigniew Brzezinski, albeit unrelentingly anti-Soviet, repeatedly speaks of the fact of Afghanistan's "neutrality" in his memoirs.⁵¹ The country had been neutral even during the Second World War.

One would have to look long and hard at the information and rhetoric offered to the American public following the Soviet intervention to derive even a hint that the civil war was essentially a struggle over deep-seated social reform; while an actual discussion of the issue was virtually non-existent. Prior to the intervention, one could get a taste of this, such as the following from the *New York Times*:

Land reform attempts undermined their village chiefs. Portraits of Lenin threatened their religious leaders. But it was the Kabul revolutionary Government's granting of new rights to women that pushed orthodox Moslem men in the Pashtoon villages of eastern Afghanistan into picking up their guns. ... "The government said our women had to attend meetings and our children had to go to schools. This threatens our religion. We had to fight." ... "The government imposed various ordinances allowing women freedom to marry anyone they chose without their parents' consent."⁵²

Throughout the 1980s, the Karmal, and then the Najibullah regimes, despite the exigencies of the war, pursued a program of modernization and broadening of their base: bringing electricity to villages, along with health clinics, a measure of land reform, and literacy; releasing numerous prisoners unlawfully incarcerated by Amin; bringing mullahs and other non-party people into the government; trying to carry it all out with moderation and sensitivity instead of confronting the traditional structures head-on; reiterating its commitment to Islam, rebuilding and constructing mosques, exempting land owned by religious dignitaries and their institutions from land reform; trying, in short, to avoid the gross mistakes of the Amin government with its rush to force changes down people's throats.⁵³

Selig Harrison, writing in 1988, stated:

The Afghan Communists see themselves as nationalists and modernizers ... They rationalize their col-

laboration with the Russians as the only way available to consolidate their revolution in the face of foreign "interference" ... The commitment of the Communists to rapid modernization enables them to win a grudging tolerance from many members of the modern-minded middle class, who feel trapped between two fires: the Russians and fanatic Muslims opposed to social reforms.⁵⁴

The program of the Kabul government eventually encouraged many volunteers to take up arms in its name. But it was a decidedly uphill fight, for it was relatively easy for the native anti-reformists and their foreign backers to convince large numbers of ordinary peasants that the government had ill intentions by blurring the distinction between the present government and its detested and dogmatic predecessor, particularly since the government was fond of stressing the continuity of the April 1978 revolution.⁵⁵ One thing the government, as well as the anti-reformists, were undoubtedly not told of was the US connection to the selfsame detested predecessor, Hafizullah Amin.

Another problem faced by the Kabul government in winning the hearts and minds of the people was of course the continuing Soviet armed presence, although it must be remembered that Islamic opposition to the leftist government began well before the Soviet forces arrived; indeed, the most militant of the Moudjahdeen leaders, Hekmatyar, had led a serious uprising against the previous (non-leftist) government as well, in 1975, declaring that a "godless, communist-dominated regime" ruled in Kabul.⁵⁶

As long as Soviet troops remained, the conflict in Afghanistan could be presented to the American mind as little more than a battle between Russian invaders and Afghanistan resistance/freedom fighters; as if the Afghanistan army and government didn't exist, or certainly not with a large following of people who favored reforms and didn't want to live under a fundamentalist Islamic government, probably a majority of the population.

"Maybe the people really don't like us, either," said Mohammed Hakim, Mayor of Kabul, a general in the Afghan army who was trained in the 1970s at military bases in the United States, and who thought that America was "the best country", "but they like us better than the extremists. This is what the Western countries do not understand. We only hope that Mr. Bush and the people of the United States take a good look at us. They think we are very fanatic Communists, that we are not human beings. We are not fanatics. We are not even Communists."⁵⁷

They were in the American media. Any official of the Afghan government, or the government as a whole, was typically referred to, *a priori*, as "Communist", or "Marxist", or "pro-Communist", or "pro-Marxist", etc., without explanation or definition. Najibullah, who took over when Karmal stepped down in 1986, was confirmed in his position in 1987 under a new Islamized constitution that was stripped of all socialist rhetoric and brimming with references to Islam and the holy Koran. "This is not a socialist revolutionary country," he said in his acceptance speech. "We do not want to build a Communist society."⁵⁸

Could the United States see beyond cold war ideology and consider the needs of the Afghan people? In August 1979, three months before the Soviet intervention, a classified State Department Report stated:

the United States's larger interests ... would be served by the demise of the Taraki-Amin regime, despite whatever setbacks this might mean for future social and economic reforms in Afghanistan. ... the overthrow of the D.R.A. [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] would show the rest of the world, particularly the Third World, that the Soviets' view of the socialist course of history as being inevitable is not accurate.⁵⁹

Repeatedly, in the 1980s, as earlier, the Soviet Union contended that no solution to the conflict could be found until the United States and other nations ceased their support of the

Moujahedeen. The United States, in turn, insisted that the Soviets must first withdraw their troops from Afghanistan.

Finally, after several years of UN-supported negotiations, an accord was signed in Geneva on 14 April 1988, under which the Kremlin committed itself to begin pulling out its estimated 115,000 troops on 15 May, and to complete the process by 15 February of the next year. Afghanistan, said Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, had become "a bleeding wound".

In February, after the last Soviet forces had left Afghanistan, Gorbachev urged the United States to support an embargo on arms shipments into Afghanistan and a cease-fire between the two warring sides. Both proposals were turned down by the new Bush administration, which claimed that the Afghan government had been left with a massive stockpile of military equipment. It is unclear why Washington felt that the rebels who had fought the government to a standstill despite the powerful presence of the Soviet armed forces with all their equipment, would now be at a dangerous disadvantage with the Russians gone. The key to the American response may lie in the State Department statement of the prior week that the United States believed that the Kabul government on its own would not last more than six months.⁶⁰

By raising the question of an arms gap (whether it was for real or not), Washington was assuring the continuation of the arms race in Afghanistan—a microcosm of the cold war. At the same time, the Bush administration called upon the Soviets to support "an independent, nonaligned Afghanistan", although this was precisely what the United States had worked for decades to thwart.

Two days later, President Najibullah criticized the American rejection of Gorbachev's proposal, offering to return the Soviet weapons if the rebels agreed to lay down their weapons and negotiate. There was no reported response to this offer from the US, or from the rebels, who in the past had refused such offers.

It would appear that Washington was thinking longer term than cease-fires and negotiations. On the same day as Najibullah's offer, the United States announced that it had delivered 500,000 made-in-America textbooks to Afghanistan which were being used to teach Grades one through four. The books, which "critics say bordered on propaganda", told of the rebels' fight against the Soviet Union and contained drawings of guerrillas killing Russian soldiers.⁶¹ Since the beginning of the war, the Moujahedeen had reserved its worst treatment for Russians. Washington possessed confirmed reports that the rebels had drugged and tortured 50 to 200 Soviet prisoners and imprisoned them like animals in cages, "living lives of indescribable horror".⁶² Another account, by a reporter from the conservative *Far Eastern Economic Review*, relates that:

One [Soviet] group was killed, skinned and hung up in a butcher's shop. One captive found himself the centre of attraction in a game of buzkashi, that rough and tumble form of Afghan polo in which a headless goat is usually the ball. The captive was used instead. Alive. He was literally torn to pieces.⁶³

Meanwhile, much to the surprise of the United States and everyone else, the Kabul government showed no sign of collapsing. The good news for Washington was that since the Soviet troops were gone (though some military advisers remained), the "cost-benefit ratio" had improved,⁶⁴ the cost being measured entirely in non-American deaths and suffering, as the rebels regularly exploded car bombs and sent rockets smashing into residential areas of Kabul, and destroyed government-built schools and clinics and murdered literacy teachers (just as the US-backed Nicaraguan contras had been doing on the other side of the world,

and for the same reason: these were symbols of governmental benevolence).

The death and destruction caused by the Soviets and their Afghan allies was also extensive, such as the many bombings of villages. But individual atrocity stories must be approached with caution, for, as we have seen repeatedly, the propensity and the ability of the CIA to disseminate anti-communist disinformation—often of the most far-fetched variety—was virtually unlimited. With the Soviet Union the direct adversary, the creativity lamp must have burning all night at Langley.

Amnesty International, with its usual careful collection methods, reported in the mid-'80s on the frequent use of torture and arbitrary detention by the authorities in Kabul.⁶⁵ But what are we to make, for example, of the report, without attribution, by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson—who had ties to the American Afghan lobby—that Soviet troops often marched into unfriendly villages in Afghanistan and "massacred every man, woman and child"?⁶⁶ Or the *New York Times* recounting a story told them by an Afghan citizen of how Afghan soldiers had intentionally blinded five children with pieces of metal and then strangled them, as a government supporter he was with just laughed. To the newspaper's credit, it added that "There is no way of confirming this story. It is possible that the man who told it was acting and trying to discredit the regime here. His eyes, however, looked like they had seen horror."⁶⁷ Or a US congressman's charge in 1985 that the Soviets had used booby-trapped toys to maim Afghan children,⁶⁸ the identical story told before about leftists elsewhere in the world during the cold war, and repeated again in 1987 by CBS News, with pictures. The *New York Post* later reported the claim of a BBC producer that the bomb-toy had been created for the CBS cameraman.⁶⁹

Then there was the Afghan Mercy Fund, ostensibly a relief agency, but primarily in the propaganda business, which reported that the Soviets had burned a baby alive, that they were disguising mines as candy bars and leaving other mines disguised as butterflies to also attract children. The butterfly mines, it turned out, were copies of a US-designed mine used in the Vietnam war.⁷⁰

There was also the shooting down of a Pakistan fighter plane over Afghanistan in May 1987 that was reported by Pakistan and Washington—knowing with certainty that their claim was untrue—to be the result of a Soviet-made missile. It turned out that the plane had been shot down by a companion Pakistani plane in error.⁷¹

Throughout the early and mid-'80s, the Reagan administration declared that the Russians were spraying toxic chemicals over Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan—the so-called "yellow rain"—and had caused more than ten thousand deaths by 1982 alone, (including, in Afghanistan, 3,042 deaths attributed to 47 separate incidents between the summer of 1979 and the summer of 1981, so precise was the information). Secretary of State Alexander Haig was a prime dispenser of such stories, and President Reagan himself denounced the Soviet Union thusly more than 15 times in documents and speeches.⁷² The "yellow rain", it turned out, was pollen-laden feces dropped by huge swarms of honeybees flying far overhead. Then, in 1987, it was disclosed that the Reagan administration had made its accusations even though government scientists at the time had been unable to confirm any of them, and considered the evidence to be flimsy and misleading.⁷³ Even more suspicious: the major scientific studies that later examined Washington's claims spoke only of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand; no mention at all was made of Afghanistan. It was as if the administration—perhaps honestly mistaken at first about Indochina—had added Afghanistan to the list with full knowledge of the falsity of its allegation.

Such disinformation campaigns are often designed to serve a domestic political need. Consider Senator Robert Dole's contribution to the discussion when he spoke in 1980 on

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the floor of Congress of "convincing evidence" he had been provided "that the Soviets had developed a chemical capability that extends far beyond our greatest fears ... [a gas that] is unaffected by ... our gas masks and leaves our military defenseless." He then added: "To even suggest a leveling off of defense spending for our nation by the Carter administration at such a critical time in our history is unfathomable."⁷⁴ And in March 1982, when the Reagan administration made its claim about the 3,042 Afghan deaths, the *New York Times* noted that: "President Reagan has just decided that the United States will resume production of chemical weapons and has asked for a substantial increase in the military budget for such weapons."⁷⁵

The money needed to extend American propaganda campaigns internationally flowed from the congressional horn of plenty as smoothly as for military desires—\$500,000 in one moment's flow to train Afghan journalists to use television, radio, and newspapers to advance their cause.⁷⁶

It should be noted that in June 1980, before any of the "yellow rain" charges had been made against the Soviet Union, the Kabul government had accused the rebels and their foreign backers of employing poison gas, citing an incident in which 300 pupils and teachers at several secondary schools had been poisoned with noxious gases; none were reported to have died.⁷⁷

One reason victory continued to elude the Moujahedeen was that they were terribly split by centuries-old ethnic and tribal divisions, as well as the relatively recent rise of Islamic fundamentalism in conflict with more traditional, but still orthodox, Islam. The differences often led to violence. In one incident, in 1989, seven top Moujahedeen commanders and more than 20 other rebels were murdered by a rival guerrilla group. This was neither the first nor the last of such occurrences.⁷⁸ By April 1990, 14 months after the Soviet withdrawal, the *Los Angeles Times* described the state of the rebels thusly:

they have in recent weeks killed more of their own than the enemy. ... Rival resistance commanders have been gunned down gangland-style here in the border town of Peshawar [Pakistan], the staging area for the war. There are persistent reports of large-scale political killings in the refugee camps ... A recent execution ... had as much to do with drugs as with politics. ... Other commanders, in Afghanistan and in the border camps, are simply refusing to fight. They say privately that they prefer [Afghan President] Najibullah to the hard-line Moujahedeen fundamentalists led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.⁷⁹

The rebel cause was also corrupted by the huge amounts of arms flooding in. Investigative reporter Tim Weiner reported the following:

The CIA's pipeline leaked. It leaked badly. It spilled huge quantities of weapons all over one of the world's most anarchic areas. First the Pakistani armed forces took what they wanted from the weapons shipments. Then corrupt Afghan guerrilla leaders stole and sold hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of anti-aircraft guns, missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, AK-47 automatic rifles, ammunition and mines from the CIA's arsenal. Some of the weapons fell into the hands of criminal gangs, heroin kingpins and the most radical faction of the Iranian military. ... While their troops eked out hard lives in Afghanistan's mountains and deserts, the guerrillas' political leaders maintained fine villas in Peshawar and fleets of vehicles at their command. The CIA kept silent as the Afghan politicians converted the Agency's weapons into cash.⁸⁰

Amongst the weapons the Moujahedeen sold to the Iranians were highly sophisticated Stinger heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles, with which the rebels had shot down many hundreds of Soviet military aircraft, as well as at least eight passenger planes. On 8 October

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1987, Revolutionary Guards on an Iranian gunboat fired one of the Stingers at American helicopters patrolling the Persian Gulf, but missed their target.⁸¹

Farther the same year, the CIA told Congress that at least 20 percent of its military aid to the Moujahedeen had been skimmed off by the rebels and Pakistani officials. Columnist Jack Anderson stated at the same time that his conservative estimate was that the diversion was around 60 percent, while one rebel leader told Anderson's assistant on his visit to the border that he doubted that even 25 percent of the arms got through. By other accounts, as little as 20 percent was making it to the intended recipients. If indeed there was a deficiency of arms available to the Moujahedeen compared to the government forces, as George Bush implied, this was clearly a major reason for it. Yet the CIA and other administration officials simply looked upon it as part of doing business in that part of the world.⁸²

Like many other CIA clients, the rebels were financed as well through drug trafficking, and the Agency was apparently as little concerned about it as ever as long as it kept their boys happy. Moujahedeen commanders inside Afghanistan personally controlled huge fields of opium poppies, the raw material from which heroin is refined. CIA-supplied trucks and mules, which had carried arms into Afghanistan, were used to transport some of the opium to the numerous laboratories along the Afghan-Pakistan border, whence many tons of heroin were processed with the cooperation of the Pakistani military. The output provided an estimated one-third to one-half of the heroin used annually in the United States and three-quarters of that used in Western Europe. US officials admitted in 1990 that they had failed to investigate or take action against the drug operation because of a desire not to offend their Pakistani and Afghan allies.⁸³ In 1993, an official of the US Drug Enforcement Administration called Afghanistan the new Colombia of the drug world.⁸⁴

The war, with all its torment, continued until the spring of 1992, three years after the last Soviet troops had gone. An agreement on ending the arms supply, which had been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union, was now in effect. The two super-powers had abandoned the war. The Soviet Union no longer existed. And the Afghan people could count more than a million dead, three million disabled, and five million made refugees, in total about half the population.

At the same time, a UN-brokered truce was to transfer power to a transitional coalition government pending elections. But this was not to be. The Kabul government, amidst food riots and army revolts, virtually disintegrated, and the guerrillas stormed into the capital and established the first Islamic regime in Afghanistan since it had become a separate and independent country in the mid-18th century.

A key event in the downfall of the government was the eleventh-hour defection to the guerrillas of General Abdul Rashid Dostum. Dostum, who previously had been referred to in the US media as a "Communist general", now metamorphosed into an "ex-Communist general".

The Moujahedeen had won. Now they turned against each other with all their fury. Rockets and artillery shells wiped out entire neighborhoods in Kabul. By August at least 1,500 people had been killed or wounded, mostly civilians. (By 1994, the body count in this second civil war would reach 10,000.) Of all the rebel leaders, none was less compromising or more insistent upon a military solution than Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Robert Neumann, a former US ambassador to Afghanistan, observed at this time:

Hekmatyar is a nut, an extremist and a very violent man. He was built up by the Pakistanis. Unfortunately, our government went along with the Pakistanis. We were supplying the money

and the weapons but they [Pakistani officials] were making the policy.

Washington was now very concerned that Hekmatyar would take power. Ironically, they were afraid that if he did, his brand of extremism would spread to and destabilize the former Soviet republics of large Moslem populations, the same fear which had been one of the motivations behind the Soviets intervening in the civil war in the first place.⁸⁵

It was to the forces of Hekmatyar that the "Communist general" Dostum eventually aligned himself.

Suleiman Layeq, a leftist and a poet, and the fallen regime's "ideologue", watched from his window as the Moujahdeen swarmed through the city, claiming building after building. "Without exception," he said of them, "they follow the way of the fundamentalist aims and goals of Islam. And it is not Islam. It is a kind of theory against civilization—against modern civilization."⁸⁶

Even before taking power, the Moujahdeen had banned all non-Muslim groups. Now more of the new law was laid down: All alcohol was banned in the Islamic republic; women could not venture out in the streets without veils, and violations would be punished by floggings, amputations and public executions. And this from the more "moderate" Islamics, not Hekmatyar. By September, the first public hangings were carried out. Before a cheering crowd of 10,000 people, three men were hung. They had been tried behind closed doors, and no one would say what crimes they had committed.⁸⁷

In February 1993, a group of Middle Easterners blew up the World Trade Center in New York City. Most of them were veterans of the Moujahdeen. Other veterans were carrying out assassinations in Cairo, bombings in Bombay, and bloody uprisings in the mountains of Kashmir.

This, then, was the power and the glory of President Reagan's "freedom fighters", who had become yet more anti-American in recent years, many of them backing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91. Surely even Ronald Reagan and George Bush would have preferred the company of "communist" reformers like President Noor Mohammed Taraki, Mayor Mohammed Hakim or poet Suleiman Layeq.

But the Soviet Union had bled. They had bled profusely. For the United States it had also been a holy war.

54. El Salvador 1980-1994

Human rights, Washington style

The United States was supporting the government of El Salvador, said President Ronald Reagan, because it was trying "to halt the infiltration into the Americas, by terrorists and by outside interference, and those who aren't just aiming at El Salvador but, I think, are aiming at the whole of Central and possibly later South America and, I'm sure, eventually North America."¹

Psychiatrists have a term for such perceptions of reality. They call it paranoid schizophrenia.

If the insurgents in El Salvador, the smallest country by far in all of Central and South

America, were engaged in what Ronald Reagan perceived as a plot to capture the Western Hemisphere, others saw it as the quintessential revolution.

Viewed in the latter context, it cannot be asserted that the Salvadorean people rushed precipitously into revolution at the first painful sting of repression, or turned to the gun because of a proclivity towards violent solutions, or a refusal to "work within the system", or because of "outside agitators", or any of the other explanations of why people revolt so dear to the hearts of Washington opinion makers. For as long as anyone could remember, the reins of El Salvador's government had resided in the hands of one military dictatorship or another, while the economy had been controlled by the celebrated 14 coffee and industrial families, with only the occasional, short-lived bursting of accumulated discontent to disturb the neat arrangement.

In December 1980, *New York Times*, reporter Raymond Bonner asked José Napoleón Duarte "why the guerrillas were in the hills". Duarte, who had just become president of the ruling junta, responded with an answer that surprised Bonner: "Fifty years of lies, fifty years of injustice, fifty years of frustration. This is a history of people starving to death, living in misery. For fifty years the same people had all the power, all the money, all the jobs, all the education, all the opportunities."²

In the decades following the famed peasant rebellion in 1932, which was crushed by an unholy massacre, a reform government had occupied the political stage only twice: for nine months in 1944, then again in 1960. The latter instance was precipitated by several thousand students of the National University who staged a protest against the curtailment of civil liberties. The government responded by sending in the police, who systematically smashed offices, classrooms, and laboratories, beat up the school's president, killed a librarian, bayoneted students, and raped dozens of young women. Finally, when the students amassed anew, troops opened fire upon them point-blank.

The bloody incident was one of the turning points for a group of junior military officers. They staged a coup in October aimed at major social and political reforms, but the new government lasted only three months before being overthrown in a counter-coup which the United States was reportedly involved in.³ Dr. Fabio Castillo, a former president of the National University and a member of the ousted government, testified years later before the US Congress that in the process of overthrowing the reform government, the American Embassy immediately began to "intervene directly", and "members of the U.S. Military Mission openly intensified their invitation to conspiracy and rebellion".⁴

Throughout the 1960s, multifarious American experts occupied themselves in El Salvador by enlarging and refining the state's security and counter-insurgency apparatus: the police, the National Guard, the military, the communications and intelligence networks, the co-ordination with their counterparts in other Central American countries ... as matters turned out, these were the forces and resources which were brought into action to impose widespread repression and wage war. Years later, the *New York Times* noted:

In El Salvador, American aid was used for police training in the 1950's and 1960's and many officers in the three branches of the police later became leaders of the right-wing death squads that killed tens of thousands of people in the late 1970's and early 1980's.⁵

If during the 1960s, the apparatus could not be charged with the level of murder or torture or disappearance of political opponents reached in Guatemala and elsewhere in Latin America, it had more to do with the modest degree of outspoken dissent and violent unrest it faced than with greater respect for human rights; those opposition groups which were not outlawed were those regarded as unthreatening; the bloated stomachs of malnour-

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and the weapons but they [Pakistani officials] were making the policy.

Washington was now very concerned that Hekmatyar would take power. Ironically, they were afraid that if he did, his brand of extremism would spread to and destabilize the former Soviet republics of large Moslem populations, the same fear which had been one of the motivations behind the Soviets intervening in the civil war in the first place.⁸⁵

It was to the forces of Hekmatyar that the "Communist general" Doctum eventually aligned himself.

Suleiman Layeq, a leftist and a poet, and the fallen regime's "ideologue", watched from his window as the Moujahdeen swarmed through the city, claiming building after building. "Without exception," he said of them, "they follow the way of the fundamentalist aims and goals of Islam. And it is not Islam. It is a kind of theory against civilization—against modern civilization."⁸⁶

Even before taking power, the Moujahdeen had banned all non-Muslim groups. Now more of the new law was laid down: All alcohol was banned in the Islamic republic; women could not venture out in the streets without veils, and violations would be punished by floggings, amputations and public executions. And this from the more "moderate" Islamics, not Hekmatyar. By September, the first public hangings were carried out. Before a cheering crowd of 10,000 people, three men were hung. They had been tried behind closed doors, and no one would say what crimes they had committed.⁸⁷

In February 1993, a group of Middle Easterners blew up the World Trade Center in New York City. Most of them were veterans of the Moujahdeen. Other veterans were carrying out assassinations in Cairo, bombings in Bombay, and bloody uprisings in the mountains of Kashmir.

This, then, was the power and the glory of President Reagan's "freedom fighters", who had become yet more anti-American in recent years, many of them backing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91. Surely even Ronald Reagan and George Bush would have preferred the company of "communist" reformers like President Noor Mohammed Taraki, Mayor Mohammed Hakim or poet Suleiman Layeq.

But the Soviet Union had bled. They had bled profusely. For the United States it had also been a holy war.

54. El Salvador 1980-1994

Human rights, Washington style

The United States was supporting the government of El Salvador, said President Ronald Reagan, because it was trying "to halt the infiltration into the Americas, by terrorists and by outside interference, and those who aren't just aiming at El Salvador but, I think, are aiming at the whole of Central and possibly later South America and, I'm sure, eventually North America."⁸¹

Psychiatrists have a term for such perceptions of reality. They call it paranoid schizophrenia.

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El Salvador 1980-1994

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ished peasant children were not regarded as threatening at all.

For apparently no better reason than the fact that even militarists cherish a veneer of legitimacy, during the 1960s certain political organizations of generally urban middle-class membership were allowed to run candidates for municipal and legislative office. They did well, though the government-calculated returns consistently left the opposition as a minority in the legislature; i.e., without real power. In 1967, the government went through its motions of the first contested election for the presidency since 1931. After declaring its party, PCN, the winner, the government promptly banned one of the major contending parties, PAR, on the grounds that it supported principles "contrary to the Constitution". According to a PAR spokesperson, the "principle" involved was support for agrarian reform. Another source reports that the party was declared illegal "allegedly for dispensing Communist ideologies", which, within the government's frame of reference, may well have been one and the same.⁶

Undeterred, a center-left coalition, UNO by acronym, was formed and put forth Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte as its presidential candidate in 1972. Though UNO was confronted by violence against its candidates and campaigners, including the murder of an aide of Duarte, and the sabotaging of the coalition's radio broadcasts, it arrived at election day with high expectations. Two days after the polling, the Central Election Board, after first announcing a victory for PCN, shocked everyone by declaring that a recount had shown UNO to be the winner instead. The government quickly imposed a news blackout and for the next two days nothing was heard concerning the election results. On the third day, the Election Board announced that PCN was indeed the winner after all.

In the 1974 and 1976 legislative elections, and again in the 1977 presidential election, the government employed similar creative counting along with gross physical intimidation of candidates, voters, and poll watchers, to assure its continuance in office.⁷

A mass demonstration following the 1977 polling, protesting against electoral fraud, was surrounded by government security forces who opened fire. The result was nothing less than a bloodbath, the death toll measurable in the hundreds. In the immediate aftermath, top leaders of UNO were exiled and the party's followers became liable to arrest, torture and murder.⁸ The country's president, Col. Arturo Molina, blamed the protests on "foreign Communists". His response to charges of electoral fraud was: "Only God is perfect."⁹

Government political violence of this sort had been sporadic in the 1960s, but became commonplace in the 1970s as more and more Salvadoreans, frustrated by the futility of achieving social change through elections, resorted to other means. While some limited themselves to more militant demonstrations, strikes, and occupations of sites, an increasing number turned to acts of urban guerrilla warfare such as assassination of individuals seen as part of the repressive machinery, bombings, and kidnappings for ransom. The government and its paramilitary right-wing vigilante groups—"death squads" is the self-named modern genre—countered with a campaign centered upon leaders of labor unions, peasant organizations and political parties, as well as priests and lay religious workers. "Be Patriotic—Kill a Priest" was the slogan of one death squad. Church people were accused of teaching subversion to the peasants, what the church people themselves would call the word of God, in this the only country in the world named after Christ. The CIA and the US military played an essential role in the conception and organization of the security agencies from which the death squads emanated. CIA surveillance programs routinely supplied these agencies with information on, and the whereabouts of, various individuals who wound up as death squad victims.¹⁰

In October 1979, a cabal of younger military officers, repelled by the frequent government massacres of groups of protesters and strikers, and wishing to restore the military's

"good name", ousted General Carlos Romero from the presidency and took power in a bloodless coup. A number of prominent civilian political figures were given positions in the new administration, which proclaimed an impressive program of reforms. But it was not to be. The young and politically inexperienced officers were easily co-opted by older, conservative officers, and by pressure exerted by the United States, to install certain military men into key positions.¹¹ The civilian members of the government found themselves unable to exercise any control over the armed forces and were left to function only as reformist camouflage.

Washington had supported the removal of the brutal Romero because only three months earlier the Sandinistas had overthrown the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, and the Carter administration did not wish to risk the loss of a second client state in Central America in so short a space of time, but brakes had to be applied to keep the process within manageable bounds.

Meanwhile, the security forces did not miss a beat as they continued to fire into crowds: the body count in the first month of the "reformist" government was greater than in the first nine months of the year. By January 1980, almost all the civilian members had resigned in disgust over government-as-usual.¹² The experience was the straw which broke the backs of many moderates and liberals, as well as members of the Salvadorean Communist Party, who still clung to hopes of peaceful reforms. The Communist Party had supported the new government, even contributed the Minister of Labor, "because we believe it is going to comply with its promises and open the possibility of democratizing the country." The party was the last group on the left to join the guerrilla forces.¹³

One of the civilians, Minister of Education Salvador Samayoa, in front of the TV cameras, simultaneously announced his resignation and his enlistment with a guerrilla group.¹⁴ For those who continued to harbor illusions, a steady drumbeat of terrorism soon brought them into the fold. A demonstration march by a coalition of popular organizations on 22 January was first sprayed with DDT by crop-duster planes along the route of the march; then, when the demonstrators reached San Salvador's central plaza, snipers fired at them from surrounding government buildings; at least 21 dead and 120 seriously wounded was the toll, some of which reportedly resulted from the demonstrators' undisciplined return of fire.

On 17 March, a general strike was met by retaliatory violence—54 people killed in the capital alone.

A week later, the Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero, an outspoken critic of the government's human-rights violations, who had called upon President Carter, "Christian to Christian", to cease providing military aid, was assassinated. In his last sermon, he had addressed the security forces with these words: "I beseech you, I beg you, I order you, in the name of God: *stop the repression*." The next day he became the eleventh priest murdered in El Salvador in three years.

At the funeral of the martyred Archbishop—who had been a nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize the year before, 23 members of the US House of Representatives being among his nominators—a bomb was thrown amongst the mourners in the plaza, followed by rifle and automatic fire, all emanating from the National Palace and some of the office buildings flanking the plaza, just as in January. At least 40 people were reported killed and hundreds injured.¹⁵

Junta president Duarte tried to put the blame for the funeral carnage on the left. His case rested apparently on bald statement and nothing else, for all eyewitness reports stated that the bomb and gunfire came from the National Palace and the other government buildings. A statement issued by eight bishops and 16 other foreign church visitors who had been present denied the government's version.¹⁶

Seven years were to pass before Duarte, elected to the presidency in 1984, accused former army Major Roberto d'Aubuisson, the prominent leader of the country's right wing, with having ordered Romero's murder. Though this was a belief already widely held, the public accusation created a stir in El Salvador and the United States. The CIA, it turned out, knew the facts no later than one year after the assassination. (D'Aubuisson, it should be noted, was a man who once told three European reporters: "You Germans are very intelligent. You realized that the Jews were responsible for the spread of communism, and you began to kill them.") The American-trained former intelligence officer was never arrested because of immunity arising from his being a deputy in the National Assembly. He died in 1992.¹⁷

During the early months of 1980, the government, with direct American influence and input, enacted a program of agrarian reform, the *sine qua non* of social change in El Salvador. Its key provision—tenant farmers gaining title to the plots they worked—was similar to programs the US had advocated in a number of other Third World hot spots since the 1950s, and for the same reasons: as a counter-insurgency tactic—stealing the guerrillas' thunder; and to make the government receiving US military aid appear more deserving, in the eyes of Congress and the world. A memorandum from the Agency for International Development (AID) in mid-1980, commenting on reaction in El Salvador to the program of "Land to the Tiller", says in part:

Many believe it is a "symbolic" and "cosmetic" measure which was proposed because it would look good to certain American politicians and not necessarily because it would be beneficial or significant in the Salvadorean context.¹⁸

The reaction of the Salvadorean agrarian elite could have been predicted. They expelled many thousands of peasants from their meager plots to preclude land being turned over to them. This was not the worst ...

The testimony of a technician of the *Instituto Salvadoreño de Transformación Agraria*, established to oversee the program:

The troops came and told the workers the land was theirs now. They could elect their own leaders and run it themselves. The peasants couldn't believe their ears, but they held elections that very night. The next morning the troops came back and I watched as they shot every one of the elected leaders.¹⁹

This was not an isolated case. The Assistant Minister of Agriculture, Jorge Alberto Villacorta, in his resignation letter in March 1980, stated that "During the first days of the reform—to cite one case—5 directors and 2 presidents of new campesino organizations were assassinated and I am informed that this repressive practice continues to increase."²⁰

"Force," wrote Karl Marx, "is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one." Revolution was now the only item of importance on the political agenda of the opposition, united as never before—united more by a common enemy than by a common ideology, but many saw this pluralism as strength rather than weakness. Leftists would now be fighting alongside (former) Christian Democrats whom, only shortly before, they had accused of serving US imperialism.

If Jimmy Carter's trumpeted devotion to human rights was to be taken seriously, his administration clearly had no alternative but to side with the Salvadorean opposition, or at least keep its hands strictly out of the fighting. The Carter administration, however, with only

an occasional backward glance at its professed principles, continued its military support of the government. Within days before his term ended in January 1981, Carter ordered a total of \$10 million in military aid along with additional American advisers to be sent to El Salvador, an action characterized by one observer as "President Carter's foreign policy establishment's last convulsive effort to evade responsibility for having been 'too soft' in dealing with the Salvadorean rebels." (Two years later, private citizen Carter stated: "I think the government in El Salvador is one of the bloodthirstiest in [the] hemisphere now.")²¹

The Reagan administration, to whom "human rights" was a suspect term invented by leftists, had little fear of the too-soft label. Its approach to the conflict was threefold: (a) a sharp escalation, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in the American military involvement in El Salvador; (b) a public relations campaign to put a human face on the military junta; (c) a concurrent exercise in news management to convince the American public and the world that the Salvadorean opposition had no legitimate cause for revolution; which was to say that what the Salvadoreans had experienced during the previous two decades, indeed for half a century, had little or nothing to do with their uprising—this, it turned out, was the inspiration of (unprovoked, mindless) "left-wing terrorists" abetted by the Soviet Union, by Nicaragua, by Cuba. The Red Devils were at it again.

Military Escalation

El Salvador did not turn into another Vietnam quicksand for the United States as many critics of the left and center warned. But for the Salvadorean people the war and its horror dragged on as interminably as it did for the Vietnamese, and for the same reason: American support of a regime—one even more loathsome than in Vietnam—which would have crumbled dismally if left to its own resources. Despite overwhelmingly superior military might, the government could hold the insurgents to no more than a stalemate.

The amount of American military aid to El Salvador from 1980 to the early 1990s, for the hardware alone, ran into the billions of dollars. Six billion is the figure commonly used in the press, but the true figure will never be known. The Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus, a bipartisan congressional group, accused the Reagan administration in the mid-1980s of supplying "insufficient, misleading and in some cases false information" concerning aid to El Salvador. The administration, concluded the Caucus study, categorized most military aid as "development" aid, and undervalued the real cost of the hardware even when it was properly categorized as military aid.²²

To this must be added the cost of training Salvadorean military personnel by the thousands in the United States, and the Panama Canal Zone, as well as in El Salvador; the further training which was provided in the earlier years by Argentina, Chile and Uruguay at US behest; and the substantial military aid routed through Israel, a maneuver employed by the United States elsewhere in Central America as well.²³

One telling result of this massive provision of weapons and training, as well as the money to pay higher salaries, was the sizeable expansion of the Salvadorean armed forces and other security services. From an estimated seven to twelve thousand men in 1979, the army alone jumped to more than 22,000 by 1983, with an additional 11,000 civilian security forces; three years later, the total of these two forces had spiraled to 53,000.²⁴ The equipment available to them flowed endlessly; when, for example, in January 1982, the rebels destroyed 16 to 18 aircraft in a raid upon an airport, the United States replaced them

in a matter of weeks with 28 new aircraft.²⁵ Part of the air power available to the government were US reconnaissance planes fitted with sophisticated surveillance equipment which could provide almost instant intelligence on guerrilla movements before and after combat operations, and designate bombing targets.²⁶ The guerrillas had neither air power nor a practical anti-aircraft capability until November 1990 when they used a Soviet-made surface-to-air missile for the first time.

Predictably, the bombing, as well as the strafing and napalming, took the lives of many more civilians than guerrillas who had better learned how to avoid the attacks; countless dwellings were leveled in the process, villages destroyed, a nation of refugees created. Civilian deaths, whether from air or ground raids, were not necessarily accidental, as the many massacre stories make evident. It is a basic tenet of counter-insurgency: kill the sympathizers and you win the war.

Officially, the US military presence in El Salvador was limited to an advisory capacity. In actuality, military and CIA personnel played a more active role on a continuous basis from as early as 1980. About 20 Americans were killed or wounded in helicopter and plane crashes while flying reconnaissance or other missions over combat areas.²⁷ Moreover, the American program for training Salvadoran pilots, bombardiers and gunners could easily serve to conceal the advisers' direct participation in these operations while accompanying their trainees.

Considerable evidence surfaced of a US role in the ground fighting as well. There were numerous reports of armed Americans spotted in combat areas,²⁸ a report by CBS News of US advisers "fighting side by side" with government troops,²⁹ and reports of other Americans, some ostensibly mercenaries, killed in action.³⁰ The extent of American mercenary involvement in El Salvador is not known, but Lawrence Bailey, a former US Marine, has stated that he was part of a team of 40 American soldiers of fortune paid by wealthy Salvadoran families living in Miami to protect their plantations from takeover by the rebels.³¹

During the Iran-Contra hearings in 1987, it was disclosed that at least until 1985, CIA paramilitary personnel had been organizing and leading special Salvadoran army units into combat areas to track down guerrillas and call in air strikes.³²

These bit-by-bit disclosures pointed to a frequent, if not routine, American involvement in the ongoing combat. In September 1988 another news item related that US military advisers were caught in a gun battle between Salvadoran army forces and guerrillas and that, in "self-defense", they opened fire on the rebels.³³

The degree of overall control of the military operation by the United States is perhaps best captured by an excerpt from an interview given to *Playboy* magazine in 1984 by President Duarte, one of the few Christian Democrat leaders of the earlier days still working within the government.

Playboy: Do the American military advisers also tell you how to run the war?

Duarte: This is the problem, no? The root of this problem is that the aid is given under such conditions that its use is really decided by the Americans and not by us. Decisions like how many planes or helicopters we buy, how we spend our money, how many trucks we need, how many bullets and of what caliber, how many pairs of boots and where our priorities should be—all of that ... And all the money is spent over there. We never even see a penny of it, because everything arrives here already paid for.³⁴

In Duarte's previous incarnation as a government opponent, his view of the Yanquis was even harsher. US policy in Latin America, he said in 1969, was designed to "maintain

the Iberoamerican countries in a condition of direct dependence upon the international political decisions most beneficial to the United States, both at the hemisphere and world levels. Thus [the North Americans] preach to us of democracy while everywhere they support dictatorships."³⁵

Duarte's ideology, however, appears to have been a flexible and marketable commodity. At some point in the 1970s, if not earlier, he began to covertly supply the CIA with intelligence.³⁶

A Human Face

On 28 January 1982, President Reagan certified to Congress that the El Salvador government was "making a concerted and significant effort to comply with internationally recognized human rights" and that it was "achieving substantial control over all elements of its own armed forces, so as to bring to an end the indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran citizens by these forces." The language was that imposed by Congress upon the administration if the flow of arms and American military personnel was to continue.

Two days earlier, the American and foreign press had carried the story of how government troops had engaged in a massacre of the people of the village of El Mozote in December. From 700 to 1,000 persons were reported killed, mostly the elderly, women and children. When a very long, detailed account of this incident appeared eventually, in 1993, it became more apparent than ever that this was one of the most repulsive and cruelest massacres of the 20th century carried out by ground troops face-to-face with their victims—people hacked to death by machetes, many beheaded, a child thrown in the air and caught on a bayonet, an orgy of rapes of very young girls before they were killed ... "If we don't kill them [the children] now, they'll just grow up to be guerrillas," barked an army officer to a reluctant soldier ... anti-communism at its zenith.

Both immediately and thereafter, the massacre was attended by denials and a coverup by the State Department, with abundant media complicity.³⁷ The State Department's defense of its position before a congressional committee left the committee members conspicuously underwhelmed, even though the congressmen did not yet know the full story.³⁸

Two days after the president's certification, the world could read how Salvadoran soldiers had pulled about 20 people out of their beds in the middle of the night, tortured them, and then killed them, meanwhile finding the time to rape several teenage girls.³⁹

Earlier the same month, the *New York Times* had published an interview with a deserter from the Salvadoran Army who described a class where severe methods of torture were demonstrated on teenage prisoners. He stated that eight US military advisers, apparently Green Berets, were present. Watching "will make you feel more like a man," a Salvadoran officer appraised the recruits, adding that they should "not feel pity of anyone" but only "hate for those who are enemies of our country."⁴⁰

Another Salvadoran, a former member of the National Guard, later testified: "I belonged to a squad of twelve. We devoted ourselves to torture, and to finding people whom we were told were guerrillas. I was trained in Panama for nine months by the [unintelligible] of the United States for anti-guerrilla warfare. Part of the time we were instructed about torture."⁴¹

Officers of the National Guard were also trained in the United States. In August 1986, CBS Television reported that three senior Guard officers who had been linked to rightwing

death squads received training at a police academy in Phoenix.⁴²
 In 1984, Amnesty International reported that it had received:

regular, often daily, reports identifying El Salvador's regular security and military units as responsible for the torture, "disappearance" and killing of non-combatant civilians from all sectors of Salvadoran society ... A number of patients have allegedly been removed from their beds or operating theaters and tortured and murdered ... Types of torture reported ... by those who have survived arrest and interrogation included beatings, sexual abuse, use of chemicals to disorient, mock executions, and the burning of flesh with sulphuric acid.⁴³

In light of the above, and many other reports of a similar nature,⁴⁴ it can be appreciated that the Reagan administration had to exercise some creativity in getting around congressional hesitation about continued military aid to the government of El Salvador. Thus it was that in March 1984 the administration tacked on a request for additional military aid to legislation to send US food supplies to starving Africans.⁴⁵ (A few days later, it tacked on a request for support of the Nicaraguan contras to a bill to provide emergency fuel spending for the poor in parts of the United States which were suffering a severe winter.)⁴⁶

Death squad executions ... military massacres ... the legion of the disappeared ... the numbers reached well into the tens of thousands. And the death squads may have reached their arm into the United States. A number of Americans and Salvadoreans living in Los Angeles and working with refugees or actively opposing US military aid to El Salvador received death threats in 1987. Rev. Luis Olivares, a Catholic priest whose church is part of the "sanctuary" movement, was sent an anonymous letter bearing the letters "EM", which were often found on the doors or buildings of people who were targeted in El Salvador. The letters stand for *Escuadrón Muerto* [death squad].⁴⁷

In July 1987, a Salvadorean woman named Yanira Corea who had received threatening phone calls and letters was kidnapped outside the Los Angeles office of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). Two men, speaking with what she described as Salvadorean accents, forced her at knifepoint into a van, interrogated her about her political activities and colleagues, cut her hands with a knife, burnt her fingers with cigarettes, sexually assaulted her with a stick, then raped her. A month earlier, she had narrowly escaped being abducted, along with her three-year-old son. Other activists had their cars smashed or vandalized.⁴⁸

For several years under the Reagan administration, the FBI conducted a nationwide investigation of CISPES. During this period, some of the organization's offices were broken into with nothing of value taken except files. "It is imperative at this time to formulate some plan of attack against CISPES ...", reads one FBI teletype later made public.⁴⁹

On some days during the 1980s, Washington officials issued warnings to the Salvadorean government to improve its human rights record, or told Congress that the record was improving, or told the world how much worse that record would be if not for American influence. On most other days, the United States continued to build up each and every component of the military and paramilitary forces engaged in the atrocities. In 1984, in an interview with the *New York Times*, Col. Roberto Eulalio Santibáñez, a former Salvadorean military official who had served at the highest level of the security police, confirmed—for those who may still have entertained doubts—that the network of death squads had been shaped by leading Salvadorean officials and was still directed by them. He also revealed that one of these officials, Col. Nicolas Carranza, the head of the Treasury Police, which "have long been considered the least disciplined and most brutal of the Salvadorean

security forces", had been receiving more than \$90,000 a year during the previous five or six years from the CIA. Although some members of the Treasury Police were linked by the Reagan administration itself to death-squad activities, the United States continued to train and equip them.⁵⁰

In a visit to San Salvador in February 1989, Vice President Dan Quayle told army leaders that death squad killings and other human rights violations attributed to the military had to be ended. Ten days later, the US-trained Atlacatl Battalion—which was believed to have a US trainer assigned to it at all times—attacked a guerrilla field hospital, killing at least ten people, including five patients, a doctor and a nurse, and raping at least two of the female victims before shooting them. Sources close to the El Salvador military said afterward that Quayle's warning was not taken seriously, but as rhetoric aimed at the US Congress and the American public.⁵¹

In October 1989, former Salvadorean Army commando Cesar Vielman Joya Martinez, in an interview on the CBS Evening News, related that he and others in his unit—the intelligence section of the army's First Brigade—had acted as a clandestine death squad, that the two US military advisers attached to the unit were aware of the assassinations, although they refused to hear the details, and that the advisers supplied money to his unit that helped maintain two civilian vehicles used for death-squad operations and a safehouse that served as a secret base of operations and storage of weapons. In subsequent interviews with the American press, Joya Martinez stated that the advisers had used the names Mauricio Torres and Raul Antonio Lazo, that his unit had carried out 74 assassinations of Salvadorean dissidents between April and July of 1989, and that he himself had been personally involved in eight torture murders. Apropos of deadly bombings in El Salvador in November of dissident organizations (a union hall and an organization of mothers of the disappeared), he added that his unit had received explosives training from US advisers. The Salvadorean Embassy in Washington, while denying any government involvement in death-squad activities, did confirm that "Joya Martinez was a member of the intelligence unit of the First Brigade".⁵²

In July 1990, an aide to Rep. Joseph Moakley (D-Mass.), chairman of the Speaker's Task Force on El Salvador, declared: "The fact that Joya Martinez has been in the U.S. since last August, given all kinds of interviews, been arrested, and no one from the government has bothered to question him, seems pretty strange, unless people don't want to find the answers."⁵³

On the twelfth of that month Joya Martinez had been arrested for having illegally entered the United States after being deported six years earlier. After a lengthy legal battle, he was ordered deported back to El Salvador in October 1992. His supporters in the United States expressed their concern about his safety in El Salvador, to which a State Department official responded, presumably with a straight face, that Joya Martinez "has admitted to killings and torture and it would be callous to the victims to prevent him from standing trial."⁵⁴

A few weeks after Joya Martinez went public in the United States, one of the most shocking atrocities in this war of shocking atrocities occurred. Six Jesuit priests at the University of Central America in San Salvador were shot to death in cold blood at their campus residence, along with their housekeeper and her young daughter. A witness, whom the killers failed to observe, Lucia Barrera de Cerna, said she saw five armed men in uniform carry out the murders. The Salvadorean military—whom the Roman Catholic order had often criticized for human rights violations—were the immediate and logical suspects. Because of an extraordinary outcry against the crime, in the United States and internationally, including the creation of the special congressional task force referred to above, two months later nine officers and enlisted men were arrested—a platoon from the Atlacatl

Battalion, seven of whom, it turned out, had only two days before the murders participated in combat training exercises supervised by the U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets) in El Salvador.

Almost two years passed before any of those arrested were convicted of the crime—two relatively low-level officers; their higher-ups who gave the order were not touched. Yet, this was an achievement in a country where thousands of people had been killed by military death squads, and no officer had ever before been tried, let alone convicted, for murder or other human-rights abuse. The Salvadorean military tolerated the trial of the officers because Congress had made prosecution of the killers a condition for continuing military aid.

During the two-year period, as well as after the convictions, officials of the Bush administration appeared to be trying to thwart the investigation and aid in a coverup, by such tactics as the following:

- a) grossly intimidating Cerna and labeling her a liar;
- b) refusing on grounds of national security to provide a Salvadorean court with classified documents that dealt with the case; withholding, on the same grounds, substantive material from journalists making Freedom of Information Act requests;
- c) refusing for a long time to allow questioning, by the investigating judge, of US Army Major Eric Buckland, stationed in El Salvador, who had learned of the Salvadorean military's culpability shortly after the murders from Salvadorean Col. Carlos Aviles; then imposing a series of conditions on Buckland's questioning that served to conceal much of his story;
- d) putting Buckland through such horrendous interrogation that he underwent an apparent nervous breakdown;
- e) immediately informing the Salvadorean high command about what Aviles had revealed to Buckland (which caused Aviles much grief).

Father Charles Beirne, vice rector of the Jesuit university, declared in 1991 that "the Americans were helping to protect the [Salvadorean army] high command all along. They were afraid the whole house of cards would fall if the investigation went any further." A year later, United Nations investigators were still complaining that the United States was slow in turning over vital information about the case.⁵⁵

The cruelty level of the guerrillas' military and political campaign generally stood in sharp contrast to that of the government. *Newsweek* reported in 1983 that when the rebels "capture a town, they treat the civilians well, paying for food and holding destruction to a minimum. And they have begun to free most of the government troops they capture, which helps to persuade other soldiers to surrender rather than fight to the death."⁵⁶ Eventually, however, the guerrillas began to treat civilians more harshly, in particular those suspected of informing or of other collaboration with the government, or those refusing to collaborate with rebel forces; some peasants reportedly were forced to leave their villages and farms as punishment; several village mayors were killed; young men were forcibly recruited to join the rebels.

However, given the numerous instances of disinformation disseminated by the Salvadorean government about the rebels, reports of guerrilla ruthlessness must be approached with caution. The following case is instructive (see the notes for reference to other examples):

In February 1988, the *New York Times*, reported that:

Villagers say guerrillas publicly executed two peasants ... because they had applied for and received new voter registration cards. According to the villagers, the guerrillas placed the voting cards of [the two men] in their mouths after executing them as a warning to others not to take part in the elections.⁵⁷

The story was included in a State Department booklet to highlight the guerrillas' "campaign of intimidation and terrorism". The booklet was mailed to Congress, newspaper editors, and other opinion makers. But the story, it turned out, was the invention of a Salvadorean Army propaganda specialist who had placed it in the San Salvador newspaper *El Mundo*. From there it was picked up by the *New York Times* reporter who gave the impression that he had interviewed villagers with firsthand knowledge of the incident, instead of attributing the story to the military as had *El Mundo*. The *Times* later recanted the story.⁵⁸

Outside Agitators

"Sometimes I feel like Sisyphus," said a senior Reagan administration official involved in developing US Latin America policy in March 1982. "Every time we head up the hill to explain or justify our policy, the stone comes crashing down on top of us."⁵⁹

Two weeks earlier, Secretary of State Alexander Haig had asserted that the United States had "overwhelming and irrefutable" evidence that the insurgents were controlled from outside by non-Salvadoreans. Haig, however, declined to provide any details of the evidence, saying it would jeopardize intelligence sources. Challenged to prove his charges two days later, the good general insisted that the United States had "unchallengeable" evidence of Nicaraguan and Cuban involvement in the command and control of the operation in El Salvador and, oddly enough, only the day before a Nicaraguan military man had been captured there. As it turned out, according to the Mexican Embassy in San Salvador, the man was a student on his way back to school in Mexico from Nicaragua, traveling overland because he couldn't afford to fly.⁶⁰

The following week, a Nicaraguan was captured fighting with the guerrillas. He told US Embassy and Salvadorean Army officials that he had been trained in Cuba and Ethiopia, then sent to El Salvador by the Nicaraguan government. The State Department was understandably excited. It presented the young man at a press conference in Washington, at which time he declared that he had never been to Cuba or Ethiopia, had joined the guerrillas on his own, and had made his previous statements under torture by his Salvadorean captors. He added that he had never seen another Nicaraguan or Cuban in El Salvador and denied that Nicaragua had provided aid to the guerrillas.⁶¹

"Then there were two Nicaraguan air force defectors," reported *Time* magazine during the same period, "who were scheduled to bear witness to their country's involvement in El Salvador but by week's end were judged 'not ready' to face the press." *Time* entitled its story: "A Lot of Show, but No Tell: The U.S. bungles its evidence of foreign subversion in El Salvador."⁶²

In January 1981, US diplomats disclosed that five boats had landed in El Salvador containing 100 "well-armed, well-trained guerrillas", allegedly from Nicaragua. They knew the boats had come from Nicaragua because "they were made from wood of trees not native to El Salvador."⁶³ No sign, dead or alive, of any of the hundred invaders was ever found, however.

One hundred seemed to be the number of choice for the Reagan administration. That was the count of Cuban combat troops, said a senior State Department policy maker, who were sent to El Salvador in the fall of 1981 by way of Nicaragua. "They were brought in clandestinely and given operational responsibilities in El Salvador," he asserted.⁶⁴ The later whereabouts and actions of the Cubans likewise remained a mystery.

The world was also informed that Soviet and Chinese weapons had been seized from rebels and this was cited as further proof of outside Communist aid.⁶⁵ The weapons capture may have been real—although the CIA has long had warehouses full of Communist weapons of all kinds, suitable for all occasions—but then what were we to make of the US, Israeli, Belgian and German weapons which, by Washington's admission a month later, were also to be found amongst the rebels?⁶⁶ The world arms traffic is indeed wide open and fluid. (In neighboring Honduras, the US-supported contras were using Soviet-made missiles to shoot down Soviet-made helicopters of Nicaragua.)⁶⁷ Moreover, the Salvadorean rebels captured weapons from government forces and they claimed that they also purchased arms from corrupt Salvadorean Army officers, a practice common to other Latin American guerrilla wars. A source cited by the *New York Times* corroborated the rebels' claim.⁶⁸

The centerpiece of the Reagan administration's campaign to prove the international-conspiracy nature of the revolution in El Salvador was its White Paper issued a month after taking office and based largely on purported "captured guerrilla documents", some of which were included in the report. Amongst the various analyses of the White Paper which cast grave doubts upon its claims was the one in the *Wall Street Journal* by Jonathan K Witny. This included an interview with a State Department official, Jon D. Glassman, who was given the major credit for the White Paper. Admitted Mr Glassman: parts of the paper were possibly "misleading" and "over-embellished" ... it contained "mistakes" and "guessing". Said the *Wall Street Journal*: "A close examination ... indicates that, if anything, Mr. Glassman may be understating the case in his concession that the White Paper contains mistakes and guessing."

Amongst the many specific shortcomings of the paper pointed out in the article was that:

Statistics of armament shipments into El Salvador, supposedly drawn directly from the documents, were extrapolated, Mr. Glassman concedes. And in questionable ways, it seems. Much information in the White Paper can't be found in the documents at all.⁶⁹

It was not merely the accuracy of the White Paper that was questioned, but the authenticity of the documents themselves. Apropos of this, former US Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert White (sacked by Reagan because of excessive commitment to human rights and reforms), commented: "The only thing that even makes me think that these documents were genuine was that they proved so little."⁷⁰

When pressed to state what proof his government had of Nicaraguan intervention, President Duarte declined to answer on the grounds that the world would not believe him anyway.⁷¹ But President Reagan had some evidence to offer. He saw the hand of foreign masters pulling strings in the fact that demonstrators in Canada carried "the same signs" as demonstrators in the United States: "U. S. Out of El Salvador."⁷²

But all of this was essentially besides the point. Revolutions are not exported like so many cartons of soap. We have seen what the circumstances were in El Salvador for decades which finally provoked people to take up the gun. Ambassador White, no champion of the rebels' cause, observed that "The revolution situation came about in El Salvador because you had what was one of the most selfish oligarchies the world has ever seen, com-

ained with a corrupt security force ... Whether Cuba existed or not, you would still have a revolutionary situation in El Salvador."⁷³

Education-minister-turned-guerrilla, Salvador Samayoa, speaking in 1981, asserted that US charges that the Soviet bloc was directing the guerrilla movement "reveals Washington's deep ignorance of our movement". He pointed out that three of the five guerrilla groups that made up the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) were "strongly anti-Soviet". Samayoa added: "To say we are run by Cuba because we have a relationship with Cuba is like saying we're a Christian movement because we have received enormous help from the church. ... Instead of seeing us as Communist subversives, the U.S. should see us as a people struggling to survive."⁷⁴

Despite American patrol boats in the Gulf of Fonseca (which separates El Salvador from Nicaragua), AWAC surveillance planes in the skies over the Caribbean, and an abundance of aerial photographs, despite a large US radar installation in Honduras and an abundance of American military technicians, the finest electronic monitoring equipment modern technology had to offer, and all the informers that CIA money could buy⁷⁵ ... despite it all, the Reagan administration singularly failed to support its case that the fires of the Salvadorean revolution were stoked by Nicaraguan and Cuban coals, nor by the Soviet Union, Vietnam, the PLO, Ethiopia, or any of the other countries indicted at one time or another as important suppliers of military aid.

In any case, whatever military support the Salvadorean insurgents actually received from abroad—necessarily limited to what could be carried by the occasional clandestine small truck or boat—plainly did not belong in the same league, nor on the same planet, as the huge transport-planes and shipfuls of American aid, in all its forms, to the Salvadorean government. The United States had waged ruthless war against the Salvadorean revolution, and threatened worse—in April 1991, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, announced that "if necessary, [the civil war in El Salvador] can be resolved the way it was in the Persian Gulf."⁷⁶

In early 1992, the war came to an official end when a United Nations commission, after a year-and-a-half effort, finally got the warring sides to agree to a cease fire and a peace agreement. A major offensive launched by the guerrillas in late 1989—in which they "brought the war home" to wealthy neighborhoods and Americans in the capital—had made clear to Washington and its Salvadorean allies, once again, finally, that the war was unwinnable. In February 1990, Gen. Maxwell Thurman, the head of the US Southern Command, told Congress that the El Salvador government was not able to defeat the rebels and that the only way to end the fighting was through negotiation.⁷⁷ Moreover, the ostensible end of the cold war had undermined the United States' professed rationale for—and may have relaxed its obsession with—defeating "communism" in El Salvador. At the same time, Congress was balking more and more about continuing military aid to the Salvadorean government, an attitude that had been growing ever since the November 1989 murder of the Jesuit priests.

One of the many provisions of the complex peace agreement was the establishment of a UN Commission of the Truth "to investigate the worst acts of violence since 1980". In March of 1993 the Commission presented its report. Among its findings and conclusions were the following:

The military forces, supported by the government and the civilian establishment, were plainly the main perpetrators of massacres, executions, torture and kidnappings during the civil war. These acts could not be blamed on the excesses of war but on premeditated and

ideologically inspired decisions to kill.

The commission called for the dismissal of more than 40 high-ranking military personnel—including Defense Minister Gen. Rene Emilio Ponce, a long-time favorite of US officials—whom it found had given the orders that led to the murders of the priests, and stipulated that none should ever be allowed to return to military or security duty and should be banned from other public and political life for 10 years.

Dismissal and a 10-year ban was also specified for government officials and bureaucrats who abused human rights or took part in a cover-up of the abuses, including the President of the Supreme Court. (Right-wing parties in the Salvadorean National Assembly quickly pushed through an amnesty law barring prosecution for any crimes committed during the war.)

Several leaders of the left were singled out for the assassinations of 11 mayors during the war.

A special investigation of death squads was called for. These squads, said the report, were "often operated by the military and supported by powerful businessmen, landowners and some leading politicians." (The peace accords did not put an end to this: dozens of leaders and members of the FMLN were assassinated during 1992 and 1993, as well as a few from the right.)

Cited as the most notorious of the death squad leaders by the report was Roberto d'Aubuisson, the principal founder of the Nationalist Republican Alliance (Arena) party, the party of the country's current president, Alfredo Cristiani. D'Aubuisson, the report confirmed, hired the sharpshooter who killed Archbishop Romero.

Other sins laid at the doorstep of the government were the rapes and killings of three American nuns and a female religious worker in 1980, the murder of two American labor advisers in 1981, and the assassination, in 1982, of four Dutch journalists, whose reports were evidently considered favorable to the guerrillas.

The Commission did not focus on any American role in the abuses and cover-up. "The role of the United States in El Salvador is a role more effectively studied by the U.S. Congress," said Commission member Thomas Buergethal, an American jurist, at a news conference. However, the Commission did chastise the United States for failing to rein in Salvadorean exiles in Miami who "helped administer death squad activities between 1980 and 1983, with apparently little attention from the U.S. government. Such use of American territory for acts of terrorism abroad should be investigated and never allowed to be repeated."⁷⁸ (Cuban exiles, of course, have been using Miami as a base for terrorism abroad, as well as in the US, for 30 years.)

Members of Congress, outraged by the findings of the Commission of the Truth, called for the declassification of State Department, Defense Department, and CIA files on El Salvador to help determine whether the Reagan and Bush administrations had concealed evidence from Congress about widespread human rights abuses by their Salvadorean allies. "It [the Commission's report] simply verifies what a number of us knew all through the '80s," said Rep. David Obey, "that our own government was lying like hell to us." The report proves that the Reagan administration was willing to "lie ... and ... certify to anything ... to get the money it wanted."⁷⁹

Various of the more than 12,000 once-secret documents released by the Clinton administration unequivocally confirmed Obey's charge. Other papers revealed that ...

The current Vice President, Francisco Merino, had organized death squads.

The CIA referred to Roberto d'Aubuisson as "egocentric, reckless and perhaps mentally unstable"; he trafficked in drugs and smuggled arms; his paramilitary unit was responsible for thousands of murders; and in 1983 he and his advisers were invited by American Ambassador Deane Hinton to have lunch with the visiting US representative to the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick. Six years later, shortly before the CIA reported that d'Aubuisson's inner circle had plotted to assassinate President Cristiani, Ambassador William G. Walker invited him to the embassy's Fourth of July party.⁸⁰

American military advisers trained a militia of some 50 wealthy Salvadoreans, ostensibly for them to be able to defend their own lavish homes against a rebel attack, but the group was actually linked to d'Aubuisson and their militia was a "cover for the recruitment, training and possible dispatch of paramilitary civilian death squads". Ambassador Walker halted the training as soon as he learned of it, despite protests from the chief of the US military advisory mission. (Another memo, written by a Defense Department official, argued that the wealthy Salvadoreans might fund death squads, but would not get blood on their own hands.)⁸¹

On 20 March 1994, the ruling party Arena and its main ally scored a victory in elections held to choose a new president, National Assembly, and hundreds of municipal governments. With the exception of a few reforms touching upon civil liberties, whose significance remains to be seen, the outcome left the society at essentially the same place it was in 1980 when the war had just begun and José Napoleón Duarte had said: "For fifty years the same people had all the power, all the money, all the jobs, all the education ..." One could now say: "For more than sixty years ..."

Why had more than half the people of El Salvador, most of them very poor, voted for parties intimately connected with not only the wealthy, but with death squads? The new president, Armando Calderon Sol, had long and close ties to death-squad godfather Roberto d'Aubuisson, a large portrait of whom hung in his office. The declassified documents referred to above raised questions about Calderon Sol himself—connections to a kidnapping and to a group of young Arena militants who bombed the Ministry of Agriculture and wreaked other havoc in the early 1980s in an attempt to destabilize the government whose new agrarian reform was supposed to take land from the wealthy.

Arena's sophisticated multimillion-dollar campaign relied heavily on nurturing two kinds of fears: the traditional fear of "communism", inculcated by decades of authoritarian rule; and the supposed economic incompetence of the left, as typified by the Sandinista rule in Nicaragua. Further, ignoring their own violent history, Arena portrayed the left as terrorists who were exclusively responsible for the war's death and destruction.

How honest and fair had the actual voting been? Was the right willing to end a half-century of political exclusion of the left? Besides having a great deal more money at its disposal than its opponents, the Arena party in power had controlled the press in El Salvador for many years—the one daily paper, *Diario Latino*, which had dared to show a brief independence, was destroyed by bombs.⁸² Moreover, the makeup of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), which supervised the election, was based on the election of 1991 which the FMLN had boycotted; it was thus dominated by Arena, with no one from the FMLN.

Many points of contention were raised about the voting, such as the following:

A large number of people who registered to vote were unable to do so because they didn't receive their voting card. According to United Nations monitors, as of 1 February these cases came to more than half a million, equal to 20 percent of the electorate. After the election, the FMLN estimated the number of such non-voters at 340,000.

74,000 other applicants were rejected because they couldn't produce a birth certificate; often this was because the local office of records had been destroyed in the war.

Another large block of people held valid voting cards but couldn't vote because they had no transportation to a distant polling station. This was exacerbated, reportedly, by a slowdown in bus service by bus companies owned by Arena supporters and the Arena-controlled bus drivers' union.

Many made it to the polling stations with their voting cards only to be kept from voting because their names did not appear on the voter-registration lists, or were spelled incorrectly (at least 25,000 such cases according to the UN); several times that, said the FMLN).

Other potential voters left the stations without casting their ballots because very long lines and an extremely cumbersome and snail-paced processing system left them still waiting when the polls closed.

These problems of course affected the poor, the rural, the less educated, and the first-time voters the most, the base of the FMLN's support.

The TSE refused international advice, declined to spend money to transport voters to the polls, and made voting unnecessarily complicated, UN observers said. "There was frightening mismanagement of the election beyond our worst expectations," said a senior UN official. "There was widespread lack of trust by the electorate before the voting, [and] now it's much worse. The [TSE] is completely discredited and has therefore tarnished the election."

The FMLN claimed the irregularities cheated the party out of several municipal and legislative seats, a contention lent credence by the UN observers who stated that thousands of people were denied voting cards in 30 towns where the FMLN was strong. The party challenged the results in 37 cities and towns, but the TSE rejected all the claims—a decision that Rafael Lopez Pintor, who headed the UN electoral division, called "shocking".

A team of observers representing the US government also said it was "troubled" that "many of the procedures cited as administrative defects" in previous elections continued to be practiced.

In the days immediately following the vote, election authorities delayed the release of official results. Then on the third day, they abruptly cut off access to party monitors to computerized tabulations. The FMLN said that initial tabulations showed that many ballot boxes contained more votes than the legal maximum of 400, some of them two to three times as many. They also claimed that in San Miguel, one of the country's largest cities, a group of Arena militants had absconded with 15 ballot boxes.

As it turned out, in the announced result for the presidency, Arena got 641,000 votes, 49 percent of the total, while the Democratic Coalition, which included the FMLN, was credited with 326,000 votes, or 25 percent. Failure of any party to win a majority necessitated a run-off election a month later, at which time Arena won 68 percent of the vote to the Coalition's 32 percent. Because the winner of the run-off was a completely foregone conclusion, there were undoubtedly many poor people who didn't vote because they were unwilling to go through the great inconvenience and uncertainty a second time.

There was also the matter of intimidation. According to observers from the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES):

Meanwhile, army helicopters buzzed cities where the opposition was strong. Soldiers set up checkpoints and machine-gun nests in towns traumatized by army massacres during the war. The government did its best to instill fear in the electorate, and must have scared many voters into staying home.

Before the election, some workers were warned that if the FMLN won, heads would roll, or they would be fired. Inasmuch as a polling official tore off the corner of each ballot, containing the same number as on the ballot, a voter could see that someone could save his number and check how he voted later.

The *Los Angeles Times* reported the story of the master of ceremonies at a rally staged by Arena, attended by a number of peasants, farmers and market vendors.

"All those who support Arena, raise your hats!" the emcee implored the crowd. "A few people lifted their hats.

"All those who support Arena, raise your hats!" he tried again. "And those who don't raise their hats are terengos!" he added, invoking a slang word for "terrorists" used by the army throughout this country's brutal civil war.

A lot of people took their hats off.⁸³

For the benefit of which Salvadoreans did Arena remain in power? For which of them had 75,000 civilians been killed? For whom was the US Treasury reduced by \$6 billion? Two reports from the *New York Times* ...

Over canapes served by hovering waiters at a party, a guest said she was convinced that God had created two distinct classes of people: the rich and people to serve them. She described herself as charitable for allowing the poor to work as her servants. "It's the best you can do," she said. The woman's outspokenness was unusual, but her attitude is shared by a large segment of the Salvadoran upper class.

The separation between classes is so rigid that even small expressions of kindness across the divide are viewed with suspicion. When an American, visiting an ice cream store, remarked that he was shopping for a birthday party for his maid's child, other store patrons immediately stopped talking and began staring at the American. Finally, an astonished woman in the check-out line spoke out. "You must be kidding," she said.

One of their class, who had had enough and was leaving, commented to the *Times*: "I can't accept the fact that if you're born a peasant here, you die a peasant and your children are going to be peasants. There's no vision that kids of farmhands should be going to Harvard and running this country one day. There's no vision of a modern society."⁸⁴

After taking part in Washington's decade-long effort to train and reform the Salvadoran Army, many American military advisers have left here angry over the Salvadorans' resistance to change ... [they] say they feel manipulated and betrayed by the Salvadoran officers. ... the advisers described Salvadoran officers as being mainly interested in amassing wealth and power, as willing to deprive troops of equipment to further the officers' own ends and as allowing the regular killing or mistreatment of prisoners. ... None went so far as to say the effort to help the Salvadoran armed forces in their war against a leftist insurgency had been futile. They thought human rights abuses would have been worse or that the guerrillas might have won the war without their presence.⁸⁵

The *Times* apparently did not ask the advisers whether they believed that the United States government had in some way been forced to take sides in the civil war. And if not, what had their government's ultimate motive been? And if so, why had they not taken the side of the insurgents? And how bad would the human rights abuses have been if the armed forces had not been provided by Washington with a never-ending supply of every weapon and implement and training known to man to bring destruction, pain and suffering to the greatest number of people?

In a postwar survey, a United Nations inspection team declared that the allied bombardment had had a "near apocalyptic impact" on Iraq and had transformed the country into a "pre-industrial age nation" which "had been until January a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society."¹¹⁹

It will never be known how many hundreds of thousands of Iraqis died from the direct and indirect effects of the war; the count is added to every day. With the United States refusing to end the embargo against Iraq, everything has continued: malnutrition, starvation, lack of medicines and vaccines, contaminated drinking water, human excrement piling up, typhoid, a near-epidemic of measles, several other diseases ... Iraq's food supply had been 70 percent dependent on imports, now billions of dollars were frozen in overseas accounts, and with prohibitive restrictions on selling its oil ... an inability to rebuild because vital parts could not be imported, industry closing its doors, mass unemployment, transportation and communications broken down¹²⁰ ... By September 1994, with the US government still refusing to release its death grip on the embargo, still hoping that the suffering would reach critical mass and the Iraqi people would overthrow Saddam, the Iraqi government announced that since the sanctions had begun in August 1990 about 400,000 children had died of malnutrition and disease.¹²¹

After the war, when the Iraqi government was repressing a Kurdish revolt—which the US had encouraged, then failed to support—Bush said: "I feel frustrated any time innocent civilians are being slaughtered."¹²²

This was the second time the United States had led the Kurdish lambs to slaughter with a broken commitment. (See Iraq 1972-75 chapter.)

The United States had also encouraged the Shiite Muslims in Iraq to rebel, then did not back them, presumably because Washington only wanted to drive Saddam up the wall some more, make him irrational enough to incite a coup against him; but Washington was not looking to foster a pro-Iranian regime and inspire Muslim fundamentalists elsewhere in the Middle East.

American mental hospitals and prisons are home to many people who claim to have heard a voice telling them to kill certain people, people they'd never met before, people who'd never done them any harm, or threatened any harm.

American soldiers went to the Persian Gulf to kill the same kind of people after hearing a voice command them: the voice of George Herbert Walker Bush.

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CHAPTER
15

*Beyond the Cold War:
American Foreign Policy
in the Reagan-Bush Era*



In the wake of the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter alike sought to engineer what some have called America's "retreat from empire"—a scaling-back of the rampant globalism of the Kennedy and Johnson years, and the beginnings of détente with the Soviet Union and China. In contrast, Ronald Reagan campaigned for the White House on a platform that promised to restore American leadership in world affairs. Reagan and his supporters initially denounced the Soviet Union in vintage Cold War terms as an "evil empire" and pledged to rebuild U.S. military strength. Under Reagan the United States embarked on a massive military buildup, first in more or less conventional weapons and then through "Star Wars," the highly controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which proposed to defend the United States with a high-tech "umbrella" of costly and sophisticated electronic weapons. The United States also pursued a new interventionism, especially in the Caribbean, where the Reagan administration invaded the tiny island of Grenada and launched a "covert" campaign to overthrow the left-wing Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Reagan's revival of Cold War patriotism touched a popular nerve, perhaps best symbolized by the flag waving and chants of "We're Number One" by Americans at the 1984 summer Olympic games in Los Angeles. By 1986, nevertheless, the administration was in deep trouble. Massive military spending, coupled with reduced taxes, sent the nation's indebtedness skyrocketing. The Iran-contra scandal, meanwhile, revealed that the president and his top advisers were clearly implicated in a foolish and illegal attempt to trade arms for hostages and divert the proceeds to the U.S.-sponsored "contras"—an anti-Sandinista guerrilla army—in Nicaragua.

The administration abruptly changed course during the final two years of Reagan's term. The president abandoned Cold War confrontation for a new pragmatism that included the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty

with the Russians and progress toward a more comprehensive reduction of all nuclear weapons. Much of the change owed to developments that neither Reagan nor most Americans could have anticipated—the growing economic paralysis of the Soviet Union, the rapid dismantling of much of its empire in Eastern Europe, and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev and a new leadership dedicated to sweeping political and economic reforms. Some saw in these developments a vindication of Reagan's policies. The United States, they claimed, had won the Cold War. Others viewed the shift as a happy coincidence. Ronald Reagan, the "teflon president," had lucked out again. Still others saw in recent developments an end not only to the Cold War but to an entire era in world history.

Yet if the Cold War had ended, the many conflicting interests and impulses on which it had for a time imposed an order of a sort remained and in fact began to reassert themselves. In the Middle East, the euphoria of the new post-Cold War era was quickly shattered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and by the Persian Gulf war in which U.S.-led forces easily crushed the Iraqis. Although President George Bush proclaimed his commitment to the establishment of a new world order, neither the character of that new order nor America's role in it were at all clear. Indeed, even as the president called for the use of force to defend "our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world," liberals and conservatives alike scrambled to reconstruct their understanding of American foreign policy.

W D O C U M E N T S

In a March 8, 1983, speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, excerpts from which are reprinted in the first document, President Reagan invoked the image of the U.S.S.R. as a threatening "evil empire" and called for expanded U.S. military power. The second document, a graph drawn from public sources, traces the rise in military spending during the Reagan administration. The third selection, excerpted from the 1987 report of the congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair, describes the covert and illegal activities of Oliver North and other White House officials who sought to sell arms to Iran in return for money and the release of hostages, and then to divert the proceeds to support the U.S.-backed contra rebels in Nicaragua. In a December 1988 speech to the United Nations, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev outlined a new and peaceful course for relations between the Soviet Union and the United States (the fourth document). In the fifth document, the editors of *The New York Times*, summarizing nearly two months of discussion and debate on the paper's op-ed page, announced on April 2, 1989, that the Cold War was over. As the Cold War ended, however, debate focused increasingly on the future of the postwar era. In the sixth document, excerpted from a joint address to Congress following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush announced his administration's goal of establishing a new world order.

President Ronald Reagan on Russia as an "Evil Empire," 1983

During my first press conference as President, in answer to a direct question, I pointed out that, as good Marxist-Leninists, the Soviet leaders have openly

and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is that which will further their cause, which is world revolution. I think I should point out I was only quoting Lenin, their guiding spirit, who said in 1920 that they repudiate all morality that proceeds from supernatural ideas—that's their name for religion—or ideas that are outside class conceptions. Morality is entirely subordinate to the interests of class war. And everything is moral that is necessary for the annihilation of the old, exploiting social order and for uniting the proletariat.

Well, I think the refusal of many influential people to accept this elementary fact of Soviet doctrine illustrates an historical reluctance to see totalitarian powers for what they are. We saw this phenomenon in the 1930's. We see it too often today.

This doesn't mean we should isolate ourselves and refuse to seek an understanding with them. I intend to do everything I can to persuade them of our peaceful intent, to remind them that it was the West that refused to use its nuclear monopoly in the forties and fifties for territorial gain and which now proposes 50-percent cut in strategic ballistic missiles and the elimination of an entire class of land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

At the same time, however, they must be made to understand we will never compromise our principles and standards. We will never give away our freedom. We will never abandon our belief in God. And we will never stop searching for a genuine peace. But we can assure none of these things America stands for through the so-called nuclear freeze solutions proposed by some.

The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength.

I would agree to a freeze if only we could freeze the Soviets' global desires. A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. Instead, they would achieve their objectives through the freeze.

A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable. And an honest freeze would require extensive prior negotiations on the systems and numbers to be limited and on the measures to ensure effective verification and compliance. And the kind of a freeze that has been suggested would be virtually impossible to verify. Such a major effort would divert us completely from our current negotiations on achieving substantial reductions.

A number of years ago, I heard a young father, a very prominent young man in the entertainment world, addressing a tremendous gathering in California. It was during the time of the cold war, and communism and our own way of life were very much on people's minds. And he was speaking to that subject. And suddenly, though, I heard him saying, "I love my little

girls more than anything—" And I said to myself, "Oh, no, don't. You can't—don't say that." But I had underestimated him. He went on: "I would rather see my little girls die now, still believing in God, than have them grow up under communism and one day die no longer believing in God."

There were thousands of young people in that audience. They came to their feet with shouts of joy. They had instantly recognized the profound truth in what he had said, with regard to the physical and the soul and what was truly important.

Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian darkness—pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on the Earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.

It was C. S. Lewis who, in his unforgettable "Screw-tape Letters," wrote: "The greatest evil is not done now in those sordid 'dens of crime' that Dickens loved to paint. It is not even done in concentration camps and labor camps. In those we see its final result. But it is conceived and ordered (moved, seconded, carried and minuted) in clear, carpeted, warmed, and well-lighted offices, by quiet men with white collars and cut fingernails and smooth-shaven cheeks who do not need to raise their voice."

Well, because these "quiet men" do not "raise their voices," because they sometimes speak in soothing tones of brotherhood and peace, because, like other dictators before them, they're always making "their final territorial demand," some would have us accept them at their word and accommodate ourselves to their aggressive impulses. But if history teaches anything, it teaches that simple-minded appeasement or wishful thinking about our adversaries is folly. It means the betrayal of our past, the squandering of our freedom.

So, I urge you to speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority. You know, I've always believed that old Screw-tape reserved his best efforts for those of you in the church. So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil.

I ask you to resist the attempts of those who would have you withhold your support for our efforts, this administration's efforts, to keep America strong and free, while we negotiate real and verifiable reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and one day, with God's help, their total elimination.

While America's military strength is important, let me add here that I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith.

Whittaker Chambers, the man whose own religious conversion made him a witness to one of the terrible traumas of our time, the Hiss-Chambers case, wrote that the crisis of the Western World exists to the degree in which the West is indifferent to God, the degree to which it collaborates in communism's attempt to make man stand alone without God. And then he said, for Marxism-Leninism is actually the second oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, "Ye shall be as gods."

The Western World can answer this challenge, he wrote, "but only provided that its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins is as great as communism's faith in Man."

I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: "He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might He increased strength. . . . But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary. . . ."

Yes, change your world. One of our Founding Fathers, Thomas Paine, said, "We have it within our power to begin the world over again." We can do it, doing together what no one church could do by itself. God bless you, and thank you very much.

A Congressional Committee Reports on "Irangate," 1987

The full story of the Iran-Contra Affair is complicated, and, for this Nation, profoundly sad. In the narrative portion of this Report, the Committees present a comprehensive account of the facts, based on 10 months of investigation, including 11 weeks of hearings.

But the facts alone do not explain how or why the events occurred. In this Executive Summary, the Committees focus on the key issues and offer their conclusions. Minority, supplemental, and additional views are printed in Section II and Section III.

Summary of the Facts

The Iran-Contra Affair had its origin in two unrelated revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua.

In Nicaragua, the long-time President, General Anastasio Somoza Debayle, was overthrown in 1979 and replaced by a Government controlled by Sandinista leftists.

In Iran, the pro-Western Government of the Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi was overthrown in 1979 by Islamic fundamentalists led by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Khomeini Government, stridently anti-American, became a supporter of terrorism against American citizens.

United States policy following the revolution in Nicaragua was to encourage the Sandinista Government to keep its pledges of pluralism and democracy. However, the Sandinista regime became increasingly anti-American and autocratic; began to aid a leftist insurgency in El Salvador; and turned toward Cuba and the Soviet Union for political, military, and economic assistance. By December 1981, the United States had begun supporting the Nicaraguan Contras, armed opponents of the Sandinista regime.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the U.S. Government agency that assisted the Contras. In accordance with Presidential decisions, known as Findings, and with funds appropriated by Congress, the CIA armed, clothed, fed, and supervised the Contras. Despite this assistance, the Contras failed to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua.


Although the President continued to favor support of the Contras, opinion polls indicated that a majority of the public was not supportive. Opponents of the Administration's policy feared that U.S. involvement with the Contras would embroil the United States in another Vietnam. Supporters of the policy feared that, without U.S. support for the Contras, the Soviets would gain a dangerous toehold in Central America.

Congress prohibited Contra aid for the purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista Government in fiscal year 1983, and limited all aid to the Contras in fiscal year 1984 to \$24 million. Following disclosure in March and April 1984 that the CIA had a role in connection with the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors without adequate notification to Congress, public criticism mounted and the Administration's Contra policy lost much of its support within Congress. After further vigorous debate, Congress exercised its Constitutional power over appropriations and cut off all funds for the Contras' military and paramilitary operations. The statutory provision cutting off funds, known as the Boland Amendment, was part of a fiscal year 1985 omnibus appropriations bill, and was signed into law by the President on October 12, 1984.

Still, the President felt strongly about the Contras, and he ordered his staff, in the words of his National Security Adviser, to find a way to keep the Contras "body and soul together." Thus began the story of how the staff of a White House advisory body, the NSC, became an operational entity that secretly ran the Contra assistance effort, and later the Iran initiative. The action officer placed in charge of both operations was Lt. Col. Oliver L. North.

Denied funding by Congress, the President turned to third countries and private sources. Between June 1984 and the beginning of 1986, the President, his National Security Adviser, and the NSC staff secretly raised \$34 million for the Contras from other countries. An additional \$2.7 million was provided for the Contras during 1985 and 1986 from private contributors, who were addressed by North and occasionally granted photo opportunities with the President. In the middle of this period, Assistant Secretary of State A. Langhorne Motley—from whom these contributions were concealed—gave his assurance to Congress that the Administration was not "soliciting and/or

U.S. Military Spending, 1980-1990: A Graphic



encouraging third countries" to give funds to the Contras because, as he conceded, the Bolland Amendment prohibited such solicitation.

The first contributions were sent by the donors to bank accounts controlled and used by the Contras. However, in July 1985, North took control of the funds and—with the support of two National Security Advisers (Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter) and, according to North, [CIA] Director [William] Casey—used those funds to run the covert operation to support the Contras.

At the suggestion of Director Casey, North recruited Richard V. Secord, a retired Air Force Major General with experience in special operations. Secord set up Swiss bank accounts, and North steered future donations into these accounts. Using these funds, and funds later generated by the Iranian arms sales, Secord and his associate, Albert Hakim, created what they called "the Enterprise," a private organization designed to engage in covert activities on behalf of the United States.

The Enterprise, functioning largely at North's direction, had its own airplanes, pilots, airfield, operatives, ship, secure communications devices, and secret Swiss bank accounts. For 16 months, it served as the secret arm of the NSC staff, carrying out with private and non-appropriated money, and without the accountability or restrictions imposed by law on the CIA, a covert Contra aid program that Congress thought it had prohibited.

Although the CIA and other agencies involved in intelligence activities knew that the Bolland Amendment barred their involvement in covert support for the Contras, North's Contra support operation received logistical and tactical support from various personnel in the CIA and other agencies. Certain CIA personnel in Central America gave their assistance. The U.S. Ambassador in Costa Rica, Lewis Tamba, provided his active assistance. North also enlisted the aid of Defense Department personnel in Central America, and obtained secure communications equipment from the National Security Agency. The Assistant Secretary of State with responsibility for the region, Elliott Abrams, professed ignorance of this support. He later stated that he had been "careful not to ask North lots of questions."

By Executive Order and National Security Decision Directive issued by President Reagan, all covert operations must be approved by the President personally and in writing. By statute, Congress must be notified about each covert action. The funds used for such actions, like all government funds, must be strictly accounted for.

The covert action directed by North, however, was not approved by the President in writing. Congress was not notified about it. And the funds to support it were never accounted for. In short, the operation functioned without any of the accountability required of Government activities. It was an evasion of the Constitution's most basic check on Executive action—the power of the Congress to grant or deny funding for Government programs.

Moreover, the covert action to support the Contras was concealed from Congress and the public. When the press reported in the summer of 1985 that the NSC staff was engaged in raising money and furnishing military support to the Contras, the President assured the public that the law was

being followed. His National Security Adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, assured Committees of Congress, both in person and in writing, that the NSC staff was obeying both the spirit and the letter of the law, and was neither soliciting money nor coordinating military support for the Contras. . . .

The NSC staff was [thus] already engaged in covert operations through Secord when, in the summer of 1985, the Government of Israel proposed that missiles be sold to Iran in return for the release of seven American hostages held in Lebanon and the prospect of improved relations with Iran. The Secretaries of State and Defense repeatedly opposed such sales to a government designated by the United States as a supporter of international terrorism. They called it a straight arms-for-hostages deal that was contrary to U.S. public policy. They also argued that these sales would violate the Arms Export Control Act, as well as the U.S. arms embargo against Iran. The embargo had been imposed after the taking of hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and was continued because of the Iran-Iraq war.

Nevertheless, in the summer of 1985 the President authorized Israel to proceed with the sales. The NSC staff conducting the Contra covert action also took operational control of implementing the President's decision on arms sales to Iran. The President did not sign a Finding for this covert operation, nor did he notify the Congress.

Israel shipped 504 TOW anti-tank missiles to Iran in August and September 1985. Although the Iranians had promised to release most of the American hostages in return, only one, Reverend Benjamin Weir, was freed. The President persisted. In November, he authorized Israel to ship 80 HAWK anti-aircraft missiles in return for all the hostages, with a promise of prompt replenishment by the United States, and 40 more HAWKs to be sent directly by the United States to Iran. Eighteen HAWK missiles were actually shipped from Israel in November 1985, but no hostages were released.

In early December 1985, the President signed a retroactive Finding purporting to authorize the November HAWK transaction. That Finding contained no reference to improved relations with Iran. It was a straight arms-for-hostages Finding. National Security Adviser Poindexter destroyed this Finding a year later because, he testified, its disclosure would have been politically embarrassing to the President.

The November HAWK transaction had additional significance. The Enterprise received a \$1 million advance from the Israelis. North and Secord testified this was for transportation expenses in connection with the 120 HAWK missiles. Since only 18 missiles were shipped, the Enterprise was left with more than \$800,000 in spare cash. North directed the Enterprise to retain the money and spend it for the Contras. The "diversion" had begun.

North realized that the sale of missiles to Iran could be used to support the Contras. He told Israeli Defense Ministry officials on December 6, 1985,

one day after the President signed the Finding, that he planned to generate profits on future arms sales for activities in Nicaragua. . . .

In February 1986, the United States, acting through the Enterprise, sold 1,000 TOWs to the Iranians. The U.S. also provided the Iranians with military intelligence about Iraq. All of the remaining American hostages were supposed to be released upon Iran's receipt of the first 500 TOWs. None was. But the transaction was productive in one respect. The difference between what the Enterprise paid the United States for the missiles and what it received from Iran was more than \$6 million. North directed part of this profit for the Contras and for other covert operations. Poindexter testified that he authorized this "diversion."

The diversion, for the Contras and other covert activities, was not an isolated act by the NSC staff. Poindexter saw it as "implementing" the President's secret policy that had been in effect since 1984 of using non-appropriated funds following passage of the Boland Amendment.

According to North, CIA Director Casey saw the "diversion" as part of a more grandiose plan to use the Enterprise as a "stand-alone," "off-the-shelf," covert capacity that would act throughout the world while evading Congressional review. To Casey, Poindexter, and North, the diversion was an integral part of selling arms to Iran and just one of the intended uses of the proceeds.

In May 1986, the President again tried to sell weapons to get the hostages back. This time, the President agreed to ship parts for HAWK missiles but only on condition that all the American hostages in Lebanon be released first. A mission headed by Robert McFarlane, the former National Security Adviser, traveled to Tehran with the first installment of the HAWK parts. When the mission arrived, McFarlane learned that the Iranians claimed they had never promised to do anything more than try to obtain the hostages' release. The trip ended amid misunderstanding and failure, although the first installment of HAWK parts was delivered.

The Enterprise was paid, however, for all of the HAWK parts, and realized more than an \$8 million profit, part of which was applied, at North's direction, to the Contras. Another portion of the profit was used by North for other covert operations, including the operation of a ship for a secret mission. The idea of an off-the-shelf, stand-alone covert capacity had become operational. . . .

The sale of arms to Iran was a "significant anticipated intelligence activity." By law, such an activity must be reported to Congress "in a timely fashion" pursuant to Section 501 of the National Security Act. If the proposal to sell arms to Iran had been reported, the Senate and House Intelligence Committees would likely have joined Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger in objecting to this initiative. But Poindexter recommended—and the President decided—not to report the Iran initiative to Congress.

Indeed, the Administration went to considerable lengths to avoid notifying Congress. The CIA General Counsel wrote on January 15, 1986, "the key issue in this entire matter revolves around whether or not there

will be reports made to Congress." Shortly thereafter, the transaction was restructured to avoid the pre-shipment reporting requirements of the Arms Export Control Act, and place it within the more limited reporting requirements of the National Security Act. But even these reporting requirements were ignored. The President failed to notify the group of eight (the leaders of each party in the House and Senate, and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the Intelligence Committees) specified by law for unusually sensitive operations.

After the disclosure of the Iran arms sales on November 3, 1986, the American public was still not told the facts. The President sought to avoid any comment on the ground that it might jeopardize the chance of securing the remaining hostages' release. But it was impossible to remain silent, and inaccurate statements followed. . . .

While the President was denying any illegality, his subordinates were engaging in a coverup. Several of his advisers had expressed concern that the 1985 sales violated the Arms Export Control Act, and a "cover story" had been agreed on if these arms sales were ever exposed. After North had three conversations on November 18, 1986, about the legal problems with the 1985 Israeli shipments, he, Poindexter, Casey, and McFarlane all told conforming false stories about U.S. involvement in these shipments. . . .

In light of the destruction of material evidence by Poindexter and North and the death of Casey, all of the facts may never be known. The Committees cannot even be sure whether they heard the whole truth. . . . But enough is clear to demonstrate beyond doubt that fundamental processes of governance were disregarded and the rule of law was subverted.

The common ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law. A small group of senior officials believed that they alone knew what was right. They viewed knowledge of their actions by others in the Government as a threat to their objectives. They told neither the Secretary of State, the Congress nor the American people of their actions. When exposure was threatened, they destroyed official documents and lied to Cabinet officials, to the public, and to elected representatives in Congress. They testified that they even withheld key facts from the President.

The United States Constitution specifies the process by which laws and policy are to be made and executed. Constitutional process is the essence of our democracy and our democratic form of Government is the basis of our strength. Time and again we have learned that a flawed process leads to bad results, and that a lawless process leads to worse.

Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev Charts a New Direction for the U.S.S.R., 1988

The Soviet Union's role in world affairs is well known. In view of the revolutionary restructuring that is taking place in our country—pere-

stroika—which has a tremendous potential for promoting peace and international cooperation, we are particularly interested today in being understood correctly. . . .

What will humanity be like as it enters the 21st century? Thoughts about this already very near future are engaging people's minds. While we look forward to the future with the anticipation of change for the better, we also view it with alarm.

Today, the world is a very different place from what it was at the beginning of this century, and even in the middle of it. And the world and all of its components keep changing.

The emergence of nuclear weapons was a tragic way of stressing the fundamental nature of these changes. Being the material symbol and the bearer of the ultimate military force, nuclear weapons at the same time laid bare the absolute limits to this force.

Humankind is faced with the problem of survival, of self-protection, in all its magnitude.

Profound social changes are taking place.

In the East and in the South, in the West and in the North, hundreds of millions of people, new nations and states, new public movements and ideologies have advanced to the foreground of history.

The striving for independence, democracy and social justice manifests itself, in all its diversity and with all its contradictions, in broad and frequently turbulent popular movements. The idea of democratizing the entire world order has grown into a powerful social and political force.

At the same time, the revolution in science and technology has turned economic, food, energy, ecological, information and demographic problems, which only recently were of a national or regional character, into global problems.

The newest techniques of communications, mass information and transport have made the world more visible and more tangible to everyone. International communication is easier now than ever before.

Nowadays, it is virtually impossible for any society to be "closed." That is why we need a radical revision of the views on the totality of problems of international cooperation, which is the most essential component of universal security.

The world economy is becoming a single entity, outside of which no state can develop normally, regardless of its social system or economic level.

All this calls for creating an altogether new mechanism for the functioning of the world economy, a new structure of the international division of labour.

World economic growth, however, is revealing the contradictions of the traditional type of industrial development and its limitations. The expansion and deepening of industrialization is leading to an ecological catastrophe.

But there are many countries with insufficiently developed industry and some that are not yet industrialized. Whether these countries will follow the old technological patterns in their economic development or be able to join the search for ecologically clean industries is one of the biggest problems.

Another problem is the growing gap between the industrialized nations and most of the developing countries, which is presenting an increasingly serious threat on a global scale.

All these factors make it necessary to look for a fundamentally new type of industrial progress that would be in accordance with the interests of all peoples and states. . . .

In thinking all this over, it becomes clear that we have to look for ways together to improve the international situation, to build a new world—that is, if we are going to take into consideration the lessons of the past, the realities of the present, and the objective logic of world development.

If this is really true, it would be worthwhile to reach an understanding on the basic and genuinely universal principles of this search, and the prerequisites for it.

It is evident, in particular, that force or the threat of force neither can nor should be instruments of foreign policy. This mainly refers to nuclear arsenals, but not to them alone. All of us, and first of all the strongest of us, have to practice self-restraint and renounce the use of force in the international arena. . . .

The New York Times Announces the End of the Cold War, 1989

The cold war of poisonous Soviet-American feelings, of domestic political hysteria, of events enlarged and distorted by East-West confrontation, of almost perpetual diplomatic deadlock is over.

The we-they world that emerged after 1945 is giving way to the more traditional struggles of great powers. That contest is more manageable. It permits serious negotiations. It creates new possibilities—for cooperation in combating terrorism, the spread of chemical weapons and common threats to the environment, and for shaping a less violent world.

True, Europe remains torn in two; but the place where four decades of hostility began is mending and changing in complicated patterns. True, two enormous military machines still face each other around the world; but both sides are searching for ways to reduce the burdens and risks. Values continue to clash, but less profoundly as Soviet citizens start to partake in freedoms.

The experts who contributed to a two-month series on the Op-Ed page called "Is the Cold War Over?" agreed, with variations in emphasis and definition, that Soviet-American relations are entering a new era. They differed over whether Mikhail Gorbachev can last and whether his policies can outlast him, and over how much the West can or should do to help him and what to ask in return. But these questions are the stuff of genuine policy debate, not grist for old ideological diatribes.

In his four years of power, what has Mikhail Gorbachev done to bring about this reconsideration of the cold war?

"The Cold War Is Over" from *The New York Times*, April 2, 1989. Copyright © 1989 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission.

A great deal, as Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Sciences rightly pointed out. Mr. Gorbachev has pushed Yasir Arafat toward renouncing terrorism and accepting Israel, supported political settlements in Angola and Cambodia, pulled out Soviet troops from Afghanistan, agreed to vastly disproportionate cuts in medium-range missiles and pledged significant unilateral reductions in Soviet forces in Central Europe.

At home, Mr. Stone said properly, the Soviet leader is introducing economic decentralization, allowing Soviet nationalities to assert their separate identities, encouraging free speech and experimenting with elections. These measures give hope for a more open Soviet society and Government. And, as Graham Allison of Harvard's Kennedy School pointed out, this has been the very goal of America's containment policy.

But what if Mr. Gorbachev is ousted? Couldn't his successors readily reverse his actions?

Frank Carlucci argued that it's too early to foretell Mr. Gorbachev's fate or judge whether he or his successors might not simply change policies. The former Defense Secretary argued that Soviet policy is in a transitional phase.

Dimitri Simes of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, on the other hand, convincingly made the case that the changes occurring in the Soviet Union are of a more fundamental nature. Whoever leads the Soviet Union, he argued, would have little choice but to respond to Moscow's current economic and political weaknesses and follow the Gorbachev path.

Mr. Simes rightly argued that the debate in the Soviet Union revolves around the scope and pace of change, not the need for change. And there is little evidence that Mr. Gorbachev's foreign and military policies are under attack. Moscow simply does not have the resources for costly global challenges.

If the Soviet Union is in such bad shape, why not squeeze hard for concessions?

William Luers, a former U.S. diplomat, offered one reason. He warned against humiliating Mr. Gorbachev in ways that would unite a proud nation against the West. Ed Hewitt of the Brookings Institution provided another: Soviet leaders still have sufficient economic strength and foreign policy options to make life easier or harder for the West.

These cautions have to be kept in mind. But the West should not shy away from driving hard bargains. That can be done, as Ronald Reagan demonstrated, without destroying relations.

What should Western policy be?

Zbigniew Brzezinski correctly argued that the West needs a strategy to deal with "the gravity of the challenge and the magnitude of the opportunity." But the West would tie itself in knots if it followed his advice to "insist that any substantial assistance be reciprocated by reforms that institutionalize economic and political pluralism."

On the contrary, the West cannot manage Soviet reforms any more than it can "save" Mr. Gorbachev. It can reinforce and encourage reforms when Western interests are also at stake—by providing credits and technology on a modest and safe scale and by easing restrictions on trade. The point is for

the West to rid itself of self-made restraints on expanding economic relations so that decisions can be made on a case-by-case basis.

The prospect of such economic openings and the diminishing Soviet threat are likely to give freer play to conflicts among Western industrialized powers, according to Edward Luttwak of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He was exactly right in urging Western leaders to "act now to construct a new system of economic cooperation that would stand on its own and not lean on the imperatives of resisting" Moscow.

No one seems to have a good answer about the division of Europe, always the most dangerous East-West question. Michael Mandelbaum of the Council on Foreign Relations offered as good a prescription as anyone. He looked toward superpower talks to bring about sovereign nations in Eastern Europe and special arrangements for the two Germans.

The Bush Administration seems less attentive to these issues and more preoccupied with Mr. Gorbachev's seizing headlines worldwide. It would do better to think of him as part of the solution, not the problem, as Richard Ullman of Princeton University counseled. "Who takes the initiative," he wrote, "matters less than the result."

The Administration now nears the completion of its East-West policy review. Hints dribble out about senior officials worrying that Mr. Reagan was too friendly with Mr. Gorbachev and too eager for arms control. That's self-defeating talk. The treaty eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe represents a substantial victory for the West. Similarly, Mr. Bush and the country would gain by early completion of a treaty to cut intercontinental-range missiles and bombers.

None of the contributors recommended cosmic disarmament agreements, and Mr. Bush would be right to avoid them. But he would be flat wrong not to exploit Moscow's willingness to compromise on cutting troops in Europe and otherwise reduce the costs and risks of security.

It would also be unfortunate if the Bush team worried too much about its right flank and tried to prove that it can out-tough Mr. Reagan. That would drain them of the imagination and boldness necessary to go beyond the cold war. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev have the opportunity of the century to refocus energies and resources from sterile conflicts onto common threats to mankind.

President George Bush Proclaims a New World Order, 1990

We gather tonight, witness to events in the Persian Gulf as significant as they are tragic. In the early morning hours of August 2nd, following negotiations and promises by Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein not to use force, a powerful Iraqi army invaded its trusting and much weaker neighbor, Kuwait. Within 3 days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to check that aggression.

At this moment, our brave servicemen and women stand watch in that

distant desert and on distant seas, side-by-side with the forces of more than 20 other nations.

Tonight, I want to talk to you about what's at stake—what we must do together to defend civilized values around the world and maintain our economic strength at home.

The Objectives and Goals

Our objectives in the Persian Gulf are clear; our goals defined and familiar.

- Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately, and without condition.
- Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored.
- The security and stability of the Persian Gulf must be assured.
- American citizens abroad must be protected.
- These goals are not ours alone. They have been endorsed by the UN Security Council five times in as many weeks. Most countries share our concern for principle, and many have a stake in the stability of the Persian Gulf. This is not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world.

We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward a historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge; a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony.

A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today, that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.

This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.

The test we face is great—and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world.

America and the world must defend common vital interests. And we will. America and the world must support the rule of law. And we will. America and the world must stand up to aggression. And we will. And one thing more; in the pursuit of these goals, America will not be intimidated.

Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the earth. We do not exaggerate. Nor do we exaggerate when we say Saddam Hussein will fail.

Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some 10% of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—neighbors that control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't.

Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.

Our interest, our involvement in the gulf is not transitory. It predated Saddam Hussein's aggression and will survive it. Long after all our troops come home—and we all hope it is soon, very soon—there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role then—to deter future aggression. Our role is to help our friends in their own self-defense, and, something else, to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile, and, above all, nuclear technologies.

Let me also make clear that the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is with Iraq's dictator and with his aggression. Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. That is not a threat; that is not a boast; that is just the way it is going to be.

W E S S A Y S

As the Cold War gave way to a new and uncertain era in international affairs, historians and other foreign-policy experts hastened to explain the legacy of the Reagan era and to map out the future course of U.S. foreign relations. In the first essay, diplomatic historian John Lewis Gaddis of Ohio University offers a favorable assessment of Ronald Reagan's policies, praising the former president for "hanging tough" and for helping to bring about "the most dramatic improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations . . . since the Cold War began." In the second essay, Richard J. Barnet of the Institute for Policy Studies presents a far more critical assessment of both Reagan and George Bush and of the powerful inertial momentum of America's Cold War institutions. Note that both essays were published before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Persian Gulf war, and George Bush's call for "a new world order."

Ronald Reagan's Cold War Victory

JOHN LEWIS GADDIS

The time has come to acknowledge an astonishing development: during his eight years as president, Ronald Reagan has presided over the most dramatic

"Ronald Reagan's Cold War Victory," by John Lewis Gaddis from the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Copyright © 1989 by the Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, 6042 South Kimbark, Chicago, IL 60637, USA.

West is indifferent to God, the degree to which it collaborates in communism's attempt to make man stand alone without God. And then he said, for Marxism-Leninism is actually the second oldest faith, first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with the words of temptation, 'Ye shall be as gods.'

The Western World can answer this challenge, he wrote, 'but only provided that its faith in God and the freedom He enjoins is as great as communism's faith in Man.'


I believe we shall rise to the challenge. I believe that communism is another sad, bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages even now are being written. I believe this because the source of our strength in the quest for human freedom is not material, but spiritual. And because it knows no limitation, it must terrify and ultimately triumph over those who would enslave their fellow man. For in the words of Isaiah: 'He giveth power to the faint; and to them that have no might He increased strength ... But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary ...'

Yes, change your world. One of our Founding Fathers, Thomas Paine, said, 'We have it within our power to begin the world over again.' We can do it, doing together what no one church could do by itself.

God bless you, and thank you very much.

POST-COLD WAR

19 PRESIDENT BUSH PROCLAIMS A NEW WORLD ORDER (1990)



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20 THE PARIS JOINT DECLARATION (1990)

The transformation of the Soviet Union began under Mikhail Gorbachev, and the response of the United States, through the Cold War period to a close and this Declaration formally marked its end. It was signed by twenty-two nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union, at the Paris Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in November 1990. The Conference also produced the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. However, new and resurgent security issues would soon replace the Cold War division of Europe.

The Heads of State or Government of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America

- greatly welcoming the historic changes in Europe
- gratified by the growing implementation throughout Europe of a common commitment to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights, which are essential to lasting security on the continent,
- affirming the end of the era of division and confrontation which has lasted for more than four decades, the improvement in relations among their countries and the contribution this makes to the security of all,
- confident that the signature of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe represents a major contribution to the common objective of increased security and stability in Europe, and
- convinced that these developments must form part of a continuing process of co-operation in building the structures of a more united continent,

Issue the following Declaration:

1. The signatories solemnly declare that, in the new era of European relations which is beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship.
2. They recall their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirm all of their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act. They stress that all of the ten Helsinki Principles are of primary significance and that, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others. In that context, they affirm their obligation and commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, from seeking to change existing borders by threat or use of force, and from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of those documents. None of their weapons will ever be used except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. They recognize that security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [CSCE].
4. They undertake to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence. They will bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines.
5. They reaffirm that every State has the right to be or not to be a party to a treaty of alliance.

6. They note with approval the intensification of political and military contacts among them to promote mutual understanding and confidence. They welcome in this context the positive responses made to recent proposals for new regular diplomatic liaison.

7. They declare their determination to contribute actively to conventional, nuclear and chemical arms control and disarmament agreements which enhance security and stability for all. In particular, they call for the early entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and commit themselves to continue the process of strengthening peace in Europe through conventional arms control within the framework of the CSCE. They welcome the prospect of new negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of their short-range nuclear forces.

8. They welcome the contribution that confidence- and security-building measures [CSBMs] have made to lessening tensions and fully support the further development of such measures. They reaffirm the importance of the 'Open Skies' initiative and their determination to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

9. They pledge to work together with the other CSCE participating States to strengthen the CSCE process so that it can make an even greater contribution to security and stability in Europe. They recognize in particular the need to enhance political consultations among CSCE participants and to develop other CSCE mechanisms. They are convinced that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and agreement on a substantial new set of CSBMs, together with new patterns of co-operation in the framework of the CSCE, will lead to increased security and thus to enduring peace and stability in Europe.

10. They believe that the preceding points reflect the deep longing of their peoples for close co-operation and mutual understanding and declare that they will work steadily for the further development of their relations in accordance with the present Declaration as well as with the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act.

The original of this Declaration of which the English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic will be transmitted to the Government of France which will retain it in its archives. The Government of France is requested to transmit the text of the Declaration to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to its circulation to all the members of the organization as an official document of the United Nations, indicating that it is not eligible for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. Each of the signatory States will receive from the Government of France a true copy of this Declaration.

In witness whereof the undersigned High Representatives have subscribed their signatures below.

Nor, apparently, would it be allowed in nearby Albania. On 31 March 1991, a Communist government won overwhelming endorsement in elections there. This was followed immediately by two months of widespread unrest, including street demonstrations and a general strike lasting three weeks, which finally led to the collapse of the new regime by June.³⁶ The National Endowment for Democracy had been there also, providing \$80,000 to the labor movement and \$23,000 "to support training and civic education programs."³⁷

52. Iraq 1990-1991 Desert holocaust

"This is the one part I didn't want to see," said a 20-year-old private. "All the homeless, all the hurting. When we came through the refugee camp, man, that's something I didn't need."

"It's really sad," said the sergeant. "We've got little kids come up and see my gun, and they start crying. That really tears me up."

"At night, you kill and you roll on by," said another GI. "You don't stop. You don't have to see anything. It wasn't until the next morning the rear told us the devastation was total. We'd killed the entire division."¹

While many nations have a terrible record in modern times of dealing out great suffering face-to-face with their victims, Americans have made it a point to keep at a distance while inflicting some of the greatest horrors of the age: atomic bombs on the people of Japan; carpet-bombing Korea back to the stone age; engulfing the Vietnamese in napalm and pesticides; providing three decades of Latin Americans with the tools and methods of torture, then turning their eyes away, closing their ears to the screams, and denying everything ... and now, dropping 177 million pounds of bombs on the people of Iraq in the most concentrated aerial onslaught in the history of the world.

What possessed the United States to carry out this relentless devastation for more than 40 days and nights against one of the most advanced and enlightened nations in the Middle East and its ancient and modern capital city?

It's the first half of 1990. The dismantling of the Berlin wall is being carried out on a daily basis. Euphoria about the end of the cold war and optimism about the beginning of a new era of peace and prosperity are hard to contain. The Bush administration is under pressure to cut the monster military budget and institute a "peace dividend". But George Bush, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, former Texas oil man, and former Director of the CIA, is not about to turn his back on his many cronies in the military-industrial-intelligence complex. He rails against those who would "naively cut the muscle out of our defense posture", and insists that we must take a cautious attitude towards reform in the USSR.² In February, it's reported that "the administration and Congress are expecting the most acrimonious hard-fought defense budget battle in recent history"; and in June that "tensions have escalated" between Congress and the Pentagon "as Congress prepares to draft one of the most pivotal defense budgets in the past two decades."³ A month later, a Senate Armed Services subcommittee votes to cut military manpower by nearly three times more than recommended by the Bush administration ... "The size and direction of the cuts indicate that

President Bush is losing his battle on how to manage reductions in military spending."⁴

During this same period Bush's popularity was plummeting: from an approval rating of 80 percent in January—as he rode the wave of public support for his invasion of Panama the previous month—to 73 in February, down to the mid-60s in May and June, 63 on 11 July, 60 two weeks later.⁵

George Herbert Walker Bush needed something dramatic to capture the headlines and the public, and to convince Congress that a powerful military was needed as much as ever because it was still a scary and dangerous world out there.

Although the official Washington version of events presented Iraq's occupation of neighboring Kuwait as an arbitrary and unwarranted aggression, Kuwait had actually been a district of Iraq, under Ottoman rule, up to the First World War. After the war, to exert leverage against the abundantly oil-rich Iraq, the British Colonial Office established tiny Kuwait as a separate territorial entity, in the process cutting off most of Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf. In 1961, Kuwait became "independent," again because Britain declared it to be so, and Iraq massed troops at the border, backing down when the British dispatched their own forces. Subsequent Iraqi regimes never accepted the legitimacy of this state of affairs, making similar threats in the 1970s, even crossing a half-mile into Kuwait in 1976, but Baghdad was also open to a compromise with Kuwait under which Iraq would gain access to its former islands in the Gulf.⁶

The current conflict had its origins in the brutal 1980-88 war between Iraq and Iran. Iraq charged that while it was locked in battle, Kuwait was engaged in stealing \$2.4 billion of oil from the Rumaila oil field that ran beneath the vaguely defined Iraq-Kuwait border and was claimed in its entirety by Iraq; that Kuwait had built military and other structures on Iraqi territory; and worst of all, that immediately after the war ended, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates began to exceed the production quotas established by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), flooding the oil market, and driving prices down. Iraq was heavily strapped and deeply in debt because of the long war, and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared this policy was an increasing threat to his country—"economic war", he called it, pointing out that Iraq lost a billion dollars a year for each drop of one dollar in the oil price.⁷ Besides compensation for these losses, Hussein insisted on possession of the two Gulf islands which blocked Iraq's access to the Gulf as well as undisputed ownership of the Rumaila oilfield.

In the latter part of July 1990, after Kuwait had continued to scorn Iraq's financial and territorial demands, and to ignore OPEC's request to stick to its assigned quota, Iraq began to mass large numbers of troops along the Kuwaiti border.

The reaction to all this by the world's only remaining superpower and self-appointed global policeman became the subject of intense analysis and controversy after Iraq actually invaded. Had Washington given Iraq a green light to invade? Was there, at a minimum, the absence of a flashing red light? The controversy was fueled by incidents such as the following:

19 July: Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated that the American commitment made during the Iran-Iraq war to come to Kuwait's defense if it were attacked was still valid. The same point was made by Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, at a private luncheon with Arab ambassadors. (Ironically, Kuwait had been allied with Iraq and feared an attack from Iran.) Later, Cheney's remark was downplayed by his own spokesman, Pete Williams, who explained that the secretary had spoken with "some degree of liberty". Cheney was then told by the White House: "You're committing us to war we might not

want to fight," and advised pointedly that from then on, statements on Iraq would be made by the White House and State Department.⁸

24 July: State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler, in response to a question, responded: "We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait." Asked whether the United States would help Kuwait if it were attacked, she said: "We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the gulf with whom we have deep and longstanding ties"—a statement that some Kuwaiti officials said privately was too weak.⁹

24 July: The US staged an unscheduled and rare military exercise with the United Arab Emirates, and the same Pete Williams then announced: "We remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the gulf with whom we have deep and longstanding ties." And the White House declared: "We're concerned about the troop buildup by the Iraqis. We ask that all parties strive to avoid violence."¹⁰

25 July: Saddam Hussein was personally told by the US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, in a now-famous remark, that "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." But she then went on to tell the Iraqi leader that she was concerned about his massive troop deployment on the Kuwaiti border in the context of his government's having branded Kuwait's actions as "parallel to military aggression".¹¹

25 July: John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, killed a planned Voice of America broadcast that would have warned Iraq with the identical party-line words used by Tutweiler and Williams.¹² Hussein may not have known of this incident, although in April he had been personally assured by visiting Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, speaking in behalf of the president, that the Bush administration dissociated itself from a Voice of America broadcast critical of Iraq's human-rights abuses and also opposed a congressional move for economic sanctions against Iraq.¹³

27 July: The House and Senate each voted to impose economic sanctions against Iraq because of its human-rights violations. However, the Bush administration immediately reiterated its opposition to the measure.¹⁴

28 July: Bush sent a personal message to Hussein (apparently after receiving Glaspie's report of her meeting with the Iraqi leader) cautioning him against the use of force, without referring directly to Kuwait.¹⁵

31 July: Kelly told Congress: "We have no defense treaty relationship with any Gulf country. That is clear. ... We have historically avoided taking a position on border disputes or on internal OPEC deliberations."

Rep. Lee Hamilton asked if it would be correct to say that if Iraq "charged across the border into Kuwait" the United States did "not have a treaty commitment which would obligate us to engage U.S. forces" there.

"That is correct," Kelly responded.¹⁶

The next day (Washington time), Iraqi troops led by tanks charged across the Kuwaiti border, and the United States instantly threw itself into unmitigated opposition.

Official statements notwithstanding, it appears that the United States did indeed have an official position on the Iraq-Kuwait border dispute. After the invasion, one of the documents the Iraqis found in a Kuwaiti intelligence file was a memorandum concerning a November 1989 meeting between the head of Kuwaiti state security and CIA Director William Webster, which included the following:

We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country's government to delineate our

common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level.

The CIA called the document a "total fabrication". However, as the *Los Angeles Times* pointed out, "The memo is not an obvious forgery, particularly since if Iraqi officials had written it themselves, they almost certainly would have made it far more damaging to U.S. and Kuwaiti credibility."¹⁷ It was apparently real enough, and damaging enough to the Kuwaiti foreign minister—he fainted when confronted with the document by his Iraqi counterpart at an Arab summit meeting in mid-August.¹⁸

When the Iraqi ambassador in Washington was asked why the document seemed to contradict US Ambassador Glaspie's avowal of neutrality on the issue, he replied that her remark was "part and parcel of the setup".¹⁹

Was Iraq set up by the United States and Kuwait? Was Saddam provoked into his invasion—with the conspirators' expectation perhaps that it would not extend beyond the border area—so he could be cut down to the size both countries wanted?

In February 1990, Hussein made a speech before an Arab summit which could certainly have incited, or added impetus to, such a plot. In it he condemned the continuous American military presence in the Persian Gulf waters and warned that "If the Gulf people and the rest of the Arabs along with them fail to take heed, the Arab Gulf region will be ruled by American will." Further, that the US would dictate the production, distribution and price of oil, "all on the basis of a special outlook which has to do solely with U.S. interests and in which no consideration is given to the interests of others."²⁰

In examining whether there was a conspiracy against Iraq and Saddam Hussein, we must consider, in addition to the indications mentioned above, the following:

Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat has asserted that Washington thwarted the chance for a peaceful resolution of the differences between Kuwait and Iraq at an Arab summit in May, after Saddam had offered to negotiate a mutually acceptable border with Kuwait. "The US was encouraging Kuwait not to offer any compromise," said Arafat, "which meant there could be no negotiated solution to avoid the Gulf crisis." Kuwait, he said, was led to believe it could rely on the force of US arms instead.²¹

Similarly, King Hussein of Jordan revealed that just before the Iraqi invasion the Kuwaiti foreign minister stated: "We are not going to respond to [Iraq] ... if they don't like it, let them occupy our territory ... we are going to bring in the Americans." And that the Kuwaiti emir told his military officers that in the event of an invasion, their duty was to hold off the Iraqis for 24 hours; by then "American and foreign forces would land in Kuwait and expel them." King Hussein expressed the opinion that Arab understanding was that Saddam had been goaded into invading, thereby stepping into a noose prepared for him.²²

The emir refused to accede to Iraq's financial demands, instead offering an insulting half-million dollars to Baghdad. A note from him to his prime minister before the invasion speaks of support of this policy from Egypt, Washington and London. "Be unwavering in your discussions," the emir writes. "We are stronger than they [the Iraqis] think."²³

After the war, the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil and Finance acknowledged:

But we knew that the United States would not let us be overrun. I spent too much time in Washington to make that mistake, and received a constant stream of visitors here. The American policy was clear. Only Saddam didn't understand it.²⁴

But we have seen perhaps ample reason why Saddam would fail to understand.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz declared that a sharp drop in the price of oil was something the Kuwaitis, with their vast investment holdings in the West, could easily afford, but which undercut the oil revenues essential to a cash-hungry Baghdad. "It was inconceivable," said Aziz, that Kuwait "could risk engaging in a conspiracy of such magnitude against a large, strong country such as Iraq, if it were not being supported and protected by a great power; and that power was the United States of America."²⁵ There is, in fact, no public indication that the United States, despite its very close financial ties, tried to persuade Kuwait to cease any of its provocative actions against Iraq.

And neither Washington nor Kuwait seemed terribly concerned about heading off an invasion. In the week prior to the Iraqi attack, intelligence experts were telling the Bush administration with increasing urgency that an invasion of at least a part of Kuwait was likely. These forecasts "appear to have evoked little response from Government agencies."²⁶ During this period Bush was personally briefed and told the same by CIA Director William Webster, who showed the president satellite photos of the Iraqi troops massed near the Kuwaiti border. Bush, reportedly, showed little interest.²⁷ On 1 August, the CIA's National Intelligence Officer for Warning (sic) walked into the offices of the National Security Council's Middle East Staff and announced: "This is your final warning." Iraq, he said, would invade Kuwait by day's end, which they did. This, too, did not produce a rush to action.²⁸ Lastly, a Kuwaiti diplomat stationed in Iraq before the invasion sent many reports back to his own government warning of an Iraqi invasion; these were ignored as well. His last warning had specified the exact date (Kuwaiti time) of 2 August. After the war, when the diplomat held a press conference in Kuwait to discuss the government's ignoring of his warnings, it was broken up by a government minister and several army officers.²⁹

In July, while all these warnings were ostensibly being ignored, the Pentagon was busy running its computerized command post exercise (CPX), initiated in late 1989 specifically to explore possible responses to "the Iraqi threat"—which, in the new war plan 1002-90, had replaced "the Soviet threat"—the exercise dealing with an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia or both.³⁰ At a war-games exercise at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., participants were also being asked to determine the most effective American response to a hypothetical invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.³¹ While at Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina, another war "game" involved identifying bombing targets in Iraq.³²

And during May and June, the Pentagon, Congress and defense contractors had been extensively briefed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University on a study of the future of conventional warfare, which concluded that the most likely war to erupt requiring an American military response was between Iraq and Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.³³

Another person who seems to have known something in advance was George Shultz, who was Reagan's Secretary of State and then returned to the Bechtel Corp., the multinational construction giant. In the spring of 1990, Shultz convinced the company to withdraw from a petrochemicals project in Iraq. "I said something is going to go very wrong in Iraq and blow up and if Bechtel were there it would get blown up too. So I told them to get out."³⁴

Finally, there was this disclosure in the *Washington Post*:

Since the invasion, highly classified U.S. intelligence assessments have determined that Saddam took U.S. statements of neutrality ... as a green light from the Bush administration for an invasion. One senior Iraqi military official ... has told the agency [CIA] that Saddam seemed to be sincerely surprised by the subsequent bellicose reaction.³⁵

On the other hand we have the statement from Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz, who was present at the Glaspie-Hussein meeting.

She didn't give a green light, and she didn't mention a red light because the question of our presence in Kuwait was not raised. ... And we didn't take it as a green light ... that if we intervened militarily in Kuwait, the Americans would not react. That was not true. We were expecting an American attack on the morning of the second of August.³⁶

But one must be skeptical about so casual an attitude toward an American attack. And these remarks, in effect denying that Iraq was played for a sucker, must be considered in light of the Iraqi government's stubborn refusal for some time to admit the harm done to the country by US bombing, and to downplay the number of their casualties.

The Bush administration's position was that Iraq's Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, had urged the United States all along not to say or do anything that might provoke Saddam. Moreover, as Ambassador Glaspie emphasized, no one expected Hussein to take "all" of Kuwait, at most the parts he already claimed: the islands and the oilfield.

But, of course, Iraq had claimed "all" of Kuwait for a century.

The Invasion

When Iraq invaded, the time for mixed signals was over. Whatever devious plan, if any, George Bush may have been operating under, he now took full advantage of this window of opportunity. Within hours, if not minutes, of the border crossing, the United States began mobilizing, the White House condemned Iraq's action as a "blatant use of military aggression", demanded "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces", and announced that it was "considering all options"; while George Bush was declaring that the invasion "underscores the need to go slowly in restructuring U.S. defense forces".³⁷

Before 24 hours had passed, an American naval task force loaded with fighter planes and bombers was on its way to the Persian Gulf, Bush was seeking to enlist world leaders for collective action against Iraq, all trade with Iraq had been embargoed, all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States had been frozen; and the Senate had "decisively defeated efforts to end or freeze production of the B-2 Stealth bomber after proponents seized on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to bolster their case for the radar-eluding weapon"; they said, "demonstrates the continuing risk of war and the need for advanced weapons" ... Said Senator Dole: "If we needed Saddam Hussein to give us a wake-up call at least we can thank him for that."³⁸

"One day after using Iraq's invasion of Kuwait to help save the high-tech B-2 bomber, senators invoked the crisis again Friday to stave off the mothballing of two World War II vintage battleships."³⁹

Within days, thousands of American troops and an armored brigade were stationed in Saudi Arabia. It was given the grand name of Operation Desert Shield, and a heightened appreciation for America's military needs was the prevailing order of the day ...

Less than a year after political changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union sent the defense industry reeling under the threat of dramatic cutbacks, executives and analysts say the crisis in the Persian Gulf has provided military companies with a tiny glimmer of hope.

"If Iraq does not withdraw and things get messy, it will be good for the industry. You will hear less rhetoric from Washington about the peace dividend," said Michael Lauer, an analyst with Kidder, Peabody & Co. in New York.

"The possible beneficiaries" of the crisis, added the *Washington Post*, "cover the spectrum of companies in the defense industry."⁴⁰

By September, James Webb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, felt moved to speak out:

The President should be aware that, while most Americans are laboring very hard to support him, a mood of cynicism is just beneath their veneer of respect. Many are claiming that the buildup is little more than a "Pentagon budget drill," designed to preclude cutbacks of an Army searching for a mission as bases in NATO begin to disappear.⁴¹

Remarkably, yet another cynical former Assistant Secretary of Defense was heard from. Lawrence Korb wrote that the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia "seems driven more by upcoming budget battles on Capitol Hill than a potential battle against Saddam Hussein."⁴²

But can anything be too cynical for a congressman stalking re-election? By the beginning of October we could read:

The political backdrop of the U.S. military deployment in Saudi Arabia played a significant role in limiting defense cuts in Sunday's budget agreement, halting the military spending "free fall" that some analysts had predicted two months ago, budget aides said. Capitol Hill strategists said that Operation Desert Shield forged a major change in the political climate of the negotiations, forcing lawmakers who had been advocating deep cuts on the defensive.

The defense budget compromise ... would leave not only funding for Operation Desert Shield intact but would spare much of the funding that has been spent each year to prepare for a major Soviet onslaught on Western Europe.⁴³

Meanwhile, George Bush's approval rating had recovered. The first poll taken in August after the US engagement in the Gulf showed a jump to 74 percent, up from 60 percent in late July. However, it seems that the American public needs the rush of a regular patriotic-fix to maintain enthusiasm for the man occupying the White House, for by mid-October, due to Bush's extreme obfuscation of why the US was in the Persian Gulf, the rating they granted him was down to 56—since Bush's first month in office, it had never been lower; and it stayed close to that level until the citizenry's next patriotic-invasion-fix in January, as we shall see.⁴⁴

Prelude to War

As Iraq went about plundering Kuwait and turning it into Iraqi Province 19, the United States was building up its military presence in Saudi Arabia and the surrounding waters, and—employing a little coercion and history's most spectacular bribes—creating a "coalition" to support US-fostered United Nations resolutions and the coming war effort in a multitude of ways: a figleaf of "multinational" respectability, as Washington had created in Korea, Grenada and Afghanistan, for what was essentially an American mission, an American war. Egypt was forgiven many billions of dollars in debt, while Syria, China, Turkey, the Soviet Union, and other countries received military or economic aid and World

Bank and IMF loans, had sanctions lifted, or were given other perks, not only from the US but, under Washington's pressure, from Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia. As an added touch, the Bush administration stopped criticizing the human rights record of any coalition member.⁴⁵

But Washington and the media were unhappy with Germany for not enthusiastically jumping on the war bandwagon. The Germans who only yesterday were condemned as jackbooted fascists marching through Poland, were now called "cowards" for marching for peace in large demonstrations.

Washington pushed a dozen resolutions through the Security Council condemning Iraq, imposing severe economic sanctions, and getting "authorization" to wage war. Only Cuba and Yemen voted against any of them. When Yemen's delegate received some applause for his negative vote on the key use-of-force resolution of 29 November, US Secretary of State Baker, who was presiding, said to his delegation: "I hope he enjoyed that applause, because this will turn out to be the most expensive vote he ever cast." The message was relayed to the Yememis, and within days, the tiny Middle-East nation suffered a sharp reduction in US aid.⁴⁶

UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar acknowledged that "It was not a United Nations War. General Schwarzkopf [commander of the coalition forces] was not wearing a blue helmet."⁴⁷ The American control of the United Nations prompted British political commentator Edward Pearce to write that the UN "functions like an English medieval parliament: consulted, shown ceremonial courtesy, but mindful of divine prerogative, it mutters and gives assent."⁴⁸

The paramount issue in the United States soon became: how long should we wait for the sanctions to work before resorting to direct military force? The administration and its supporters insisted that they were giving Hussein every chance to find a peaceful, face-saving way out of the hole he had dug himself into. But the fact remained that each time President Bush made the Iraqi leader any kind of offer, it was laced with a deep insult, and never offered the slightest recognition that there might be any validity to Iraq's stated grievances.⁴⁹ Indeed, Bush had characterized the Iraqi invasion as being "without provocation."⁵⁰ The president's rhetoric became increasingly caustic and exaggerated; he was putting it on a personal level, demonizing Saddam, as he had done with Noriega, Reagan had done with Qaddafi, as if these foreigners did not have pride or reason like Americans have. Here's how the *Los Angeles Times* viewed it:

Shortly after Iraq's invasion ... Bush carefully compared Iraq's aggression with the German aggression against Poland that launched World War II. But he stopped short of a personal comparison of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler. That caution went out the window last month, when Bush not only compared Hussein to Hitler but also threatened Nuremberg-style war crime trials. Then, last week, Bush went further, briefly maintaining that the Iraqi leader is worse than Hitler because the Germans never held U.S. citizens as "human shields" at military sites.

After this trivializing of the Holocaust, Bush went on to warn that any acceptance of uncontrolled aggression "could be world war tomorrow". Said one of his own officials: "Got to get his rhetoric under control."⁵¹

Saddam Hussein could not help but soon realize that by seizing all of Kuwait—not to mention sacking and pillaging it—he had bitten off substantially more than he could chew. In early August and again in October, he signaled his willingness to pull Iraqi forces out of the country in return for sole control of the Rumaila oil field, guaranteed access to the Persian Gulf, the lifting of sanctions, and resolution of the oil price/production problem.⁵²

He also began to release some of the many foreigners who had had the misfortune of being in Iraq or Kuwait at the wrong time. In mid-December the last of them was freed. Earlier that month, Iraq began laying out a new Iraqi-Kuwait border, which might have meant a renunciation of its claim of Kuwait being a part of Iraq, though its meaning was not clear.⁵³ And in early January, as we shall see, his strongest peace signal was reported.

The Bush administration chose to not respond in a positive manner to any of these moves. After Saddam's August offer, the State Department "categorically" denied it had even been made; then the White House confirmed it.⁵⁴ A later congressional summary of the matter stated:

The Iraqis apparently believed that having invaded Kuwait, they would get everyone's attention, negotiate improvements to their economic situation, and pull out. ... a diplomatic solution satisfactory to the interests of the United States may well have been possible since the earliest days of the invasion.

The Bush administration, said the congressional paper, wanted to avoid seeming in any way to reward the invasion. But a retired Army officer, who was acting as a middle man in the August discussions, concluded afterward that the peace offer "was already moving against policy."⁵⁵

After a certain point in the American military buildup, could the United States have given peace a chance even if it wanted to? Former Assistant Defense Secretary Lawrence Korb observed in late November that all the components of the defense establishment were pushing to get in on the action, to prove their worth, to prove that there was still a need for them, to assure their continued funding ...

By mid-January ... the United States will have over 400,000 troops in the Gulf [it turned out to be over 500,000] from all five armed services (yes, even the Coast Guard is there). This is about 100,000 more troops than we had in Europe at any time during the Cold War. The Army will eventually have eight divisions on the ground in Saudi Arabia, twice as many as it had in Europe. ... two-thirds of the entire Marine Corps' combat power [will be there] ... The Navy will deploy six of its 14 aircraft carrier battle groups, two of its four battleships and one of its two amphibious groups ... The Air Force already has fighters from nine of its 24 active tactical wings ... as well as bombers ... Even the combat reserves are scheduled to be sent ... The reserve lobby recognized that their future funding may be jeopardized if their units do not get involved. ... Just as every service wants to be involved in the deployment, will not each want a piece of the real action?

And would the military high-command be able to resist the pressures from each service, Korb wondered. The Navy, which had moved some its carriers into the narrow and dangerous waters of the Gulf just to be closer to the action? The Marines, who might want to demonstrate the continuing viability of amphibious warfare by staging an assault on the coast? And could the Army lay back while air power carried the day?⁵⁶ [They couldn't, and it prolonged the war.]

The US military and President Bush would have their massive show of power, their super-hi-tech real war games, and no signals from Iraq or any peacenik would be allowed to spoil it. *Fortune* magazine, in an ingenuous paeon to Bush's fortitude, later summed up the period before the war began thusly:

The President and his men worked overtime to quash freelance peacemakers in the Arab world, France, and the Soviet Union who threatened to give Saddam a face-saving way out of the box Bush was building. Over and over, Bush repeated the mantra: no negotiations, no deals, no face-saving, no rewards, and specifically, no linkage to a Palestinian peace conference [a point raised

by Iraq on several occasions].⁵⁷

On 29 November, the UN Security Council authorized the use of "all necessary means" to compel Iraq to vacate Kuwait if it didn't do so by 15 January. Over Christmas, International's agonizing report of Iraqi arrests, rape, and torture in Kuwait. After the holiman has to be stopped."⁵⁸

It's not reported whether Bush ever read any of Amnesty's many reports of the period on the equally repulsive violations of human rights and the human spirit perpetrated by Washington's allies in Guatemala, El Salvador, Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. If he did, the literature apparently had little effect, for he continued to support these forces. Amnesty had also been reporting about Iraq's extreme brutality for more than a decade, and only a few months before the August invasion had testified about these abuses before the Senate, but none of this had filled George Bush with righteous indignation.

As the 15 January deadline neared, the world held its breath. Was it possible that in five and a half months no way could have been found to avoid inflicting another ghastly war upon this sad planet? On the 11th, Arab diplomats at the UN said that they had received reports from Algeria, Jordan and Yemen, all on close terms with Iraq, that Saddam planned an initiative soon after the 15th that would express his willingness "in principle" to pull out of Kuwait in return for international guarantees that Iraq would not be attacked, an international conference to address Palestinian grievances, and negotiations on disputes between Iraq and Kuwait. The Iraqi leader, the diplomats said, wanted to wait a day or two after the deadline had passed to demonstrate that he had not been intimidated.

For the United States, with half-a-million troops poised for battle in Saudi Arabia, this was unacceptable. Saddam Hussein will "pass the brink at midnight, January 15", said Secretary of State Baker, and could not expect to save himself by offering to pull out of Kuwait after that time.⁵⁹

The multiple explanations of George Bush

Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world will suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell in the hands of that one man, Saddam Hussein.⁶⁰

Thus spaketh George Herbert Walker Bush to the people of America. As Theodore Draper observed:

These reasons were both mundane and implausible. That "jobs" should have been mentioned first suggested that Bush, as in a domestic political campaign, sought primarily to appeal to the voters' pocketbook. It was, however, a peculiarly crass reason to go to war, if it came to that, halfway around the world.⁶¹

During the entire lengthy buildup to the war, during the war, after the war, no one was sure they understood why Bush had intervened in the Persian Gulf, and then taken the United States into war. Congressmen, journalists, editors, plain citizens kept asking, almost pleading at times, for the president to clearly and unambiguously explain his motivations,

and without contradicting what he had said the previous week. (Economists and think-tank intellectuals found it professionally awkward to admit their uncertainty, and thus wound up writing lots of authoritative-sounding mumbo-jumbo.)

The prevailing bewilderment prompted the *Wall Street Journal* to assemble a group of "voters" to discuss the issues. "They are confused about what's happening and are crying out for more information," reported the newspaper about the participants. "And they are unsettled by the perception that Mr. Bush seems to be switching his reasoning day to day." Said one participant: "So far it's been like David Letterman's Top 10 Reasons for Being There. There's a different story every week or so."⁶²

Taking place in the Persian Gulf, as it all did, of course lent itself to the belief that the liquid gold had a lot, if not everything, to do with the conflict. This, however, is a thesis which cannot be supported by the immediate circumstances. Supply was not a problem—the Energy Department acknowledged that there was not an oil shortage, and Saudi Arabia and other countries increased their production to more than make up for the oil lost from Iraq and Kuwait, which, in any event, together accounted for only about five percent of American consumption. There was a whole world ready to supply more oil, from Mexico to Russia, as well as large untapped American sources. This indicates the difficulties faced by any single producer—Hussein or anyone else—who might try to control or dominate the market; which in turn raises the question: what would such a country do with all the oil, drink it? By December it was reported that "OPEC is pumping oil at the highest levels since early summer, and unless a war in the Middle East disrupts supplies, there's a prospect again of an oil glut and sharply lower prices."⁶³

As to the price of oil: did oilmen George Bush and James Baker and the depressed American oil states want it to go up or down? A case could be made for either hypothesis. (In January 1990 the US had secretly urged Saddam to try to raise the OPEC oil price to \$2.5 a barrel.)⁶⁴ And how easily could Washington control it either way in a chaotic situation? As it is, oil prices fluctuate on a regular basis, often sharply—between 1984 and 1986, for example, the price of a barrel of oil fell from around \$30 to less than \$10, despite the ongoing Iraq-Iran war which cut into the production of both countries.

However, this analysis of the immediate circumstances does not take into consideration the formidable and continual influence of the "mystique of oil" upon the thinking of American policy makers. If Bush was looking for a "crisis" to impress upon the congressional mind the enduring danger of the world we live in, then getting involved in a conflict between two major oil producing countries would certainly generate the desired effect much more readily than if he had seized upon Bolivia attacking Paraguay, or Ghana occupying Ivory Coast.

The president's remark about the American way of life and everyone's freedom reflects the life-and-death seriousness that he and other policy makers publicly ascribe to oil. (What these men really believe and feel in each instance is something we are not privy to.) Earlier in the year, CIA Director William Webster had told Congress that oil "will continue to have a major impact on U.S. interests" because "Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil will rise dramatically" in the next decade; while General Schwarzkopf, who had lifelong ties to the Middle East, testified:

Mideast oil is the West's lifeblood. It fuels us today, and being 77 percent of the Free World's proven oil reserves, is going to fuel us when the rest of the world has run dry. ... It is estimated that within 20 to 40 years the U.S. will have virtually depleted its economically available oil reserves, while the Persian Gulf region will still have at least 100 years of proven oil reserves.⁶⁵

It was actually 69 percent at the time, and since the Soviet Union has joined the "Free World", it's even less.⁶⁶ It should also be noted that the good general's prediction for the

US is rather speculative, and that the term "economically available" is a reference to the fact that US domestic oil reserves are more costly to exploit than those in the Gulf. But this only makes it a profit problem, not an oil-supply problem. Moreover, the vast potential residing in alternative energy sources must be included in the equation.

At this time, the United States—seemingly in a panic about danger to the Gulf oil supply—was receiving about 11 percent of its oil from the region, while Japan, which got 62 percent of its oil, and Europe which got 27 percent from there, were hardly stirred up at all, except for Margaret Thatcher who foamed at the mouth when it came to Saddam and former colony Iraq.⁶⁷ Germany's figure was about 35 percent, yet both Bonn and Tokyo had to have their arms twisted by Washington to support the war effort. The two countries may, in fact, have been leery about helping the United States acquire greater influence and control over the region's oil.

Official Washington's embrace of the oil mystique has given rise to a long-standing policy, expressed as follows by political analyst Noam Chomsky:

It's been a leading, driving doctrine of U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s that the vast and unparalleled energy resources of the Gulf region will be effectively dominated by the United States and its clients, and, crucially, that no independent, indigenous force will be permitted to have a substantial influence on the administration of oil production and price.⁶⁸

This has not always meant the use of force. In 1973, when OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, used substantial price increases and an oil boycott in an attempt to force Washington to influence Israel into withdrawing from its recently occupied territories, the United States did not launch, or even threaten, an invasion. The matter was resolved through extensive diplomacy without a shot being fired. What saved the OPEC states from a violent fate may have been the combination of the Vietnam war still hanging heavy in the air in Washington, and the Nixon administration on the verge of being swallowed up by Watergate.

In addition to issuing several dire warnings early on about the invasion's severe economic consequences for the United States, which never came to pass, Bush warned of an even worse fate if Iraq took over Saudi Arabia. The danger-to-Saudi Arabia explanation was a non-starter. Iraq never had any designs on Saudi Arabia, as a simple look at a map makes clear. The Iraqis have a long border with that country; they didn't have to go through Kuwait to invade the Saudis; and even if they did, they could have moved into Saudi Arabia virtually unopposed during the three weeks following their takeover of Kuwait, as General Colin Powell later conceded.⁶⁹ Bush administration officials in fact admitted that neither the CIA nor the Defense Intelligence Agency thought it probable that Iraq would invade Saudi Arabia.⁷⁰ The Saudis didn't think so either, until Defense Secretary Cheney flew to Riyadh on 5 August and personally told King Fahd that his country stood in great potential danger and desperately needed a very large infusion of American military forces to defend it.⁷¹

Bush backed away from the oil rationale when critics charged that he was only trying to protect the interests of the oil industry. In October, he was interrupted while making a speech by some people calling out: "Mr. President, bring our troops home from Saudi Arabia! No blood for oil!" To which George Bush replied—as the hecklers were hustled out—"You know, some people never get the word. The fight isn't about oil. The fight is about naked aggression that [we] will not stand." A month later, if not sooner, the president again began to play the oil card, tying America's economic security to that of Saudi Arabia. Shortly afterward, he returned to "the devastating damage being done every day" to the US and international economies by the disruption of oil markets.⁷²

As to Iraq's naked aggression—a remark requiring selective-memory skills of a high order coming from a government that held all modern records for international aggression, naked or otherwise, and from a man who, less than a year before, had nakedly invaded Panama—both Syria and Israel had invaded Lebanon and still occupied large portions of that country, Israel bombarding Beirut mercilessly in the process, without a threat of war emanating from Washington. Saddam Hussein, perhaps wondering when they had changed the rules, said to the United States: “You are talking about an aggressive Iraq ... if Iraq was aggressive during the Iran war, why then did you speak with [us] then?”⁷³

During Iraq's epic struggle against the Ayatollah Khomeini, the United States of course had more than spoken to Baghdad. Washington—choosing Iraq as the lesser evil against Shiite extremism—was responsible for huge amounts of weaponry, military training, sophisticated technology, satellite-photo intelligence, and billions of dollars reaching a needy Hussein, who was also lavishly supported by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, they being concerned that Iran's anti-monarchist sentiments might spread to their own realms. Indeed, there is evidence that Washington encouraged Iraq to attack Iran and ignite the war in the first place.⁷⁴ And during this period of American support of Hussein, he was certainly the same odious, repressive, beastly thug as when he later came under American moralistic rhetorical fire. Similarly, absent Washington's prodding, the UN did not condemn Iraq's invasion, nor did it impose any sanctions or lay down any demands.

Even as it officially banned arms sales to either combatant, the US secretly provided weapons to both. The other *bête noire* of the region, the Ayatollah, received American arms and military intelligence on Iraq during the war, so as to enhance the ability of the two countries to inflict maximum devastation upon each other and stunt their growth as strong Middle-East nations.

In contrast to Iraq-the-enemy now were the two “allies” most involved, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Although Washington did not make a big thing about the “virtue” of either country, official policy was always that the United States had a principled commitment to defending the former and liberating the latter. And they were not a pretty pair. Saudi Arabia regularly featured extreme religious intolerance, extrajudicial arrest, torture, and flogging.⁷⁵ It also practiced gender apartheid and systematic repression of women, virtual slavery for its foreign workers, stoning of adulterers, and amputation of the hands of thieves. US chaplains stationed in the country were asked to remove crosses and Stars of David from their uniforms and call themselves “moral officers.”⁷⁶

Kuwait, oddly enough, was virulently anti-American in its foreign policy.⁷⁷ Though more socially enlightened than Saudi Arabia (but less than Iraq), it was nonetheless run by one family as an elitist oligarchy, which closed down the parliament in 1986, had no political parties, and forbade criticism of the ruling emir; no more than 20 percent of the population possessed any political rights at all. After the country had been returned to its rightful dictators, it behaved very brutally toward its large foreign-worker population, holding them without charge or trial for several months; death squads executed scores of people. “Torture of political detainees was routine and widespread,” said Amnesty International, and at least 80 “disappeared” in custody. The targets of the campaign, which took place in the presence of thousands of US troops, were primarily those who were accused of collaboration with the Iraqis, although this was something most of them had no choice in, and those who were involved in a nascent pro-democracy movement. Additionally, some 400 Iraqis were forced to return to Iraq despite fears that they would be harmed or executed there.⁷⁸

The elite of the region did not display much gratitude for all that George Bush said America was doing for them. Said one Gulf official: “You think I want to send my teen-

aged son to die for Kuwait?” He chuckled and added, “We have our white slaves from America to do that.” A Saudi teacher saw it this way: “The American soldiers are a new kind of foreign worker here. We have Pakistanis driving taxis and now we have Americans defending us.” Explaining the absence of expressed gratitude on the part of Gulf leaders, a Yemeni diplomat said: “A lot of the Gulf rulers simply do not feel that they have to thank the people they've hired to do their fighting for them.”⁷⁹ Apart from anything else, people in the Arab world were very sensitive about the killing of Muslims and Arabs by foreigners, as well as foreign military presence on Arab soil, a reminder of a century of Western, white colonialism.

Bush also warned that Iraq posed a nuclear threat. True enough. But so did the United States, France, Israel, and every other country that already had nuclear weapons. Iraq, on the other hand, according to American, British and Israeli experts, was five to ten years away from being able to build and use nuclear weapons.⁸⁰ It's unlikely that the president himself believed there was any such danger. His warning came only after a poll showed that a plurality of Americans felt that preventing Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons was the most persuasive argument for going to war.⁸¹

One factor not mentioned by Bush as a reason for the intervention, but which, in fact, probably played an important role, was the Pentagon's desire to make or strengthen agreements with Gulf-region countries for an ongoing US military presence; and considerable progress along these lines appears to have been made.⁸² General Schwarzkopf had earlier told Congress that “U.S. presence” in the Gulf is one of the three pillars of overall military strategy, along with security assistance and combined exercises, all of which lead to all-important “access”, which one can take as a euphemism for influence and control.⁸³ After the war, the existence of a network of military-communication-systems “superbases” in Saudi Arabia was revealed. Ten years in the building by the United States, in maximum secrecy, its cost of almost \$200 billion paid for by the Saudis, its use during the Gulf War indispensable, it may explain why Bush moved so quickly to defend Saudi Arabia, albeit against a non-existent threat.⁸⁴

“Stop me before I kill again!”

Josef Stalin studied for the priesthood ... Adolf Hitler was a vegetarian and anti-smoking ... Herman Goering, while his Luftwaffe rained death upon Europe, kept a sign in his office that read: “He who tortures animals wounds the feelings of the German people.” ... this fact Elie Wiesel called the greatest discovery of the war: that Adolf Eichmann was cultured, read deeply, played the violin ... Charles Manson was a staunch anti-vivisectionist ...

About Panama, as we have seen, after he ordered the bombing, George Bush said that his “heart goes out to the families who have died in Panama.” And when he was asked, “Was it really worth it to send people to their death for this? To get Noriega?” he replied, “... every human life is precious, and yet I have to answer, yes, it has been worth it.”

About Iraq, Bush said: “People say to me: ‘How many lives? How many lives can you expend?’ Each one is precious.”⁸⁵

Just before ordering the start of the war against Iraq in January, Bush prayed, as tears ran down his cheeks. “I think,” he later said, “that, like a lot of others who had positions of responsibility in sending someone else's kids to war, we realize that in prayer what mattered is how it might have seemed to God.”⁸⁶

God, one surmises, might have asked George Bush about the kids of Iraq. And the adults. And, in a testy, rather un-godlike manner, might have cracked: "So stop wasting all the precious lives already!"

Tanks pulling plows moved alongside trenches, firing into the Iraqi soldiers inside the trenches as the plows covered them with great mounds of sand. Thousands were buried, dead, wounded, or alive.⁸⁷

US forces fired on Iraqi soldiers after the Iraqis had raised white flags of surrender. The navy commander who gave the order to fire was not punished.⁸⁸

The bombing destroyed two operational nuclear reactors in Iraq. It was the first time ever that live reactors had been bombed, and may well have set a dangerous precedent. Hardly more than a month had passed since the United Nations, under whose mandate the United States was supposedly operating, had passed a resolution reaffirming its "prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities" in the Middle East.⁸⁹ Sundry chemical, including chemical warfare, facilities and alleged biological-warfare plants, were also targets of American bombs. General Schwarzkopf then announced that they had been very careful in selecting the means of destruction of these as well as the nuclear facilities, and only "after a lot of advice from a lot of very, very prominent scientists," and were "99.9 percent" certain that there was "no contamination".⁹⁰ However, European scientists and environmentalists detected traces of chemical-weapons agents that the bombings had released; as well as chemical fallout and toxic vapors, also released by the air attacks, that were killing scores of civilians.⁹¹

The American government and media had a lot of fun with an obvious piece of Iraqi propaganda—the claim that a bombed biological warfare facility had actually been a baby food factory. But it turned out that the government of New Zealand and various business people from there had had intimate contact with the factory and categorically confirmed that it had indeed been a baby food factory.⁹²

The United States also made wide use of advanced depleted uranium (DU) shells, rockets and missiles, leaving tons of radioactive and toxic rubble in Kuwait and Iraq. The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, in an April 1991 secret report, warned that "if DU gets in the food chain or water this will create potential health problems." The uranium-238 used to make the weapons can cause cancer and genetic defects if inhaled. Uranium is also chemically toxic, like lead. Inhalation causes heavy metal poisoning or kidney or lung damage. Iraqi soldiers, pinned down in their bunkers during assaults, were almost certainly poisoned by radioactive dust clouds.⁹³

The civilian population suffered in the extreme from the relentless bombing. Middle East Watch, the human-rights organization, has documented numerous instances of the bombing of apartment houses, crowded markets, bridges filled with pedestrians and civilian vehicles, and a busy central bus station, usually in broad daylight, without a government building or military target of any kind in sight, not even an anti-aircraft gun.⁹⁴

On 12 February, the Pentagon announced that "Virtually everything militarily ... is either destroyed or combat ineffective."⁹⁵ Yet the next day there was a deliberate bombardment of a civilian air raid shelter that took the lives of as many as 1,500 civilians, a great number of them women and children; this was followed by significant bombardment of various parts of Iraq on a daily basis for the remaining two weeks of the war, including what was reported for the 18th in *The Guardian* of London as "one of [the coalition's] most ferocious attacks on the centre of Baghdad."⁹⁶ What was the purpose of the bombing campaign after the 12th?

The United States said it thought that the shelter was for VIPs, which it had been at one time, and claimed that it was also being used as a military communications center, but neighborhood residents insisted that the constant aerial surveillance overhead had to observe the daily flow of women and children into the shelter.⁹⁷ Western reporters said they could find no signs of military use.⁹⁸

An American journalist in Jordan who viewed unedited videotape footage of the disaster, which the American public never saw, wrote:

They showed scenes of incredible carnage. Nearly all the bodies were charred into blackness; in some cases the heat had been so great that entire limbs were burned off. ... Rescue workers collapsed in grief, dropping corpses; some rescuers vomited from the stench of the still-smoldering bodies.⁹⁹

Said White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater after the bombing of the shelter: It was "a military target ... We don't know why civilians were at this location, but we do know that Saddam Hussein does not share our value in the sanctity of life."¹⁰⁰ Said George Bush, when criticized for the bombing campaign: "I am concerned about the suffering of innocents."¹⁰¹

The crippling of the electrical system multiplied geometrically the daily living horror of the people of Iraq. As a modern country, Iraq was reliant on electrical power for essential services such as water purification and distribution, sewage treatment, the operation of hospitals and medical laboratories, and agricultural production. Bomb damage, exacerbated by shortages attributable to the UN/US embargo, dropped electricity to three or four percent of its pre-war level; the water supply fell to five percent, oil production was negligible, the food distribution system was devastated, the sewage system collapsed, flooding houses with raw sewage, and gastroenteritis and extreme malnutrition were prevalent.¹⁰²

Two months after the war ended, a public health team from Harvard University visited health facilities in several Iraqi cities. Based on their research, the group projected, conservatively, that "at least 170,000 children under five years of age will die in the coming year from the delayed effects" of the destruction of electrical power, fuel and transportation; "a large increase in deaths among the rest of the population is also likely. The immediate cause of death in most cases will be water-borne infectious disease in combination with severe malnutrition."¹⁰³ One member of both the Harvard group and a later research group which visited Iraq testified before Congress that "Children play in the raw sewage which is backed up in the streets ... Two world renowned child psychologists stated that the children in Iraq were 'the most traumatized children of war ever described'."¹⁰⁴

Despite repeated statements by American authorities about taking the greatest of care to hit only military targets, using "smart bombs" and laser-guided bombs, and "surgical strikes", we now know that this was little more than an exercise in propaganda, just as referring to this suffering as "collateral damage" was. After the war, the Pentagon admitted that non-military facilities had been extensively targeted for political reasons.¹⁰⁵ Comprehensive post-World War II government studies had concluded that "the dread of disease and the hardships imposed by the lack of sanitary facilities were bound to have a demoralizing effect upon the civilian population", and that there was a "reliable and striking" correlation between the disruption of public utilities and the willingness of the German population to accept unconditional surrender.¹⁰⁶

In the Iraqi case there was a further motivation: to encourage desperate citizens to rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein. Said a US Air Force planner:

Big picture, we wanted to let people know, "Get rid of this guy and we'll be more than happy to assist in rebuilding. We're not going to tolerate Saddam Hussein or his regime. Fix that, and we'll fix your electricity."¹⁰⁷

Those who tried to escape the bombing horror in Iraq by fleeing to Jordan were subjected to air attacks on the highway between Baghdad and the Jordanian border—buses, taxis, and private cars were repeatedly assaulted, literally without mercy, by rockets, cluster bombs and machine guns; usually in broad daylight, the targets clearly civilian, with luggage piled on top, with no military vehicles or structures anywhere to be seen, surrounded by open desert, the attacking planes flying extremely close to the ground ... busloads of passengers incinerated, and when people left the vehicles and fled for their lives, planes often swooped down upon them firing away. ... "You're killing us!" cried a Jordanian taxi driver to an American reporter. "You're shooting us everywhere we move! Whenever they see a car or truck, the planes dive out of the sky and chase us. They don't care who we are or what we are. They just shoot." His cry was repeated by hundreds of others. ... The US military, it appears, felt that any vehicle, including those filled with families, might be a cover for carrying military fuel or other war materiel, some perhaps related to Scud missiles; and even carrying civilian fuel was a violation of the embargo.¹⁰⁸

At the very end, when the hungry, wounded, sick, exhausted, disoriented, demoralized, ragged, sometimes barefoot Iraqi army, which had scarcely shown any desire to fight, left Kuwait and headed toward Basra in southern Iraq, Saddam tried to salvage a pathetic scrap of dignity by announcing that his army was withdrawing because of "special circumstances". But even this was too much for George Bush to grant. "Saddam's most recent speech is an outrage," declared the president, forcefully. "He is not withdrawing. His defeated forces are retreating. He is trying to claim victory in the midst of a rout."

This could not be permitted. Thus it was that American air power in all its majesty swept down upon the road to Basra, bombing, rocketing, strafing everything that moved in the long column of Iraqi military and civilian vehicles, troops and refugees. The nice, god-fearing, wholesome American GIs, soon to be welcomed as heroes at home, had a ball ... "we toasted him" ... "we hit the jackpot" ... "a turkey shoot" ... "This morning was bumper-to-bumper. It was the road to Daytona Beach at spring break ... and spring break's over."

Again and again, as loudspeakers on the carrier Ranger blared Rossini's "William Tell Overture", the rousing theme song of the Lone Ranger, one strike force after another took off with their load of missiles and anti-tank and anti-personnel Rockete cluster bombs, which explode into a deadly rain of armor-piercing bomblets; land-based B-52s joined in with 1000-pound bombs. ... "It's not going to take too many more days until there's nothing left of them." ... "shooting fish in a barrel" ... "basically just sitting ducks" ... "There's just nothing like it. It's the biggest Fourth of July show you've ever seen, and to see those tanks just 'boom' and more stuff just keeps spewing out of them ... they just become white hot. It's wonderful."

The British daily, *The Independent*, although it supported the war, denounced the glee with which the Americans carried out the barrage, saying it "turned the stromachs" and was "stickenen to witness a routed army being shot in the back".¹⁰⁹

A BBC Radio reporter summed up the attack by asking: "What threat could these pathetic remnants of Saddam Hussein's beaten army have posed? Wasn't it obvious that the people of the convoy would have given themselves up willingly without the application of such ferocious weaponry?"¹¹⁰

And all this against a foe that had for five days been calling for a cease-fire. But heaven forbid that the Americans should offend any of the people of the Gulf. Thus it

was that GIs were taught things like never to use their left hand when offering food or drink, for that hand is traditionally reserved for sanitary functions; and the proper way to beckon an Arab with one's hand and fingers, so as not to confuse it with beckoning a dog.¹¹¹

We also have the story of the American pilot who, during an earlier bombing operation, stuffed into his identification packet a \$20 bill and a note written in Arabic, Farsi, Turkish and English. It said: "I am an American and do not speak your language. I bear no malice toward your people." Then he was off, roaring through the skies toward Iraq with his payload of bombs.¹¹²

Did the GIs bear any malice toward their female soldiers-in-arms? One post-war study found that more than half the women who served in the Gulf War felt that they had been sexually harassed verbally, while eight percent (almost 3,000) had been the objects of attempted or completed sexual assaults.¹¹³

And immediately after George Bush ordered the bombing to begin, his rating with the American people jumped for joy: an 82 percent approval rating, the highest ever in his two years in office, higher even than after his invasion of Panama.¹¹⁴ One journalist later noted:

One minute of nightly truth on this "popular" war would have changed American public opinion. ... if for just 60 seconds the 6 o'clock Monday news had shown 5,000 Iraqi soldiers with hideous phosphorous burns that alter human anatomy followed by 60 seconds Tuesday night of the slaughter at the Baghdad bomb shelter ... What if on Wednesday Americans had seen 10,000 Iraqi soldiers incinerated by American high-tech weapons?¹¹⁵

Ever since the Iraqi invasion in August, and despite the many confusing soundbites and heavy rhetoric emanating from the White House, one thing seemed clear enough: if Iraq agreed to withdraw from Kuwait, military attacks against it would not take place, or would cease, whatever other punishment or sanctions might continue. Thus, it seemed like a ray of hope, however late, when the Soviet Union succeeded on 21-22 February 1991 in getting Iraq to agree to withdraw completely the day after a cease-fire of all military operations went into effect. The agreement came with specified timetables and monitoring.¹¹⁶

George Bush refused to offer a cease-fire, per se. He could not even bring himself to mention the word in his replies. All he would say was that the retreating Iraqi forces would not be attacked (which turned out to be untrue), and that the coalition "will exercise restraint." Saddam could have chosen to take this as the cease-fire, but he was as proud and stubborn as George.

The point Bush emphasized the most during these two crucial days, as well as earlier, was that Iraq must comply with all 12 UN resolutions. In evaluating Bush's legalistic demands, it should be kept in mind that the policy and practice of the American war had repeatedly violated the letter and the spirit of the United Nations Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions, the Nuremberg Tribunal, the protocols of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the US Constitution, amongst other cherished documents.¹¹⁷

In the end, Bush gave Saddam 24 hours to begin withdrawing from Kuwait, period. When the time came and went, the United States launched the long-expected ground war, while the aerial attacks—including the carnage on the road to Basra—continued until the end of the month.

Said Vitaly Ignatenko, a spokesman for Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev: "It seems that President Gorbachev cares more about saving the lives of American soldiers than George Bush does."¹¹⁸

KILLING HOPE

In a postwar survey, a United Nations inspection team declared that the allied bombardment had had a "near apocalyptic impact" on Iraq and had transformed the country into a "pre-industrial age nation" which "had been until January a rather highly urbanized and mechanized society."¹¹⁹

It will never be known how many hundreds of thousands of Iraqis died from the direct and indirect effects of the war; the count is added to every day. With the United States refusing to end the embargo against Iraq, everything has continued: malnutrition, starvation, lack of medicines and vaccines, contaminated drinking water, human excrement piling up, typhoid, a near-epidemic of measles, several other diseases ... Iraq's food supply had been 70 percent dependent on imports, now billions of dollars were frozen in overseas accounts, and with prohibitive restrictions on selling its oil ... an inability to rebuild because vital parts could not be imported, industry closing its doors, mass unemployment, transportation and communications broken down¹²⁰ ... By September 1994, with the US government still refusing to release its death grip on the embargo, still hoping that the suffering would reach critical mass and the Iraqi people would overthrow Saddam, the Iraqi government announced that since the sanctions had begun in August 1990 about 400,000 children had died of malnutrition and disease.¹²¹

After the war, when the Iraqi government was repressing a Kurdish revolt—which the US had encouraged, then failed to support—Bush said: "I feel frustrated any time innocent civilians are being slaughtered."¹²²

This was the second time the United States had led the Kurdish lambs to slaughter with a broken commitment. (See Iraq 1972-75 chapter.)

The United States had also encouraged the Shiite Muslims in Iraq to rebel, then did not back them, presumably because Washington only wanted to drive Saddam up the wall some more, make him irrational enough to incite a coup against him; but Washington was not looking to foster a pro-Iranian regime and inspire Muslim fundamentalists elsewhere in the Middle East.

American mental hospitals and prisons are home to many people who claim to have heard a voice telling them to kill certain people, people they'd never met before, people who'd never done them any harm, or threatened any harm.

American soldiers went to the Persian Gulf to kill the same kind of people after hearing a voice command them: the voice of George Herbert Walker Bush.

53. Afghanistan 1979-1992

America's *Jihad*

His followers first gained attention by throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil. CIA and State Department officials I have spoken with call him "scary," "vicious," "a fascist," "definite dictatorship material".¹

This did not prevent the United States government from showering the man with large amounts of aid to fight against the Soviet-supported government of Afghanistan. His name was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He was the head of the Islamic Party and he hated the United

U.S. Foreign Policy

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148. "The 'Diplomatic Scene,' in brief, as of May 8, 1999."
149. "Summarizing the Case Against the Bombing [of Kosovo]."
150. "The NATO Military Operation Against Kosovo, by Malcolm Fraser."

The crisis we are facing today does not require of us the kind of sacrifice that Martin Treptow and so many thousands of others were called upon to make. It does require, however, our best effort and our willingness to believe in ourselves and to believe in our capacity to perform great deeds, to believe that together with God's help we can and will resolve the problems which now confront us.

And after all, why shouldn't we believe that? We are Americans.

God bless you, and thank you.

9 BILL CLINTON'S INAUGURAL ADDRESS (1993)

My fellow citizens: Today, we celebrate the mystery of American renewal.

This ceremony is held in the depth of winter. But, by the words we speak and the faces we show the world, we force the spring — a spring reborn in the world's oldest democracy, that brings forth the vision and courage to reinvent America.

When our founders boldly declared America's independence to the world and our purposes to the Almighty, they knew that America, to endure, would have to change; not change for change's sake, but change to preserve America's ideals — life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. Though we march to the music of our time, our mission is timeless.

Each generation of Americans must define what it means to be an American.

On behalf of our nation, I salute my predecessor, President Bush, for his half-century of service to America, and I thank the millions of men and women whose steadfastness and sacrifice triumphed over depression, fascism, and communism.

Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom, but threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues.

Raised in unrivaled prosperity, we inherit an economy that is still the world's strongest, but is weakened by business failures, stagnant wages, increasing inequality and deep divisions among our own people.

When George Washington first took the oath I have just sworn to uphold, news traveled slowly across the land by horseback and across the oceans by boat. Now, the sights and sounds of this ceremony are broadcast instantaneously to billions around the world.

Communications and commerce are global; investment is mobile; technology is almost magical; and ambition for a better life is now universal. We earn our livelihood in America today in peaceful competition with people all across the earth.

Profound and powerful forces are shaking and remaking our world, and the urgent question of our time is whether we can make change our friend and not our enemy.

This new world has already enriched the lives of millions of Americans who are able to compete and win in it. But when most people are working harder for less, when others cannot work at all, when the cost of health care devastates families and threatens to bankrupt our enterprises, great and small, when the fear of crime robs law-abiding citizens of their freedom and when millions of poor children cannot even imagine the lives we are calling them to lead, we have not made change our friend.

We know we have to face hard truths and take strong steps. But we have not done so. Instead, we have drifted, and that drifting has eroded our resources, fractured our economy, and shaken our confidence.

Though our challenges are fearsome, so are our strengths. Americans have ever been a restless, questing, hopeful people. And we must bring to our task today the vision and will of those who came before us.

From our revolution to the Civil War, to the Great Depression, to the civil rights movement, our people have always mustered the determination to construct from these crises the pillars of our history.

Thomas Jefferson believed that to preserve the very foundations of our nation, we would need dramatic change from time to time. My fellow Americans, this is our time. Let us embrace it.

Our democracy must be not only the envy of the world but the engine of our own renewal. There is nothing wrong with America that cannot be cured by what is right with America.

So today, we pledge an end to the era of deadlock and drift, and a new season of American renewal has begun.

To renew America, we must be bold.

We must do what no generation has had to do before. We must invest more in our own people, in their jobs and in their future, and at the same time cut our massive debt. And we must do so in a world in which we must compete for every opportunity.

It will not be easy; it will require sacrifice. But it can be done, and done fairly. Not choosing sacrifice for its own sake, but for our own sake, we must provide for our nation the way a family provides for its children.

Our founders saw themselves in the light of posterity. We can do no less. Anyone who has ever watched a child's eyes wander into sleep knows what posterity is. Posterity is the world to come — the world for whom we hold our ideals, from whom we have borrowed our planet, and to whom we bear sacred responsibility.

We must do what America does best: offer more opportunity to all and demand more responsibility from all.

It is time to break the bad habit of expecting something for nothing, from our government or from each other. Let us all take more responsibility, not only for ourselves and our families but for our communities and our country.

To renew America, we must revitalize our democracy.

This beautiful capital, like every capital since the dawn of civilization, is often a place of intrigue and calculation. Powerful people maneuver for position and worry endlessly about who is in and who is out, who is up and who is down, forgetting those people whose toil and sweat sends us here and pays our way.

Americans deserve better. In this city today, there are people who want to do better. And so I say to all of you here, let us resolve to reform our politics, so that power and privilege no longer shout down the voice of the people. Let us put aside personal advantages so that we can feel the pain and see the promise of America.

Let us resolve to make our government a place for what Franklin Roosevelt called 'bold, persistent experimentation', a government for our tomorrows, not our yesterdays.

Let us give this capital back to the people to whom it belongs.

To renew America, we must meet challenges abroad as well as at home. There is no longer a clear division between what is foreign and what is domestic — the world economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms race, they affect us all.

Today, as an old order passes, the new world is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse has called forth old animosities and new dangers. Clearly America must continue to lead the world we did so much to make.

While America rebuilds at home, we will not shrink from the challenges, nor fail to seize the opportunities, of this new world. Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape change, lest it engulf us.

When our vital interests are challenged or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act — with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary. The brave Americans serving our nation today in the Persian Gulf, in Somalia, and wherever else they stand are testament to our resolve.

But our greatest strength is the power of our ideas, which are still new in many lands. Across the world, we see them embraced and we rejoice. Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause.

The American people have summoned the change we celebrate today. You have raised your voices in an unmistakable chorus. You have cast your votes in historic numbers. And you have changed the face of Congress, the presidency, and the political process itself.

Yes, you, my fellow Americans, have forced the spring.

Now, we must do the work the season demands.

To that work I now turn, with all the authority of my office. I ask the Congress to join with me. But no President, no Congress, no government, can undertake this mission alone.

My fellow Americans, you, too, must play your part in our renewal.

I challenge a new generation of young Americans to a season of service — to act on your idealism by helping troubled children, keeping company with those in need, reconnecting our torn communities. There is so much to be done — enough indeed for millions of others who are still young in spirit to give of themselves in service, too.

In serving, we recognize a simple but powerful truth: We need each other. And we must care for one another.

Today, we do more than celebrate America; we rededicate ourselves to the very idea of America:

- An idea born in revolution and renewed through two centuries of challenge;
- An idea tempered by the knowledge that, but for fate, we — the fortunate and the unfortunate — might have been each other;
- An idea ennobled by the faith that our nation can summon from its myriad diversity the deepest measure of unity;
- An idea infused with the conviction that America's long heroic journey must go forever upward.

And so, my fellow Americans, as we stand at the edge of the 21st Century, let us begin anew with energy and hope, with faith and discipline, and let us work until our work is done. The scripture says, 'And let us not be weary in well-doing, for in due season, we shall reap, if we faint not.'

From this joyful mountain top of celebration, we hear a call to service in the valley.

We have heard the trumpets. We have changed the guard. And now — each in our own way, and with God's help — we must answer the call.

Thank you and God bless you all.

perity in America may bring with it some difficulties; if recovery means a reopening of the cost-push problem, then we have no choice but to move closer to the day when that problem has to be successfully grappled with. Economic statesmanship does involve difficult compromises, but not capitulation to any one of the pluralistic goals of modern society.

Running a deliberately slack economy in order to put off the day when such doubts about inflation can be tested is not a policy open to a responsible democratic government in this decade of perilous world crisis. A policy of inaction can be as truly a policy of living dangerously as one of overaction. Far from averting deterioration of our international position, a program that tolerates stagnation in the American economy can prevent us from making those improvements in our industrial productivity that are so desperately needed if we are to remain competitive in the international markets of the world.

History reminds us that even in the worst days of the Great Depression there was never a shortage of experts to warn against all curative public actions, on the ground that they were likely to create a problem of inflation. Had this counsel prevailed here, as it did in pre-Hitler Germany, the very existence of our form of government could be at stake. No modern government will make that mistake again.

[...]

11 PRESIDENT CLINTON'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROGRAM (1993)

President Clinton came to power after a successful campaign which emphasized the need to address America's domestic economic problems, in contrast to the perceived preoccupation with foreign policy which characterized the Bush Administration. At the American University in Washington, DC on 26 February 1993 President Clinton outlined an economic programme which placed domestic economic well-being and security in its international context. The speech proposes a five-year plan of action in relation to the domestic and global economy. It remains to be seen how successful this plan will be.

[...]

Over the past year, I have tried to speak at some length about what we must do to update our definition of national security and to promote it and to protect it — and to foster democracy and human rights around the world. Today, I want to allude to those matters, but to focus on the economic leadership we must exert at home and abroad as a new global economy unfolds before our eyes.

Twice before in this century, history has asked the United States and other great powers to provide leadership for a world ravaged by war. After World War I, that call went unheeded. Britain was too weakened to lead the world to reconstruction. The United States was too unwilling. The great powers together turned inward as violent, totalitarian power emerged. We raised trade barriers. We sought to humiliate rather than rehabilitate the vanquished. And the result was instability, inflation, then depression and ultimately a second World War.

After the second war, we refused to let history repeat itself. Led by a great American President, Harry Truman, a man of very common roots but uncommon vision, we drew together with other Western powers to reshape a new era. We established NATO to oppose the aggression of communism. We rebuilt the American economy with investments like the GI Bill and a national highway system. We carried out the Marshall Plan to rebuild war-ravaged nations abroad. General MacArthur's vision prevailed in Japan, which built a massive economy and a remarkable democracy. We built new institutions to foster peace and prosperity — the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and more.

These actions helped to usher in four decades of robust economic growth and collective security. Yet the Cold War was a draining time. We devoted trillions of dollars to it, much more than many of our more visionary leaders thought we should have. We posted our sons and daughters around the world. We lost tens of thousands of them in the defense of freedom and in the pursuit of a containment of communism.

We, my generation, grew up going to school assemblies, learning about what we would do in the event a nuclear war broke out. We were taught to practice ducking under our desks and praying that somehow they might shield us from nuclear radiation. We all learned about whether we needed a bomb shelter in our neighborhood to which we could run in the event that two great superpowers rained nuclear weapons on one another. And that fate, frankly, seemed still frighteningly possible just months before President Kennedy came here to speak in 1963. Now, thanks to his leadership and that of every American president since the Second World War from Harry Truman to George Bush, the Cold War is over.

The Soviet Union itself has disintegrated. The nuclear shadow is receding in the face of the START I and START II agreements, and others that we have made and others yet to come. Democracy is on the march everywhere in the world. It is a new day and a great moment for America.

Yet, across America I hear people raising central questions about our place and our prospects in this new world we have done so much to make. They ask: Will we and our children really have good jobs, first-class opportunities, world-class education, quality affordable health care, safe streets? After having fully defended freedom's ramparts, they want to know if we will share in freedom's bounty.

One of the young public school students President Duffey just introduced was part of the children's program that I did last Saturday with children from around America. If you saw their stories, so many of them raised troubling questions about our capacity to guarantee the fruits of the American Dream to all of our own people.

I believe we can do that, and I believe we must. For in a new global economy, still recovering from the after-effects of the Cold War, a prosperous America is not only good for Americans, as the prime minister of Great Britain reminded me just a couple of days ago, it is absolutely essential for the prosperity of the rest of the world.

Washington can no longer remain caught in the death grip of gridlock, governed by an outmoded ideology that says change is to be resisted, the status quo is to be preserved like King Canute ordering the tide to recede. We cannot do that. And so, my fellow Americans, I submit to you that we stand at the third great moment of decision in the 20th century. Will we repeat the mistakes of the 1920s or the 1930s by turning inward, or will we repeat the successes of the 1940s and the 1950s by reaching outward and improving ourselves as well? I say that if we set a new direction at home, we can set a new direction for the world as well.

The change confronting us in the 1990s is in some ways more difficult than previous times because it is less distinct. It is more complex and in some ways the path is less clear to most of our people still today, even after 20 years of declining relative productivity and a decade or more of stagnant wages and greater effort.

The world clearly remains a dangerous place. Ethnic hatreds, religious strife, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the violation of human rights flagrantly in altogether too many places around the world still call on us to have a sense of national security in which our national defense is an integral part. And the world still calls on us to promote democracy, for even though democracy is on the march in many places in the world, you and I know that it has been thwarted in many places, too. And yet we still face, overarching everything else, this amorphous but profound challenge in the way humankind conducts its commerce.

We cannot let these changes in the global economy carry us passively toward a future of insecurity and instability. For change is the law of life. Whether you like it or not, the world will change much more rapidly in your lifetime than it has in mine.

It is absolutely astonishing the speed with which the sheer volume of knowledge in the world is doubling every few years. And a critical issue before us, and especially before the young people here in this audience, is whether you will grow up in a world where change is your friend or your enemy.

We must challenge the changes now engulfing our world toward America's enduring objectives of peace and prosperity, of democracy and human dignity. And we must work to do it at home and abroad. It is important to

understand the monumental scope of these changes. When I was growing up, business was mostly a local affair. Most farms and firms were owned locally, they borrowed locally, they hired locally, they shipped most of their products to neighboring communities or states within the United States. It was the same for the country as a whole. By and large, we had a domestic economy.

But now we are woven inextricably into the fabric of a global economy. Imports and exports, which accounted for about one in ten dollars when I was growing up, now represent one dollar in every five. Nearly three-quarters of the things that we make in America are subject to competition at home or abroad from foreign producers and foreign providers of services. Whether we see it or not, our daily lives are touched everywhere by the flows of commerce that cross national borders as inexorably as the weather.

Capital clearly has become global. Some 3,000,000 million dollars of capital race around the world every day. And when a firm wants to build a new factory, it can turn to financial markets now open 24 hours a day, from London to Tokyo, from New York to Singapore. Products have clearly become more global. Now, if you buy an American car, it may be an American car built with some parts from Taiwan, designed by Germans, sold with British-made advertisements, or a combination of others in a different mix.

Services have become global. The accounting firm that keeps the books for a small business in Wichita may also be helping new entrepreneurs in Warsaw. And the same fast food restaurant that your family goes to — or at least that I go to — also may well be serving families from Manila to Moscow, and managing its business globally with information, technologies, and satellites.

And most important of all, information has become global and has become king of the global economy. In earlier history, wealth was measured in land, in gold, in oil, in machines. Today, the principal measure of our wealth is information — its quality, its quantity, and the speed with which we acquire it and adapt to it. We need, more than anything else to measure our wealth and our potential by what we know and what we can learn, and what we can do with it. The value and volume of information has soared; the half-life of new ideas has trumped.

Just a few days ago, I was out in Silicon Valley at a remarkable company called Silicon Graphics that has expanded exponentially, partly by developing computer software with a life of 12 months to 18 months, knowing that it will be obsolete after that, and always being ready with a new product to replace it.

We are in a constant race toward innovation that will not end in the lifetime of anyone in this room. What all this means is that the best investment we can make today is in the one resource firmly rooted in our own borders. That is, in the education, the skills, the reasoning capacity and the creativity of our own people.

For all the adventure and opportunity in this global economy, an American cannot approach it without mixed feelings. We still sometimes wish wistfully that everything we really want, particularly those things that produce good wages, could be made in America. We recall simpler times when one product line would be made to endure and last for years. We're angry when we see jobs and factories moving overseas or across the borders or depressing wages here at home when we think there is nothing we can do about it. We worry about our own prosperity being so dependent on events and forces beyond our shores. Could it be that the world's most powerful nation has also given up a significant measure of its sovereignty in the quest to lift the fortunes of people throughout the world?

It is ironic and even painful that the global village we have worked so hard to create has done so much to be the source of higher unemployment and lower wages for some of our people. But that is no wonder. For years our leaders have failed to take the steps that would harness the global economy to the benefit of all of our people. Steps such as investing in our people and their skills, enforcing our trade laws, helping communities hurt by change — in short, putting the American people first without withdrawing from the world and people beyond our borders.

The truth of our age is this — and must be this: Open and competitive commerce will enrich us as a nation. It spurs us to innovate. It forces us to compete. It connects us with new customers. It promotes global growth without which no rich country can hope to grow wealthier. It enables our producers, who are themselves consumers of services and raw materials, to prosper.

And so I say to you in the face of all the pressures to do the reverse, we must compete, not retreat.

Our exports are especially important to us. As bad as the recent recession was, it would have gone on for twice as long had it not been for what we were able to sell to other nations. Every billion dollars of our exports creates nearly 20,000 jobs here, and we now have over seven million export-related jobs in America. They tend to involve better work and better pay. Most are in manufacturing and, on average, they pay almost \$3,500 more per year than the average American job. They are exactly the kind of jobs we need for a new generation of Americans.

American jobs and prosperity are reason enough for us to be working at mastering the essentials of the global economy. But far more is at stake. For this new fabric of commerce will also shape global prosperity or the lack of it, and with it, the prospects of people around the world for democracy, freedom and peace.

We must remember that even with all our problems today, the United States is still the world's strongest engine of growth and progress. We remain the world's largest producer and its largest and most open market. Other nations, such as Germany and Japan, are moving rapidly. They have done better than we have in certain areas. We should respect them for it, and

where appropriate, we should learn from that. But we must also say to them, you, too, must act as engines of global prosperity.

Nonetheless, the fact is that for now and for the foreseeable future, the world looks to us to be the engine of global growth and to be the leaders.

Our leadership is especially important for the world's new and emerging democracies. To grow and deepen their legitimacy, to foster a middle class and a civic culture, they need the ability to tap into a growing global economy. And our security and our prosperity will be greatly affected in the years ahead by how many of these nations can become and stay democracies.

All you have to do to know that is to look at the problems in Somalia, to look at Bosnia, to look at the other trouble spots in the world. If we could make a garden of democracy and prosperity and free enterprise in every part of this globe, the world would be a safer and a better and a more prosperous place for the United States and for all of you to raise your children in.

Let us not minimize the difficulty of this task. Democracy's prospects are dimmed, especially in the developing world by trade barriers and slow global growth. Even though 60 developing nations have reduced their trade barriers in recent years, when you add up the sum of their collective actions, 20 of the 24 developed nations have actually increased their trade barriers in recent years. This is a powerful testament to the painful difficulty of trying to maintain a high-wage economy in a global economy where production is mobile and can quickly fly to a place with low wages.

We have got to focus on how to help our people adapt to these changes, how to maintain a high-wage economy in the United States without ourselves adding to the protectionist direction that so many of the developed nations have taken in the last few years. These barriers in the end will cost the developing world more in lost exports and incomes than all the foreign assistance that developed nations provide, but after that they will begin to undermine our economic prosperity as well.

It's more than a matter of incomes, I remind you — it's a matter of culture and stability. Trade, of course, cannot ensure the survival of new democracies, and we have seen the enduring power of ethnic hatred, the incredible power of ethnic divisions — even among people literate and allegedly understanding — to splinter democracy and to savage the nation state.

But, as philosophers from Thucydides to Adam Smith have noted, the habits of commerce run counter to the habits of war. Just as neighbors who raise each other's barns are less likely to become arsonists, people who raise each other's living standards through commerce are less likely to become combatants. So if we believe in the bonds of democracy, we must resolve to strengthen the bonds of commerce.

Our own nation has the greatest potential to benefit from the emerging economy, but to do so we have to confront the obstacles that stand in our

way. Many of our trading partners cling to unfair practices. Protectionist voices here at home and abroad call for new barriers. Indifferent policies have left too many of our workers and communities exposed to the harsh winds of trade without letting them share in the sheltering prosperity trade has also brought, and without helping them in any way to build new ways to work so they can be rewarded for their efforts in global commerce.

Cooperation among the major powers toward world growth is not working well at all today. And most of all, we simply haven't done enough to prepare our own people and to produce our own resources so that we can face with success the rigors of the new world. We can change all that if we have the will to do it. Leonardo da Vinci said that God sells all things at the price of labor. Our labor must be to make this change.

I believe there are five steps we can and must take to set a new direction at home and to help create a new direction for the world. First, we simply have to get our own economic house in order. I have outlined a new national economic strategy that will give America the new direction we require to meet our challenges. It seeks to do what no generation of Americans has ever been called upon to do before: to increase investment in our productive future, and to reduce our deficit at the same time.

We must do both. A plan that only plays down the deficit without investing in those things that make us more productive will not make us stronger. A plan that only invests more money without bringing down the deficit will weaken the fabric of our overall economy such that even educated and productive people cannot succeed in it.

It is more difficult to do both. The challenges are more abrasive — you have to cut more other spending and raise more other taxes. But it is essential that we do both — invest so that we can compete; bring down the debt so that we can compete. The future of the American dream and the fate of our economy and much of the world's economy hangs in the balance on what happens in this city in the next few months.

Already the voices of inertia and self-interest have said, well, we shouldn't do this or this or that detail is wrong with that plan. But almost no one has taken up my original challenge that anyone who has any specific ideas about how we can cut more should simply come forward with them. I am genuinely open to new ideas to cut inessential spending and to make the kinds of dramatic changes in the way government works that all of us know we have to make. I don't care whether they come from Republicans or Democrats or I don't even care whether they come from home or abroad. I don't care who gets the credit, but I do care that we not vary from our determination to pass a plan that increases investment and reduces the deficit.

I think every one of you who is a student at this university has a far bigger stake in the future than I do. I have lived in all probability more than half my life with benefits far beyond anything I ever dreamed or deserve because my country worked. And I want my country to work for you.

The plan I have offered is assuredly not perfect, but it is an honest and bold attempt to honestly confront the challenges before us, to secure the foundations of our economic growth, to expand the resources, the confidence and the moral suasion we need to continue our global leadership into the next century.

And I plead with all of you to do everything you can to replace the blame game that has dominated this city too long with the bigger game of competing and winning in the global economy.

Second, it is time for us to make trade a priority element of American security. For too long, debates over trade have been dominated by voices from the extremes. One says government should build walls to protect firms from competition. Another says government should do nothing in the face of foreign competition, no matter what the dimension and shape of that competition is, no matter what the consequences are in terms of job losses, trade dislocations, or crushed incomes.

Neither view takes on the hard work of creating a more open trading system that enables us and our trading partners to prosper. Neither steps up to the task of empowering our workers to compete or of ensuring that there is some compact of shared responsibility regarding trade's impact on our people, or of guaranteeing a continuous flow of investment into emerging areas of new technology which will create the high-wage jobs of the 21st century.

Our administration is now developing a comprehensive trade policy that will step up to those challenges. And I want to describe the principles upon which it will rest. It will not be a policy of blame, but one of responsibility. It will say to our trading partners that we value their business, but none of us should expect something for nothing.

We will continue to welcome foreign products and services into our markets, but insist that our products and services be able to enter theirs on equal terms. We will welcome foreign investment in our businesses knowing that with it come new ideas as well as capital — new technologies, new management techniques and new opportunities for us to learn from one another and grow. But as we welcome that investment, we insist that our investors should be equally welcome in other countries.

We welcome the subsidiaries of foreign companies on our soil. We appreciate the jobs they create and the products and services they bring. But we do insist simply that they pay the same taxes on the same income that our companies do for doing the same business.

Our trade policy will be part of an integrated economic program, not just something we use to compensate for the lack of a domestic agenda. We must enforce our trade laws and our agreements with all the tools and energy at our disposal. But there is much about our competitive posture that simply cannot be straightened out by trade retaliation. Better-educated and trained workers, a lower deficit, stable, low interest rates, a reformed health care system, world-class technologies, revived cities: these must be the steel of our competitive edge. And there must be a continuing quest by business

and labor and, yes, by government for higher and higher and higher levels of productivity.

Too many of the chains that have hobbled us in world trade have been made in America. Our trade policy will also bypass the distracting debates over whether efforts should be multilateral, regional, bilateral, unilateral. The fact is that each of these efforts has its place. Certainly we need to seek to open other nations' markets and to establish clear and enforceable rules on which to expand trade.

That is why I'm committed to a prompt and successful completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT talks. That round has dragged on entirely too long. But it still holds the potential, if other nations do their share and we do ours to boost American wages and living standards significantly and to do the same for other nations around the world.

We also know that regional and bilateral agreements provide opportunities to explore new kinds of trade concerns, such as how trade relates to policies affecting the environment and labor standards and the antitrust laws. And these agreements, once concluded, can act as a magnet including other countries to drop barriers and to open their trading systems.

The North American Free Trade Agreement is a good example. It began as an agreement with Canada, which I strongly supported, which has now led to a pact with Mexico as well. That agreement holds the potential to create many, many jobs in America over the next decade if it is joined with others to ensure that the environment, that living standards, that working conditions, are honored — that we can literally know that we are going to raise the condition of people in America and in Mexico. We have a vested interest in a wealthier, stronger Mexico, but we need to do it on terms that are good for our people.

And we should work with organizations, such as the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, to liberalize our trade across the Pacific as well.

And let me say just a moment about this. I am proud of the contribution America has made to prosperity in Asia and to the march of democracy. I have seen it in Japan after World War II. I have seen it, then, in Taiwan as a country became more progressive and less repressive at the same time. I have seen it in Korea as a country has become more progressive and more open. And we are now making a major contribution to the astonishing revitalization of the Chinese economy, now growing at 10 percent a year, with the United States buying a huge percentage of those imports. And I say, I want to continue that partnership, but I also think we have a right to expect progress in human rights and democracy and should support that progress.

Third, it is time for us to do our best to exercise leadership among the major financial powers to improve our coordination on behalf of global economic growth. At a time when capital is mobile and highly fungible, we simply cannot afford to work at cross-purposes with the other major industrial democracies. Our major partners must work harder and more closely with

us to reduce interest rates, stimulate investment, reduce structural barriers to trade and to restore robust global growth. And we must look anew at institutions we use to chart our way in the global economy and ask whether they are serving our interests in this new world, or whether we need to modify them or create others.

Tomorrow, our Treasury secretary, Secretary Bentsen, and the Federal Reserve Board chairman, Alan Greenspan, will meet with their counterparts from these Group of Seven nations to begin that work. And I look forward to meeting with the G-7 heads of state and the representatives of the European Community at our Tokyo Summit in July. I am especially hopeful that by then our economic package here at home will have been substantially enacted by the Congress. And if that is so, I will be able to say to my counterparts, you have been telling us for years that America must reduce its debt and put its own house in order. You have been saying to us for years we must increase investment in our own education and technology to improve productivity. We have done it. We have done it for ourselves, we have done it for you, now you must work with us in Germany and Japan and other nations to promote global growth.

We have to work with these nations. None of us are very good at it. America doesn't want to give up its prerogatives. The Japanese don't want to give up theirs. The Germans don't want to give up theirs. There are deep and ingrained traditions in all these nations. But the fact is that the world can't grow if America is in recession, but it will be difficult for us to grow coming out of this recovery unless we can spark a renewed round of growth in Europe and in Japan. We have got to try to work more closely together.

Fourthly, we need to promote the steady expansion of growth in the developing world, not only because it's in our interests, but because it will help them as well. These nations are a rapidly expanding market for our products — some three million American jobs flow from exports to the developing world. Indeed, because of unilateral actions taken by Mexico over the last few years, the volume of our trade has increased dramatically, and our trade deficit has disappeared.

Our ability to protect the global environment and our ability to combat the flow of illegal narcotics also rests in large measure on the relationships we develop commercially with the developing world.

There is a great deal that we can do to open the flow of goods and services. Our aid policies must do more to address population pressures; to support environmentally responsible, sustainable development; to promote more accountable government — and to foster a fair distribution of the fruits of growth among an increasingly restive world population — where over 1,000 million people still exist on barely a dollar a day. These efforts will reap us dividends of trade, of friendship and peace.

The final step we must take, my fellow Americans, is toward the success of democracy in Russia and in the world's other new democracies. The perils facing Russia and other former Soviet republics are especially acute and

especially important to our future. For the reductions in our defense spending that are an important part of our economic program over the long run here at home are only tenable as long as Russia and the other nuclear republics pose a diminishing threat to our security and to the security of our allies and the democracies throughout the world. Most worrisome is Russia's precarious economic condition. If the economic reforms begun by President Yeltsin are abandoned, if hyperinflation cannot be stemmed, the world will suffer.

Consider the implications for Europe if millions of Russian citizens decide they have no alternative but to flee to the West where wages are 50 times higher. Consider the implication for the global environment if all the Chernobyl-style nuclear plants are forced to start operating there without spare parts, when we should be in phased stage of building them and shutting them down — building them down, closing them up, cleaning them up. If we are willing to spend trillions of dollars to ensure communism's defeat in the Cold War, surely we should be willing to invest a tiny fraction of that to support democracy's success where communism failed.

To be sure, the former Soviet republics and especially Russia, must be willing to assume most of the hard work and high cost of the reconstruction process.⁶ But then again, remember that the Marshall Plan itself financed only a small fraction of postwar investments in Europe. It was a magnet, a beginning, a confidence-building measure, a way of starting a process that turned out to produce an economic miracle.

Like Europe then, these republics now have a wealth of resources and talent and potential. And with carefully targeted assistance, conditioned on progress toward reform and arms control and non-proliferation, we can improve our own security and our future prosperity at the same time we extend democracy's reach.

These five steps constitute an agenda for American action in a global economy. As such, they constitute an agenda for our own prosperity as well. Some may wish we could pursue our own domestic effort strictly through domestic policies, as we have understood them in the past. But in this global economy, there is no such thing as a purely domestic policy. This thing we call the global economy is unruly; it's a bucking bronco that often lands with its feet on different sides of old lines, and sometimes with its whole body on us. But if we are to ride the bronco into the next century, we must harness the whole horse, not just part of it.

I know there are those in this country, in both political parties and all across the land, who say that we should not try to take this ride, that these goals are too ambitious, that we should withdraw and focus only on those things which we have to do at home. But I believe that would be a sad mistake and a great loss. For the new world toward which we are moving actually favors us. We are better equipped than any other people on earth by reason of our history, our culture and our disposition, to change, to lead and to prosper. The experience of the last few years where we have stubbornly

refused to make the adjustment we need to compete and win are actually atypical and unusual seen against the backdrop of our nation's history.

Look now at our immigrant nation and think of the world toward which we are tending. Look at how diverse and multi-ethnic and multi-lingual we are — in a world in which the ability to communicate with all kinds of people from all over the world and to understand them will be critical. Look at our civic habits of tolerance and respect. They are not perfect in our own eyes. It grieved us all when there was so much trouble a year ago in Los Angeles. But Los Angeles is a country (sic) with 150 different ethnic groups of widely differing levels of education and access to capital and income. It is a miracle that we get along as well as we do. And all you have to do is to look at Bosnia, where the differences were not so great, to see how well we have done in spite of all of our difficulties.

And look at the way our culture has merged technology and values. This is an expressive land that produced CNN and MTV. We were all born for the information age. This is a jazzy nation, thank goodness, for my sake. It created be-bop and hip-hop and all those other things. We are wired for real time. And we have always been a nation of pioneers. Consider the astonishing outpouring of support for the challenges I laid down last week in an economic program that violates every American's narrow special interest if you just take part of it out and look at it.

And, yet, here we are again, ready to accept a new challenge, ready to seek new change because we're curious and restless and bold. It flows out of our heritage. It's ingrained in the soul of Americans. It's no accident that our nation has steadily expanded the frontiers of democracy, of religious tolerance, of racial justice, of equality for all people, of environmental protection and technology and, indeed, the cosmos itself. For it is our nature to reach out, and reaching out has served not only ourselves, but the world as well.

Now, together, it is time for us to reach out again. Toward tomorrow's economy. Toward a better future. Toward a new direction. Toward securing for you, the students at American University, the American Dream.

ECONOMICS

Democracy's slow death

Thomas Jefferson once warned of the dangers posed by a "single and splendid government of an aristocracy, founded on banking institutions and moneyed incorporations," through which the few would be "riding and ruling over the plundered ploughman and beggared yeomanry." Today, Jefferson's nightmare is being realized beyond anything he might have dreamed.

A "de facto world government," led by transnational corporations, is now taking shape.

By Noam Chomsky

In the *Financial Times*, BBC economics correspondent James Morgan describes the "de facto world government" that is now taking shape: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, G-7, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and other structures designed to serve the interests of transnational corporations (TNCs), banks and investment firms in a "new imperial age." At the other

end of the bludgeon, the nongovernmental South Commission (consisting of leading Third World economists, government planners, religious leaders and others) observes that "the most powerful countries in the North have become a de facto board of management for the world economy, protecting their interests and imposing their will on the South," where governments "are then left to face the wrath, even the violence, of their own people, whose standards of living are being depressed for the sake of preserving the present patterns of operation of the world economy"—that is, the present structure of wealth and power.

A particularly valuable feature of the rising de facto government institutions is their immunity from popular influence, even awareness. They operate in secret, creating a world subordinated to the needs of investors, with the public "put in place," the threat of democracy reduced. This reversal of the expansion of democracy over the past centuries is a matter of no slight importance, alongside the new forms of perversion of classical liberal doctrine in the international economy.

These developments are naturally regarded with much concern throughout the Southern Hemisphere, and the growing Third World at home should be no less concerned. In his last address to the Group of 77, which represents more than 100 of the less developed nations, Chairman Luis Fernando Jaramillo of Colombia contemplated the "hostile international environment" and the "loss of economic and political standing" of the developing nations "in the so-called New World Order ... at the dawn of the 21st century." These factors cause real adversity that contrasts sharply with the "euphoria" engendered by the agreement of international elites. The strategy of the rich, Jaramillo observed, is "clearly directed at strengthening more and more the economic institutions and agencies that operate outside the United Nations system," which, with all its serious flaws, remains "the only multilateral mechanism in which the developing countries can have some say."

In contrast, institutions such as the World Bank and IMF that are being made "the center of gravity for the principal economic decisions that affect the developing countries" are marked by "their undemocratic character, their lack of transparency, their dogmatic principles, their lack of pluralism in the debate of ideas and their impotence to influence the policies of the industrialized countries"—whose dominant sectors they serve, in reality.

The new World Trade Organization established by the latest GATT agreements will align itself with the World Bank and the IMF in "a New Institutional Trinity which would have as its specific function to control and dominate the economic relations that commit the developing world,"

according to Jaramillo, while the industrialized countries will make "their own deals ... outside normal channels," in G-7 meetings and elsewhere.

A similar perception was expressed at a conference organized by Jesuits in San Salvador in January 1994. Its report concludes that "Central America today is experiencing globalization as a more devastating pillage than what its people underwent 500 years ago with the conquest and colonialization," a comment that generalizes to much of the "developing world." The new dominant force is not the market but rather "a strong transnational state that dictates economic policy and plans resource allocation. The IMF, World Bank, International Development Bank, U.S. Agency for International Development, European Community, U.N. Development Program and their ilk are all state or interstate institutions of a transnational character that have much greater economic influence over our countries than the market."

Moreover, the institutions of the transnational state largely serve other masters, as state power typically does; in this case, the rising transnational corporations in the domains of finance and other services, manufacturing, media and communications—institutions that are totalitarian in internal structure, quite unaccountable, absolutist in character and immense in power. Within them, a participant takes a place in a fairly rigid hierarchy of domination, implementing orders from above, transmitting them downwards. Those outside may try to rent themselves to the masters and may purchase what they produce, but few other options are open to the great mass of the population.

One consequence of the globalization of the economy is the rise of new governing institutions to serve the interests of transnational economic power. Another is the spread of the two-tiered Third World social model to the industrial world. The United States is taking the lead, another consequence of the unusual power and class consciousness of the business sector, which has been able to resist the social contract that popular struggle has achieved elsewhere. Increasingly, production can be shifted to low-wage areas, and directed to privileged sectors in the global economy. Large parts of the population thus become superfluous for production and perhaps even as a market, unlike the days when Henry Ford realized that he could not sell cars unless his workers had a decent wage in a more national economy.

GATT, NAFTA and the like are called "free trade" agreements. That is a misdescription. Firstly, the term "trade" hardly applies to a system in which some 40 percent of U.S. "trade" is intrafirm, centrally managed by the same highly visible hands that control planning, production and investment. Over half of U.S. "exports" to Mexico, for example, do not enter the Mexican market, consisting of transfers from one to another branch of a U.S. corporation, to maximize gains from lower labor costs and environmental standards. Such internal operations (including pricing policies aimed at tax benefits and the like) also introduce various market distortions that amount to non-governmental non-tariff barriers of no small scale, though not consid-

ered in the trade agreements and the neoliberal fetishism that accompanies them.

Calculations of alleged trade efficiencies overlook numerous other factors. Former World Bank senior economist Herman Daly notes that they do not take into account such matters as the artificial reduction of transport costs by government subsidy of energy through investment tax credits and research, as well as military expenditures that ensure access to petroleum and control its price, which is a large part of the function of the Pentagon system. Environmental costs of fuel-burning are also "externalized," another factor that would greatly reduce the alleged advantages of trade. In the case of U.S.-Mexico trade, Daly observes, "U.S. corn subsidized by depleting topsoil, aquifers, oil wells and the federal treasury can be freely imported" to Mexico, so that "it is likely that NAFTA will ruin Mexican peasants when "inexpensive" U.S. agribusiness exports, subsidized in such ways, undercut them and drive them to the cities, lowering wages there, and indirectly in the United States as well.

In an important critical analysis of GATT, Daly and fellow World Bank economist Robert Goodland point out that in prevailing economic theory, "firms are islands of central planning in a sea of market relationships." "As the islands get bigger," they note, "there is really no reason to claim victory for the market principle"—particularly as the islands approach the scale of the sea.


Apart from not being remotely "free," the "free trade" agreements are only partially related to "trade," not only



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because they enhance the power of TNCs and thus reduce "trade" (in any meaningful sense). The agreements go far beyond trade. One leading feature is the demand for liberalization of finance and services, which means allowing international banks to displace domestic rivals so that no country can carry out the kind of national economic planning

In other ways as well, the current trade agreements reflect the hostility of the "rich nations" to the neoliberal doctrines that are imposed on the poor to ensure more efficient plunder. One primary U.S. objective is increased protection for "intellectual property," including software and patents, with patent rights extending to process as well as product. The



that enabled the rich countries to develop. And, needless to say, Adam Smith's principle that "free circulation of labor" is one of the cornerstones of free trade, while constantly invoked by the Third World, is dismissed out of hand by the champions of neoliberalism, who also have little use for their hero's conclusion that working people will be devastated by market forces "unless government takes some pains to prevent" this outcome, as must be assured in "every improved and civilized society." Furthermore, the rich powers, and dominant elements within, remain opposed to free trade as they commonly have been, except when they feel they can prevail in competition.

U.S. International Trade Commission estimates that U.S. companies stand to gain \$61 billion a year from the Third World if U.S. protectionist demands are satisfied in GATT (as they are in NAFTA), a cost to the South that will dwarf the huge debt service flow when extrapolated to other industrial countries. Such doctrines—which the United States and other rich countries never accepted when they were developing—are designed to ensure that U.S.-based corporations control the technology of the future, including biotechnology, which, it is hoped, will allow state-subsidized private enterprise to control health and agriculture, and the means of life generally, locking the poor majority

into dependence on high-priced products of Western agribusiness, biotechnology, the pharmaceutical industry and so on.

Exactly as intended, market reforms have undermined the basis for functioning democracy, leaving people isolated, "each for oneself," if not yet "crushed" as in Eastern Europe and other places mired more deeply in Third World misery. One finds much the same in American working-class communities, where people who once struggled courageously and successfully for social justice and human rights are now often hopeless, demoralized and alone. Among the deeply impoverished of America's growing Third World, criminal violence and other forms of social pathology have reached shocking proportions as human values erode under the impact of selective marketization.

Neither at home nor abroad does the real world resemble the dreamy fantasies now fashionable about history converging to an ideal of free markets and democracy, "a future for which America is both the gatekeeper and the model."

A more accurate description would bring together the features that have come more vividly into view over the past 20 years. In the New World Order, the world is to be run by the rich and for the rich. The world system is nothing like a classical market; the term "corporate mercantilism" is a closer fit. Governance is increasingly in the hands of huge private institutions and their representatives. The institutions are totalitarian in character: in a corporation, power flows from top down, with the outside public excluded. In the dictatorial system known as "free enterprise," power over investment decisions, production and commerce is centralized and sacrosanct, exempt from influence and control by workers and community as a matter of principle and law. Systems of private governance have gained undreamed-of power. They have naturally used it to create the "de facto world government" described in the business press, with its own institutions, also insulated from public inspection or influence. National governments, which in varying ways involve some measure of public participation, are constrained by such factors to serve the interests of the rich and powerful even more than in the past.

There is little that is new in neoliberal programs, trickle-down theories and the rest of the doctrinal baggage that serves the interests of privilege and power. The ideology of oppression may differ in form when applied to Third World service areas and domestic populations, but similarities are apparent, and current enthusiasms are hardly more than a recapitulation, often sordid, of earlier devices to justify the privilege of those who hold the reins. As in the early 19th century, we are now once more to understand that it is a violation of natural liberty and even science to deceive people into thinking that they have some rights beyond what they can gain by selling their labor power. Any effort to depart from such right thinking leads directly to the Gulag, leading thinkers soberly explain.

Amid an atmosphere of general dismay and fear, there are also signs of resistance, taking varied forms. Compare

two cases: the 1992 riots in South-Central Los Angeles and the Mayan uprising in Chiapas, Mexico, on January 1, 1994. In both cases, the uprising reflected the increasing marginalization of people who do not contribute to profit-making under prevailing institutional arrangements, and therefore lack human rights or value. People who live in the slums of Los Angeles once had jobs, in part in the state sector that plays a critical role in the "free market capitalist" society, in part in factories that have been shifted to places where labor can be more savagely exploited and destruction of the environment can proceed unhampered. By absolute measures, they are considerably wealthier than the Mayans of Chiapas, who recognize that what remains of their lives faces destruction as the investor rights agreements (NAFTA, GATT) extend their sway. But the Los Angeles riots proceeded quite differently from the Chiapas rebellion. The contrast reflects the difference between communities that have become demoralized and devastated by external forces and others that have retained their inner cohesion and vitality. The specific problems that lie ahead are quite different; the crying need for solidarity and constructive participation could hardly be more clear, in the face of the "global experiment" now under way.

The nature of the experiment is graphically illustrated by a report of the International Labor Organization (ILO), which estimates that about 30 percent of the world's labor force was unemployed in January 1994, unable to earn enough to sustain a minimum standard of living. This "long-term persistent unemployment" is a crisis on the scale of the Great Depression, the ILO concludes. Vast unemployment persists alongside of huge demands for labor. Wherever one looks, there is work to be done of great social and human value, and there are plenty of people eager to do that work. But the economic system cannot bring together needed work and the idle hands of suffering people. Its concept of "economic health" is geared to the demands of profit, not the needs of people. In brief, the economic system is a catastrophic failure. Of course, it is hailed as a grand success, as indeed it is for a narrow sector of privileged people, including those who declare its virtues and triumphs.

How far can this go? Will it really be possible to construct an international society on something like the Third World model, with islands of great privilege in a sea of misery—fairly large islands, in the richer countries—and with controls of a totalitarian nature within democratic forms that increasingly become a facade? Or will popular resistance, which must itself become internationalized to succeed, be able to dismantle these evolving structures of violence and domination, and carry forth the centuries-old process of expansion of freedom, justice and democracy that is now being aborted, even reversed? These are the large questions for the future. ◀

Noam Chomsky is the author of numerous books on international politics and economics. This essay was adapted from *World Orders Old and New*, published this month by Columbia University Press. Copyright © 1994 by Noam Chomsky. Reprinted by arrangement with the publisher and author.

Doc. # 4

E D I T O R I A L

MEXICAN CRISIS NEGATES NAFTA PROMISES

In the bad old days of the Cold War, Soviet and Chinese rulers were faulted for imposing terrible hardship on their people—hardship the Communists claimed was necessary in order to achieve a future life of ease and security for everyone.

Today, the World Bank and the IMF make oddly similar claims as they defend austerity measures that they insist will bring a better life in the by-and-by—if only ordinary workers and small businesspeople will accept steadily declining living standards in the here-and-now.

These austerity schemes have been imposed worldwide. But except for a few corporate giants, 50 years of World Bank and IMF policies have brought misery for just about everyone, everywhere. In Eastern Europe, in countries like Poland and Lithuania where democratic elections are still open and fluid, the harsh reality of these “free market” impositions has resulted in the defeat of the initial democratic reformers and the election to office of former Communists, now “democratic socialists.” In the Third World, where elections are more tightly controlled by the ruling elites, these policies have simply caused increasing misery and, in some cases, incipient threats of insurrection, or, as in Mexico, the beginnings of real insurrection.

The peso's collapse will slow exports to Mexico and lower Mexican wages. For American workers that will mean fewer jobs and increased pressure to keep wages low.

In the United States, Republicans and Clinton Democrats alike have promoted free trade—as defined by NAFTA and GATT—as a panacea for problems of development as well as profitability. In their campaign to ratify NAFTA, Clinton and his Republican allies presented Mexico as a model of modernization in the World Bank/IMF mold. But the collapse of the peso, and with it the facade of government credibility, has

dealt a heavy blow to the myth that domestic austerity and export-based development are beneficial not only to investors, but also to ordinary workers and small business owners.

The Mexican crisis occurred because the peso was pegged to the dollar at the artificially high rate of three to one. This made imported goods cheap and exports pricey, which resulted in a trade deficit of nearly \$30 billion in 1994, the biggest trade imbalance in Mexico's history. The trade deficit, in turn, led to a draining of Mexico's foreign currency reserves from some \$25 billion to \$6.5 billion, barely enough

to cover two months of imports.

This situation was hidden from the public as best it could be by the outgoing regime of Carlos Salinas de Gortari. But when Mexico's new president, Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León, took office in December things rapidly unraveled. Zedillo was forced by events to allow the peso to trade freely, and it promptly lost half of its value, falling to nearly six to the dollar.

This, of course, caused panic on Wall Street, and especially among the U.S. holders of \$30-35 billion in Mexican stocks, government bonds and other peso-based interest-bearing securities who saw the value of their holdings cut nearly in half overnight. In turn, the Zedillo administration was forced to scramble in order to pacify the U.S. investors, who own \$45-50 billion of the \$73 billion in foreign investment in Mexico, and who have been seen as the motor of the Mexican miracle.

So Zedillo did his duty. He announced a new program of austerity in which growth will be lowered from 4.5 percent a year to 1.5 percent, inflation will soar to 19 percent, up from 7 percent in 1994 and from the previously projected 4 percent rate for this year. Profitable government-owned businesses will be offered for sale, and workers will be held to a 7 percent increase in actual wages, or to a substantial cut in real wages in 1995, and presumably beyond.

The purpose of all this is to boost Mexican exports and to reduce their imports. But NAFTA was sold to the American people on the theory that it would increase employment here—despite the loss of jobs to maquiladoras—because American exports to Mexico would grow rapidly. Now, the opposite is true.

Further, we were assured, Mexican wages would go up as a result of expanded free trade, and the consequent new demand for labor in Mexico. But now growth will be slowed and real wages will fall even more rapidly, thereby putting pressure on American workers seeking increased pay at home.

In short, we have been sold a bill of goods. As in all the recent World Bank/IMF development plans, the net result may be higher corporate profits, but the vast majority of the population both in the target country and the United States will suffer declines in real income and in power over decisions that affect their lives.

MAQUILA MENACE

GUATEMALAN WOMEN DEFY THEIR BRUTAL BOSSES

BY ARNIE ALPERT AND JUDY ELLIOTT

In March of 1995, Yovany Gomez, a union leader at the RCA maquiladora factory in Guatemala, was murdered. Gomez was kidnapped March 13, and his body was discovered in a ravine five days later. While Gomez was Guatemala's first maquila-sector unionist to be assassinated, violence against union activists and members is common.

In Guatemala, thugs can be hired cheaply and the risk of punishment is negligible. "Despite hundreds of violent attacks on Guatemalan trade unionists over the past three years, including murder, disappearances, torture, beatings, and death threats, not a single person has been charged let alone prosecuted," says the U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project (US/GLEP), a Chicago-based group that supports the rights of Guatemalan workers.

Employment at export assembly plants, known as maquiladoras, or maquilas, has grown dramatically in Guatemala, from less than two thousand in 1984 to 70,000 in 1994, according to one estimate. In 1994, Guatemalan apparel exports, most of which were produced in maquilas, totaled \$590

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million. Maquilas are now second in importance to coffee for Guatemala's export economy.

Most Guatemalan maquilas specialize in assembling clothing. The apparel is usually designed and cut out by skilled workers in the United States. Then the pieces are shipped to Guatemala, where workers get paid around \$3 a day to stitch them together for export back to the United States. Maquila goods

qualify for reduced tariffs upon re-entry to the United States, and host countries such as Guatemala generally offer tax breaks at their end as well.

Women dominate the maquila workforce. Most are young and unmarried, with 30% to 45% under 18. While exploitation is fierce and conditions degrading, these factories offer women employment opportunities not otherwise available. Women have also become active in labor organizing, with consequences that reveal not only the powerful obstacles they face, but also the leadership they have taken in spite of the odds. And their experience suggests that assistance from international solidarity movements can be vitally important.

THE LAST RESORT

In a society where women have traditionally worked in their homes or as domestic servants, the emergence of women in manufacturing is a major development. What lies behind the change? First, as companies shift assembly jobs from First to Third World countries, they seek the most exploitable workers available, and so maquila owners prefer a young, female labor force. Employers believe that women have the fine manual dexterity and patience required for sewing. Unmarried women demand less pay, take less time off, and are less likely to require pregnancy benefits. And young women have more endurance to withstand grueling maquila conditions. Just as important, employers see female workers as docile, less likely than males to protest maltreatment. According to one employer interviewed by Kurt Petersen (author of *The Maquiladora Revolution in Guatemala*), "Men are more likely to form unions. Women do not have this mentality. They are more prone to do what you tell them without questioning."

While this explains why maquilas prefer to hire young women, other changes in Guatemalan society explain why

young women would accept long hours and terrible working conditions to earn poverty wages in maquilas. One factor is the urban migration of many Guatemalan families. Until recently, most Guatemalan families, the majority of whom are of Mayan Indian ancestry and culture, were farmers. But land ownership is extremely unequal, with 65% of the farmland owned by 2% of the landowners, and meaningful land reform has never been achieved.

In addition, as the population has risen, children have inherited shrinking plots from their parents. Due to both these factors, many rural families lack sufficient acreage to grow the corn and beans that form the core of their diet. The lack of land drives them from rural areas into Guatemala's cities.

The political repression of recent generations has caused further dislocations. Ever since a U.S.-sponsored coup toppled the popularly-elected Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, Guatemala has been ruled by military or military-dominated governments which have brutally repressed popular social movements. In the early 1980s, in an effort to uproot a growing insurgency movement, the military and military-

tions and internal repression combined to cause per capita incomes to plunge in the early 1980s. The government's neoliberal response of devaluation, lower social spending, regressive taxation, and privatization have hit the poor especially hard. Over 80% of Guatemalan families live in poverty, and over 60% cannot even meet basic nutritional needs.

In response to declining living standards, many young women have turned to maquila work to supplement family incomes. According to one woman interviewed by Kurt Petersen, "I would not be working in this horrible factory...unless it was absolutely necessary. My father does not have a job and so we — the girls — had to find work. I went to the maquila because I knew they would hire me. I want to be in school but I am here. I do not like it but what is one to do?"

A final reason that women have turned to maquilas is the lack of other good opportunities for paid employment. Outside the maquila sector, industrial work has traditionally been dominated by men, while the traditional source of paid employment for young women has been domestic

service. The minimum daily maquila wage of about \$3 a day is almost twice what young women can earn working as domestics. Maquila jobs, bad as they are, can represent a step up.

Young women working in maquilas confront abysmal working conditions. In addition to low pay, they may face long hours of mandatory overtime, often enforced by locking doors to prevent them from leaving. Physical conditions may include extreme temperatures, lack of ventilation, and lack of access to toilet facilities and potable water. Health insurance and social security premiums may be deducted from

wages, without ever being deposited for the benefit of workers. Supervisors often beat workers. Sexual harassment and assault are common occupational hazards. Workplaces may shut down and move without paying workers.

DEATH THREATS

Yet despite their reputation for docility, some women maquila workers have formed labor unions to fight for better working conditions. They face daunting obstacles. The government's dismal record of labor law enforcement

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In the May Day march in Guatemala City, unionists carry a banner reading, "Worker's rights are not to be begged for, but demanded and respected."

sponsored death squads launched a reign of terror in which 140,000 Guatemalan civilians were killed or "disappeared" and 440 villages were destroyed. As a result, many Guatemalans were widowed or orphaned. Thousands of families fled to neighboring countries, and still more became internal refugees, resettling in cities, often in squatter camps.

The displacement of Guatemalan families has meant that traditional income sources are no longer available to many male family members. New sources must be found, and this often means sending the family's daughters to work.

The global economy and neoliberal economic policies have also put pressure on families. World market condi-

LABOR

CRIMES OF FASHION

3.

EL SALVADOR

THOSE WHO SUFFER
TO BRING YOU
GAP T-SHIRTS

BY MARC BRESLOW

At a maquiladora plant owned by Mandarin International in El Salvador, Judith Viera earned \$43 for working an 88-hour week. Conditions were horrific: the young, female workers are allowed only two bathroom breaks a day, the drinking water is contaminated, and beatings and sexual abuse are commonplace. When Viera and her co-workers tried to improve conditions by organizing a union, the company responded with violence and mass firings.

Mandarin sells to the Gap and Eddie Bauer, among other U.S. firms. Its plant can produce 1,500 Gap t-shirts a day, which sell for \$20 each in the United States — while the maquiladora workers are paid 16 cents per shirt. By not owning Mandarin and similar factories, the Gap and other retailers avoid direct responsibility for pitiful wages and abusive conditions.

Meanwhile, in 1994 the Gap made \$311 million in profits from its 1,300 stores throughout the United States and Canada. And Gap CEO Donald Fisher paid himself \$2 million, not including stock options.

The Gap is not alone. Other popular U.S. retailers also buy from maquila firms in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and elsewhere. Gabo, for example, a Korean-owned plant also in El Salvador, sells to Marshall's, Sears, Wal-Mart, and Nordstrom's. Not only are the wages meager, but the company of-

ten cheats the women workers on their paychecks. In addition, while collecting social security taxes from its employees, Gabo regularly fails to give the money to the government, preventing the women from receiving free health care.

In July 1995 the National Labor Committee, a union-backed group in New York City that seeks to improve conditions at "maquila" plants in Central America, brought Judith Viera and Claudia Molina (from Honduras), to various U.S. cities to share their stories. The Committee pointed out that the conditions at Mandarin and other plants violate the Gap's own "code of conduct" for the factories it buys from.

This code sounds impressive, requiring, for example, that employers "must never force employees to work extra hours" and "may neither threaten nor penalize employees for their efforts to organize or bargain collectively." But the code of conduct is largely a public relations exercise, as the maquila owners violate it with impunity.

Responding to publicity from Viera and Molina's tour, the Gap issued a statement asserting that "we conduct thorough investigations of all new and potential vendors, and we strive hard to ensure that all business partners meet our sourcing guidelines — which set strict standards for working conditions and human rights." But the Gap claims not to have found any violations of its guidelines at Mandarin.

Charles Kernaghan, director of the Labor Committee, visited El Salvador's free trade zone in September. "We reached fifty of the workers who were fired, and interviewed them in groups. They confirmed

FORUM

what Judith Viera said," reports Kernaghan. Meanwhile, the maquila owners are trying to ensure that no other such stories reach the outside world. "There are armed guards everywhere, with sawed-off shotguns," Kernaghan says. And the women employees have been warned not to talk with any *gringos* who come around asking questions, or they will lose their jobs.

Viera and Molina can speak best for themselves. Last July 14 they were interviewed in Boston by Karen Kampworth of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). Below we provide excerpts from that interview, which was translated by Holly Grant, also of CISPES.

SURVIVING THE MAQUILAS

Judith Viera (JV) and Claudia Molina (CM)

JV: I am eighteen years old and am from El Salvador. In San Salvador my family lives in San Miguel. I have no father and my mother couldn't manage with all of us, so I only studied up until fifth grade. I worked one year in the maquila, where I learned a lot but suffered a lot of mistreatment.

CM: I am seventeen years old and from Honduras. I worked in the maquila. My family is from Comayagua and Copan. I also only studied up to fifth grade. I also don't have a father and my mother couldn't handle schooling and the food and all.

JV: We decided to work in the maquilas because it seemed like a nice job. Also we are minors, and I was only seventeen years old and only in a place like that was I able to work because I was underaged. In the maquilas there are girls who are fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen years old and only in a maquila can a fourteen-year old get a job.

CM: I decided to work in a maquila because my mother earned very little money, and it wasn't enough for the food. I thought the job would be nice and easy, but it wasn't. I was only fifteen years old when I began working in the maquila.

JV: I worked as "Secretary of the Line." I was in charge of everything that came in and left the factory line, all

the completed shirts. I was in charge of controlling all the permissions, etc. of the people who worked in my line. I was in total charge of production of the line.

CM: When I started I was a cutter and then I started working at the machines closing shirts. Then I worked making buttonholes and then cuffs. And then as punishment they moved me to packaging and made me work standing up. I did not like this work. But even though I didn't like the work, I had to do it because I needed the salary.

How many hours a day do you work?

CM: I work thirteen hours a day and on Saturdays it is twenty-three hours of work.

JV: My work schedule Monday to Thursday was from 7 am to 9 pm. On Fridays it was from 7 am to 5 pm, and then 7 pm to 3 am, and we stayed in the factory and slept on the floor to begin work again on Saturday from 7 am to 5 pm. For all that work the most I earned was 750 colones for two weeks, which is \$43 a week.

Does the \$43 per week cover your costs?

JV: No. With that all you can buy is a little food and bus fare. I take two buses — one from my house to downtown, and then another one to the free trade zone. Our budget is a lot bigger than what we earn, than what our salaries are.

JV: We brought some shirts that we make — from the Gap, and we also work with Eddie Bauer and other brands.

CM: This is the shirt that we make for Orion, Gitano, Manhattan and other brands, but the brand that we work with the most is Manhattan.

Who had the idea of forming a union?

JV: The idea came from a woman who worked in quality control because there was a lot of mistreatment... when there was a meeting in the morning to announce that a union had been formed, at lunchtime the company closed its doors and wouldn't open them for us. That is when the work stoppage began so that they would accept the union. We are paid very little; they yell at us; they hit us with the shirts; we get a ticket to go to the bathroom — we only get two tickets a day and can only go for five minutes; they put us out in the sun and make us sweep

all day under the sun. There are other punishments as well. They do not give us purified water but contaminated water to drink. So we decided to form a union and there was lots of support. We were able to get the company to open again on Monday, but they have continued to mistreat us since that day, firing people, many threats.

CM: In the maquila where I worked, there was also lots of mistreatment. They also didn't give us permission. One compañera on March 20 had to miscarry in the factory because they didn't give her permission to go to the doctor. She had asked for permission beginning at 9 am until 4 pm, when they [finally] gave her permission, but it was too late.

Were you afraid to join the union?

JV: No, because there are so many mistreatments that occur in the factory. I wasn't able to support many of the work stoppages because I was Secretary... Many times I was in meetings at which they said they were going to close the factory for two months so they could get rid of the union. They have fired many pregnant women and minors. They have fired more than 350 people solely for the reason that they were members of the union. I was fired together with my two sisters because we were members of the union.

Why did you come on tour?

JV: It is important to be here on tour representing all the working Salvadoran women in the factory, so many people. I know this tour is important and that they will accept the union, and that all the women will get their jobs back. Our idea is that the people in the United States help us and support our campaign. I don't completely know how they can help us, but I know they can and they will.

JV: In the factory there is also sexual abuse. There is an ex-colonel that is director of personnel. Many times he asked me out, he followed me in his car. He told me that if I went out with him I wouldn't be fired. Also, this man hired men who were ex-combatants in the army; these men are only there to control our union. If you try to present them something or if they fire someone and you don't like it, these men will beat or hit you. Last week, there was a work stoppage at the factory because they had fired several pregnant women and union leaders. The National Civilian Police showed up to forcibly move them by hitting them and they forced us to stop the strike. They also captured our secretary general of the union; and they hit them and threatened them. The situ-

ation now is that the factory does not want to re-instate the pregnant women and the union leaders. There are many people who've been fired. The union leadership continues to fight about this, and the factory continues to threaten to close. ■

GUATEMALAN WORKERS

continued from page 29

makes possible flagrant labor violations by employers. And although violent repression by the government has greatly decreased since the 1980s, workers still risk their lives by forming unions. Yet women in maquilas persist in their organizing efforts.

Cortex, a maquila in Guatemala City, assembled clothing for Esprit, Bloomingdales, Eddie Bauer, Haggar, and other U.S.-based companies. Workers organized a union two years ago to protest speed-ups, physical abuse, and forced overtime. But Adela Augustin, general secretary of the Cortex union, says that after she posted a sign announcing a union meeting last March, she overheard a manager say "you've either got to hit her or kill her." Augustin was suspended from her job for eight days, then viciously assaulted as she got off a bus while returning home. "They want us to give up the struggle, to not have a union," she said matter-of-factly. The Cortex maquila has subsequently closed.

The RCA maquila (no relation to the U.S. corporation), whose union leader Yovany Gomez was murdered, produced clothes under contract to Liz Claiborne and other North American companies. The owners used threats and bribes to stop a union drive prompted by low pay, unsanitary working conditions, and physical abuse. After a year of battling the union, the owners simply closed the plant in August, 1994. Because maquilas generally represent a low level of capital investment, it is commonplace for owners to shut down, declare bankruptcy, and relocate rather than deal with determined workers. Lacking labor laws or a justice system to protect their rights, workers have no recourse other than capitulation or direct action.

Following the shut-down, 78 workers took over the RCA plant to prevent removal of the machinery. A month and four days later, the workers were forcibly evicted in the middle of the night. The union believes the factory has reopened in another part of Guatemala City. Having lost their jobs, the RCA workers continued to demand back pay.

Sylvia Escobar, the union's general secretary, has seen suspicious cars in her neighborhood, has had knocks at her door in the middle of the night, and has had warnings spray painted on her house. Escobar lives in fear for the

safety of her grandchildren, but she is undeterred. "The [owners] thought that once they killed our companion we'd stop struggling, but thanks to God we will not stop," she told a delegation from Peace Brigades International.

Flor de Maria Salguero, a union organizer with the FES-TRAS labor federation, said Guatemalan labor activists support the right of Guatemalans, including children, to have jobs in maquilas as long as they are treated respectfully and labor laws are obeyed. Flor de Maria helps maquila workers understand their rights under Guatemala's labor code by leafleting outside plant gates during lunch breaks and shift changes. After receiving threats since March, presumably because of her support for maquila workers who had been sexually harassed, on May 17 she was kidnapped, drugged, beaten and raped. The fact that her money and jewelry were not stolen provides strong evidence that the assault was politically motivated. Salguero has since received further phone threats.

SOLIDARITY FROM UP NORTH

While most of the maquilas are Guatemalan or Korean-owned, the industry has close links with the United States, where most of the products are sold. Moreover, Guatemala benefits from tariff concessions under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), although the GSP and CBI benefits do not apply to the apparel sector itself. This gives the U.S. government some power to push for labor rights in all sectors of the Guatemalan economy. Using this handle, U.S. activists have worked in solidarity with women organizing in Guatemalan maquilas.

In recent years, US/GLEP has organized campaigns to force the Guatemalan government to recognize the union at a maquila owned by Phillips Van Heusen. The Chicago-based group also supported a campaign that successfully pressured the South Korean government to get owners of the RCA maquila to give back pay to their laid-off employees.

Together with unions and human rights groups, US/GLEP has used U.S. laws governing international trade to pressure Guatemalan employers and the Guatemalan government. Provisions of the GSP, a program that provides reduced tariffs for developing nations exporting to the United States, require participating countries to respect labor rights, including the right to organize unions. US/GLEP has led campaigns that have persuaded the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to keep Guatemala's access to GSP benefits under review since 1992. This review was a key factor in forcing the Guatemalan government to raise the minimum wage and improve the labor code (at least on paper). But mere review has not stopped abuses against unions.

In an April 10 letter to USTR Mickey Kantor, US/GLEP said "violence against workers exercising their basic rights has continued unabated since November and has actually increased significantly in the maquila sector." Instead of just continuing the review status, US/GLEP has proposed suspending duty free imports of Guatemalan sugar and beef, followed by kicking Guatemala out of the GSP entirely if there is no progress in charging and prosecuting those responsible for the killing of Yovany Gomez, the assault against Adela Augustin, and other recent violations. Although Guatemala's privileges have not been suspended, Kantor extended his review of them until November 1, 1995.

US/GLEP's alliance with Guatemalan unions is a good example of what Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello call the "Lilliput Strategy." In their recent book, *Global Village or Global Pillage*, Costello and Brecher suggest that just as the Lilliputians immobilized the giant Gulliver with hundreds of tiny threads, labor rights advocates in different countries can employ a variety of tactics to stymie global corporations.

The growing numbers of women in the maquila sector is a sign of profound changes in Guatemalan society. The repression and dislocation that have led to these changes have caused tremendous suffering. Yet the leadership shown by many Guatemalan women labor activists demonstrates that these women are not as docile and exploitable as their employers had hoped.

The need continues for support by U.S. activists. The U.S. Congress will soon act on the Caribbean Basin Trade Security Act, a proposal to extend NAFTA-like trade concessions to Central American and Caribbean maquila sectors. The bill's worker rights protections are woefully inadequate, and US/GLEP is pushing to strengthen them. Such efforts will assist the ongoing struggle of the women working in Guatemala's maquiladoras. ■

For further information contact:

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Peace Brigades International, by providing accompaniment in areas of conflict, creates "breathing space" for groups working nonviolently for social justice in Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Haiti, and Native Communities in North America. 2642 College Ave., Berkeley CA 94704, (510) 540-0749, e-mail: pbiusa@igc.apc.org.

Resources: *Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up*, Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello, South End Press, 1994; *The Maquiladora Revolution in Guatemala*, Kurt Petersen, New Haven: Orville Schell Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School, 1992.

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NAFTA THOUGHTS

EVALUATING LABOR'S FAIR TRADE STRATEGY

BY BRIAN BURGOON

By all accounts, the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in the fall of 1993 was a major defeat for organized labor in the United States. From the left and the right of the political spectrum, commentators have uniformly described its passage as marking the demise of organized labor's power and relevance, capping a thirty-year decline in membership, workplace gains, and legislative influence.

For those on the free-market right, this was a victory over labor as a loud, protectionist "special interest," indicating that economic globalization will proceed unfettered by labor's meddlesome demands. For those on the left, NAFTA's passage was a major defeat of labor's most aggressive attempt ever to influence trade policy. The loss has had a demoralizing effect among labor supporters, prompting many to conclude that they either ought to rethink their strategy or give up on trade policy altogether.

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Neither of these views does justice to the accomplishments and promise of labor's recent strategy to humanize global trade. Crafted in response to frustrations with its past trade policymaking efforts, this strategy has been to promote a clear and focused concept of "fair trade."

Instead of embracing unlimited free trade or rejecting the growth of trade on principle, labor has articulated a vision of a global economy in which trade policy raises the conditions of workers across nations to a humane level. This goal of "upward levelling" is an in-

novative strategic response to free trade, which gives corporations *carte blanche* to abandon areas where the cost of labor is relatively high for those where it's cheaper. Under fair trade, the United States would allow foreign companies access to its markets only on the condition that they not try to beat out their competitors by exploiting lax labor and environmental regulations, or by infringing on workers' rights to bargain collectively, in the U.S. or abroad.

The fair trade strategy has achieved meaningful successes, which have largely been overshadowed by NAFTA's significant disappointments. These achievements indicate that, rather than advocate absolute trade barriers or disengage from trade policymaking in despair, labor should pursue its fair trade strategy. As NAFTA and the WTO (the World Trade Organization, formerly GATT) are implemented and refined, progressive forces need to identify strong points and build on them. In short, the glass of economic justice in trade policy may not even be half full, but it's not empty, and labor's new trade strategy has the best chance of filling it.

FROM FREE TRADE TO FAIR TRADE

Labor's fair trade strategy is the product of forty years of difficult experience. Throughout most of this period, industry unions commonly cast their lot with their employers, adopting strategies reflecting their position in the international economy. Unions in internationally-competitive industries supported free trade, while those in industries facing competition from imports backed protectionism (that is, they supported restrictions on foreign firms selling products in the United States).

Despite this fragmentation, there was a general trend toward union protectionism between 1945 and the 1980s. Right after World War II, most unions embraced free trade, since the country's industrial preeminence left them feeling invulnerable to foreign competition. As this preeminence faded from the 1950s to the 1970s, union support for free trade grew less absolute. Unions demanded that the government provide dislocated workers with income-supplements, as well as training and relocation assistance. Then, as limited assistance programs began to frustrate unions, and as the nation's industrial decline continued, a more protectionist perspective took hold. Labor began to support industry-specific tariffs, quotas, domestic content regulations, and other trade barriers. Throughout this evolution, union trade policy activity was confined to elite lobbying and campaign contributions.

The recent protectionism did little to improve the lives of working people and fueled accusations that labor was a backward-looking special interest. Employers and their unions used protectionist policies to raise prices and prop up wages, rather than to invest in better products and production processes. At the same time, employers were taking advantage of their growing ability to move manufacturing operations to low wage, lax regulation countries.

These developments meant that even the workers in protected industries lost their jobs and faced cutbacks in wages and benefits. In addition, protectionist policies made it easy to cast the entire labor movement as a "rent-seeking" special interest unconcerned with consumers and unprotected workers in the United States, and all citizens of other countries. And the high-level lobbying and campaign contributions, disconnected from the unions' rank-and-file, made unions look elitist and undemocratic.

In the mid-1980s, unions departed from these trade strategies by proposing to humanize rather than to prevent trade. Some U.S. labor leaders began to believe that expanding access to foreign markets could create jobs at home, and globalization was already weakening unions as firms used the threat of exit as a bargaining tool. Labor leaders saw that, to work in their favor, access to U.S. markets could be granted on the condition that trading partners protect minimal labor and environmental standards, and basic human and labor rights, in their own countries. Since access to the immense U.S. market is so coveted, unions perceived that it would be a strong lever to induce other nations to protect labor rights.

Unions invoked several International Labor Organization (ILO) charters, including those mandating decent working conditions, banning child and forced labor, and protecting the rights of association and collective bargaining. So, this fair trade policy would expand job-creating

exports and access to cheaper and better imports, while at the same time ensuring that companies and investors would not abandon the United States in favor of countries with low wages and poor conditions.

Although unions had called attention to global labor standards in the past, international unions like the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), the United Electrical Workers (UE), and the United Auto Workers (UAW) were the first to call for explicit links between these standards and trade access. They won labor rights amendments to the General System of Preferences, linking labor rights to preferential trade access for developing countries, and to the 1988 Trade Act.

It was only during the battle over NAFTA, however, that labor's fair trade strategy fully bloomed. When the Bush Administration initially negotiated the NAFTA agreement, seeking unprecedented safeguards for property rights of U.S. corporations and major cuts in trade barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, U.S. labor was unified for the first time in pushing for fair trade. The AFL-CIO, Teamsters, ACTWU, UE, and other unions sought comparable safeguards for basic working conditions and labor rights in all three countries, and for the upward leveling of environmental regulations — under the explicit mantle of "fair trade."

They publicized the poor quality of working conditions in the *maquiladora* region along the Mexican-U.S. border, and they documented violations of Mexican labor's right to associate and bargain collectively. They pressured Bush to renegotiate NAFTA, and when Clinton took over the same labor groups pushed for strong side-agreements protecting labor rights.

This time, in addition to lobbying and financial contributions, unions promoted their trade agenda by working extensively with other groups and through massive grassroots mobilization. Far more than in any previous campaign, union strategists intimately collaborated with U.S., Canadian, Mexican, and international groups with overlapping interests in more humane trade. These included environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and Greenpeace, religious organizations such as the Methodist Church, citizen action groups such as Public Citizen, and human rights organizations such as Amnesty International. This cooperation was institutionalized in organizations

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such as the Fair Trade Campaign and the Citizen's Trade Watch Campaign. In addition, U.S. unions set up coalitions with labor unions in Canada and (more tentatively) Mexico, to pressure all NAFTA signatories. Unions mobilized their rank and file and the public as never before through extensive organizing drives, teach-ins, and leafletting in communities across the United States and abroad.

FAIR TRADE'S DISAPPOINTMENTS

One thing that came of all this innovation in labor's trade policy strategy is well known: major defeat. Arrayed against unions and their allies were powerful corporations in the United States and Mexico, and these interests were concerned that strong protection for labor rights would undermine low-wage, lax regulation "flexibility" in Mexico *and* in the United States. The Mexican government was actively hostile to fair trade, while the U.S. President was only tepidly supportive of it. So Clinton negotiated, and the U.S. Congress passed, a NAFTA package with environmental and labor side-agreements that provided little protection for the environment or labor rights and conditions.

The labor side-agreement was even weaker than its environmental counterpart. The institution set up to implement the labor agreement, the National Administration Office (NAO) of the Commission of Labor Cooperation, was to be staffed by only 15 people, while the size of the Environmental Commission's monitoring office was unlimited. The NAO can research cases of lax government enforcement only after receiving permission from two of the three countries' labor ministers, whereas environmental cases *must* be investigated unless two environmental ministers object. More importantly, the NAO can only impose fines and trade sanctions in cases involving worker safety, child labor, and minimum wages. For other labor issues, such as Mexico's infringing on the rights of workers to form labor unions and to bargain collectively, the NAO can only mandate discussion by labor ministers.

To add insult to injury, the implementation of the labor side-agreement has also been a disappointment. Of several major allegations made by labor and human rights groups monitoring standards in Mexico, all but one have been ignored by NAO. For instance, the UE (United Electrical Workers) and the Teamsters petitioned the NAO to address the firing of 11 Mexican workers in one G.E. plant and 21 in a Honeywell plant after workers tried to form independent unions. The NAO did nothing.

UNIONS WITHOUT BORDERS

There has been a lot of talk about cross-border solidarity among unions recently—and also, despite formidable obstacles, a fair amount of action.

Attempts to organize unions in Mexican workplaces are often greeted with threats of violence and mass firings. Since enforcement of labor law is so lax, there is frequently little to deter management from squelching organizing drives other than pressure from U.S. public opinion. That is where U.S. unions can come into play.

When the U.S.-owned Kirkwood Industries fired 100 workers who supported a unionization drive this past spring, the Teamsters publicized the company's actions, pressuring members of Congress to condemn them. At the Mexican government-supervised union representation election on July 21, the workers had to deliver their vote verbally in front of Kirkwood management representatives. Still, the union lost by just 8 votes. The Teamsters also confronted the Honeywell company for suppressing union organizing, invoking the labor side-agreement of NAFTA.

Mexican unions need both publicity and financial support from their U.S. counterparts, according to Benedicto Martinez, Chief Coordinator of Mexico's embattled FAT (Authentic Labor Front), the country's only independent union federation. Speaking in Boston on a June 1995 tour of the United States sponsored by the United Electrical Workers, Martinez said, "There have been continual accusations by businessmen and the government that such relations betray our country. Nevertheless, we consider ourselves international trade unionists. We believe that just as businesses have [an international relationship] with this NAFTA treaty, workers as well must seek this same kind of relationship." Looking to the future, Martinez envisions "international organizations of workers based on industry, just as companies are organized internationally."

— Betsy Reed

Research/Translation: Jonathan Schlefer

The lone exception to the NAO's general negligence occurred when Mexico rejected an independent union's attempt to officially register its organization of workers in Sony Corporation's Nuevo Laredo plants along the Texas border. In response to a petition by labor and human-rights groups to investigate, in April of this year the NAO ruled that Labor Secretary Robert Reich should meet with his Mexican counterpart to discuss the incident. This type of ruling is the strongest action NAO can take on issues concerning rights of association. As NAO Secretary Irasema Garza pointed out, however, "the agreement does not specify exactly what constitutes ministerial consultations... [And] there is also no time limit for resolving the issue."

With such weak provisions for labor, the aftermath of NAFTA's passage is shaping up to be as bad as labor's most pessimistic forecast. We don't know exactly how many factory closings are directly attributable to NAFTA, but we know that plenty have been facilitated by its passage. We also know that companies are continually threatening workers with their exit-options in order to bargain-down wage and benefits. And we know that the massive expansion in U.S. exports to Mexico promised during the NAFTA debate has failed to materialize, partly because of the crash of the peso (see "NAFTA Shock," James M. Cypher, *D&S* March/April 1995).

In trade policymaking since NAFTA, fair trade principles have not done any better. The passage of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in 1994 set up a supra-national World Trade Organization (WTO) to oversee future reductions in trade barriers. Although the Clinton Administration proposed the creation of an institution under GATT that would monitor and enforce minimum labor conditions and rights, a number of Third World governments and U.S. businesses strongly objected — and Clinton capitulated. So the current GATT-WTO framework does not contain protection for fair trade principles.

This string of disappointments has caused some labor supporters to rethink the logic of fair trade, in some cases assuming a protectionist stance once again. The UAW, for instance, recently gave its qualified support to trade sanctions against the import of Japanese luxury automobiles, on the grounds that Japanese institutions discriminate against U.S. products.

An even stronger temptation is to give up on trade policy. Demoralized labor supporters may conclude that with the chance of injecting fair trade principles into future NAFTA and GATT revisions so remote, the resources of the labor movement so scarce, it ought to focus its attention on other activities, including cross-border organizing, organizing new industries, and rethinking relationships with employers and communities.

THE GLASS ISN'T EMPTY

But before concluding that organized labor ought to revert to the protectionism of old or throw in the towel on trade policy, consider a few "fair trade" successes.

First, labor pressure was responsible for the creation of the labor side-agreement under NAFTA. Although the NAO lacks the power and focus of the institutions protecting property rights or the environment, it already plays a monitoring role and can pressure industries and countries to respect minimum labor conditions and rights. The institution is a concrete foothold that can be leveraged into more powerful and extensive protection in the future. Although GATT-WTO does not contain such a foothold for labor, unions successfully pressured Clinton into at least proposing a link between market access and labor and environmental conditions in those negotiations. —

Moreover, labor's fight for fair trade has educated millions of Americans about the perils of unregulated international trade and globalization. Protectionism earns little respect from the American public, sparking suspicions that the proponents simply want to increase their own piece of the pie at the expense of unprotected Americans and less developed countries. Polls consistently show that the public prefers an open to a closed economy. Fair trade offers an appealing vision of an international economy with expanded trade as well as protection for human, labor and environmental conditions, and especially, labor *rights*. Such a focus on rights is particularly compelling in a country whose political traditions are so intimately tied to the celebration of individual freedoms.

It's clear from the shift in public sympathies during the NAFTA debate that the fair trade approach garnered popular support. In March 1991, 72% of Americans believed that NAFTA's impact on the United States would be "mostly good," while only 15% believed it would be "mostly bad." By September 1993, after the side-agreements were announced, political economist Ian Robinson points out, "only 35% of American respondents supported the NAFTA package, while 41% opposed it....[and] those who were strongly opposed (21%) were three times more

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Sweeney's opponents have zeroed in on his dual salary. For years, he has derived substantial income as an "executive advisor" to his home local in New York City—in addition to his salary as president of the national union. Each year from 1989 to 1993, Sweeney collected payment ranging from \$67,000 to \$91,000 from the local. In 1994, after criticism surfaced, his fee plunged to \$10,000. SEIU dissidents have also criticized Sweeney for his role as head of the AFL-CIO's health care committee. The SEIU president was instrumental in turning the tide against the many labor proponents of single-payer health care.

Moreover, Sweeney is not likely to put a stop to the trend that has virtually taken over U.S. unions in the past decade—"labor-management cooperation." ("Cooperation" can sometimes involve giving unions more control over decisions that had been considered management prerogatives. But critics contend that more often, cooperation plans have the effect of undermining union power by allowing company-dominated joint labor-management committees to take the place of unions at the workplace.) Like most U.S. union leaders, Sweeney has been a cooperation proponent.

Trumka, by contrast, has taken a strong position in favor of worker empowerment on the issue of cooperation. Last year, he headed a committee of the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department that explored the issue of "workplace rights," with an eye to influencing the Clinton administration's labor policy. The committee's report argued for "achieving social justice through workplace democracy" and laid out a long list of reforms needed to empower workers.

Meanwhile, Donahue, as head of the AFL-CIO Committee on the Evolution of Work, released a report that presented worker-management "partnership" as labor's central mission. And the theme continues to arise in his current campaign.

Neither Donahue nor Sweeney is a rebel when it comes to making a break with the Democratic Party. Rather than calling for a rethinking of labor's slavish relationship to the Democratic Party, the Sweeney slate's platform focuses only on buffing up the federation's political machinery. It calls for creating a center for training political campaign organizers and another center for studying policy. But Sweeney and company are perhaps more critical of Bill Clinton than is Donahue, who in a recent press conference declared the President to be workers' "best hope" on economic issues.

While labor's most fiery leaders may not be at the top of the ballot, many union activists are nevertheless feeling pretty frisky about the contest so far. After decades of glum resignation about the AFL-CIO hierarchy and its crusty old leaders, change is at least a possibility. Even the process

of dusting off the AFL-CIO constitution to find out how contested elections actually work holds a thrill.

Donahue seems to believe that open contention among labor's top leaders is dangerous. He has warned that unless the two slates come together under his leadership, the federation may split into two again. Kirkland is also deeply upset at the current show of disunity. He confessed in June that he had actually planned to retire until his opposition went to the press with their complaints instead of directly to him. After his opponents' "anonymous poisoning of the well" and a "campaign of mendacity and falsehoods," Kirkland said he opted to run after all. "I deeply resent the rise of this militia," said Kirkland, apparently referring to his old friends on the Executive Council.

Kim Moody, a staff member at *Labor Notes*, feels differently. In fact, he says, "the main value of this whole thing is that it's demonstrating to people that you can crack these monoliths. It's probably all to the good, even if Sweeney doesn't turn out to be all that different."

OLAW's Bob Wages looks ahead and sees a long fight to get the federation to take a stronger stand. "I think it's clear we can do something on progressive social issues," he says. "We need to recommit ourselves to national health care, to a national industrial policy. We need to recommit ourselves to a political process in which we define our own issues and bring people along with us rather than accept the never-ending proposition of the lesser of two evils. My idea is, if you get an agenda moving, and it is endorsed and embodied in what you do at the AFL-CIO convention, then you have a basis upon which to claim there's a change." ■

FAIR TRADE

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numerous than those who were strongly in favor (7%).” Even in the face of extensive pro-NAFTA propaganda, labor's fair trade strategy apparently caused the public to grow more doubtful about the agreement.

In addition, the labor movement's success in engaging the rank and file in the struggle for fair trade has shaken labor's image as an elite-focused, sclerotic bureaucracy. Since labor's influence in American politics requires public sympathy and respect, this change in reputation matters.

Inside the labor movement, this grassroots, coalition-based mode of organizing around fair trade has hastened major reform. The alliances formed with environmental, human rights, citizen action and religious groups have lasted, benefitting labor in arenas other than trade policy. These coalitions have set precedents for a general strategy of collaborating with other interest groups as a way of achieving legislative and political goals, rather than going it

21 PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (1994) *Clinton.*

30 countries We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Brussels to renew our Alliance in light of the historic transformations affecting the entire continent of Europe. We welcome the new climate of cooperation that has emerged in Europe with the end of the period of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War. However, we must also note that other causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged. We therefore confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny. It reflects a European Security and Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe. It is reaching out to establish new patterns of cooperation throughout Europe. It rests, as also reflected in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, upon close collaboration in all fields.

Building on our decisions in London and Rome and on our new Strategic Concept, we are undertaking initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability, and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has always been our Alliance's fundamental goal. We have agreed:

- to adapt further the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces;
- to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries;
- to launch a major initiative through a Partnership for Peace, in which we invite Partners to join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance;
- to intensify our efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

2. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the transatlantic link, which is the bedrock of NATO. The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fundamentally important aspect of that link. All our countries wish to continue the direct involvement of the United States and

Canada in the security of Europe. We note that this is also the expressed wish of the new democracies of the East, which see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole. The fuller integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union into a Europe whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

3. Today, we confirm and renew this link between North America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility on defence matters. We welcome the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launching of the European Union, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all the Allies. We reaffirm that the Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

4. We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests.

5. We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organization and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this. We welcome the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU that has been achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. In future contingencies, NATO and the WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies.

6. We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. Better European coordination and planning will also strengthen the European pillar and the Alliance itself. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Security and Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence and other tasks.

7. In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE [Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe], including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

8. Against this background, NATO must continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in line with requirements for flexible and timely responses contained in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. We also will need to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by facilitating the use of our military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations, and assist participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations and other contingencies as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace.

9. Therefore, we direct the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity. As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. We have directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. The North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session will report on the implementation of these decisions to Ministers at their next regular meeting in June 1994.

10. Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. We remain deeply committed to further strengthening the CSCE, which is the only organization comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, cooperative security, and the advancement of democracy and human rights. We actively support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

11. As part of our overall effort to promote preventive diplomacy, we welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe, will contribute to its elaboration, and look forward to the opening conference which will take place in Paris in the Spring.

12. Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

13. We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership — a Partnership for Peace. We invite the other states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this Partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

14. The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

15. To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North

Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

16. Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.

17. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means constitutes a threat to international security and is a matter of concern to NATO. We have decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the work already underway in other international fora and institutions. In this regard, we direct that work begin immediately in appropriate fora of the Alliance to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.

18. We attach crucial importance to the full and timely implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements as well as to achieving further progress on key issues of arms control and disarmament, such as:

- the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and work towards an enhanced verification regime;
- the early entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention;
- the negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- issues on the agenda of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation;
- ensuring the integrity of the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Treaty and full compliance with all its provisions.

19. We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.

20. We reaffirm our support for political and economic reform in Russia and welcome the adoption of a new constitution and the holding of democratic parliamentary elections by the people of the Russian Federation. This is a major step forward in the establishment of a framework for the development of durable democratic institutions. We further welcome the Russian

implementation of the UNSC [United Nations Security Council] Resolutions regarding the reinforcement of UNPROFOR. We reaffirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, we urge the UNPROFOR authorities to draw up urgently plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be opened for humanitarian relief purposes.

26. The past five years have brought historic opportunities as well as new uncertainties and instabilities to Europe. Our Alliance has moved to adapt itself to the new circumstances, and today we have taken decisions in key areas. We have given our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. We have endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to adapt the Alliance to its future tasks. We have opened a new perspective of progressively closer relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. In doing all this, we have renewed our Alliance as a joint endeavour of a North America and Europe permanently committed to their common and indivisible security. The challenges we face are many and serious. The decisions we have taken today will better enable us to meet them.



government's firm commitment to democratic and market reform and to a reformist foreign policy. These are important for security and stability in Europe. We believe that an independent, democratic, stable and nuclear-weapons-free Ukraine would likewise contribute to security and stability. We will continue to encourage and support the reform processes in both countries and to develop cooperation with them, as with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

21. The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to be of special concern. We condemn the use of force for territorial gains. Respect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is essential to the establishment of peace, stability and cooperation in the region. We call upon all states to join international efforts under the aegis of the United Nations and the CSCE aimed at solving existing problems.

22. We reiterate our conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean. We strongly welcome the agreements recently concluded in the Middle East peace process which offer an historic opportunity for a peaceful and lasting settlement in the area. This much-awaited breakthrough has had a positive impact on the overall situation in the Mediterranean, thus opening the way to consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to review the overall situation, and we encourage all efforts conducive to strengthening regional stability.

23. As members of the Alliance, we deplore the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. We continue to believe that the conflict in Bosnia must be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield. Only the parties can bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Only they can agree to lay down their arms and end the violence which for these many months has only served to demonstrate that no side can prevail in its pursuit of military victory.

24. We are united in supporting the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union to secure a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia, agreeable to all parties, and we commend the European Union Action Plan of 22 November 1993 to secure such a negotiated settlement. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith. We commend the front-line states for their key role in enforcing sanctions against those who continue to promote violence and aggression. We welcome the cooperation between NATO and the WEU in maintaining sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic.

25. We denounce the violations by the parties of the agreements they have already signed to implement a ceasefire and to permit the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the victims of this terrible conflict. This situation cannot be tolerated. We urge all the parties to respect their agreements. We are determined to eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] mandate. We will continue operations to enforce the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. We call for the full

by most magazine editors. As Microsoft allies itself with NBC, *Time* with Warner and CNN, and Murdoch, Disney and the rest of the warriors of mass distraction continue to eat up what's left of our public space, Henry Luce's operating belief that reality is

whatever appears in *Time*—or its media cousins—will be increasingly difficult to argue with. It may be only marginally truer than in 1923, but the cultural space to prove its falseness will have shrunk to the size of a computer screen. ■

GLOBALIZATION'S EFFECTS ARE HARDLY THEORETICAL, AS A CONGRESSIONAL BUS TOUR SEES.

Fair Trade or Bust

JIM HIGHTOWER

"We are too quiet," John Lewis says in his quiet but forceful voice to the people assembled around him. "We need to make some noise." Lewis is the Atlanta Congressman who was side by side with Martin Luther King Jr. in the bloody-ugly confrontations of the civil rights movement in the sixties. But on this late-February day, 1998, he is in Columbus, Georgia, working with another downtrodden group, encouraging them in their fight not against Jim Crow but against a new oppressor: global corporatism.

Globalization is a much more polished and cosmopolitan overmaster than the old Southern power structure, but not any less ruthless as it bloodies heads worldwide, making a mockery of workers' rights and devastating entire communities. Today's globalist is Bull Connor in an Armani suit, enforcing order with Wall Street lawyers rather than fire hoses, holding people down with Washington lobbyists rather than snarling dogs.

Representative Lewis is one of several lawmakers (including David Bonior of Michigan, Allen Boyd of Florida, William Delahunt of Massachusetts, Marcy Kaptur of Ohio, Bart Stupak of Michigan and Karen Thurman of Florida) who are going to the grassroots this year to learn about the issue firsthand. It was after hearing from some locals in a Columbus union hall that Lewis said, "We need to make some noise," not so much to them as to himself and the House members with him.

These members are veterans of the floor fights against NAFTA in '93 (which they lost) and "fast track" in '97 (which they won), and they know many more fights are coming. "We are on a journey," Lewis says, invoking the gospel reference and long-term strategy embraced by the civil rights movement. It's a journey to establish a new American policy of fair trade based on raising the world's labor, health, environmental and living standards—rather than knocking ours down. Believe it or not, this is considered an unacceptable option in Washington, which is why the Representatives decided to take to the countryside.

They did it in proper plebeian style, too—a far cry from one of Bill Clinton's Renaissance Weekends at Hilton Head, or one of the G.O.P.'s resort retreats. Called the "Fair Trade or Bust Tour" (get it?



KAREN CALDWELL

Bus/Bust?...never mind), the trip was organized by Lori Wallach and Mike Dolan of the Citizens Trade Campaign, a coalition that includes Ralph Nader's Public Citizen. C.T.C. provided a groaning old bus, a long-haul driver named J.W., sandwiches and potato salad for lunch and dinner, and accommodations in the spare bedrooms of local families. As the country's only nationally syndicated populist radio host, I was invited to hop the bus and broadcast my daily talk show from the road with them, which I joyfully did.

Beginning with a pulpit-thumping, gospel-singing, standing-room-only rally in the sanctuary of Ebenezer Baptist, the Atlanta church where King himself preached, the two-day tour wound its way from urban to suburban settings, from small towns to farms. The uniqueness of this Congressional foray among the folks is that the lawmakers did precious little speechifying and a whole lot of listening and note-taking. They heard stories like those told by former workers of Lucent Technologies, the \$26-billion-a-year giant that until recently made and repaired telephones for AT&T.

About a hundred Communications Workers of America members gathered outside their now-closed plant on the edge of Atlanta to tell us about being drop-kicked from the edge of the new global economy. A thousand of them had been employed there and had gradually worked their way into the middle class, earning some \$15.50 an hour—roughly \$30,000 a year. These were skilled, efficient and reliable workers. Quality. Still, Lucent constantly messed with them, saying Mexico beckoned. They were told in the early nineties to take a \$2-an-hour pay cut, and they did. But even that giveback wasn't enough. Shortly after a gleeful Clinton and Congress rammed through NAFTA, Lucent hitched up the wagons and hauled off to Reynosa, Mexico, where maquiladoras pay workers \$1 an hour with no benefits, then ship product back to a store near you without paying any tariffs or honoring any quotas.

Anna Harris is one of the former Lucent workers who poured out their stories. Now in her early 50s, she was abruptly abandoned by the globally wayward Lucent after twenty-five years. She now works for \$7.50 an hour at a Target store, though she can only get sporadic hours, adding up to less than full time each month and a poverty income each year. Ironically, she sells AT&T phones at Target. Even though the Mexican-made phones are produced by low-paid laborers now, the retail price at Target is not a dime cheaper. Welcome to the New World Order.

Jim Hightower's Chat & Chew radio talk show (www.jimhightower.com) is syndicated coast to coast. His latest book is There's Nothing in the Middle of the Road But Yellow Stripes and Dead Armadillos (HarperCollins).

Conventional wisdom among Washington's political cognoscenti is that NAFTA, fast track, GATT, W.T.O., I.M.F., M.A.I. and the other pillars of our globalization policy are way too complex and arcane to interest, much less engage, ordinary Americans. But even a dog knows the difference between being stumbled over and being kicked. For America's workaday majority, globalization is not theoretical, it is experience. Neither is global greed anonymous. Behind the corporate masks are individuals whose names are known to folks like Anna Harris—individuals like Lucent C.E.O. Rich McGinn, who hauls home about \$2.5 million a year and has not offered to cut a dime of it in the interest of improving the firm's "global competitiveness."

The people know that globalization, as currently practiced, is globaloney. They know, too, that Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, Trent Lott and the lesser royals of Washington who preach the glories of the new internationalism have their pockets stuffed with corrupt campaign cash from the global profiteers.

Representatives Bonior, Kaptur, Lewis and the rest were barely off Capitol Hill before the powers that be were firing shots at

them. Democratic leader Dick Gephardt pointedly let it be known that he is too busy inside the Beltway crafting a Republican-Democratic trade policy compromise to be taking any bus rides. Representative Calvin Dooley, co-chair of the New Democrat Coalition, even pronounced the BusTourers disloyal: "We just spent two days at Wintergreen [a Virginia resort] talking about issues that unify the party. I find this entirely inconsistent with efforts to maintain Democratic Party unity."

But the political elites—especially Democrats—are badly misjudging the power and volatility of this issue. Globalization is no more about trade than civil rights was about states' rights. Rather, it's a moral issue that goes right to the heart of people's fundamental sense of economic fairness and social justice. John Lewis knows from his hard-won experiences in the civil rights movement that Washington will be the last to get it. But the good news is that the noise level is rising in the countryside. The BusTour continues in April along the Mexican border, and it will also go to the West Coast, the upper Midwest, the Northeast and elsewhere. It's our country's unity that is at stake. ■

LETTERS

C O N T I N U E D

(Continued From Page 2)

State College, Pa.

■ Garrison Keillor says cable channels make public TV obsolete. I have to agree. The problem is that they don't—or won't—produce the programs that public TV provides. No cable service is even close to the quality of PBS's children's programming. Oh sure, there are some good programs on TLC or Nickelodeon, but they are few and far between, and compromised by the commercials in and around them. True, cable TV does a lot, but only 73 percent of the nation's households subscribe to cable or have satellite TV. By contrast, public TV is available free to nearly 98 percent of all TV households in the United States. No, I think that public TV is alive and well, despite the conventional wisdom down at the Chatterbox Cafe. GREG PETERSEN
Penn State Public Broadcasting

SHE'S NOT A JOLLY GOODFELLA

Washington, D.C.

■ We who have worked closely with Geraldine Ferraro were shocked by your baseless attack on her ["Ferraro Goes Impersonal," Feb. 2/9]. We do not know the substance of the charges against Ferraro in the editorial, particularly the vague "inconvenient facts" about mobsters. We do know that all charges against her were closely analyzed by the F.B.I., the State Department and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in connection with her work on intelligence-related matters, and with her representation of the United States at international human rights proceedings; the latter required high-level State Department and Senate security clearance.

Her insistence on a pledge against personal attacks is certainly understandable. She was viciously attacked in 1992 with false allegations by Elizabeth Holtzman and Robert Abrams, which gave the election to the egregious Al-

fonse D'Amato. Who should have to go through that again? *The Nation*, either indifferent to or ignorant of any of this, concludes by chiding her opponents with acceding to "a political *omertà*," the Mafia code of silence. The insinuation is obvious. *The Nation* should not stoop so low.

HERMAN SCHWARZ
FELICE D. GAER

FROM THE GREEDY TO THE NEEDY

Fort Lauderdale, Fla.

■ Richard Rorty's "First Projects, Then Principles" [Dec. 22] (which has only now come to my attention) is correct in placing campaign finance reform first in his list of things that need to be accomplished to halt bribery of our politicians by the "rich and greedy." However, he offers only a palliative in his prescription of free TV time. President Clinton tossed out that bone in his State of the Union Message. A far better proposition would be the Clean Money Option adopted by the voters in Maine in 1996. In exchange for a promise to voluntarily accept a ceiling on campaign expenditures, public funds would be available to pay for reasonable efforts to present a candidate and his views in the various forms of media advertising customarily employed. If one of the candidates refused to take the pledge and accept a ceiling on her spending, her opponent would receive an additional sum from a public campaign fund to equal the spending of the noncomplying candidate.

There are ongoing efforts, particularly in Massachusetts but in other states as well, to put this method of eliminating private money from the political process into effect in statewide elections. In the last session of Congress, Senators Wellstone, Kerry, Biden and Glenn introduced similar legislation for federal campaigns.

The left could find many allies among the disillusioned ranks of voters who, after the dis-

closures of the horrors of campaign finance in the 1996 elections, realize that only as private money donors are replaced by public financing will we strike a blow for the needy and against the greedy.

JOHN B. ANDERSON
National co-chair, Public Campaign
Former Member of Congress

ALL THE WAY WITH 401(K)

Dallas

■ Michael Moore's trenchant "Is the Left Nuts? (Or Is It Me?)" [Nov. 17] was ironically borne out by the editorial in the same issue expressing regret that the October stock market hiccup was not worse, to punish the plutocrats. But in the nineties, the booming U.S. stock markets now contain the life savings and retirement hopes of a lot of working Americans. For today's workers, traditional pensions have disappeared, job security is gone, college costs have exploded, real estate has tanked and real wages have stagnated. We're on our own as far as saving for retirement and somehow staying employed. But working Americans who have invested in equities—through 401(k) plans—have benefited from an astonishing 95 percent return in the past three years. The same capitalist forces that generated chainsaw layoffs, wholesale elimination of benefits and job insecurity have also produced remarkably efficient U.S. companies. These efficiencies—whether or not you approve of the methods—have increased the value of the retirement accounts and college funds of millions of average Americans.

You should cheer the mild intervention of the Fed and the Administration to reassure investors that the economy is sound despite the well-deserved Asian meltdown. The market rout you wish for would hurt the very people *The Nation* and the left have traditionally cared about: working Americans. GEORGE ALLEN KIRCHWEY

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TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE

INTRODUCTION

Welfare—the money we hand out to corporations and wealthy individuals—costs us at least \$448 billion a year. Let's put that number into perspective:

- The federal deficit—the amount the government's expenditures exceed its revenues—is now running about \$117 billion a year (all figures on this page are for fiscal 1996). So we could wipe out the entire deficit simply by cutting welfare by about 26%.
- Welfare for the rich costs us about 3½ times as much as the \$130 billion we spend each year on welfare for the poor—an amount the 1996 welfare "reform" bill will reduce significantly. (For details on the programs that make up welfare for the poor, see the appendix that starts on page 15.)
- The federal budget's discretionary spending—in other words, not counting entitlement trust funds like Social Security and Medicare—is \$1.3 trillion. So three years of welfare costs us more than it does to run the government for a year.
- The federal debt, which has been accumulating since 1789, is now about \$5.1 trillion. So just 11½ years of welfare for the rich equals more than 200 years of deficit spending by the whole federal government.

For a summary of what goes into that \$448-billion welfare figure, turn back one page to the table of contents, where we list the estimated annual cost of the various subsidies, handouts, tax breaks, loopholes, rip-offs and scams this book describes.

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We've calculated these amounts as precisely as possible, but since they change every year—and since data is often hard to obtain—they're inevitably estimates. But you could cut them all by 75% and welfare for the rich would still cost almost as much each year as the federal deficit.

We're not saying that \$448-billion figure is an overestimate—if anything, it's an underestimate. Time and space limitations forced us to leave out many major categories of welfare.

Most of these could be books in themselves: state and local welfare (as opposed to federal), the easy treatment given white-collar criminals, Medicare waste and fraud, automobile subsidies, the effects of Federal Reserve policies, the NAFTA and GATT treaties, foreign aid, deregulation of various industries, fraudulent charitable deductions, and on and on.

We discuss some of them in the chapter called *What we've left out*, which begins on page 115. (Only the Pentagon chapter is longer, which gives you an idea of how much welfare isn't included in our estimate.)

Even within categories we do cite figures for, there are often additional welfare expenses we haven't been able to nail down. So, in our view, \$448 billion greatly understates the amount of money American taxpayers spend each year on welfare for the rich.

Stealing from the poor

Before we go on, we'd like to make something clear. We're not saying there's anything wrong with being rich, in and of itself. Many wealthy

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people earned their money by producing a product or service the public liked and wanted to buy, or by helping a company do that. The Grateful Dead are a good example—their concerts became so popular that they had to run lotteries to decide who got to buy tickets.

Now, speaking personally, we don't think people should inherit fortunes while others spend their whole lives scrambling to get by. We also think that, as long as anybody in the world is starving, there should be an upper limit on how much money any one person can have. But this book isn't about those issues.

All this book says is that it's not fair for people to get rich—and stay rich—by *defrauding people who are poorer than they are*. As you'll soon see, stealing from the poor—actually, from anybody who isn't rich—has become standard operating procedure in this country. In fact, the US government today functions mostly as a huge Robin-Hood-in-reverse.

But doesn't it help the economy?

It's sometimes argued that corporate welfare benefits society as a whole, by recirculating money back into the economy. Of course, that's also true of welfare for the poor, which benefits landlords, supermarkets, variety stores, etc.

What's more, a lot of welfare programs pay for themselves many times over in future savings on health care, prisons and welfare payments. (Head Start is a perfect example—according to conservative estimates, \$1 invested in Head Start saves \$3 in future costs to society.)

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Corporate welfare, on the other hand, tends to finance industries that pollute our air, water and soil, so we end up paying for them twice—with our money and with our health. Subsidizing certain businesses or industries is not only unfair to competitors who aren't subsidized, but it also stifles the incentive of the subsidized businesses to innovate and to develop new products, which ultimately makes them less competitive.

Welfare for the rich fosters corruption, both in business and in government. And it's not uncommon for two welfare programs to conflict—as when the Interior Department subsidizes irrigation water for agribusinesses and the Agriculture Department pays those same companies not to grow crops with that water. (What do the companies do? Why, sell the water back to local governments at a profit, of course. What else?)

It's not as if the money currently used for welfare would suddenly evaporate if we weren't handing it over to the rich. It could go into the economy some other way, and would almost certainly have a more beneficial effect. (For more on this, see the section called *What about the jobs we'd lose?* It starts on p. 25, in the chapter on military waste and fraud.)

There's one final cost to all this welfare chicanery. The creative talents of a lot of very bright lawyers, accountants and financial advisors are spent figuring out how to squeeze the maximum benefit out of our labyrinthine tax code. If they weren't wasting

TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE

their time on that, they could be doing something genuinely useful, which would make the economy more productive for all of us.

Who gets taxed?

Back in the 1950s, US corporations paid 31% of the federal government's general revenues. Today, they pay just 1%. If businesses paid taxes at the same rate they did 40 years ago, the federal deficit would disappear overnight—and that's without eliminating a single direct subsidy or handout.

It's easy for "fiscally responsible" candidates to achieve their dearest goal, balancing the budget. All they have to do is get corporations to pay as much in taxes as they did when what was good for General Motors was good for the country.

Taxes that corporations don't pay have to be raised by taxing individuals. Not by taxing all individuals *indiscriminately*, of course—that would be un-American. A series of tax "reforms" that began in 1977 have cut the rate paid by the richest Americans nearly in half, while Social Security taxes—which are paid overwhelmingly by ordinary wage earners (and not paid at all on income over \$62,700)—have steadily risen.

The rich get richer

Not surprisingly, these tax changes have contributed to a widening gap between rich and poor. Between 1983 and 1989, 99% of the increase in Americans' wealth went to the top 20% of the population, and 62% of it went to

INTRODUCTION

the top 1% of the population (currently made up of families whose net worth is \$2.35 million or more). Income disparity in the United States is now the widest it's been since the crash of 1929, and it continues to grow.

The total net worth of that top 1% is now equal to the total net worth of the bottom 90% of the population! In other words, the 2.7 million Americans who are worth \$2.35 million or more have as much money as the 240 million Americans who are worth \$346,000 or less.

Wherever you look on the economic ladder, the rich are getting richer. The wealth of the top 20% has increased while the wealth of the bottom 80% has decreased. Within that top 20%, the top 5% have gotten richer than the bottom 15%. Within that top 5%, the top 1% have gotten richer than the bottom 4%. Within that top 1%, the top 1/4% have gotten richer than the bottom 3/4%.

And so it goes, right up to the 400 wealthiest Americans. In the eight years from 1980 to 1987, their average net worth *tripled*.


Now, we hate paying taxes as much as anybody else, and we're certainly not fans of the IRS. But since corporations and wealthy individuals derive most of the benefit from what the government does, we think they should at least pay their fair share of taxes. They're always blathering on about free enterprise—a mythical system they wouldn't survive in for five minutes if it did exist—so let's assume they mean what they say, and take them off the dole.

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since five laborers make that amount and no more than three people make any other amount. The mode is the value you'd get most often if you picked inhabitants at random and asked them to tell you their incomes. (In fact, \$1,000 is the answer you'd get 45% of the time.)

So, in this example, the mode also provides a much better idea of the average than the mean does. (The mode isn't typically at the bottom of the distribution, by the way; often it's near the median.)

Here's our example in chart form:



billion

Numbers in the billions contain three commas. A billion dollars is a thousand times more than a million dollars. It's equal to a stack of crisp, new dollar bills twelve times as high as the Empire State Building.

GLOSSARY

If you laid those dollar bills end-to-end, they'd stretch from New York to Los Angeles and back sixteen times, and you'd still have enough left over to go from New York to Mexico City and back.

Let's say you took a road trip. If you really pushed it, you might be able to drive an average of twelve hours a day (not counting gas stops, meals, sleep, etc.). If you drove seven days a week and averaged 65 while moving, it would take you almost four months to drive past a billion dollars' worth of dollar bills.

But a billion dollars is *nothing* compared to a trillion dollars.

black budgets

Both the Pentagon and the various intelligence agencies have secret "black budgets" that are completely off the books. Despite a Supreme Court ruling to the contrary, black budgets clearly violate the Constitution, which states that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law" and requires that the government publish a "regular statement...of the receipts and expenditures of all public money."

Congressional Black Caucus

This policy-planning group consists of the African-American members of Congress.

constant dollars

Due to *inflation* (or, very rarely, *deflation*), the value of a dollar is always changing. So if you contrast how much something cost in, say,

TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE

1980 with how much it costs today, you're not going to get an accurate comparison. The way around that is to pick what the dollar was worth in a given year and make that the standard. Then you can say, "the project was expected to cost \$2.3 billion in 1980, but ended up costing \$7.8 billion (in 1980 dollars)."

credit — see *tax credit*

debt

The federal debt is the cumulative figure for how much the government owes at a given point in time (in other words, it's the total of all the *deficits*, minus any surpluses). In late 1996, the debt stood at slightly more than \$5 trillion.

deduction — see *tax deduction*

deficit

The federal budget deficit is how much expenditures exceed revenues in a given fiscal year. In fiscal 1995, it was \$164 billion, and it's projected at \$117 billion for fiscal 1996. Compare *debt*.

deflation

Deflation is when, over time, a given amount of money is able to buy more and more things. Compare *inflation*.

depreciation

Depreciation allows you to deduct a certain part of the cost of an asset from your taxable income each year, supposedly to allow for the decrease in its value as it ages. (Thus it's a kind of *amortization*.) *Depreciation schedules*

GLOSSARY

tell you how much you can take off each year; they vary with the type of property, and with changes in the tax code.

depression

A depression is simply a really bad recession. (There isn't a generally agreed upon benchmark for when a recession becomes a depression, but some people say it's when unemployment reaches 20%.)

family — see *household*

federal debt or deficit — see *debt or deficit*

fiscal year

A fiscal year is any twelve-month period an organization (a corporation, governmental entity or whatever) uses for its budgets. It can be the same as a calendar year (January 1 to December 31) but often isn't.

The federal government's fiscal years begin on October 1st and are named after the calendar year in which they end. So fiscal year 1996—typically abbreviated FY96—began October 1, 1995 and ended September 30, 1996.

GDP — see *gross domestic product*

general fund revenues

These include all federal revenues except for entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare, which aren't discretionary and which are provided for by separate trust funds (at least they were separate, before greedy politicians got their hands on them). Combining entitlements with general fund

TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE

revenues is a trick politicians play to hide how much money they're spending on discretionary items like the military budget.

GNP — see *gross national product*

gross domestic product

The gross domestic product (or *GDP*) is the total market value of the goods and services brought into final use in a nation in a certain period of time (usually a year). It became the official measure of the US economy in 1991, replacing the *gross national product*.

This change brought us into line with the way most other industrialized nations figure it, thus making comparisons easier. (For the US, the *GDP* and the *GNP* are very similar.)

gross national product

The gross national product (or *GNP*) is the *gross domestic product* plus income earned by the nation's residents in foreign investments, minus income earned by foreign investors in the domestic market. In other words, the *GNP* measures what's produced by a nation's citizens, regardless of where they're located.

household

The Census Bureau distinguishes between a *household* (any group of people living together) and a *family* (an "economic unit" joined by marriage). That's why figures for median household income (or net worth) are different from those for family income (or net worth).

GLOSSARY

House Progressive Caucus

This policy-planning group consists of progressive members of the House of Representatives.

income disparity

As its name implies, this measures how evenly or unevenly income is distributed among people in a particular group (usually a nation). Of course, there can be different kinds of income disparity. In Saudi Arabia, for example, few people are really poor and a relatively small group make *tons* of money.

In the United States, many more people are poor and many more are rich (although few make as much as the richest Saudis). These varieties of income distribution complicate the question of how to measure income disparity, but if you just want to know if a nation has a lot of income disparity or a little, it usually isn't hard to tell.

inflation

Inflation is when, over time, a given amount of money is able to buy fewer and fewer things. Compare *deflation*.

mean — see *averages*

means testing

Means testing is figuring out how much money someone has, in order to decide if they're eligible for a welfare program that's only supposed to be open to people with low incomes and few assets.

TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE

median — see *averages*

million

Numbers in the millions contain two commas. A million dollars is a thousand times more than a thousand dollars. Laid end-to-end, a million dollars' worth of dollar bills would stretch almost 95 miles.

Imagine yourself driving by them. You're doing 65, so they're just a blur there by the side of the road. Still, it takes you almost an hour and a half to get past all those dollar bills.

But a million dollars is nothing compared to a billion dollars.

mode — see *averages*

multinational — see *transnational*

PAC

A PAC (the name is short for *political action committee*) is basically just a way to get around limits on campaign contributions. Also, by bundling many small-to-medium-sized donations, PACs have more influence. A politician may not know—or care—what industry you're associated with if you send in a \$100 donation, but that's never the case when \$5000 or \$10,000 comes from a PAC.

perk

A perk—short for *perquisite*—is an extra benefit, beyond salary, that someone gets by virtue of being in a certain job (or unpaid position). For example, a company pays for a business flight but the employee who makes the flight

GLOSSARY

gets the frequent flyer miles. (*Fringe benefit* means almost the same thing as *perk*, but a perk is much more likely to be an unofficial benefit that isn't explicitly stated anywhere.)

prime rate

Theoretically, the prime rate is the lowest interest a bank charges (on money it lends to its best customers). More typically, it's an arbitrary benchmark to which other interest rates are pegged.

progressive tax

With a progressive tax, the more money you make, the higher the percentage of it you pay in taxes. US income tax is supposed to be progressive. Compare *regressive tax*.

recession

A recession is usually defined as a decline in general business activity (as measured by the *GDP*) that goes on for at least two or three quarters (that is, for six to nine months). When a recession is really bad, it's called a *depression*.

regressive tax

With a regressive tax, the less money you make, the higher the percentage of it you pay in taxes. Many new tax proposals—as well as many existing provisions—are in fact regressive (the Social Security tax is a good example). Compare *progressive tax*.

revenues

Money coming in to the government. Also see *general fund revenues*.

TAKE THE RICH OFF WELFARE

tax credit

A tax credit lets you subtract an expense from the taxes you owe, not merely from your income (as a *tax deduction* does). Depending on your tax bracket, a credit is currently worth about 2½ to 7 times more than a deduction of the same size.

tax deduction

A tax deduction lets you subtract an expense from the income you report on your tax return. Compare *tax credit*.

transnational

A transnational—or *multinational*—is simply a corporation that has operations in more than one country. Typically, however, the term is used to refer to the larger transnationals, which are richer than many countries and more powerful than most. (We prefer the term *transnationals* to *multinationals* because it's better at giving the flavor of how they soar over and subsume mere nations.)

trillion

Numbers in the trillions contain four commas. A trillion dollars is a thousand times more than a billion dollars and a million times more than a million dollars.

A trillion dollars is equal to a stack of crisp, new dollar bills almost three thousand miles high. If you laid that pile down on its side, packed tightly together, it would stretch from New York to Los Angeles.

If you took that same trillion dollars in dollar bills and laid it down end-to-end, it would

WELFARE FOR THE POOR

stretch from New York to Los Angeles and back about 17,000 times—or from the earth to the sun and then around it.

If you started a business the day Christ was born and it lost a million dollars *a day*, you'd still have more than 700 years to go before you lost a trillion dollars.

WELFARE FOR THE POOR

Federal expenditures on welfare for the poor cost around \$130 billion in fiscal year 1996. There are two basic categories of benefits—those that go exclusively to the poor (or are supposed to) and those that go partially to the poor. The following programs fall into the first group:

- **Food stamps**—\$26 billion. (This program was severely cut back by the 1996 welfare "reform" bill.)
- **AFDC** (Aid to Families with Dependent Children)—\$18 billion. Along with food stamps, AFDC is what most people think of as "welfare." It's always been controversial because it's mostly geared towards women who are raising children without male support. (AFDC was essentially abolished by the 1996 welfare "reform" bill.)
- **Housing assistance**—\$13.1 billion. Section 8 helps families living in private housing keep their rent below 30% of their family income (at a cost of \$9.8 billion a year); a similar program does the same thing for people living in public housing projects (\$3.3 billion a year). Between them, they cost about half of the \$26 billion in welfare rich homeowners receive (as described in that chapter).

Taken from Against the Conventional Wisdom,
by Douglas Dowd (1997).

1

Myths and Realities of the Free Market

Markets are useful guides for certain purposes. But as economist Samuel Bowles has warned, "Markets not only allocate resources and distribute income, they also shape our culture, foster or thwart desirable forms of human development, and support a well defined structure of power. Markets are as much political and cultural institutions as they are economic."¹

The marketability of *everything*—the aim of free market guru Milton Friedman and his numerous followers—means the commodification of everything. Commodification has been and will remain lethal for a goodly number of vital economic and social processes, the very processes that do so much to determine the quality of our existence, those that involve health, education, and the preservation of natural resources. The need is great to disentangle what is valuable from what is harmful in the operation of free markets, to extract what can be a useful guide to economic policy from what has now become an indiscriminate endorsement of the market.

"Listen to the Market"

The spuriousness of today's free market dogma is quickly exposed if, in response to the command to listen to the market, one asks "*which* market?" Only rarely is there a hint of what would almost always be the accurate answer: the financial market—and there is more than one. Even if that is made clear, however, scarcely ever is it also acknowledged that the financial sector is dominated, not by the servicing of productive investment that has provided its reputability, but by speculation in securities and in the foreign exchange market (the latter exceeding \$2.6 trillion per day).² And one would have to follow such matters closely indeed to know that those who do the

speculating are mostly in their late twenties (Nicholas Leeson was just twenty-eight when he brought Baring Brothers down), and that their daily exertions resemble fraternity high jinks considerably more than the staid behavior once thought typical of bond traders: today Nintendo, tomorrow derivatives games (in which it is estimated more than \$40 trillion are involved).

All that is a far cry from what Adam Smith (1723–1790) had in mind in his *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776), the newly canonized bible of free market capitalism. Smith's aim was to break the hold of concentrated and corrupt power over the British economy—power held by the monarchy (the “mad” George III and his decadent court) in conjunction with the most powerful merchants and industrialists of the time.

The power those business groups possessed had been granted to them by the Crown—in a “patent of monopoly”—to their mutual enrichment. Such monopolies were granted to the members of giant trading companies (e.g., the East India Company) and, among others, to industrialists, giving them the sole right to produce a commodity (e.g., the Batteries Royal for arms or, for that matter, Johnny Walker for whiskey). Those arrangements, which Smith called “the mercantile system,” were initiated in the sixteenth century as a response to the weaknesses of traders and producers in the early modern era. They needed state protection and support to survive and flourish, and the Crown needed economic strength in an epoch of almost permanent war among the budding nation-states.

Smith had many aims; central to all of them was his recognition of the burgeoning of the new technology. For well over a century before the publication of the *Wealth of Nations*, the productive forces that would underlie modern industry had been emerging, but their application to production was suppressed by the entrenched beneficiaries of the old system.

By Smith's time, when Britain's private sector and its state were poised at the very edge of economic and military triumph, the fused relationships between the private and state power centers had come to mean always-deeper corruption, always more lost opportunities for what otherwise could become a dynamic industrialization process. Although his current devotees ignore it, Smith trusted neither the means nor the ends of businessmen—“an order of men,” he observed, “whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.”³

Smith *did* trust a free market—free of social, political, and business power or control—made and kept free by “the invisible hand” of market competition. He believed that such competition could come to be and would “transform individual selfishness into social well-being”—*if and only if* all sellers were small, no single company were big enough alone or with others to control *any* portion of the market. In other words, the market would determine the sellers' fates, not, as with the twentieth-century supercorporations, vice versa.

Smith died in 1790, a quarter of a century before the founding of the first enterprise to realize his technological hopes—an English cotton textile factory. In subsequent decades something like his free market ideal developed in that industry, with large numbers of competitive small producers and sellers. However, the profits of those enterprises depended upon the exploitation of powerless textile workers (including very young children), who worked twelve-to-fourteen-hour days, received bare subsistence wages, and led sickly and short lives. Smith's analysis, like those of the classical economists who followed—and like Marx—accepted the “labor theory of value,” which took harsh working conditions and subsistence wages as given.

The Wealth of Nations, the fount of today's “economic wisdom,” may be seen as a set of arguments that in Smith's time was reasonable, although seriously flawed by omissions—more understandable for one who wrote before rather than after the amply documented social outrages and human damages of industrialization. The harsh realities of nineteenth-century industrial capitalism notwithstanding, Smith's analysis hardened into ideology—in Britain and later in the United States (but not in other leading countries). As always, the costs of those “errors of omission” were borne by the powerless, whether in the industrializing or in the colonized countries. Those costs not only rose but also became socially explosive. The nineteenth century ended with a plague of wars over colonial interests, and the twentieth began with the most disastrous war in history—until that time.

Then, bent and battered almost beyond recognition by the economic and political convulsions—wars, depression, revolutions, and counterrevolutions—of the first half of this century, the philosophy and practices of “free market enterprise” were shunted into the shadows. For most of the period after World War II the leading capitalist nations were characterized by some degree of social democracy (as in Western Europe) or by the “welfare-welfare state,” as in the United States.

But as the 1970s ended, both the ideology and the policies of the market were resuscitated—first in Margaret Thatcher's Britain, then in Ronald Reagan's United States. By now, free marketry, powered by the governments of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain and by their leading corporations, central banks, and the global financial institutions they dominate, has become an epidemic throughout the world. One should note, however, that free markets do not in fact exist if the business world can help it: With one arm business elbows out public controls; with the other it develops private controls—alone or, all else failing, in concert with rivals. Nevertheless, the market ideologues blithely use Smith's language, even though they cannot legitimately employ his analysis.

Feb. 17.97

The Clinton Doctrine

See below for [Clinton's Defense](#)

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President Clinton's decision to use military force against the Serbs was not simply a calculated response to Slobodan Milosevic's intransigence. A careful reading of recent Administration statements and Pentagon documents shows that the NATO bombing is part of a larger strategic vision.

That vision has three basic components. The first is an increasingly pessimistic appraisal of the global security environment. "In this last annual threat assessment of the twentieth century," Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified on February 2, "I must tell you that US citizens and interests are threatened in many arenas and across a wide spectrum of issues." Those perils range from regional conflict and insurgency to terrorism, criminal violence and ethnic unrest.

The second component is the assumption that as a global power with far-flung economic interests, the United States has a vested interest in maintaining international stability. Because no other power or group of powers can guarantee this stability, the United States must be able to act on its own or in conjunction with its most trusted allies (meaning NATO).

The third component is a conviction that to achieve global stability, the United States must maintain sufficient forces to conduct simultaneous military operations in widely separated areas of the world against multiple adversaries, and it must revise its existing security alliances--most of which, like NATO, are defensive in nature--so that they can better support US global expeditionary operations.

Combined, these three propositions constitute a new strategic template for the US military establishment. This template is evident, for example, in the \$112 billion the President wants to add to the Defense Department budget over the next six years, which will be used to procure additional warships, cargo planes, assault vehicles and other equipment intended for "power projection" into distant combat zones.

Less public, but no less significant, is the US effort to convert NATO from a defensive alliance in Western Europe into a regional police force governed by Washington. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright first unveiled this scheme this past December at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels. Claiming that missile-armed "rogue states" pose as great a threat to Europe as the Warsaw Pact once did, Albright called on NATO to extend its operational zone into distant areas and to combat a wide range of emerging threats. "Common sense tells us," she said, "that it is sometimes better to deal with instability when it is still at arm's length than to wait until it is at our doorstep."

Herein lies the essence of what might be termed the Clinton Doctrine--the proposition that the best way to maintain stability in the areas that truly matter to the United States (like Western Europe) is to combat instability in other areas, however insignificant it may seem, before it can intensify and spread. Perha4/30/99 9:09 AM

most explicit expression of this doctrine was Clinton's February 26 speech in San Francisco--an important statement that clearly foreshadowed the decision to bomb Serbia:

It's easy...to say that we really have no interests in who lives in this or that valley in Bosnia, or who owns a strip of brushland in the Horn of Africa, or some piece of parched earth by the Jordan River. But the true measure of our interests lies not in how small or distant these places are, or in whether we have trouble pronouncing their names. The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so [emphasis added].

This is an extraordinary statement; not since the Vietnam era has a US President articulated such an ambitious and far-reaching policy. Moreover, as we have seen in the Balkans, Clinton has every intention of acting on its precepts. His decision to bomb Serbia is consistent with a clearly delineated strategic plan.

There is a growing debate over the wisdom of bombing Serbia. Certainly many people are concerned about the humanitarian dimensions of the Serbian actions in Kosovo. But in the course of this debate it is essential not to lose sight of the larger strategic doctrine behind the bombing. If the newly hatched Clinton Doctrine is not repudiated, the bombing of Yugoslavia may be only the first in a series of recurring overseas interventions--a prospect that should galvanize peace and disarmament groups across America.

Michael T. Klare

E-mail this story to a friend.

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Eisenhower Doc
Nixon Doc.

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The Kosovo/NATO Conflict: Questions and Answers

By Michael Albert and Stephen R. Shalom

1. What are the roots of the Kosovo conflict?

Ethnic Serbs and Albanians give extended historical arguments going back as far as 1389 or 1912 or World War II. The basic issue is that the Kosovo province of Serbia (called Kosova in Albanian) has a large majority -- as much as 90 percent -- of ethnic Albanians with a roughly 10 percent Serbian minority. The Kosovo Albanians, however, are only about 16 percent of Serbia's total population. The Kosovo Albanians claim to be an oppressed minority within Serbia and want self-determination. The Kosovo Serbs claim to be an oppressed minority within Kosovo, and want protection from the Albanians. For Serbs, Kosovo, particularly in the north, is the site of many historical events and locales, their Jerusalem and Alamo rolled into one.

Yugoslavia consisted of 6 republics (Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and in 1974 Tito gave autonomous status to two provinces of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Kosovo autonomy allowed its ethnic Albanians to develop their own institutions, but angered Serbian nationalists. The Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY) under Tito and after his death in 1980, suppressed nationalist ideology and political dissent.

In 1987, however, Slobodan Milosevic used anger over Kosovo to take control of the Serbian branch of the LCY. The previous leaders, Milosevic charged, had appeased the Albanians and failed to defend Serb interests. In 1989, Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomy, encouraging forcible Serb repression of the Albanian majority ever since. Most Albanian Kosovars now want complete independence.

2. What is the KLA?

The Albanian Kosovars fought Serb control in 1989 by non-violent resistance: they elected their own leaders, refused to cooperate with the Serb authorities, and established their own counter-institutions. Their "president" was Ibrahim Rugova, a

follower of Gandhi, who urged his people to reject violence while working toward independence. Serbian repression in Kosovo since 1989 didn't attract much concern from Washington. In 1995, when the United States sponsored talks in Dayton, Ohio to end the fighting in Bosnia, Milosevic was feted as the key to peace and Rugova was excluded from the conference. Thereafter repression increased in Kosovo and Rugova had little to show for his non-violent approach.

In 1996, an obscure organization appeared on the scene, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, or UCK in Albanian), committed to armed struggle. They undertook some ineffectual attacks on police stations and sometimes Serb civilians, including Serbian refugees from the Yugoslav wars whom many Albanians viewed as colonizers intended to shift the demographic balance. In early 1998, Serbian special police assaulted three villages, killing more than eighty people, at least seventeen after they had been detained or surrendered. This attack drove thousands of Albanians into the KLA, and though still called terrorists by the Serbian authorities, they became a serious guerrilla army, with mass support. Over the next months the KLA took control of roughly 40 percent of Kosovo's territory. By late summer, however, Serbian forces retook most of the territory, their major tactic being to crush civilian support for the rebels by systematically destroyed towns and villages and forcing thousands of people to flee.

It is difficult to tell the KLA attitude toward Serb civilians. Human rights groups have accused them of serious human rights violations, including compelling Serb villagers to leave their homes, with some killings, though not approaching the scale of atrocities committed by Serbian forces. The KLA claims not to target civilians, while acknowledging that abuses are committed by fighters in the field.

3. Why does everyone talk about the conflict spreading?

Massive refugee flows have the potential to destabilize many surrounding countries where there is a delicate ethnic balance. In Macedonia, for example, commentators fear that Albanian immigration would provoke the Albanian minority to secede or would even make it a majority, which the Macedonian majority is determined to prevent. And having hundreds of thousands of Albanians living in refugee camps brings visions of the Palestinians, with all the instability their plight has caused the Middle East. In addition, Albania has warned that it will not sit idly by if its compatriots across the border are slaughtered, and Serbia has made incursions into Albania to prevent the flow of weapons and recruits to the KLA. Finally, Turkey and Greece, long-time enemies, and Bulgaria as well might get involved. (Of course, it is a little odd for NATO to launch a war in order to prevent two NATO members -- Turkey and Greece -- from going at each other.)

4. Is the U.S. motivated by humanitarianism in the Balkans?

No. But how do we prove such a claim? Suppose the U.S. is motivated to wage war

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and drop bombs in this instance by humanitarian concerns. If so, that would mean that concern for the plight of oppressed minorities and populations ranked very high in U.S. policy-making calculations. We would then expect, it follows, that in any case where large populations are suffering horrible repression Washington would try to intervene to stop the repression.

Now consider the reverse claim that U.S. foreign policy is never motivated by concern for the well being of local constituencies but will only opportunistically use related rhetoric for rationalization purposes when possible. If this were true, in contrast, we would expect that the U.S. would intervene in the affairs of other countries only to serve domestic elites in the U.S. or to aid local elites in other countries on behalf of U.S. elites, or perhaps to influence or enhance policies undertaken by other countries thought to benefit U.S. government and elite interests -- but with the human costs to victims playing virtually no role in the calculations.

Now look at the evidence.

- Before World War II, for example, the United States could have admitted many Jews fleeing from Hitler's Europe; it did not.
- During World War II, the United States could have bombed the death camp at Auschwitz, slowing down the Nazi killing machine; it did not.
- When hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered in Indonesia in 1965; the killers were cheered on by the U.S. government who even provided lists of communists to exterminate.
- When the Pakistani army began slaughtering and raping hundreds of thousands of Bengalis in 1971, sending millions into exile, U.S. policy was to (in Kissinger's words) "tilt in favor of Pakistan."
- When Indonesia invaded East Timor, leading to the deaths of one third of the population, it received weapons and diplomatic support from Washington. Just this past week, White House press secretary Joe Lockhart was asked whether the United States supported independence for East Timor. "Not that I am aware of," he replied.
- When the Khmer Rouge was responsible for monstrous killings in Cambodia, the United States encouraged China to aid the Khmer Rouge and provided covert aid of its own.
- When the government of Guatemala killed 200,000 people in the 1980s, it was with United States aid and encouragement.
- When upwards of half a million people, mostly members of the Tutsi ethnic minority, were exterminated in Rwanda in 1994, the Clinton administration demanded that a UN force already on the scene be reduced and obstructed efforts to save lives, even failing to apply diplomatic pressure against the killers.

Investigation of all these cases and many more -- the Turkish treatment of Kurds in Turkey, for example -- reveals a consistent pattern which has nothing to do with concerns for repressed populations and everything to do with calculations of U.S. elite and geo-political interests. In every case policy would have been roughly opposite to what took place, if there had been humanitarian concerns. There weren't, and there aren't.

5. So why is NATO now bombing in the Balkans?

Just as killings by the (U.S.-trained) junta in Haiti did not concern U.S. policymakers until large numbers of refugees started fleeing to the United States, so too human rights abuses in Kosovo did not concern U.S. policymakers as long as they didn't threaten regional stability. But as the fighting in Kosovo escalated, with large numbers of displaced Albanian refugees, U.S. officials decided they needed to curb the problem—not to aid locally affected people, but to prevent losses to U.S. interests due to the conflict spreading into other parts of Europe.

In February and March at Rambouillet in France, the United States and its European allies invited the Albanian Kosovars and the Milosevic government to sign an agreement that provided for the withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, the disarming of the KLA, autonomy for Kosovo, a NATO peacekeeping force, and follow-up final-status negotiations after three years. Milosevic said he was unwilling to accept foreign troops on his territory. NATO said it would bomb him if the Albanians signed and he didn't. (Compare this with U.S. mediation efforts in Northern Ireland where threatening to bomb a recalcitrant party was not part of the equation.) The Albanians reluctantly accepted the Rambouillet agreement and Milosevic refused.

Now the primary NATO goal became maintaining its credibility. The Clinton administration had invested heavily in expanding NATO, to make it a primary instrument of U.S. policy not only in Europe, but beyond. There is an elementary point of big power politics that no one denies: threats made need to be carried out if the credibility of future threats are to be maintained. And, likewise, threats carried out but not yielding total victory need to be escalated until the adversary is crushed.

So why make the initial threat to bomb? There is a predisposition in Washington to favor military solutions. A diplomatic approach would have strengthened the UN and international law and made Russia a player, all of which would interfere with U.S. freedom of action. Bombing, on the other hand, leads with the U.S. strong suit. It provides a rationale for U.S. domestic military spending, and an international arms bazaar. It tells the world that the U.S. response to problems with other nations is to bomb them. "What good is this marvelous military force," Albright asked Gen. Colin Powell a few years back, "if we can never use it?"

6. What effects do the bombings have?

In preparation for the bombing, relief workers (who might have continued to mitigate the suffering) and international observers (who might have continued to discourage the most blatant atrocities) were pulled out of Kosovo. The NATO bombing then provoked a horrific outburst of ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces as hundreds of thousands of Albanian Kosovars were driven from their homes. Because all reporters and international observers had left Kosovo, we do not know the human toll of Serb actions, but it surely considerably exceeds the toll for the previous year, during which some 2,000 ethnic Albanian civilians had been killed and about 250,000 ethnic

Albanians had become refugees, most of them within Kosovo.

Even without the bombing, a Serbian offensive was likely imminent, but it is hard to believe it would have been as ferocious as what has occurred. The bombing incensed many even in Serbia's democratic movement, so one can only imagine how it must have affected Serb security forces in Kosovo. Unable to retaliate against NATO missiles and warplanes, they could be expected to lash out at those most vulnerable, ethnic Albanian civilians. Of course, none of this mitigates the responsibility for the atrocities on the part of those who carried them out. But if someone is holding a person hostage and you recklessly charge forward, leading to the death of the hostage, you also bear some responsibility -- all the more so if you rush in not out of true concern for the hostage, but for other reasons entirely. Many U.S. officials have acknowledged that they thought the bombing might well lead to a paroxysm of violence from Milosevic and that air power, the NATO tool of choice, could do nothing to stop that violence in the short run.

Bombing, of course, has had other implications as well. Within Yugoslavia the population has rallied to its leader, Milosevic. The democratic opposition, previously challenging Milosevic, now appears to be either dismantled, jailed, or, most chillingly, supporting him. As Zorin Djindjic, the leader of Serbia's Democratic Party and an organizer of pro-democracy demonstrations in 1996-97 put it, the "bombs have marginalized any dissenters here." Washington, he said bitterly, has spent more on one day's bombs than it ever spent helping the democracy movement in Yugoslavia. Montenegro, the smaller of the two Yugoslav republics, had previously passed a resolution questioning Milosevic's Kosovo policy, but the bombing has quieted its opposition as well. These results were predictable. And the level of hostility and tension in the whole region has climbed dramatically, making negotiations and a lasting peace, eventually obviously required, that much more difficult.

And then there is the horrible loss of life and means of sustaining life that mounts with each new raid of Belgrade and Yugoslavia as a whole. Bombing has a deadly logic of its own. What begins as "surgical" attacks inevitably expands. "We have to drop the bridges and turn out the lights -- there should be no more outdoor rock concerts in downtown Belgrade," Sen. John McCain told Newsweek. "Twelve days of surgical bombing was never going to turn Serbia around," wrote New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman. "Let's see what 12 weeks of less than surgical bombing does. Give war a chance."

7. But even if badly motivated, and even if they have some bad effects, won't the bombings at least restrain Milosevic?

Restrain him from what? The idea that doing something necessarily improves a situation is, of course, quite false. Some things may be beneficial. Others not. Yes, even an ill-motivated action can sometimes have a desirable effect and therefore deserve support, but in this case the bombing is not only ill-motivated, its effects are horribly detrimental as well. It has worsened the plight of the Albanian Kosovars, vastly increasing the flow of refugees and, due to the scale, created a catastrophe of the first order. It has diminished the internal opposition to Milosevic, and if reports are

accurate perhaps destroyed it. It has undermined the UN, turned NATO into an offensive, interventionary institution, played havoc with international law, and further projected the U.S. as a country eager and willing to punish any deviations it discerns from its will with bombs, thus acting as a threat against countries throughout the world. All these effects are horribly negative and then there is the devastation of Yugoslavia itself, the immediate expansion of deaths and casualties, and the future expansion due to the wrecking of a country's infrastructure.

The remarkable thing is that there is little dispute about the above. Yes, our formulation has a moral tone that many others lack when recounting these facts, but the facts are not in doubt.

8. But can the U.S. really be that vile? Isn't this just left cynicism and a knee-jerk rejection of all U.S. actions?

Sometimes when a person or group holds roughly the same position repeatedly in different contexts it indicates that the person or group is gravitating to it reflexively or has lost touch with reason and is bending reality to fit his or her prejudices. And yes, there are likely critics of the bombing who have adopted a stance based not on evidence and sound reasoning, but on a pre-determined mindset, with facts bent to fit.

But, the facts of U.S. international relations, and of the limited options available in this case are really not in dispute. And the judgment drawn by critics of U.S. policy are not leaps from those facts or distortions of those facts or subjective impositions on those facts, but rather very simple deductions from the facts, which, were the culprit any other nation, would be obvious to all.

9. How come there are conflicting viewpoints among leftists and progressives, some favoring bombing, some opposing it?

There has been an avalanche of media commentary emphasizing the immense and grotesque crimes in the Balkans for nearly a decade. It is natural that some folks, including many on the left, have become very impassioned about wishing to see those crimes curbed. This desire, perfectly reasonable on the face of it (though at times ignoring other and often worse cases of repression and violence in the world), has left some folks blind to the reality that just saying that a policy helps people doesn't mean that, in fact, the policy does help those people. The desire not to ignore the plight of the Kosovars is worthy. But to advocate policies that end up hurting the Kosovars, Yugoslavia as a whole, international law, the UN, and by the threat-effect all who might oppose U.S. pursuits, on grounds that at least it is doing something, is unworthy.

10. Why do many leftists inside Serbia deny that the Serbs have committed atrocities? Are we being misled about that?

There are many factors at work, no doubt. Ethnic conflicts frequently find leftists on opposite sides, swept up in the myths and distortions of their own ethnic group. (Think of the Palestine-Israeli or the Turkish-Greek conflicts.) Having bombs drop in your neighborhood and nation, which destroy the daily functioning of your society, has, we know from history, a tremendously galvanizing and homogenizing effect on people's views. More, there is likely also honest confusion. Facts available outside Yugoslavia may not be available inside, or at least may not be comprehensible there.

In matters such as this, testimony from people on the scene, from whatever persuasion, must be understood in context. Single events can be elaborated into whole theses, a common trick of the mass media, but in chaotic situations there are single events demonstrative of pretty much any kind of behavior one might wish to find. What matters most is not single examples or events, but widespread patterns of behavior and broad policies and their broad implications.

11. How come many right-wingers are against this action?

Some rightwingers reflexively oppose anything Clinton does (a draft-dodger can't lead us into war, etc.) But there are two other sources of rightwing opposition. One is the general point that elites can differ in their views as to what best serves U.S. elite interests. If it doesn't work as planned, which is certainly a reasonable projection of likelihoods, this operation may in fact leave NATO and the U.S. in a worse place than at its outset. Therefore, for those who doubt the bombing's capacity to lead to stable results that legitimate NATO, reduce risk of spreading conflict, etc., there is reason to oppose the policy.

Moreover, to some rightwingers, multilateralism -- even if it's NATO rather than the UN -- is suspect because it reduces to some extent U.S. freedom of action. If the situation in Kosovo might cause a crisis in southeastern Europe, let the Europeans deal with it. The right opposes peacekeeping operations ("the United States needs to husband its resources for great exertions, not dissipate them in a thousand stagnant fens" [Charles Krauthammer]). And where left critics of the bombing argue that it will not achieve -- and will in fact exacerbate -- any humanitarian objectives, the right is about as concerned about the suffering in Kosovo as it is about the suffering in America's cities.

12. What is the role of law in international relations and in this crisis? Where is the UN in all this?

U.S. officials frequently proclaim their adherence to international law, except when they don't want to. So, Washington ignored a ruling by the World Court on Nicaragua, vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to obey international law,

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and more generally acts unilaterally whenever it feels like. The same pattern pertains in this case, too.

The Charter of the United Nations -- which is a treaty signed by the United States and thus part of the "Supreme law of the land" -- prohibits the use or threat of force against other nations except in self-defense to an armed attack or if authorized by the UN Security Council. When the United States can bring along the Security Council it is delighted to do so (for example, during the 1991 war against Iraq), even if it takes blatant bribery to pressure other states to assent. But where such consensus is impossible, Washington has been happy to simply ignore the Security Council, claiming that it has authorization from previous Council resolutions, even though most other countries see no such authorization (the U.S.-British bombing of Iraq in December 1998, for example) or else advancing ludicrous claims that it is acting in self-defense (as in its recent missile strikes on a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant).

Regional organizations like NATO simply do not have the right to act on their own. Article 53 of the UN Charter states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." So in the case of Kosovo, the U.S. and NATO, confronting a problem, turned not to the UN but to the Pentagon. The UN is not entirely under U.S. auspices and could, conceivably, act independently and in a humanitarian manner which would frequently conflict with U.S. interests and require changes in U.S. policies.

13. But aren't borders an abstraction? Shouldn't we be concerned with people rather than with nations? Why does it matter that Yugoslavia is a sovereign nation and that this is an internal conflict rather than between nations?

Borders exist. And the reason to be concerned about their violation even with good motivations much less by a unilateral and illegal force uninterested in the plight of the suffering, is because respect for borders is one of the few impediments to the mighty doing whatever they please with the weak. To establish the precedent that national sovereignty is inconsequential is to remove perhaps the major impediment to one nation sending troops, bombers, or missiles into another. Once that is done, there remains only debate over what is warranted, and in the world as we know it such debate is dominated by the most powerful states and their massive media machines, most particularly the U.S. (Military intervention, Richard Falk has reminded us, is like the Mississippi River: it only flows from North to South.) Thus, to deny the validity of national sovereignty is to effectively give the U.S. carte blanche to intervene when and where it decides -- which is, of course, from the U.S. perspective, a delightful by-product of the current events.

14. What is the right way to deal with crises like this? There are two questions: How can we reduce violence and get settlements, and what rights

are national minorities entitled to?

Crises inside sovereign nations are complex problems on the international scene. Should Japan bomb Washington out of solidarity with blacks subjected to horrible conditions and violence in our inner cities? Would that improve or worsen the plight of blacks, have ancillary affects that were positive or negative from the point of view of justice and self-determination? The major means of impacting relations ought to be diplomacy, international opinion, and domestic movements. In some instances (as in the case of apartheid in South Africa) these may be rightly augmented with economic sanctions which are supported by the internal opposition. In other instances, however, sanctions can amount to a deadly and immoral weapon, having as their chief consequence huge and criminal casualties among civilians, as in Iraq in recent years. And yes, one can certainly imagine situations where a powerful state or community can and will devastate a minority ethnic group if there is not some form of more powerful intervention -- but this does not mean bombing by interested parties not seeking true peace and which will only aggravate crimes and divisions.

Most world problems, including most humanitarian crises, don't call for military solutions, but non-pacifists believe that there are some situations where force is the only option. If that force is wielded by the United States, however, it will be used to further U.S. elite interests rather than any humanitarian objective. Other countries, too, look out for their own elite interests, so the way to minimize the influence of the elite-serving agendas of individual governments is to put a humanitarian military force under democratic international control. International control must mean the UN General Assembly, not the Security Council which is set up in the most undemocratic way imaginable, with five countries (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) having veto power.

Even the General Assembly does not represent real democracy. There's no relation of votes to population, many members states are themselves undemocratic, and even those that are formally democratic are dominated by elites with money. True democratic control of a humanitarian force must await global social change, but in the meantime the General Assembly provides the best approximation.

Thus, in extreme cases, what is needed to prevent human travail is no doubt a true peace-keeping force, under the auspices of the General Assembly of the UN, prepared to stand between combatants and, if necessary, to defend itself and those being abused, to create conditions for negotiations.

What rights are national minorities entitled to? As a basic position, we must support self-determination as a fundamental democratic right. But there are some tough questions. What if a minority wants to secede, but within their territory live other minorities? Such situations have no simple solution, especially if the minority does not live in contiguous territory. What if a minority wishes to leave a country and take with it the bulk of the country's resources or assets, leaving a majority behind bereft of the means to sustain themselves?

A proper policy regarding national minorities requires a flexible mechanism of international law and adjudication, respected by the peoples and nations of the world, with binding powers that all abide, and with priority attention to ensuring that the

Z Magazine, May 1999

"Give Peace A Chance: How Long Can NATO Continue Bombing Yugoslavia?"

by Michael Albert

The Clinton administration's answer so far has been, "as long as it takes" for Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to capitulate to its demands. It doesn't seem to matter if the bombing only worsens the plight for the Kosovar Albanians, the people we are supposedly trying to help. But there may be limits to what the people who reside within the NATO countries, including this one, are willing to tolerate. This is especially true now that Milosevic has offered to accept an international presence in Kosovo to oversee the return of refugees and their safety. "I think, that as Jesse Jackson would say, give peace a chance here," said Trent Lott, Senate Majority Leader. This has been a war against civilians, on both sides, an ugly truth that gets increasingly difficult to conceal with each set of bombing raids directed at non-military targets. Indeed President Clinton practically admitted as much when he declared that Milosovic's intransigence would cause the "the Serb people he claims to represent [to] face mounting hardship."

The Yugoslav army and paramilitary have terrorized the civilian population of Kosovo for the same reasons that the United States and its proxies did so in Vietnam, El Salvador and Guatemala: they are fighting against a guerrilla army that has support among the population of the contested territory. One way to wage this fight is to "drain the sea from the fish that swim in it," as U.S. counter-insurgency strategists used to say. These barbaric methods are now labeled "ethnic cleansing." On the NATO side, the war is being waged against civilians for somewhat different reasons: NATO's leaders cannot afford to risk their soldiers' lives by engaging Yugoslav forces on the ground, due to lack of support at home. So they have been trying to bomb Yugoslavia "back to the Stone Age" or at least to make it a very poor country for some time to come. They are close to achieving this goal.

For US policy-makers, destroying the Yugoslav economy is an important goal. It demonstrates to the world that any country that refuses to obey U.S. orders will pay an unbearable price. Hence Secretary of Defense William Cohen's response to the release of the three American POW's over the weekend: "We're going to intensify the bombing." But American citizens have been sold on this war as a humanitarian effort to rescue the Kosovars. They do not see the need to punish the people of Yugoslavia, nor do they share their leaders' other strategic aims. For example, the Clinton administration has already used this war to establish NATO's new role as an aggressive international police force, in contrast to its original stated purpose as a defensive alliance during the Cold War. The ever-expanding membership and mission of the new NATO is also a means by which the US can continue to control Europe's foreign and military policies.

Most Americans are not interested in these goals, and certainly wouldn't want all the suffering on both sides of the conflict in Yugoslavia to continue for reasons of power politics. This is the basis for the cracks that are appearing in the political support for the war here, beginning with last week's vote in which the U.S. House of Representatives refused to endorse the bombing. Europe's leaders are mostly willing to accept the hegemonic role of the United States, and the continued violence and suffering that this entails. But there too, the citizenry has different ideas. Anti-Americanism is on the rise in Germany, and on May 13, Germany's Green Party will meet to debate their policy on the war. The Greens will probably ask their leaders why they are supporting the continued bombing of Yugoslavia, while the Republican leadership in the U.S. Congress is now pushing for a negotiated solution to what some are calling "Clinton's war." Twenty-six Democrats also broke ranks last week and voted against the bombing. Many Greens are very angry about their party's collaboration with the war, and if their views prevail, it could conceivably topple the German government (a coalition of the Social Democratic and Green Parties). If the real purpose of the bombing were to secure a safe return and democratic government for Kosovo's Albanians, a settlement might well be reached. Some compromise could be worked out on the differences that remain: primarily the composition of the international peace-keeping force and their weapons. But the Clinton administration has imperial ambitions that carry a much higher priority. So we will need increasing pressure from citizens on both sides of the Atlantic to get President Clinton and his European allies back to the negotiating table.

TUESDAY, APRIL 13, 1999

EDITORIALS/OPINION

Why the Generation of 1968 Chose to Go to War

By Tony Blair

Mr. Blair is Britain's prime minister.

LONDON — We have learnt by bitter experience not to appease dictators. We tried it 60 years ago. It did not work then and it should not be tried now. President Slobodan Milosevic's actions in Kosovo have given rise to scenes of suffering and cruelty people thought were banished from Europe forever. Europe and the United States must stand firm together.

Mr. Milosevic's policy of ethnic cleansing must be defeated and reversed. President Bill Clinton has shown exactly the right resolve and determination. Once again, our thanks go to him and to the American people for their support in the cause of what is right.

Of course, we will be subject to the usual barrage of criticism, sometimes from people who, I think, find it hard to come to terms with the fact that there is a new generation of leaders in the United States and in Europe, who were born after World War II, who hail from the progressive side of politics, but who are prepared to be as firm as any of our predecessors right or left in seeing this thing through. See it through, we will.

Some argue we waited too long to act. To them I say it was right to give the negotiations every chance. Others argue we should not have acted at all. Of them I ask, what would have been to do nothing would have been to acquiesce in Mr. Milosevic's brutality. It was clear that unless he was stopped, Kosovo would share Bosnia's fate.

The evidence is sobering. The Serbian offensive last year forced over 300,000 people from their homes. Vil-

lages were burned, people massacred. Despite the efforts of the international community, including Russia, Mr. Milosevic rejected diplomacy in Paris this year. Hours later, he let his forces loose in Kosovo. Within days, tens of thousands of people had fled their homes.

Mr. Milosevic was preparing for ethnic cleansing long before a single NATO bomb fell. What has happened was part of a plan to drive hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians out of their homes, execute many of their men and torch their villages.

In Bosnia we waited four years before acting decisively. As a result of that conflict, more than 200,000 people lost their lives, and 2 million people were made homeless. The duration of the conflict meant that a million of them were never able to return to their homes. NATO has not made the same mistake in Kosovo. Anyone who has seen the pictures of the hundreds of thousands of refugees leaving Kosovo, or who has heard the piteous stories of suffering imposed by the Serbian special police and the paramilitary thugs who work with them, knows why we had to act. Now they want to know that we are going to succeed.

Just as I believe there was no alternative to taking action, I am convinced there is no alternative to continuing until we succeed. On its 50th birthday NATO must prevail. We are

fighting for a world where dictators are no longer able to visit horrific punishments on their own people in order to stay in power. It is important the people of Serbia know our quarrel is not with them.

It is with the architects of Kosovo's ethnic cleansing. Just as after World War II, a war-crimes tribunal will bring those responsible to justice.

Our policy in Kosovo is taking its toll on Mr. Milosevic's killing machine. We should not be fooled by his state-controlled television. If he was so confident of his position, why did he suppress the independent media in Serbia? But we need to be patient. As I said, as Mr. Clinton said, as other world leaders said at the outset of this action, he will not be defeated overnight.

We are also right to be cautious of the notion of a ground intervention force. Of course ground forces will be necessary in Kosovo to give the refugees the confidence to return to their homes in safety. But that is very different from fighting our way in.

While we keep all options under review at all times, that is not our plan. A land invasion would be a massive undertaking and would take time to assemble. The casualties would potentially be large. And the civilian population would be at Mr. Milosevic's mercy. That is why air strikes remain the sensible option in the crisis, intensifying them and adding to their impact.

Mr. Milosevic knows what he has to do to end NATO's air campaign: a verifiable cessation of all combat ac-

tivities and killings; the withdrawal of military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo; an international security force; the return of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid; and a political framework for Kosovo based on the Rambouillet accord.

We will not stop until he agrees to all of these conditions. The world knows too much of Mr. Milosevic to fall for any of his ploys. The succession of offers from Belgrade show that he is now looking for a way out. He wants to hang on to the results of his ethnic cleansing while protecting his killing machine. But anything short of what I have listed, and there's nothing doing. The air strikes go on.

We should start now planning for the longer term, building on the agreement that was reached at Rambouillet, accepted by the Kosovo Liberation Army, but rejected by Mr. Milosevic. After all their suffering, it is clear that the Kosovar Albanians will never trust Mr. Milosevic to rule Kosovo again. Any political solution must recognize that fact.

Russia has a unique and leading role to play in these efforts.

We need to enter a new millennium where dictators know that they cannot get away with ethnic cleansing or repress their peoples with impunity. We are fighting not for territory but for values. For a new internationalism where the brutal repression of ethnic groups will not be tolerated. For a world where those responsible for such crimes have nowhere to hide.

Newsweek

The myth of America's "booming economy"

You cannot escape it. You read it and hear it everywhere. From every news medium, every politician -- the economy is booming ... thriving ... soaring ... the leading economic indicators are looking great ... stock market is going through the roof ... "economy showed signs of continued strength in January as American's personal income rose by a robust .6 percent" ... prosperity everywhere ... the world's richest country ...

But ... but what about ... what about ...

- the working poor, the millions who toil at full-time jobs, yet remain below the official poverty level (an unrealistically low figure to begin with)
- the husbands and wives each having to work full time so together they manage to rise a little above the poverty level
- the millions who surrender 30 to 70 percent of their paycheck for rent
- those living in severely substandard housing
- those on the increasingly long waiting lists for public housing, due to the loss of such units
- the unemployed (the real amount, not the fudged figures announced to the public)
- those who want and need a full-time job, but can only get a part-time job, minus benefits
- those who want and need a permanent job, but can only get a temporary job, minus benefits
- the underemployed -- college graduates and those with advanced degrees working at relatively menial jobs with no connection to their studies
- the more than 43 million without any health insurance
- the even greater number without dental insurance
- the further millions with inadequate health insurance, including those with Medicare and Medicaid
- the elderly who spend half their income for health care and prescriptions
- the elderly who have to choose between prescriptions and food
- the elderly who purchase cat and dog food, but don't own any pets
- the millions with inadequate sick leave or maternity leave, or none at all
- those -- the great majority of employees -- who are lucky to

file:

get two weeks vacation, compared to the European norm of five weeks

- those forced to choose between heat and sufficient food in the winter
- those literally dying in the Southwest on hot summer days because they can't afford an air conditioner or are concerned about their electricity bill
- the homeless
- those one paycheck or one illness or one divorce away from homelessness
- those living five to ten people in a one-bedroom apartment
- the millions who go to bed hungry at least part of every month; (the largest network of food banks, Second Harvest, reported that 26 million people sought help during 1997)
- those frightened by the welfare reform law of 1996 into not applying for food stamps, welfare or Medicaid
- the 1.8 million souls in prisons and jails
- those who want to go to college but can't afford to
- those who go to college at the cost of a huge debt hanging round their neck for years
- the illegal aliens working as semi-slaves in sweatshops
- those living on their credit cards, making only the minimum payments each month, as the exorbitant interest piles up year after year
- the more than 50,000 businesses which file for bankruptcy each year
- the one million 500,000 individuals who file for bankruptcy each year
- the middle-class people who maintain their standard of living by working 50, 60, 70 hours per week, by their choice or their employer's dictate, plus a daily two- or three-hour commute, returning home totally wiped out and overstressed
- those hanging on to jobs they hate, jobs making them sick, only because of the health insurance and pension
- those forced by their employers to pay more and more of their insurance and pension costs
- those living only on social security
- those living only on welfare

Written by William Blum, author of *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*
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A companion piece to the above
Dancing on the electric grid

By Per Fagereng

Picture this standard experiment in psychology: A group of rats is placed on an electric grid and the voltage is slowly increased. After a while the rats feel a burning tingle in their feet. The experimenters up the voltage some more, and watch the rats dance and bite each other.

The experimenters are seeking knowledge, and the rats' pain is presumably worth it. The experimenters don't blame the rats for fighting each other, or punish the more aggressive ones. They know that individuals react to pain in different ways.

Now picture the economic terrain as a different kind of pain grid. Instead of electric shocks, the inhabitants experience job loss, higher prices, less pay, overwork, polluted neighborhoods and so on. Controlling the grid are not psychologists, but CEOs and bankers. Instead of knowledge, they are seeking profit. And so they up the pain, but not because they want to hurt people. They are really trying to up their profits, and the pain is a side effect.

After a while people on the grid do nasty things to each other, everything from domestic violence to immigrant-bashing to crime. Unlike the rats, the people get blamed for their misbehavior. We are told to point our fingers at the victims on the grid, instead of at the economic rulers who keep increasing the pain.

You'd think that the CEOs and bankers would ease up on the pain, but think again. They continue to demand more sacrifice from the poor, knowing full well how they'll react.

Would you call this a big conspiracy? Or the sum of many small conspiracies? Maybe it doesn't matter that much. I'm not a mind reader. The point is, the economic rulers pursue their profits and they know the consequences. So to that extent, they are choosing to inflict pain.

DISMANTLING FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RECOLONISING BOSNIA

by Michel Chossudovsky

The author is Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa.
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As heavily-armed NATO troops enforce the peace in Bosnia, the press and politicians alike portray Western intervention in the former Yugoslavia as a noble, if agonizingly belated, response to an outbreak of ethnic massacres and human rights violations. In the wake of the November 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, the West is eager to touch up its self-portrait as saviour of the Southern Slavs and get on with "the work of rebuilding" the newly sovereign states.

But following a pattern set since the onslaught of the civil war, Western public opinion has been misled. The conventional wisdom, exemplified by the writings of former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia Robert Zimmermann, is that the plight of the Balkans is the outcome of an "aggressive nationalism", the inevitable result of deep-seated ethnic and religious tensions rooted in history.¹ Likewise, much has been made of the "Balkans power-play" and the clash of political personalities: "Tudjman and Milosevic are tearing Bosnia-Herzegovina to pieces".²

Drowned in the barrage of images and self-serving analyses are the economic and social causes of the conflict. The deep-seated economic crisis which preceded the civil war has long been forgotten. The strategic interests of Germany and the US in laying the groundwork for the disintegration of Yugoslavia go unmentioned, as does the role of external creditors and international financial institutions. In the eyes of the global media, Western powers bear no responsibility for the impoverishment and destruction of a nation of 24 million people. But through their domination of the global financial system, the Western powers, pursuing their collective and individual "strategic interests" helped from the beginning of the 1980s, bring the Yugoslav economy to its knees, contributing to stirring simmering ethnic and social conflicts. Now, the efforts of the international financial community are channelled towards "helping Yugoslavia's war-ravaged successor states". Yet while the World's attention is focused on troop movements and cease fires, creditors and international financial institutions are busy at work collecting former Yugoslavia's external debt, while transforming the Balkans into a safe-haven for free enterprise.

Adopted in several stages since the early 1980s, the reforms imposed by Belgrade's creditors wreaked economic and political havoc leading to disintegration of the industrial sector and the piece-meal dismantling of the Yugoslav Welfare State. Despite Belgrade's political non-alignment and extensive trading relations with the US and the European Community, the Reagan administration had targeted

the Yugoslav economy in a "Secret Sensitive" 1984 National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 133) entitled "United States Policy towards Yugoslavia". A censored version of this document declassified in 1990 largely conformed to a previous National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 54) on Eastern Europe issued in 1982. Its objectives included "expanded efforts to promote a 'quiet revolution' to overthrow Communist governments and parties"... while reintegrating the countries of Eastern Europe into the orbit of the World market.³

Secessionist tendencies feeding on social and ethnic divisions, gained impetus precisely during a period of brutal impoverishment of the Yugoslav population. The first phase of macro-economic reform initiated in 1980 shortly before the death of Marshall Tito "wreaked economic and political havoc... Slower growth, the accumulation of foreign debt and especially the cost of servicing it as well as devaluation led to a fall in the standard of living of the average Yugoslav... The economic crisis threatened political stability ... it also threatened to aggravate simmering ethnic tensions".⁴ These reforms accompanied by the signing of debt restructuring agreements with the official and commercial creditors also served to weaken the institutions of the federal State creating political divisions between Belgrade and the governments of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces. "The Prime Minister Milka Planinc, who was supposed to carry out the programme, had to promise the IMF an immediate increase of the discount rates and much more for the Reaganomics arsenal of measures..."⁵

Following the initial phase of macro-economic reform in 1980, industrial growth plummeted to 2.8 percent in the 1980-87 period, plunging to zero in 1987-88 and to -10.6 percent in 1990.⁶ The economic reforms reached their climax under the pro-US government of Prime Minister Ante Markovic. In the Autumn of 1989 just prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the federal Premier had travelled to Washington to meet President George Bush. A "financial aid package" had been promised in exchange for sweeping economic reforms including a new devalued currency, the freeze of wages, a drastic curtailment of government expenditure and the abrogation of the socially owned enterprises under self-management.⁷ The "economic therapy" (launched in January 1990) contributed to crippling the federal State system. State revenues which should have gone as transfer payments to the republics and autonomous provinces were instead funnelled towards servicing Belgrade's debt with the Paris and London clubs. The republics were largely left to their own devices thereby exacerbating the process of political fracturing. In one fell swoop, the reformers had engineered the demise of the federal fiscal structure and mortally wounded its federal political institutions. The IMF induced budgetary crisis created an economic "fait accompli" which in part paved the way for Croatia's and Slovenia's formal secession in June 1991. The Agreement with the IMF

The economic package was launched in January 1990 under an IMF Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) and a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL II). The budget cuts requiring the redirection of federal revenues towards debt servicing, were conducive to the suspension of transfer payments by Belgrade to the governments of the Republics and Autonomous Provinces thereby fuelling the process of political balkanisation and secessionism. The government of Serbia rejected Markovic's austerity programme outright leading to a walk-out protest of some 650,000 Serbian workers directed against the Federal government.⁸ The

Trade Union movement was united in this struggle: "worker resistance crossed ethnic lines, as Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and Slovenians mobilised (...) shoulder to shoulder with their fellow workers (...).⁹

The 1989 Enterprise Reforms

The 1989 enterprise reforms adopted under Premier Ante Markovic played a central role in steering the industrial sector into bankruptcy. By 1990, the annual rate of growth of GDP had collapsed to -7.5 percent.¹⁰ In 1991, GDP declined by a further 15 percent, industrial output collapsed by 21 percent.¹¹ The restructuring programme demanded by Belgrade's creditors was intended to abrogate the system of socially owned enterprises. The Enterprise Law of 1989 required abolishing the "Basic Organizations of Associated Labour (BAOL)".¹² The latter were socially-owned productive units under self-management with the Workers' Council constituting the main decision making body. The 1989 Enterprise Law required the transformation of the BOALs into private capitalist enterprises with the Worker's Council replaced by a so-called "Social Board" under the control of the enterprise's owners including its creditors.¹³ "The objective was to subject the Yugoslav economy to massive privatisation and the dismantling of the public sector. Who was to carry it out? The Communist Party bureaucracy, most notably its military and intelligence sector, was canvassed specifically and offered political and economic backing on the condition that wholesale scuttling of social protections for Yugoslavia's workforce was imposed...".¹⁴

Overhauling The Legal Framework

A number of supporting pieces of legislation were put in place in a hurry with the assistance of Western lawyers and consultants. A new Banking Law was enacted with a view to triggering the liquidation of the socially owned "Associated Banks". More than half the country's banks were dismantled, the emphasis was on the formation of "independent profit oriented institutions".¹⁵ By 1990, the entire "three-tier banking system" consisting of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, the national banks of the eight Republics and autonomous provinces and the commercial banks had been dismantled under the guidance of the World Bank.¹⁶ A World Bank Financial Sector Adjustment Loan was being negotiated in 1990. It was to be adopted by the Belgrade government in 1991...

The Bankruptcy Programme

Industrial enterprises had been carefully categorised. Under the IMF-World Bank sponsored reforms, credit to the industrial sector had been frozen with a view to speeding up the bankruptcy process. So-called "exit mechanisms" had been established under the provisions of the 1989 Financial Operations Act.¹⁷ The latter stipulated that if an enterprise were to remain insolvent for 30 days running, or for 30 days within a 45 day period, it must hold a meeting within the next 15 days with its creditors in view of arriving at a settlement. This mechanism allowed creditors (including national and foreign banks) to routinely convert their loans into a controlling equity in the insolvent enterprise. Under the Act, the government was not authorised to intervene. In case a settlement was not reached, bankruptcy procedures would be initiated in which case workers would not normally receive

severance payments.¹⁸

In 1989, according to official sources, 248 firms were steered into bankruptcy or were liquidated and 89,400 workers had been laid off.¹⁹ During the first nine months of 1990 directly following the adoption of the IMF programme, another 889 enterprises with a combined work-force of 525,000 workers were subjected to bankruptcy procedures.²⁰ In other words, in less than two years "the trigger mechanism" (under the Financial Operations Act) had led to the lay off of more than 600,000 workers (out of a total industrial workforce of the order of 2.7 million). The largest concentrations of bankrupt firms and lay-offs were in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo.²¹

Many socially owned enterprises attempted to avoid bankruptcy through the non payment of wages. Half a million workers representing some 20 percent of the industrial labour force were not paid during the early months of 1990, in order to meet the demands of creditors under the "settlement" procedures stipulated in the Law on Financial Organisations. Real earnings were in a free fall, social programmes had collapsed, with the bankruptcies of industrial enterprises, unemployment had become rampant, creating within the population an atmosphere of social despair and hopelessness. "When Mr. Markovic finally started his "programmed privatisation", the republican oligarchies, who all had visions of a "national renaissance" of their own, instead of choosing between a genuine Yugoslav market and hyperinflation, opted for war which would disguise the real causes of the economic catastrophe".²²

The January 1990 IMF sponsored package contributed unequivocally to increasing enterprise losses while precipitating many of the large electric, petroleum refinery, machinery, engineering and chemical enterprises into bankruptcy. Moreover, with the deregulation of the trade regime in January 1990, a flood of imported commodities contributed to further destabilising domestic production. These imports were financed with borrowed money granted under the IMF package (ie. the various "quick disbursing loans" granted by the IMF, the World Bank and bilateral donors in support of the economic reforms). While the import bonanza was fuelling the build-up of Yugoslavia's external debt, the abrupt hikes in interest rates and input prices imposed on national enterprises had expedited the displacement and exclusion of domestic producers from their own national market.

"Shedding Surplus Workers"

The situation prevailing in the months preceding the Secession of Croatia and Slovenia (June 1991) (confirmed by the 1989-90 bankruptcy figures) points to the sheer magnitude and brutality of the process of industrial dismantling. The figures, however, provide but a partial picture, depicting the situation at the outset of the "bankruptcy programme". The latter has continued unabated throughout the period of the civil War and its aftermath... Similar industrial restructuring programmes were imposed by external creditors on Yugoslavia's successor states.

The World Bank had estimated that there were still in September 1990, 2,435 "loss-making" enterprises out of a remaining total of 7,531.²³ In other words, these 2,435 firms with a combined work-force of more than 1,3 million workers had been

categorised as "insolvent" under the provisions of the Financial Operations Act, requiring the immediate implementation of bankruptcy procedures. Bearing in mind that 600,000 workers had already been laid off by bankrupt firms prior to September 1990, these figures suggest that some 1.9 million workers (out of a total of 2.7 million) had been classified as "redundant". The "insolvent" firms concentrated in the Energy, Heavy Industry, Metal processing, Forestry and Textiles sectors were among the largest industrial enterprises in the country representing (in September 1990) 49.7 percent of the total (remaining and employed) industrial work-force.²⁴

Political Disintegration

Supporting broad strategic interests, the austerity measures had laid the basis for "the recolonisation" of the Balkans. In the multi-party elections in 1990, economic policy was at the centre of the political debate, the separatist coalitions ousted the Communists in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Slovenia.

Following the decisive victory in Croatia of the rightist Democratic Union in May 1990 under the leadership of Franjo Tudjman, the separation of Croatia received the formal assent of the German Foreign Minister Mr. Hans Dietrich Genscher who was in almost daily contact with his Croatian counterpart in Zagreb.²⁵ Germany not only favoured secession, it was also "forcing the pace of international diplomacy" and pressuring its Western allies to grant recognition to Slovenia and Croatia. The borders of Yugoslavia are reminiscent of World War II when Croatia (including the territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina) was an Axis satellite under the fascist Ustasa regime: "German expansion has been accompanied by a rising tide of nationalism and xenophobia... Germany has been seeking a free hand among its allies to pursue economic dominance in the whole of Mitteleuropa..."²⁶ Washington on the other hand, favoured "a loose unity while encouraging democratic development... [the US Secretary of State] Baker told [Croatia's President] Franjo Tudjman and [Slovenia's President] Milan Kucan that the United States would not encourage or support unilateral secession... but if they had to leave, he urged them to leave by a negotiated agreement"...²⁷

Post-War Reconstruction

The economic reforms now being imposed on the "successor states" are a natural extension and continuation of those previously implemented in federal Yugoslavia. In the tragic aftermath of a brutal and destructive War, the prospects for rebuilding the newly independent republics appear bleak. Despite a virtual press blackout on the subject, debt rescheduling is an integral part of the peace process. The former Yugoslavia has been carved up under the close scrutiny of its external creditors, its foreign debt has been carefully divided and allocated to the republics. The privatisation programmes implemented under the supervision of the donors, have contributed to a further stage of economic dislocation and impoverishment of the population. GDP had declined by as much as 50 percent in four years (1990-93).²⁸

Moreover, the leaders of the newly sovereign states have fully collaborated with the creditors: "All the current leaders of the former Yugoslav republics were Communist Party functionaries and each in turn vied to meet the demands of the

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the better to qualify for investment loans and substantial perks for the leadership... State industry and machinery were looted by functionaries. Equipment showed up in "private companies" run by family members of the nomenklatura".29

Even as the fighting raged, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia had entered into separate loan negotiations with the Bretton Woods institutions. In Croatia, the government of President Franjo Tudjman signed in 1993, an agreement with the IMF. Massive budget cuts mandated under the agreement thwarted Croatia's efforts to mobilize its own productive resources, thus jeopardizing post-war reconstruction. The cost of rebuilding Croatia's war-torn economy was estimated at some \$23 billion, requiring an influx of fresh foreign loans. In the absence of "debt forgiveness", Zagreb's debt burden will be fuelled well into the 21st Century.

In return for foreign loans, the government of President Franjo Tudjman had agreed to reform measures conducive to further plant closures and bankruptcies, driving wages to abysmally low levels. The official unemployment rate increased from 15.5 percent in 1991 to 19.1 percent in 1994.30

Zagreb has also instituted a far more stringent bankruptcy law, together with procedures for "the dismemberment" of large state-owned public utility companies. According to its "Letter of Intent" to the Bretton Woods institutions, the Croatian government had promised to restructure and fully privatize the banking sector with the assistance of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The latter have also demanded a Croatian capital market structured to heighten the penetration of Western institutional investors and brokerage firms. Under the agreement signed in 1993 with the IMF, the Zagreb government was not permitted to mobilise its own productive resources through fiscal and monetary policy. The latter were firmly under the control of its external creditors. The massive budget cuts demanded under the agreement had forestalled the possibility of post-war reconstruction. The latter could only be carried out through the granting of fresh foreign loans, a process which would fuel Croatia's external debt well into the 21st Century. The cost of rebuilding Croatia's war-torn economy was estimated at some 23 billion dollars...

Macedonia has also followed a similar economic path. In December 1993, the Skopje government agreed to compress real wages and freeze credit in order to obtain a loan under the IMF's Systemic Transformation Facility (STF). In an unusual twist, multi-billionaire business tycoon George Soros participated in the International Support Group composed of the government of the Netherlands and the Basel-based Bank of International Settlements. The money provided by the Support Group, however, was not intended for "reconstruction" but rather to enable Skopje to pay back debt arrears owed the World Bank...31

Moreover, in return for debt rescheduling, the government of Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski had to agree to the liquidation of remaining "insolvent" enterprises and the lay off of "redundant" workers--which included the employees of half the industrial enterprises in the country. As Deputy Finance Minister Hari Kostov soberly noted, with interest rates at astronomical levels because of donor-sponsored banking reforms, "it was literally impossible to find a company in

the country which would be able to (...) to cover [its] costs (...).³²

Overall, the IMF economic therapy for Macedonia constitutes a continuation of the "bankruptcy programme" launched in 1989 under federal Yugoslavia. The most profitable assets are now on sale on the year-old Macedonian stock market, but this auction of socially owned enterprises has led to industrial collapse and rampant unemployment. Yet despite the decimation of the economy and the disintegration of schools and health centres under the austerity measures, Finance Minister Ljube Trpevski proudly informed the press that "the World Bank and the IMF place Macedonia among the most successful countries in regard to current transition reforms". The head of the IMF mission to Macedonia, Mr. Paul Thomsen, concurs that "the results of the stabilization program [under the STF] were impressive" giving particular credit and appreciation to "the efficient wages policy" adopted by the Skopje government.³³

Rebuilding Bosnia and Herzegovina

With a Bosnian peace settlement apparently holding under NATO guns, the West has unveiled a "reconstruction" programme which fully strips Bosnia-Herzegovina of its economic and political sovereignty. This programme largely consists in developing Bosnia-Herzegovina as a divided territory under NATO military occupation and Western administration.

Resting on the November 1995 Dayton accords, the US and the European Union have installed a full-fledged colonial administration in Bosnia. At its head is their appointed High Representative (HR) Mr. Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister and European Representative in the Bosnian Peace negotiations. The HR has full executive powers in all civilian matters, with the right to overrule the governments of both the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska. The HR is to act in close liaison with the IFOR Military High Command as well with donors agencies.

An international civilian police force is under the custody of an expatriate Commissioner appointed by the United Nations Secretary General Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, some 1,700 policemen from fifteen countries most of whom have never set foot in the Balkans, were dispatched to Bosnia after a five days training programme in Zagreb.

While the West has underscored its support to democracy, the Parliamentary Assembly set up under the "Constitution" finalised under the Dayton Accords, largely acts as a "rubber stamp". Behind the democratic facade, actual political power rests in the hands of a "parallel government" headed by the High Representative and staffed by expatriate advisors.

Moreover, the Constitution agreed in Dayton hands over the reins of economic policy to the Bretton Woods institutions and the London based European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Article VII stipulates that the first Governor of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina is to be appointed by the IMF and "shall not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or a neighbouring State..."

Just as the Governor of the Central Bank is an IMF appointee, the Central Bank will not be allowed under the Constitution to function as a Central Bank: "For the first six years (...) it may not extend credit by creating money, operating in this respect as a currency board" (Article VII). Neither will the new "sovereign" successor State be allowed to have its own currency (issuing paper money only when there is full foreign exchange backing), nor permitted to mobilise its internal resources. As in the other successor republics, its ability to self-finance its reconstruction (without massively increasing its external debt) is blunted from the outset...

The tasks of managing the Bosnian economy have been carefully divided among donor agencies: while the Central Bank is under IMF custody, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) heads the Commission on Public Corporations which supervises operations of all public sector enterprises including energy, water, postal services, roads, railways, etc. The President of the EBRD appoints the Chairman of the Commission which also oversees public sector restructuring, meaning primarily the sell-off of State and socially owned assets and the procurement of long term investment funds.

One cannot sidestep a fundamental question: is the Bosnian Constitution formally agreed between heads of State at Dayton really a constitution? A sombre and dangerous precedent has been set in the history of international relations: Western creditors have embedded their interests in a Constitution hastily written on their behalf, executive positions within the Bosnian State system are to be held by non-citizens who are appointees of Western financial institutions. No constitutional assembly, no consultations with citizens' organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, no "constitutional amendments"...

The Bosnian government estimates that reconstruction costs will reach \$47 billion. Western donors have pledged \$3 billion in reconstruction loans, yet only a meagre \$518 million dollars were granted in December 1995, part of which is tagged (under the terms of the Dayton Peace Accords) to finance some of the local civilian costs of the Implementation Force's (IFOR) military deployment as well as repay debt arrears with international creditors.

In a familiar twist, "fresh loans" have been devised to pay back "old debt". The Central Bank of the Netherlands has generously provided "bridge financing" of 37 million dollars. The money, however, is earmarked to allow Bosnia to pay back its arrears with the IMF, a condition without which the IMF will not lend it fresh money...³⁵ But it is a cruel and absurd paradox: the sought after loan from the IMF's newly created "Emergency Window" for so-called "post-conflict countries" will not be used for post-war reconstruction. Instead it will be applied to reimburse the Central Bank of the Netherlands which had coughed up the money to settle IMF arrears in the first place... While debt is building up, no new financial resources are flowing into Bosnia to rebuild its war-torn economy...

Multinationals have an Eye on Bosnia's Oil Fields

Western governments and corporations show greater interest in gaining access to

potential strategic natural resources than committing resources for rebuilding Bosnia. Documents in the hands of Croatia and the Bosnian Serbs indicate that coal and oil deposits have been identified on the eastern slope of the Dinarides Thrust, a region retaken from rebel Bosnian Krajina Serbs by the Croatian army in the final offensives before the Dayton Peace accords. Bosnian officials report that Chicago-based Amoco was among several foreign firms that subsequently initiated exploratory surveys in Bosnia. The West is anxious to develop these regions: "The World Bank --and the multinationals that conducted operations-- are [August 1995] reluctant to divulge their latest exploration reports to the combatant governments while the war continues"...³⁶ Moreover, there are also "substantial petroleum fields in the Serb-held part of Croatia just across the Sava river from the Tuzla region".³⁷ The latter under the Dayton Agreement, is part of the US Military Division with headquarters in Tuzla.

The territorial partition of Bosnia between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska under the Dayton Accords thus takes on strategic importance, the 60,000 NATO troops on hand to "enforce the peace" will administer the territorial partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with Western economic interests.

National sovereignty is derogated, the future of Bosnia will be decided upon in Washington, Bonn and Brussels rather than in Sarajevo... The process of "reconstruction" based on debt rescheduling is more likely to plunge Bosnia-Herzegovina (as well as the other remnant republics of former Yugoslavia) into the status of a Third World country.

While local leaders and Western interests share the spoils of the former Yugoslav economy, the fragmentation of the national territory and the entrenching of socio-ethnic divisions in the structure of partition serve as a bulwark blocking a united resistance of Yugoslavs of all ethnic origins against the recolonization of their homeland.

Concluding Remarks

Macro-economic restructuring applied in Yugoslavia under the neoliberal policy agenda has unequivocally contributed to the destruction of an entire country. Yet since the onset of war in 1991, the central role of macro-economic reform has been carefully overlooked and denied by the global media. The "free market" has been presented as the solution, the basis for rebuilding a war-shattered economy. A detailed diary of the war and of the "peace-making" process has been presented by the mainstream press. The social and political impact of economic restructuring in Yugoslavia has been carefully erased from our social consciousness and collective understanding of "what actually happened". Cultural, ethnic and religious divisions are highlighted, presented dogmatically as the sole cause of the crisis when in reality they are the consequence of a much deeper process of economic and political fracturing.

This "false consciousness" has invaded all spheres of critical debate and discussion. It not only masks the truth, it also prevents us from acknowledging precise historical occurrences. Ultimately it distorts the true sources of social

conflict. The unity, solidarity and identity of the Southern Slavs have their foundation in history, yet this identity has been thwarted, manipulated and destroyed.

The ruin of an economic system, including the take-over of productive assets, the extension of markets and "the scramble for territory" in the Balkans constitute the real cause of conflict. What is at stake in Yugoslavia are the lives of millions of people. Macro-economic reform destroys their livelihood, derogates their right to work, their food and shelter, their culture and national identity... Borders are redefined, the entire legal system is overhauled, the socially owned enterprises are steered into bankruptcy, the financial and banking system is dismantled, social programmes and institutions are torn down... In retrospect, it is worth recalling Yugoslavia's economic and social achievements in the post-war period (prior to 1980): the growth of GDP was on average 6.1 per annum over a twenty year period (1960-1980), there was free medical care with one doctor per 550 population, the literacy rate was of the order of 91 percent, life expectancy was 72 years...37

Yugoslavia is a "mirror" of similar economic restructuring programmes applied not only in the developing World but also in recent years in the US, Canada and Western Europe... "Strong economic medicine" is the answer, throughout the World, people are led to believe that there is no other solution: enterprises must be closed down, workers must be laid off and social programmes must be slashed... It is in the foregoing context that the economic crisis in Yugoslavia should be understood. Pushed to the extreme, the reforms in Yugoslavia are the cruel reflection of a destructive "economic model" imposed under the neoliberal agenda on national societies throughout the World...

ENDNOTES

1. See the account of Warren Zimmermann (former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia), "The Last Ambassador, A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia", Foreign Affairs, Vol 74, Number 2, 1995.
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3. Sean Gervasi, "Germany, US and the Yugoslav Crisis", Covert Action Quarterly, No. 43, Winter 1992-93.
4. Ibid
5. Dimitrije Boarov, "A Brief Review of Anti-inflation Programs, the Curse of Dead Programs", Vreme New Digest Agency, No. 29, 13 April 1992.
6. World Bank, Industrial Restructuring Study, Overview, Issues and Strategy for Restructuring", Washington DC, June 1991, p. 10 and 14.

7. Sean Gervasi, op cit.,
8. Ibid.
9. Ralph Schoenman, "Divide and Rule Schemes in The Balkans", The Organiser, 11 September 1995.
10. World Bank, op cit., p. 10. The term GDP is used for simplicity, yet the concept used in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe to measure national product is not equivalent to the GDP concept under the (Western) system of national accounts.
11. See Judit Kiss, Debt Management in Eastern Europe, Eastern European Economics, May-June 1994, p. 59.
12. World Bank, op cit
13. Ibid, p. viii.
14. Ralph Schoenman, "Divide and Rule Schemes in The Balkans", The Organiser, 11 September 1995.
15. For further details see World Bank, Yugoslavia, Industrial Restructuring, p. 38.
16. Ibid., p. 38.
17. Ibid., p. 33.
18. Ibid., p. 33
19. Ibid, p. 34. Data of the Federal Secretariat for Industry and Energy, Of the total number of firms, 222 went bankrupt and 26 were liquidated.
20. Ibid., p. 33. These figures include bankruptcy and liquidation.
21. Ibid, p. 34.
22. Dimitrije Boarov, op. cit.
- 23 World Bank, Industrial Restructuring p. 13. Annex 1, p. 1.
24. "Surplus labour" in industry had been assessed by the World Bank mission to be of the order of 20 percent of the total labour force of 8.9 million, --ie. approximately 1.8 million. This figure seems, however, to grossly underestimate the actual number of redundant workers based on the categorisation of "insolvent" enterprises. Solely in the industrial sector, there were 1.9 million workers (September 1990) out of 2.7 million employed in enterprises classified as insolvent. See World Bank, Yugoslavia, Industrial Restructuring, Annex 1.
25. Sean Gervasi, op. cit., p. 65

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28. Figure for Macedonia; Enterprise, Banking and Social Safety Net, World Bank Public information Center, 28 November 1994.

29. Ralph Schoenman, "Divide and Rule Schemes in The Balkans", The Organizer, 11 September 1995.

30 "Zagreb's About Turn", The Banker, January 1995, p. 38.

31 See World Bank, Macedonia Financial and enterprise Sector, Public Information Department, November 28, 1995.

32 Statement of Macedonia's Deputy Minister of Finance Mr. Hari Kostov, reported in MAK News, April 18, 1995.

33 Macedonian Information and Liaison Service, MILS News, 11 April 1995.

34 See International Monetary fund, Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a Member of the IMF, Press Release No. 97/70, Washington, December 20, 1995.

35 Frank Viviano and Kenneth Howe, Bosnia Leaders Say Nation Sit Atop Oil Fields, The San Francisco Chronicle, 28 August 1995. See also Scott Cooper, "Western Aims in Ex-Yugoslavia Unmasked", The Organizer, 24 September 1995.

36 Viviano and Howe, op cit.,

37 World Bank, World Development Report 1991, Statistical Annex, tables 1 and 2, Washington DC, 1991.

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MONDAY, MAY 17, 1999

EDITORIALS/OPINION



Accidents

escalating attack that NATO has adopted in what is now almost two months of bombing? Has enough experience not been accumulated in this campaign to reduce the likelihood, frequency and dimensions of such tragic mishaps? Is fatigue a factor?

The foreign secretaries of Britain and the United States, today on this page, describe these incidents as a regrettable but comprehensible falling away from "perfection." They assure the NATO public that "at each stage" procedures are reviewed. These responses are welcome but they do not address the whole problem. Especially in Europe, and in some countries more than others, public opinion cannot be expected to sustain support for the bombing indefinitely, regardless of the repeated defenses of it offered by high officials. There is a real possibility that successive incidents will send successive tremors through the political society. NATO's air campaign is already being challenged to produce more results, both in the military arena and in the political, than the alliance has been able to demonstrate persuasively to date. A further home-front slippage of backing for the air war for its occasional but deadly strikes on the wrong targets could put a damaging extra burden on the whole allied conduct of the war.

—THE WASHINGTON POST.

Tainted Secrets

The Air Campaign Remains the Right Thing to Do

By Manteleine K. Albright and Robin Cook

The writers are the U.S. secretary of state and the British foreign secretary.

WASHINGTON — On March 24, we and our NATO allies initiated a campaign in response to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo because it was the right thing to do. Continuing that campaign is still the right thing to do. The brutality of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic has made us even more determined than when we started. We will not stop until we have prevailed — until we have created the conditions under which the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo can be reversed. On that simple point there is unity between us.

It is easy to see why some people might get so caught up in the details of both conflict and diplomacy that they forget why we are fighting. It is time for a reminder of what this is all about. We are fighting to get the refugees home, safe under our protection. Their homes have been destroyed, their villages burned, their lives ruined by a regime determined to achieve ethnic purity and prepared to use cruel and violent means to achieve it. More than a million Albanian Kosovars have lost their homes, hundreds of thousands have become refugees and tens of thousands have disappeared.

It is hard to believe that in a corner of Europe so important to our interests, near the turn of the 21st century, we can be seeing the same scenes that so scarred us half a century ago. The systematic rapes, the mass graves, the large-scale deportations by train — these were sights we were meant to have banished for good. Yet we have heard too many accounts from the refugees, who have made it across the border to be

in any doubt about what is going on. The refugees must go home to a Kosovo made safe by an international security presence, with NATO at its core. On that point, there is no room for negotiation. We will carry on attacking Mr. Milosevic's military machine until he yields. We have already destroyed a brigade's worth of his tanks, heavy armor and military infrastructure in Kosovo. We have cut his supply routes into Kosovo, taken out his communications, disabled his air defenses and choked his fuel supplies. Thanks to the onset of better weather, we are now attacking his fielded forces in Kosovo 24 hours a day from all directions. As a result, those forces are now spending less and less time inflicting violence on others and more and more looking after their own survival.

Many in Serbia have already got the message as to where this campaign is leading. Mr. Milosevic's own soldiers are deserting at the rate of hundreds a week. His people are ignoring his call to fight in a conflict that they do not want and know they cannot win. Some of his colleagues in government are urging him to accept the principles that we agreed on with Russia as the basis for a settlement. His neighbors are uniting in condemnation. Mr. Milosevic is thoroughly isolated from the international community and is beginning to find himself isolated at home.

For all his desperate bravado and bloody and brutal program was designed to achieve. He has shown that he will not stop until he is forced to do so. To put pressure on Mr. Milosevic to reverse course, our military campaign is backed by vigorous diplomacy. Already we have reached broad agreement in the Group of Eight forum with Russia on the principles for a peaceful settlement, and our diplomats are hard at work narrowing the remaining gaps and fleshing out the details of an agreement and its implementation. We are pursuing a settlement under which Mr. Milosevic would withdraw his forces and allow the deployment of an international security force, with NATO at its core, thus enabling the refugees to return in safety. We remain supportive of the political framework negotiated at Rambouillet under which the Kosovars would enjoy genuine self-government, and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be preserved.

These are the terms of a fair settlement. If Mr. Milosevic accepted and began to implement them immediately, the NATO air campaign could end immediately. Certainly the alternative for him looks grim — a future in which his military has been destroyed and his repressive police apparatus crippled, in which he has more and more to answer for to his people. For our part, the United States and the United Kingdom, together with our NATO allies, are determined to persist in our efforts until Mr. Milosevic reverses course and the people of Kosovo are able to return, reunite and begin, with our help, to rebuild.

The Washington Post.

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The "Diplomatic Scene," in brief, as of May 8

Michael Albert prepared from material made available by Noam Chomsky

(I): The Rambouillet accords of March were presented to Milosovic as a take-it-or-get bombed ultimatum. This was not a legitimate exercise in diplomacy, of course, at least for those few in the West who join the great majority of people in the world in accepting that constraints on the use of violence by the powerful are important. Still, it is part of the "diplomatic scene," such as it is, and so we begin with Rambouillet.

Rambouillet called for military occupation of Kosovo by NATO, and effective military occupation of the rest of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR), at NATO's will. The terms for the occupation are set out in Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force. One crucial paragraph reads:

NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.

The remainder of the Appendix spells out the demand that NATO forces and whoever they employ can do as they wish throughout the territory of the FYR, without any obligations or concern for the laws of the country or jurisdiction of its authorities, though the latter are required to follow any NATO orders "on a priority basis and with all appropriate means."

The text has apparently not been published in mainstream U.S. media. The wording apparently was designed to guarantee rejection. Would any country even consider such terms, except in the form of unconditional surrender?

(II): The Serbian National Assembly responded to the US/NATO ultimatum on March 23 (one day before the bombing). The Assembly's Resolution rejected the demand for military occupation, and called on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the U.N. to facilitate a peaceful diplomatic settlement. Specifically, "We also condemn a withdrawal of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. There is not a single reason for this but to put the withdrawal into the service of blackmails and threats to our country." The withdrawal of the international OSCE observers had just been ordered by the U.S., in preparation for the bombing after the (apparently intended) FYR rejection of the Rambouillet ultimatum.

The Assembly Resolution further calls for negotiations leading "toward the reaching of a political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija [the official name for the province], with the securing of a full equality of all citizens and ethnic communities and with respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Further:

The Serbian Parliament does not accept presence of foreign military troops in Kosovo and Metohia. The Serbian Parliament is ready to review the size and

character of the international presence in Kosmet [Kosovo/Metohija] for carrying out the reached accord, immediately upon signing the political accord on the self-rule agreed and accepted by the representatives of all national communities living in Kosovo and Metohia.

The essentials of the March 23 Resolution were reported on major wire services (French, German, UPI, AP) and therefore were certainly known to every newsroom and every journalist who wished to be informed. Several database searches have found no mention in the mainstream press, however, apart from a few midwestern journals, notably the *Detroit Free Press*. The absence of major media coverage tells quite a lot about what counts as "news."

At a March 24 State Department press briefing, spokesperson James Rubin was asked about the Serbian Assembly resolution, particularly its reference to an "international presence." Mr. Rubin evaded the question, saying only that "I'm not aware that anybody in this building regarded it as a silver lining." He apparently didn't know what "it" was -- apparently "it" was too insignificant to think about, particularly if the whole farce was just an attempt to get the bombers flying.

This part of Rubin's press briefing was also apparently not reported. Nor was there any report, to my knowledge, of the FAIR Action Alert of April 14, 1999 (distributed to the major press), reporting the press briefing.

In the following weeks, bits and pieces of the Serb Assembly Resolution dribbled out in the press (Erlanger, *NYT*, April 8 being the first in the mainstream), sometimes inaccurately, typically buried in some other context.

(III): On April 22, a highly-publicized meeting took place between Milosevic and Washington's favorite Russian, Viktor Chernomyrdin. It was reported, with headlines like "Russian Ends Peace Visit: Slight Signs of Progress" (*NY Times*); "US, Britain reject Serb offer for UN Kosovo role" (*Globe*). Chernomyrdin announced that "Mr. Milosevic had agreed to an 'international presence in Kosovo under United Nations auspices,' to implement any political settlement" (*NYT*); he "had agreed in principle to 'the possibility of an international presence led by the UN' if NATO calls off its five-week air campaign" (*Globe*). The press reported that "US and NATO officials saw little more in Milosevic's apparently agreement with Chernomyrdin...than the first signs of hope that the Yugoslav president's defiance may be dissolving amid the NATO assault," but that this might be another of his "feigned peace overtures." The U.S. and UK instantly rejected the proposal, stepping up the bombing of civilian targets (TV was knocked off that day) and insisting "on an armed "international security force" with NATO troops as its core, so that Chernomyrdin's "progress" is not sufficient to end the bombing (*NYT*).

At a news conference, Clinton responded by saying that "If there is an offer for a genuine security force that's the first time Mr. Milosevic has done that, and that represents, I suppose, some step forward."

In other words, on April 22, Milosevic reiterated the proposal of the Serbian National Assembly of March 23, this time in a way that was impossible to suppress: namely, via the Russian envoy who is the West's favorite emissary of Russian communications. Since the earlier March 23 proposal with the same content had been efficiently suppressed, however, it was possible to present the reiteration of it as a sign that violence works and Milosevic's "defiance" is crumbling, even though, in fact, it was simply a reiteration of the prior terms.

On May 1 the press reported another Chernomyrdin-Milosevic meeting under the headline "After Seeing Milosovic, Russian Hints at Progress" (Steven Erlanger, *NYT*). The "hint" was again Milosevic's reiteration of the March 23 offer (as Erlanger, reporting from Belgrade, was able to sneak into his story, sufficiently deep so that it could pass unobserved -- he evidently knows the facts).

The same day the *Times* also published a UPI interview with Milosevic (April 30) in which he called for a "political process" and said that "The U.N. can have a huge mission in Kosovo if it wishes," a "U.N. peacekeeping force" with "self-defense weapons," but not "an occupation" of the sort demanded in the "Clinton Administration diktat" at Rambouillet: 28,000 troops occupying Kosovo with heavy equipment. Milosevic also called for reduction of the Yugoslav forces to the pre-bombing level of 10-11,000, "return of all refugees, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation," "free access for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Red Cross," and continuing negotiations for "the widest possible autonomy for Kosovo within Serbia."

Quoting the last phrase, the *NYT* report said that he was "borrowing language from the proposed Rambouillet accords." More accurately, Milosevic was "borrowing language" from the March 23 National Assembly Resolution that the *Times* (and its colleagues) refused to report -- then or since. In fact, the April 30 proposals are within the framework of the (Western-suppressed) March 23 proposals, with some further detail.

(IV): The next major phase of the drama/farce is May 7, when the press reported with great enthusiasm the official statement of the Group of Eight (G-7 + Russia). Their May 6 statement again repeated the essentials of the Serb National Assembly March 23 proposal. It called for an end to violence and repression, withdrawal of (unspecified) "military, police and paramilitary forces," "Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted by the United Nations," "a political process toward the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other countries of the region," and the demilitarization of the U.C.K. [KLA]. The only modification of the March 23 Serb Parliament proposal was the call for "Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations..." which had previously been barred from any role by Washington.

At the level of the words offered, Washington's effective acceptance of the March 23 Serb proposals in the G-8 proposal was portrayed as a great victory for the U.S., the UK, and their resort to violence. The lead headline in the *Times* read: "Russia in Accord on Need for Force to Patrol Kosovo." Two stories followed. One opened by saying that "The Clinton Administration...managed to get the Russians on its side today." The second opened: "The West and Russia agreed for the first time today on the need for an international military presence in Kosovo to keep any eventual peace." "The accord also intensifies pressure on" Milosevic, who is now isolated, with the Russians having come "on board." In the *Boston Globe*, veteran correspondent John Yemma (maybe now an editor) reported that the great achievement "was to bring Russia over to the NATO position," though "before the bombing stops, Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic will have to accept the G-8 plan, at least in principle" -- that is, the plan that in essence he put forth on March 23 and elaborated since. The news stories also recognized that although the Russians are now "on board," the official G8 statement still "finessed several of their [NATO's] key demands," in particular, the demand that the force be effectively under US/NATO command, with the UN in some meaningless nominal role.

So what did happen? More than likely meetings were held whose real point was for the Russians to communicate to the world that they weren't going to escalate their disagreements with the U.S. over Kosovo into a renewed more generalized conflict (they have "come on board"). The G-8 statements that resulted to convey that fact in a way designed to permit Russia to save face, either mean, if taken at face value, virtual agreement with the Yugoslav March 23 terms which would suggest possible diplomatic settlement or they mean a continuation of Rambouillet (and proposed NATO/U.S. occupation, etc.) and likely continued war. The vagueness permitted the Russians to sign and to discuss the terms as if they mean the former (respecting Russian wishes), and it permitted people like Albright and others to discuss them and interpret them as if they mean the latter. In other words the official U.S. line is still that the G8 statement, which doesn't even mention NATO, means that Rambouillet is reinstated. The words seem to imply something else only because everyone at the table was polite enough to leave out the true meaning so as not to embarrass the Russians, and to allow them to come "on board." Milosevic, presumably, listens to not Russia's reading or hopes, of face saving rhetoric, but to Albright's doctrines to know what U.S. policy is.

(V): In brief, the differences as far as we can tell from available reports appear to remain about as they were on March 23, except that the U.S. has now accepted the basic outline of the Serb Assembly proposal -- on paper that is, in the G-8 statement. In fact, however, in all other pronouncements it rejects the terms of its own official (G-8) statement. (Also conceded is that the KLA rejects the demand that they disarm.)

The basic point of U.S. rejection (or if you prefer, interpretation) of its own G-8 proposal was clarified by State Department spokesperson James Rubin (*NYT*, May 8). He "stressed that there would be no United Nations involvement in the actual military operation": "Nobody in the United States or any of the NATO countries envisages the United Nations Secretariat and the blue-helmet peacekeeping unit to play any role in the peacekeeping force," Mr. Rubin said. "This would be a situation where the United Nations Security Council, acting on behalf of the world, would authorize member states to put together a force." Presumably, as is usual with U.S. policy, if "the world" doesn't like it, then too bad for the world.

That seems to be the essence of it, as of May 8, which is to say nothing much has changed after the U.S. chose violence over diplomacy on March 24, apart from the human consequences which are of course of little concern to the masters and easily attributed by their servants to genocidal Serbs, and apart from the slowly growing resistance to the war in many quarters, which is far more consequential to the masters and which, if it grows sufficiently, could compel them to reinterpret once again their own words and to settle essentially in the manner indicated by the Yugoslav Assembly on March 23.

Pending the growth of such anti-war resistance, we may be in for many more ugly days. Britain's campaign is called Operation Agricola. Apart from his own estimable feats, Agricola was the father-in-law of Tacitus, famous for defining Roman imperialism with the phrase "they make a desert and call it peace." And for his astute observation that "crime once exposed had no refuge but in audacity" -- a favorite maxim of John Quincy Adams, for good reason, given his own role in massive slaughter and ethnic cleansing. At least you have to admire the British their classical education.

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Summarizing the Case Against the Bombing **By ZNeter Gar Lipow**

Stop the bombing now. Cruise missile humanitarianism has multiplied the number of Kosovar Albanian homeless and dead, without saving one life, or stopping one atrocity. By highest estimates, the Kosovo civil war drove 400,000 ethnic Albanians from their homes in 1998; 30,000 of these fled Kosovo. The first two weeks of the bombing increased this to over one million homeless Kosovars; more than 400,000 of whom fled Kosovo. From March 26th through April 13th, NATO escalated the atrocities to double those in the whole year of 1998.

NATO bears the same responsibility a police officer does in a hostage situation – the responsibility not to get the hostages killed by charging at the kidnapper in a macho frenzy. The CIA and Pentagon both warned our government that it would provoke massacres before it dropped the first kind and cuddly bomb. Milosevic rose to power, in part, by stirring up Serbian nationalist sentiment over Kosovo.

Before our fighter jets flattened large portions of Serbia, Milosevic did not have everything his own way. There was a strong democratic opposition in Yugoslavia, and a strong opposition press. Milosevic was not in a position to completely ignore public opinion. It is far from sure that he could have escalated the level of atrocities.

The first bomb that came close to killing a Yugoslav child changed this. As would happen in the U.S. if bombs were falling on New York, Atlanta, Chicago and Seattle, Yugoslavians rallied 'round the flag. So long as NATO bombs fall on the suburbs and railways of Yugoslavia, there is no atrocity Milosevic can commit which will cost him popular support. War is freedom for tyrants.

In Kosovo, Serbia, and throughout Yugoslavia, NATO aims tenderhearted explosives at oil refineries, power plants, television stations, and office buildings – and quite often misses. It has admitted to unintentionally bombing residential suburbs, civilian factories, a passenger rail car, and part of a convoy of Albanian refugees. Pilots of British Harriers, tired of frequent misses, have turned to cluster bombs, which spray humanitarian shrapnel over a wide area.

In spite of claims to surgical precision, this amounts to indiscriminate terror bombing. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH) who initially supported the bombing now opposes it for just this reason.

In the April 9, 1999 New York Times he writes: "... the destruction of the civilian infrastructure of Yugoslavia has become part of the strategy to end the war on Kosovo... We are bringing down terror on the Serbian people ... the Serbian people will never accept a peace with the ethnic Albanians as long as we are dropping bombs on their heads...."

This war threatens more than the population of former Yugoslavia. It threatens the stability of the entire region. Albania, perhaps the poorest country in Europe is overwhelmed by the refugee influx. Macedonia, which already has a strong Albanian minority, fears becoming another Kosovo. As of this writing, the Yugoslav military had crossed an international border to take over a small Albanian village. The Balkans were historically flashpoints for major wars, because major powers got involved in local disputes.

Well, we had to do something didn't we?

Actually we didn't. In our own lives, when confronted by a problem, how many of us would choose making things worse as an alternative to doing nothing?

But, in fact, there were alternatives. The New York Times of April 8, 1999, writing of the failed Rambouillet negotiations said "In a little-noted resolution of the Serbian Parliament just before the bombing, when that hardly independent body rejected NATO troops in Kosovo, it also supported the idea of U.N. forces to monitor a political settlement there." Milosevic had accepted most U.S. demands during Rambouillet negotiations *except NATO monitors*. If he was willing to accept *U.N. monitors* instead, should we not have explored the possibility before we began bombing?

There still are alternatives. Stop the bombing. Forget ground troops. Start real negotiations. Involve the U.N., and what remains of the democratic Yugoslav opposition. Some armed third party will probably be needed to enforce whatever solution is agreed to, and protect all groups in Kosovo from ethnic cleansing. But both sides of the conflict must agree to such enforcers. We could also provide more aid to the refugees, actually give them refuge if needed. We should also remember that the Yugoslav army currently enforces the death penalty for avoiding service in their military, and offer refuge to Serb draft resisters and deserters.

Some people, admitting that bombing is useless, are supporting ground troops instead. A strong U.S. force on the ground will make everything all right. After all, even if we made a well-meaning blunder in this case (no doubt dragged into the situation by our NATO allies), doesn't the U.S. generally do the right thing in foreign policy?

Well, no it doesn't.

The idea that we were "dragged into this" by NATO is wrong to begin with. In the context of this war, the U.S. is NATO. Other NATO countries provide bases, and some of the military force. But the U.S. leads NATO. The U.S. has made essentially all the decisions, both military and diplomatic.

The U.S. may be the best place in the world to live, but people outside the U.S. would just as soon not have us involved in their civil wars. Most of the world winces when it hears the U.S. is about to take action. Our humanitarian sanctions against Saddam Hussein manage to kill about 5,000 Iraqi children each month. We've been bombing Iraq for years; no doubt the Iraq government will fall any day now.

In retaliation for terrorist bombing of U.S. embassies in Africa, we managed to bomb a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan responsible for producing most of Sudan's prescription drugs. At the time, we claimed it was partially owned by Bin Laden and

helped produce nerve gas. It later turn out that Bin Laden had no ownership stake in the plant (direct or indirect) and the chemicals we thought to be a nerve gas precursor were actually used in the making of beneficial drugs. Oops! Sorry 'bout that!

Recent humanitarian catastrophes in which we did not intervene include: 80,000 dead in Algeria, 10,000 dead in the Ethiopian-Eritrean war within the past month, 820,000 dead in Rwanda during the last five years, 1.5 million dead in Sudan during the last 15 years.

Worse, we ignore atrocities by our client states, states we could simply order to stop the killing, NATO member Turkey has killed more than 40,000 Kurds (the same ethnic group we are bombing Iraq, as you read this, to protect) using weapons it bought from the U.S.

East Timor was an independent country until Indonesia took it over in 1975, killing 200,000 people (more than 1/3rd of the population). Indonesia launched the invasion hours after President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with Indonesian dictator Suharto. The U.S. then doubled military aid to Indonesia, blocked the UN taking effective enforcement action, and continued to sell new weapons, particularly helicopters for the next two decades. Since 1975, the United States has sold more than \$1.1 billion worth of weaponry to Indonesia. The latest massacre in East Timor took place a few days ago, when paramilitaries armed by the Indonesian government slaughtered a church full of refugees.

In short, given the U.S. record, there is no reason to expect a ground force invasion will have superior results to our current policy of better living through bombing. Negotiations are not glamorous. Rambo would have single handedly ended the war. John Wayne would have taken along some sidekicks. But in the real world, negotiations are the only way to save the lives the Kosovar Albanians – especially if we decide that the occasional Serbian life has value as well.

Comment

Women

dom hasn't brought a most of the world's economic and social. It is time to afflict much of the world. The benefits seem to elude growing people in more and more.

... once said that by a nation can revolution and its society. It is time to educate and educate women, have and contribute significant productivity. But developing countries do service to the notion of education. They need a boost in institutions of learning, aid organizations on educational and employment for women.

by Gupta, commenting in Newsweek.

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By Malcolm Fraser

At the end of the war, Kosovo was recognized as an integral part of Yugoslavia. At Rambouillet, the ultimatum required that NATO troops be allowed access to any part of Yugoslavia. At the end of the war, the occupying force was to be confined to Kosovo. The Rambouillet conditions could not have been accepted by any Serbian leader, or by any president of Yugoslavia. With more skillful diplomacy, the war could have been avoided.

Since it ended, the KLA, coupled with Albanian organized crime, seem set to dominate Kosovo. On Aug. 11, a report by Human Rights Watch in New York indicated that since the arrival of NATO troops in mid-June more than 164,000 Serbs had fled Kosovo, and peacekeepers had reported nearly 200 murders. Later, the International Crisis Group reported murders in Kosovo running at 30 a week, mostly of Serbs. At that rate, around 800 people will have been killed by Christmas. With all its power and authority, NATO is clearly unable to protect minorities in Kosovo.

Should NATO's condemnation of Serbia now be turned upon itself? And if that is so, what can we conclude? Can war ever be fought for humanitarian purposes? War represents a failure of diplomacy and of reason, it encourages the basest instincts in the human race, and truth becomes the first casualty.

At the end of the fighting, NATO made three significant concessions which were not on the agenda at Rambouillet. Those concessions can only be regarded as a weakening of NATO's position. At Rambouillet, NATO demanded that its forces occupy and govern Kosovo. At the end of the war the responsibility was given to the United Nations. At Rambouillet, NATO required a referendum in three years to determine Kosovo's

In the larger issue of affairs between nations, it is a small thing; but to Mr. Jelen, his wife Nadia and their two children, it is everything. His release would be seen as an act of generosity and compassion. It would help to underline the fact that the demonization of Serbs has itself been unjust.

Mr. Jelen's release would give greater credibility to those who believe that Western policy toward Yugoslavia has been unbalanced and unwise. It would also help to undermine those who promoted NATO's policy so avidly.

The writer is the World Bank's special representative for Southeast Europe, based in Brussels, and its former resident representative in Sarajevo. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

IN OUR PAGES: 100, 75 AND 50 YEARS AGO

1899: Bolstering Trade

PARIS — [The Herald says in an Editorial:] The commercial treaty negotiated by the French and American Governments was laid before the Chamber yesterday [Dec. 21], and it is receiving the careful consideration of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. From a statement made in the Chamber it is expected that the Government may be called upon to show that the interests of French agriculture are well guarded by the treaty. M. Delcassé has declared that it will have this effect, and, furthermore, that it will give a fresh stimulant to the commercial exchanges between the two countries. Like all reciprocity arrangements for a freer international exchange of commodities, this treaty is designed to stimulate trade between France and the United States, and give to each better markets in the other.

1924: Albanian Charge

BELGRADE — The Albanian Government has sent a Note to Belgrade charging Yugo-Slavia with helping to organize the rising in Albania. The Yugo-Slav Government replied that it had always refrained from interference with internal affairs of other countries. Moreover, the Belgrade Government would admit no further discussion and would regard it as non-existent.

1949: Indonesian Peace

BATAVIA — Indonesia's outlook is bright today compared with a year ago when the islands were plagued with bitter warfare. On the eve of independence, the Indies are enjoying more complete peace and genuine good will than at any time. On the basis of an almost unblemished record during the interim period, most observers are counting on continued peace

SCHEIDT WOULD KNOW TO HIS

wife and me was a Muslim. That monthly pension (up by now to some \$200) came from tax revenues provided by Serbs, Croats and Muslims.

I take strenuous issue with those who portray the last four hopeful years as a disaster. That view imperils subsequent efforts by the international community, as in the case of Kosovo or East Timor, to help mend societies battered by war.

Let us instead take heart from the Bosnian experience and give these worldwide post-conflict campaigns the respect they so clearly deserve.

The writer is the World Bank's special representative for Southeast Europe, based in Brussels, and its former resident representative in Sarajevo. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

U.S. Foreign Policy

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

Set #17:

151. "Impact of the 9-Year Sanctions War on the People of Iraq."
152. "The Truth About the U.S. & Iraq."
153. "God Save the King: On British Imperialism."
154. "The Middle East: The Legacies of Failure."
155. "U.S. Aid: The Lifeblood of Occupation."
156. "Israel's Approved Ethnic Cleansing: Part I, 'Making Facts on the Ground'."
157. "Israel's Approved Ethnic Cleansing: Part II, 'U.S. Official Protection'."
158. "Israel's Approved Ethnic Cleansing: Part III, 'How the U.S. Media Protects It'."
159. "First the Carrot, Then the Stick: Behind the Carnage in Palestine."
160. "Amid the Ruins of Jenin, the grisly evidence of a war crime."
161. "Atrocities Management."
162. "Uncertain Toll in the Fog of War: Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan."
163. "George Soros, Imperial Wizard: Master-Builder of the New Bribe Sector."
164. "A Very American Coup."
165. "List of Accomplishments by George W. Bush, the first few months in office."
166. "Greg Palast: Guerrilla of the Week."
167. "Bush's New Budget: Deficits Aren't The Problem."
168. "To Kill Iraq."
169. "Iraq War Quiz."
170. "Why War With Iraq? Why Now? Phantom Reasons and Real Ones."
171. "Greg Palast on American Journalism since 9/11."
172. "Justice Department Drafts Sweeping Expansion of Anti-Terrorism Act."
173. "Lettre à George Bush", par Michael Moore.

one-page leaflet for distribution

Impact of the 9-Year Sanctions War on the People of Iraq

From UN Reports

- Iraq "has experienced a shift from relative affluence to massive poverty. In marked contrast to the prevailing situation prior to the events of 1990-91, the infant mortality rates in Iraq today are among the highest in the world, low infant birth weight affects at least 23% of all births, chronic malnutrition affects every fourth child under five years of age, only 41% of the population have regular access to clean water, 83% of all schools need substantial repairs. The ICRC states that the Iraqi health-care system is today in a decrepit state. UNDP calculates that it would take 7 billion US dollars to rehabilitate the power sector country-wide to its 1990 capacity." - UN Report on the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq, submitted to the Security Council, March 1999
- "The humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy, which in turn cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts." - UN Report on the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq, submitted to the Security Council, March 1999
- "The increase in mortality reported in public hospitals for children under five years of age (an excess of some 40,000 deaths yearly compared with 1989) is mainly due to diarrhea, pneumonia and malnutrition. In those over five years of age, the increase (an excess of some 50,000 deaths yearly compared with 1989) is associated with heart disease, hypertension, diabetes, cancer, liver or kidney diseases." Approximately 250 people die every day in Iraq due to the effect of the sanctions. - UNICEF, April 1998.
- "The Oil-for-Food plan has not yet resulted in adequate protection of Iraq's children from malnutrition/disease. Those children spared from death continue to remain deprived of essential rights addressed in the Convention of Rights of the Child." -- UNICEF, April 1998.
- "32 percent of children under five, some 960,000 children are chronically malnourished - a rise of 72 percent since 1991. Almost one quarter (23%) are underweight - twice as high as the levels found in neighboring Jordan or Turkey." - UNICEF, November 1997.
- "There is no sign of any improvement since Security Council Resolution 986/1111 ["Oil for Food"] came into force." - UNICEF, November 1997.
- "One out of every 4 Iraqi infants is malnourished. ... Chronic malnutrition among children under five has reached 27.5%. After a child reaches two or three years of age, chronic malnutrition is difficult to reverse and damage on the child's development is likely to be permanent." UNICEF and World Food Programme (WFP), May 1997
- "Iraq's health system is close to collapse because medicines and other life-saving supplies scheduled for importation under the 'oil-for-food' deal have not arrived. ... Government drug warehouses and pharmacies have few stocks of medicines and medical supplies. The consequences of this situation are causing a near-breakdown of the health care system, which is


reeling under the pressure of being deprived of medicine, other basic supplies and spare parts." World Health Organizations (WHO), February 1997.

- "4,500 children under the age of 5 are dying each month from hunger and disease. ... The situation is disastrous for children. Many are living on the very margin of survival."-UNICEF, October 1996.
- "Since the onset of sanctions, there has been a six-fold increase in the mortality rate for children under five and the majority of the country's population has been on a semi-starvation diet." - WHO, March 1996.
- "Famine threatens four million people in sanctions-hit Iraq - one fifth of the population - following a poor grain harvest...The human situation is deteriorating. Living conditions are precarious and are at pre-famine level for at least four million people. ... The deterioration in nutritional status of children is reflected in the significant increase of child mortality, which has risen nearly fivefold since 1990." - UN FAO, September 1995.
- "Alarming food shortages are causing irreparable damage to an entire generation of Iraqi children". - UN FAO and WFP, September 1995.
- "Sanctions are inhibiting the importation of spare parts, chemicals, reagents, and the means of transportation required to provide water and sanitation services to the civilian population of Iraq. ... What has become increasingly clear is that *no significant movement towards food security can be achieved so long as the embargo remains in place*. All vital contributors to food availability - agricultural production, importation of foodstuffs, economic stability and income generation, are dependent on Iraq's ability to purchase and import those items vital to the survival of the civilian population." - UNICEF, 1995

Iraq Action Coalition ... <http://iraqaction.org> ...



[Iraq Action Coalition - homepage]



A ZNet companion page to the new motion picture *Three Kings*.

"[In *Three Kings*, the soldiers] think Iraq is littered with cell phones, luxury cars and booty stolen from rich Kuwait ... But they suddenly find a situation that completely confronts their humanity and demands that they re-think what they're doing and who they are."

- *THREE KINGS* Director David Russell

"When I returned to Iraq in 1997, nothing could have prepared me for what I saw. Never have I witnessed the moral conscience of the American people more fundamentally betrayed."

- Gulf War Veteran Erik Gustafson

Attention Activists!
Take advantage of <i>Three Kings</i> show-ings by passing out this flyer to the audiences!

The U.S. Government has committed no less than three major betrayals against humanity in the wake of the Gulf War. They include:

- 1 Ignoring Domestic Opposition in Iraq**
Following the Gulf War, President George Bush called on the Iraqi people to rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein with the promise of U.S. support. Then he reversed his position. Over 10,000 Iraqis were killed awaiting air support that never came. Throughout the Gulf Crisis which began in 1990, Washington has made appoint of deterring any chances for a new, democratic government in Iraq.

Read about the deterrence of democracy.

Maintaining Sanctions to Punish Civilians

On September 17, the Chicago Tribune declared "the killing of innocent civilians... has been the most notable result of nine years of economic sanctions in Iraq."

2

When asked about the 500,000 children dead as a result of economic sanctions, Secretary of State Madeline Albright responded, "The price is worth it." The international community resoundingly condemns the sanctions policy, including, most recently, Hans Van Sponeck, the senior UN official in Iraq. Still, the United States refuses to budge.

Read more about the sanctions and their devastating effects.

3 Infecting & Neglecting Gulf War Veterans

While the Federal government spends tens of billions of dollars to bomb and sanction Iraq, causing untold suffering, funding for veterans' hospitals has been slashed. More than 100,000 U.S. veterans suffer from Gulf War illnesses and can't get adequate health care. Additionally, there is massive and mounting evidence that experimental weapons used by the US military itself are at least partly to blame for these illnesses. Meanwhile, Washington still hasn't fully admitted the existence of these diseases, much less culpability in their cause! If you're a Gulf War veteran and/or interested in learning more, contact the **NGWRC**.

Learn more about the Gulf War's impact on vets and Iraqi civilians.

View/Download a Portable Document Format (PDF) flyer version of this page (158k) to hand out at showings of *Three Kings* in your area! To do so, you will need to have the free **Adobe Acrobat Reader** installed (you may already have it). You can then print out a ready-to-copy version of the flyer, fonts, graphics and all. Catch a movie and educate the public this weekend! (If clicking the **view/download** link doesn't work, try right-clicking and opting to save target.) **Read about the experiences some**

activists have had distributing this flyer at local cinemas.

If you'd like to learn more about these and other issues surrounding US involvement in the Persian Gulf, please check out these resources:

ZNet's Iraq Crisis Page

Iraq Action Coalition

Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC)

The concept for this page was derived from a flyer created by EPIC. Much of the text was also directly lifted from EPIC's flyer. You might want to check out their version as well.

This web page/flyer was produced for ZNet by On the Ground, a collective in Syracuse, NY.

--Field Reports--

Here are some reactions from activists who have already flyered local moviegoers. The response to this idea -- which was actually inspired by the folks at EPIC, of course -- has been overwhelming. Both ZNet and On the Ground are talking about collaborating on many more Internet-based distribution projects for the near future. Please let us know of any ideas, or how distribution could be improved. You can reach On the Ground at grounded@rootmedia.org.

Nearly everyone who has seen the movie has reviewed it quite positively, so this is definitely an excellent chance to be pro-active in getting the word out about the horrendous crisis continuing in Iraq.

For what it's worth, my experience with flyering has led me to the conclusion that briefly engaging the recipient of your propaganda, with a smile (and in this case, a wish that they enjoy the film), is the best route to take. This is a perfect opportunity to have friendly meetings with everyday folks. Making them feel like you might be protesting the entertainment activity in which they are about to engage is definitely not going to win you any positive attention, so be sure to be clear about your purpose if anyone even seems to be wondering, embarassed or concerned. And it would be terrific if you can be available after the film for

discussion. Most of all, have fun!

-- Brian Dominick, On the Ground & ZNet

"My wife Angela and I saw the movie opening night and distributed the Epic flyers afterwards (we also hit cars). Our method was to only approach people leaving the theater after the movie, and we greeted them with, 'Would you please read about what's going on in Iraq today?'. Response was very positive. We heard many comments such as, 'yeah, we really screwed those people,' and 'Do you think we really did all that kind of stuff?' Angela went to Iraq with a Voices in the Wilderness delegation in July, so we had added that to the bottom of the flyer, and five separate people came back to meet her and talk about it. I recommend adding on any local contact information."

-- Greg Gerdeman, Nashville, TN

"Thanks for the info and the flyer. I went out tonight and hit three theaters. The shows were sold out (good sign), the lines were long (a captive audience), and people seemed surprisingly receptive...no spitting or yelling or anything. It seemed like people were actually reading and listening. Hmmm...maybe I should actually go see the movie next time."

-- Daphne Whittington

"Saw the film on friday night [...]. We brought the fliers and gave them out both before (outside) and after (inside) the film. People reacted quite positively, especially those who had just seen the film."

-- Jim

"Just got back from flyering 2 cinemas. This was a great idea. Thanks Brian for the flyer and the inspiration to do something. Had some negative reaction. One woman brought the flyer back to me and told me to take my political opinion somewhere else. Then she sent her husband to tell the manager. He obediently did her bidding and we were asked to stop. [...] After being asked to stop in the cinema we left flyers on cars (as was suggested) and then to another cinema and stood on the sidewalk (not on their property) and caught another crowd of moviegoers. Some brought the flyers back but a few actually expressed appreciation for the information. Many thought we were protesting the movie which is probably what had the cinema managers anxious. How do you avoid that impression?"

-- 'North Beach'

"So far Seattle distributed some 2,000 flyers. Hopefully this will generate some calls to congress."

-- Jeff Gustafson

:"Well, I enjoyed the flyer, but apparently the manager at the movie theatre didn't. me and my friend went to distribute them at the door of the theatre and after a while the manager saw us and he said it wasn't a problem...but then he came back after 15 min and told us to leave...so what we found was just as effective was to go to the parking lot of the theatre, and put the flyers under the

windshield wipers of the cars...hehe...just a little tip....(he couldn't
get rid of us that easy)..."
--Nahar Fityani

**EXCERPTS FROM *THE ENEMY* (Vintage Books, 1971),
by Felix Greene.**

**HOW IT BEGAN
(pages 47-64)**

CHAPTER I

"God Save the King"

It was formerly the custom in British schools, even during my own childhood, to hang a large map of the world on the wall of each classroom. The dominant color was red, for this was before the Russian Revolution, and red had not yet been appropriated by the Communists. India, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, huge areas of the African continent running from Cairo to the Cape of Good Hope, Samoa, Burma, Malaya, Hong Kong, the West Indies, Ceylon --all colored red. And scattered across every ocean hundreds of islands and small outposts, obscure harbors and refueling stations--also red. Here on these maps, for the edification of British youth, was spread the British Empire in all its majesty. One-quarter of the land surface of the world, one-fifth of the human population intimately linked with or controlled by our own tiny island. It made us feel very superior. We took for granted that this vast medley of people, of every possible creed and color, were under us because they wanted to be. Who better could they be under? We British were just; our rule was benign. The young men we sent out to administer the empire were hardworking, they lived on a pittance, had enormous self-reliance and were incorruptible. Were we not demonstrating to these backward peoples what good government was? Were we not leading them towards the infinite consolations of Christian civilization? Were we not teaching them, with the patience of a father toward his children, that it was part of God's plan that young men wear trousers and that the breasts of young women be covered? In our generosity we were even providing them with schools where they could learn English and could broaden their minds by reciting Shakespeare.* We built hospitals and clinics to improve their health, and agricultural colleges where they could learn how to grow their crops better. No wonder they respected us. It gave us a curious thrill, as we looked on those maps, to think that all these people scattered around the world saluted our flag and sang "God Save the King" --our king.

*Writing in the *New Statesman* (April 4, 1969), Sir Jock Campell gives a marvelous example of the noneducation that was provided, until quite recently, in the British colonies. 'I was shown over a high school in British Guiana a year or two before it became independent Guyana. The English Literature class were reading an erotic short story in Cornish dialect; for Geography the children were studying the [English] Lake District; for Agriculture, the dust bowl of the American Middle West. They were doing sums in pounds, shillings and pence (when the 'colony' used dollars and cents). And the girls' domestic economy form room was bedecked with . . . posters showing how to buy, cook, serve, and carve beef: most of the class were Hindus.

What was more, this admirable state of affairs was clearly destined to continue indefinitely because we British were more clever and more humane than the Romans and Spaniards and the others who had tried to run an empire and had made a mess of it. Besides, we were the richest people in the world, our fleet was by far the most powerful and so our empire would go on and on forever, Amen. That, in all its fraudulent innocence, was the vision of the world entertained by our young minds and most of the British people not so many years ago. No one of course mentioned such words as exploitation, expropriation or forced labor. No one told us that the schools "we" provided were paid for by the people we ruled; that the "medical services" on which we prided ourselves often provided only one doctor for 10 thousand or more people (and in one case, Nigeria, only one for 34 thousand people); and that the increased profits resulting from improved agricultural methods benefited the plantation owner and not those who labored for him. No one told us about the conditions of work in the African diamond mines or in the cotton fields of India. No one talked about relative infant mortality rates or expectancy of life. We heard a lot about the *cost* of running the empire, and the enormous effort it took (the "white man's burden" we called it). But we never heard a word about the millions of pounds sterling (far, far more than the visible budgetary costs) that flowed back each year to British investors in the form of interest and profit; or the millions made by the bankers who financed it all, and by the insurance and shipping companies; or of the salaries and pensions paid out to Britishers from the colonial funds. No one explained to us that much of the cost of the empire was borne by the colonial people themselves. Nor that the costs that were paid for were paid by the British people as a whole through taxation, while the *benefits*, the fabulous financial benefits, were being reaped by a relatively small handful of individuals.

People who run empires have to be disingenuous, and they must not ask themselves too many questions. They need to have at their command a rhetoric of justification that will shield them from realities. They need to be serenely confident that they are doing humanity good.

But why bother with justifications when none were needed? Words and ideas only get in the way, and can be disturbing. There, on the map, was something more real than words. The British Empire --solid and permanent as Gibraltar.

* *

Those maps, of course, no longer hang in British classrooms. The old methods of empire have changed. Such control as the British ruling class still retains is more indirect, less visible. A new empire, the American Empire, has replaced the British Empire as the leading imperialist power. Exercising its power in a structurally different way, but nevertheless seeking the same ends and often with the same means, it is the American Empire which today bestrides the world. Though militarily and industrially vastly more powerful than the British Empire ever was, the new Empire is subject to greater challenge and greater uncertainty and much less likely to last as long.

Before we examine the factors which allowed the United States to wrest the position of world supremacy from Britain, it may be useful to go back yet further

and remind ourselves how it came about that a very few individuals were able to subject so many others to their will and live off their labor. For at this point we touch the very origin of empire. History, they tell us, doesn't repeat itself. Perhaps not, but the study of history can help us to understand today more clearly.

CHAPTER II

"The Rise and Fall"

Empires --domination of one power over another-- have been a feature throughout recorded history.

China, Egypt, Greece, Rome --all exercised control over peoples outside their own formal borders. These empires of antiquity were primarily concerned with tribute or the plunder of wealth. It was for treasure that Spain sent her galleons and armed caballeros to Mexico and South America; it was plunder that made Spain the richest country in the world in the sixteenth century.

The emphasis then was on the looting of gold and silver. Our concern in this book is not with the empires of long ago but of today. A central characteristic of modern imperialism is its emphasis on a different kind of plunder--the pillage of other countries' wealth through *unequal trade* and through *investment*: which draws out far more wealth than it puts in.

The people of Britain (or more precisely, a relatively small controlling group within Britain) were the first to apply these new methods of plunder on a truly global scale. They became, before long, the real professionals of empire building. The system they developed, in its magnitude, diversity and in the complexity of its operations, dwarfed previous empires. Never before had so many people --one quarter of the entire human race-- been subjugated and to work for the enrichment of so few.

What were the conditions that made it possible for Britain to develop such a wondrously profitable system? Of course, innumerable factors contributed to the success, we can isolate four closely related conditions that were basic importance:

1. The new technology of the industrial revolution.
2. The availability of an abundant supply of cheap labor.
3. The accumulation of capital.
4. The development of foreign markets.

The New Technology

As the new steam-powered factories increased their production capacity, the nations of Europe soon realized that commodities could be produced faster than they could be sold in the home market. This does not mean that there was a "surplus"

productive capacity in any real sense. The themselves needed the goods, but their wages were so that they did not have the money with which to buy. At early stage capitalism was already confronted by its own fundamental contradiction-the capacity to expand production faster than the market can absorb it.

The fundamental, built-in, inescapable contradiction of capitalism can (even at the cost of over-simplification) be briefly summarized as follows: The profit an employer makes is secured by selling goods at a price higher than they cost him to make. The total earnings of workers can never match the full value of what they produce or there would be no profit. What is paid out in wages is therefore *never* sufficient to purchase all that is produced. This basic contradiction is hidden by the complexities of the economic process, and the consequences of the inability of purchasing power to absorb all that is produced can be postponed by enhancing consumer demand by buying on credit-but this merely stimulates demand today at the expense of tomorrow. There are other methods of boosting consumer demand, by stage-engendered monetary expansion, governmental consumption for military spending and so on. Ultimately, however, the decisive market factor is consumption by individuals. As long as the total amount paid out in wages and salaries is less than the value of the goods manufactured (and in a capitalist system based on profit it *must* be less) available purchasing power will never be able to absorb the output of consumer goods.

British industry, first in the field, was technically the most advanced and the most efficiently managed. In almost every branch of technical innovation British engineers led the way. Others merely followed. Thus the British gained a clear start over other industrializing countries of Europe.

* *

Cheap Labor

Britain could not have advanced her industrialization so rapidly if, just when owners of factories needed it most, an abundant supply of cheap labor had not made itself available.

Britain had been an agricultural country, but with wool becoming Britain's chief export, the landowners found raising sheep more profitable than renting land to tenants. Thousands of peasant farmers were evicted from their cottages, uprooted, often with no warning, from the land that they and their fathers had used from time immemorial.

What caused even more widespread suffering were the Acts under which public or "common land" was enclosed. In accordance with age-old tradition all men were free to use these common lands for the grazing of sheep and goat in the economy of the peasant farmers access to this land was an essential element without which they could not survive. Between 1760 and 1810 no fewer than 2,765 Enclosure Acts were passed. The human suffering they cause -is beyond imagination.

Thus it happened that when the new factories that were springing up required labor, tens of thousands of homeless and hungry agricultural workers, with

their wives and children, were forced into the cities in search of work, *any* work, under *any* conditions, that would keep them alive.

The emergence of a huge, property-less and impoverished working class was precisely what the new industrialists wished for. They could, and did, dictate their own conditions. The laboring people of Britain were subjected to treatment so inhuman that today we would have difficulty believing it if the official records were not there for us to read. For wages that would barely keep them alive workers were herded into huge slums that had no sewerage, no adequate water supply, no beauty, no cultural amenities, no playgrounds. The company-built hovels in

-5-

which they had to live were of such meanness that today it would be illegal to use them to house animals. In the cotton mills near Manchester the workers were required to work fourteen hours a day in a temperature of eighty-four degrees. They were not permitted to send out for water or to open a window. Penal ties were exacted and deducted from their wages for most trivial offenses. Some factory owners devised ingenious rules which insured the further reduction of their workers' already miserable wage. Thus from a Parliamentary Report we learn that one regulation posted in a factory warned that "Any spinner found dirty at his work will be fined one shilling." And in the same factory another regulation stated "Any spinner found washing himself will be fined one shilling." (A shilling, at that time, was approximately a day's wage.)

Children were cheaper to hire than adults, so children frequently became the wage earners while their parents remained unemployed. Pauper children, bought from the Guardians of the Poor, were cheaper still and were shipped in groups from London to the mining towns of South Wales and the northern cotton mills. Boys of nine were sent down the mines to work for fourteen hours a day hewing coal; and in the cotton mills of Lancashire girls of seven would work as "apprentices" from five in the morning until eight at night --a fifteen-hour work day.

Under what were known as the "Combination Laws" all forms of collective bargaining, all associations of workers to improve their position, were considered "conspiracies" punishable by imprisonment. If the workers rioted, they were fired on by troops. When, in sheer desperation, men began to wreck the machinery, Parliament passed an act making the damaging of machinery punishable by death. In ways such as these did those with wealth and power achieve the continuation of the supply of cheap labor--the second of the 4 basic factors which made the development of the empire possible.

For those looking only at the statistics, Britain showed extraordinary advances during the industrial revolution. Production of cotton, of iron and coal and of every commodity was being multiplied tenfold. Profits were soaring. Wealth was pouring into Britain from all over the world. For the few it was a field day. Money, money, money - - it was rolling in. Money for country mansions; money for huge London houses; money for carriages and servants and elegant clothes; money for weekend parties and tours around the Continent; money for plays and entertainment and fancy-dress balls; money for music and education and seaside holidays; money just

for fun. This rich man's London might have been a million miles away from the dark cities where the great mass of the British people were existing in inconceivable

degradation. In 1836, at a time of unprecedented "prosperity," thousands of people were literally starving.

This was the cost that successive generations of the British working class paid for Britain's industrial leadership, which made possible the "glories of empire."

* *

The Accumulation of Capital

The third major factor which made possible the new methods of global plunder was the accumulation of capital. This derives from the exploitation of the workers which we have just described.

Capital is the wealth produced by the workers but expropriated from them. To put it differently, the worker produces a given amount of value but he is paid not the amount he has produced but only a part-the existential minimum necessary to guarantee his return to the same work tomorrow. The value he produced but did not receive, that value which was appropriated (stolen would be the better word) is the source of all capital. "Capital," said Marx, "is but yesterday's frozen or dead labor." This is true whether the capital is represented by money, machinery, factories, or anything else. Accumulated capital, arising from the exploitation of workers yesterday, perpetuates the enslavement of the living workers today. But there is one question on which we must be clear if we are to understand the workings of capitalism. At what stage is wealth created? The capitalist convinces himself that it is he who has created wealth, capital, when he sells an article for more than it cost him. But in actual fact wealth is not created at the time when a commodity is sold but when it is produced. It is true that it is only when he sells an article and gets paid for it that the capitalist can lay his hands on the excess value - that portion that was not paid to the worker. But this value was already *contained in the product itself* before it was marketed. The real issue is not whether the accumulation of capital is "wrong"-for capital is an essential element of progress-but who owns it, who controls it, and for whose benefit it is to be used

The relatively small group of capitalists who developed British industry had no doubts as to the answers. The capital belonged to them, would be controlled by them and would benefit them. This was, as they saw it, the natural law of things. It never occurred to them to question it.

* *

The Development of Foreign Markets

From the sixteenth century Britain had recognized the importance of the seas as her main trade highway, and had thereafter built a powerful fleet of merchant and war ships. The aim was trade, and particularly trade which exploited the profitability of cheap labor in the overseas territories. There was the slave trade, organized as a "business-like" operation, in which the British ships plied the "triangle" of trade. The ships transported slaves from Africa to America, carried tobacco and cotton from America to Bristol and Liverpool, and then returned with manufactured goods (including guns, whiskey and Bibles) to the African ports. There were also the products of the East which were handled by the East India Company—a powerful government organ in its own right.

Though the British took the lead in expanding their foreign markets, there was nevertheless a continuous bitter rivalry among the newly industrialized powers. The French, the Germans, the Belgians, the Dutch, as well as the British, were faced with the same problem (factories able to produce more goods than could be sold at home) and all were seeking the same solutions. The wars between France and Britain from 1792 to 1815 were essentially a struggle for markets and for sources of raw material which could be obtained at the least possible cost through the use of cheap labor.

The century from Britain's victory over France at Waterloo in 1815 to the start of World War I in 1914, the century during which Britain exercised to the highest degree world-wide power and plundered the wealth of other nations most successfully, is often referred to as a peaceful period.

Pax Britannica it is often called. It was a century almost continuous strife. Only by the use of aggressive military force was Britain able to seize one after the other, her overseas possessions.

- 1814 British Guiana
- 1816 Gambia, Sikkim
- 1819 Singapore
- 1821 The Gold Coast
- 1826 Assam
- 1833 Falkland Islands
- 1839 Aden
- 1840 New Zealand
- 1841 Hong Kong
- 1842 Natal, Sind
- 1846 North Borneo
- 1849 The Punjab
- 1852 Burma
- 1853 Nagpur
- 1854 Baluchistan
- 1861 Nigeria
- 1868 Basutoland
- 1874 Fiji

1878 Cyprus
1882 Egypt
1884 Somaliland
1887 Zululand
1888 Southern Rhodesia, Sarawak
1890 Kenya, Zanzibar
1891 Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland
1894 Uganda
1900 Transvaal, Orange Free State, Tonga
1906 Swaziland

The West Indies, India, Australia, Ceylon, Mauritius and part of North America were already colonized, and with the defeat of the French, Britain had assumed control over large areas of the North American continent. That was only the start. Here is the timetable of British penetration into almost every corner of the world during this century of "**peace.**"

There were only fifteen years in that century when Britain was not engaged in some bloody military struggle. So much for **Pax Britannica!**

* *

The development of Britain's global system of exploitation would have been impossible if the small group with capital had not learned to pool their resources, to gather together, to concentrate, to centralize large reserves of money--the capital that was never rightfully theirs in the first place.

Because of the volume of her trade, London became the financial center of the world. Merchant bankers combined the role of both merchants and bankers. A network of credit agencies was established throughout the empire whose sole purpose was to encourage British investments and trade and to increase profits. Branches of London banks were set up in all colonial territories. It was *capital* that enabled the factories and ships to be built, credits to be extended to cover purchases, the necessary reserves to be built up for insurance. At certain moments the immediate availability of large sums of money enabled the British to jump ahead of others. When, for example, the British Government heard that financial control of the Suez Canal could be seized (it was then owned by the French) if 4 million pounds were found immediately, the Government turned to the bankers and the money was provided overnight.

Those making commodities and selling them abroad, the bankers making money by extending credit, the insurance companies, the shipping companies, the entrepreneurs were not of course engaging in their activities for the "glory of empire" or "to bring civilization to the backward people" --this was merely the rhetoric. They were out for themselves they were out for **profit**. And they made it. The empire, this intricate, complex system which was using the cheap labor in

Britain and the still cheaper labor in the colonies as means of amassing wealth, seemed foolproof. Outwardly it gave every appearance of stability and strength. Yet, even as it grew, there were intimations that the system contained its own built-in contradictions which must sooner or later prove fatal. But before we examine the reasons why Britain lost her position of supremacy, we must discuss the question often raised in justification of the system, of whether-in spite of the unspeakable miseries it brought to generations of the working people-the industrial revolution and the rise British imperialism brought with it compensating advantages and a general advance in the conditions of mankind.

* *

Bourgeois Democracy

After decades of prolonged and bitter struggle the working class in Britain did secure some political and social rights. Workers finally forced the industrialists and government to legalize trade unions; maximum working hours were set, the franchise was gradually extended; political parties began to be formed. Although the newly organized power of the workers brought some gains, the power structure remained essentially unaltered, as it is even today. Bourgeois democracy is a form of class rule; it provides the appearance of democracy without its substance. It is an effective screen behind which class rule can continue. After a century and a half of "democracy," power and wealth still remain in the hands of a very small group within the British population. The great mass of workers are still being denied the wealth that they produce. Most of the "freedoms" that were won through their struggles are freedoms in form only and have no functional reality. (Anyone is "free" to start an independent newspaper-if he has a million pounds to do it with. Anyone is "free" to start his own business --if he has 20 thousand pounds in the bank.)* Within Britain's bourgeois democracy there still exist today grotesque and deep-seated inequalities --in educational opportunities, in wealth, in social status, in treatment before the law. But what about the advances (such as the legalization of trade unions) won only after the most bitter struggle by the workers of Britain, the United States and other industrially advanced capitalist countries? These advances --and they *were* advances-- must be seen for what they really are. It is one of the hideous ironies of

*Henry J. Kaiser once remarked somewhat ruefully, "It cost me \$34 million to find out that I was too poor to get into the automobile manufacturing business."

capitalism that gains achieved by one section of the working class are paid for by another section. Capitalists, finding that the higher wages they were forced to give the workers at home to avoid revolt reduced their profits, went abroad and there, with total ruthlessness, systematically stole the land and destroyed the primitive self-sufficiency of colonial peoples, driving them (much as was done in the enclosure movement in England) into the arms of the "free labor" market. From there they could be recruited for work in the mines and the plantations at wages that barely kept them alive. In other words, the amelioration of the sufferings of the workers at home led to the increase of the sufferings of the workers in the colonies. Such is the relentless mathematics of imperialism.

Viewed within the context of a single country the British working people did, as in the United States, improve their conditions through their struggles. But if one takes not a regional view but considers the working class as a whole --the hundreds of millions in the poorer countries the surplus value of whose labor works its way through the world-wide apparatus of imperialism --one must see that the so-called "bourgeois democracy" has brought no improvement, amelioration of conditions, but rather an *increase* of repression.

The Fate of the Parasite

Capital has no loyalty but to itself. It follows its own built-in rules. It will at times for tactical reasons appear to give some consideration to other factors than its own immediate purposes, but in the end it will seek its own advantage regard-less of more general social consequences. Capitalists were not concerned with the appalling conditions they imposed on the working people of Britain as long as they were able to extract from them high profits; nor with the slavery, or near-slavery, they imposed on the people overseas. As the wealthier class accumulated capital, they found lending their capital abroad or investing it in overseas enterprises to be more profitable than investing in Britain herself. Especially toward the end of the century the *export of capital* (which is characteristic of imperialism) became as important to the British economy as the export of British goods.

On the eve of World War I, Britain's foreign investment represented one-quarter of Britain's total national assets. One-half of Britain's annual savings were being placed -abroad. This exported capital brought in huge annual revenues in the form of interest and profits, but it also brought consequences which were detrimental to the economy as a whole. Britain in this sense had become a parasite, drawing its nourishment from the toil of millions overseas. Capital that should have been invested to keep factories in Britain up-to-date went abroad where the returns were greater. Inevitably Britain's industrial plant began to suffer and her manufacturers were less and less able to produce goods in competition with other countries.

By 1870 Britain's industrial monopoly was lost. Germany and the United States, especially, were not ready to see Britain's position of supremacy continue unchallenged. Rising later on the industrial scene, they could take advantage of more advanced technology, more modern factories, and little by little these

countries began to out-produce and undersell Britain. Britain was saddled with old machinery and cheap labor scattered in distant colonies, while a growing imperialist rival, the United States, used "free" wage labor and slavery (a "colony" much more conveniently placed within her own territory) to amass sufficient capital eventually to render British factories obsolete.

On the eve of World War I Britain was still very powerful. The empire at that time consisted of *fifty-five countries, 12 million square miles of territory, over 400 million people*. The British navy was the most powerful in the world, and British merchant ships represented *50 per cent of the world's tonnage*. The pound was the currency against which all other currencies were measured. But both the United States and Germany had out-stripped British industrial production, and Germany was challenging Britain's naval supremacy on the high seas.

In Germany Britain saw still another threat.

For several centuries Britain had realized that she would become vulnerable if ever Europe was unified under a single power. Britain had already fought three major continental wars to prevent such unification. She had fought Philip of Spain, Louis of France and Napoleon. Now, in 1914, she felt herself threatened again. Not only was Germany encroaching on Britain's commercial position overseas, but, with plans for a huge expansion of naval forces, her supremacy on the seas. Added to these fears was the possibility that if Germany were victorious in another war she might gain power over all of continental Europe.

Britain had no choice. Though in an already weakened position, Britain and her empire had to turn to meet this challenge in the first of two prolonged, destructive, costly and bloody wars. Britain was on the winning side of both, but they brought to an end her position of world supremacy*

* *

Every empire at the height of its success has appeared indestructible and permanent. With such wealth and massive power at its disposal, such sophistication and administrative experience in its leadership, why should it ever be eclipsed? Yet within every empire there are built-in antagonisms which make its eventual decline inevitable. Today world supremacy of the United States appears as unassailable as did that of Britain at the height of her imperial might. But America's present power and wealth cannot in any conceivable way prevent her economy from declining. For this very power and wealth, as we shall see later in this book, require the continued economic enslavement of other peoples and these peoples (and not only in the poor countries) are no longer prepared to submit.

* Just how quickly Britain's military power was supplanted can be seen by the decline of her naval forces. Until after World War I the British navy was supreme; by 1922, under the Washington Treaty, she "granted" equality of naval strength to the United States. For a short period in the British navy was down to a total active strength of one cruiser four destroyers.

All empires rise and fall, and the American empire be no exception. As the decline of Britain shows us, when empires begin to crumble they may crumble fast.

CHAPTER IX

The Satellization of the Rich (pages 207-215)

There is no immediate economic answer to the American invasion of Europe while America has its own *Fifth Column*, the capitalists, who are only too ready to sell the pass for a bit of cash; but sooner or later there will be a *political* answer. It will come in Europe as a result of a significant number of individuals realizing that the problem is not the "satellization" of Europe by the American economy (or competing with it on its own terms as J.-J. Servan-Schreiber suggests in his book, *The American Challenge*). For capitalism is not only faced with an objective economic crisis, but a crisis *within the consciousness of man himself*. The increasing mechanization and dehumanization of man's experience and the identification of technological progress with progress have stripped man of his individuality. Man can no longer express himself in his work, and is less and less able to shape his life in accordance with his own choices. For Europe to "Americanize" itself would be only to plunge into the same extremity of social conflicts and lawlessness that the United States is facing today.

The answer for Europe, as we hope to show in a later chapter, is to extricate itself from the bondage of a system that is certainly not meeting the human needs of its victims, nor even of those who are supposedly benefitting from it most.

* *

This chapter would not be complete without some mention of what the British choose to call their "special relationship" with the United States. There still lingers in the minds of many British people a romantic notion that between the United States and themselves there exists a strong bond of friendship. The United States is pictured as a country essentially democratic progressive, closely knit to Britain by ties of blood, language and common ideas of law, and sharing many similar attitudes to the problems of the world. The United States being presented to British people as being fundamentally friendly and helpful in spite of occasional frictions which, the British people say to themselves, are the kind of minor disagreements that "occur in any family." Many of these ideas about America --its democracy, its attachment to peace and aversion to militarism and bureaucracy, and its special regard for Britain as the "mother country"-- derive from a much earlier era. They have no validity whatever today. But these are attitudes which help America achieve its imperialist aims, namely, to *use* Britain, to control as much as necessary, Britain's international

policies without this becoming too obvious, and to take over any British enterprises which might be profitable to herself.

At Potsdam, Britain still figured as one of the "Big Three," but she soon was seen to be a much weaker power than either the United States or the Soviet Union. As other capitalist powers recovered from the war and Britain's relative position weakened still further, Britain aspired to a position of a lesser partner of the United States. Britain did all she could to cultivate this "special relationship" with the United States to conceal as far as possible her own growing weakness. But this role too was lost. When Kennedy became President in 1960 he made it clear that Britain was to be treated as no better than one capitalist country among a number and all were expected to toe the American line. If anything the United States began to regard West Germany, rather than Britain, as America's most useful junior partner. After World War II, with all her allies (who were also her potential rivals) impoverished, the United States deliberately and consciously set out to take over global power--largely at Britain's expense. Canada, with 70 per cent or more of her industry acquired by the United States, was pulled into the U.S. orbit; Australia and New Zealand were linked to the United States in the military ANZUS Pact, from which Britain was ostentatiously excluded; Britain was displaced in the Middle East as the dominant imperialist power; in 1949 the U.S. forced a 30 per cent devaluation of Sterling and insisted on the loosening of British exchange and trade controls in order to facilitate her commercial economic penetration.

No one saw and expressed more clearly the United States' global ambitions than Mao Tse-tung. In August 1946 --, three years before the successful conclusion of the Chinese Revolution --he talked to the American journalist Louise Strong. This was at the start of the United States' cold war against the Soviet Union. In the course of this conversation Mao said:

There are two aspects to the propaganda about an anti-Soviet war. On the one hand, U.S. imperialism is indeed preparing a war against the Soviet Union; the current propaganda about an anti-Soviet war . . . is political preparation for such a war. On the other hand, the propaganda is a smokescreen put up by the U.S. reactionaries to cover many actual contradictions immediately confronting U.S. imperialism. There are the contradictions between the U.S. reactionaries and the American people, and the contradictions of U.S. imperialism with other capitalist countries and with the colonial and semi-colonial countries Both Hitler and his partners, Japanese warlords, used anti-Soviet slogans for a long as a pretext for enslavement of the people at home and aggression against other countries. Now the U.S. reactionaries are acting in exactly the same way.

The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union is out of the question. In the Pacific the United States now controls areas larger than all the British spheres of influence there put together; it controls Japan, that part of China under Kuomintang rule, Korea and the South Pacific. It has long controlled Central and South America. It seeks also to control the whole British Empire and Western Europe. Using various pretexts the United States is

making large-scale military arrangements and setting up military bases in many countries. The U.S. reactionaries say that the military bases they have set up and are preparing to set up all over the world are directed against the Soviet Union. True, these military bases are directed against the Soviet Union. At present, however, it is not the Soviet Union but the countries in which these military bases are located that are the first to suffer U.S. aggression.

Despite all the efforts and apparent successes of the Americans, the balance of forces on a world scale since the end of the war have swung against them.

First, their relative economic preponderance has declined. While in 1945 America's industrial output was twice that of all the other capitalist countries, today the others together equal hers; and the socialist countries, which from 1949 have included China, account for nearly one-third of total world output.

In spite of the United States' relatively declining global power the British ruling class continued to seek support from the United States. American support meant for them, concretely, not merely loans and supplies but also the deployment of American forces in appropriate areas. This is why the British after the war not only connived at American cold war propaganda but helped to promote it. The cold war was a pretext for spreading American power over the world.

To some extent the British imperialist policy worked as they expected. They received financial and some political and military support from America. But British political influence was downgraded. The Suez attack in 1956 was a milestone on this road of British decline. It was the last attempt on the part of Britain to act independently of the United States. She was quickly brought to heel. The lesson sank in. Since Suez the British ruling class has never ventured to challenge the Americans on any major question.

This gives rise to a fundamental political question: to what extent is there today a separation between British and American imperialism? Are the two so closely linked that for all essential political purposes they are inseparable? Who is the main enemy of the British people today? British imperialism? American imperialism? The two jointly? The close ties between the British imperialists and American imperialism are seen more and more clearly as time goes on. Each successive British government now obeys the Americans with complete servility. They talk of long-term policies to strengthen Britain but their actual short-term policies of continued overseas spending and domestic deflation make Britain weaker not stronger. The help that the British Government is being given by other imperialist powers is extended on terms that ensure that no change in Britain's policies can be made, and hence Britain's decline is accentuated. The position of the British ruling class is dependent on the closest possible collaboration with American imperialism and they will do all they can to maintain it.

Although American direct investment in the United Kingdom has grown, the total volume of U.S. investment is less significant than its character. American influence in United Kingdom is based not so much on direct investment as on the way U.S. interests have interlocked themselves with British. For example, the British and

American *oil companies* act in many ways as a joint international cartel; there are many links in *chemicals, non-ferrous metals, machinery, consumer goods* and so on... There is very close collaboration between the "City" and the United States over *banking, insurance and investment*.

The out-and-out collaborators with U.S. imperialism, those committed to an unshakable alliance with the United States, are a relatively small number of the biggest capitalists. They are small but extremely powerful.

On the other hand other British interests feel themselves directly and immediately challenged by America and anxious to resist its control before it is too late. Two examples are the British *aircraft and automation* industries. Other British groups which are predominantly concerned with overseas trade tend to collaborate with the Americans in the belief that they can obtain support which, on balance, is worthwhile. Many capitalists, including smaller industrial concerns, are fearful of American competition not merely in overseas markets but in their share of the United Kingdom market itself. For example, *drugs, toiletry and cosmetics, food processing, some non-ferrous metals* and so forth.

But what is the position of the British worker?

Great numbers of the British people already have strong feelings against United States' domination. These feelings are given little or no expression by any of the political parties. A very wide section of the British people, however, for many different reasons and with differing degrees of understanding, realize that Britain must resist the increasing United States dominance over her affairs. Particularly those who want to see a genuine socialism established in Britain must realize that this is impossible until Britain can settle her future free from outside interference. A great task at this stage for the British people is to build up a wide alliance of those who stand for British national independence and a resistance to American imperialism and its British partners.

* *

Those who still cling, in spite of all the evidence, to the comfortable belief that the United States is Britain's "friend" should read a report written by Mr. Richard Neustadt for circulation among official circles in Washington which was printed in the *New Left Review* in their September-October 1968 issue. Neustadt was a presidential adviser to both President Kennedy and President Johnson. He was sent to Britain shortly before the Labour Government took office to assess what their reactions would be in regard to the Multilateral Nuclear Force policy which was then being pushed by Washington. This report reflects clearly the attitude of patronizing contempt with which Washington views British influence and power and how cynically they view their relationship with the British political leaders. Talking, for instance, of a forthcoming visit of Mr. Wilson to Washington, Neustadt wrote:

As Prime Minister I would expect him to arrive in Washington with recollections of the Anglo-American relationship and hopefully his own personal relationship which are quite different from perceptions of reality held by many American officials. Numbers of things can be done on the cheap to avoid shocking his sensibilities. For

one, the President might ask his advice on the short list of replacements for [Ambassador] David Bruce. For another Averell Harriman might figure prominently among his hosts. If these don't serve there are sure to be others. They are worth thought and attention.

These suggestions all rest on the one underlying premise that it will be worth our while to ease the path for Wilson, pay him a good price, leave him no possible excuse we can foresee for failing to proceed toward MLF in company with us and with the Germans . . . if we get over this hurdle in good style the stage will be well set ... for effective Anglo-American relations. I can think of nothing likelier to speed a Labour Government's approach toward the European and Atlantic attitudes we favor, than productive, firm relations both with Washington and Bonn.

The "royal reception" of Mr. Wilson on one of his more recent visits with an honor guard and all the trappings on the white House lawn, indicates that the American officials are still looking for things "that can be done on the cheap to avoid shocking his sensibilities."


This is about all that is left of Britain's "special relationship" with the United States.

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For <Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr>; Fri, 31 May 2002 20:34:33 +0200 (MET DST)
Date: Fri, 31 May 2002 20:37:18 +0100
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Subject: from ANOTHER CENTURY OF WAR, chap 2

Chapter 2
The Middle East: The Legacies of Failure

Oil has not been the sole factor in guiding the U.S.' foreign policy in the Middle East, but free access to the region's enormous reserves--now about two-thirds of the world's known supply--has been its most consistent and overriding concern. Other considerations have at various times been important, of course, but they have simply not been of the same significance. The events of September 11 were the direct results of over fifty years of American involvement in the region, the consequences of actions and policies that have destabilized the arc of nations extending from the Mediterranean to South Asia. Today we live with these outcomes. The United States has its oil but the region is profoundly troubled--and so is the entire world.

The Middle East was the region where the intrinsic ambiguities of its relationship to Great Britain, its closest military and ideological ally, shaped all of the U.S.' actions, because although it sought not to weaken Britain either economically or militarily--on the contrary, it loaned England huge sums after August 1945 precisely because it wanted a barrier to Soviet influence ranging from Europe to the Indian Ocean--it also wanted far greater control over the region's oil reserves.

Objectively the two nations were the sole rivals for the single most important ingredient in a modern industrial society, but the Truman Administration believed it was very much to the U.S.' interest that the British continue their military role in the region; if they did not police it then Washington would have to fill the vacuum. Elements of genuine friendship as well as competition characterized its actions throughout the period ending about 1956, when the two nations irrevocably parted ways in the region. But domestic political pressures--especially from ambitious oil companies and the powerful pro-Zionist lobby--and the formal American ideological commitment to the "Open Door" principle and the growing need for access to the region's oil made its nominal desire not to weaken the British far more rhetoric than reality.

Ideologically at least, the British had a great deal in common with the U.S. The two nations were rivals for control over the region's oil, and each favored their own clients, but British obstinacy and arrogance made it much easier for America to gradually supplant its dominating role in the area. But Britain could not afford the price of being an imperial power, placing it at a decisive disadvantage in dealing with the Americans. As early as 1946, London asked the U.S. to take over its costly aid to the Greek regime and it was in this context that the Truman Doctrine was declared in March 1947 and the domino theory first articulated; aid was also extended to Turkey, and Washington warned that the Middle East, with its "great natural resources," and even Asia, was at stake.

The U.S. even supported the beleaguered British position in Palestine until 1948, where Zionist terrorists cost the British many lives, but the presidential election compelled Truman reluctantly to play an independent role. What the British wanted most was assurances from the State Department that it would not help American oil firms challenge the 1928 "Red Line agreement," which formalized their dominant position--Saudi Arabia excluded--in the Middle East's oil industry.

Events were to show that they were not to get it, either verbally or in reality. Iran and Iraq--setting a precedent that other states in the region also followed--both sought to entice American firms to counterbalance British predominance, and the bait was too tempting. Even though official Washington favored continued collaboration with England, and certainly wanted it after 1948 to assume responsibility for the Middle East's military security, the cooperation it proposed was increasingly on its own terms. But it was not only access to oil that motivated American actions. They also feared a vacuum of power wherever the weakened British empire was capsizing--ranging as far as South Asia--into which an amorphously defined communist influence could enter. Oil provided the context in which the Americans placed their concern over the decline of British power, and thereby accelerated it principally for the nobly-intended sake of geopolitics rather than the profit of American oil firms. The U.S. had been a net exporter of oil before 1939, but by 1946 it was clear it would import an ever-greater share of its petroleum needs--by 1960 it purchased nearly one-fifth of its oil from foreign sources. Even before extensive exploration, in 1946 the Middle Eastern reserves were almost equal to the entire Western Hemisphere's, and its output went up exponentially. By 1950 its reserves were equal to the rest of the world combined--and the British controlled most of it. Everyone knew that the Middle East held the key to the future of the world's oil industry, and it also cost far less than American oil to locate and extract.

The Korean War accelerated the U.S. abandonment of the British. The U.S. concluded that "ultra-nationalists" were the greatest danger and that the British were strengthening their influence by refusing to pay higher royalties--the 50-50 split that U.S. firms had initiated with Venezuela in 1948. The minor communist threat in these nations could be handled with stronger "police controls." What was essential was a British willingness to pay the Arab states greater shares for their oil. Acheson later recalled that "in an unplanned, undesired, and haphazard way" the U.S. supplanted the British in the area. But there was nothing unplanned in the CIA's help to General Naguib el-Hilali's overthrow of King Farouk--a docile British puppet--in July 1952, which brought Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. The U.S. agents dealing with Nasser directly sympathized with his commitment to a period of discipline to purge Egypt of its negative inheritances--and stifle whatever communists existed. The single most important British bastion, through which its canal to its Asian empire flowed, now was under American influence.

In Iran, however, the U.S. decided to openly undercut the British, who controlled the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, as well as prevent the nationalist Mohammed Mossadegh from coming to power. Mossadegh, who headed the crucial committee of the Majlis (parliament) and was the most visible exponent of the popular proposal for nationalizing the AOIC, was European-educated and played to the urban middle classes. While he was opportunistic (politicians everywhere suffer from this malady) and willing to utilize the Communist Tudeh Party when useful, he was also an anti-communist who was eager to modernize Iran in a vague but fairly conventional bourgeois fashion. The Americans favored the young Shah, who courted them to offset the British and Russians and who shared their utter dislike of Mossadegh's nationalism. Since Iran was virtually bankrupt, and the British paid 10-12 percent royalties while the U.S. firms agreed to a 50-50 split in neighboring Saudi Arabia in 1950, the die was cast. The American ambassador in Teheran thought the British were "self-righteous and arrogant." In early 1951 they reluctantly agreed to 50-50 but it was too late; the Majlis nationalized the AIOC in March, and Mossadegh became prime minister the following month.

While the Pentagon feared the change might increase Soviet influence, the State Department at first encouraged Mossadegh's intransigence, and

the British with ample reason thought the Americans were openly undermining their position. During 1952, however, the U.S. wavered because the Mossadegh government created mounting economic disorder and the Communists became stronger; in July and again in November Washington offered Iran a \$100 million advance if it permitted U.S. firms to handle its oil, but the British were able to block it. Mossadegh, who also feared growing turmoil and was strongly anti-Soviet, was naively convinced he could play Britain against America to obtain his goals. He was sorely naive! By this time the U.S. saw Iran mainly as a dangerous island of instability which the Soviets could exploit, while the British were worried principally about the future of the Empire and their payments balances—oil.

When Eisenhower became president in January 1953 he authorized the CIA to cooperate with a British plan to overthrow Mossadegh. London successfully stressed the communist danger, but Washington also decided that it would take over the once-crucial British role. The following August, despite mishaps which almost produced failure, the Shah was installed as a virtual dictator. Working under a deadline to force the British hand, the Iranians hired the former head of Texaco to advise them, while the official American representative to the renewed oil negotiations was a former consultant to major American oil companies. Five major U.S. firms got 40 percent of the new company; even the Shah disliked the new terms but the British were the major losers.

By far the most important problem that America confronted in the Middle East was not the Soviet Union but its relations with England, for not only were the Communist parties inconsequential but the region's social and political dynamics were far more complex than elsewhere. The British were removed step-by-step but the labyrinthine cultural and political factors which were playing itself out far transcended America's capacity to comprehend, much less control.

In Iran, which was of crucial importance both strategically and economically, the US. opposed and overthrew a nationalist, largely middle-class movement which was neither authoritarian or traditionalist. These nationalists may have done so inefficiently, but they was more likely than any of the alternatives to modernize the nation. In Iran the U.S. placed all of its bets on the Shah, and thereby made a grievous error. Elsewhere in the Persian Gulf the U.S. supported feudal and authoritarian regimes, all strongly traditionalist. American policy was not merely convoluted but it was entirely opportunist, and the British leaders who later wrote memoirs bitterly portrayed the Americans as anti-British; in fact they were more likely simply pro-American. What was crucial in the longer run was that secular movements of political, social, and ideological change were either repressed—and here the American role was crucial in buttressing traditionalist regimes—or they discredited themselves. It meant that rebellion and discontent throughout the Middle East increasingly over the decades took fundamentalist Islamic forms and adapted its ideologies accordingly. Some were syncretic and quite irrational but they had a broader mass appeal than modernist and middle-class ideologies, and most were deadly serious in their fanaticism. Terrorism was one of the outcomes.

The U.S. replaced Britain only insofar as control over oil was concerned, but otherwise there was almost no improvement in the fate of the people or the kinds of political orders that controlled them. The large majority of people in the Middle East needed and often desired elementary social services and rights, but anyone who spoke for their cause was likely to be treated as a subversive. Only the mosque was an acceptable locale for dissent. Instead of developing gradually politically or ideologically, the region remained locked in ignorance and authoritarianism, and repression became the rule—with American endorsement of most of it. There were some exceptions, of course, but they were not sufficient to avert the crisis that is wracking the U.S.

and the Middle East today.

The United States Traumatizes the Region

But the U.S. was convinced it had to confront the nationalism which spread throughout much of the Middle East after the late 1940s, and this it did unevenly and often uncomfortably. By 1962 five countries were ruled by the military, who comprised the large majority of the new leaders. That they were anti-British was axiomatic, but Marxism's influence was negligible, and the politically astute men who led these movements knew how to play on Cold War rivalries to optimize the military and economic aid they received from both sides. Syncretic ideologies were the rule, and while they were opposed to Islamic traditionalism and monarchies they also tended to be inefficient, unstable, and corrupt.

In Egypt the U.S. supported Nasser, who became formal head of the nation in November 1954 and spent the next two years trying to consolidate his precarious domestic political position. Nasser played on divisions among American decision makers but they all had no doubt he was, in his own way, staunchly anti-Soviet. The Saudis gave him financial support; Nasser merely attempted to get the West and Russians, as British foreign secretary Harold Macmillan later put it, "to bid up each other's price." Nasser miscalculated and alienated the U. S. in May 1956 by recognizing Communist China, and two months later Washington canceled an offer to loan Egypt money to build the Aswan dam. Nasser then seized and nationalized the Suez canal at the end of July, Britain's lifeline to the Persian Gulf and its former empire. Britain's leaders were certain then and later that the Eisenhower Administration had encouraged their plans to invade Egypt in conjunction with the French and Israelis, but in fact the U.S. favored a negotiated resolution of the dispute--there was a presidential election in November. The attack on Egypt began the end of October, and the U.S. immediately opposed it. The alliance with Britain and France, it stated clearly, was purely European; at the beginning of December, bowing to the U.S. working through the UN, they ignominiously withdrew from Egypt. The once-dominant British role in the vast region ended with it.

The result was a vacuum and a vastly increased American role. In January 1957 Eisenhower proclaimed his doctrine that the U.S. was ready to protect any country requesting aid "against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism," a vague formulation that created altogether new problems for the U.S. Lebanon, Syria, Jordan--the region was destabilized as never before, and during 1956-65 U.S. military forces greatly increased their interventions in the region--for a total of thirty-nine from 1946 through 1975. Some of these were huge in scale. In the case of Lebanon in July 1958, 14,000 troops equipped with atomic artillery landed. Now its credibility was at stake in a far more unstable political environment than the region had ever experienced--officers overthrew the pro-British Iraqi monarchy at the same time. No Middle East nation, then or thereafter, ever became communist, and the word itself was meaningless in the regional context. Not only American spokesmen abused it; in March 1959 Nasser accused the officers ruling Iraq of introducing "a Communist reign of terror."

The problem, which many American officials admitted in private, was that Arab political complexities and changes transcended the U.S.' ability to master them, and that it might be just as much a victim of the region's social and political dynamics as the British. But although Congress over Eisenhower's and Dulles' objections gave Israel modest sums of economic aid in the form of grants and loans, largely because of the Zionist bloc's skill in mobilizing Congress' ethnic voting coalition and the Democrats, the U.S. had managed to avert the shoals of the Arab-Israeli conflict for well over a decade. It also banned arms deliveries to Israel and Jordan. But Israel's lesser importance at this time was due principally to the indifference of Middle Eastern states

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after 1949 to the Palestinian Arab cause, which was to change. Nothing lay before the U.S. save far deeper troubles.

Those difficulties began in the spring of 1967 and culminated in June, when Israel embarked on its "Six Days War" and conquered the remainder of pre-1948 Palestine as well as Syria's Golan Heights. Israel's actions were in large part a response to demagogic rivalries among the Arab states, which included Syrian shelling of Israel from the Golan, an Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, and other clear provocations. Guerrilla activity during preceding years was only a nuisance to the Israelis but it provided them a convenient excuse to expand their territorial control over pre-1948 Palestine--plus the Golan. The war ended because of Moscow's threats and a tense, potentially very dangerous U.S.-Soviet naval standoff. But it also initiated a regional arms race which allowed the Soviets, for the first time, to play a major role in the area. In January 1968 U.S. lifted its embargo and began massive arms aid to Israel, reaching \$600 million in 1971 (seven times the amount as under the entire Johnson Administration) and over \$2 billion in 1973--making Israel thereafter the leading recipient of its arms aid from that time onwards. Today it still receives \$2 billion in free American arms aid. Most of the Arab world, quite understandably, has since identified Israel and the U.S. as one.

The British decision in December 1967 to withdraw all its forces from the Persian Gulf region by the end of 1971 left the U.S. alone, with immense obligations, at a time it was deeply involved in the Vietnam War and scarcely in a position to fill the vacuum. American relations with Israel had been friendly but discreet until then, but Washington began to look for surrogates or proxies that could help it create barriers to the Soviet Union--who was unwilling to employ its own troops but ready to heavily arm states such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. The CIA before the June 1967 war told the various administrations that Israel could defeat their neighbors even if they combined to fight together. The State Department warned that Arab nationalism was a greater threat than the USSR, but successive administrations ignored its opinion.

Israel and Iran, and later Saudi Arabia, were designated the US' closest allies in the region, where five major American firms controlled half the entire oil output at a time that both the demand and price of oil was rising. Washington believed its reliance on surrogates was a solution to its regional challenges when in reality it only increased its problems. It now had to defend and stabilize its proxies, expanding its definition of credibility to include their security. In doing so it further enflamed Arab nationalism. From this point onwards, however, Washington subordinated all regional issues to what it believed was an overriding Soviet-American rivalry. Israel increasingly held a de facto veto over American policy on the Palestine Arab question. When on October 6, 1973 the Egyptians overwhelmed a completely surprised Israeli army in Sinai, America united with the Russians in the UN to end the fighting. But it still regarded the USSR as its main enemy in the region rather than as a victim of the Arab world's cynical willingness to exploit it for arms. Not a single communist state was established in the region, and it should have been perfectly obvious that Arab nationalism--which united the virtually medieval Saudis and secular Arabs--was far more potent than radicalism. Of far greater and enduring importance was a massive Saudi and Gulf oil boycott which increased oil prices by 1979 to almost twenty times the 1970 level and had immense repercussions on the world economy.

After 1967, the Arab-Israeli conflict guaranteed that anti-Americanism would only intensify. The quickening cycle of change and crisis, combined with its crucial importance as supplier of the world's oil, meant that the region would increasingly frustrate the U.S. and that it, in turn, would alienate the Arab world. Given the vast responsibilities in the area it decided to assume, and its need to depend upon surrogate regimes, only crises lay before it.

America's Failure: the Iran Crisis

Iran was to confirm the fact that the U.S. was no stronger than its proxies. Assuming Britain's lucrative rights but complex responsibilities in Iran was one of the most crucial actions the America was to take in the Middle East. It eliminated a secular, middle class nationalism but it had no idea whatsoever that it would also have to confront profound changes in that nation. The U.S. overthrew those who favored modernizing options and left a resurgent Muslim fundamentalism as the status quo's main opponent. No other nation in the Middle East better illustrated the risks to the U.S. when it depended on proxies to protect its interests.

The Shah was anti-British but he understood thoroughly America's geopolitical goals in the region and how he might exploit them to reinforce his power. He relied on the military to sustain his regime, and over time his police also became crucial--especially after 1962, when he assumed virtually total power. He bypassed the nationalist middle classes and intelligentsia, and during the early 1960s some American officials worried that he was politically too isolated. By introducing an inept and corruptly managed land reform intended to end virtual feudalism in many areas, he instead added to the rural society's problems and drove many peasants into the cities. By 1963 his main opposition came from the traditionalist, fundamentalist Shiite religious leaders, the mullahs, of whom Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was the most important; the Shah was not a Shiite. Riots in the major cities in the summer of 1963 resulted in over a thousand deaths and increasing repression, which became the Shah's way of retaining power--and after 1971 the CIA and Israeli Mossad helped train Savak, his dreaded security organization. Some thousands filled Iranian prisons and the press and media, universities, and the like were tightly controlled. Washington depended on the Shah, and its reliance on him increased after 1967 when the British decided to leave the Gulf.

The Shah courted the Americans successfully but he also wanted greater oil revenues and more sophisticated arms, and he even threatened to turn to the USSR if he could not buy them from the U.S. He shrewdly encouraged America's geopolitical visions and fears for the region, but he also increased his oil revenues until 1976. He even announced in early 1973 that he would not renew the 1954 oil agreement when it expired in 1979--in effect, nationalizing oil and following in Mossadegh's footsteps. But he also spent \$20 billion on overpriced American arms during 1970-78, providing a market for one-quarter of its arms exports. Corruption and repression suffused his regime, and the Shah and his family amassed a huge fortune. Some 7,200 American military personnel and contract employees by 1977 helped service his modern army, but the living standards for the large majority fell. The visible class differences helped to traumatize the people further. There was no class basis for the Shah's regime, only the army and its satraps--and their ultra-modern equipment. In September 1978 the CIA predicted the Shah would remain in office over the next decade, even though bloody confrontations between Muslims and the police had begun earlier that year. In the fall of 1978 the opposition to the Shah took to the streets, and the army learned it could not depend on its poorly paid conscripts from the villages. It took only several months for the army to disintegrate. The rest was certain. The Shah went into exile in January 1979, and on February 5th Khomeini took power and Iran became an Islamic republic. It was a major, total defeat for American policy in the Middle East, the most important it has ever experienced. The Carter Administration's intense dissatisfaction turned to fury when Iran's new leaders seized fifty-two Americans working in the Embassy the following November. Never had the U.S. suffered such humiliation, and the following January it proclaimed the "Carter Doctrine," which threatened any "outside force" seeking "to gain control of the Persian Gulf region" with an unspecified but possibly nuclear response anywhere

in the world should America's "vital interests" be attacked. The Carter Doctrine was not a policy but an impotent and pathetic stance; the problem was not the Soviet Union but a very militant Islamic movement. Communism was irrelevant, and a botched American effort in April 1980 to free the hostages only added to its discomfort. Having pushed the British out and taken on the immense task of seeking to control the Middle East, the U.S. had no means for doing so. Like Britain before it, it now confronted the region's immense complexities.

The Reagan Administration picked up the gauntlet Iran had thrown down, and its chosen instrument was the secular Saddam Hussein, who became the virtual dictator of Iraq in July 1979. Indeed, he had even begun his career with vaguely socialist pretensions, which were then in vogue among officers, but he was ultimately completely opportunistic. Power, not ideology, was his sole concern. He not only detested Islamic fundamentalism but also had ample reasons, going back to the 1960s when Iran began to supply Kurdish dissidents with arms and seized strategic Iraqi islands in 1971 (leading to a break in diplomatic relations), to consider Iran an enemy. The U.S., beginning under Carter, encouraged Saddam to confront the Iranian bullies, who were over-armed with American weapons, by secretly giving Iraq false intelligence on alleged Iranian weaknesses. In the sordid war that followed, successive American administrations also gave Iran some assistance, and indeed the CIA helped to fund U.S. aid to the contras in Nicaragua by secretly selling arms to Iran via Israel, but most of its effort went to help Iraq--and Saddam Hussein. But the U.S. helped Iran enough to protract the war, and proved a devious ally to both sides. Iraq was set-up to fight a war it could not win, one that ended by benefiting only the U.S., its reactionary neighbors, and arms merchants all over the world. Washington, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia strongly encouraged Saddam to invade Iran in late 1980 in the expectation that Iraq would annex part of Iran and help prevent the charismatic Shiites from extending their influence throughout the region. As then President George Bush put it in early 1992, "As you may remember in history, there was a lot of support for Iraq at the time as a balance to a much more aggressive Iran under Khomeini...." But Iran had much larger manpower and the war took far longer than expected. Iraq borrowed \$95 billion, mainly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and imported \$42 billion in arms. The U.S. supplied Iraq with intelligence throughout the war, and provided it a total of over \$5 billion in food credits, technology, and industrial products, most of it after it began to use mustard, cyanide and nerve gasses both against the Iranians and dissident Iraqi Kurds. Both sides wrecked each other's refineries, and at the beginning of 1987, with Iran desperate and angry at Kuwait for funding the war, the U.S. put its own flag on Kuwait's tankers and provided its Navy's protection for them, increasing the U.S. warships in the Gulf from six to at least forty by September 1987. Indeed, had they not done so, the Kuwaitis and Saudis threatened to dump their vast holdings of U.S. Treasury bonds. A cease-fire was signed in August 1987, and a tense, disputatious peace has existed since then.

At least 370,000 people died, 262,000 of them Iranians; but Iran claimed 800,000 dead. No one really knows how to measure accurately such horrors. The war cost Iran over \$600 billion directly and in lost oil and export income; Iraq spent almost as much and owed its neighbors vast sums. Both nations were devastated.

The U.S. was Iraq's functional ally and encouraged it to build and utilize a huge army with modern armor, aviation, artillery, and chemical and biological weapons. It did not foresee what was obvious: Saddam could also use his advanced arms in yet other ways. But the profusion of modern arms in so many hands was far more than commerce for arms manufacturers. It also transformed power relations in the Middle East and made the world far more dangerous.

Oil: The Middle East's Stakes

What stakes are involved in the Middle East? Some data is relevant at this point.

The U.S. produced 69 percent of the petroleum it consumed in 1970 but 38 percent in 1996. After the early 1980s its production in absolute terms began falling, and its crude oil imports became even more crucial. From 1960 until 1996 its imports rose at least four times. Most of its imports after 1945 were from Western Hemisphere sources and Nigeria, but the Persian Gulf region supplied 8.8 percent of U.S. imports in 1983 and 22.1 percent in 2000--most of it from Saudi Arabia. For Western Europe and Japan it is far higher. The Persian Gulf in 2000 contained approximately 65 percent of the world's total reserves and about 34 percent of its natural gas reserves. The region has become increasingly important for the entire world economy.

Projections are always subject to correction, some crucial, but domestic U.S. petroleum production until 2020 is expected to remain constant. Its consumption over the period 1998-2020 is projected to rise from 18.9 to 25.8 million barrels daily, and all of this increase must be imported. But the competition for imports will become far more intense, especially from China. The Persian Gulf states will always be eager to sell their oil, but that they already control the single most crucial factor in modern industrial power--and are likely to increase their crucial leverage in the future--is a fact that those in power in Washington are acutely aware. Both the president and the vice president have worked in the oil industry.

The Gulf War and Its Aftermath

No sooner than Iraq's war with Iran had ended than Kuwait began pressing Baghdad for repayment of its huge loans. It also demanded that Iraq abandon its border dispute with Kuwait and it lowered greatly the world price of oil, virtually Iraq's only source of hard currency, by exceeding its OPEC output quota. The Iraqi army occupied Kuwait in August 1990, and it now became its former allies' detested enemy. The U.S., Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia for a decade had pursued a political strategy in the Gulf which was now a consummate failure; it had backfired in a way that was disastrous. They had financed and supported Iraq as a balance to Iran, and to destroy Saddam Hussein's forces was to produce the very outcome it had been American policy to avoid: Iran became the dominant power in the absolutely vital Gulf region, and Iraq's action produced a vacuum that assured that Iran would remain the principal long-term threat to the U.S.' interests.

Washington began planning for war with Iraq no later than the following October, intending to destroy Saddam's elite Republican Guard.

"Operation Desert Storm" began January 17, 1991. Saddam was an astonishingly convenient and stupid enemy who followed the rules of conventional warfare, and over forty-seven days air power largely--but not entirely--decimated his army and the modern equipment the Kuwaitis and Saudis had financed. The 380,000 American soldiers and as many allied forces were used over a much shorter time against 183,000 Iraqis in Kuwait alone; a total military victory came very quickly. Only the Kuwaitis favored the American-led forces driving all the way to Baghdad, which they could have easily done, but its coalition would have disintegrated. Saddam Hussein remains in power after a decade, and Iraq is a pariah state under UN sanctions, still subject to U.S. and British air attacks. Iraq's debts are now astronomical, making it the world's most indebted nation, and it is unlikely they will be fully paid. The United States is his arch-enemy, and believes that he is attempting to develop chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction. He surely had ample help from Western nations in doing so when his target was Iran. If true, and it may be, then he may use them against American interests in ways that cannot be predicted.

Civilian deaths as a result of the U.S.-led war against Iraq are subject to radically different estimates, for there are no accurate census takers of the atrocities over the past century. As many as 33,000

civilians died during the short war and the Kurdish and Shiite rebellions that followed, and estimates of the number of civilians who have died over the past decade as a result of UN-sanctions (which the U.S. has supported more strongly than any nation) on absolutely vital imports of food and medicine range from 100,000 to a half-million. These figures, as shocking as they are, are still much lower than the casualties Iraq inflicted upon Iran with enthusiastic Kuwaiti, Saudi, and American support.

The brief American war with Iraq--so easy in large part because Saddam is a incompetent military strategist--ended the occupation of Kuwait but it created far more important difficulties for the victors, above all Saudi Arabia. For Saudi Arabia is a very troubled and increasingly unstable nation. It is ruled as a result of a 1744 alliance between the Al Saud family, which has held political power since, and the al-Wahhab family, which runs what is the state religion along exceedingly conservative, puritanical lines and is in charge of Islam's holiest sites. This hereditary arrangement is a gross anachronism in every sense. It has left the vast majority of locals, including the increasing proportion of educated males (women have no rights whatsoever and cannot work or even drive), politically impotent. There have been increasingly articulate and important attempts to challenge the monarchy's absolute power, but erstwhile reforms during the 1990s in the form of consultative bodies changed nothing. The ruling family itself (which numbers about 7,000) is divided, the succession unclear, and some parts of it are supporters of dissidents such as bin Laden. The large majority of the labor force is comprised of foreign workers (7 million of the 22 million population), who have no rights, but the majority are Muslims. The per capita income, reflecting the drop in oil revenues, has fallen by almost two-thirds since the early 1980s, and this has also fueled discontent.

There is growing dissatisfaction with the basic political structure, a good part of which has taken religious forms, and it has expanded greatly over the past decades. Indeed, opposition in the guise of religion is the only legally tolerated form of dissent in much of the Arab world, and Islamic purist extremism is to a crucial extent a reflection of this fact. The royal family lives ostentatiously abroad, and there are sharper class distinctions and consciousness than ever. There is now an alternate clergy, but Wahhabism still remains a charismatic religion. In this unstable context, bin Laden has been highly successful in recruiting followers and raising money. With the encouragement of all religious tendencies, at least 12,000 young Saudis went to Afghanistan to fight with the mujahedeen against Soviet troops during the 1980s. Bin Laden, who was very well connected with the elite, was chosen by the head of Saudi intelligence to help command them. It was during the 1980s that the CIA worked closely with the Saudis to fund the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and they nearly matched the \$3 billion that the Agency itself spent. Many of bin Laden's wealthy Saudi contacts, motivated by similar religious convictions, a sense of guilt, or the like, continued to fund him over the following decade. They presently include members of the extended royal family unhappy with current trends and the possible succession. The U.S., in any case, welcomed Islamist movements as an antidote to secular leftist groups, which they feared would work with the Soviets, just as it preferred the Shah in Iran to secular middle-class nationalists. The Gulf War brought these tensions to a head, which essentially revolve around the question of how a virtually medieval but very rich society should interact with modern realities, and they have only sharpened since then. Bin Laden proposed that a purely Islamic army, such as he had formed in Afghanistan, could drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait and--above all--defend Saudi Arabia, and that foreigners were not needed on holy Saudi soil. The ruling family preferred that the Americans confront Iraq, but it also increased its purchases of sophisticated

military equipment, a step that divided the elite. For this also meant accepting--for an indefinite duration--a much more visible presence of U.S. troops, along with their rules and conspicuous manners. American military personnel and support in that country peaked at about 30,000 but are now reduced to approximately 5,000, plus a larger number of American civilians to service the ultra-modern Saudi army. Bin Laden could build a following in this heady context, and he especially opposed the stationing of Americans--which led to his being stripped of his citizenship in 1994. He has concocted an inchoate chiliastic and syncretic alternative to the ruling elite and its theology, but his intense hostility to all foreign influences is one that emerges logically from the official Wahhabi doctrine--with which his differences are more of degree than of kind--and resonates sufficiently throughout the nation to provide him with many followers and ample funds. This mixture of theology and rebellion against authority also appealed to many Muslims in other nations and it replaced various socialist notions as the dominant expression of discontent and revolt.

The heart of bin Laden's global network is Saudi Arabia and it explains why the U.S. has gotten far less cooperation from that nation during its war in Afghanistan than it desired. Its rulers know that if the thousands of discontented young men who go to fight jihads in foreign lands stay at home instead many are likely to challenge their authority. In a word, it has exported potential trouble. The regime there knows that if it gives the U.S. everything it asks for there is a serious risk of political turmoil, and it may even be overthrown in the name of Islam. But bin Laden's vision is not confined to one nation but the entire Islamic world, and even if there is not the remotest chance that his vague theocratic notions for it will be realized, al-Qaeda interacts with existing instabilities and grievances and may destabilize various Muslim nations. For bin Laden's primitivist Islamic appeals are very powerful, especially among the young, and many clerics strongly support his anti-foreign rhetoric; he has shown this already in Afghanistan but there are much more important places, where ignorance, injustice, and hunger have created a heady symbiosis of discontent and potential rebellion where the ground is already fertile.

Should Saudi Arabia undergo an Islamic revolution such as bin Laden and those who share his beliefs desire, or the unstable society produce some fundamental changes that challenge the anachronistic political and social order that has existed there for over two centuries, then the strategic and economic consequences for the U.S. will be enormous. Afghanistan's destiny, by comparison, will be of minor consequence. Sooner or later, it is likely to happen.

Meanwhile, the U.S.' political strategy of isolating and imposing sanctions on Iraq, Libya, and Iran because of their alleged links with terrorism has greatly reduced its access to oil, which it will have to import in ever-larger quantities. Germany, France, and Italy, among others, have actively sought to buy oil from these nations, and Russia will sell Iran billions of dollars of arms and finish a giant nuclear power plant there. Iran alone has the world's fifth largest proven oil reserves, and it is especially enticing. At the same time, of course, these NATO members solidarize with the American war against terrorism, which Washington has cast in broad terms to include Iraq, Libya, and Iran among those states that encourage terrorism. Largely because of the pro-Israel lobby in Congress, the U.S. has a law that can even impose penalties on any foreign company that invests more than \$20 million in Iran or Libya, but important American oil firms regard these gestures as counterproductive aids to French and other rivals for the control of oil supplies. Even Vice President Dick Cheney, when he headed the giant oil services company, Halliburton, was opposed to sanctions against Iran, and legal restrictions are hardly enforced, if at all.

The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism reflects in part the failure of

America's efforts in the Middle East. While its position on Israel is the most important single error it made, and it is the one that even its closest friends in the region argue was the origin of terrorism and anti-Americanism, it also conveniently simplifies American policies; there were also other causes for hostility toward the U.S.--and these I have only outlined in this chapter. The Bush Administration acknowledged that strong U.S. support for Israel has alienated even its conservative friends in the area, above all the Saudis, and it surely has made it far more difficult to gain support from Muslim countries for the coalition it alleged it wished to build to fight in Afghanistan and eradicate "terrorism" globally. Even before September 11 it acknowledged that America's bias in favor of Israel was harming it. But it is too late for the U.S. to undo the compounded policy errors of successive administrations over the past 40 years. If it can override the powerful pro-Israel bloc in the Senate and House, which is most doubtful, it may even seek to do so by favoring a Palestinian state or attempting to impose a peace settlement on both sides, but it is unlikely to succeed. Israel is now far too strong militarily and politically, and its leaders will make few, if any, of the essential real concessions that will be required of it. Arafat far too weak and his hold on the Palestinian people is now too contested. Neither Israel's political leaders nor Arafat will commit political suicide among their domestic political constituencies and try to achieve a genuine peace settlement. Both sides are unwilling and unable to act rationally, and it is scarcely a promising situation.

But there are other reasons besides Israel for the strategic and policy impasse the U.S. now confronts. All of its policies in the Middle East have collectively produced a disaster which now threatens to destabilize nations not only crucial to its interests but--and this is infinitely more important--endangers its very security at home and world peace. It made many errors elsewhere, of course, but by encouraging Islam and traditionalism as an alternative to nationalism, and then profoundly alienating the reactionary and repressive regimes that fostered them, the U.S. has now become involved in a conflict from which--temporary military successes notwithstanding--it will only lose. Opinion in the Arab world has been overwhelmingly critical of the U.S.' war in Afghanistan, which its media accurately portray as a form of bullying terrorism and political adventurism quite independent of the Taliban and bin Laden, whom few admire. The opportunism which the U.S. rationalized in the name of anti-communism, which led it to enthusiastically support oppressive regimes, has now created a permanent crisis extending over the Islamic arc reaching from the Mediterranean to South Asia. It is a crisis the U.S. will confront in the decades to come.

THE WASHINGTON REPORT ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS

03/19/2002

US Aid: The Lifeblood of Occupation
By Matt Bowles

Israel has maintained an illegal occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Palestinian territories) for 35 years, entrenching an apartheid regime that looks remarkably like the former South African regime. Palestinians are confined into small, noncontiguous bantustans, imposing closures and curfews to control where they go and when, while maintaining control over the natural resources, exploiting Palestinian labor, and prohibiting indigenous economic development.

The Israeli military (IDF) --the third or fourth most powerful army in the world-- routinely uses tanks, Apache helicopter gunships, and F-16 fighter jets (all subsidized by the U.S.) against a population that has no military and none of the protective institutions of a modern state.

All of this, Israel tells its citizens and the international community, is for "Israeli security." The reality, not surprisingly, is that these policies have resulted in a drastic increase in attacks on Israel. These attacks are then used as a pretext for further Israeli incursions into Palestinian areas and more violations of Palestinian human rights which makes Israeli civilians more secure; all of which further entrenches Israel's colonial apartheid regime. Most Americans do not realize the extent to which this is all funded by U.S. aid, nor do they understand the specific economic relationship the U.S. has with Israel and how that differs from other countries.

The aid pipeline

There are at least three ways in which aid to Israel is different from that of any other country. First, since 1982, U.S. aid to Israel has been transferred in one lump sum at the beginning of each fiscal year, which immediately begins to collect interest in U.S. banks. Aid that goes to other countries is disbursed throughout the year in quarterly installments.

Second, Israel is not required to account for specific purchases. Most countries receive aid for very specific purposes and must account for how it is spent. Israel is allowed to place US aid into its general fund, effectively eliminating any distinctions between types of aid. Therefore, U.S. tax-payers are helping to fund an illegal occupation, the expansion of colonial-settlement projects, and gross human rights violations against the Palestinian civilian population.

A third difference is the sheer amount of aid the U.S. gives to Israel, unparalleled in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Israel usually receives roughly one third of the entire foreign aid budget, despite the fact that Israel comprises less than .001 of the world's population and already has one of the world's higher per capita incomes. In other words, Israel, a country of approximately 6 million people, is currently receiving more U.S. aid than all of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean combined when you take out Egypt and Colombia.

This year, the U.S. Congress approved \$2.76 billion in its annual aid package for Israel. The total amount of direct U.S. aid to Israel has been constant, at around \$3 billion (usually 60% military and 40% economic) per year for the last quarter century. A new plan was recently implemented to phase out all economic aid and provide corresponding increases in military aid by 2008. This year Israel is receiving \$2.04 billion in military aid and \$720 million in economic aid there is only military aid.

In addition to nearly \$3 billion in direct aid, Israel usually gets another \$3 billion or so in indirect aid: military support from the defense budget, forgiven loans, and special grants. While some of the indirect aid is difficult to measure precisely, it is safe to say that Israel's total aid

(direct and indirect) amounts to at least five billion dollars annually.

On top of all of this aid, a team from Israel's finance ministry is slated to meet with U.S. government officials this month about an additional \$800 million aid package which the Clinton administration promised Israel (and the Bush administration later froze) as compensation for the costs of its withdrawal from Lebanon. The U.S. also managed to find another \$28 million in the 2001 Pentagon budget to give Israel to purchase "counter terrorism equipment."

According to the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise (AICE), from 1949-2001 the U.S. has given Israel a total of \$94,966,300,000. The direct and indirect aid from this year should put the total U.S. aid to Israel since 1949 at over one hundred billion dollars. What is not widely known, however, is that most of this aid violates American laws. The Arms Export Control Act stipulates that US-supplied weapons be used only for "legitimate self-defense."

Moreover, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act prohibits military assistance to any country "which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." The Proxmire amendment bans military assistance to any government that refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to allow inspection of its nuclear facilities, which Israel refuses to do. To understand why the U.S. spends this much money funding the brutal repression of a colonized people, it is necessary to examine the benefits for weapons manufacturers and, particularly, the role that Israel plays in the expansion and maintenance of U.S. imperialism.

A very special relationship

In the fall of 1993, when many were supporting what they hoped would become a viable peace process, 78 senators wrote to former President Bill Clinton insisting that aid to Israel remain at current levels. Their reasons were the "massive procurement of sophisticated arms by Arab states." Yet the letter neglected to mention that 80% percent of those arms to Arab countries came from the U.S. itself.

Stephen Zunes has argued that the Aerospace Industry Association (AIA), which promotes these massive arms shipments, is even more influential in determining U.S. policy towards Israel than the notorious AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) lobby. AIA has given two times more money to campaigns than all of the pro-Israel groups combined. Zunes asserts that the general thrust of U.S. policy would be pretty much the same even if AIPAC didn't exist: "We didn't need a pro-Indonesia lobby to support Indonesia in its savage repression of East Timor all these years."

The "special relationship" between the U.S. and Israel must be understood within the overall American imperialist project and the quest for global hegemony, beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, 99% of all U.S. aid to Israel came after 1967, despite the fact that Israel was relatively more vulnerable in earlier years (from 1948-1967). Not coincidentally, it was in 1967 that Israel won the Six Day War against several Arab countries, establishing itself as a regional superpower. Also, in the late 1960s and particularly in the early 1970s (this was around the time of the Nixon Doctrine), the U.S. was looking to establish "spheres of influence"-regional superpowers in each significant area of the world to help the U.S. police them.

The primary U.S. interest in the Middle East is, and has always been, to maintain control of the oil in the region, primarily because this is the source of energy that supplies the industrial economies of Europe and Japan. The U.S. goal has been to insure that there is no indigenous threat to their domination of these energy resources. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. made the strategic decision to ally itself with Israel and Iran, which were referred to as "our two eyes in the middle east" and the "guardians of the gulf." It was at this point that aid increased drastically, from \$24 million in 1967 (before the war), to \$634 million in 1971, to a staggering \$2.6 billion in 1974, where it has remained relatively consistent ever since.

Israel was to be a military stronghold, a client state, and a proxy army, protecting U.S. interests in the Middle East and throughout the world. Subsidized by the CIA, Israel served U.S. interests well beyond the immediate region, setting up dependable client regimes (usually military-based

dictatorships) to control local societies. Noam Chomsky has documented this extensively: Israel was the main force that established the Mobutu dictatorship in Zaire, for example. They also supported Idi Amin in Uganda, early on, as well as Haile Selassie in Ethiopia, and Emperor Bokassa in the Central African Republic.

Israel became especially useful when the U.S. came under popular human rights pressure in the 1970s to stop supporting death squads and dictatorships in Latin America. The U.S. began to use Israel as a surrogate to continue its support. Chomsky documents how Israel established close relations with the neo-Nazi and military regimes of Argentina and Chile. Israel also supported genocidal attacks on the indigenous population of Guatemala, and sent arms to El Salvador and Honduras to support the contras. This was all a secondary role, however.

The primary role for Israel was to be the Sparta of the Middle East. During the Cold War, the U.S. especially needed Israel as a proxy army because direct intervention in the region was too dangerous, as the Soviets were allied with neighboring states. Over the last thirty years, the U.S. has pursued a two-track approach to dominating the region and its resources: It has turned Israel into a military outpost (now probably the most militarized society in the world) that is economically dependent on the U.S. while propping up corrupt Arab dictatorships such as those in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. These regimes are afraid of their own people and, thus, are very insecure. Therefore, they are inclined to collaborate with the U.S. at any cost.

Prospects for activism

Since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear threat associated with direct intervention in the Middle East has disappeared and the U.S. has started a gradual and direct militarization of the region. This began with the Gulf War—putting U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia (the primary source of oil), among other places—and has continued through the current 'war on terrorism.'

Although U.S. aid has not decreased yet, there have been other observable shifts. The first obvious one is the mainstream media reporting on the conflict. Although there is still, of course, an anti-Palestinian bias, the coverage has shifted significantly in comparison to ten years ago. This has been noticeable in both journalistic accounts of Israeli human rights abuses and the publication of pro-Palestinian op-eds in major papers such as the Washington Post and the Boston Globe.

There are also some stirrings in the U.S. Congress. Representative John Conyers (D-MI) requested that President Bush investigate whether Israel's use of American F-16s is violating the Arms Export Control Act. Further, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) recently complained about giving aid without conditions: "There are no strings on the money. There is no requirement that the bloodshed abate before the funding is released." Other elected representatives are slowly starting to open up to the issue as well, but there is a long way to go on Capital Hill.

The most important development, however, has been the rising tide of concern and activism around the Palestinian issue in the US left. The desperate plight of the Palestinians is gaining increasing prominence in the movement against Bush's "war on terrorism," and it is gradually entering into the movement against corporate globalization.

For years the Palestinian cause was marginalized by the left in America. Since this intifada broke out 17 months ago, that began to shift significantly and has moved even further since September 11. With the new "anti-war" movement, there has come a deeper understanding of U.S. policy in the Middle East and how the question of Palestine fits into progressive organizing.

In Durban, South Africa last September, at the UN Global Conference Against Racism, one of the most pressing issues on the global agenda was the Palestinian struggle against Israel's racist policies. 30,000 people from South Africa and around the world demonstrated against Zionism, branding it as a form of apartheid no different than the system that blacks suffered through in South Africa. Shortly after, the U.S. and Israel stormed out of the conference.

In Europe and America, a range of organizations have risen in opposition to Israeli apartheid and

in support of Palestinian human rights and self-determination. Just over the last year or two, organizations such as Students for Justice in Palestine, based at the University of California at Berkeley, have begun organizing a divestment campaign, modeled after the campaign that helped bring down South African apartheid. SUSTAIN (Stop U.S. Tax-funded Aid to Israel Now!) chapters in a number of cities have focused their efforts on stopping U.S. aid to Israel, which is the lifeblood of Israeli occupation and continued abuses of Palestinian rights.

Many Jewish organizations have emerged as well, such as Not in My Name, which counters the popular media assertion that all Jewish people blindly support the policies of the state of Israel. Jews Against the Occupation is another organization, which has taken a stand not only against the occupation, but also in support of the right of Palestinian refugees to return. These movements, and particularly their newfound connection with the larger anti-war, anti-imperialist, and anti-corporate globalization movements, are where the possibilities lie to advance the Palestinian struggle.

The hope for Palestine is in the internationalization of the struggle. The building of a massive, international movement against Israeli apartheid seems to be the most effective and promising form of resistance at this time. The demands must be that Israel comply with international law and implement the relevant UN resolutions. Specifically, it must recognize that all Palestinian refugees have the right to return, immediately end the occupation, and give all citizens of Israel equal treatment under the law.

We must demand that all U.S. aid to Israel be stopped until Israel complies with these demands. Only when the Palestinians are afforded their rights under international law, and are respected as human beings, can a genuine process of conflict resolution and healing begin. For all the hype over peace camps and dialogue initiatives, until the structural inequalities are dealt with, there will be no justice for Palestinians and, thus, no peace for Israel.

Matt Bowles is a member of SUSTAIN - Stop US Tax Funded Aid to Israel Now.

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X-Sender: feeley@POP.u-grenoble3.fr
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Date: Sun, 07 Apr 2002 16:31:19 +0200
To: Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr
From: Francis Feeley <Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr>
Subject: Edward Herman on Israel: Part 1 of 3.

7 April 2002
Grenoble, France

Dear Colleagues:

The Grenoble Center for the Advanced Study of American Institutions and Social Movements just received this three-part series on Israel, written by our associate researcher, Edward Herman, Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. (Dr. Herman participated in the International Colloquium on "The Impact of American Multinational Corporations," which was held at the University of Grenoble-III last January.

Eileen Sutton writes of this research, "Along with Chomsky's *The Fateful Triangle*, Herman's meticulously-researched work will give anyone a keener understanding of the region's conflict. It's a must read in the effort to deconstruct the propaganda surrounding Israel in the U.S. press."

Sincerely,

F. Feeley

----- Original Message -----

From: Eileen Sutton
To: writetoemma@earthlink.net
Sent: Saturday, April 06, 2002 11:11 AM
Subject: Herman on Israel

"The racist discrimination in pushing out Palestinians in favor of Jews is cruel, scandalous, and reminiscent of the behavior of the Nazis (a comparison made often in the Israeli press, but not in the U.S. mainstream media)...Amnesty International (AI) notes in discussing Israel's policy on demolitions that "The Palestinians are targeted for no other reason than because they are Palestinians" in a system where "the family may only have 15 minutes to take out what belongings they have before the furniture is thrown into the street and their home bulldozed"...in 1994, Rabbi Yaacov Perin stated that "One million Arabs are not worth a Jewish fingernail."

**ISRAEL'S APPROVED ETHNIC CLEANSING: PART 1
MAKING "FACTS ON THE GROUND"**

by Edward S. Herman

Imprimé pour Francis Feeley <Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr>

4/7/02

Israel's treatment of the Palestinians has always presented a moral problem to the West, as that treatment has violated every law and moral standard on the books.

Some 750,000 Palestinians were driven from their homes in 1948-1949, and since then scores of thousands more have been pushed out by force, their houses demolished or taken over by Israeli Jews (not Israeli Arabs). Under the supposed "peace process" following the signing of the Oslo Agreement in September 1993, a UN Special Report of November 13, 2000, says that "In the past seven years...Israel's confiscation of Palestinian land and construction of settlements and bypass roads for Jewish settlers has accelerated dramatically in breach of Security Council Resolution 242 and of provisions of the Oslo agreements requiring both parties to respect 'the territorial integrity and unity of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.'

Since 1993 the settler population in the West Bank and Gaza has doubled to 200,000 and increased to 170,000 in East Jerusalem." The report also describes and condemns the demolitions of Palestinian houses, the diversion of water to Israeli cities and settlements, the policy of closures that has damaged Palestinian social and economic life, and the "widespread violation of their [Palestinian] economic, social and cultural rights" both within Israel and in the occupied territories. It also assails Israel's use of excessive force against Palestinians and hundreds of Intifada killings, "most of them unarmed demonstrators."

The settlements have been made in territory outside of Israel, technically "occupied" by Israel and subject to international law that clearly prohibits dispossession and settlement by the "belligerent occupying power" (the Palestinians are "protected persons" under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949; violations of that Convention, including dispossession and settlements, are "war crimes"). This systematic violation of international law has been going on for several decades, just as the creation of new "facts on the ground" in brazen violation of Article 31(7) of Oslo has proceeded since 1993, but as the United States does not object, and in fact has supported these law and agreement violations by massive economic and military aid, and by vetoing any hostile UN actions (it has used the veto an estimated 60 times to give Israeli ethnic cleansing and law violations free play), international law is inoperative.

The contrast with Kosovo is dramatic and enlightening. In that case also international law was inoperative, but only because intervention allegedly to protect the Kosovo Albanians would have been excessively constrained by adherence to legal niceties such as the UN Charter. International observers, already agreed to by Yugoslavia, were not enough--a full military occupation by Nato forces was required. In the case of Israel and the Palestinians, however, as Israel naturally does not want foreign observers, let

alone a UN military force to protect the Palestinians, the United States defers to Israel (as it did to Indonesia in East Timor) and refuses to support even an observer presence without the ethnic cleanser's acquiescence.

We may note also that Nato's forcible occupation of Kosovo took place in Yugoslav territory, whereas the U.S. defers to Israel (and for 25 years to Indonesia) in reference to its performance in illegally occupied territory where the indigenous population has long been subjected to serious abuses condemned by overwhelming UN majorities. Welcome to the New World Order and "ethical foreign policy"!

Racist State, Brutal Occupation, and Large-Scale Ethnic Cleansing

The racist discrimination in pushing out Palestinians in favor of Jews is cruel, scandalous, and reminiscent of the behavior of the Nazis (a comparison made often in the Israeli press, but not in the U.S. mainstream media). It was Nazi practice in occupied territories to dispossess the locals from homes to provide "lebensraum" for the "ubermenschen," and Amnesty International (AI) notes in discussing Israel's policy on demolitions that "The Palestinians are targeted for no other reason than because they are Palestinians" in a system where "the family may only have 15 minutes to take out what belongings they have before the furniture is thrown into the street and their home bulldozed" (AI, Israel: Home Demolitions, Dec. 8, 1999). Israeli author Israel Shamir, writing in the Russian Israeli publication RI in December 2000, says that Israelis "are taught they belong to the Chosen People, who are Uber Alles. They have been indoctrinated in belief that the Gentiles are not fully human, and therefore can be killed and expropriated at will." And the U.S. Jewish observer Eduardo Cohen says that "traveling through Israel I encountered a deep, widespread and racist contempt for Arabs," based on the belief that Arabs "didn't share the same faculties of thought and reason that 'civilized human beings' possess" (OR, Oct. 18, 2000). Before the Final Solution was decided upon by Hitler during World War II--and in 1940 Himmler was still referring to "the Bolshevik method of physical extermination of a people" as "un-German and impossible"--there was active discussion in Nazi official circles of how alien peoples in occupied lands should be handled to best serve German interests. Partly, it was a matter of space needs--in 1940 Hitler claimed that "the Jewish question really was a space question," and Jews and others were expelled in Vienna and elsewhere to provide housing for Germans. There was much debate in 1940 about the desirability of forced emigration and resettlement, of bringing some of the racially valuable to Germany for assimilation, but with a remnant population "that would serve as a

reservoir for migrant labour to Germany" (quoting Christopher Browning's summary of this debate).

Similar debates have taken place in Israel between the "hardliners" on the one hand, who have favored forcible "transfer" and the "mass deportations of Arabs from the territories" (Netanyahu), and the "moderates" on the other hand, who want to rely on the now traditional methods of slow but steady dispossession and encouraging "voluntary" exit by impoverishment. The moderates also recognize the service of the impoverished alien population in providing a reservoir of migrant labor for Israel. Israel Shamir also compares the Israeli treatment of the Palestinians in Intifada II unfavorably to the anti-Jewish pogroms in Czarist Russia, where the casualties were much smaller and where, after the pogrom, "all writers and intelligentsia condemned the perpetrators. In the Jewish state, a few dozens gathered on the demonstration in Tel Aviv, while the Hebrew Writers Union supported the pogrom of Gentiles." Shamir goes on to say that Israeli racism is "not less wide-spread and poisonous" than that of the German Nazis, citing a number of genocidal opinions of Russian-Israeli Jews and stating that today: "The Jewish state is the only place in the world possessing legitimate killer squads, embracing a policy of assassinations, and practicing torture on a medieval scale. But do not worry dear Jewish readers, we torture and assassinate Gentiles only."

In Israeli publications it is repeatedly pointed out that the army does not kill Jews, only Gentiles. Phyllis Bennis notes that in 1982, when an Israeli Jewish protester against the war in Lebanon was killed by Israeli forces, there was such an enormous outcry that his name--Emil Grunzweig--is remembered even today. But when a Palestinian is killed by Israelis, this is hardly newsworthy and only body counts are given--"we never hear their names, who their parents and children are, what they did for a living" (Max Elbaum, Interview with Bennis, "For Jews Only: Racism Inside Israel," ColorLines, Dec. 15, 2000). It has also been pointed out by AI that "Israeli security forces repeatedly resorted to excessive use of lethal force in circumstances where neither their lives nor the lives of others were in imminent danger, resulting in unlawful killings." But AI notes that the Israelis are expert in non-lethal crowd control, citing July-August 1999 riots "policed without resort to firearms." But they note that here it was Ultra-Orthodox Jews rioting, so as in the case of settler violence the use of lethal force is ruled out, to be used only on Gentiles. Israeli dissident Uri Avnery describes how, when the Israeli army several months ago would not allow Palestinians to harvest their olives in an orchard bordering a Jewish settlement, where a 14-year old Palestinian boy had recently been shot and killed when alone in the orchard with his father, the villagers sent an SOS to Avnery and his group to come so that their presence would preclude shooting ("Olives, Stones and Bullets," Ha'aretz, Nov. 18, 2000). Many old olive trees had already been cut down, and ancient

terraces destroyed, "apparently to enable the army to shoot without hindrance." But the Avnery group did its job--their Jewish presence enabled some olives to be picked without the threat of shooting. Avnery noted that the settlers were of course free to move and travel at will, under heavy army protection.

The well-known Israeli journalist Amira Hass recently described in detail the growing racist cruelty "characteristic of every occupation regime...that intensified during the Oslo years because of the gap between the fine talk about a 'peace process' and a reality." ("The Mirror Does Not Lie," Ha'aretz, Nov. 1, 2000). The new Intifada is a popular uprising that "is a final attempt to thrust a mirror in the face of Israelis and to tell them: 'Take a good look at yourselves and see how racist you have become.'"

She focuses on the Israeli occupation of Hebron, writing: "How perfectly natural that 40,000 persons should be subject to local curfew for more than a month in the Old City of Hebron in order to protect the lives and well-being of 500 Jews.... How perfectly natural that 34 schools attended by thousands of Palestinian children should be closed down for more than a month...while the children of their Jewish neighbors...are free to frolic as usual in the street among and with the Israeli soldiers stationed there...The protracted curfew imposed on Hebron and the way in which their curfew has been accepted in Israeli eyes as such a natural event convey, in a nutshell, both the entire story of Israeli occupation of Palestinian land in general and the essence of the kind of Israeli thinking that has developed in the shadow of obvious military superiority."

Hass also discusses the freedom of settlers to travel, versus severe restrictions on Palestinians; the well-built highways for settler use, constructed on lands expropriated from Palestinian villages; the limitations imposed by the occupying authority on Palestinian development of their own communities, while the Jewish settlers get expedited treatment and subsidies; and the discrimination in water use with days and even weeks "without running water in the faucets of Palestinian homes" while their Jewish neighbors "experience no problems or shortages as far as their water supply is concerned."

Jeff Halper, Professor of Anthropology at Ben Gurion University, and head of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, states that, having seized control of West Bank/Gaza water supplies, Israel and the settlers now give themselves 6.7 times the water they allow the Palestinians (870 million cubic meters per annum for themselves, 130 million cubic meters for the Palestinians). He also points out that under the Oslo "peace process" Israel has uprooted some 80,000 Palestinian-owned olive and fruit trees and much farmland "for Israeli construction and 'security'," with some 10,000 trees removed just since the beginning of the recent uprising.

Israel has been constructing some 300 miles of highways and bypass roads to serve the settlements, but which divide the West Bank into tiny islands and prevent the free movement of Palestinian people and goods. With its military control and superior force Israel has imposed lengthy and devastating "closures" on Palestinian movement that has created widespread poverty and hunger. (For further details, Halper, "The 'Peace Process' As Seen From the Ground," Feb. 12, 2001.) The per capita GDP of the Palestinians in the occupied territories has fallen drastically under the Oslo "peace process," surely by more than 25 percent.

Demolitions for Lebensraum

Since 1967 some 8,500 Palestinian homes have been demolished, 1,200 of these since the Oslo agreement of 1993 (with 5,000 people made homeless, including 2,000 children). Israel demolishes Palestinian homes on the slightest provocation--"security," a youngster in the household throws stones at an Israeli soldier--but it does this mainly as part of a systematic program to provide space for the "chosen people." In December 1994, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, a former chief rabbi of Israel and the Israeli armed forces, urged the armed forces to refuse to obey orders to remove Jewish settlers from the West Bank, citing the law of Moses and asserting that "The command to settle the land of Israel is greater than all the commandments put together" (Los Angeles Times, Jan. 3, 1994).

This is consistent with the focus of Zionist ideology on "redemption of the land" of Palestine, which should be held only by Jews; land held by non-Jews is "unredeemed." Israeli human rights activist and scholar Israel Shahak claims that this exclusivist ideology, aiming at minimizing the number of non-Jews in the "Land of Israel," is inculcated in Jewish school children in Israel (Jewish History, Jewish Religion [Pluto, 1994], pp. 7-8). "A state built upon the principle of the purity of nation and race can only be honored and respected by a Jew who declares his belonging to his own kind." Thus spoke Dr. Joachim Prinz, a Zionist rabbi, in a book entitled Wir Juden (We Jews), published in 1934 and celebrating the victory of Adolf Hitler and the defeat of liberalism in Germany. Later Prinz became a central figure in the World Zionist Organization, and Shahak shows that the ideology that Prinz espoused remains a powerful force in Israel.

Palestinian stone throwing can mean demolition. On the other hand, if a Baruch Goldstein slaughters 29 Palestinians, his home is not demolished. In fact, a memorial to this mass murderer was erected near his home, although destroyed by the army under court order in 1999, and he is honored by significant numbers within Israel. At his memorial service in 1994, Rabbi Yaacov Perin stated that "One million Arabs are not worth a Jewish fingernail."

As Amira Hass contends, this Nazi-like mindset has grown under the occupation, where the military superiority, abuse of the inferiors, and fear that they might not remain quiet, has made for an increasingly racist perspective that now characterizes the majority of the Jewish population of Israel. Speaking of Israeli attitudes toward the intensified repression in 1996, David Hoffman reported that "few Israelis have objected to going back to the old methods against the Palestinians; many, in fact, have complained that the reaction was too timid" (WP, March 15, 1996). Phyllis Bennis states that "The majority of Israeli Jews are willing to accept the killing of Palestinians and collective punishment of the Palestinian people as justified state policy."

Within Israel, the Jewish state and Jewish National Fund, which own over 90 percent of the land, for decades have reserved it for Jews. A recent High Court ruling in favor of an Israeli Arab couple wanting to buy a house in Katzir in the Galilee that had been reserved for Jews has called this tradition into question, but the breadth of effect of this decision remains to be seen. In any case, the sizable (18 percent) Arab minority are legally second class citizens, without "nationality rights," that have included not only land use but access to public and private employment and credit, and many other privileges that are limited to Jews. Arab citizens may also be killed if they protest, and 14 of them have already died in Intifada II, in contrast with Israeli Jewish citizens, who can protest without fear of the application of lethal force.

Jews living in distant countries can come to Israel and immediately obtain rights denied Arab citizens, and of course the Palestinians expelled from their homes in Israel have no rights to return or compensation. In the Negev, where the indigenous Bedouin have been blocked from grazing their flocks, the state has allowed

Jewish farmers to occupy the land, build on it, and then have their seizures recognized retrospectively in a process of "Judaization" of the land (Orit Shohat, Ha'aretz, March 27, 1998). This is structured racism, and a set of policies which if applied against Jews in Italy or France would justifiably cause a furious outcry.

Torture, Aggression, and the Intifadas

Israel has used torture on a systematic basis against Palestinians for decades, the New York Times noting matter-of-factly in 1993 that Israel's torture victims were running to 400-500 per month, but that Israel was "rethinking" the merits of its "interrogation" practices (Joel Greenberg, "Israel Rethinks Interrogation of Arabs," Aug. 14, 1993). Again, if this was being done to Jews on a systematic basis in some country, the outcry would be deafening, but here also an Israeli practice condemned everywhere as barbaric is treated in very low key and brings about no negative policy responses from the United States or international community.

This has permitted Israel to thrive, to command massive international aid, and to be given regular

accolades as a model democracy, despite its long record of being "the only state in the world to effectively legalize the use of methods which constitute torture or ill-treatment" (AI, "The Israeli government should implement the High Court decision making torture illegal," Sept. 6, 1999).

Similarly, Israel can invade other countries freely, bomb them at will, and kill civilians there with a free hand without penalty. Each time it has invaded Lebanon, killing many thousands of civilians and deliberately creating large refugee populations, this has led to no substantive responses whatever on the part of the United States and its allies, and the mainstream media have reported these de facto aggressions with great understanding of Israel's position and alleged "security" needs.

Even mass slaughters of civilians are permissible for Israel, as in the case of Ariel Sharon's admitting the Christian Phalange to the Sabra-Shatila camp in 1982 where 2,000 or more Palestinian women, children and old men were butchered in cold blood. We may recall the official and media outrage at the alleged massacre of some 40 Kosovo Albanians by the Serbs at Racak in January 1999--a massacre which may never have occurred, as shown in a belatedly released analysis of the forensic findings on the bodies in Forensic Science International [116: 171-185, 2001]--and recall also that the figure 2,000 has been widely accepted as the total of killings on all sides in Kosovo in the year preceding the Nato bombing of Yugoslavia.

But in the case of the 2,000 purely civilian victims of Israel, the international outcry was modest and resulted in no penalty or constraint on Israel's ability to kill. Israel was also free to organize and maintain a proxy army in South Lebanon to serve its post-invasion "iron fist" cross-border policies. If done by Libya such an arrangement would be condemned as sponsorship of international terrorism, but again, both the sponsorship of a terrorist army and the numerous "iron fist" killings were not condemned by the United States or its allies and this approved international terrorism could proceed at the terrorist's discretion. Israel's occupation has produced two "Intifadas," both rooted in the severity of Israel's abuse of Palestinians in the occupied territories. In the first, which lasted some five years, over a thousand Palestinians were killed and many thousands were injured. The West did not intervene at all in this process even though Israel's abuses were in violation of UN resolutions and international law; U.S. economic and military aid to the ethnic cleanser did not shrink, and Israel was therefore free to kill and repress with no apparent limit.

The same has been true in the case of the second Intifada which began in September 2000. Israel has so far killed about 400 Palestinians, injured thousands, and escalated the brutality of its army's repression in the occupied territories in a genuine anti-civilian war, preventing Palestinians from working, harvesting crops, and obtaining

medical care. But again the United States supports Israel without limit, and the international community in general does nothing substantive for the victims.

Yasar Arafat has asked for UN intervention to protect the Palestinians who have been under harsh military attack, and Amnesty International has called for international observers. But Israel is against this, the United States supports Israel, so no protection is forthcoming. As noted earlier, the contrast with Kosovo, and the consistency with U.S. (and British) deference to Indonesia's rights to ethnically cleanse East Timor in 1999 and earlier, are enlightening. It was also noted that Israel's and Indonesia's violence and ethnic cleansing have taken place in illegally occupied territory, whereas Yugoslavia's occurred within its own borders and in territory where international observers had already been admitted.

But all of this is of no account as Israel and Indonesia are prized U.S. client states, Yugoslavia is not. In the former cases, therefore, "ethical foreign policy" and the new dedication of the international community to the protection of defenceless people against ethnic cleansing are suspended. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen has claimed that not only Germans but the Serbs had cultural qualities giving their countries a bent toward ethnic cleansing and genocide.

But he has had nothing to say about any Israeli cultural penchant that causes them to treat Palestinian Gentiles harshly, although Eduardo Cohen, Israeli Shamir and Israel Shahak, and the words of Netanyahu and Rabbis Shlomo Goren and Yaacov Perrin, suggest that this should be rich Goldhagen terrain. No outcries over this case of real and sustained ethnic cleansing have been heard from Susan Sontag, David Rieff, Geoffrey Robertson, Bernard Kouchner, Vaclav Havel, Michael Ignatieff, and the rest. This is officially approved ethnic cleansing, the Palestinians are "unpeople" (John Pilger's word) or "unworthy victims," and Israel's longstanding and savage operations can proceed at their expense without impediment.

The Coming Bloodbath

Israel has had a free ride as an ethnic cleanser in part because Jews, as victims of the Holocaust, have been treated gently and claimed special security rights as erstwhile victims. But as noted, like the Germans themselves, the Jews, or rather an important segment of Jews, have claimed to be a chosen people with superior rights to contested land. Add to this the protection given by the United States to their implementation of these rights by force, and a dangerous amalgam is put into play that has in fact led to increasingly abusive behavior that feeds on itself.

With Ariel Sharon, a terrorist, war criminal, and longtime advocate of "transfer" and policies of force, now head of the Israeli state, and with his accession warmly greeted and "rock solid" U.S. support of this terrorist assured by President Bush, there is every reason

to fear a shift from mere brutal ethnic cleansing and a "moderate" bloodbath under the moderate Barak to a more massive bloodbath and war under the "tough warrior" Sharon.

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ISRAEL'S APPROVED ETHNIC CLEANSING: PART 2, U.S. OFFICIAL PROTECTION

by Edward S. Herman

- > When Milosevic dealt brutally with Kosovo Albanians, the United
- > States claimed to find such actions so intolerable as to justify a
- > war against the villain and his people and an occupation of Kosovo
- > to terminate the process. Returning expelled Kosovo Albanians to
- > their homes was an urgent priority--after NATO policy itself had
- > produced the expulsions.
- >
- > In sharp contrast, as described in Part 1, Israel has been able
- > to establish and maintain a "Jewish" state--hence a racist state--
- > and systematically "redeem" the land from the large indigenous
- > Palestinian population--that is, engage in large-scale ethnic
- > cleansing--because in this case the United States found ethnic
- > cleansing not only tolerable but worthy of aggressive support. An
- > international consensus has condemned the Israeli occupation for
- > decades, and huge majorities in the UN have periodically called for
- > an Israeli exit (e.g., 144-2 on Resolution 242 in December 1990),
- > but the United States and Israel have said "nyet," so nyet it has
- > been.

Official Protection: The Orwellian Processes

- > Thus, instead of having to leave the occupied territories Israel
- > continues to push out the locals by force, uproot their trees,
- > steal their water, beggar them by "closures" and endless
- > restrictions, and it suffers no penalties because it has U.S.
- > approval, protection, and active assistance (see below). The

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> partners also deny Palestinians any right to return to land from
 > which they were expelled, so 140+ contrary UN votes, and two
 > Security Council Resolutions--both vetoed by the United States--
 > have no effect; and in a remarkable Orwellian process of
 > doublethink--and double morality--Israel is free to expel more
 > Palestinians in the same time frame in which their protector spent
 > billions and great moral energy in a campaign to return worthy
 > victims in Kosovo. (On the lying and non-humanitarian root and
 > effects of the Nato war, see Chomsky's New Military Humanism;
 > Herman and Peterson, "The Nato-Media Lie Machine," Z Magazine, May
 > 2000; Herman and Peterson, "Kosovo One Year Later: From Serb
 > Repression to NATO-Sponsored Ethnic Cleansing," ZNet Commentary,
 > June 26,2000.)

>
 > Another remarkable Orwellian process is this: the abused and
 > beggared Palestinian people periodically rebel as their conditions
 > deteriorate and more land is taken, homes are demolished, and they
 > are treated with great ruthlessness and discrimination. Many are
 > among the hundreds of thousands expelled earlier, or who have still
 > not forgotten their relatives killed and injured by Israeli
 > violence over many years--and Palestinian deaths by Israeli arms
 > almost surely exceed Israeli deaths from "terrorism" by better than
 > 15 to 1 (see Herman and O'Sullivan, The "Terrorism" Industry, pp.
 > 29-33). Judith Stone, a frequent visitor to Palestine, says that "I
 > have yet to meet a Palestinian who hasn't lost a member of their
 > family to the Israeli Shoah, nor a Palestinian who cannot name a
 > relative or friend languishing under inhumane conditions in an
 > Israeli prison" ("Quest for Justice,"
 > <http://www.facts4peace.com/article/stone.htm>). And after this long
 > history of expulsion and murder they are still under assault. In
 > this context, if they rise up in revolt at their oppressors this is
 > not "freedom fighters" or a "national liberation movement" in
 > action, it is "irrational violence" and a return to "terrorism,"
 > and both Israeli and U.S. officials (and therefore the mainstream
 > U.S. media) agree that the first order of business is to stop this
 > terrorism.

>
 > Back at the time of the first Intifada, U.S. Ambassador Robert
 > Pelletreau was explicit that the "riots" in the occupied
 > territories "we view as terrorist acts against Israel."
 > Correspondingly, U.S. policy was to put no pressure on Israel to
 > curb its repression or alter its policies, essentially giving
 > Israel carte blanche to use "harsh military and economic pressure"
 > till "in the end, they will be broken" (Yitzak Rabin). In the
 > second Intifada, once again there is absolutely no U.S. pressure on
 > Israel to change its policies. Arms aid and training programs to
 > Israel have been stepped up--35 Black Hawk military helicopters
 > supplied in October, 2000 and nine Apache attack helicopters bought
 > from Boeing in February 2001; U.S. training in urban counter-
 > insurgency tactics that would help Israel to take control of

> Palestinian urban centers, provided in mid-September 2000; and
 > joint U.S.-Israeli military exercises along with the redeployment
 > of Patriot missiles from Germany to Israel in February 2001--and as
 > in the past all UN resolutions of condemnation and calls for an
 > international presence in the occupied territories have been
 > ignored or vetoed by the United States on behalf of its ethnic-
 > cleansing client.

>
 > This of course makes the process self-fulfilling. A people under
 > continuous oppression and a long process of "redemption of the
 > land" at their expense is given no peaceful recourse by Israel and
 > its patron--Oslo was an agreement confirming all Palestinian
 > losses, with no right of return or compensation promised, no ending
 > of expropriations and expulsions in the occupied territories, and
 > with any benefits to the victims dependent on future negotiations.
 > But that future never came: since 1993 the Palestinians have been
 > ground down further, and Israel has continued its steady
 > encroachment and increased its brutalization (the more recent
 > Barak-Clinton Bantustan offer is discussed in Part 3 under
 > "Apologetic Frames"). In consequence, the Palestinians periodically
 > burst forth with bombings involving the self-immolation of
 > desperate men, and with mass upheavals, as in the two Intifadas.

>
 > But in the definitional system of oppressor and patron this is
 > TERRORISM, horrifying and intolerable. What Israel has done making
 > this people desperate is not terror. As State Department PR man
 > James Rubin explained after another spate of Israeli demolitions of
 > Palestinian houses, this was "a wrong signal" for a delicate stage
 > in peace talks (NYT, June 23, 1998). Not bad in themselves and a
 > violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, just a wrong signal.
 > Madeleine Albright called on the Israelis to refrain from "what
 > Palestinians see as the provocative expansion of settlements, land
 > confiscation, house demolitions and confiscation of IDs" (NYT, Oct.
 > 15, 1997). Only "the Palestinians" see these actions as
 > "provocative;" Albright does not find them objectionable in
 > themselves or illegal. In fact, under Clinton the United States
 > finally rejected the international law and almost universal
 > consensus on the occupation, declaring the territories not
 > "occupied Palestinian lands" but "disputed territories" (Albright).
 > By U.S. fiat Palestinian lands became open to settlement by force
 > by the ethnic cleanser who the United States has armed to the
 > teeth, and who has aggressively brutalized while creating "facts on
 > the ground" during the "dispute," which will not be settled until
 > the victims end their terrorism.

>
 > And Albright has stressed that there is "No moral equivalency
 > between suicide bombers and bulldozers" (Newsweek, Aug. 18, 1997).
 > Clinton, standing next to Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres as
 > the latter defended a blockade of the Palestinians that was adding
 > to their misery, put the blame on Hamas who were allegedly "trying

> to make the Palestinians as miserable as possible" (Phila. Inquirer, March 15, 1996). There was not the slightest hint that Israel was contributing to Palestinian misery despite massive expropriations and 300 devastating "closures" after 1993.

>

> So it is not Israeli policy, which amounts to a continuous and illegal assault on and displacement of the Palestinians, that is ultimately at fault and that must be changed to resolve this conflict. Albright can't recognize that decades of "bulldozers" necessarily produce suicide bombers, although she was quick to find that much less repression in Kosovo produced "freedom fighters;" nor can she distinguish between systematic policy (i.e., bulldozers) and uncontrollable outbursts from victims that do NOT constitute policy. The inability of these U.S. officials to see Israel's hugely discriminatory and brutal expulsions, demolitions, mistreatment and plain exploitation as seriously wrong in themselves, illegal, or causal manifests a complete identification with and apologetic for the ethnic cleansers. Five years ago a senior Clinton White House official declared that "We are not going to second-guess Israel" (PI, March 15, 1996), and on March 19, 2001, Colin Powell assured the Jewish lobbying group AIPAC that "We are dedicated to preserving this special relationship with Israel and the Israeli people...[and] a secure Israel with internationally-recognized borders remains a cornerstone of the United States foreign policy." In short, now as in the past, and with only rare exceptions, as in the case of the unauthorized Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, Israel will get strong U.S. support for whatever it does, and the ethnic cleansing of its unworthy victims can proceed as required.

>

> One of the triumphs of Oslo was its buying off of Arafat, making him into a second class client and an enforcer of the pathetic "settlement," with U.S. and Israeli funds and training exchanged for his commitment to keep his people in line and control "terrorism." (For a compelling account, with full background, Chomsky, World Orders Old and New [1994], chap. 3.) The formula for the wholesale terrorists (Israel) has always been: whatever violence we perpetrate is "retaliation" and it is up to the retail terrorists (Palestinians) to stop terrorizing and then we might "negotiate" with them in a "peace process." Israeli leaders say "You can't ask us to stop expanding existing settlements, which are living organisms" (Netanyahu), as if this were not in violation of UN resolutions, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and even the 1993 Oslo agreement itself. (Note also the spiritual affinity with another great ethnic cleanser, who said: "One only possesses a land when even the last inhabitant of this territory belongs to his own people." [Heinrich Himmler])

>

> U.S. officials can never bring themselves to say that what Israel is doing is wrong--at worst it may send "a wrong signal," etc. And

- > they follow closely the Israeli party line that "terrorism"
- > (Palestinian, not Israeli) must be stopped first, so that the
- > "peace process" can be put back on track. For Albright, "security"
- > is primary, and she told Arafat that "she needed a commitment and
- > action on the subject of security" before she could make a credible
- > approach to Israel on other issues (WP, Sept 12, 1997). "Security"
- > always means Israeli security, not Palestinian, for Albright--or
- > for Colin Powell--just as for Israeli officials. Here as elsewhere
- > these high U.S. officials internalize the Israeli perspective and
- > the idea of "security" for the unworthy victims doesn't arise, any
- > more than the notion that Israeli insecurity arises from the much
- > greater Palestinian insecurity that inevitably results from Israeli
- > policies. In his visit to Jerusalem in March 1996, Clinton spoke of
- > "the awful persistence of fear"--but only in reference to Israelis,
- > not to Palestinians (PI, March 15, 1996). This is an internalized
- > racist bias that has characterized U.S. official statements and
- > media and expert opinion here for decades.

Reasons For and Modalities of Support

- > Why does the United States support Israel's ethnic cleansing?
- > Broadly speaking, the reasons boil down to two factors. One is
- > Israel's role as a U.S. proxy in the Middle East and its
- > integration into the U.S. security system, which encompasses not
- > only keeping the Arab world in line, but also providing services
- > like supplying arms to the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, the Pinochet
- > government of Chile, Mobutu, Idi Amin, apartheid South Africa, and
- > the Guatemalan and Argentinian terror states. Because of these
- > services, Israel's victims are not merely unworthy, they also
- > become "terrorists" and part of the "Islamic threat" for the U.S.
- > political elite and mainstream media.
- >
- > The second factor is the exceptional power of the pro-Israel
- > lobby, which for many years has bought and bullied politicians and
- > the media, so that they all vie with one another in genuflections
- > to the holy state. This bullying is especially strong and effective
- > in Canada and the United States, but it applies widely, and the
- > distinguished British reporter Robert Fisk, describing the abuse he
- > has suffered in reporting on the Middle East, says that "the
- > attempt to force the media to obey Israel's rules is now
- > international" ("I Am Being Vilified For Telling the Truth About
- > Palestinians," *The Independent*, Dec. 13, 2000). (For fuller
- > analyses of "why" see my "The Pro-Israel Lobby," *Z Magazine*, July-
- > August 1994; and especially Chomsky's *The Fateful Triangle*, Updated
- > Edition, 1999, Preface and chapter 2.)
- >
- > These factors feed into the intellectual and media culture in
- > complex ways that institutionalize the huge bias, with pro-Israeli
- > and anti-Palestinian perspectives internalized and/or made

- > obligatory by potential flak and pressure from above and without.
- > This is extremely important, as there is no reason to believe that
- > the U.S. public would support a massive and brutal ethnic cleansing
- > program if they were given even a modest quantum of the ugly facts,
- > if the main victims rather than the ethnic cleansers were
- > humanized, and if the media's frames of reference were not designed
- > to apologize for Israeli expropriation and violence. However, the
- > ongoing media and intellectual biases do very effectively
- > complement the national policy of support for the ethnic cleansing
- > state, just as they helped cover up national policy supporting
- > Indonesia's murderous occupation of East Timor, and just as they
- > roused the public to a pitch of frenzy over the unapproved Yugoslav
- > violence in Kosovo.

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ISRAEL'S APPROVED ETHNIC CLEANSING: PART 3, HOW THE U.S. MEDIA PROTECTS IT

by Edward S. Herman

- > The U.S. mainstream media have followed closely their
- > government's agenda of giving Israel carte blanche in dealing with
- > their Palestinian subjects, both within Israel and in the occupied
- > territories. This has involved a major intellectual and moral
- > challenge, given the facts of serious racist discrimination, the
- > long Israeli refusal to exit the occupied territories as demanded
- > by an overwhelming international consensus, Israel's daily
- > violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention requirements on
- > treatment of people in occupied territories--including a massive
- > ethnic cleansing openly designed to benefit the "chosen people"--
- > and their clear intention to create a Palestinian system of
- > dependent and poor bantustans in the occupied territories,
- > organized strictly for the advantage of the ethnic cleansing state.
- >
- > This brutal, racist and illegal ethnic cleansing program has
- > taken place in an era when the United States and its allies have
- > proclaimed a new moral order in which defenseless people will be
- > protected by the Great Powers, as allegedly happened in Kosovo. The
- > challenge of rationalizing the Israeli ethnic cleansing in this
- > ideological context has been severe, but it has been met by the
- > U.S. media with remarkable success. Identifying completely with the
- > Israelis, the media have transformed them into the primary victims
- > and treated the populace really victimized as "unpeople" whose pain
- > does not count and who do not require "security" like the
- > victimizers. And by a comprehensive system of biased word usage,
- > framing, eye aversion, and rewriting of history, they have
- > demonstrated once again that in its service to the state the Free
- > Press can teach a lesson to any state-run propaganda system.

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>
 > The bias on the Israel-Palestinian conflict is sometimes
 > illustrated dramatically in events such as long-time Executive
 > Editor of the New York Times, A. M. Rosenthal's, receipt of an
 > award in 1991 as "Defender of Jerusalem" for his "passionate voice
 > on Jewish and Israeli affairs," or his refusal to allow an
 > unpleasant fact about Rabbi Meïer Kahane to be published because it
 > "would generate anti-semitism;" or CBS news anchor Dan Rather's
 > enthusiastic participation--contrary to CBS rules--in a 1992
 > Jerusalem Foundation fund-raiser chaired by pro-Israel hawks Martin
 > Peretz and Morton Zuckerman. But the bias is on continual display
 > in actual media performance.

>
 > Let us review briefly, with some recent illustrations, some of
 > the modalities by which Israel's more than half-century long,
 > massive ethnic cleansing has been made palatable.

>
 > **1. Language: Ethnic Cleansing, Violence, Terrorism, Clashes**

>
 > The phrase "ethnic cleansing" is far more applicable to Israeli
 > actions than to those of the Serbs in Kosovo. The brutal Serb
 > mistreatment of Kosovo Albanians was a feature of an ongoing civil
 > war, and the killings and large scale expulsions during the Nato
 > bombing were war-related actions; they were not part of a long-term
 > project to "redeem the land" from non-Serbs. Albanians in Belgrade
 > have not been limited in property ownership as Arabs are in Israel
 > and the occupied territories, and Kosovo Albanian homes were not
 > demolished for the purpose of providing space for Serbs. Despite
 > this reality, in the three year period 1998 through 2000, the New
 > York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Time and Newsweek
 > used the phrase "ethnic cleansing" some 1,200 times in discussing
 > Kosovo, in about four-fifths of the cases in reference to Serb
 > policy, whereas during the entire decade of the 1990s they used the
 > phrase only 14 times in discussing Israel, and only five times
 > referring to Israeli policy. This reflects massive internalized
 > bias.

>
 > In media reporting on Intifada II, "violence" means stone
 > throwing and shooting, it never refers to the "structural violence"
 > of expropriating land, evicting people from their houses and
 > demolishing them, seizing and diverting their water resources for
 > the use of the chosen people, building roads that destroy
 > communities' access to former neighbors and jobs, closing down
 > access directly by army orders and barricades, and tolerating and
 > protecting settlers' attacks, destruction, and seizure of Gentile
 > property. Even though there have been a substantial number of
 > killings and injuries inflicted on the Gentiles by army and
 > settlers in this process, this massive low-intensity violence has
 > been entirely acceptable to the Clinton, Bush II, and predecessor
 > administrations, so for the mainstream media it is not classified

> as violence or given serious attention (as discussed further
> below).

>

> But even within their limited conception of violence, the media's
> bias displayed during Intifada II has been spectacular in giving
> far greater attention and exclusive indignation to stone-throwing
> and suicide bombings by Palestinians, than to the more cruel and
> deadly violence of the Israeli army. The better than six to one
> ratio of killings and far higher ratio of Palestinian injuries to
> those of Israelis is neutralized by greater attention to--and much
> greater humanization of--Israeli victims. In a simple and rough
> measure of this bias, of eight front page photos of Intifada
> victims in the New York Times from September 28, 2000 through March
> 9, 2001, six were of Israelis and two were of Palestinians. This,
> along with massive suppressions detailed later, helps sustain the
> identification of "violence" with the stone throwing and suicide
> bombing of the population in revolt.

>

> Similarly, the media have continued their long tradition of
> finding the Palestinians terrorists, the Israelis victims--even
> "under siege"--and engaging in retaliation only. Almost without
> exception the media make deadly Palestinian actions terrorism, and
> with indignant language attached--the killing of two Israeli
> soldiers was a "sickening lynch-murder," a Palestinian attack on a
> settlers' bus was "unspeakable" and a "terrorist outrage" in the
> New York Times--but none of the 400 Palestinian deaths were worthy
> of such adjectives. Thus, regarding a massive Israeli bombardment
> of a civilian area in Gaza, this was "predictably...a strong
> Israeli response" to a previous bombing of a settlers' bus. Only
> the Israelis respond and retaliate, and do this "predictably"
> (meaning responsively and reasonably). "Yesterday's Palestinian
> terrorism and Israeli retaliation..."(ed., NYT, Nov. 21, 2000) is
> the formulaic language of deep bias. Norman Solomon reports that
> a Nexis search of U.S. media for the first 100 days of 2001 found
> several dozen references to Israeli "retaliation," but only one
> instance where Palestinian actions were deemed retaliatory.

>

> By the same rule of bias Ariel Sharon, whose record of
> responsibility for killing unarmed civilians exceeds that of Carlos
> the Jackal by a factor of 20 or more, is never a "terrorist" or
> "war criminal" in the mainstream media, although occasionally it is
> said that "they" (Arabs) so designate him. Rather, he has a "new
> air of electability" (Phila. Inquirer, Jan. 7, 2001) or is "tough"
> and a "warrior" as the New York Times describes him on their front
> page of February 7, 2001, or an "old soldier" on the next day
> (earlier, and shortly after the Sabra-Shatila massacre, "the
> forceful general intent on security for Israel," NYT, Feb. 11,
> 1983).

>

> Robert Fisk says that when he reads of death in "a cross-fire"

> or "clashes" he knows that this means the Israelis did the killing.
 > Fisk notes that even when CNN's Cairo bureau chief, Ben Wedeman,
 > was shot in the back in a gun battle in Gaza, almost certainly by
 > Israeli soldiers, CNN could not bring itself to suggest who was to
 > blame "at this time." And AP reported that Wedeman had been "caught
 > up in a crossfire" (Fisk, "Media: The Biased Reporting that Makes
 > Killing Acceptable," The Independent, Nov, 14, 2000). Fisk also
 > notes how easily the media refer to a "suspected Palestinian
 > gunman" or "presumably by Palestinians" when Israelis are shot at,
 > whereas Palestinians always die "in clashes"--"as if they they were
 > accidentally shot rather than targets for Israeli snipers."

>
 > On March 27, 2001, the New York Times featured on its front page
 > that "Palestinians Kill Baby Boy in West Bank," citing "Israeli
 > officials," with Ariel Sharon adding that this was a "deliberate,
 > cold-blooded escalation of violence." On March 11, however, the
 > paper showed on its front page a picture of a dead nine-year old
 > Palestinian boy, described as shot by "an errant Israeli bullet."
 > So by rule of bias the Israeli killing was "errant" rather than
 > deliberate, in contrast with the action of the Palestinians. And
 > if Israelia snipers shoot numerous children, often in the eyes or
 > other vulnerable spot, the media--who never use the numerous photos
 > of Palestinian children with eye damage--are pleased to give
 > credence to Israeli army suggestions that the soldiers are perhaps
 > just a bit trigger-happy (Joel Greenberg, "Israeli Military Worries
 > Some Troops May Be Trigger-Happy," NYT, Jan 17, 2001).

>
 > The Israelis are not only "worried" about over-zealous soldiers,
 > they admit making "mistakes," and the media sometimes acknowledge
 > that their responses may be "excessive," "heavy-handed," or
 > "disproportionate" in retaliating to terrorism--but they are never
 > engaging in state terrorism and killing civilians, including
 > children, deliberately and "unspeakably." Their killings are never
 > "massacres," as Serb killings in Kosovo were often designated.
 > Palestinian violence is never a "predictable" response to Israeli
 > structural violence and direct state terror.

>
 >
 > **2. Critical Frames: Featuring the Violence of the Ethnic Cleansing State.**

>
 > Framing bias is closely linked to bias in language, and as I
 > have just shown, the U.S. mainstream media use words like terrorism
 > and violence to describe the retail acts of the Palestinians, not
 > the wholesale killings and coerced structural changes imposed by
 > the Israelis. They also refuse to use the words "ethnic cleansing"
 > to describe Israeli policy, despite the excellence of the fit. But
 > there are powerful frames that do put the locus of blame for
 > violence on the ethnic cleansing state and its sponsor. These
 > critical frames are spelled out by Israeli journalists like Amira
 > Hass and Danny Rubenstein, but they are as scarce as hens' teeth in

- > the U.S. mainstream press, although they flourish in the
- > alternative media.

2A. The injustice frame

- > The primary alternative frame we may call the injustice model.
- > As I showed in Part 1, Amira Hass writing in Ha'aretz employs a
- > clear critical frame that explains Intifada II as an inevitable
- > response to the complete failure of Oslo to do anything whatever
- > for the Palestinians, and their further decline in welfare and
- > morale. Robert Fisk says the same: that the Intifada "is what
- > happens when a whole society is pressure-cooked to the point of
- > explosion" ("Lies, Hatred and the Language of Force, The
- > Independent, Oct. 13, 2000). Hass, Fisk, Danny Rubenstein in
- > Ha'aretz, and other reporters and analysts have given similar
- > interpretations that stress the continued expropriations by
- > settlers and the army, the hugely racist and humiliating treatment
- > meted out to the Palestinians by their overlords, and the fact that
- > recent Israeli-US plans not only ratify the illegal post-Oslo
- > "facts on the ground," they provide for no meaningful resolution of
- > the refugee crisis, no credible East Jerusalem sovereignty, and no
- > viable and independent Palestinian state.
- >
- > In this critical frame, the Palestinian uprising is rooted in
- > extreme abuse and injustice, disappointed hopes, disillusionment
- > with both Oslo and the corrupt and pitiful Arafat leadership
- > serving as Israeli enforcers, and the final provocation of Sharon
- > and Barak at al-Aqsa. The explosion was widely expected,
- > "predictable," and understandable, and in these senses it was a
- > "rational" response to extreme abuse and the absence of peaceable
- > options.

2B. The Israeli provocation model

- > A secondary alternative frame, that actually supplements the
- > primary injustice model, starts with the fact that Intifada II was
- > clearly begun by Ariel Sharon's visit to the al-Aqsa mosque on
- > September 28, 2000. Even Thomas Friedman and the mainstream media
- > acknowledge that this was a "provocation," but by various tricks
- > they make the Palestinian response causally more important than the
- > provocation.
- >
- > One trick has been to portray Barak as a man of peace who was
- > offering a reasonable settlement, and distancing him from the
- > provocation. Thus, Thomas Friedman says that "In short, the
- > Palestinians could not deal with Barak, so they had to turn him
- > into Sharon. And they did" ("Arafat's War," NYT, Oct. 13, 2000).
- > But Friedman suppresses relevant facts. First, Arafat, his chief
- > negotiator Saeb Erekat, and Palestinian official Faisal Husseini,
- > all pleaded with Barak not to allow the Sharon visit because of its

- > destabilizing potential, and Barak not only turned them down he
- > supported Sharon's provocation with 1000 border police. Second, on
- > the day after Sharon's visit, Barak's police were massively present
- > at al-Aqsa and fired to kill in the turmoil that ensued, leaving
- > seven dead and several hundred wounded. Third, following this
- > further provocation Barak did nothing to reduce the tensions, and
- > in fact offered a further show of force. But for Friedman and the
- > mainstream media, this series of provocations and failure of Barak
- > to do anything peaceable does not make him responsible; it was
- > Arafat who had to call off HIS people.
- >
- > By rule of deep bias, while the media have speculated freely on
- > Arafat's motives in possibly influencing the Palestinian response--
- > his "chancy gamble" as Time put it (Oct. 23, 2000)--they never even
- > raise the possibility that the Israeli leaders might have had
- > political aims leading THEM to provoke and that might explain THEIR
- > response. That the Sharon provocations, with Barak's cooperation,
- > might have been intended to induce violence and might be explained
- > by Israeli political dynamics is simply outside the apologetic
- > frames of reference. Eduardo Cohen argues that the Sharon-Barak
- > provocations flowed from their political calculations: Sharon
- > wanting to take center stage before Netanyahu's recovery from his
- > scandal--he was exonerated in a court case on alleged corruption on
- > September 27, 2000, the day before Sharon went to al-Aqsa--and
- > knowing that a tough stance and renewed war would serve his
- > political interests; Barak hoping to undercut Sharon and
- > precipitate a crisis and early election in which his chances would
- > also be better than if he waited for the political recovery of
- > Netanyahu (Cohen, "American Journalists Should Have Looked a Little
- > Deeper," undated). Whatever the merits of this line of argument,
- > the failure of the U.S. media even to discuss possible political
- > reasons for the provocations, and whether they might have been
- > intended to provoke the ensuing violence, reflects overwhelming
- > bias.

3. Apologetic Frames: Those That Blame any Violence on the Victims of Ethnic Cleansing.

- > Almost without exception the U.S. mainstream media frame their
- > presentations of the issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict so
- > as to apologize for Israeli policy and put the blame for any
- > violence on Israel's victims.

3A. The injustice model--Barak's generous offer, Arafat's war, irrational Palestinian outburst.

- > Essential ingredients of this dominant mainstream frame are the
- > assumptions that Barak was a "moderate" and that his offers and the
- > "peace process" have been reasonable, so that any disturbances or
- > uprisings are therefore irresponsible, unjustifiable, or

- > irrational. Trudy Rubin, the editorial foreign policy commentator
- > of the Philadelphia Inquirer, is not alone in finding that
- > "Irrationality drives violence in the region" (Oct. 18, 2000).
- > Absolutely essential to propagating this frame is the refusal to
- > discuss issues of justice and to evaluate those in detail--so you
- > will never find Friedman, or Rubin, discussing the Israeli policy
- > of systematic expropriation of Palestinians in the occupied
- > territories, the demolitions, the appropriation of water for Jewish
- > use, the doubled settler population since 1993, the road
- > construction that makes a Palestinian state unviable, or the policy
- > of killing and injuring Gentiles freely, but not Jews. They never
- > seriously discuss--let alone urge--the right of return of expelled
- > Palestinians, although both Friedman and Rubin were aggressively
- > supportive of the right of return of Kosovo Albanians. The news
- > columns in their papers, and the mainstream media more generally,
- > also follow the official (U.S. and Israeli) party line and scant
- > all of these issues.
- >
- > In his "Arafat's War," which gives us Friedman's standard
- > "injustice" model, characteristic of the Times as an institution,
- > and predominant throughout the mainstream media, Friedman mentions
- > the "old complaints about the brutality of the continued Israeli
- > occupation and settlement building. Frankly, the Israeli
- > checkpoints and continued settlement building are oppressive." He
- > finesses this huge set of issues by making them "old" (stale), and
- > avoiding details, numbers, or discussing the racist violence in
- > expropriation for Israeli Jews only, the large-scale violations of
- > the Fourth Geneva Convention, or the beggaring of the Palestinians
- > under Oslo. He also argues that such matters are now irrelevant
- > because Barak has offered "unprecedented compromises," so that if
- > the Palestinians don't fall in line with these any violence is
- > their fault. He never discusses why Sharon engaged in his
- > provocation or explains why this act by an Israeli leader does not
- > deserve considerable weight; and he fails to acknowledge Barak's
- > support of the provocation and never suggests that these Israeli
- > actions might be related to Israeli politics. And he has not one
- > word of criticism of the Israeli killings of September 29 or the
- > ensuing brutal repression. He mentions the "gleeful savage mob
- > murder of Israeli soldiers in Ramallah," but otherwise there was
- > only a "week of Israeli-Palestinian killings," but no "murders" let
- > alone "gleeful savage murders" of Palestinians.
- >
- > Friedman never mentions that the vague terms of the Oslo deal
- > allowed Israel, with total U.S. support, to double settlements and
- > create facts on the ground extremely damaging to Palestinian
- > welfare. Thus the "old complaints about brutality" etc., continued
- > despite that prior good deal. Now the new good deal gives the
- > Palestinians a fine alternative--"more than 90 percent of the West
- > Bank for a Palestinian state, a partial resolution of the refugee
- > problem and Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and Christian

- > quarters of the Old City of Jerusalem..." Even Bill Clinton likes
- > this plan, so what more need be said about fairness? The "90
- > percent" figure is the Israeli version, that allows a "facts on
- > the ground" Greater Jerusalem to be counted as part of Israel--so
- > that 70 to 80 percent may be more accurate. There is also the
- > question of the quality of the land, the implicit Israeli control
- > of the mountain aquifer under the West Bank, and the fact that the
- > land allocations, Jewish settlements, and "for Jews only" road
- > networks have broken the "90 percent" into unconnected enclaves,
- > with no borders except with Israel. This is a bantustan solution
- > that does not yield a viable or independent state; and of course it
- > does not return to the Palestinians any of the property stolen even
- > since 1993 for Israel's "security" and lebensraum for some of the
- > chosen people.
- >
- > Friedman is satisfied with the "partial resolution" of the
- > refugee problem that involves Israel recognizing Palestinian "pain"
- > and promising to allow a "return" to "historic Palestine," which
- > includes the West Bank where the refugees are already congregated,
- > not to their original homes and not promising compensation in lieu
- > of such return. Palestinian sovereignty over the Muslim and
- > Christian quarters of the Old City does not include Harim Al
- > Sharif, and those Muslim and Christian quarters have been broken
- > into pieces by expropriations and massive Israeli construction for
- > Jews only since the last good deal (1993).
- >
- > So "Arafat's War" rests on the failure of the Palestinians to
- > acknowledge total defeat: their unwillingness to accept all the
- > past injustices, including post-1993 expropriations, a bantustan
- > system worse than that imposed by South Africa under apartheid, and
- > continued military domination by a country that has been a wee bit
- > "oppressive" (Clinton and Barak demanded a demilitarized
- > Palestinian state, and continued Israeli occupation rights in the
- > West Bank, out of consideration for Israeli security). If Arafat
- > wouldn't accept this, and sign another imprecise agreement that
- > once again left much to the goodwill of Israel and its sponsor, all
- > the violence is his doing.
- >
- > This is the "injustice model" that amounts to crude apologetics
- > for ethnic cleansing. And it was hardly confined to Friedman and
- > the New York Times editorial pages. It was pretty standard in the
- > news as well as editorial pages that it was Arafat's choice of
- > "Peace or Victimhood" (Jane Perlez, "Fork in Arafat's Road," NYT,
- > Dec. 29, 2000).

3B. Arafat and the return to terrorism

- > For years Arafat and the PLO were terrorists for Israeli and
- > U.S. officials, and therefore for the mainstream media. Israel has

- > only engaged in retaliation and counterterror, by rule of political
- > bias, whatever the facts. Then in 1991, when Arafat surrendered and
- > allowed himself to be sucked into a "peace process" that made him
- > the Israeli enforcer, but gave his people absolutely nothing, he
- > suddenly ceased to be a terrorist and became a statesman! With
- > Intifada II, however, and his failure to perform his function of
- > keeping his defeated people under control, he has been tentatively
- > returned at least in some media to the terrorist class.
- >
- > So we find regular media references to Arafat's responsibility
- > for failing to contain the violence, speculations on whether he
- > actually stirred it up to improve his bargaining position with
- > Israel, and admonitions to Arafat to get his people under control.
- > Among many other cases, Time had him taking a "chancy gamble;" the
- > Inquirer's Trudy Rubin said he "fanned, or failed to calm,
- > religious and national passions" (Oct. 18, 2000), and she asked
- > "Can Arafat stop the violence" (Nov. 1, 2000). Some of the claims
- > of his deliberate incitements have come from Israeli army and
- > intelligence sources, which the media find highly newsworthy (Tracy
- > Wilkinson, "Is the violence beyond Arafat's control?," Los Angeles
- > Times, Oct. 4, 2000). Jane Perlez asks "Can Arafat Turn It Off?,"
- > subtitled "U.S. Officials Debate Degree of His Control" (NYT, Oct.
- > 17, 2000). There have not been any articles entitled "Is the
- > violence beyond Barak's [or Sharon's] control?," nor have the media
- > been able to locate anybody to assess Barak's motives and
- > responsibility. And in a spectacular display of bias they rarely if
- > ever suggested that Barak could or should have stopped the
- > wholesale violence that he carried out from September 29, 2000;
- > only "Arafat had a choice" (Rubin), not Barak, or Sharon, who are
- > implicitly engaging in "retaliation" and "counterterror," in a
- > longstanding propaganda tradition.

3C. Pushing the children forward as martyrs

- > In a similar and disgusting pattern, the mainstream media have
- > also latched on to the claim that the Palestinians are callously
- > pushing their children forward to die, that they suffer from a
- > martyr syndrome, and that the parents, Arafat, and the penchant
- > toward martyrdom are therefore responsible for the numerous
- > shooting deaths of children (Chris Hedges, "The Deathly Glamour of
- > Martyrdom," NYT, Oct. 29, 2000). This penchant for martyrdom is also
- > responsible for the breakdown of peace (John Burns, "The Promise of
- > Paradise That Slays Peace," NYT, April 1, 2001).
- >
- > The Philadelphia Inquirer played the martyrdom line with relish,
- > with a news article on "Grieving Arabs find comfort in concept of
- > martyrdom" (Oct. 25, 2000), an op-ed column by Rubin on "The
- > children's crusade" that blames the Palestinians for the death of
- > their children (Oct. 25), and a cartoon by Tony Auth showing Arafat
- > urging children to plunge to martyrs' deaths over a cliff (Oct. 26).

- >Auth has twice had cartoons showing Arafat with blood on his
- > hands, but never an Israeli leader.
- >
- > Uri Avnery notes that this ready attribution of responsibility
- > for the child killings to the Arab parents "betrays an obnoxious
- > racism" ("Israel/Palestine: Twelve Conventional Lies," Oct. 21,
- > 2000). He also observes that Palestinian parents can hardly
- > restrain their children "when they live under a cruel occupation
- > and their brothers and sisters provide examples of heroism and
- > self-sacrifice" in a tradition going back to 16 year-old Joan of
- > Arc. He also points out that there is a Jewish tradition of
- > children fighters and heroes, and that the settlers routinely
- > exploit their children, "not hesitating to put them in harms way,"
- > and without eliciting any suggestions of irresponsibility and a
- > desire for martyrdom on the part of the critics of Palestinian
- > parents.
- >
- > "The right question is why do our soldiers kill these children?
- > And in some cases in cold blood?" But that is Eyad Serraj writing
- > in Le Monde Diplomatique (Nov. 2000), not a U.S. mainstream news
- > source. Rarely if ever do the media point out that the Israelis are
- > doing the shooting, that many of the children are shot with the
- > intent to seriously injure or kill them, and that non-lethal
- > methods of crowd control are available and are used by the
- > Israelis, but only when dealing with protests by Israeli Jews.
- >
- > In a more general argument for Palestinian voluntary self-
- > sacrifice and Israeli innocence, General Wesley Clark, wrote in
- > Time, that "For Israel, every casualty, even among the
- > Palestinians, is a loss. For the Palestinians, every clash is
- > strategic and offensive, increasing the pressure on Israel,
- > building support in the Arab world and, with every Israeli
- > response, affording the opportunity to further isolate Israel..."
- > ("How to Fight an Asymmetric War," Oct. 23, 2000). This apologetic-
- > -and the article's title points up its design to advise Israel--
- > which is based on no evidence, does not explain why Israel should
- > engage in aggressive and lethal responses that are allegedly
- > "losses," fails to explore the hypothesis that Israel is repeating
- > its handling of Intifada I where its strategy was explicitly to
- > break the protest movement by terror, and it assumes that
- > Palestinian behavior is based on a plan rather than an
- > uncontrollable explosion based on serious injustice, started by the
- > Sharon-Barak provocation, and kept alive by Israel's brutal
- > response.

3D. The United States as honest broker

- > The Israelis do not want any interference with their ethnic
- > cleansing, so they "rightly resist any shift to an international
- > format," as it was expressed in a New York Times editorial of

- > November 13, 2000, and the Israelis are happy to have the United
- > States, the 50-odd year sponsor and underwriter of their ethnic
- > cleansing, as a substitute for a genuine international presence.
- > The appropriateness of this arrangement thus becomes the U.S.
- > official position and media truth, and the demand for international
- > protection of the victims of Israel's ethnic cleansing becomes not
- > a moral issue fulfilling that new Western dedication to protecting
- > defenceless people but rather "a favorite of Palestinians" (Keith
- > Richburg, "Israel rejects international presence," Phila. Inquirer,
- > Nov. 11, 2000). Richard Holbrooke says that "no force would be
- > supported without Israeli approval" (Nicole Winfield, "Arafat
- > appeals for U.N. protection, but Israel, U.S. oppose," Phila.
- > Inquirer, Nov. 11, 2000), so that settles the matter for the
- > mainstream media. No comparison with Kosovo, no mention of the
- > similar performance in East Timor where the Clinton team deferred
- > to its Indonesia client, thereby allowing the destruction of East
- > Timor.
- >
- > Nor will the media ever discuss the huge, long-standing pro-
- > Israeli bias of the U.S. government that has protected Israeli
- > expropriations and ethnic cleansing for an entire generation. As
- > noted earlier, Thomas Friedman cites Clinton's approval of Barak's
- > peace proposal as if an assessment by an honest broker, not a
- > partisan. On the aggressively pro-ethnic cleansing right, William
- > Safire postulates that Clinton and company really are honest
- > brokers, and decries this fact as "Israel Needs an Ally, It does
- > not need a broker" (NYT, Oct. 12, 2000).
- >
- > Although the Palestinians have been militarily defeated and
- > ethnically cleansed by a powerful combination of a superpower and
- > its main client, it is essential that the mainstream press pretend
- > that the supportive superpower is objective and not helping the
- > ethnic cleansing state capture the fruits of this rather uneven
- > military contest. The media have cooperated fully in doing this,
- > although occasionally the Times, for example, allows it to be
- > mentioned that the Palestinians are becoming a bit distrustful of
- > the honest broker! (William Orme, "As New Peace Talks Go On,
- > Palestinians Criticize Clinton," NYT, Jan. 23, 2001).

3E. "Impatient" Israelis versus Serbian "Willing Executioners"

- > The mainstream media repeatedly tell us that the Israelis have
- > "lost patience" with the Palestinians, with the "peace process,"
- > and with their leaders who have allowed this new spate of
- > (Palestinian) "violence." If Barak's approval rating went up from
- > 20 to 50 percent following his and Sharon's show of force at al-
- > Aqsa, and if they have voted in the ruthless Sharon and now support
- > a more brutal response to the Intifada, this does not discredit the
- > populace for murderous attitudes and extremism. On the contrary, it

- > is a given to which the world must adjust. Back in 1999, Stacy
- > Sullivan asked: what if a people "supports ethnic cleansing--
- > actively or passively? In that case, we do have a quarrel with
- > the...people...It is the very mentality of the nation." But she was
- > talking about the SERBS as "Milosevic's Willing Executioners" (New
- > Republic, May 10, 1999), not a populace supporting an approved
- > ethnic cleansing.
- >
- > In reference to the Serbs, the official and therefore media party
- > line was that what the Serb armed forces were doing to the
- > Albanians in Kosovo was ugly and criminal and must be stopped, so
- > the idea of Serb "impatience" with the Kosovo Albanians for their
- > resistance and "terrorism" would have been viewed as outlandish.
- > The question was: how guilty were ordinary Serbs for the crimes of
- > their government, and even though the Serbs were alleged to be
- > suffering under a "dictatorship," Anthony Lewis, Blaine Harden, and
- > Thomas Friedman in the Times and Stacy Sullivan and Daniel Jonah
- > Goldhagen in the New Republic, and many others, found the Serbs
- > guilty, either because of their indifference concerning their
- > government's crimes or their positive support, as "willing
- > executioners."
- >
- > In the case of Israelis, many more of them than Serbs have been
- > openly in favor of violence against their state's victims, and
- > there are numerous available quotes of Israelis saying "I would
- > kill all Arabs," "Arabs must be eliminated," and that Palestinians
- > are mere "grasshoppers" and that these "vipers" should be
- > "annihilated" (Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, spiritual leader of Israel's
- > Shas party, speaking on April 9, 2001). But here, in this case of
- > an approved ethnic cleansing, the media not only don't suggest
- > Israeli citizen guilt, Israeli support of escalated state terrorism
- > against Palestinians is reported antiseptically and even
- > sympathetically, as the Israelis are the victims of "terrorism" but
- > never themselves terrorize. They may be killing and wounding
- > innocent civilians at a rate 20 or more times the rate of their
- > victimization by the "terrorists," but that doesn't affect an
- > equation where the value of lives of the terrorists and their
- > families is zero.

4. Suppression of Inconvenient Facts

- > Eye aversion is extremely important in protecting the approved
- > system of institutionalized injustice and ethnic cleansing. Thus,
- > the mainstream U.S. media simply won't discuss the laws applying to
- > an occupying power and their responsibilities under the Fourth
- > Geneva Convention, and Israel's massive violations of these rules
- > in expropriations, discriminatory use of water and other matters
- > are barely noted. The violence of Israel in imprisonments, torture,
- > beatings, killings and injuries, and aid and protection to settler

- > violence is enormously greater than Palestinian violence against
- > Israel, but it is downplayed and relevant information on these
- > matters is subjected to massive suppression.
- >
- > Let me give a small sample illustrative of suppressions, taken
- > from a very large pool, by class of suppression. It should be noted
- > that what is suppressed is very often reports by UN bodies, human
- > rights groups, Palestinian and Arab sources, and other individuals
- > and reporters who fail to meet agenda standards. They put Israel in
- > too bad a light, or mention U.S. military or counterinsurgency aid
- > not helpful to the image of an honest broker. Barak, Sharon,
- > Israeli army sources, and U.S. officials, although hugely biased
- > and guilty of repeated lies, are the steady basis of the "news"
- > agenda, which explains why whether Arafat can control the violence
- > is an issue but not whether Barak, Sharon and Clinton or Bush can
- > do the same

UN DOCUMENTS:

- >
- > 1. UN Special Report on Israel for the Committee on Economic,
- > Social, and Cultural Rights, dated Nov. 13, 2000, strongly
- > condemning Israel violations of the Geneva Convention, Oslo
- > agreement, and human rights, was not mentioned in the U.S. media.
- >
- > 2. UN report of Feb. 26, 2001, which described the Israeli
- > closures on the West Bank and Gaza as being "the most severe and
- > sustained set of move restrictions imposed on the Occupied
- > Palestinian Territory since the beginning of the occupation in
- > 1967," was completely ignored in the U.S. mainstream media.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORTS:

- 1. Human Rights Watch's report charging that "Israeli soldiers
- > have abused hundreds of Palestinian drivers, beating them and
- > slashing their car tires on roads in the West Bank," released on
- > February 27, was not cited anywhere in the U.S. mainstream media.

- 2. Human Rights Watch's report of April 11, 2001, "Center of
- > the Storm," called "a very severe report on the killing and
- > wounding of Palestinian civilians in Hebron by Israeli Defense
- > Forces soldiers and Jewish settlers," was featured twice in
- > Ha'aretz and once in London's Independent, but was mentioned in
- > passing only in the Washington Post (April 16), and was otherwise
- > entirely blacked out in the U.S. media.

- 3. AI's report of December 8, 1999, on the Israeli policy of
- > house demolitions, was unreported in the U.S. mainstream media.

- 4. AI's report of Oct. 26, 2000 charging that Israel's failure

- > to investigate deaths cheapens life was mentioned briefly in the
- > Washington Post (Nov. 2) and Boston Globe (Nov. 2), but was
- > featured nowhere in the mainstream media.

5. AI's Nov. 3, 2000 report condemning Israel's attacks on
> civilians was mentioned in the Los Angeles Times (Nov. 5), but was
> not featured there or mentioned elsewhere.

6. AI's Nov. 9, 2000 report charging that mass arrests in
> Jerusalem and northern Israel are often followed by police beatings
> was mentioned (but not featured) only in the Chicago Tribune (Nov.
> 15), Chicago Sun-Times (Nov. 14), and The Oregonian (Nov. 16).

7. AI's Nov. 24, 2000 call for the deployment of human rights
> observers was mentioned only in the New York Times on the back page
> and dismissively (Nov. 28, 2000), and in The Deseret News (Nov. 25,
> 2000)

8. AI's Jan. 24, 2001 report charging impunity in the case of
> the killing of Palestinians (specifically criticizing a nominal
> sentence for a settler's murder of an 11 year old Palestinian
> child) was unmentioned in the mainstream media.

EVIDENCE OF U.S. SUPPLYING OF DEADLY WEAPONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT AND TRAINING:

1. The Hebrew weekly Kol Ha'ir reported on January 26 that
> "U.S. Marines Trained with Tsahal [IDF] for Reconquest of the
> Territories of the Palestinian Authority." Picked up by Agence
> France Presse on January 27, 2001, this was unreported in the U.S.
> media.

2. Defense journals and Boeing reported the Boeing sale of nine
> Apache Longbow helicopters to Israel in February 2001, but the
> mainstream media failed to report this transaction (and other major
> weapons sales and transfers to Israel were of equal disinterest).

3. Israel and the "honest broker" also carried out joint
> exercises in February 2001 to test Patriot air defense missiles
> transferred from U.S. bases in Germany to Israel. This evidence of
> an extremely close military relationship between the two countries
> was mentioned in passing in the Washington Post (February 20,
> 2001), but nowhere else in the mainstream media.

EVIDENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL ISRAELI CRUELTY:

1. The Palestine Monitor reported on March 19, 2001, that
> "Israeli soldiers at Al Ram checkpoint fired tear gas canisters and

Imprimé pour Francis Feeley <Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr>

- > sound bombs directly at Palestinians participating in a peaceful
- > women's march. Women were beaten with the butts of rifles by the
- > soldiers. 15 women have been transported to nearby hospitals. The
- > march was organized by the Union of Palestinian Women's Committees
- > to protest the continued Israeli imposed closure and siege on the
- > Occupied Palestinian Territories. Eyewitnesses report that the
- > march from Ramallah to Al Ram checkpoint was completely peaceful
- > from the Palestinian side." This incident was unreported in the
- > U.S. media.

- 2. On February 20, 2001, the National School for Blind Girls in**
- > al-Bireh was shelled by Israeli tanks and heavy weaponry for three
 - > hours, seriously damaging the building and terrifying the disabled
 - > girls. The attacks apparently resulted because a nearby Jewish
 - > settlement had been fired upon by unknown parties. This incident
 - > was unreported in the U.S. mainstream media.

- 3. In early January a 10 year-old Palestinian girl Ella Ahmed in**
- El Sawiya, near Nablus, died of a burst appendix after Israeli**
- > soldiers twice refused to allow passage to a hospital in Nablus.
 - > This was reported in Ha'aretz on January 9, but was not picked up
 - > in the U.S. media.

- 4. Sabreen Balout was born in a taxi on January 24, as the**
- > Israeli Defense Forces refused to allow passage to a hospital, and
 - > in fact insisted that the passengers in the taxi, including the
 - > baby still linked to her mother by an umbilical cord, get out of
 - > the cab on a cold rainy night. This was reported in Ha'aretz, but
 - > not in the U.S. media.

- 5. UNRRA director Peter Hansen issued an unusual press release**
- > and report on March 11 declaring that Israeli policy in the West
 - > Bank and Gaza in destroying roads, uprooting trees, and damaging
 - > agricultural land in the interest of "security," not only violated
 - > international norms and law, it threatened a "humanitarian
 - > catastrophe." This UNRRA material was not picked up in the U.S.
 - > mainstream media.

6. Normalizing Structural Violence: Demolitions

- > The media's treatment of Israel's systematic demolitions of
- > Palestinian homes provides an enlightening case study in bias. The
- > policy of demolitions is horrendously inhumane and with its racist
- > concentration on Palestinian homes is reminiscent of Nazi practice.
- > There has been a steady stream of stories on the web issued by the

> Ethnic NewsWatch, Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
> (ICHAD), the Palestinian Land Defense Committee (PLDC), Christian
> Peacemaker Teams (CPT), the Hebron Solidarity Committee (HSC), and
> other groups, that describe army demolitions that push out
> Palestinians virtually without notice. (Check out the website of
> the Hebron Solidarity Committee: "CPT Hebron"
> <cptheb@mail.palnet.com>.)

>
> These stories are numerous, dramatic, and often heart-breaking
> as Jewish Israeli protesters and Christian teams often struggle to
> protect Palestinians from the racist onslaught of the army and
> settlers. The stories often describe demolitions of houses being
> rebuilt by protesters and then being bulldozed out of existence by
> the army for a second or third time. As noted earlier, Amnesty
> International had a report on this savage policy, stressing the
> racist essence, the widespread Palestinian fear of being
> demolished, and the murderous character of the policy--in one case,
> 100 border police coming without notice, starting to destroy a
> house, Palestinians starting to throw stones, and the police
> shooting dead Zaki 'Ubayd, a 28-year old father. This AI report was
> ignored by the Free Press.

>
> A Nexis search of coverage of demolitions of Palestinian homes
> in the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Time and
> Newsweek for the five years from January 1, 1996 through December
> 31, 2000, comes up with only 23 articles: none in Time, one in
> Newsweek, five in the New York Times, 11 in the Washington Post,
> and six in the Los Angeles Times. With only a single exception in
> the Washington Post, these articles never mention the Israeli
> Committee Against Demolitions, the Hebron Solidarity Committee, and
> the Palestinian Land Defense Committee. Only two of the 23 articles
> made the front page, and only five give substantial detail on the
> brutality of the practice and suffering of the Palestinian victims.
> Twenty of the 23 give the Israeli rationale that the Palestinian
> homes were illegally built, and nine mention the demolitions as
> being a response to Palestinian violence; only six note that
> Palestinians are not allowed to build, and only one suggests even
> indirectly that the demolitions and settlements violate the Oslo
> accords as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention.

>
> In that single exceptional case, Steven Erlanger says that
> "While Labor governments have also expanded existing settlements
> and the Oslo accords do not limit them from doing so, the
> Palestinians have complained that Israel now builds large new
> neighborhoods near existing settlements in order to call them
> expansion, rather than label them new." (NYT, Sept. 12, 1997). Note
> first that Erlanger's statement that Oslo does not preclude
> expanding settlements is strictly the Israeli interpretation of
> general language; and he cannot admit that new settlements have
> taken place, but only speaks of Palestinian complaints. He does not

- > discuss whether doubling the number of settlers and other Israeli
- > actions might possibly violate the spirit of Oslo.
- >
- > In sum, in a period of intense demolition activity by Israel, the
- > five print media examined treated the issue in very low key, with
- > zero editorial attention. They created a phony balance by giving
- > serious weight to alleged building code-violations and responses to
- > Palestinian terrorism as the basis for Israeli policy, downplaying
- > the violations of Oslo and international law, the hugely
- > discriminatory features of Israeli law, and the direct terroristic
- > abuses of the army and settlers in demolishing and taking over
- > Palestinian property. They handled the issue in such a manner that
- > the U.S. public would hardly know of this practice, and would
- > hardly be roused to indignation, in contrast with their responses
- > to the media's focus on Palestinian stone throwing and other
- > misbehavior.

7. Rewriting History

- > In systems of propaganda, not only are inconvenient facts
- > blacked out or treated in very low key where awkward, but history
- > is also rewritten. Thus it has long been an important part of
- > Israeli, U.S. official, and hence mainstream media propaganda that
- > Arafat and the PLO have always been "rejectionist" whereas Israel
- > and its sponsor have been patiently awaiting a negotiating partner.
- > However, it has been shown time and again that this is an Orwellian
- > inversion--that in fact only the ethnic cleanser and its sponsor
- > have rejected an international consensus, long accepted by the PLO
- > and Soviet Union as well as everybody but the "nyet duo," that
- > would have returned the "occupied territories" to the Palestinians
- > and involved mutual recognition. (For convincing evidence, Chomsky,
- > Fateful Triangle, Updated Edition, chap. 3; or his World Orders New
- > and Old, chap. 3.)

- >
- > Another key myth has been that the Palestinian flight of 1948-
- > 1949 was carried out voluntarily, not mainly by deliberate Israeli
- > violence. This myth was long ago exploded by Israeli historians
- > like Benny Morris and Simha Flapan, among others, but it also
- > continues to live even today within the U.S. propaganda system.
- > Thus, Elie Wiesel says that "Incited by their leaders, 600,000
- > Palestinian left the country convinced that, once Israel was
- > vanquished, they would be able to return home" ("Jerusalem in My
- > Heart," NYT, Jan. 24, 2001), and this fabrication is not only
- > published by the Newspaper of Record, it is not corrected in the
- > letters columns or "Corrections." It also shows up uncorrected in
- > the "news," where reporter John Kifner says that 52 years ago
- > "750,000 people fled the fighting that commenced with the Arab
- > attack on the newly created state of Israel" (NYT, Dec. 31, 2000).
- > They didn't "flee the fighting," most of them were deliberately

> driven out in the first phase of "redeeming the land."

8. Conclusions: The Media's Supportive Role in Ethnic Cleansing; Where Will It End In Making a "Safe" Israel?

- > Robert Fisk notes that "Oddly, you can now learn more from the
- > Israeli press than the American media. The brutality of Israeli
- > soldiers is fully covered in Ha'aretz, which also reports on the
- > large number of U.S. negotiators who are Jewish. Four years ago, a
- > former Israeli soldier described in an Israeli newspaper how his
- > men had looted a village in southern Lebanon; when the piece was
- > reprinted in the New York Times, the looting episode was censored
- > out of the text" (Independent, Dec. 13, 2000).
- >
- > The U.S. mainstream media's coverage of Middle East issues shows
- > a genuine propaganda system in action. As I have shown, the media
- > have done a truly outstanding job of supporting state policy by
- > making Israel's ethnic cleansing palatable, finding the victims the
- > source of the violence, and thus facilitating virtually any level
- > of wholesale violence Israel deems necessary to protect itself
- > against "terrorism." As its ethnic cleansing policies inevitably
- > produce secondary reactions to the primary (Israeli) violence, the
- > media therefore contribute to an escalating process with no decent
- > end in sight.
- >
- > A "safe" Israel could be obtained by accommodation to a
- > Palestinian presence with justice, but that has never been
- > consistent with the Israeli policy of "redeeming the land" from the
- > Gentiles, and there is no evidence that it has been seriously
- > considered as a policy option in the Clinton and Oslo years or in
- > any Bush signals or media perspectives. The other routes to a
- > "safe" Israel, although cruel, dangerous, and almost certain to
- > fail, are more consistent with the drift of actual policy, Sharon's
- > victory, and media apologetics for everything Israel has done up to
- > this moment. One route is a more aggressive policy of expulsions
- > from any contested territory, a solution long advocated by
- > Netanyahu and Sharon. The other route, easily combined with a
- > policy of expulsion, is a still more violent crackdown that would
- > kill or injure even larger numbers in the hope that this would
- > escalate an exodus, directly deplete Palestinian numbers, and keep
- > any remnants passive from fear.
- >
- > I have no doubt that this semi-genocidal and dangerous policy,
- > already approached in the Intifada II crackdown, would be
- > effectively rationalized by the mainstream media as a regrettably
- > necessary response to "violence" and the demands of Israeli
- > "safety."

X-Sender: feeley@POP.u-grenoble3.fr
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.2.0.58
Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2002 08:11:40 +0200
To: Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr
From: Francis Feeley <Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr>
Subject: A NEW HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE ISRAELI MASSACRES IN PALESTINE.

18 April 2002
Grenoble, France

Dear Colleagues :

The Grenoble *Center for the Advanced Study of American Institutions and Social Movements* has just received this essay by Norman G. Finkelstein, forwarded to us from Belgium by Jean Bricmont, an Associate Research Director at our Center.

This summary of historical events leading up to the current civilian massacres by the Israeli armed forces should be useful for future legal and historical research on this tragic international event now under way....

Sincerely,

Professor Francis Feeley
Director of Research
Université Stendhal
Grenoble, France

Francis, Sorry if you have already received this, but it is an excellent summary by Norman G. Finkelstein.
Jean Bricmont

First the Carrot, Then the Stick: Behind the Carnage in Palestine
by Norman G. Finkelstein
14 April 2002

During the June 1967 war, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, completing the Zionist conquest of British-mandated Palestine. In the war's aftermath, the United Nations debated the modalities for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the Fifth

Imprimé pour Francis Feeley <Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr>

4/19/02

Emergency Session of the General Assembly convening in the war's immediate aftermath, there was "near unanimity" on "the withdrawal of the armed forces from the territory of neighboring Arab states occupied during the recent war" since "everyone agrees that there should be no territorial gains by military conquest." (Secretary-General U Thant, summarizing the G.A. debate) In subsequent Security Council deliberations, the same demand for a full Israeli withdrawal in accordance with the principle of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" was inscribed in United Nations Resolution 242, alongside the right of "every state in the region" to have its sovereignty respected. A still-classified State Department study concludes that the US supported the "inadmissibility" clause of 242, making allowance for only "minor" and "mutual" border adjustments. (Nina J. Noring and Walter B. Smith II, "The Withdrawal Clause in UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967") Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan later warned Cabinet ministers not to endorse 242 because "it means withdrawal to the 4 June boundaries, and because we are in conflict with the Security Council on that resolution."

Beginning in the mid-1970s a modification of UN Resolution 242 to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict provided for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza once Israel withdrew to its pre-June 1967 borders. Except for the United States and Israel (and occasionally a US client state), an international consensus has backed, for the past quarter century, the full-withdrawal/full recognition formula or what is called the "two-state" settlement. The United States cast the lone veto of Security Council resolutions in 1976 and 1980 calling for a two-state settlement that was endorsed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and front-line Arab states. A December 1989 General Assembly resolution along similar lines passed 151-3 (no abstentions), the three negative votes cast by Israel, the United States, and Dominica.

From early on, Israel consistently opposed full withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, offering the Palestinians instead a South African-style Bantustan. The PLO, having endorsed the international consensus, couldn't be dismissed, however, as "rejectionist" and pressure mounted on Israel to accept the two-state settlement. Accordingly, in June 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon, where the PLO was headquartered, to fend off what an Israeli strategic analyst called the PLO's "peace offensive." (Avner Yaniv, Dilemmas of Security)

In December 1987 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza rose up in a basically non-violent civil revolt (intifada) against the Israeli occupation. Israel's brutal repression (extra-judicial killings, mass detentions, house demolitions, indiscriminate torture,

deportations, and so on) eventually crushed the uprising. Compounding the defeat of the intifada, the PLO suffered yet a further decline in its fortunes with the destruction of Iraq, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the suspension of funding from the Gulf states. The US and Israel seized this occasion to recruit the already venal and now desperate PLO leadership as surrogates of Israeli power. This is the real meaning of the "peace process" inaugurated at Oslo in September 1993: to create a Palestinian Bantustan by dangling before the PLO the perquisites of power and privilege.

"The occupation continued" after Oslo, a seasoned Israeli commentator observed, "albeit by remote control, and with the consent of the Palestinian people, represented by their 'sole representative,' the PLO." And again: "It goes without saying that 'cooperation' based on the current power relationship is no more than permanent Israeli domination in disguise, and that Palestinian self-rule is merely a euphemism for Bantustanization." (Meron Benvenisti, *Intimate Enemies*)

After seven years of on-again, off-again negotiations and a succession of new agreements that managed to rob the Palestinians of the few crumbs thrown from the master's table at Oslo (the population of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories had fully doubled in the meanwhile), the moment of truth arrived at Camp David in July 2000. President Clinton and Prime Minister Barak delivered Arafat the ultimatum of formally acquiescing in a Bantustan or bearing full responsibility for the collapse of the "peace process." As it happened, Arafat refused. Contrary to the myth spun by Barak-Clinton as well as a compliant media, in fact "Barak offered the trappings of Palestinian sovereignty," a special adviser at the British Foreign Office reports, "while perpetuating the subjugation of the Palestinians." (The Guardian, 10 April 2002; for details and the critical background, see Roane Carey, ed., *The New Intifada*)

Consider in this regard Israel's response to the recent Saudi peace plan. An Israeli commentator writing in Haaretz observes that the Saudi plan is "surprisingly similar to what Barak claims to have proposed two years ago." Were Israel really intent on a full withdrawal in exchange for normalization with the Arab world, the Saudi plan and its unanimous endorsement by the Arab League summit should have been met with euphoria. In fact, it elicited a deafening silence in Israel. (Aviv Lavie, 5 April 2002) Nonetheless, Barak's - and Clinton's - fraud that Palestinians at Camp David rejected a maximally generous Israeli offer provided crucial moral cover for the horrors that ensued.

Having failed in its carrot policy, Israel now reached for the big stick. Two preconditions had to be met, however, before Israel

could bring to bear its overwhelming military superiority: a "green light" from the U.S. and a sufficient pretext. Already in summer 2000, the authoritative Jane's Information Group reported that Israel had completed planning for a massive and bloody invasion of the Occupied Territories. But the US vetoed the plan and Europe made equally plain its opposition. After 11 September, however, the US came on board. Indeed, Sharon's goal of crushing the Palestinians basically fit in with the US administration's goal of exploiting the World Trade Center atrocity to eliminate the last remnants of Arab resistance to total US domination. Through sheer exertion of will and despite a monumentally corrupt leadership, Palestinians have proven to be the most resilient and recalcitrant popular force in the Arab world. Bringing them to their knees would deal a devastating psychological blow throughout the region.

With a green light from the US, all Israel now needed was the pretext. Predictably it escalated the assassinations of Palestinian leaders following each lull in Palestinian terrorist attacks. "After the destruction of the houses in Rafah and Jerusalem, the Palestinians continued to act with restraint," Shulamith Aloni of Israel's Meretz party observed. "Sharon and his army minister, apparently fearing that they would have to return to the negotiating table, decided to do something and they liquidated Raad Karmi. They knew that there would be a response, and that we would pay the price in the blood of our citizens." (Yediot Aharonot, 18 January 2002) Indeed, Israel desperately sought this sanguinary response. Once the Palestinian terrorist attacks crossed the desired threshold, Sharon was able to declare war and proceed to annihilate the basically defenseless civilian Palestinian population.

Only the willfully blind can miss noticing that Israel's current invasion of the West Bank is an exact replay of the June 1982 invasion of Lebanon. To crush the Palestinians' goal of an independent state alongside Israel - the PLO's "peace offensive" - Israel laid plans in August 1981 to invade Lebanon. In order to launch the invasion, however, it needed the green light from the Reagan administration and a pretext. Much to its chagrin and despite multiple provocations, Israel was unable to elicit a Palestinian attack on its northern border. It accordingly escalated the air assaults on southern Lebanon and after a particularly murderous attack that left two hundred civilians dead (including 60 occupants of a Palestinian children's hospital), the PLO finally retaliated killing one Israeli. With the pretext in hand and a green light now forthcoming from the Reagan administration, Israel invaded. Using the same slogan of "rooting out Palestinian terror," Israel proceeded to massacre a defenseless population, killing some 20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese, almost all civilians.

The problem with the Bush administration, we are repeatedly told, is that it has been insufficiently engaged with the Middle East, a diplomatic void Colin Powell's mission is supposed to fill. But who gave the green light for Israel to commit the massacres? Who supplied the F-16s and Apache helicopters to Israel? Who vetoed the Security Council resolutions calling for international monitors to supervise the reduction of violence? And who just blocked the proposal of the United Nation's top human rights official, Mary Robinson, to merely send a fact-finding team to the Palestinian territories? (IPS, 3 April 2002)

Consider this scenario. A and B stand accused of murder. The evidence shows that A provided B with the murder weapon, A gave B the "all-clear" signal, and A prevented onlookers from answering the victim's screams. Would the verdict be that A was insufficiently engaged or that A was every bit as guilty as B of murder?

To repress Palestinian resistance, a senior Israeli officer earlier this year urged the army to "analyze and internalize the lessons of Show the German army fought in the Warsaw ghetto." (Haaretz, 25 January 2002, 1 February 2002) Judging by the recent Israeli carnage in the West Bank - the targeting of Palestinian ambulances and medical personnel, the targeting of journalists, the killing of Palestinian children "for sport" (Chris Hedges, New York Times former Cairo bureau chief), the rounding up, handcuffing and blindfolding of all Palestinian males between the ages 15 and 50, and affixing of numbers on their wrists, the indiscriminate torture of Palestinian detainees, the denial of food, water, electricity, and medical assistance to the Palestinian civilian population, the indiscriminate air assaults on Palestinian neighborhoods, the use of Palestinian civilians as human shields, the bulldozing of Palestinian homes with the occupants huddled inside - it appears that the Israeli army is following the officer's advice. Dismissing all criticism as motivated by anti-Semitism, Elie Wiesel - chief spokesman for the Holocaust Industry - lent unconditional support to Israel, stressing the "great pain and anguish" endured by its rampaging army. (Reuters, 11 April; CNN, 14 April)

Meanwhile, the Portuguese Nobel laureate in literature, Jose Saramago, invoked the "spirit of Auschwitz" in depicting the horrors inflicted by Israel, while a Belgian parliamentarian avowed that Israel was "making a concentration camp out of the West Bank." (The Observer, 7 April 2002) Israelis across the political spectrum recoil in outrage at such comparisons. Yet, if Israelis don't want to stand accused of being Nazis they should simply stop acting like Nazis.

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To: Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr
From: Francis Feeley <Francis.Feeley@u-grenoble3.fr>
Subject: Fwd: War crimes

17 April 2002
Grenoble, France

Dear Colleagues:

We have just received this message forwarded to us from our research associate, Professor Richard Du Boff of Bryn Mawr College in Pennsylvania.

Sincerely,

F. Feeley
Director of Research
Center for the Advanced Study of American Institutions and Social Movements
Université Stendhal
Grenoble, France

From: "Richard B. Du Boff" <rduboff@brynmawr.edu>
Subject: War crimes

Now the US opposition to the International Criminal Court is making more sense: we care not only about defending ourselves against arbitrary charges by enemies of freedom, but also our true friends . .

R.D.B.

The Independent 16 April 2002

Amid the ruins of Jenin, the grisly evidence of a war crime. From Phil Reeves in Jenin

A monstrous war crime that Israel has tried to cover up for a fortnight has finally been exposed. Its troops have caused devastation in the centre of the Jenin refugee camp, reached yesterday by *The Independent*, where thousands of people are still living amid the ruins.

A residential area roughly 160,000 square yards about a third of a mile wide has been reduced to dust. Rubble has been shovelled by bulldozers into 30ft piles. The sweet and ghastly reek of rotting human bodies is everywhere, evidence that it is a human tomb. The people, who spent days hiding in basements crowded into single rooms as the rockets pounded in, say there are hundreds of corpses, entombed beneath the dust, under a field of debris, criss-crossed with tank and bulldozer treadmarks.

In one nearby half-wrecked building, gutted by fire, lies the fly-blown corpse of a man covered by a

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4/19/02

tartan rug. In another we found the remains of 23-year-old Ashraf Abu Hejar beneath the ruins of a fire-blackened room that collapsed on him after being hit by a rocket. His head is shrunken and blackened. In a third, five long-dead men lay under blankets.

A quiet, sad-looking young man called Kamal Anis led us across the wasteland, littered now with detritus of what were once households, foam rubber, torn clothes, shoes, tin cans, children's toys. He suddenly stopped. This was a mass grave, he said, pointing.

We stared at a mound of debris. Here, he said, he saw the Israeli soldiers pile 30 bodies beneath a half-wrecked house. When the pile was complete, they bulldozed the building, bringing its ruins down on the corpses. Then they flattened the area with a tank. We could not see the bodies. But we could smell them.

A few days ago, we might not have believed Kamal Anis. But the descriptions given by the many other refugees who escaped from Jenin camp were understated, not, as many feared and Israel encouraged us to believe, exaggerations. Their stories had not prepared me for what I saw yesterday. I believe them now.

Until two weeks ago, there were several hundred tightly-packed homes in this neighbourhood called Hanat al-Hawashim. They no longer exist.

Around the central ruins, there are many hundreds of half-wrecked homes. Much of the camp - once home to 15,000 Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war - is falling down. Every wall is speckled and torn with bullet holes and shrapnel, testimony of the awesome, random firepower of Cobra and Apache helicopters that hovered over the camp.

Building after building has been torn apart, their contents of cheap fake furnishings, mattresses, white plastic chairs spewed out into the road. Every other building bears the giant, charred, impact mark of a helicopter missile. Last night there were still many families and weeping children still living amid the ruins, cut off from the humanitarian aid. Ominously, we found no wounded, although there was a report of a man being rescued from beneath ruins only an hour before we arrived.

Those who did not flee the camp, or not detained by the army, have spent the bombardment in basements, enduring day after day of terror. Some were forced into rooms by the soldiers, who smashed their way into houses through the walls. The UN says half of the camp's 15,000 residents were under 18. As the evening hush fell over these killing fields, we could suddenly hear the children chattering. The mosques, once so noisy at prayer time, were silent.

Israel was still trying to conceal these scenes yesterday. It had refused entry to Red Cross ambulances for nearly a week, in violation of the Geneva Convention. Yesterday it continued to try to keep us out.

Jenin, in the northern end of the occupied West Bank, remained "a closed military zone", was ringed Merkava tanks, army Jeep patrols, and armoured personnel carriers. Reporters caught trying to get in were escorted out. A day earlier the Israeli armed forces took in a few selected journalists to see sanitised parts of the camp. We simply walked across the fields, flitted through an olive orchard overlooked by two Israeli tanks, and into the camp itself.

We were led in by hands gesturing at windows. Hidden, whispering people directed us through narrow alleys they thought were clear. When there were soldiers about, a finger would raise in warning, or a hand waved us back. We were welcomed by people desperate to tell what had occurred. They spoke of

executions, and bulldozers wrecking homes with people inside. "This is mass murder committed by Ariel Sharon," Jamel Saleh, 43, said. "We feel more hate for Israel now than ever. Look at this boy." He placed his hand on the tousled head of a little boy, Mohammed, the eight-year-old son of a friend. "He saw all this evil. He will remember it all." So will everyone else who saw the horror of Jenin refugee camp. Palestinians who entered the camp yesterday were almost speechless.

Rajib Ahmed, from the Palestinian Energy Authority, came to try to repair the power lines. He was trembling with fury and shock. "This is mass murder. I have come here to help by I have found nothing but devastation. Just look for yourself." All had the same message: tell the world.

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ATROCITIES MANAGEMENT

Edward S. Herman

It is extremely easy to demonize by atrocities management. I became steeped in this subject during the Vietnam War era, and even published a small volume in 1970 entitled *Atrocities in Vietnam: Myths and Realities*. The marvel of that era was how easily and effectively the U.S. establishment and media focused on the cruel acts and killings of the indigenous National Liberation Front (NLF, "Vietcong") and made them into sinister killers ("terrorists"), when in fact the terror of the U.S. and its local and foreign proxies was worse by a very large factor. The violence of the Diem government in the late 1950s was extremely brutal, indiscriminate, and massive; and when the US entered the fray directly in the 1960s a new level of (wholesale terror) was reached with chemical warfare, napalm, fragmentation bombs, "free fire zones," and high level B-52 bombing raids on "suspected Vietcong bases" (i.e., villages). The NLF was always more selective in its killing, for strategic and political reasons--it had a mass base in the countryside that it did not want to harm or alienate. The Diem government, its successors, and the US, were less discriminating for the same reason--they had little or no peasant support, so that indiscriminate terror and mass killing was the understandable strategy of aggression.

But the U.S. media featured the relatively small and selective terrorist acts of the enemy, dramatized and personalized them with details, and gave correspondingly slight and more antiseptic attention to the horrendous behavior of our clients and ourselves, also presented as defensive and retaliatory. I recall being one-upped on a radio debate on the war when my opponent pulled out an article in *Time* magazine showing a picture of two Vietnamese, hands-tied, allegedly executed by the NLF. This may or may not have been an instance of NLF terror, but two things were clear: the political selectivity of *Time* here and in general completely distorted the overall truth regarding terror in Vietnam, and the selectivity and dramatization made for very effective propaganda. While the U.S. was destroying Vietnam in order to "save" it, the U.S. media found only the Vietnamese enemy evil; the U.S. failed there, but with the noblest intentions.

Another important result of the effective demonization of the NLF as terroristic was to paralyze many liberals and leftists, unwilling to be tagged as not only unpatriotic but siding with terrorists. Many lapsed into silence; others condemned both sides, calling weakly for restraint and compromise; and only "extremists" were willing to call the U.S. aggression and long struggle against Vietnamese self-determination by its right name. This paralysis and marginalization of a principled position weakened the oppositional movement to the war.

The U.S. also destroyed Cambodia in a "sideshow" to the Vietnam war (1969-75), and following the devastating four year rule of the Khmer Rouge, the US supported the ousted Pol Pot forces as the "enemy of my enemy" (Vietnam). The U.S. media focused intensively and indignantly on the Khmer Rouge genocide, but from 1969 to today have largely blacked out the atrocities of the "sideshow" years, the misdeeds of the Khmer Rouge during the period of U.S. support, and the fact of that support. Here again, the power of media propaganda has been such that calling attention to the U.S. role as the first phase genocidists and its badly compromised position as Pol Pot supporter after 1978 is virtually unheard of, and departures from an exclusive focus

KR crimes makes one an apologist for the KR. This process extends to the "left," with repeated illustrations in the Progressive and In These Times, and in an Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)-Interhemispheric Resource Center publication, Foreign Policy in Focus. In the latter case, a 1997 essay on Cambodia by Philip Robertson focused entirely on KR crimes, portrayed the US as a neutral party in that country and suitable adjudicator of policy, and supplied a list of policy recommendations for it to implement there, including U.S. support for war crimes trials for KR leaders.

Another sideshow of the Vietnam war was the mass killings in Indonesia in 1965-66, which destroyed the base of the Communist Party and brought Indonesia into the U.S. sphere of influence. This sideshow was greeted enthusiastically by the U.S. establishment. Given this approval, and 33 years of U.S. support for the Suharto dictatorship, atrocities management has required that the large-scale murders and rule by violence, and the mass killings in East Timor from 1975-1999, be kept under the rug. The U.S. media have done a great job here. There are no UN forensic groups over there looking at bodies, and there are no demands for ending Suharto's impunity.

Similarly, with the US "constructively engaged" with South Africa, Israel, and Turkey over the past several decades, the South African occupation of Namibia, assaults on the front line states, and support of Renamo and Savimbi, Israel's invasions and "iron fist" attacks on Lebanon, and Turkey's scorched earth policies and killings of Kurds, could proceed for many years killing hundreds of thousands unimpeded by any intense focus on atrocities or serious attention from the "international community." Turkey could even offer to lend armed support to the NATO effort in Kosovo, presumably diverting troops from killing Kurds, without eliciting the slightest sense of irony in the West.

Only when the Godfather needs atrocities--as with the NLF, PLO, or Serbs--do atrocities come on line, with intense focus and indignation. This is done with such assurance and self-righteous virtue that liberals and leftists jump on the bandwagon and welcome the Godfather's gracious willingness in this particular case to finally properly lead and bring justice to the targeted villain and area. The willingness of leftists to accept the U.S. (and NATO) as proper authorities to decide, judge and drop bombs is nothing short of astonishing. Some of them might the previous week have condemned the murderous U.S. sanctions that are killing more Iraqi children each month than the aggregate casualties in Kosovo, U.S. support of the Turkish war against the Kurds, the U.S. bombing of the Sudan, etc., but still their political vision is so limited, their response to atrocities so elemental, that they collapse intellectually and morally. One leftist is reported to have said that the Serbs are pulling people out of houses and killing them, implying that this justified the NATO bombing of Serbia. On this kind of reasoning, Israel would have been bombed after Sabra- Shatila and on many other occasions; and of course the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala would have been bombed incessantly in the 1980s, instead of being supplied and protected by the US.

With Milosevic and the Serbs effectively demonized, the left even puts forward spokespersons who openly favor the NATO bombing. Both IPS and Mother Jones offer as an expert and spokesperson Albert Cevallos of the International Crisis Group, who urges "the need of bombing to bring Serbia back into the peace process," to be followed by an international peacekeeping army in Kosovo. Mother Jones also provides Doug Hostetter of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, who proposes that as Milosevic is carrying out "genocidal acts" the U.S. should seek to bring him before the war crimes tribunal. Reminiscent of the Vietnam War paralysis, the IPS and Mother Jones leftists oppose the bombing (Cevallos excepted) mainly because it won't work in achieving purportedly humane goals, whose substantive primacy is taken for granted. Not one of these experts condemns the U.S. and NATO for tearing Yugoslavia apart, for violating international law in the bombing, and for their political selectivity and gross double standard in choice of innocents

to be protected from crimes against humanity.

Atrocities management works, but it also requires a complementary gross misunderstanding of the issues at stake and context of the actions taken. The Serbs have committed terrible acts in Kosovo and deserve condemnation; and international efforts to end that crisis are eminently desirable. But past NATO policies have contributed to the ongoing violence and are part of the problem--their bombing strategy is the culmination of policies that have exacerbated the crisis. The bombing is not merely immoral and illegal, it is part of an ugly and destructive policy sequence rooted in self-serving geo-political strategies. _

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February 10, 2002

Uncertain Toll in the Fog of War: Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

By BARRY BEARAK

his article was reported by Barry Bearak, Eric Schmitt and Craig S. Smith and was written by Mr. Bearak.

In an age of eavesdropping warplanes and satellite-guided bombs, the Pentagon finds itself accused of sometimes relying on faulty intelligence in Afghanistan, leading to an unnecessary toll of civilian deaths.

Scrutiny has grown since a pre dawn raid on Jan. 24, when U.S. com mandos killed at least 15 men presumed to be Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. Officials in the interim Af ghan government have since joined grieving survivors in calling the at tack a tragic mistake, with some surmising the Americans were duped with false information by a scheming local warlord.

A full-fledged investigation by the Pentagon's Central Command is under way, which is unusual. Despite scores of credible reports about possibly misdirected airstrikes and sizable civilian losses — accounts from the United Nations, aid agencies and journalists — the military has made detailed inquiries into but a few cases, like the bombing of Red Cross warehouses in Kabul twice within 10 days in October.

Most often, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and military spokesmen have dismissed accusations of mistakes as enemy propaganda. They express confidence in their targeting and regret any "collateral damage." They maintain that extraordinary efforts have been taken to minimize civilian losses, something that even most critics of the war effort would not dispute.

Nevertheless, certainly hundreds and perhaps thousands of innocent Afghans have lost their lives during American attacks, a scattering of bodies extraordinarily difficult to tabulate.

Many mournful Afghan families demand a reckoning.

"Tell me why our homes were destroyed and 55 people — even little children — are dead?" asked an angry young man named Gul Nabi, standing in December among the 15 obliterated houses of

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"There were only farmers who lived a good life and prayed to Allah for peace."

The American military routinely reviews the effectiveness of its air raids, but by its own admission it has faced insurmountable difficulty in tracking the toll of civilian deaths. Mr. Rumsfeld has called the task "next to impossible," citing a lack of ground access to bombed targets.

That leaves much unknown. American weaponry, according to a statement Mr. Rumsfeld made in October, is "probably 85-90 percent reliable."

Assessing the Damage.

For the Afghanistan campaign, the Air Force created a special assessment team at its air operations center outside Riyadh to look at cases of possible civilian losses and other unintended damage. Pilot reports, targeting data and aerial reconnaissance photos are examined. The team has reviewed "several scores" of reports and acknowledged a handful of bomb malfunctions that have led to unintended casualties.

Mistakes caused by bad intelligence are harder to investigate. Credible reports about such instances are referred to Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Fla. Field investigations are necessary. Customarily, none have been assigned because of the difficulty of getting troops to the sites.

The military ordered its investigation of the Jan. 24 commando raid only after Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's pro-American interim president, personally complained to Gen. Tommy R. Franks, commander of the operation in Afghanistan.

"The military knows they'll get pummeled about issues relating to civilian casualties, and they don't have a clue how to address it in a nonpropagandistic way," said William H. Arkin, a former army intelligence analyst who is a military adviser to Human Rights Watch. "The subject ties them in knots. It's an irritant, and they avoid it."

For a war that has so riveted the world's attention, there are tremendous gaps in knowledge about what has occurred. Some of this was deliberate. For months, the Taliban excluded any foreign observers. Much of what they claimed about civilian casualties has proven to be false.

But now, even with the Taliban gone, truth remains hard to come by. The sites of past air raids are often in remote locations that are only reachable on unsafe roads. Memory, as always, can be a chameleon. In the Muslim tradition, bodies are buried soon after death. Some answers disappear in the turned earth.

"What we were challenged with each and every time, particularly in the early weeks of the war, was that we did not have people on the ground to check," said Rear Adm. Craig R. Quigley, senior spokesman for the Central Command.

Now, about 4,000 American troops are in Afghanistan. But most investigations would be unreliable because of the amount of time that has passed, the admiral said. Some of the damage has been repaired, many of the witnesses have moved away.

"You just don't find much," he said.

If that is true, many mysteries will remain unresolved.

What happened at the village of Karam in Nangahar Province on Oct. 11? The Taliban claimed 200 civilians were killed in an air raid. Some survivors put the death count at 50, some 100, some higher. Reporters, visiting the scene days later, found a hamlet of demolished mud huts and interviewed devastated family members. Mr. Rumsfeld called the claims of a high death toll "ridiculous" and said secondary explosions proved that a major arms dump had been struck.

What happened on Dec. 1 when bombs leveled several villages near Tora Bora, the cave complex where Osama bin Laden was thought to be hiding? America's anti-Taliban allies in the region said the bombs killed at least 115 civilians and called for the raids to stop. Doctors Without Borders, the aid organization, said they transported 72 dead, including women and children, and left many more bodies behind. The Pentagon said its planes had hit only its intended targets.

What happened on Dec. 20 when American planes attacked a convoy in Paktia Province, killing

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as many as 50 to 60 people on the road and in surrounding villages? The Pentagon said that Taliban leaders were in the vehicles and that the enemy fired first, using anti-aircraft missiles. Survivors claimed the convoy was bringing tribal elders to Kabul for the inauguration of the interim president.

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Uncertain Toll in the Fog of War: Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan

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What happened on Dec. 29 in an air raid on Niazi Qala, a village in Paktia? Some survivors said more than 100 civilians were killed. The Pentagon claimed it had hit a Taliban ammunition depot, and journalists later found a huge cache of tank rounds and mortar shells. Villagers, however, said anti-Taliban forces had earlier taken control of the munitions and that many of the people killed, including women and children, had congregated for a wedding.

"We've got about 300 incidents in our database, and I'd say about a third involve some civilian casualties that would be worth taking a second look at," said Mr. Arkin, the Human Rights Watch adviser, who is also an adjunct professor at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Airpower Studies.

Human Rights Accounting

The rights group is making plans to send researchers to Afghanistan in March to estimate the number of civilians killed and to investigate those attacks that might have arisen from an illegitimate use of force.

America's use of cluster bombs will be studied. Each one sprays a huge area with more than 200 soda-can-size armor-piercing bomblets. Some fail to detonate on contact.

"The duds in effect become land mines that explode when touched," said Joost Hiltermann, executive director of the Human Rights Watch arms division.

By some calculations, he said, the American bombing campaign may have left 36,000 unexploded canisters strewn across Afghanistan's rugged landscape, an estimate that Admiral Quigley said was too high. He declined to provide a better number.

Rights groups often take the lead in counting civilian deaths, and some experts believe it would in the Pentagon's interest to provide its own numbers.

"It hasn't been a major focus of attention for the military, which may well be a mistake," said Eliot A. Cohen, a professor at Johns Hopkins University who directed the Air Force's definitive study of the 1991 Persian Gulf war. "Frequently, the human rights community will, in the absence of good numbers, put out bad numbers."

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A few researchers have already done some arithmetic, basing their calculations on various news reports. Prof. Marc W. Herold, an economist at the University of New Hampshire, added up at least 3,767 civilian casualties from Oct. 7 to Dec. 6. Carl Conetta, co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, used a more stringent distillation of media accounts and concluded that a better guess would be 1,000 to 1,300 deaths.

Whatever the total, the Pentagon would likely continue to insist that it is a bare, if inevitable, minimum. "There is no question but from time to time, innocent people, noncombatants, undoubtedly are killed and that is always unfortunate," Mr. Rumsfeld has said repeatedly.

Military officials describe a rigorous process of picking targets. In Afghanistan, the Pentagon has used multiple sources of intelligence, including local Afghans, U-2 spy planes, reconnaissance satellites, unpiloted Predator drones and RC-135 Rivet Joint planes that collect electronic transmissions. Sources are crosschecked for accuracy.

Commanders then determine which aircraft to dispatch, the type and size of bomb, and even the best approach route to minimize the threat to civilians. Lawyers review the targets, also evaluating the risk to civilians.

"This has been the most accurate war ever fought in this nation's history," General Franks told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week.

About 60 percent of the 18,000 bombs, missiles and other ordnance used since the air campaign began on Oct. 7 were precision-guided, up from fewer than 10 percent of munitions in the Persian Gulf war, military officials said.

A Raid Gone Awry

But word-of-mouth, rather than faulty high-tech gear, is the main suspect in the seemingly misbegotten Jan. 24 raid. In the pitch of night, relying on surprise, American soldiers and some commandos from an allied country burst into two compounds in the town of Oruzgan, more than 100 miles northeast of Kandahar. They were expecting to find secreted members of the Al Qaeda or Taliban leadership. And they were hoping to catch them napping.

Nayaz Muhammad, 27, said he was asleep in a school when he was awakened by a blast. Most of the 11 other men in the room died almost immediately in a barrage of gunfire. He escaped by diving out a window. The attackers were bathing the building in light. He managed to flee to a barn.

"I didn't know why they were shooting," Mr. Muhammad recalled days later.

Neither did Muhammad Y unas, a former district government chief, who had been sleeping in the other compound. He saw the charging Americans.

"I told my men, 'Don't shoot, they're our people, they'll come to talk,' " he said. "We were amazed. Why would the Americans come to attack us?"

In the morning light, 21 lay dead, villagers said. Nineteen had been pulled from the school by neighbors. Two of the corpses had their hands bound behind their backs with white tape, witnesses said. The others were burned beyond recognition.

Hours later, back in Washington, a victory was being announced. The commandos had destroyed a large cache of weapons, it was reported. Twenty-seven prisoners were taken. They were being questioned. Some might be high-level Taliban.

But within two weeks, the raiders themselves were on the defensive. Mr. Rumsfeld conceded that friends might well have been mistaken for foes. Villagers insisted the weapons cache was merely a storehouse for confiscated arms. The 27 prisoners were released to Afghan authorities.

Meanwhile, the military investigation began. Was the raid legitimate? If not, where had the American military gotten the false intelligence? General Franks said that at least some of the detainees were criminals, if not enemy warriors.

Many Afghan officials from the area say the Americans listened to lies and were drawn into a feud between factions fighting to control the town. They wonder why the military did not go to

Oruzgan and ask around.

Ahmed Wali Karzai, the president's brother, is based in Kandahar. He said he had tried to settle the dispute. Instead, people are needlessly dead.

"I hope that the Americans are brave enough to name the person who gave them that information," he said.

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
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George Soros, Imperial Wizard

MASTER-BUILDER OF THE NEW BRIBE SECTOR,
SYSTEMATICALLY BILKING THE WORLD

Heather Cottin



December 10, 2001. New York, New York. Irene Diamond, left, David Rockefeller, center, and George Soros, three of eleven recipients of the inaugural Carnegie Medals of Philanthropy, indulge in a round of self-congratulation.

“Yes, I do have a foreign policy...my goal is to become the conscience of the world.”¹

This is not a case of narcissistic personality disorder; this is how George Soros exercises the authority of United States hegemony in the world today. Soros foundations and financial machinations are partly responsible for the destruction of socialism in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. He has set his sights on China. He was part of the full court press that dismantled Yugoslavia. Calling himself a phi-

lanthropist, billionaire George Soros' role is to tighten the ideological stranglehold of globalization and the New World Order while promoting his own financial gain. Soros' commercial and "philanthropic" operations are clandestine, contradictory and coercive. And as far as his economic activities are concerned, by his own admission, he is without conscience; a capitalist who functions with absolute amorality.

Soros is a leading figure on the Council of Foreign Relations, the World Economic Forum, and Human Rights Watch (HRW). In 1994, after a meeting with his philosophical guru, Sir Karl Popper, Soros ordered his companies to start investing in

Central and Eastern European communications. The Federal Radio Television Administration of the Czech Republic accepted his offer to take over and fund the archives of Radio Free Europe. Soros moved the archives to Prague and spent over \$15 million on their maintenance.² A Soros foundation now runs CIA-created

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Heather Cottin is a writer, lifelong political activist, and recently retired high school history teacher. She lives in Freeport, NY, and was for many years married to the late scholar and activist Sean Gervasi.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty jointly with the U.S. and RFE/RL, which has expanded into the Caucasus and Asia.³ Soros is the founder and funder of the Open Society Institute. He created and maintains the International Crisis Group (ICG) which,

GEORGE SOROS WAS BORN IN HUNGARY IN 1930 TO JEWISH PARENTS SO REMOVED FROM THEIR ROOTS THEY ONCE VACATIONED IN NAZI GERMANY.

among other things, has been active in the Balkans since the destruction of Yugoslavia. Soros works openly with the United States Institute of Peace—an overt arm of the CIA.

He thrusts himself upon world statesmen and they respond. He has been close to Henry Kissinger, Vaclav Havel and Poland's General Wojciech Jaruzelski.⁴ He supports the Dalai Lama, whose institute is housed in the Presidio in San Francisco, also home to the foundation run by Soros' friend, former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.⁵

When anti-globalization forces were freezing in the streets outside New York's Waldorf-Astoria hotel in February 2002, George Soros was inside addressing the World Economic Forum. As the police forced protesters into metal cages on Park Avenue, Soros was extolling the virtues of the "Open Society" and joined Zbigniew Brzezinski, Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama and others.

WHO IS THIS GUY?

George Soros was born in Hungary in 1930 to Jewish parents so removed from their roots that they once vacationed in Nazi Germany.⁶ Soros lived under the Nazis, but with the triumph of the Communists moved to England in 1947. There, Soros came under the sway of the philosopher Karl Popper, at the London School of Economics. Popper was a lionized anti-communist ideologue and his teachings formed the basis for Soros' political tendencies. There is hardly a speech, book or article that Soros writes that does not pay obeisance to Popper's influence.

Knighted in 1965, Popper coined the slogan "Open Society," which eventually manifested in Soros' Open Society Fund and Institute. Followers of Popper repeat his words like true believers. Popperian philosophy epitomizes Western individualism. Soros left England in 1956, and

found work on Wall Street where, in the 1960s, he invented the "hedge fund."

...hedge funds catered to very wealthy individuals...The largely secretive funds, usually trading in offshore locations...produced astronomically superior results. The size of the "bets" often became self fulfilling prophecies: 'rumors of a position taken by the big hedge funds prompted other investors to follow suit,' which would in turn force up the price the hedgers were betting on to begin with.⁷

Soros organized the Quantum Fund in 1969 and began to dabble in currency manipulation. In the 1970s, his financial activities turned to:

Alternating long and short positions... Soros won big both on the rise of real estate investment trusts and on their subsequent collapse. Under his 20-year stewardship, Quantum returned an amazing 34.5% a year. Soros is best known (and feared) for currency speculation...In 1997 he earned the rare distinction of being singled out as a villain by a head of state, Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad, for taking part in a highly profitable attack on that nation's currency.⁸

Through such clandestine financial scheming, Soros became a multibillionaire. His companies control real estate in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico; banking in Venezuela; and are some of the most profitable currency traders in the world, giving rise to the general belief that his highly placed friends assisted him in his financial endeavors, for political as well as financial gain.⁹

George Soros has been blamed for the destruction of the Thai economy in 1997.¹⁰ One Thai activist said, "We regard George Soros as a kind of Dracula. He sucks the blood from the people."¹¹ The Chinese call him "the crocodile," because his economic and ideological efforts in China were so insatiate, and because his financial speculation created millions of dollars in profits as it ravished the Thai and Malaysian economies.¹²

Soros once made a billion dollars in one day by speculating (a word he abhors) on the British pound. Accused of taking "money from every British taxpayer when he speculated against sterling," he said, "When you speculate in the financial markets you are free of most of the moral concerns that confront an ordinary businessman...I did not have to concern myself with moral issues in the financial markets."¹³

Soros has a schizophrenic craving for unlimited personal wealth and a desire to

be thought well of by others:

Currency traders sitting at their desks buy and sell currencies of Third World countries in large quantities. The effect of the currency fluctuations on the people who live in those countries is a matter that does not enter their minds. Nor should it; they have a job to do. Yet if we pause to think, we must ask ourselves whether currency traders...should regulate the lives of millions.¹⁴

It was Soros who saved George W. Bush's bacon when his management of an oil exploration company was ending in failure. Soros was the owner of Harken Energy Corporation, and it was he who bought the rapidly depreciating stocks just prior to the company's collapse. The future president cashed out at almost one million dollars. Soros said he did it to buy "political influence."¹⁵ Soros is also a partner in the infamous Carlyle Group. Organized in 1987, "the world's largest private equity firm" with over twelve billion dollars under management, is run by "a veritable who's who of former Republican leaders," from CIA man Frank Carlucci to CIA head George Bush, Sr. The Carlyle Group makes most of its money from weapons expenditures.

THE PHILANTHROPIST SPOOK

In 1980, Soros began to use his millions to attack socialism in Eastern Europe. He financed individuals who would cooperate with him. His first success was in Hungary. He took over the Hungarian educational and cultural establishment, incapacitating socialist institutions throughout the country. He made his way right inside the Hungarian government. Soros next moved on to Poland, aiding the CIA-funded Solidarity operation and in that same year, he became active in China. The USSR came next.

It is not coincidental that the Central Intelligence Agency had operations in all of those countries. The goal of the Agency was exactly the same as that of the Open Society Fund: to dismantle socialism. In South Africa, the CIA sought out dissidents who were anticommunist. In Hungary, Poland and the USSR, the CIA, with overt intervention from the National Endowment for Democracy, the AFL-CIO, USAID and other institutions, supported and organized anticommunists, the very type of individuals recruited by Soros' Open Society Fund. The CIA would have called them "assets." As Soros said, "In each country I identified a group of people—some leading personalities, others less well known—who shared

my belief..."¹⁶ Soros' Open Society organized conferences with anticommunist Czechs, Serbs, Romanians, Hungarians, Croatians, Bosnians, Kosovars.¹⁷ His ever-expanding influence gave rise to suspicions that he was operating as part of the U.S. intelligence complex. In 1989, the *Washington Post* reported charges first made in 1987 by the Chinese government officials that Soros' Fund for the Reform and Opening of China had CIA connections.¹⁸

TAKING ON MOSCOW

After 1990, Soros funds targeted the Russian educational system, providing the entire nation with textbooks.¹⁹ In effect, Soros ensured the indoctrination of an entire generation of Russian youth with OSI propaganda. Soros foundations were accused of engineering a strategy to take control of the Russian financial system, privatization schemes, and the process of foreign investment in that country. Russians reacted angrily to Soros' legislative meddlings. Critics of Soros and other U.S. foundations said the goal of these maneuvers was to "thwart Russia as a state, which has the potential to compete with the world's only superpower."²⁰ Russians began to suspect Soros and the CIA were interconnected. Business tycoon Boris Berezovsky said, "I nearly fainted when I heard a couple of years ago that George Soros was a CIA agent."²¹ Berezovsky's opinion was that Soros, and the West, were "afraid of Russian capital becoming strong."

If the economic and political establishment in the United States fear an economic rivalry from Russia, what better way to control it than to dominate Russian media, education, research centers and science? After spending \$250 million for the "transformation of education of humanities and economics at the high school and university levels," Soros created the International Science Foundation for another \$100 million.²² The Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) accused Soros foundations in Russia of "espionage." They noted that Soros was not operating alone; he was part of a full court press that included financing from the Ford and Heritage Foundations; Harvard, Duke, and Columbia universities, and assistance from the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence services.²³ The FSK criticized Soros' payouts to 50,000 Russian scientists, saying that Soros advanced his own interests by gaining control of thousands of Russian scientific discoveries and new technologies to collect state and commercial secrets.²⁴

In 1995, Russians were infuriated by the insinuation of State Department opera-

tive Fred Cuny into the conflict in Chechnya. Cuny's cover was disaster relief, but his history of involvement in international conflict zones of interest to the U.S., plus FBI and CIA search parties, made clear his government connections. At the time of his disappearance, Cuny was working under contract to a Soros foundation.²⁵ It is not widely known in the U.S. that the violence in Chechnya, a province in the heart of Russia, is generally perceived as the result of a political destabilization campaign on which Washington looks favorably, and may actually be directing. This assessment of the situation is clear enough to writer Tom Clancy that he felt free to include it as an assertion of fact in his best-seller, *The Sum of All Fears*. The Russians accused Cuny of being a CIA operative, and part of an intelligence operation to support the Chechen uprising.²⁶ Soros' Open Society Institute is still active in Chechnya, as are other Soros-sponsored organizations.

Russia was the site of at least one joint endeavor to enhance Soros' balance sheet, arranged with diplomatic assistance from the Clinton administration. In 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright blocked a \$500 million loan guarantee by the U.S. Export-Import Bank to the Russian company, Tyumen Oil, on the grounds that it was contrary to U.S. national interests. Tyumen wanted to buy American-made oil equipment and services from Dick Cheney's Halliburton Company and ABB Lummus Global of Bloomfield, New Jersey.²⁷ George Soros was an investor in a company that Tyumen had been trying to acquire. Both Soros and BP Amoco lobbied to prevent this transaction, and Albright obliged.²⁸

NURTURING LEFT ANTI-SOCIALISM

Soros' Open Society Institute has a finger in every pot. Its board of directors reads like a "Who's Who" of Cold War and New World Order pundits. Paul Goble is Communications Director; he was the major political commentator at Radio Free Europe. Herbert Okun served in the Nixon State Department as an intelligence adviser to Henry Kissinger. Kati Marton is the wife of former Clinton administration UN ambassador and envoy to Yugoslavia, Richard Holbrooke. Marton lobbied for the Soros-funded radio station B-92, also a project of the National Endowment for Democracy (another overt arm of the CIA), which was instrumental in bringing down the Yugoslav government.

When Soros founded the Open Society Fund he picked liberal pundit Aryeh Neier to lead it. Neier was the head of Helsinki Watch, a putative human rights organiza-

tion with an anticommunist bent. In 1993, the Open Society Fund became the Open Society Institute.

Helsinki Watch became Human Rights Watch in 1975. Soros is currently on its

**SOROS' ACTIVITIES ECHO
NED'S ALLEN WEINSTEIN: "A
LOT OF WHAT WE DO TODAY
WAS DONE COVERTLY TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS AGO BY THE CIA."**

Advisory Board, both for the Americas and the Eastern Europe-Central Asia Committees, and his Open Society Fund/Soros/OSI is listed as a funder.²⁹ Soros is intimately connected to HRW, and Neier wrote columns for *The Nation* magazine without mentioning that he was on Soros' payroll.³⁰

Soros is intimately involved in HRW, although he does his best to hide it.³¹ He says he just funds and sets up these programs and lets them run. But they do not stray from the philosophy of the funder. HRW and OSI are close. Their views do not diverge. Of course, other foundations fund these institutions as well, but Soros' influence dominates their ideology.

George Soros' activities fall into the construct developed in 1983 and enunciated by Allen Weinstein, founder of the National Endowment for Democracy. Weinstein said, "A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA."³² Soros is operating exactly within the confines of the intelligence complex. He is little different from CIA drug runners in Laos in the 1960s, or the mujahedin who profited from the opium trade while carrying out CIA operations against socialist Afghanistan in the 1980s. He simply funnels (and takes home) a whole lot more money than those pawns, and he does much of his business in the light of day. His candor insofar as he expresses it is a sort of spook damage control that serves to legitimize the strategies of U.S. foreign policy.

The majority of people in the U.S. today who consider themselves politically left-of-center are undoubtedly pessimistic about the chances for a socialist transformation of society. Thus the Soros "Decentralization" model, or the "piecemeal" approach to "negative utilitarianism, the attempt to minimize the amount of misery," which was Popper's philosophy, appeals to them.³³ Soros funded an HRW study that was used to back California and Arizona legislation

relaxing drug laws.³⁴ Soros favors the legalization of drugs—one way of temporarily reducing awareness of one's misery. Soros is an equal-opportunity bribeester. At a loftier rung of the socioeconomic ladder, one finds Social Democrats who accept Soros funding and believe in civil liberties within the context of capitalism.³⁵ For these folks, the evil consequences of Soros' business activities (impoverishing people all over the world) are mitigated by his philanthropic activities. Similarly, liberal/left intellectuals, both in the U.S. and abroad, have been drawn in by the "Open Society" philosophy, not to men-

**SOROS FUNDED OTPOR,
THE ORGANIZATION THAT
RECEIVED THOSE "SUITCASES
OF MONEY" IN SUPPORT OF
THE OCTOBER 5, 2000 COUP
THAT TOPPLED THE YUGOSLAV
GOVERNMENT.**

tion the occasional funding plum.

The New Left in the United States was a social democratic movement. It was resolutely anti-Soviet, and when Eastern Europe and the USSR fell, few in the New Left opposed the destruction of the socialist systems. The New Left did not mourn or protest when the hundreds of millions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia lost their right to jobs, housing at reasonable and legally protected rents, free education through graduate school, health care and cultural enhancement. Most belittled any suggestion that the CIA and certain NGOs such as the National Endowment for Democracy or the Open Society Fund had actively participated in the annihilation of socialism. These people felt that the Western determination to destroy the USSR since 1917 was barely connected to the fall of the USSR. For them, socialism failed of its own accord, because it was flawed.

As revolutions, such as the ones in Mozambique, Angola, Nicaragua or El Salvador were destroyed by proxy forces or were stalled by demonstration "elections," New Left pragmatists shrugged their shoulders and turned away. The New Left sometimes seemed to deliberately ignore the post-Soviet machinations of U.S. foreign policy.

Bogdan Denitch, who had political aspirations in Croatia, was active within the Open Society Institute, and received OSI funding.³⁶ Denitch favored the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Croatia, NATO bombing of Bosnia and then Yugoslavia,

and even a ground invasion of Yugoslavia.³⁷ Denitch was a founder and chair for many years of the Democratic Socialists of America, a leading liberal-left group in the U.S. He has also long chaired the prestigious Socialist Scholars Conference, through which he was key to manipulating the sympathies of many toward support for NATO expansion.³⁸ Other Soros targets for support include Refuse and Resist the ACLU, and a host of other liberal causes.³⁹ Soros added another unlikely trophy when he became involved in the New School for Social Research in New York, long an academy of choice for left intellectuals. He now funds the East and Central Europe Program there.⁴⁰

Many leftists who were inspired by the revolution in Nicaragua sadly accepted the election of Violetta Chamorro and the defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990. Most of the Nicaragua support network faded thereafter. Perhaps the New Left could have learned from the rising star of Michael Kozak. He was a veteran of Washington's campaigns to install sympathetic leaders in Nicaragua, Panama and Haiti, and to undermine Cuba—he headed the U.S. Interests Section in Havana.

After organizing the Chamorro victory in Nicaragua, Kozak moved on to become U.S. Ambassador to Belarus. Kozak worked with the Soros-sponsored "Internet Access and Training Program" (IATP), which was busy "creating future leaders" in Belarus.⁴¹ This program was simultaneously imposed upon Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. IATP operates openly with the support of the U.S. Department of State. To its credit, Belarus expelled Kozak and the Soros-Open Society/U.S. State Department crowd. The government of Aleksandr Lukashenko found that for four years before moving to Minsk, Kozak was instrumental in engineering the flow of tens of millions of dollars to the Belarus opposition. Kozak was creating a united opposition coalition, funding websites, newspapers and opinion polls, and tutoring a student resistance movement similar to Yugoslavia's Otpor. Kozak brought in Otpor leaders to instruct dissidents in Belarus.⁴² Just before September 11, 2001, the U.S. was revving up a demonization campaign against President Aleksander Lukashenko. Demonizing Lukashenko has temporarily taken a back burner to the "war on terrorism."

Through OSI and HRW, Soros was a major supporter of the B-92 radio station in Belgrade. Soros funded Otpor, the organization that received those "suitcases of money" in support of the October 5, 2000 coup that toppled the Yugoslav gov-

ernment.⁴³ Human Rights Watch helped legitimize the subsequent kidnapping and show trial of Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague by saying nothing about his rights.⁴⁴ Louise Arbour, who served as judge at that illegal tribunal, is presently on the Board of Soros' International Crisis Group.⁴⁵ The Open Society/Human Rights Watch gang has been working on Macedonia, calling it part of their "civilizing mission."⁴⁶ Expect that republic to be "saved" to finish the total disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

DEPUTIES OF POWER

Soros has actually stated that he considers his philanthropy moral and his money management business amoral.⁴⁷ Yet those in charge of Soros-funded NGOs have a clear and consistent agenda. One of Soros' most influential institutions is the International Crisis Group, founded in 1986. ICG is headed by individuals from the very center of political and corporate power. Its board includes Zbigniew Brzezinski, Morton Abramowitz, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State; Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander for Europe; and Richard Allen, former U.S. National Security Adviser. Allen is noteworthy for quitting Nixon's National Security Council out of disgust with the liberal tendencies of Henry Kissinger; recruiting Oliver North to Reagan's National Security Council, and negotiating missiles for hostages in the Iran-Contra scandal. For these individuals, "containing conflict" boils down to U.S. control over the people and resources of the world.

In the 1980s and 1990s, under the aegis of the Reagan Doctrine, U.S. covert and overt operations in Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia were in the works. Soros was openly active in most of these places, working to buy off would-be revolutionaries, or subsidize politicians, intellectuals and anyone else who might come to power when the revolutionary moment had passed. According to James Petras:

By the early 1980s the more perceptive sectors of the neoliberal ruling classes realized that their policies were polarizing the society and provoking large-scale social discontent. Neoliberal politicians began to finance and promote a parallel strategy 'from below,' the promotion of 'grassroots' organizations with an 'anti-statist' ideology to intervene among potentially conflictory classes, to create a "social cushion." These organizations were financially dependent on neoliberal sources and were

directly involved in competing with socio-political movements for the allegiance of local leaders and activist communities. By the 1990s these organizations, described as "nongovernmental," numbered in the thousands and were receiving close to four billion dollars world-wide.⁴⁸

In *Underwriting Democracy*, Soros boasts about the "Americanization of Eastern Europe." According to his account, through his education programs he began to establish a young cadre of Sorosian leaders. These Soros Foundation-educated young men and women are prepared to fulfill the functions of so-called "influence agents." Thanks to their fluent knowledge of languages and their insertion into the emerging bureaucracies in target countries, these recruits would philosophically smooth the inroads for Western multinational corporations.

Career diplomat Herbert Okun, on the Europe Committee of Human Rights Watch, along with George Soros, is connected to a host of State Department-linked institutions, from USAID to the Rockefeller-funded Trilateral Commission. From 1990 to 1997, Okun was executive director of something called the Financial Services Volunteer Corps, part of USAID, "to help establish free market financial systems in former communist countries."⁴⁹ George Soros is in complete accord with the capitalists who are in the process of taking control of the global economy.

NON-PROFIT PROFITEERING

Soros claims not to do philanthropy in the countries in which he is involved as a currency trader.⁵⁰ But Soros has often taken advantage of his connections to make key investments. Armed with a study by ICG, and with the support of Bernard Kouchner, chief of the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), Soros attempted to acquire the most profitable mining complex in the Balkans.

In September 2000, in a hurry to take the Trepca mines before the Yugoslavian election, Kouchner stated that pollution from the mining complex was raising lead levels in the environment.⁵¹ This is incredible considering that he cheered when the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia rained depleted uranium on the country and released more than 100,000 tons of carcinogens into the air, water and soil.⁵² But Kouchner had his way, and the mines were closed for "health reasons." Soros invested \$150 million in an effort to gain control of Trepca's gold, silver, lead, zinc and cadmium, which make the property worth

\$5 billion.⁵³

As Bulgaria was imploding into "free-market" chaos, Soros was busy scavenging through the wreckage, as Reuters reported in early 2001:

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) invested \$3.0 million in [Bulgarian high-tech company] Rila, the first firm to benefit from a new \$30 million facility set up by the EBRD to support IT firms in central and eastern Europe.... Another \$3.0 million came from U.S. private investment fund Argus Capital Partners, sponsored by Prudential Insurance Company of America and operating in central and eastern Europe...Soros, who had invested around \$3.0 million in Rila and in 2001 invested another \$1.0 million...remained its majority owner.⁵⁴

FRAMING THE ISSUES

His pose as a philanthropist gives Soros the power to shape international public opinion when social conflict raises the question of who are the victims and who are the malefactors. Like other NGOs, Human Rights Watch, Soros' mouthpiece on human rights, avoids or ignores most organized and independent working class struggles.

In Colombia, labor leaders are routinely killed by paramilitaries working in concert with the U.S.-sponsored government. Because those unions oppose neoliberal economics, HRW is relatively silent. In April of this year, HRW's Jose Vivanco testified before the U.S. Senate in favor of Plan Colombia.⁵⁵

Colombians remain committed to human rights and democracy. They need help. Human Rights Watch has no fundamental problem with the United States providing that help.⁵⁶

HRW equates the actions of the Colombian guerrilla fighters struggling to free themselves from the oppression of state terror, poverty and exploitation with the repression of the U.S.-sponsored armed forces and paramilitary death squads, the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia). HRW validated the Pastrana government and its military, whose role was to protect property rights and maintain the economic and political status quo. According to HRW, 50% of civilian deaths are the work of the government-tolerated death squads.⁵⁷ The correct number is 80%.⁵⁸

HRW essentially certified the election and ascendancy of the Uribe government

in 2002 as well. Uribe is a throwback to the Latin American dictators the U.S. supported in the past, although he was "elected." HRW had no comment about the fact that the majority boycotted the election.⁵⁹

SOROS FUNDS WORKED TO DEFEAT POPULAR ASPIRATIONS FOLLOWING THE END OF THE DUVALIER DICTATORSHIP BY UNDERMINING HAITI'S FIRST ELECTED LEADER, JEAN-BERTRAND ARISTIDE.


In the Caribbean Basin, Cuba is another opponent of neoliberalism that has been demonized by Human Rights Watch. In nearby Haiti, Soros-funded activities have worked to defeat popular aspirations following the end of the Duvalier dictatorship by undermining Haiti's first democratically elected leader, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. HRW's Ken Roth helpfully chimed in with U.S. denunciations of Aristide as "undemocratic." To demonstrate his idea of "democracy," Soros foundations were commencing operations in Haiti complimentary to such unseemly U.S. activities as USAID's promotion of persons associated with FRAPH, the notorious CIA-sponsored death squads which have terrorized the country since the fall of 'Baby Doc' Duvalier.⁶⁰

On HRW's web site, Director Roth criticized the U.S. for not opposing China more vigorously. Roth's activities include the creation of the Tibetan Freedom Concert, a traveling propaganda project that toured the U.S. with major rock musicians, urging young people to support Tibet against China.⁶¹ Tibet has been a pet project of the CIA for many years.⁶²

Roth has recently pressed for opposition to Chinese control over its oil-rich western province of Xinjiang. With the colonialist "divide and conquer" approach, Roth has tried to convince some of the Uighur religious minority in Xinjiang that the U.S./NATO intervention in Kosovo holds promise as a model for them. As late as August 2002, the U.S. government has given some support in this endeavor as well.

U.S. designs on this region were signaled clearly when a *New York Times* article on Xinjiang Province in western China described the Uighurs as a "Muslim majority, [which] lives restively under Chinese rule." They "are well versed in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia last year which

Shahk Alivazov/AP Photo



October 21, 1996, Presidential Palace, Tbilisi, Georgia. President Eduard Shevardnadze, right, greets George Soros. Both played key roles in the downfall of the USSR. Both are now playing key roles in the destabilization of Russia through the instrument of Chechnya.

some celebrate for liberating the Muslims in Kosovo; they fantasize about a similar 'rescue' here."⁶³ The *New York Times Magazine* noted "Recent discoveries of oil have made Xinjiang extremely attractive to international trade," while comparing the conditions for its indigenous population to those in Tibet.⁶⁴

INNUMERACY

When Sorosian organizations count, they seem to lose track of the truth. Human Rights Watch asserted that 500 people, not over 2,000, were killed by NATO bombers in the 1999 war in Yugoslavia.⁶⁵ They said only 350, not over 4,000, died as a result of U.S. attacks on Afghanistan.⁶⁶ When the U.S. bombed Panama in 1989, HRW prefaced its report by saying that the "ouster of Manuel Noriega...and installation of the democratically-elected government of President Guillermo Endara brought high hopes in Panama..." The report neglected to mention the *number* of casualties.

Human Rights Watch prepared the groundwork for the NATO attack on Bosnia in 1993 by the false rape-of-thousands and "genocide" stories.⁶⁷ This tactic of creating political hysteria was necessary for the United States to carry out its Balkan policy. It was repeated in 1999 when HRW functioned as the shock troops of indoctrination for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia. All of Soros' blather about the rule of law was forgotten. The U.S. and NATO made their own law, and the institutions of George Soros stood behind it.

Massaging of numbers to provoke a

response was a major part of a Council on Foreign Relations campaign after September 11, 2001. This time it was the 2,801 killed in the World Trade Center. The CFR met on November 6, 2001, to plan a "major public diplomacy campaign." CFR created an "Independent Task Force on America's Response to Terrorism." Soros joined Richard C. Holbrooke, Newton L. Gingrich, John M. Shaikashvili (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), and other powerful individuals on a campaign to make the Trade Center dead into tools for U.S. foreign policy. The CFR report set out to make the case for a war on terrorism. George Soros' fingerprints were all over the campaign:

Have senior-level U.S. officials press friendly Arab and other Muslim governments not only to publicly condemn the 9/11 attacks, but also to back the rationale and goals of the U.S. anti-terror campaign. We are never going to convince the publics in the Middle East and South Asia of the righteousness of our cause if their governments remain silent. We need to help them to deflect any blow-back from such statements, but we must have them vouch on board.... Encourage Bosnian, Albanian, and Turkish Muslims to educate foreign audiences regarding the U.S. role in saving the Muslims of Bosnia and Kosovo in 1995-99, and our long-standing, close ties to Muslims around the world. Engage regional intellectuals and journalists across the board, regardless of their views. Routinely monitor the regional press in real time to enable prompt responses... Stress references to the victims (and ideally, named

*victims to personalize them) whenever we discuss our cause and goals.*⁶⁸

Sorosian innumeracy: counting to bolster and defend U.S. foreign policy.

Soros is very worried about the decline in the world capitalist system and he wants to do something about it, now. He recently said: "I can already discern the makings of the final crisis.... Indigenous political movements are likely to arise that will seek to expropriate the multinational corporations and recapture the 'national' wealth."⁶⁹

Soros is seriously suggesting a plan to circumvent the United Nations. He proposes that the "democracies of the world ought to take the lead and forge a global network of alliances that could work with or without the United Nations." If he were psychotic, one might think he was having an episode. But the fact is, Soros' assertion that "The United Nations is constitutionally incapable of fulfilling the promises contained in the preamble of its charter," reflects the thinking of such reactionary institutions as the American Enterprise Institute.⁷⁰ Though many conservatives refer to the Soros network as left-wing, on the question of U.S. affiliation with the United Nations Soros is on the same page as the likes of John R. Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, who, with "[M]any Republicans in Congress—believe that nothing more should be paid to the UN system."⁷¹ There has been a decades-long rightwing campaign against the UN. Now Soros is leading it. On various Soros web sites one may read criticism of the United Nations as too rich, unwilling to share information, or flawed in ways that make it unfit for the way the world should run according to George Soros.

Even writers at *The Nation*, writers who clearly ought to know better, have been influenced by Soros' ideas. William Greider, for instance, recently found some validity in Soros' criticism that the United Nations should not be a venue for "tin-pot dictators and totalitarians...treated as equal partners."⁷² This kind of Eurocentric racism is at the heart of Soros' hubris. His assumption that the United States can and should run the world is a prescription for fascism on a global scale. For much too long, Western "progressives" have been giving Soros a pass. Probably Greider and others will find the reference to fascism excessive, unjustified, even outrageous.

But just listen closely to what Soros himself has to say: "In old Rome; the Romans only voted. In the modern global capitalism, the Americans only vote. The Brazilians do not vote."⁷³

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Brown & Root Services

ENGINEERING OPPRESSION FOR OVER 50 YEARS

Douglas Valentine

On July 26, 2002, the Department of Defense (DoD) awarded Brown & Root Services, an engineering firm based in Houston, Texas, a \$9,700,000 contract to construct a 204-unit Detention Camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Each of Brown & Root's modular steel units will measure 6 feet 8 inches long by 8 feet wide. A bed, toilet and hand basin with running water will be included in each cell. If all goes on schedule, work will be completed by October 2002.

Brown & Root will add the new cells to the existing Camp Delta facility, where the CIA and its military counterparts have been detaining and interrogating an estimated 564 Al Qaeda and Taliban "unlawful enemy combatants" since April 2002. It's uncertain, however, how many cells Brown & Root will ultimately build, as its contract is renewable over four years, and could total a whopping \$300,000,000. This renewable contract does, however, imply that the CIA is planning to indefinitely detain many more so-called illegal combatants. And the number of captured terrorist suspects is certain to increase, as the eternal war on terror spreads from Afghanistan to the 60 countries designated by National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice as harboring suspected terrorists.

The Pentagon claims the Brown & Root contract was "competitively procured," but that's a flagrant lie, considering that Brown & Root is the engineering division of the Halliburton Company, where Dick Cheney served as chairman and CEO right after resigning as George I's Defense Secretary, up until he joined rampaging George II's regime. During the years that Cheney served as Halliburton's CEO, the company received an estimated \$2.5 billion in government contracts, and now that he's in the catbird seat, Halliburton's coffers will only continue to grow, as the scope of U.S. military action widens.

It is not just American money that's pouring into Brown & Root: The British Ministry of Defence paid Brown & Root, its fifth largest defense contractor, \$410 million to supply large tank transporters to bolster England's imperial escapades.

Kickbacks occur in many ways, and our presidents and their political associates

have always found ways to benefit from the wars they wage. Brown & Root, for example, financed Lyndon Johnson's election to the U.S. Senate in 1948, back in the days when political payoffs were strictly cash and carry. In return Johnson steered numerous defense contracts in its direction, enabling Brown & Root to pioneer Texas's ascent as America's preeminent

*For one to go to
Con Son was never to be
seen again.*

—Vietnamese saying, circa 1970

military-industrial welfare state. During the Vietnam War, LBJ also made sure that Brown & Root received more than its fair share of lucrative contracts to build roads, airports, harbors, military bases, pipelines and barracks from one end of South Vietnam to the other. Those Vietnam contracts helped Brown & Root expand its operations around the world, and today it employs some 20,000 people and operates in more than 100 countries.

But there is something sinister about Brown & Root. Like its parent company, Halliburton—which, under Cheney, sold products and services to the Islamic Republic of Iran—Brown & Root has always been willing to skirt the edge to make a buck. Over the years Brown & Root has formed close relationships with the CIA and Special Forces: Wherever they go, Brown & Root is there, too, building facilities and providing cover for covert operations. Brown & Root does not admit it provides cover, but several individuals directly involved in such operations have made the assertion.¹ Case in point: Brown & Root was in Macedonia in 1999, building barracks at a military base for some 700 U.S. troops, including the 10th Special Forces Group, for which it seems to have a special affinity.²

Brown & Root is a non-partisan, warmongering outfit and espionage arm of the CIA, and after Lyndon Johnson gave way to Richard Nixon, it received a contract to

build prison detention facilities for the CIA on Con Son Island in South Vietnam.

The "tiger cage" scandal broke in 1970 when Donald Luce, a member of the World Council of Churches and an accredited newspaper reporter, led a congressional delegation to Con Son Prison, where the tiger cages were located. Con Son Prison was on an island in the South China Sea, and it was South Vietnam's largest holding cell for civilian prisoners—as many as 10,000 prisoners were held there with no legal rights, as part of the CIA's infamous Phoenix Program, with its grotesque An Tri "administrative detention" laws.

Originally known as the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation/Screening Interrogation and Detention (ICEX/SIDE) Program, Phoenix was a CIA-run computerized, management-by-objective driven counterinsurgency program that required its "coordinators" to neutralize (assassinate, imprison, or make to defect) 1,800 Vietnamese every month. Like the "unlawful combatants" being held at Guantanamo Bay, people arrested under the Phoenix Program were indefinitely detained until disposed of by military tribunals or "province security committees."

As Don Luce knew, remote Con Son Prison was the worst of the Phoenix detention facilities in South Vietnam. It was also a "re-education camp," and prisoners there were subjected to CIA psychological warfare operations, from the pro-government propaganda of the Bang Song theatrical company, to MKULTRA-type medical experiments. Most troubling of all were reports that death row inmates, peaceniks, draft dodgers, recalcitrants who refused to salute the South Vietnamese flag, and those who couldn't pay a big enough bribe to the Con Son commandant, were kept in a facility known as the "tiger cages."

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Michael Moore :
(©excerpt from *Stupid White Men*, 2001)

A Very American Coup

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED BY U. N. FORCES ON 9/1/01, AT 0600 HOURS, FROM SOMEWHERE WITHIN THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT:

I am a citizen of the United States of America. Our government has been overthrown. Our elected President has been exiled. Old white men wielding martinis and wearing dickies have occupied our nation's capital.

We are under siege. We are the United States Government-in-Exile.

Our numbers are not insignificant. There are over 154 million adults among us, and 80 million children. That's 234 million people who did not vote for, and are not represented by, the regime that has placed itself in power.

Al Gore is the elected President of the United States. He received 539,898 more votes than George W Bush. But he does not sit tonight in the Oval Office. Instead our elected President roams the country without purpose or mission, surfacing only to lecture college students and replenish his stash of Little Debbie's Snack Cakes.

Al Gore won. Al Gore, President-in-Exile. Long live El Presidente Albertoooooooo Gorrrrrrrrrrrre!

So who, then, is the man that now occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue? I'll tell you who: He is George W Bush, "President" of the United States. The Thief-in-Chief
It used to be that politicians would wait until they were in office before they became crooks. This one came prepackaged. Now he is a trespasser on federal land, a squatter in the Oval Office. If I told you this was Guatemala, you'd believe it in a heartbeat, no matter what your political stripe. But because this coup was wrapped in an American flag, delivered in your choice of red, white, or blue, those responsible believe they're going to get away with it.

That's why, on behalf of 234 million Americans held hostage, I have requested that NATO do what it did in Bosnia and Kosovo, what America did in Haiti, what Lee Marvin did in The Dirty Dozen:

Send in the Marines! Launch the SCUD missiles! Bring us the head of Antonin Scalia!

I have sent a personal request to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan to hear our plea. We are no longer able to govern our-selves or to hold free and fair elections. We need U.N. observers, U.N. troops, U.N. resolutions!

Dammit, we need Jimmy Carter!

We are now finally no better than a backwater banana republic. We are asking ourselves why any of us should bother to getup in the morning to work our asses off to produce goods and services that only

serve to make the junta and its cohorts in Corpo-rate America (a separate, autonomous fiefdom within the United States that has been allowed to run on its own for some time) even richer. Why should we pay our taxes to finance their coup? Can we ever again send our sons off into baffle to give their lives defending "our way of life"-when all that really means is the lifestyle of the gray old men holed up in the headquarters they seized by the Potomac?

Oh JesusMaryAndJoseph, I can't take it! Somebody pass me the uni-versal remote! I need to switch back to the fairy tale that I was a citizen in a democracy with an inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of Happy Meals The story I was told as a child said that I mattered, that I was equal to every one of my fellow citizens --and that not a single one of us was to be treated differently or unfairly, that no one was to wield power over others without their consent The will of the people. America the Beautiful. Land that I love. Twilight's'... last gleaming. Oh, say, can you see --are the Belgian peacekeepers on their way? Hurry!

The coup began long before the shenanigans on Election Day 2000. In the summer of 1999 Katherine Harris, an honorary Stupid White Man who was both George W. Bush's presidential campaign co-chairwoman and the Florida secretary of state in charge of elections, paid \$4 million to Database Technologies to go through Florida's voter rolls and remove anyone "suspected" of being a former felon. She did so with the blessing of the gover-nor of Florida, George W's brother Jeb Bush-whose own wife was caught by immigration officials trying to sneak \$19,000 worth of jewelry into the country without declaring and paying tax on it... a felony in its own right. But hey, this is America. We don't prosecute felons if they're rich or married to a governing Bush.

The law states that ex-felons cannot vote in Florida. And sadly (though I'm confident that Florida's justice system was always unimpeachably fair), that means 31 percent of all black men in Florida are prohibited from voting because they have a felony on their record. Harris and Bush knew that removing the names of ex-felons from the voter rolls would keep thousands of black citi-zens out of the voting booth.

Black Floridians, overwhelming, are Democrats --and sure enough, Al Gore received the votes of more than 90 percent of them on November 7, 2000.

That is, 90 percent of those who were allowed to vote.

In what appears to be a mass fraud committed by the state of Florida, Bush, Harris, and company not only removed thousands of black felons from the rolls, they also removed thousands of black citizens who had never committed a crime in their lives-along with thousands of eligible voters who had committed only misde-meanors.

How did this happen? Harris's office told Database-a firm with strong Republican ties --to cast as wide a net as possible to get rid of these voters. Her minions instructed the company to include even people with "similar" names to those of the actual felons. They insisted Database check people with the same birth dates as known felons, or similar Social Security numbers; an 80 percent match of relevant information, the election office instructed, was sufficient for Database to add a voter to the ineligible list.

These orders were shocking, even to Bush-friendly Database. They would mean that thousands of legitimate voters might be barred from voting on Election Day just because they had a name that sounded like someone else's, or shared a birthday with some unknown bank robber. Marlene Thorogood, the Database proj-ect manager, sent an E-mail to Emmett "Bucky" Mitchell, a lawyer for Katherine Harris's election division, warning him that "Unfortunately programming in this fashion may supply you with false positives," or misidentifications.

Never mind that, said ol' Bucky. His response. "Obviously, we want to capture more names that possibly

aren't matches and let [county election] supervisors make a final determination rather than exclude certain matches altogether."

Database did as they were told. And before long 173,000 registered voters in Florida were permanently wiped off the voter rolls. In Miami-Dade, Florida's largest county; 66 percent of the voters who were removed were black. In Tampa's county; 54 per-cent of those who would be denied the right to vote on November 7, 2000, were black.

But culling names from Florida's records alone was not enough for Harris and her department. Eight thousand additional Floridians were thrown off the voting rolls because Database used a false list supplied by another state, a state which claimed that all the names on the list were former convicted felons who had since moved to Florida.

It turns out that the felons on the list had served their time and had all their voting privileges reinstated. And there were others on the list who had committed only misdemeanors --such as parking violations or littering. What state was it that offered Jeb and George a helping hand by sending this bogus list to Florida?

Texas.

This entire incident stunk to the high heavens, but the American media ignored it. It took the British Broadcasting Corporation to dig deep into this story, running fifteen-minute segments on its prime-time news program revealing all the sordid details and laying responsibility for the scam right at the doorstep of Governor Jeb Bush. It's a sad day when we have to look to a country 5,000 miles away to find out the truth about our own elections. Eventually the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post picked up the story, but it received little attention.)

This assault on the voting rights of minorities was so wide-spread in Florida that it even affected people like Linda Howell. Linda received a letter informing her that she was a felon-and therefore advising her not to bother showing up on Election Day, because she would be barred from voting. The only problem was, Linda Howell wasn't a felon-in fact, she was the elections supervisor of Madison County, Florida! She and other local election officials tried to get the state to rectify the problem, but their pleas fell on deaf ears. They were told that everyone who complained about being prevented from voting should submit themselves for fingerprinting-and then let the state determine whether or not they were felons.

On November 7, 2000, as black Floridians flocked to the polls in record numbers, many were met at the ballot boxes with a blunt rebuke: "You cannot vote." In a number of precincts in Florida's inner cities, the polling locations were heavily fortified with police to block anyone on Katherine and Jeb's "felons list" from voting. Hundreds of law-abiding citizens looking to exercise their constitutional right to vote, mostly in black and Hispanic communities, were sent away-and threatened with arrest if they protested.

George W Bush would officially be credited with receiving 537 more votes than Al Gore in Florida. Is it safe to assume that the thousands of registered black and Hispanic voters barred from the polls might have made the difference if they had been allowed to vote-and cost Bush the election? Without a doubt.

On election night, after the polls closed, there was much confusion over what was happening with the counting of the votes in Florida. Finally a decision was made by the man in charge of the election night desk for the Fox News Channel. He decided that Fox should go on the air and declare that Bush had won Florida and thus the election. And that's what happened. Fox formally declared Bush the winner.

But down in Tallahassee, the counting of the votes had not yet been completed; in fact, the Associated Press insisted it was still too close to call, and refused to follow Fox's lead.

Not so the other networks. They ran like lemmings after Fox made the call, afraid that they would be seen as slow or out of the loop --even though their own news reporters on the ground were insisting that it was too early to call the election. But who needs reporters when you're playing follow the leader-the leader, in this case, being John Ellis, the man in charge of Fox's election coverage. Who is John Ellis?

He's a first cousin of George W and Jeb Bush.

Once Ellis made the call and everyone followed suit, there was no going back-and nothing was more psychologically devastating for Gore's chances of winning than the sudden perception that HE was being the spoiler by asking for recounts, withdrawing his concession of defeat, tying up the courts with lawyers and lawsuits. The truth is that during all of this, Gore actually was ahead-he had the most votes-but that was never how the news media played it.

The one moment from that election night I will never forget came earlier in the evening, after the networks had first-correctly-projected the state of Florida for Gore. The cameras cut to a hotel room in Texas. There sat George W with his father, the former President, and his mother, Barbara. The old man appeared cool as a cucumber; even though it looked like curtains for Sonny. A reporter asked young flush what he thought about the outcome.

"I'm not... conceding anything in Florida," Junior piped up, semicoherently. "I know you've all the projections, but people are actually counting the votes.... The networks called this thing awfully earlier and people are actually counting the votes have different perspective so..." It was an odd moment in that crazy night of election result coverage. The Bushes, with their relaxed smiles, looked like a family of cats that had just wolfed down a hunch of canaries-as if they knew something we didn't.

They did. They knew Jeb and Katherine had done their job months earlier. They knew cousin John was holding down the fort at Fox election central. And if all else tailed, there was always that team Poppy could count on: the United States Supreme Court.

As we all know; that's exactly what happened for the next thirty-six days. The forces of the Empire struck back, and they did so without mercy. While Gore was stupidly concentrating on getting recounts in a few counties, the Bush team was going after the holy grail-the overseas absentee ballots. Many of these ballots would come from the military, which typically votes Republican, and would finally give Bush the lead that denying the vote to thousands of blacks and Jewish grandmothers hadn't.

Gore knew this, and tried to make sure the ballots underwent maximum scrutiny before they could be counted. Sure, this ran contrary to the "let every vote be counted" plea he'd made when calling for recounts. But he also had Florida law, which is pretty clear about this, on his side. It states that overseas absentee ballots can only be counted if they were cast and signed on or before election day, and mailed and postmarked from another country by election day.

But while Jim Baker was chanting his mantra --"It is not fair to change the rules and standards governing the counting or recounting of votes after it appears that one side has concluded that is the only way to get the votes it needs"-he and his operatives were doing just that.

A July 2001 investigation by the New York Times showed that of the 2,490 overseas ballots that ended up being included in the certified election results, 680 were considered flawed and questionable. Bush got the overseas vote by a ratio of 4 to 5. By that percentage, 544 of the votes that went to Bush should have been thrown out. Got the math? Suddenly Bush's "winning margin" of 537 votes is down to a chilly negative 7.

So how did all these votes end up being counted for Bush? Within hours of the election, the Bush campaign had launched their attack. The first step was to make sure that as many ballots got in as possible. Republican operatives sent out frantic F-mails to navy ships asking them to dig up any ballots that might be hanging around. They even put in a call to

Clinton Defense Secretary William S. Cohen (a Republican) to ask him to put pressure on the military outposts. He declined, but it didn't matter: thousands of votes poured in --even some that were signed after election day. Now all they had to do was make sure that as many of these votes as possible went to W And so the real thievery began.

According to the Times, Katherine Harris had planned to send out a memo to her canvassing boards clarifying the procedure for counting overseas ballots. Included in this memo was a reminder that state law required all ballots to have been "postmarked or signed and dated" by election day. When it was clear that George's lead was rapidly shrinking, she decided not to send the memo. Instead she sent out a note that said ballots "are not required to be postmarked on or prior to" election day. Hmmm.

What caused her to change her mind--and the law? We may never know, since the computer records that showed what happened have been mysteriously erased --a possible violation of Florida's Sunshine Laws. Now, long after the horse has left the barn, Harris has turned over her hard drives to the media for inspection --but only after her own computer consultant "looked them over. This is a woman who is now planning to run for Congress. Can these people get any more shameless? Armed with the blessing of the secretary of state, the Republicans launched an all-out campaign to make sure as broad a standard as possible was used in counting these absentee ballots. "Equal representation," Florida style, meant that the rules governing acceptance or denial of your absentee ballot depended on what county you were from. Perhaps that would explain why in counties where Gore won, only 2 out of 10 absentee ballots with unclear postmarks were counted; in Bush counties, predictably, 6 out of 10 such ballots made it into the final tally.

When the Democrats complained that ballots that didn't follow the rules shouldn't be counted, the Republicans launched a fierce public relations campaign to make it look as if the Democrats were trying to screw the men and women who were risking their lives for our country. A Republican city council member from Naples was typical in his hyperbole: "If they catch a bullet, or fragment from a terrorist bomb, that fragment does not have any postmark or registration of any kind." Republican Congressman Steve Buyer from Indiana even obtained (possibly illegally) the phone numbers and E-mail addresses of military personnel so that he could gather tales of ballot-denial woe to garner sympathy for "our fighting men and women." Even Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf weighed in with the reflection that "it's a very sad day in our country" when Democrats start harassing military voters.

All the pressure worked on the wimpy, spineless Democrats. They choked. While appearing on Meet the Press, vice presidential candidate Joe Lieberman argued that the Democrats should stop creating a fuss and not be bothered that hundreds of military ballots were being counted, just because they weren't "postmarked."

Lieberman, like so many others among this new breed of Democrats, should have fought for principle instead of worrying about image. Why? Well, as the New York Times found out:

- * 344 ballots had no evidence that they were cast on or before Election Day
- * 183 ballots were postmarked in the United States
- * 96 ballots lacked appropriate witness information
- * 169 ballots came from unregistered voters, had envelopes that weren't signed properly, or came from people who hadn't requested a ballot
- * 5 ballots came after the November 17 deadline

* 19 overseas voters voted on two ballots-and had both counted

All of these ballots violated Florida law, yet they all were counted. Can I say this any louder? Bush didn't win! Gore did. It has nothing to do with chads, or even the blatant repression of Florida's African-American community and their right to vote. It was a simple matter of breaking the law; all documented, all the evidence sitting there in Tallahassee, clearly marked without question-and all done purposefully to throw the election to Bush.

On the morning of Saturday, December 9, 2000, the Supreme Court got word that the recounts in Florida, in spite of everything the Bush camp had done to fix the elections, were going in favor of Al Gore. By 2 PM., the unofficial tally showed that Gore was catching up to Bush-"only 66 votes down, and gaining!" as one breathless newscaster put it. It was critical to Bush that the words "Al Gore is in the lead" never be heard on American television: With only moments to spare, they did what they had to do. At 2:45 that afternoon, the Supreme Court stopped the recount.

On the Court sat Reagan appointee Sandra Day O'Connor and Nixon appointee Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Both in their seventies, they were hoping to retire under a Republican administration so that their replacements would share their conservative ideology. On election night, O'Connor was heard lamenting at a party in Georgetown that she couldn't hold out another four or eight-years. Junior Bush was their only hope for securing a contented retirement in their home state of Arizona.

Meanwhile, two other justices with extremist right-wing view-points found themselves with a conflict of interest. Justice Clarence Thomas's wife, Virginia Lamp Thomas, worked at the Heritage Foundation, a leading conservative think tank in D.C.; now, she has just been hired by George W. Bush to help recruit people to serve in his impending administration. And Eugene Scalia, the son of Justice Antonin Scalia, was a lawyer with the firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher --the very law firm representing Hush before the Supreme Court!

But neither Thomas nor Scalia saw any conflict of interest, and they refused to remove themselves from the case. In fact, when the Court convened later; it was Scalia who issued the now-infamous explanation of why the ballot-counting had to be halted: "The counting of votes that are of questionable legality does, in my view, threaten irreparable harm to petitioner [Bush], and to the country; by casting a cloud upon what he [Bush] claims to be the legitimacy of his election." In other words, if we let all the votes be counted and they come out in Gore's favor; and Gore wins, well, that will impair Bush's ability to govern once we install him as "President."

True enough: if the ballots proved that Gore had won-which they eventually would-then I guess that would tend to dampen the country's feelings of legitimacy about a Bush presidency.

In their decision, the Court used the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-the same amendment they've loudly disclaimed when used by blacks over the years to halt discrimination based on race-to justify the theft. Because of the variation in the recount methods, they argued, voters in each district weren't being treated equally, and therefore their rights were being violated. Funny, but only the dissenters on the court mentioned that the antiquated voting equipment found disproportionately in poor and minority Florida neighborhoods had created an entirely different-and far more disturbing-inequality in the system.)

Eventually the press got around to conducting their own recounts of the votes, doing their best to spin the jumbled ball of public confusion into orbit. The headline in the Miami Herald read: "Review of ballots finds Bush's win would have endured manual recount." But if you read the entire story, buried deep inside was this paragraph: "Bush's lead would have vanished if the recount had been conducted under the severely restrictive standards that some Republicans advocated.... The review found that the result would have been different if every canvassing board in every county had examined every

undervote... [Under] the most inclusive standard [that is, a standard that sought to include the true will of ALL the people] Gore would have won by 393 votes.... On ballots that [suggested] a fault with either the machine or the voter's ability to use it... Gore would have won by 299 votes."

I did not vote for Al Gore, but I think any fair person would conclude that the will of the people in Florida clearly went his way. Whether it was the counting debacle or the exclusion of thousands of black citizens that corrupted the results, there is little doubt that Gore was the people's choice.

There was perhaps no worse example of the wholesale denial of the right of each voter to have his vote properly counted than in Palm Beach County. Much has been made of the "butterfly ballot," which made it easy to vote for the wrong person because candidates' names and punch holes were crammed unevenly onto facing pages. The media went out of its way to point out that the ballot was designed by one of the county's election commission-ers, a Democrat, and then approved by the majority-Democrat local board. What right did Gore have to complain if his own party was responsible for the faulty design of the ballot?

Had anyone bothered to check, they would have discovered that one of the two "Democrats" on the committee-the ballot's designer, Theresa LePore had actually been a registered Republican. She switched her affiliation to Democrat in 1996; then, just three months after Bush seized office, she resigned as a Democrat and switched her voter registration to Independent. No one in the press bothered to question what was really going on.

Thus, the Palm Beach Post estimates that more than 3,000 voters, mostly elderly and Jewish, who thought they were voting for Al Gore ended up punching the wrong hole-for Pat Buchanan. Even Buchanan went on TV to declare that no way in hell did those Jewish voters vote for him.

On January 20, 2001, George W. Bush, positioned with his junta on the Capitol steps, stood in front of Chief Justice Rehnquist and took the oath that Presidents take at their inaugurations. A cold and steady rain fell over Washington throughout the day. Dark clouds obscured the sun, and the parade route, usually jammed with tens of thousands of citizens all the way to the White House, was eerily bare.

Except for the 20,000 protesters who jeered Bush every inch of the way. Holding signs denouncing Bush for stealing the election, the rain-soaked demonstrators were the conscience of the nation. Bush's limousine could not avoid them. Instead of cheering crowds of supporters, he was greeted by good people moved to remind this illegitimate ruler that he did not win the election and that the people would never forget.

At the traditional point where Presidents since Jimmy Carter have stopped their limos and emerged to walk the last four blocks (as a reminder that we are a nation ruled not by kings but by, uh, equals), Bush's triple-armed black car with its dark-tinted windows-favored by mobsters everywhere came to an abrupt halt. The crowd grew louder-"HAIL TO THE THIEF." You could see the Secret Service and Bush's advisers huddling in the freezing rain, trying to figure out what to do. If Bush got out and walked, he would be booed, shouted down, and pelted with eggs the rest of the way. The limousine sat there for what must have been five minutes. The rain poured. Eggs and tomatoes hit the car. The protesters dared Bush to step out and face them.

Then, suddenly, the President's car bolted and tore down the street. The decision had been made-hit the gas and get past this rabble as quickly as possible. The Secret Service agents running beside the limo were left behind, the car's tires splashing dirty rain from the street onto the men who were there to protect its passenger. It might have been the finest thing I have ever witnessed in Washington, D.C.-a pretender to the American throne forced to turn tail and run from thousands of American citizens armed only with the Truth and the ingredients of a decent omelet.

Once the American Lie put the pedal to the metal, it ran for cover to the bulletproof reviewing stand in front of the White House. Many of Bush's family and invited guests had already left to get dry But George stood there and waved proudly at the marching bands, their instruments disabled by the rain, the long parade of floats wilted and crumbled by the time they arrived at the 1600 block of Pennsylvania Avenue. Every so often a lucky convertible passed by, carrying the few dampened celebrities Hush had convinced to honor him --Kelsey Grammer, Drew Carey, Chuck Norris. By parade's end Bush stood alone in the stands, drenched, even his parents having deserted him for shelter. It was a pathetic sight-the poor little rich boy who came in second showing up to claim his prize, with no one there to cheer him on.

Sadder still were the 154 million of us who had not voted for him. In a nation of 200 million voters, I would say we constitute the majority.

And yet what could George W. have been thinking, other than "What, me worry?" There were plenty of hired hands to be installed in the White House, pulling the strings for their puppet President. With Daddy's old buddies called back to D.C. to lend a hand, Georgie could sit back and tell the public he was "delegating." The puppetmasters moved in, and the business of running the world could easily be left to them.

And who are these fine, patriotic pillars of the Bush junta? They represent the modest and selfless ranks of corporate America, and they are listed below, for easy reference, to help the United Nations and NATO forces round them up when they arrive to restore order and democracy. Grateful citizens will line the boulevards and avenues and cheer their arrival.

Personally, I will settle for nothing less than multiple show trials and their immediate deportation to a real banana republic. God Bless America!

WHO'S WHO IN THE COUP

Acting President/"Vice President"-Dick Cheney

I'm not sure yet where the "compassionate" part of "compassionate conservatism" comes from, but I do know where the conservatism resides. For six terms Dick Cheney was a congressman representing Wyoming, and he had one of the most conservative voting records of all 435 members of Congress. Cheney voted against the Equal Rights Amendment, against funding the Head Start program, against a House resolution calling for South Africa to release Nelson Mandela from prison, and against federal funding for abortions even in cases of rape or incest. And his record doesn't stop there. Cheney has had his hand in all of the recent Republican administrations, including that of Richard Nixon, when he was deputy White House counsel under Don "Rummy" Rumsfeld. He replaced Rumsfeld as President Ford's chief of staff. Under George Bush I, Cheney was defense secretary, leading the country in two of the largest military campaigns in recent history: the invasion of Panama and the war against Iraq.

In between Bush regimes, Cheney was CEO of Halliburton Industries, an oil services company that has dealings with repressive governments like Burma and Iraq. During the 2000 campaign, Cheney denied that Halliburton had a business relationship with Saddam Hussein. Then, in June 2001, the Washington Post revealed that in fact two Halliburton subsidiaries were doing business with Iraq. Can you imagine the field day Republicans would have had if they'd ever discovered such a thing about Clinton or Gore? And Alaska isn't the only place Cheney has suggested we dig up: Halliburton has a major construction deal in the development of Mexico's Cantarell offshore oil fields in the Gulf of Mexico. When nominated for the vice presidency, Cheney hemmed and hawed about divesting himself of his Halliburton stock. I guess he knew that good times were still to come.

Attorney General-John Ashcroft

The man in charge of overseeing our justice system is a man who has opposed all abortion, even in cases of rape or incest; who is against providing job discrimination protection for homosexuals; who voted to limit the death penalty appeals process (and then oversaw seven executions as governor); and who has been a staunch supporter of out-of control, over-the-top drug laws. Perhaps this record could explain why he lost his Senate reelection bid against a dead man. For his efforts, however, Ashcroft received substantial donations from AT&T Enterprise Rent-A-Car, and Monsanto. The Schering-Plough pharmaceutical company contributed \$50,000~perhaps as a thank-you for the bill he had introduced that would have extended the company's patent on the allergy pill Claritin. (The bill ultimately failed.) All this pharmaceutical funding may also explain why Ashcroft has voted against including prescription drugs under the Medicare program. Another campaign contributor, Microsoft, gave Ashcroft \$10,000 through his joint 62nd-raising committee with the National Republican Senatorial Committee. Lucky for them he lost the Senate race, so that he can turn his full attention to running the Justice Department --or, that is, standing back while the software giant, newly freed of the court ruling that would have split the company in two, is allowed to run amok under his watchful eye.

Ashcroft is also to the right (if such a thing is possible) of the National Rifle Association when it comes to gun control. His first pro-gun act as attorney general was to announce that within twenty-four hours of a purchase and background check, all background-check files on persons who purchase guns will be destroyed by the Justice Department (leaving the government with NO record of who has a gun or what kind of gun they have).

Secretary of the Treasury-Paul O'Neill

This champion of the abolition of corporate taxes served as president and CEO of Alcoa, the world's largest aluminum manufacturer (and one of the biggest polluters in Texas) before joining the Bush administration. Alcoa no longer has its own Political Action Committee (PAC) but instead does its lobbying through the law firm of Vinson & Elkins. That firm, the third largest contributor to Bush's campaign, was able to work a loophole into Texas environmental regulations that allowed Alcoa to emit 60,000 tons of sulfur dioxide each year. Alcoa has also been a big contributor to O'Neill's pockets. O'Neill recently sold off his shares in Alcoa-which make up a large portion of his \$62 million in assets --but did so only begrudgingly and very slowly, first watching them rise 30 percent during his time in office. As Treasury chief, O'Neill has said that Social Security and Medicare are not necessary. Perhaps that's because he receives an annual pension from Alcoa of \$926,000.

Secretary of Agriculture-Ann Veneman

Like many in the Bush cabinet, Agriculture Secretary Ann Veneman has a long career within Republican administrations. She worked for both Ronald Reagan and Poppy Bush and then served as director of California's Food and Agriculture Department under Governor Pete Wilson. In California she encouraged policies that have helped giant corporate farms squeeze out family-owned farms--so that now, for example, a mere four companies process 80 percent of American-produced beef. One of the least wealthy of the cabinet members (worth a mere \$680,000), Veneman supplemented her income by serving on the board of Calgene --the first company to market genetically engineered foods to stores. Calgene was bought out by Monsanto, the nation's leading biotech company. Monsanto was then bought by Pharmacia. Monsanto, which gave \$12,000 to Bush's presidential campaign, is trying to block legislation that would require food labels to identify biotech ingredients. Veneman has also served on the International Policy Council on Agriculture, Food and

Trade, a group funded by major food manufacturers such as Nestlé and Archer Daniels Midland.

Secretary of commerce-Don Evans

Before coming to the Bush administration, Evans was chairman and CEO of Tom Brown, Inc., a \$1.2 billion oil and gas company. Evans also sat on the board of TMBR/Sharp Drilling. As finance chair for Bush's campaign, he set a hind-raising record of more than \$190 million. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration-which controls the country's coastlines-falls within this oil man's domain.

Secretary of Defense-Don Rumsfeld

Don Rumsfeld is an old-school Republican hawk. He was White House counsel to Richard Nixon, where he worked alongside Dick Cheney. While serving as President Ford's secretary of defense and then as Ford's chief of staff Rumsfeld was able, almost single-handedly, to kill the SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union. He has consistently opposed any arms control, calling the ARM treaty "ancient history" during his 2001 confirmation hearing. A longtime supporter of "Star Wars" defense schemes, Rumsfeld oversaw a 1998 commission that measured the ballistic missile threat to the United States. Rumsfeld, aka Chicken Little, claimed that the United States would feel such threats from rogue nations within five years {half the amount of time the CIA predicted). When not pushing B-I bombs or MX missiles, Rumsfeld has been CEO of the G. D. Searle pharmaceutical company (now owned by Pharmacia) and General Instrument (now owned by Motorola). Before joining the Hush administration, he sat on several boards, including Kellogg's, Sears, Allstate, and the Tribune Company (which publishes the Chicago Tribune and Los Angeles Times and owns a chain of TV stations, including New York's Channel 11).

Secretary of Energy-Spencer Abraham

As a senator from Michigan, Abraham had such a strong anti-environment record that the League of Conservation Voters gave him a zero rating. He opposed research into renewable energy, wanted to repeal the federal gas tax, and thought oil drilling in Alaska was a good idea. Perhaps that's why he voted in 2000 to abolish the department he now leads. Abraham received more from the automotive industry-\$700,000-ffian any other candidate. One of the largest contributors was DaimlerChrysler, which is part of the Coalition for Vehicle Choice, a trade group trying to stop an increase in fuel economy standards. This year DaimlerChrysler has plans to introduce a longer-body SUV that gets about 10 miles per gallon. No worries: when he was a senator; Abraham also voted against increasing fuel-efficiency requirements for SUVs.

Secretary of Health and Human Services-Tommy Thompson

The man who will have perhaps the greatest role in dealing with the tobacco industry should have no trouble being objective about policy. After all, just because Thompson served on the advisory board of the Washington Legal Fund as it filed briefs on behalf of those who would promote smoking --or because as governor he received about \$72,000 in campaign contributions from Philip Morris, or because Philip Morris paid for several trips abroad that Thompson made to promote free trade-is no reason to think he won't be able to act impartially on this health issue. Too bad he recently sold his Philip Morris stock for an amount between \$15,000 and \$50,000. Was these should be very good years for Big Tobacco.

Good times ahead for wire hanger manufacturers, too. Tommy T is what they like to call "pro-life," putting up as many roadblocks to a women's right to an abortion as possible. As governor of Wisconsin he required women to seek counseling and wait three days before having the procedure.

Secretary of the Interior-Gale Norton

Gale Norton is already following in the footsteps of her mentor and predecessor, James Watt. She started her legal career with the Mountain States Legal Foundation, a conservative environmental think tank funded by oil companies and founded by Watt. Working closely with this group, Norton helped the state of Alaska challenge an Interior Department fisheries law. She has declared the Endangered Species Act unconstitutional and written legal opinions against the National Environmental Protection Act. As a lawyer with Brownstein, Hyatt & Farber, Norton represented Delta Petroleum and lobbied for NL Industries (formerly known as National Lead) while it defended itself in lawsuits over children's exposure to lead paint. She was also national chairwoman of the Coalition of Republican Environmental Advocates, a group funded by Ford Motor Company and BP Amoco.

Secretary of Labor-Elaine Chao

Chao has worked primarily in the nonprofit sector, with United Way and the Peace Corps, but has also sat on the boards of Dole Food, Clorox, and health care companies C. R. Bard (who pleaded guilty in the 1990s to manufacturing faulty heart catheters and conducting illegal experiments on the devices) and the behemoth Hospital Corporation of America (PICA). She also sat on the board of Northwest Airlines. She is married to conservative Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY).

Secretary of State-Colin Powell

When not fighting wars, Powell sat on the boards of Gulfstream Aerospace and AOL. Gulfstream makes jets for both Hollywood honchos and foreign governments like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. During his time at AOL the company merged with Time Warner, and Powell's stock rose in value by \$4 million. At the time, Colin's son, Michael Powell, had been the only Federal Communications Commission (FCC) member who advocated that the AOL/Time Warner merger go through without question. Powell's son has since been named chairman of the FCC by George W Bush; part of his job is to oversee the activities of AOL/Time Warner. He will also oversee any regulation of AOL's monopolistic "instant messaging" technology.

Secretary of Transportation-Norman Y. Mineta

A leftover from the Clinton administration, the only "Democrat" in Bush's cabinet, Mineta has his own corporate connections. When he was a congressman representing Silicon Valley, he received campaign contributions from Northwest Airlines, United Airlines, Greyhound, Boeing, and Union Pacific. After retiring from the House, he went to work at Lockheed Martin. What better place to park himself now than at the cabinet department that "oversees" all of them?

White House Chief of Staff-Andrew H. Card Jr.

Card was General Motors's chief lobbyist before leaving to work in the Bush administration. He was also CEO of the now-defunct American Automobile Manufacturers Association, which lobbied against stricter fuel emissions standards and fought over trade issues with Japan. Card testified before Congress on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Lobbying Group against the "Passenger's Bill of Rights." He personally contributed \$1,000 each to the losing campaigns of John Ashcroft and Spencer Abraham.

Director of the Office of Management and Budget-Mitch Daniels Jr.

Daniels was formerly a senior vice president of Eli Lilly pharmaceuticals. In his present position,

Daniels will oversee the draft-ing of the federal budget, including how much money (if any) will be earmarked for a prescription drug benefit for Medicare patients~a provision Eli Lilly and other pharmaceutical com-panies are lobbying against. Daniels also owns stock worth between \$50,000 and \$100,000 in GE, Citigroup, and Merck. The chances of this administration allowing a prescription drug benefit for seniors to pass in the next year are about as good as those of me setting myself on fire in front of a Rite Aid.

National Security Adviser-Condoleezza Rice

For her service on Chevron's board of directors, Rice had a 130,000-ton oil tanker named after her. She was also a director at Charles Schwab and Transamerica, and has served as an adviser for J. P. Morgan; she also served on Hush the Elder's National Security team.

Senior Adviser to the President-Karl Rove

A longtime supporter and friend of Bush, Rove was once an adviser to Philip Morris. For five years, while he was an adviser to Governor Bush, the tobacco company paid him \$3,000 a month to get his inside opinion on what was happening in the elections and with the candidates. Since Rove took the job at the White House, he has been under constant fire for using his posi-tion to further the interests of companies in which he owns stock. Recently Rove was criticized for holding meetings with Intel executives about a prospective merger while at the same time he held Intel stock (part of an overall portfolio valued at between \$1 million and \$2.5 minion). The merger was approved two months after the meetings, and Rove sold his stock a month later.

Shadow Adviser to the President-Kenneth L. Lay

Lay is the head of Enron, the largest electricity trader in the United States and a top contributor to the Bush presidential campaign. Lay has used his close relationship with the President to pressure the chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to speed up energy deregulation. Lay has apparently provided Bush with a list of preferred candidates for key commis-sion posts. Thanks in part to the California energy crisis, Enron has quickly grown into a \$100 billion company. Bush and Cheney rely on Lay for advice; some administration appointees must first be "interviewed" by Lay before getting the job.

As you can see, friends and neighbors, this is a regime that is intent on lining its pockets-and who won't leave office without a fight. It is their mission to combine their economic and (newly acquired) political power to rule the country and help their friends get even richer along the way.

These Stupid White Men must be stopped. I have informed Kofi Annan of the various locations where these (mostly) men can be found and apprehended by U.N. troops. Mr. Annan, I beseech you. You have invaded other countries for less grievous offenses. Do not ignore our plight. We plead with you: Save the United States of America! Demand that new, clean elections be held. Give the junta forty-eight hours to agree --and, if they don't, then treat them to a U.S. Air Force-style laser light show!

HOW TO STAGE THE COUNTERCOUP.

We, the people, can start a groundswell that will eventually top-ple the Bush/Cheney junta-with a commitment of only a couple of hours a week. Here's how:

1. Contact your representatives on a weekly basis, and get three friends to do the same. Senators, members of congress, and other elected officials PAY CAREFUL ATTENTION to the calls, letters, and

telegrams they receive. Each day they receive a tally of their constituents' messages. Take just a few minutes each week, and let your thoughts be known.

The Bush agenda can be brought to a grinding halt by a public outcry --and even a few hundred letters can constitute an outcry. Several Bush policies have already been shelved after public disapproval. IT WORKS! We all whine too much; why not put it to good use? Pick an issue you care about and do the following today:

- a. Call 202-224-3121-the U.S. Capitol switchboard. Just tell them your zip code, and they'll transfer you to your representative.
- b. Write to: Office of Senator[Name], United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510; or to: Office of Representative [Name], United States House of Representatives, Washington DC, 20515.
- c. E-mail: For Senators, go to <www.senate.gov/contacting/index_by_state.cfm>; for Representatives, go to <www.house.gov/writerep/>
- d. Send a telegram: call Western Union-1-800-325-6000~or visit their Web site: <www.westernunion.com>

2. Dog Bush wherever He Goes. If you hear Junior's coming to town, organize a group of friends to protest the event. Remind the media that Bush doesn't govern by the will of the people. Be loud. Be funny. Signs, street theater, mock trials-show him there's no safe haven from the Truth.

1. Force the Democrats to do their job. Obviously, the easiest way to counter the coup is to get the "opposition" to fight the good fight. But it won't be easy: today's Democrats have little time for those who can't make their \$1,000-a-plate dinners. So here's how to start a little Democratic behavior modification program:

- Take the Pledge. Go to my Web site (www.michaelmoore.com) and sign the on-line petition that challenges the Democrats in Congress to stand up to Bush/Cheney and fast --or we'll work to deny them Congressional leadership next year by running Greens in close races where the Democrat's just a Republican in a bad suit.
- Take over your local Democratic Party; In most counties the local Democratic Party is run by just a few people, 'cause most citizens would never think of showing up. Go the next county or town Party meeting, and bring ten friends. In most cases your bunch will constitute a majority. Use the rules and the state party by-laws (which can often be found on the Web) and seize control.

1. YOU must run for office. That's right-YOU, the person reading this book. It's the only way things are ever going to change. Unless normal, decent people run for government office, the job is left to rascals. How can we carp about crooked politicians if we won't do the job ourselves? It's time for YOU to throw your hat in the ring-and to do it next year. You can run for school board, city council, county treasurer, drain commissioner, city or county clerk, state representative, state senate, state board of education, secretary of state, governor, member of Congress, U.S. Senator, even dogcatcher --or any number of other offices. The one you should definitely run for is precinct delegate. Every precinct in America elects delegates from each party; it may be the lowliest office, but it's also the foundation on which the whole house of cards is built. Selected delegates attend the national party conventions to nominate the presidential candidates; you should be among them.

And I'm not just saying this --I'm doing it, this year, and getting a dozen friends to run in their precincts

too. It requires collecting enough signatures to get your name on the ballot, and qualifications vary. But so few people vote in primaries --and so many precincts end up with no candidates-- that often getting elected isn't much harder than just showing up. So head down to your board of elections or county clerk's office and pick up some petitions before the deadline passes.

These are only a few of the measures we can take to stage our counter-coup. Whether you do it as a Democrat, or a Green, or just one pissed-off citizen, the important thing is to rise up and do it.

Atelier No.15, article 27

Michael Moore :
(©excerpt from *Stupid White Men*, 2001)

List of accomplishments by George W. Bush, the first few months in office.

He has:

- Cut \$39 million from federal spending on libraries
- Cut \$35 million in funding for advanced pediatric training for doctors
- Cut funding for research into renewable energy sources by 50 percent
- Delayed rules that would reduce "acceptable" levels of arsenic in drinking water
- Cut funding for research into cleaner, more efficient cars and trucks by 28 percent
- Revoked rules strengthening the power of the government to deny contracts to companies that violate federal laws, environmental laws, and workplace safety standards
- Allowed Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton to request suggestions for opening up national monuments for foresting, coal mining, and oil and gas drilling
- Broken your campaign promise to invest \$100 million per year in rain forest conservation
- Reduced by 86 percent the Community Access Program, which coordinated care for people without health insurance among public hospitals, clinics, and other health care providers
- Nullified a proposal to increase public access to information about the potential ramifications of chemical plant accidents
- Cut funding for the Girls and Boys Clubs of America programs in public housing by \$60 million
- Pulled out of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol agreement on global warming, ultimately signed by 178 other countries
- Rejected an international accord to enforce the 1972 treaty banning germ warfare

- Cut \$200 million from workforce training programs for dislocated workers
- Cut \$200 million from the Childcare and Development grant, a program that provides child care to low-income families as they are forced from welfare to work
- Eliminated prescription contraceptive coverage to federal employees (though viagra is still covered)
- Cut \$700 million in funds for public housing repairs

- Cut half a billion dollars from the Environmental Protection Agency's budget
- Overturned workplace ergonomic rules designed to protect workers' health and safety
- Abandoned your campaign pledge to regulate carbon dioxide emissions, a major contributor to global warming
- Prohibited any federal aid from going to international family planning organizations that provide abortion counseling, referrals, or services with their own funds
- Nominated former mining company executive Dan Lauriski as Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health
- Appointed Lynn Scarlett, a global warming skeptic and an opponent of stricter standards on air pollution, as Undersecretary of the Interior
- Approved Interior Secretary Gale Norton's controversial plan to auction off areas close to Florida's eastern shore for oil and gas development
- Announced your plans to allow oil drilling in Montana's Lewis and Clark National Forest

- Threatened to shut down the white House MDS office

- Decided no longer to seek guidance from the American Bar Association on federal judicial appointments

- Denied college financial aid to students convicted of misdemeanor drug charges (though convicted murderers are still eligible for financial aid)

- Allocated only 3 percent of the amount requested by Justice Department lawyers in the government's continued litigation against tobacco companies

- Pushed through your tax cut, 43 percent of which goes to the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans

- Signed a bill making it harder for poor and middle-class Americans to file for bankruptcy, even when facing overwhelming medical bills
- Appointed affirmative action opponent Kay Cole James to direct the Office of Personnel Management
- Cut \$15.7 million from programs dealing with child abuse and neglect
- Proposed elimination of the "Reading Is Fundamental" program, which gives free books to poor children
- Pushed for development of "mini-nukes," designed to attack deeply buried targets-a violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Tried to reverse regulation protecting sixty million acres of national forest from logging and road building
- Appointed John Bolton, an opponent of nonproliferation treaties and the United Nations, as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
- Made Monsanto executive Linda Fisher deputy administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
- Nominated Michael McConnell, a leading critic of the separation of church and state, to a federal judgeship
- Nominated civil rights opponent Terrence Boyle to a federal judgeship
- Canceled the 2004 deadline for auto makers to develop prototype high-mileage cars
- Named John Walters, an ardent opponent of prison drug treatment programs, as drug czar
- Appointed oil and coal lobbyist J. Steven Giles as Deputy Secretary of the Interior
- Named Bennett Raley, who has called for the repeal of the Endangered Species Act, as Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water and Science
- Sought the dismissal of a class-action lawsuit filed in the United States against Japan by Asian women forced to work as sex slaves in World War II
- Appointed as solicitor general Ted Olson, your chief lawyer in the Florida voting debacle
- Proposed to ease the permit process for constructing refineries and nuclear and hydroelectric dams, including lowering environmental standards
- Proposed the selling of oil and gas tracts in the Alaska Wildlife Preserve

BUSH'S NEW BUDGET: DEFICITS AREN'T THE PROBLEM

Richard Du Boff

President Bush has sent to Congress his Budget for fiscal 2004 (starting in October), calling for \$2.23 trillion in expenditures and a deficit of \$304 billion, compared to \$159 billion of red ink last year and a surplus of \$127 billion in 2001. For the President's Budget Director, Mitch Daniels, this deficit is "acceptable," because it amounts to only 2.7 percent of our gross domestic product, half as much as the record peacetime deficits of the mid 1980s. The Senate Minority Leader, Democrat Tom Daschle of South Dakota, replies that, with deficits of this size, we now have "the most fiscally irresponsible administration in history."

Daniels is right. A current deficit of \$304 billion is reasonable in a stagnating \$10-trillion economy like ours, which needs more spending pumped into it from any source. If private consumption and investment are marking time, as they are, only government can do the job.

Since Bill Clinton excluded what he called "the left" from his administration in the 1990s, Democrats, in one of the great role reversals of American political history, have become the party of balanced budgets and debt reduction.

Now it's Democrats who proclaim that budget deficits drive up interest rates and "crowd out" private investment, as government borrowing competes with private investment for a fixed supply of loanable funds. There certainly are times when this can happen--when an economy is operating at or near full employment, with no reserves of labor and industrial capacity to spare, but not during recessions like the one from which we have yet to emerge. In some periods when federal deficits swelled, interest rates even declined, as during the 1980s. Rates have also fallen over the past 12 to 18 months, as the budget shifted from surplus back into deficit. And it's the Democrats who warn that deficits, which increase our national debt (the total stock of U.S. government bonds issued to cover all annual deficits to date), will leave future generations with a great "burden" and make it impossible to "save" Social Security.

Nonsense. Finance is a source of mystification for people across the political spectrum, and the "burden" of the national debt on future generations is a prime example. In fact, the burden of the national debt is practically zero. The only possible burden comes from interest paid to holders of U.S. government bonds. Some of the interest is paid to foreign bondholders and drains income out of the country; most of it is paid to U.S. residents who are largely in the wealthy class, forcing a redistribution of income from taxpayers toward the rich. But both of these effects are small-scale, and any undesirable income redistribution can be cancelled out by increasing taxes on those who can afford to pay, including wealthy bondholders--although, to be sure, this is easier said than done.

The real costs of the national debt, overwhelmingly, are borne by those of us who live during years when deficits occur, because they allow the government, by spending more money, to shift resources from private to public uses. But if deficits pay for the likes of education and health, rail and mass transit, national parks and forests, and environmental protection, future generations will be better off, not worse: public investments like these are more productive, and more desirable, than a ton of private investment--remember the telecom-internet boom of the 1990s?

Current deficits, especially when unemployment is high and business investment lagging, are fiscally sound, and they shift no debt burden nor any tax burdens to future generations. In 2013 or 2023, we will deal with the economic and social problems facing us with the resources at our disposal at that time--the labor and capital needed to produce food or medical care or automobiles or, as some may prefer, weapons of mass destruction. The size of the national debt, or the Social Security Trust Fund which consists of U.S. government bonds, will have very little, if any, effect on this--the basic question of resource allocation in our society, what we produce and who gets it.

Thus, the Bush deficits are not "fiscally irresponsible." Calling them that allows Democrats and Republicans to carry on a reactionary debate between debt cutters and tax cutters, and to dodge the real issue--that the President's budget is a social and political atrocity.

Big spending increases go to the military and "homeland security," but little new money to anything else. Education, Housing and Urban Development, the Environmental Protection Agency, and Transportation receive increases of 1 percent or less, not enough to keep up with inflation. Actual cutbacks are imposed upon Amtrak, International Assistance, Medicaid, grants for municipalities to hire more police officers and administer juvenile justice programs, among scores of other items.

Are state and local governments facing the worst fiscal squeeze since World War II? Let 'em eat cake--if they can afford it; they get no help at all from George W. Bush. The President ballyhooes his compassionate new spending to fight AIDS and HIV in Africa and the Caribbean--but his budget reduces, by the same amount, the funding that aides said would be sought for a separate development-aid initiative for poor nations. Totally eliminated is U.S. funding for a 1994 energy deal the Clinton administration negotiated with North Korea, a move likely to heighten tensions when Pyongyang may be resuming production of nuclear-weapons material in the face of an external threat--preemptive attack by the United States.

By contrast, the Pentagon gets \$380 billion, an increase of 4.2 percent on top of last year's whopping \$36 billion increase, the biggest since the administration of Ronald Reagan, and a mere way station on the road to \$484 billion by 2009, excluding costs of any war on Iraq (estimated at \$50 and \$200 billion, more in the case of extended occupation and rebuilding). This is half the true measure of Mr. Bush's budget; the matching half is the first round of fat tax cuts for the super-rich.

The Democrats' conservative fiscal policy was engineered by--can you guess?--Bill Clinton, when he negotiated the Great Budget Compromise of July 1997, to balance the budget and trim taxes at the same time. In return for another set of tax cuts (reductions in capital gains and estate taxes, new tax credits for children) and "spending caps" to hold the line on federal expenditures, Clinton vowed to put the emerging budget surpluses into a "lockbox," to "save Social Security first" and pay down the national debt. Many liberals cheered Clinton's slick maneuver, designed to block the Republicans' tax-cutting frenzy and stop them from handing more tax cuts to rich households. Too clever by more than half: by locking away trillions of tax dollars, Clinton also scuttled any plans Democrats might have had of using the surpluses for domestic social spending.

The Bush budget ushers in round 2 of Reaganomics: Republican administrations push through tax cuts to starve the federal government of resources, except for the military and its providential new sibling, the "war on terrorism." Large deficits are inevitable, and perfect for Republicans, who seize upon them as proof that the only way to bring the budget back into balance is to cut government spending to the bone--social spending, of course--and then pulverize the bone.

It works like a charm. If and when budget surpluses do appear, as they did in the late 1990s, Republicans barely need to shift gears; now they can argue that there's no way "your money" should pile up in the hands of the government, so it's time to cut taxes again. And Democrats are left whimpering about their broken "lockbox," and protesting that the tax cuts are "for the rich" (they are) and that the new round of deficits will "mortgage the future of our children" (they won't). President Bush had the jump on them all along. In August 2001, when the government's surplus was beginning to dwindle, Bush called it "incredibly positive news" because it will "create a fiscal strait-jacket for Congress." All "nonessential" government spending must be chopped . . . to help make way for new tax cuts.

A \$304 billion deficit would be exceedingly small if it were spent on social and economic reform--starting with a national health insurance program to cover everyone from birth to death. The best way to start paying for it would be to slash U.S. military spending--which would also be the greatest single step toward assuring peace and security for all the world's people, including ourselves. A theme to promote in the demonstrations against another Bush war, sure to come.

To Kill Iraq: The Reasons Why by Michael Parenti

In October 2002, after several days of full-dress debate in the House and Senate, the US Congress fell into line behind almost-elected president George W. Bush, giving him a mandate to launch a massive military assault against the already battered nation of Iraq. The discourse in Congress was marked by its usual cowardice. Even many of the senators and representatives who voted against the president's resolution did so on the narrowest procedural grounds, taking pains to tell how they too detested Saddam Hussein, how they agreed with the president on many points, how something needed to be done about Iraq but not just yet, not quite in this way. So it is with Congress: so much political discourse in so narrow a political space. Few of the members dared to question the unexamined assumptions about US virtue, and the imperial right of US leaders to decide which nations shall live and which shall die. Few, if any, pointed to the continual bloody stream of war crimes committed by a succession of arrogant US administrations in blatant violation of human rights and international law.

Pretexts for War

Bush and other members of his administration have given varied and unpersuasive reasons to justify the "war"---actually a one-sided massacre---against Iraq. They claim it is necessary to insure the safety and security of the Middle East and of the United States itself, for Iraq is developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear missiles. But UN inspection teams have determined that Iraq has no such nuclear capability and actually has been in compliance with yearly disarmament inspections.

As for the fact that Iraq once had factories that produced chemical and bacteriological weapons, whose fault was that? It was the United States that supplied such things to Saddam. This is one of several key facts about past US-Iraq relations that the corporate media have consistently suppressed. In any case, according to UN inspection reports, Iraq's C&B warfare capability has been dismantled. Still the Bushites keep talking about Iraq's dangerous "potential." As reported by the Associated Press (2 November 2002), Undersecretary of State John Bolton claimed that "Iraq would be able to develop a nuclear weapon within a year if it gets the right technology." If it gets the right technology? What does that say about anything? The truistic nature of this assertion has gone unnoticed. Djibouti, Qatar, and New Jersey would be able to develop nuclear weapons if they got "the right technology."

Through September and October of 2002, the White House made it clear that Iraq would be attacked if it had weapons of mass destruction. Then in November 2002, Bush announced he would attack if Saddam *denied* that he had weapons of mass destruction. So if the Iraqis admit having such weapons, they will be bombed; and if they deny having them, they still will be bombed--whether they have them or not.

The Bushites also charged Iraq with allowing al Qaeda terrorists to operate within its territory. But US intelligence sources themselves let it be known that the Iraqi government was not connected to Islamic terrorist organizations. In closed sessions with a House committee, when administration officials were repeatedly asked whether they had information of an imminent threat from Saddam against US citizens, they stated unequivocally that they had no such evidence (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 20 September 2002). Truth be told, the Bush family has closer ties to the bin Laden family than does Saddam Hussein. No mention is made of how US leaders themselves have allowed terrorists to train and operate within our own territory, including a mass murderer like Orlando Bosch. Convicted of blowing up a Cuban airliner, Bosch walks free in Miami.

Bush and company seized upon yet another pretext for war: Saddam has committed war crimes and acts of aggression, including the war against Iran and the massacre of Kurds. But the Pentagon's own study found that the gassing of Kurds at Halabja was committed by the Iranians, not the Iraqis (*Times of India*, 18 September 2002). Another seldom mentioned fact: US leaders gave Iraq encouragement and military support in its war against Iran. And if war crimes and aggression are the issue, there are the US invasions of Grenada and Panama to consider, and the US-sponsored wars of attrition against civilian targets in Mozambique, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Yugoslavia, and scores of other places, leaving hundreds of thousands dead. There is no communist state or "rogue nation" that has such a horrific record of military aggression against other countries over the last two decades.

With all the various pretexts for war ringing hollow, the Bushites resorted to the final indictment: Saddam was a dictator. The United States stood for democracy and human rights. It followed that US leaders were obliged to use force and violence to effect regime change in Iraq. Again, we might raise questions. There is no denying that Saddam is a dictator, but how did he and his crew ever come to power? Saddam's conservative wing of the Ba'ath party was backed by the CIA. They were enlisted to destroy the Iraqi popular revolution and slaughter every democratic, left-progressive individual they could get hold of, which indeed they did, including the progressive wing of

the Ba'ath party itself---another fact that US media have let slide down the memory hole. Saddam was Washington's poster boy until the end of the Cold War.

So why has George II, like his daddy, targeted Iraq? When individuals keep providing new and different explanations to justify a particular action, they most likely are lying. So with political leaders and policymakers. Having seen that the pretexts given by the White House to justify war are palpably false, some people conclude that the administration is befuddled or even "crazy." But just because they are trying to mislead and confuse the public does not perforce mean they themselves are misled and confused. Rather it might be that they have reasons which they prefer not to see publicized and debated, for then it would become evident that US policies of the kind leveled against Iraq advance the interests of the rich and powerful at much cost to the American people and every other people on the face of the earth. Here I offer what I believe are the real reasons for the US aggression against Iraq.

Global Politico-Economic Supremacy

A central US goal, as enunciated by the little Dr. Strangeloves who inhabit the upper echelons of policymaking in the Bush administration, is to perpetuate US global supremacy. The objective is not just power for its own sake but power to insure plutocratic control of the planet, power to privatize and deregulate the economies of every nation in the world, to hoist upon the backs of peoples everywhere—including the people of North America ---the blessings of an untrammelled "free market" corporate capitalism. The struggle is between those who believe that the land, labor, capital, technology, and markets of the world should be dedicated to maximizing capital accumulation for the few, and those who believe that these things should be used for the communal benefit and socio-economic development of the many.

The goal is to insure not merely the supremacy of global capitalism as such, but the supremacy of *US* global capitalism by preventing the emergence of any other potentially competing superpower or, for that matter, any potentially competing *regional* power. Iraq is a case in point. Some nations in the Middle East have oil but no water; others have water but no oil. Iraq is the only one with plenty of both, along with a good agricultural base—although its fertile lands are now much contaminated by the depleted uranium dropped upon it during the 1991 Gulf War bombings.

In earlier times, Iraq's oil was completely owned by US, British, and other Western companies. In 1958 there was a popular revolution in Iraq. Ten years later, the rightwing of the Ba'ath party took power, with Saddam Hussein serving as point man for the CIA. His assignment was to undo the bourgeois-

democratic revolution, as I have already noted. But instead of acting as a compradore collaborator to Western investors in the style of Nicaragua's Somoza, Chile's Pinochet, Peru's Fujimora, and numerous others, Saddam and his cohorts nationalized the Iraqi oil industry in 1972, ejected the Western profiteers, and pursued policies of public development and economic nationalism. By 1990, Iraq had the highest standard of living in the Middle East (which may not be saying all that much), and it was evident that the US had failed to rollback the gains of the 1958 revolution. But the awful destruction delivered upon Iraq both by the Gulf War and the subsequent decade of economic sanctions did achieve a kind of counterrevolutionary rollback from afar.

Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, US leaders decided that Third World development no longer needed to be tolerated. Just as Yugoslavia served as a "bad" example in Europe, so Iraq served as a bad example to other nations in the Middle East. The last thing the plutocrats in Washington want in that region is independent, self-defining developing nations that wish to control their own land, labor, and natural resources.

US economic and military power has been repeatedly used to suppress competing systems. Self-defining countries like Cuba, Iraq, and Yugoslavia are targeted. Consider Yugoslavia. It showed no desire to become part of the European Union and absolutely no interest in joining NATO. It had an economy that was relatively prosperous, with some 80 percent of it still publicly owned. The wars of secession and attrition waged against Yugoslavia--all in the name of human rights and democracy---destroyed that country's economic infrastructure and fractured it into a cluster of poor, powerless, right-wing mini-republics, whose economies are being privatized, deregulated, and opened to Western corporate penetration on terms that are completely favorable to the investors. We see this happening most recently in Serbia. Everything is being privatized at garage sale prices. Human service, jobs, and pension funds are disappearing. Unemployment, inflation, and poverty are skyrocketing, as is crime, homelessness, prostitution, and suicide. Welcome to Serbia's free market paradise.

Judging from what has been happening in Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Panama, Grenada, and elsewhere---we can anticipate that the same thing is in store for Iraq following a US occupation: An Iraqi puppet government will be put in place, headed by someone every bit as subservient to the White House as Tony Blair. The Iraqi state-owned media will become "free and independent" by being handed over to rich conservative private corporations. Anything even remotely critical of US foreign policy and free market capitalism will be deprived of an effective platform. Conservative political parties, heavily

financed by US sources, will outspend any leftist groupings that might have survived. On this steeply unlevelled playing field, US advisors will conduct US-style "democratic elections," perhaps replicating the admirable results produced in Florida and elsewhere. Just about everything in the Iraqi economy will be privatized at giveaway prices. Poverty and underemployment, already high, will climb precipitously. So will the Iraqi national debt, as international loans are floated that "help" the Iraqis pay for their own victimization. Public services will dwindle to nothing, and Iraq will suffer even more misery than it does today. We are being asked to believe that the Iraqi people are willing to endure another massive bombing campaign in order to reach this free-market paradise.

Natural Resource Grab

Another reason for targeting Iraq can be summed up in one word: oil. Along with maintaining the overall global system of expropriation, US leaders are interested in more immediate old-time colonial plunder. The present White House leadership is composed of oil men who are both sorely tempted and threatened by Iraq's oil reserve, one of the largest in the world. With 113 billion barrels at \$25 a barrel, Iraq's supply comes to over \$2.8 *trillion* dollars. But not a drop of it belongs to the US oil cartel; it is all state owned. Baghdad has offered exploratory concessions to France, China, Russia, Brazil, Italy, and Malaysia. But with a US takeover of Iraq and a new puppet regime in place, all these agreements may be subject to cancellation. We may soon witness the biggest oil grab in the history of Third World colonialism by US oil companies aided and abetted by the US government.

One thing that US leaders have been interested in doing with Iraqi oil---given the glut and slumping price of crude in recent years---is keep it off the market for awhile longer. As the London *Financial Times* (24 February 1998) reported, oil prices fell sharply because of the agreement between the United Nations and Iraq that would allow Baghdad to sell oil on the world market. The agreement "could lead to much larger volumes of Iraqi crude oil competing for market shares." The *San Francisco Chronicle* (22 February 1998) headlined its story "IRAQ'S OIL POSES THREAT TO THE WEST." In fact, Iraqi crude poses no threat to "the West" only to Western oil investors. If Iraq were able to reenter the international oil market, the *Chronicle* reported, "it would devalue British North Sea oil, undermine American oil production and---much more important---it would destroy the huge profits which the United States [read, US oil companies] stands to gain from its massive investment in Caucasian oil production, especially in Azerbaijan." We might conclude that direct control

and ownership of Iraqi oil is the surest way to keep it off the world market and the surest way to profit from its future sale when the price is right.

Domestic Political Gains

War and violence have been good to George W. Bush. As of September 10, 2001, his approval ratings were sagging woefully. Then came the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, swiftly followed by the newly trumpeted war against terrorism and the massive bombing and invasion of Afghanistan. Bush's approval ratings skyrocketed. But soon came the corporate scandals of 2002: Enron, WorldCom, and even more perilously Harken and Halliburton. By July, both the president and vice-president were implicated in fraudulent corporate accounting practices, making false claims of profit to pump up stock values, followed by heavy insider selling just before the stock was revealed to be nearly worthless and collapsed in price. By September, the impending war against Iraq blew this whole issue off the front pages and out of the evening news. Daddy Bush did the same thing in 1990, sending the savings and loan scandal into media limbo by waging war against that very same country.

By October 2002, the Republican party, reeling from the scandals and pegged as the party of corporate favoritism and corruption, reemerged as the party of patriotism, national defense, and strong military leadership to win control of both houses of Congress, winning elections it should never have won. Many Americans rallied around the flag, draped as it was around the president. Some of our compatriots, who are cynical and suspicious about politicians in everyday affairs, display an almost child-like unlimited trust and knee-jerk faith when these same politicians trumpet a need to defend our national security against some alien threat, real or imagined.

War also distracts the people from their economic problems, the need for decent housing, schools, and jobs, and a recession that shows no sign of easing. Since George II took office, the stock market has dropped 34 percent, unemployment has climbed 35 percent, the federal surplus of \$281 billion is now a deficit of \$157 billion, and an additional 1.5 million people are without health insurance, bringing the total to 41 million. War has been good for the conservative agenda in general, providing record military spending, greater profits for the defense industry, and a deficit spending spree that further enriches the creditor class at the taxpayer's expense, and is used to justify more cuts in domestic human services.

Liberal intellectuals are never happier than when, with patronizing smiles, they can dilate on the stupidity of George Bush. What I have tried to show is that Bush is neither retarded nor misdirected. Given his class

perspective and interests, there are compelling reasons to commit armed aggression against Iraq---and against other countries to come. It is time we dwelled less upon his malapropisms and more on his rather effective deceptions and relentless viciousness. Many decent crusaders have been defeated because of their inability to fully comprehend the utter depravity of their enemies. The more we know what we are up against, the better we can fight it.

Michael Parenti's latest books are *The Terrorism Trap* (City Lights); *To Kill a Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia* (Verso); and the 7th edition of *Democracy for the Few* (Wadsworth). His forthcoming work, *The Assassination of Julius Caesar: A People's History of Ancient Rome*, will be published in the spring by The New Press.

And here is an Iraq War Quiz for edification and as an organizing tool...

Iraq War Quiz
by Stephen R. Shalom

1. The anti-war movement supports our troops by urging that they be brought home immediately so they neither kill nor get killed in a unjust war. How has the Bush administration shown its support for our troops?
 - a. The Republican-controlled House Budget Committee voted to cut \$25 billion in veterans benefits over the next 10 years.
 - b. The Bush administration proposed cutting \$172 million from impact aid programs which provide school funding for children of military personnel.
 - c. The administration ordered the Dept. of Veterans Affairs to stop publicizing health benefits available to veterans.
 - d. All of the above.

2. The anti-war movement believes that patriotism means urging our country to do what is right. How do Bush administration officials define patriotism?
 - a. Patriotism means emulating Dick Cheney, who serves as Vice-President while receiving \$100,000-\$1,000,000 a year from Halliburton, the multi-billion dollar company which is already lining up for major contracts in post-war Iraq.
 - b. Patriotism means emulating Richard Perle, the warhawk who serves as head of the Defense Intelligence Board while at the same time meeting with Saudi arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi on behalf of Trireme, a company of which he is a managing partner, involved in security and military technologies, and while agreeing to work as a paid lobbyist for Global Crossing, a telecommunications giant seeking a major Pentagon contract.
 - c. Patriotism means emulating George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, John Bolton, Tom DeLay, John Ashcroft, Lewis Libby, and others who enthusiastically supported the Vietnam War while avoiding serving in it and who now are sending others to kill and be killed in Iraq.
 - d. All of the above.

3. The Bush administration has accused Saddam Hussein of lying regarding his weapons of mass destruction. Which of the following might be considered less than truthful?
 - a. Constant claims by the Bush administration that there was documentary evidence linking Iraq to attempted uranium purchases in Niger, despite the fact that the documents were forgeries and CIA analysts doubted their authenticity.

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- b. A British intelligence report on Iraq's security services that was in fact plagiarized, with selected modifications, from a student article.
- c. The frequent citation of the incriminating testimony of Iraqi defector Hussein Kamel, while suppressing that part of the testimony in which Kamel stated that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction had been destroyed following the 1991 Gulf War.
- d. All of the above.
4. White House Press Secretary Ari Fleisher stormed out of a press conference when the assembled reporters broke into laughter after he declared that the U.S. would never try to bribe members of the UN. What should Fleisher have said to defend himself?
- a. It wasn't just bribery; we also ordered the bugging of the home and office phones and emails of the UN ambassadors of Security Council member states that were undecided on war.
- b. Oh, come on! We've been doing this for years. In 1990 when Yemen voted against authorizing war with Iraq, the U.S. ambassador declared "That will be the most expensive 'no' vote you ever cast."
- c. Why do you think the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act makes one of the conditions for an African country to receive preferential access to U.S. markets that it "not engage in activities that undermine United States national security or foreign policy interests"?
- d. All of the above.
5. George Bush has declared that "we have no fight with the Iraqi people." What could he have cited as supporting evidence?
- a. U.S. maintenance of 12 years of crippling sanctions that strengthened Saddam Hussein while contributing to the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians.
- b. The fact that "coalition" forces have indicated that they will use cluster bombs in Iraq, despite warnings from human rights groups that "The use of cluster munitions in Iraq will endanger civilians for years to come."
- c. By pointing to the analogy of Afghanistan, which the U.S. pledged not to forget about when the war was over, and for which the current Bush administration foreign aid budget request included not one cent in aid.
- d. All of the above.
6. The Bush administration has touted the many nations that are part of the "coalition of the willing." Which of the following statements about this coalition is true?
- a. In most of the coalition countries polls show that a majority, often an overwhelming majority, of the people oppose the war.
- b. More than ten of the members of the coalition of the willing are

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actually a coalition of the unwilling - unwilling to reveal their names.

c. Coalition members - most of whose contributions to the war are negligible or even zero - constitute less than a quarter of the countries in the UN and contain less than 20% of the world's population.

d. All of the above.

7. The war on Iraq is said to be part of the "war on terrorism." Which of the following is true?

a. A senior American counterintelligence official said: "An American invasion of Iraq is already being used as a recruitment tool by Al Qaeda and other groups....And it is a very effective tool."

b. An American official, based in Europe, said Iraq had become "a battle cry, in a way," for Al Qaeda recruiters.

c. France's leading counter-terrorism judge said: "Bin Laden's strategy has always been to demonstrate to the Islamic community that the West, and especially the U.S., is starting a global war against Muslims. An attack on Iraq might confirm this vision for many Muslims. I am very worried about the next wave of recruits."

d. All of the above.

8. The Bush administration says it is waging war to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Which of the following is true?

a. The United States has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, viewed worldwide as the litmus test for seriousness about nuclear disarmament.

b. The United States has insisted on a reservation to the Chemical Weapons Convention allowing the U.S. President the right to refuse an inspection of U.S. facilities on national security grounds, and blocked efforts to improve compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

c. Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, testified on Feb. 11, 2003, "The long-term trends with respect to WMD and missile proliferation are bleak. States seek these capabilities for regional purposes, or to provide a hedge to deter or offset U.S. military superiority."

d. All of the above.

9. The Bush administration says it wants to bring democracy to Iraq and the Middle East. Which of the following is true?

a. If there were democracy in Saudi Arabia today, backing for the U.S. war effort would be the first thing to go, given the country's

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"increasingly anti-American population deeply opposed to the war."

- b. The United States subverted some of the few democratic governments in the Middle East (Syria in 1949, Iran in 1953), and has backed undemocratic regimes in the region ever since.
- c. The United States supported the crushing of anti-Saddam Hussein revolts in Iraq in 1991.
- d. All of the above.

10. Colin Powell cited as evidence of an Iraq-Al Qaeda link an audiotape from bin Laden in which he called Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party regime "infidels." Which of the following is more compelling evidence?

- a. An FBI official told the New York Times: "We've been looking at this hard for more than a year and you know what, we just don't think it's there."
- b. According to a classified British intelligence report seen by BBC News, "There are no current links between the Iraqi regime and the al-Qaeda network."
- c. According to Rohan Gunaratna, author of *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, "Since U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, I have examined several tens of thousands of documents recovered from Al Qaeda and Taliban sources. In addition to listening to 240 tapes taken from Al Qaeda's central registry, I debriefed several Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. I could find no evidence of links between Iraq and Al Qaeda."
- d. All of the above.

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8. d (a) Colum Lynch, "U.S. Boycotts Nuclear Test Ban Meeting; Some Delegates at U.N. Session Upset at Latest Snub of Pact Bush Won't Back," *Washington Post*, 11/12/02, p. A6. (b) Amy E. Smithson, "U.S. Implementation of the CWC," in Jonathan B. Tucker, *The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation Challenges and Solutions*, Monterey Institute, April 2001, pp. 23-29, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/tuckcwc.htm>; Jonathan Tucker, "The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention," Feb. 2002, http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_7b.html. (c) Testimony before the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, excerpted at <http://traprockpeace.org/usefulquotesoniraq.html>.

9. d (a) Craig S. Smith, "Saudi Arabia Seems Calm But, Many Say, Is Seething," NYT, 3/24/03, p. B13. In fact, "Though the Saudi government officially denies it, the bombing campaign is being directed from Saudi Arabia - something that few Saudis realize." (b) On Syria, see Douglas Little, *A Cold War and Covert Action: The United States and Syria, 1945-1958*, @ Middle East Journal, vol. 44, no. 1, Winter 1990, pp. 55-57. On Iran, see Mark J. Gasiorowski, "The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 19, Aug. 1987, pp. 261-86. (c) Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein*, New York: HarperPerennial, 1999, chap. 1.

10. d (re audiotape, see David Johnston, "Top U.S. Officials Press Case Linking Iraq To Al Qaeda," NYT, 2/12/03, p. A1; Mohamad Bazzi, "U.S. says bin Laden tape urging Iraqis to attack appears real," *Newsday*, 2/12/03, p. A5. (a) James Risen and David Johnston, "Split at C.I.A. and F.B.I. On Iraqi Ties to Al Qaeda," NYT, 2/2/03, p. 1:13. (b) "Leaked Report Rejects Iraqi al-Qaeda Link," *BBC News*, 2/5/03. (c) Rohan Gunaratna, "Iraq and Al Qaeda: No Evidence of Alliance," *International Herald Tribune*, 2/19/03.

Interpreting Your Score

9-10 Correct: Excellent. Contact United for Peace and Justice, <http://www.unitedforpeace.org/>, and work to fight the war and the system that produced it.

6-8 Correct: Fair. You've been watching a few too many former generals and government officials who provide the "expert" commentary for the mainstream media. Read the alternative media!

3-5 Correct: Poor. Don't feel bad. George W. Bush only got a C- in International Relations at College.

0-2 Correct: Failing. You have a bright future as an "embedded" journalist.

This message has been brought to you by ZNet (<http://www.zmag.org>). Visit our site for subscription options.

The column directs readers to the site of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (www.ceip.org), where you can find links to excerpts from the documents that show the genesis of our current Imperial policy.

The first document is one supervised by Paul Wolfowitz. It calls for preventing the re-emergence of any regional power who might become a global power. The primary case studies in this document concern Iraq and North Korea.

The second document is a policy paper submitted to the Israeli government by, among others, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and David Wurmser---all now members of the Bush administration. This document calls for a cessation of trading land for peace, weakening Syria, and removing Saddam Hussein from power.

There is also a link to a letter urging President Clinton to unilaterally remove Saddam Hussein, because not enough members of the Gulf War coalition are sufficiently concerned about upholding sanctions. Signatories include Wolfowitz, Perle, and Dah-dah-dah-dum-dah-dum, Donald Rumsfeld.

Atelier N°19, article n°42

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WHY WAR WITH IRAQ? WHY NOW? PHANTOM REASONS AND REAL ONES

Has America ever gone to war with less public understanding of what the war is about? Why is our Government so determined to attack Iraq? And why the rush to do it now? War is a very serious business. So I am not going to insult your intelligence by spending any time on the half dozen changing reasons that our Government has offered as a justification for starting this war. As anyone who is not addicted to Fox News knows, they are either false, grossly exaggerated, irrelevant or simply silly (I don't know whether to place the charge that Saddam is an evil man under irrelevant or silly).

But - and this is of crucial importance - even if all the Government's charges were true, not exaggerated and relevant, this would still not justify a war if there were other ways of dealing with them and/or if a war would make Americans more liable to attack by our enemies than we already are. The U.N. inspections are working and if we increased the number of inspectors and gave them more time, they would work better still. Along with frequent overflights, some of the U.N. imposed sanctions and the threat of massive retaliation should Saddam attack one of his neighbors, they have already achieved most of the aims for which almost-elected President Bush says he intends to go to war. That is, given the Government's own terms of debate, the war would appear to be

unnecessary. And if anyone had any doubts about the effect of such a war on our safety here in the U.S., Ossama Bin Laden's most recent tape (if genuine) should have made it clear that this war will bring us more terrorist attacks and not less.

Critics who see this far and no further are content to condemn the Government for its stupidity - easy to do with Bush at the helm - and craziness. Our leaders seem to be making a terrible mistake. General Zinni, a leading U.S. military figure and diplomat, has said that he doesn't know on which planet the hawks in Washington are living. And many others, including ex-President Carter, General Schwartzkopf and even officials in the intelligence (sic) community, have expressed similar sentiments.

But the leaders of our Government are not that stupid or crazy, and war is too important a matter to go forward without good reasons. They have their reasons. They just don't want to give them to us, because they suspect that most Americans wouldn't accept them as a justification for war. If we examine who our leaders are, their background and interests, some of what they've done and said before coming to power, and what they would gain from a war, it is not too hard to arrive at what these men and their one woman are thinking.

In my opinion, here are the real reasons that our Government is about to engage in its second massacre of Muslims in as many years: 1) Oil. The Bush oilgarchy wants direct control over a country whose proven oil reserves are second only to those of Saudi Arabia. American oil giants own none of this oil now. How much do you think they will own one year after the war? Direct U.S. control over Iraqi oil will not only put the profits of selling the oil and servicing the oil fields into American hands, but will also put the U.S. Government in a position to effect the price of oil by determining how much of it is put onto the market at any one time and to secure the dollar's position as the currency of choice in the purchase of oil by other countries (since 2000, Iraq has tried to undermine the hegemony of the dollar in world trade - with all its implications for U.S. financial domination - by selling its oil for Euros). And, as the availability of this non-renewable source of

energy begins to decline (it has been estimated that the world has about fifty years worth of oil left), the U.S. will be in a position to decide, almost unilaterally, which countries will grow and develop and which will not. 2) Secure the water supplies - not often mentioned - with which Iraq is blessed and all surrounding countries are to some degree dependent. 3) Establish American military and political power - if not direct colonial control - of a major Arab country in the heart of the middle-east for an indefinite period to help ensure the existence of friendly governments and market economies throughout the region. 4) Provide a rationale to expand the military budget and with it the profits of the arms industry, which includes the oil industry. 5) Help make Americans forget that we lost the war in Afghanistan, whose main objective was not to remove the Taliban but to destroy Al Qaeda and capture Osama Bin Laden. 6) Upstage the media attention given to the failure of the Government's economic policies (unemployment up 35%, stock market down 34 %, etc. and etc. since Bush took office) as well as the high level financial scandals in which both Bush and Cheney have been implicated. 7) Create an atmosphere of permanent crisis with its side-bars of fear and patriotism that will help the GOP to push through the rest of its ultra-conservative political agenda and win the next presidential election.

Though we can't know which reasons are most important for any given official, I think it is pretty clear that they all play a role and that, taken together, they are enough to account for the trigger-happy behavior of the Government. There happens to be one other major reason for their actions, however, that deserves to be mentioned, if only because it is usually passed over, even by the strongest critics of the war. And this is that the war with Iraq will serve some of Israel's most important national interests, at least as interpreted by its current right wing Government. It is seldom mentioned, of course, because anyone who does so risks being denounced as an anti-semitic, next to which being called a mass murderer today seems rather tame. So before developing this point, let me just say that I am Jewish. This way I can only be condemned as a "self-hating Jew".

What, then, are the main interests of the Israeli Government that will be served by this war?

- 1) The war will provide Israel some relief from the growing sentiment among the American public that the U.S. Government should cut off or drastically reduce both economic and military aid to Israel until it vacates all Arab lands (a little publicized Times/CNN poll showed that 60% of Americans supported such a call).
- 2) Under the cover of war, Sharon will be able to put into effect his version of the "final solution" to the Palestinian problem, the expulsion of all West Bank Arabs into the surrounding countries.
- 3) Destroying what's left of Iraq's military power neutralizes Israel's most important rival in the region.
- 4) Establishing a semi-permanent American military presence in Iraq puts U.S. troops in a position to police the whole area for Israel. If Mohammed can't go to the mountain - you have all heard this one - it is said that the mountain will go to Mohammed. Given their problems with the Arabs, some Israelis have joked that it would be nice if they could pick up the whole of Israel and move it to Long Island. Well, Mohammed couldn't get to this mountain. But now with the U.S. about to move into Israel's neighborhood, the mountain has come to Mohammed. Talk about miracles.
- 5) U.S. control of Iraqi oil and water resources will allow Israel, its best friend in the middle-east, to gain a share of both.

When you add all this up, it seems that war against Iraq is even more in the interests of the Israeli Government than it is in the interests of the American Government. It is no surprise then that among our Government's top foreign policy advisors some of the biggest hawks are right wing Zionists like - Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Defense Secretary, who earlier in life wanted to immigrate to Israel and who wrote his first official paper calling for an invasion of Iraq back in 1992), Douglas Feith (Under Secretary for Policy in the Dept. of Defense), Elliot Abrams (National Security Council), Lewis Libby (Chief of Staff for Vice President Cheney), Eric Edelman (Libby's top assistant), and Richard Perle (Chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, who the F.B.I. found passing classified information from the National Security Council to the Israeli Embassy when he was a Senate staffer in 1970 and who has worked as an election advisor for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu between 1996-'99) . Can you imagine the ruckus there would be if this number of communists or Free Masons or black nationalists were found in the higher reaches of our foreign policy establishment? Let me repeat that I am not speaking of Jews here but of right wing Zionists, or those who subscribe to an extreme version of a nationalist ideology that is currently in power in another country, a country that has a crucial stake in how the American Government acts in its region. Now, I don't believe that U.S. policy on Iraq has been made by these Zionists advisors, but neither do I believe that they are without influence in the matter or that their right wing Zionism does not affect what they tell Bush, or Cheney, or Rumsfeld. Rather, in my view, what we have here is a convergence of two imperialisms. It is Bush's and Sharon's complementary interests that have put them in bed together. The bevy of right wing Zionist advisors that surround Bush would have encouraged this tryst and perhaps served as match-maker.

They have probably also helped to convince Bush - assuming he needed any convincing - that if he served Israel's interests in this manner he would garner the support of enough American Jews, most of whom have become Zionists (soft or hard) in recent years, to put him over the top in the next election. (No one should suppose that Karl Rove, Bush's exceptionally savvy political advisor, hasn't carefully taken note of this opportunity, or that his man in the White House is indifferent to it. Hence, the otherwise surprising decision to hold the GOP 2004 Nominating Convention in New York City) I suppose this deserves being listed as the Bush crowd's eighth major reason for going to war with Iraq.

That still leaves unexplained why the rush to war, why the Government's insistence on starting the war now. If Israel needs a war now to resolve the explosive and worsening problems that have resulted from the failure of its policies in the West Bank, this is not - or at least should not be - a problem for the U.S. But if I'm right in my list of the American and Israeli Governments' real reasons for going to war, THE GREAT DANGER THAT BOTH OF THESE GOVERNMENTS FEAR IS NOT THAT THE U.N. INSPECTIONS WON'T WORK, BUT THAT THEY WILL. For if the inspections work, or show that they are working or can work, then both Governments are denied their ideological cover for going to war. At this point, the U.S. would either have to pull back from the brink, or admit to having other, hitertoo secret reasons, for going to war. However, the great majority of the American people would never accept the real reasons for this war, and without their support the American and Israeli Governments could not reap the many economic and political benefits they are hoping for, benefits they can only attain through a full scale war. Well, too bad for them, but not for the hundreds of thousands of people who are certain to die in any war.

The great crusading journalist, Izzy Stone, said he could summarize most of what aspiring young reporters need to learn in two words: "Governments lie". If he had extended his lesson just three more words, he might have added - "especially in war". The American Government has a long history of such lies; the sinking of the battleship "Maine" in the Spanish American War, the Gulf of Tonkin non-incident in the Vietnam war, and the invasion of Granada to protect U.S. medical students are but the most notorious examples. Given this history, the Bush team's consistent disregard for the truth (both in getting (s)elected and in pursuing its unpopular policies in virtually

every domain), and the collection of dated, confused and irrelevant charges that make up the official case against Iraq, it is hard to believe that anyone could take what the Administration is saying seriously. Sadly, this is not the case.

This is also very dangerous, because even most of Bush's critics, in the U.S. and around the world, refer to his position on Iraq as a "mistake" rather than a "lie" and treat their differences with him as a "disagreement" over what means are best suited to attain a common end. "Give the inspections a chance" and "No war without a U.N. resolution" were the most popular slogans in the world-wide demonstrations against the war that took place on February 15th. In short, though Bush has been unable to convince most doubters of his interpretation of events, with his domination over the public stage, he has succeeded in setting the terms of the debate, and in politics as in war being able to choose the terrain on which a battle will be fought is often the decisive step toward winning it. What will happen, in other words, if/when the Government - either under pressure or because they are more intelligent than we give them credit for - accepts the scenario urged by the majority of their critics: a couple months more of inspections and a vague U.N. resolution that even France and Germany can agree on and the U.S. can interpret as an okay to begin its war in Iraq?

I am reminded of an incident that occurred in Nazi Germany in the mid-1930s, where a jurist - I can't recall his name - objected to some Nazi practises that were not covered by the law. Once Hitler's controlled legislature passed laws that made these practises legal, the jurist said he was now satisfied and fell in behind the Fuhrer. Could the same thing happen to most of our politicians, public intellectuals and even movement partisans who are now demanding that Bush act through the U.N. and give the inspections a chance to work? I consider such a turnabout not only possible but even likely, unless more of Bush's critics begin treating his phantom reasons for attacking Iraq with the contempt that they deserve and do a much better job educating the public on the real reasons for war, ALL OF THEM. People who understand these reasons will not let themselves be snookered into supporting the war through any combination of Congressional, NATO or U.N. resolutions.

What is the role of 9/11 in all this? It is now clear that there were two kinds of hijacking on Sept. 11th, 2001, the first by free lance terrorists who took over four airplanes and bombed the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the second by U.S. state terrorists who used the events of the day to push through their right wing political agenda and to beat whomever dared criticize them over the head. By prefacing all proposals with the words "In the names of those who died", Bush seems to have appropriated 9/11 in ways very similar to how Israel's right wing Government has appropriated the Holocaust. Sadly, but all too effectively, 9/11 functions politically today as Bush's Holocaust. Perhaps his right wing Zionist advisors also instructed him on how to bring this off. The tragic victims of 9/11 - and of the Holocaust - deserve a better historical fate than this self-interested manipulation by regimes that share many of the worst features of their butchers.

Well, what's to be done? Besides urging that we replace the effort to provide the Government with a "better" means to reach our common end (where we accept their terms and framework for the debate) with an even greater effort to expose them (where the real reasons for the war become the main subject for discussion), I can summarize most of what else I have to offer on this subject by passing on an e-mail I got a couple weeks ago. Apparently, a recent study at the University of Sussex in England showed that demonstrating for a cause in which you believe is not only good for your conscience, it's also good for your health. No wonder participating in the big demonstration on February 15th felt so good. So, in the interest of good health - your's, the Iraqis', our troops' and the world's - keep it up.

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Greg Palast
< www.gregpalast.com >

On my BBC television show, Newsnight, an American journalist confessed that, since the 9/11 attacks, U.S. reporters are simply too afraid to ask the uncomfortable questions that could kill careers: "It's an obscene comparison, but there was a time in South Africa when people would put flaming tires around people's necks if they dissented. In some ways, the fear is that you will be neck-laced here, you will have a flaming tire of lack of patriotism put around your neck," Dan Rather said. Without his makeup, Rather looked drawn, old and defeated in confessing that he too had given in. "It's that fear that keeps journalists from asking the toughest of the tough questions and to continue to bore in on the tough questions so often."

Investigators were ordered to "back off" from any inquiries into Saudi Arabian financing of terror networks....

The reports I did based on this information won the California State University School of Journalism's Project Censored Award in 2002. It's not the kind of prize you want to win -- it's given to crucial stories that were effectively banned from U.S. airwaves and papers.³ I don't want any misunderstanding here, so I must emphasize what we did not find: We uncovered no information, none whatsoever, that George W. Bush had any advance knowledge of the plan to attack the World Trade Center on 9/11, nor, heaven forbid, any involvement in the attack.

FBI Document 199I

What we did discover was serious enough. To begin with, from less-than-happy FBI agents we obtained an interesting document, some 30 pages long, marked "SECRET." I've reproduced a couple of pages here (figure 2.1). Note the designation "199I" -- that's FBI-speak for "national security matter." According to insiders, FBI agents had wanted to check into two members of the bin Laden family, Abdullah and Omar, but were told to stay away by superiors -- until September 13, 2001. By then, Abdullah and Omar were long gone from the United States.

Why no investigation of the brothers bin Laden? The Bush administration's line is the Binladdins (a more common spelling of the Arabic name) are good folk. Osama's the Black Sheep, supposedly cut off from his Saudi kin. But the official line notwithstanding, some FBI agents believed the family had some gray sheep worth questioning -- especially these two working with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which the file labels "a suspected terrorist organization."

No matter how vile WAMY's indoctrination chats, they are none of the FBI's business. Recruitment for terror, however, is. Before 9/11, the governments of India and the Philippines tied WAMY to groups staging murderous attacks on civilians. Following our broadcast on BBC, the Dutch secret service stated that WAMY, "support(ed) violent activity." In 2002, The Wall Street Journal's Glenn Simpson made public a report by Bosnia's government that a charity with Abdullah bin Laden on its board had channeled money to Chechen guerrillas. Two of the 9/11 hijackers used an address on the same street as WAMY's office in Falls Church, Virginia.

The "Back-Off" Directive and the Islamic Bomb

Despite these tantalizing facts, Abdullah and his operations were A-OK with the FBI chiefs, if not their working agents. Just a dumb SNAFU? Not according to a top-level CIA operative who spoke with us on condition of strictest anonymity. After Bush took office, he said, "there was a major policy shift" at the National Security Agency. Investigators were ordered to "back off" from any inquiries into Saudi Arabian financing of terror networks, especially if they touched on Saudi royals and their retainers. That put the bin Ladens, a family worth a reported \$12 billion and a virtual arm of the Saudi royal household, off-limits for investigation. Osama was the exception; he remained a wanted man, but agents could not look too closely at how he filled his piggy bank. The key rule of any investigation, "follow the money," was now violated, and investigations -- at least before 9/11 -- began to die.

And there was a lot to investigate -- or in the case of the CIA and FBI under Bush -- a lot to ignore. Through well-known international arms dealers (I'm sorry, but in this business, sinners are better sources than saints) our team was tipped off to a meeting of Saudi billionaires at the Hotel Royale Monceau in Paris in May 1996 with the financial representative of Osama bin Laden's network. The Saudis, including a key Saudi prince joined by Muslim and non-Muslim gun traffickers, met to determine who would pay how much to Osama. This was not so much an act of support but of protection -- a payoff to keep the mad bomber away from Saudi Arabia....

Clinton Closed an Eye

True-blue Democrats may want to skip the next paragraphs. If President Bush put the kibosh on investigations of Saudi funding of terror and nuclear bomb programs, this was merely taking a policy of Bill Clinton one step further.

Following the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, Clinton hunted Osama with a passion -- but a passion circumscribed by the desire to protect the sheikdom sitting atop our oil lifeline. In 1994, a Saudi diplomat defected to the United States with 14,000 pages of documents from the kingdom's sealed file cabinets. This mother lode of intelligence included evidence of plans for the assassination of Saudi opponents living in the West and, tantalizingly, details of the \$7 billion the Saudis gave to Saddam Hussein for his nuclear program -- the first attempt to build an Islamic Bomb. The Saudi government, according to the defector, Mohammed Al Khilewi, slipped Saddam the nuclear loot during the Reagan and Bush Sr. years when our own government still thought Saddam too marvelous for words. The thought was that he would only use the bomb to vaporize Iranians....

In 1997, the Canadians caught and extradited to America one of the Khobar Towers attackers. In 1999, Vernon Jordan's law firm stepped in and -- poof! -- the killer was shipped back to Saudi Arabia before he could reveal all he knew about Al Qaeda (valuable) and the Saudis (embarrassing). I reviewed, but was not permitted to take notes on, the alleged terrorist's debriefing by the FBI. To my admittedly inexperienced eyes, there was enough on Al Qaeda to make him a source on terrorists worth holding on to. Not that he was set free -- he's in one of the kingdom's dungeons -- but his info is sealed up with him. The terrorist's extradition was "Clinton's." "Clinton's parting kiss to the Saudis," as one insider put it.

This make-a-sheik-happy policy of Clinton's may seem similar to Bush's, but the difference is significant. Where Clinton said, "Go slow," Bush policymakers said, "No go." The difference is between closing one eye and closing them both.

Blowback and Bush Sr.

Still, we are left with the question of why both Bush Jr. and Clinton would hold back disclosure of Saudi funding of terror. I got the first glimpse of an answer from Michael Springmann, who headed up the U.S. State Department's visa bureau in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, during the Reagan-Bush Sr. years. "In Saudi Arabia I was repeatedly ordered by high-level State Department officials to issue visas to unqualified applicants. These were, essentially, people who had no ties either to Saudi Arabia or to their own country. I complained bitterly at the time there." That was Springmann's mistake. He was one of those conscientious midlevel bureaucrats who did not realize that when he filed reports about rules violations he was jeopardizing the cover for a huge multicontinental intelligence operation aimed at the Soviets. Springmann assumed petty thievery: someone was taking bribes, selling visas; so he couldn't understand why his complaints about rule-breakers were "met with silence" at the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

Springmann complained himself right out of a job. Now a lawyer, he has obtained more information on the questionable "engineers" with no engineering knowledge whom he was ordered to permit into the United States. "What I was protesting was, in reality, an effort to bring

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recruits, rounded up by Osama bin Laden, to the United States for terrorist training by the CIA. They would then be returned to Afghanistan to fight against the then-Soviets."

Clinton hunted Osama with a passion ... circumscribed by the desire to protect the sheikdom sitting atop our oil lifeline.

But then they turned their talents against the post-Soviet power: us. In the parlance of spook-world, this is called "blowback." Bin Laden and his bloody brethren were created in America's own Frankenstein factory. It would not do for the current president nor agency officials to dig back to find that some of the terrorists we are hunting today were trained and armed by the Reagan-Bush administration. And that's one of the problems for agents seeking to investigate groups like WAMY, or Abdullah bin Laden. WAMY literature that talks about that "compassionate young man Osama bin Laden" is likely to have been disseminated, if not written, by our very own government. If Abdullah's Bosnian-operated "charity" was funding Chechnyan guerrillas, it is only possible because the Clinton CIA gave the wink and nod to WAMY and other groups who were aiding Bosnian guerrillas when they were fighting Serbia, a U.S.-approved enemy. "What we're talking about," says national security expert Joe! Trento, "is embarrassing, career-destroying blowback for intelligence officials." And, he could add, for the presidential father.

The Family Business

I still didn't have an answer to all my questions. We knew that Clinton and the Bushes were reluctant to discomfort the Saudis by unearthing their connections to terrorists -- but what made this new president take particular care to protect the Saudis, even to the point of stymying his own intelligence agencies?

The answers kept coming back: "Carlyle" and "Arbusto."

While some people have guardian angels, our president seems to have guardian sheiks....

Behind Carlyle is a private, invitation-only investment group whose holdings in the war industry make it effectively one of America's biggest defense contractors. For example, Carlyle owned United Technologies, the maker of our fighter jets. Carlyle has the distinction of claiming both of the presidents Bush as paid retainers. Dubya served on the board of Carlyle's Caterair airplane food company until it went bust. The senior Bush traveled to Saudi Arabia for Carlyle in 1999. The bin Ladens were among Carlyle's select backers until just after the 9/11 attacks, when the connection became impolitic. The company's chairman is Frank Carlucci, Bush Sr.'s former defense secretary. The average Carlyle partner has gained about \$25 million in equity. Notably, Saudi Prince Al Waleed bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz employed Carlyle as his advisor in buying up 10 percent of Citicorp's preferred stock. The choice of Carlyle for the high-fee work was odd, as the group is not an investment bank. !

One would almost think the Saudi potentate wanted to enrich Carlyle's members....

Who Lost the War on Terror?

So who lost the War on Terror? Osama? From his point of view, he's made the celebrity cutthroats' Hall of Fame. Where is he? Don't ask Bush; our leader just changes the subject to Iraq. So we have the 82nd Airborne looking for Osama bin Laden among the camels in Afghanistan when, in all likelihood, the billionaire butcher -- now likely beardless -- is chillin' by the pool at the Ritz Carlton, knocking back a brewsky and laughing at us while two blonde Barbies massage his feet.

Bush failed to get Osama. But we did successfully eliminate the threat of Congresswoman McKinney -- you remember, the one who dared question ChoicePoint, the company that helped Katherine Harris eliminate Black voters.

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Following our BBC broadcast and Guardian report in November 2001, McKinney cited our stories on the floor of Congress, calling for an investigation of the intelligence failures and policy prejudices you've just read here. She was labeled a traitor, a freak, a conspiracy nut and "a looney" – the latter by her state's Democratic Senator, who led the mob in the political lynching of the uppity Black woman. The New York Times wrote, "She angered some Black voters by suggesting that President Bush might have known in advance about the September 11 attacks but had done nothing so his supporters could make money in war." The fact that she said no such thing doesn't matter; the Times is always more influential than the truth. Dan Rather had warned her, shut up, don't ask questions, and you can avoid the neck-lacing. She didn't and it cost her her seat in Congress.

McKinney's electoral corpse in the road silenced politicians, the media was mum, but some Americans still would not get in line. For them we have new laws to permit investigating citizens without warrants, and the label of terrorist fellow-traveler attached to groups from civil rights organizations to trade treaty protestors. Yet not one FBI or CIA agent told us, "If only we didn't have that pesky Bill of Rights, we would have nailed bin Laden." Not one said, "What we need is a new bureaucracy for Fatherland Security." Not one said we needed to jail everyone in the Midwest named "Ahmed." They had a single request: for George W. Bush's security henchmen to get their boot heels off agents' necks and remove the shield of immunity from the Saudis.

[Cynthia] McKinney's electoral corpse in the road silenced politicians, the media was mum, but some Americans still would not get in line.

That leaves one final, impertinent question. Who won?

(See <http://tompaine.com/feature.cfm/ID/7310> for the entire article including footnotes.)

On February 25, Plume/Penguin USA released the new, expanded American edition of Greg Palast's New York Times bestseller *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy: An Investigative Reporter Exposes the Truth About Globalization, Corporate Cons and High Finance Fraudsters*. You can view Palast's reports for BBC Television's *Newsnight* and his columns for the Guardian papers of London at <http://www.gregpalast.com>.

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Special Report


Justice Dept. Drafts Sweeping Expansion of Anti-Terrorism Act

By [Charles Lewis](#) and [Adam Mayle](#)

(WASHINGTON, Feb. 7, 2003) -- The Bush Administration is preparing a bold, comprehensive sequel to the USA Patriot Act passed in the wake of September 11, 2001, which will give the government broad, sweeping new powers to increase domestic intelligence-gathering, surveillance and law enforcement prerogatives, and simultaneously decrease judicial review and public access to information.

The Center for Public Integrity has obtained a draft, dated January 9, 2003, of this previously undisclosed legislation




and is making it available in full text  (12 MB). The bill, drafted by the staff of Attorney General John Ashcroft and entitled the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, has not been officially released by the Department of Justice, although rumors of its development have circulated around the Capitol for the last few months under the name of "the Patriot Act II" in legislative parlance.


"We haven't heard anything from the Justice Department on updating the Patriot Act," House Judiciary Committee spokesman Jeff Lungren told the Center. "They haven't shared their thoughts on that. Obviously, we'd be interested, but we haven't heard anything at this point."

Senior members of the Senate Judiciary Committee minority staff have inquired about Patriot II for months and have been told as recently as this week that there is no such legislation being planned.

Mark Corallo, deputy director of Justice's Office of Public Affairs, told the Center his office was unaware of the draft. "I have heard people talking about revising the Patriot Act, we are looking to work on things the way we would do with any law," he said. "We may work to make modifications to protect Americans," he added. When told that the Center had a copy of the draft legislation, he said, "This is all news to me. I have never heard of this."

After the Center posted this story, Barbara Comstock, director of public affairs for the

Justice Dept., released a statement  saying that, "Department staff have not presented any final proposals to either the Attorney General or the White House. It would be premature to speculate on any future decisions, particularly ideas or proposals that are still being discussed at staff levels."

An Office of Legislative Affairs "control sheet"  that was obtained by the PBS program "Now With Bill Moyers" seems to indicate that a copy of the bill was sent to Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert and Vice President Richard Cheney on Jan. 10, 2003. "Attached for your review and comment is a draft legislative proposal entitled the 'Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003,'" the memo, sent from "OLP" or Office of Legal Policy, says.

Comstock later told the Center that the draft "is an early discussion draft and it has not been sent to either the Vice President or the Speaker of the House."

Dr. David Cole, Georgetown University Law professor and author of *Terrorism and the Constitution*, reviewed the draft legislation at the request of the Center, and said that the legislation "raises a lot of serious concerns. It's troubling that they have gotten this far along and they've been telling people there is nothing in the works." This proposed law, he added, "would radically expand law enforcement and intelligence gathering authorities, reduce or eliminate judicial oversight over surveillance, authorize secret arrests, create a DNA database based on unchecked executive 'suspicion,' create new death penalties, and even seek to take American citizenship away from persons who belong to or support disfavored political groups."

RELATED DOCUMENTS



The draft of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (12 MB)

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The Office of Legislative Affairs "control sheet" which shows that a copy of the bill was sent to Speaker Hastert and Vice President Cheney (157 KB)



Read the Justice Department's response to this report. (230 KB)

RELATED LINKS

For additional information, visit the web site of PBS' "Now With Bill Moyers". Read the transcript of Moyers' interview with Charles Lewis.

Some of the key provision of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 include:

Section 201, "Prohibition of Disclosure of Terrorism Investigation Detainee Information": Safeguarding the dissemination of information related to national security has been a hallmark of Ashcroft's first two years in office, and the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 follows in the footsteps of his October 2001 directive to carefully consider such interest when granting Freedom of Information Act requests. While the October memo simply encouraged FOIA officers to take national security, "protecting sensitive business information and, not least, preserving personal privacy" into account while deciding on requests, the proposed legislation would enhance the department's ability to deny releasing material on suspected terrorists in government custody through FOIA.

Section 202, "Distribution of 'Worst Case Scenario' Information": This would introduce new FOIA restrictions with regard to the Environmental Protection Agency. As provided for in the Clean Air Act, the EPA requires private companies that use potentially dangerous chemicals must produce a "worst case scenario" report detailing the effect that the release of these controlled substances would have on the surrounding community. Section 202 of this Act would, however, restrict FOIA requests to these reports, which the bill's drafters refer to as "a roadmap for terrorists." By reducing public access to "read-only" methods for only those persons "who live and work in the geographical area likely to be affected by a worst-case scenario," this subtitle would obfuscate an established level of transparency between private industry and the public.

Section 301-306, "Terrorist Identification Database": These sections would authorize creation of a DNA database on "suspected terrorists," expansively defined to include association with suspected terrorist groups, and noncitizens suspected of certain crimes or of having supported any group designated as terrorist.

Section 312, "Appropriate Remedies with Respect to Law Enforcement Surveillance Activities": This section would terminate all state law enforcement consent decrees before Sept. 11, 2001, not related to racial profiling or other civil rights violations, that limit such agencies from gathering information about individuals and organizations. The authors of this statute claim that these consent orders, which were passed as a result of police spying abuses, could impede current terrorism investigations. It would also place substantial restrictions on future court injunctions.

Section 405, "Presumption for Pretrial Detention in Cases Involving Terrorism": While many people charged with drug offenses punishable by prison terms of 10 years or more are held before their trial without bail, this provision would create a comparable statute for those suspected of terrorist activity. The reasons for presumptively holding suspected terrorists before trial, the Justice Department summary memo states, are clear. "This presumption is warranted because of the unparalleled magnitude of the danger to the United States and its people posed by acts of terrorism, and because terrorism is typically engaged in by groups – many with international connections – that are often in a position to help their members flee or go into hiding."

Section 501, "Expatriation of Terrorists": This provision, the drafters say, would establish that an American citizen could be expatriated "if, with the intent to relinquish his nationality, he becomes a member of, or provides material support to, a group that the United States has designated as a 'terrorist organization'." But whereas a citizen formerly had to state his intent to relinquish his

citizenship, the new law affirms that his intent can be "inferred from conduct." Thus, engaging in the lawful activities of a group designated as a "terrorist organization" by the Attorney General could be presumptive grounds for expatriation.

The Domestic Security Enhancement Act is the latest development in an 18-month trend in which the Bush Administration has sought expanded powers and responsibilities for law enforcement bodies to help counter the threat of terrorism.

The USA Patriot Act, signed into law by President Bush on Oct. 26, 2001, gave law enforcement officials broader authority to conduct electronic surveillance and wiretaps, and gives the president the authority, when the nation is under attack, to confiscate any property within U.S. jurisdiction of anyone believed to be engaging in such attacks. The measure also tightened oversight of financial activities to prevent money laundering and diminish bank secrecy in an effort to disrupt terrorist finances.

It also changed provisions of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which was passed in 1978 during the Cold War. FISA established a different standard of government oversight and judicial review for "foreign intelligence" surveillance than that applied to traditional domestic law enforcement surveillance.

The USA Patriot Act allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to share information gathered in terrorism investigations under the "foreign intelligence" standard with local law enforcement agencies, in essence nullifying the higher standard of oversight that applied to domestic investigations. The USA Patriot Act also amended FISA to permit surveillance under the less rigorous standard whenever "foreign intelligence" was a "significant purpose" rather than the "primary purpose" of an investigation.

The draft legislation goes further in that direction. "In the [USA Patriot Act] we have to break down the wall of foreign intelligence and law enforcement," Cole said. "Now they want to break down the wall between international terrorism and domestic terrorism."

In an Oct. 9, 2002, hearing of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher testified that Justice had been, "looking at potential proposals on following up on the PATRIOT Act for new tools and we have also been working with different agencies within the government and they are still studying that and hopefully we will continue to work with this committee in the future on new tools that we believe are necessary in the war on terrorism."

Asked by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-Wis.) whether she could inform the committee of what specific areas Justice was looking at, Fisher replied, "At this point I can't, I'm sorry. They're studying a lot of different ideas and a lot of different tools that follow up on information sharing and other aspects."

Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy Viet Dinh, who was the principal author of the first Patriot Act, told *Legal Times* last October that there was "an ongoing process to continue evaluating and re-evaluating authorities we have with respect to counterterrorism," but declined to say whether a new bill was forthcoming.

Former FBI Director William Sessions, who urged caution while Congress considered the USA

Patriot Act, did not want to enter the fray concerning a possible successor bill.

"I hate to jump into it, because it's a very delicate thing," Sessions told the Center, without acknowledging whether he knew of any proposed additions or revisions to the additional Patriot bill.

When the first bill was nearing passage in the Congress in late 2001, however, Sessions told Internet site NewsMax.Com that the balance between civil liberties and sufficient intelligence gathering was a difficult one. "First of all, the Attorney General has to justify fully what he's asking for," Sessions, who served presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush as FBI Director from 1987 until 1993, said at the time. "We need to be sure that we provide an effective means to deal with criminality." At the same time, he said, "we need to be sure that we are mindful of the Constitution, mindful of privacy considerations, but also meet the technological needs we have" to gather intelligence.

Cole found it disturbing that there have been no consultations with Congress on the draft legislation. "It raises a lot of serious concerns and is troubling as a generic matter that they have gotten this far along and tell people that there is nothing in the works. What that suggests is that they're waiting for a propitious time to introduce it, which might well be when a war is begun. At that time there would be less opportunity for discussion and they'll have a much stronger hand in saying that they need these right away."

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Michaël Moore**LETTRE À GEORGES BUSH**

jeudi 6 mars 2003

Cher georges

Depuis que tu es président des États Unis, de mauvaises langues prétendent que tu te tournes les pouces. Pourtant en quelques mois, tu as réussi à :

- 1) Réduire de 39 millions de dollars le budget des bibliothèques fédérales
- 2) Réduire de 35 millions de dollars le budget du programme de formation en médecine pédiatrique avancée.
- 3) Réduire de 50% le budget de la recherche sur les énergies renouvelables.
- 4) Repousser l'émission du règlement réduisant les niveaux "acceptables" d'arsenic dans l'eau potable.
- 5) Réduire de 28% le budget du programme de recherche pour des véhicules moins polluants et moins consommateurs d'énergie.
- 6) Abolir la législation permettant à l'État de refuser tout contrat public aux entreprises qui violent les lois fédérales, les lois de protection de l'environnement et les règles de sécurité sur le lieu de travail.
- 7) permettre à la secrétaire de l'Intérieur Gale Norton d'explorer la possibilité d'ouvrir les parcs nationaux à l'exploitation forestière et minière et aux forages pétroliers et gaziers.
- 8) Renier ta promesse de campagne d'investir 100 millions de dollars par an dans la protection des forêts tropicales.
- 9) Réduire de 86% le programme communautaire d'accès aux soins, qui organisait la coopération des hôpitaux publics, des cliniques privées et autres prestataires pour venir en aide aux malades dépourvus d'assurance médicale.
- 10) Réduire à néant une proposition visant à accroître l'accès du public aux informations sur les conséquences potentielles des accidents chimiques industriels.
- 11) Réduire de 60 millions de dollars le programme de logements sociaux de la fondation d'aide à l'enfance.

- 12) Refuser de signer l'accord de Kyoto sur l'effet de serre, contre la volonté de 178 pays.
- 13) Rejeter un accord international ayant pour but l'application du traité de 1972 bannissant les armements micro biologiques.
- 14) réduire de 200 millions de dollars le budget des programmes de formation des travailleurs au chômage.
- 15) réduire de 200 millions de dollars le Fonds pour l'enfance et le développement, un programme qui permet aux famille à bas revenus de faire garder leurs enfants pendant es heures de travail.
- 16) Éliminer la couverture des contraceptifs prescrits médicalement pour les fonctionnaires de l'administration fédérale (alors que le Viagra est encore couvert).
- 17) Réduire de 700 millions de dollars le budget de réhabilitation des logements sociaux.
- 18) Réduire d'un demi milliard de dollars le budget de l'EPA (agence de protection de l'environnement).
- 19) Abolir les directives concernant les règles d'hygiène et de sécurité sur les lieux de travail.
- 20) Renier ta promesse de campagne de réguler les émissions de dioxyde de carbone qui contribuent fortement à l'effet de serre.
- 21) Interdire l'attribution d'aides d'origine fédérale aux organisations internationales de planning familial qui fournissent des conseils ou des services en matière d'IVG, fussent-elles financées sur fond propres.
- 22) Nommer responsable en matière d'hygiène et de sécurité minières auprès du ministère du Travail un ancien dirigeant d'une entreprise minière, Dan Laurier.
- 23) Nommer sous secrétaire au ministère de l'Intérieur Lynn Scarlett, un fonctionnaire qui ne croit pas à l'effet de serre et qui s'oppose à l'introduction de règles plus contraignantes contre la pollution atmosphérique.

- 24) Approuver le projet controversé du ministère de l'Intérieur Gale Norton, qui consiste à mettre aux enchères des fonds marins proches de la côte est de la Floride aux fins d'exploitation pétrolière et gazière.
- 25) Prévoir l'autorisation de forages pétroliers dans une aire protégée du Montana, la Lewis and Clark National Forest.
- 26) Menacer de fermer le Bureau de lutte contre le sida de la maison Blanche.
- 27) Décider de ne plus consulter l'Association américaine du barreau en matière de nomination des juges fédéraux.
- 28) refuser toute aide financière aux étudiants condamnés pour des délits de toxicomanie mineurs(alors que les personnes condamnées pour assassinat ont toujours droit à ces aides).
- 29) Dégager seulement 3% du montant défini par les avocats du département de la justice pour le budget alloué aux poursuites de l'administration contre l'industrie du tabac.
- 30) Faire passer ton projet de baisse d'impôts qui profite, pour 43% au 1% des américains les plus fortunés.
- 31) Signer un décret qui rend beaucoup plus difficile aux américains disposant de revenus faibles ou moyens de se déclarer en faillite personnelle, même quand ils font face à des dépenses médicales exceptionnelles.
- 32) Nommer directeur du personnel de la Maison Blanche Kay Cole James, une adversaire de la discrimination positive en faveur des minorités.
- 33) Réduire de 15,7 millions de dollars le budget du programme contre la maltraitance des mineurs.
- 34) proposer l'élimination du programme "Lire, c'est fondamental", qui permettait de distribuer gratuitement des livres aux enfants de familles pauvres.
- 35) Stimuler le développement d'armements "micro nucléaires" destinés à atteindre des cibles souterraines et ce en violation du traité d'interdiction des essais nucléaires.

- 36) Essayer d'éliminer une législation protégeant 24 millions d'hectares de forêts contre toute fore d'exploitation forestière et contre la construction de routes.
- 37) Nommer responsable du contrôle des armements et des questions de sécurité internationale John Bolton, adversaire des traités de non-prolifération et hostile à l'ONU.
- 38) Nommer une dirigeante de Monsanto, Linda Fisher, comme administratrice adjointe de l'Agence de protection de l'environnement.
- 39) Nommer à un poste de juge fédéral Michael McConnel, dont on connaît bien l'opposition à la séparation de l'Église et de l'État .
- 40) Nommer à un poste de juge fédéral Terrence Boyle, adversaire des droits civiques.
- 41) Éliminer la date butoir de 2004 accordée aux constructeurs d'automobiles pour développer des prototypes de véhicules plus économes en carburant.
- 42) Nommer à la tête du programme gouvernemental de lutte contre la drogue John Walters, adversaire du traitement des toxicomanes incarcérée.
- 43) Nommer secrétaire adjoint à l'intérieur J. Steven Giles, bien connu pour son travail au service des lobbies du charbon et du pétrole.
- 44) Nommer responsable pour l'eau et la recherche scientifique auprès du ministère Bennet Raley, adversaire de la législation en faveur de la protection des espèces menacées.
- 45) Faire pression pour bloquer les poursuites engagées contre le Japon par les femmes asiatiques ayant servi d'esclaves sexuelles aux troupes japonaises pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.
- 46) Nommer conseiller juridique de la maison Blanche Ted Olson, ton principal avocat dans la controverse juridique sur la légalité du scrutin en Floride.
- 47) Proposer d'améliorer la procédure d'autorisation de la construction de barrages et de centrales nucléaires, y compris en affaiblissant les critères de protection de l'environnement.

48) Proposer la vente de zones de forage gazier et pétrolier dans les aires protégées de l'Alaska.

Et maintenant, tu veux te lancer dans une guerre dont tu ne mesures pas les conséquences à venir.

Je crois, cher Georges, que la France devrait faire voter par l'ONU l'envoi de casques bleus aux USA car visiblement, tu es en train de faire ce qu'aucun de tes prédécesseurs n'avait osé faire à ton peuple.....ET PAR VOIE DE CONSÉQUENCE A NOUS.

Alors, cesse de faire joujou avec tes soldats et de traiter Saddam Hussein comme un ennemi car visiblement tu lui ressembles.

Allez Georges, rentre chez toi et arrête de faire peur à mon fils avec tes bruits de bottes.

Michael Moore est un réalisateur américain. Extraits de Mike contre-attaque, édition La Découverte, Paris 2000. Ce pamphlet anti Bush vient d'être élu "livre de l'année" en Grande-Bretagne.

U. S. Foreign Policy

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177. "Building Up New Bogeymen (a review of Samuel Huntington's book, *The Clash of Civilizations in Foreign Policy*, 1998), by Stephen M. Walt.
178. "Why Consensus is So Elusive in U.S. Foreign Policy (*The Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 1998) by Peter Trubowitz.
179. "Ethnic Conflict (*Foreign Policy*, summer 1998) by Yahya Sadowski.
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186. Map: The World with Commanders' Areas of Responsibility.
187. *World Defense Review* (February 2007) "President George W. Bush announces the New U. S. Military Command for Africa," by J. Peter Pham.
188. "Conform or reform? Social movements and the Mass Media," by Michael Barker (*Fifth Estate*, February 2007).

RAVAGING THE POOR: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND INDICTED BY ITS OWN DATA

Gabriel Kolko

Recent International Monetary Fund studies on the impact of its structural adjustment programs on the poorest nations reveal that most have stagnated or declined economically. The IMF's requirement that these countries increase exports despite falling world commodity prices has been a principal cause of their economic malaise. Meanwhile, IMF loan conditions demanding lower government expenditures have led to sharp reductions in general social spending, from which the wealthiest quintile of the population receives a disproportionately larger share of outlays for health and education.

For the first time since its creation a half-century ago, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is being subjected to severe criticisms from establishment sources that may profoundly alter its future role in guiding the world economy.

The IMF's failure to reverse the economic crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, which is now spreading throughout Asia, is producing unprecedented condemnations from powerful voices within business and policy circles who believe that the Fund's conservative strategy, with its insistence on slashing government spending to balance budgets, is endangering the stability of the entire world economy. Since the beginning of the year (1998), Harvard Professor Martin Feldstein, former chair of Reagan's Council of Economic Advisers and arguably the single most influential U.S. economist, the prestigious *Financial Times*, billionaire speculator George Soros, and many others have raised fundamental questions about the IMF's direction of the world economy. In March, the World Bank formally withdrew from joint sponsorship of the quarterly *Finance & Development*, which for 34 years had reflected the profound consensus between the two institutions, and Bank officials have publicly attacked the IMF's core policies in Asia.

Far less powerful critics have long condemned the IMF on a different score. They have contended that IMF "structural adjustment" programs, imposed on dozens of poor Third World nations, perpetuate and even intensify poverty. The

IMF always admitted that adjustment may involve short-term social costs for vulnerable groups, but asserted that this short-term pain would ultimately benefit the poor themselves, since Fund-spurred economic growth would solve the basic problem of underdevelopment. Well before the economic storm in East Asia began to rage, the IMF was under mounting attack.

THE IMF IMPOSES RULES

In December 1987, the IMF expanded its existing structural adjustment program to create an "Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility" (ESAF). It invited "low-income developing nations" to borrow from it. By August 1997, 79 countries were eligible to join ESAF but only 36, with a combined population of around 670 million, had done so. In order to receive ESAF loans, countries must agree to the IMF's "conditionality" and make "general commitments to cooperate with the IMF in setting policies to the formulation of specific, quantifiable plans for financial policies."

These conditions include fundamental domestic and external policies that, depending on the IMF's intentions, can effectively control a state's crucial social and economic priorities. Among the standard IMF prescriptions for developing countries: reducing government spending and involvement in the economy; promoting exports and removing trade restrictions; deregulating the economy; privatizing government-run enterprises; eliminating price subsidies, including on essentials like food and housing; and imposing consumption taxes. The IMF reviews country compliance with "performance criteria" designed to measure adoption of these policies on a semi-annual or even monthly basis. Countries that fail to pass the test are denied additional drawings on previously agreed-to loans.

Most World Bank aid, and much of the development aid that nations give, is dependent on a country satisfying IMF criteria. The Fund therefore serves as a gatekeeper to official loans and aid, and has far more power than the funds it provides directly would suggest.

The IMF has always defended its draconian demands as the essential preconditions to economic growth, without which poverty and stagnation will continue. But growth in the developing nations under IMF tutelage has either not occurred or occurred only very unevenly. Indeed, a number of national economies following IMF prescriptions have even shrunk. In the face of mounting criticism of its performance, in 1996 the IMF initiated a review of its impact "in strengthening economic performance in ESAF countries." On July 28, 1997, the IMF issued a laudatory summary, but postponed releasing a carefully edited complete text until late February.

The policy implications of this review are very profound; the IMF cannot allow the data it gathers to be used to prove that a major aspect of its work is useless, much less harmful, to the nations accepting its guidance. Not surprisingly, the IMF interpreted the data it released as vindication of its success. But no amount

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of statistical manipulation can reverse the fact that the majority of those nations that have followed the IMF's advice have experienced profound economic crises: low or even declining growth, much larger foreign debts, and the stagnation that perpetuates systemic poverty. Carefully analyzed, the IMF's own studies provide a devastating assessment of the social and economic consequences of its guidance of dozens of poor nations.

ASSESSING POOR NATIONS

The July 28, 1997, IMF release of the preliminary results of its internal review of all 79 low-income developing nations gave the best possible interpretation of the ESAF nations' performance, but it was unconvincing. Even on the basis of the data as the IMF presented them, countries that stayed out of ESAF began and remained better off by not accepting its advice. The value of all such comparisons is limited by the fact that most of the poor countries not participating in ESAF chose nonetheless to adopt IMF-preferred policies, though often not as fully as the Fund would like.

The IMF claimed per capita annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth for ESAF countries declined 1.1 percent in 1981-1985, before the ESAF program began, and rose to zero growth during 1990-1995. Non-ESAF developing nations rose from 0.3 percent in 1981-1985 to 1.0 percent in 1991-1995.

ESAF failed at one of its key, ostensible purposes: reducing poor countries' foreign debt. External debt as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) for the ESAF nations grew from 82 percent in 1980-1985 to 154 percent in 1991-1995. Non-ESAF nations were far less encumbered: their external debt grew from 56 to 76 percent of their GNP.

The biggest difference between ESAF and non-ESAF country performance was in exports, not surprising since maximizing exports and integrating developing countries into the world economy is the ultimate objective of all IMF programs. The annual export growth of the ESAF nations increased more than four times, according to the August 5, 1997, *IMF Survey* (the IMF's biweekly publication reporting on Fund activities, policies and research), from 1.7 percent in 1981-1985 to 7.9 percent in 1991-1994, while the non-ESAF nations' exports grew modestly, from 4.4 percent to 5.7 percent.

To assess the impact of the IMF's structural adjustment programs accurately, however, a different methodology than the IMF's should be used: only nations that are economically similar should be compared. Some of the non-ESAF nations had 1995 per capita incomes of \$3,000 or more, and should not be compared to countries with per capita incomes roughly a tenth as large. There are 23 nations under ESAF for which data exist (with approximately 436 million population) with a per capita income below \$400, and 13 non-ESAF nations (with 1.2 billion population) with similarly low incomes. These are the countries that should be studied to evaluate the IMF's ESAF program.

There are also limits in comparing the two groups of states under \$400 annual per capita income, however. Significantly, averaging the 22 poorest ESAF nations for which there are sufficient data against the 13 that were independent fails to weight them by population size, which varies enormously; but to weight them introduces other distortions. The vast bulk of the non-ESAF population lived in India, while Pakistan and Bangladesh accounted for about half those under the ESAF.

Ignoring population, during 1985–1995 the poorest ESAF nations had a negative growth of 0.1 percent annually, while the 11 poorest non-ESAF nations declined 0.4 percent annually. The external debt of ESAF countries as a percent of the GNP grew from 52 percent in 1980 (in the 16 countries for which there are data) to 154 percent in 1995 (23 nations). For 11 non-ESAF nations it increased three times, to 117 percent—about the same for both groups. Debt service (interest payments on foreign debt) as a percentage of exports of goods and services over the same time grew from 16 percent to 21 percent for ESAF countries, 11 to 23 percent for the others.

On the basis of these data, there was no great difference between these two groups—all were in severe economic difficulty. But if India is assigned its importance by population, the non-ESAF poor nations as an aggregate performed far better. India had an annual growth rate from 1985 through 1995 of 3.2 percent, nearly three times that of Pakistan and one-half more than Bangladesh. Although it has begun to move to implement IMF-style liberalization in the 1990s, India remains far less dependent on exports than other low-income nations, and this has insulated it from external pressures and made stable, steady growth possible. More important, unlike its two large neighbors, its terms-of-trade (the relative value of the goods and services a nation imports compared to its exports) since 1985 have not varied greatly, further protecting it from the fluctuations of the world economy. Given the experience of these three nations only, there is a powerful argument against integrating a nation into the world economy and linking its development more than is absolutely essential into an inherently unstable export system.

Increasing exports is an absolute condition for IMF loans and ESAF nations embarked on an export-led development strategy. This decision was a recipe for stagnation and explains one crucial reason for the decline in growth for most of those who pursued it. Between 1985 and 1995 the terms-of-trade for the 18 very poor ESAF nations for which data exist fell 27 percent, according to the World Bank's *World Development Report 1997*, the basic source for the IMF's reviews and this article. This emphasis on exports in the face of declining prices was a disastrous strategic choice for development, because it is highly unlikely for a nation to export its way out of poverty in the face of falling prices for its goods. The result was that the states that the IMF directed, containing 670 million people, continue on a cycle that produces growing debts and sustains human deprivation. India chose another course, and

notwithstanding its other difficulties, it averted many of the grave problems existing elsewhere.

Despite some modest differences, all very poor nations have fared badly, and debts have aggravated rather than cured their basic problems. Indeed, it is the very fact they become indebted that compels many of them to submit to the IMF's control, creating a vicious cycle of yet greater obligations—and poverty.

SEVERELY INDEBTED

Nothing proves the danger of excessive reliance on exports more than the World Bank's list, published in the *World Development Report 1996*, of 25 countries that are "severely indebted exporters of nonfuel primary products." These are among the world's poorest nations, and 16 of them (with a 1995 population of 217 million) were under the IMF's ESAF guidance; nine (with 143 million persons) were not. Of the 23 nations under IMF control with per capita income below \$400, 13 were in the especially troubled economy category.

The 10 highly indebted ESAF nations under \$400 per capita for which data exist during 1985–1995 had an average per capita GNP decline of 0.6 percent (compared to 0.2 percent for all ESAF nations together). For the seven non-ESAF states for which there are data, the average annual decline was 1.4 percent. What united all of these nations was that their external debt as a percentage of the GNP increased about three times between 1980 and 1995, their debt service consumed about a quarter of their exports of goods and services, and they became more deeply mired in debt. The terms-of-trade for their exports fell 23 percent between 1985 and 1995. Although nine were not under direct IMF supervision, they all nonetheless pursued its program for export-oriented development and staked their economic future on exports. The gamble failed: they stagnated and became poorer.

THE IMF'S SOCIAL COSTS

It is, above all else, the human and social consequences of the IMF's structural reform programs that has evoked the most condemnation, compelling the IMF to embark on an aggressive defense of its crucial role in the Third World. But the emerging IMF data only confirm that IMF policies have eroded existing social services and aggravated the poverty and suffering of hundreds of millions of people.

One IMF structural reform program demand that directly affects the poor is the forced reduction of government deficits. This comprises everything from slashing price subsidies for rice and fuel—which, as in Indonesia last May, often produces social disorder where implemented—to health clinics and public works. "Due regard needs to be paid to the cost-effectiveness and financial viability of these safety nets," stated the Fund in the December 15, 1997, *IMF Survey*—which

means reducing them for the sake of a prosperous future which, so far, has never arrived.

As a companion to its defense of the ESAF, the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department last November (1997) produced a study, "The IMF and the Poor," which reported health and education spending in 23 ESAF-supported nations for which it had data, comparing the three years before each nation accepted the ESAF to 1994 or 1995. On balance, the IMF concluded, ESAF countries increased health and education spending after adopting structural adjustment programs.

However, six of the 23 countries examined, containing 122 million people—one-fifth of the ESAF nations' population—reduced the proportion of their GDP allocated to health and education. And the report does not include the 13 countries under ESAF for which it did not have data. Those excluded have a combined population of one-third of the 620 million persons in the ESAF countries in 1994. The report's optimistic conclusions therefore applied, at most, to slightly under half of the people under ESAF programs—but even here the IMF distorted the data.

The IMF report averaged real per capita spending for health and education in its 23 nations. But averages are wholly misleading; the real issue is which class within each nation's population gains most from socially sponsored health and education programs—that is, whether the benefits are spread evenly. In a sample of eight ESAF nations, the IMF study found that the wealthiest fifth of the population received 32 percent of the education benefits, and the poorest 13 percent. For five nations where health data existed, the wealthiest quintile received 30 percent of the allocations, the poorest 12 percent. In Vietnam, an ESAF nation whose relative spending on health and education has dropped, the wealthiest fifth receives 45 percent of the public subsidies for health and education, according to the World Bank's January 1995 "Viet Nam: Poverty Assessment and Strategy."

The IMF's own evidence shows that the poorest three-fifths of these nations are being largely excluded from whatever social "safety net" exists for education, health, housing, and social security and welfare; their position has either not changed or, for many, become worse.

In some ways, focusing on health and education spending is misleading. IMF conditionalities affect the population's economic security considerably more than does spending on health and education. ESAF programs routinely cut government wages and salaries and facilitate private sector wage cuts and layoffs, so that each nation becomes "cost-effective" in the world export market. Price subsidies on basic commodities like bread and cooking oil—most critical for the poor—are cut. The higher value-added taxes it advocates are regressive on income distribution.

Ignoring the fact that it did not benefit the poorest, the nominal increase for health and education as a percentage of GDP in its 23 nations was only one-seventh of the reduction in wages, salaries, subsidies, and transfers that the ESAF

program imposed on the total population, with the worst impact felt by the poorest. (The net decline for these functions combined was 1.8 percent of GDP.) The IMF's own data confirm that structural adjustment programs made the poor even poorer.

Unfortunately for the IMF, just as it was preparing its rebuttals of the widespread belief that its strategy hurts the poor, the World Bank, its sister institution, published a comprehensive analysis of poverty in the developing nations since 1980 which provides further evidence on how the IMF's programs have helped to sustain and create it. The Bank's study, published in the May 1997 *World Bank Economic Review*, traces poverty rates in 42 nations, divided by regions. It found that trends in living standards and absolute poverty are linked, above all else, to economic growth. No region displayed a consistent pattern, but Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa—regions where the IMF was most active—generally had a higher incidence of poverty since 1980, while poverty declined in East and South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.

THE IMF BURDEN

Most of the nations whose economic destinies the IMF has guided have not grown; they have either stagnated or declined economically, and the poor have suffered both in the short and long run in the name of the Fund's socially dangerous ideological mystifications. Save for India, which alone confirms the value of independent strategies, most of the poor nations which remained outside the ESAF program did not do much better, but they certainly did not do worse than the IMF-led countries.


The causes of the sustained crisis of development in the Third World are extremely complex, but it is certain that excessive reliance on export-led growth in an unstable world economy creates major structural problems that all growth strategies must avoid. But exports are at the core of the IMF philosophy, and its guidance has gravely hindered the struggle of innumerable poor nations to escape their suffering.

Note — This article is adapted from a report published in *Multinational Monitor*, June 1998, pp. 20–23.

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ARTICLES



NAFTA at 10: Where Do We Go From Here?

Ten years ago, the North American Free Trade Agreement was sold to the people of the United States, Mexico and Canada as a simple treaty eliminating tariffs on goods crossing the three countries' borders. But NAFTA is much more: It is the constitution of an emerging continental economy that recognizes one citizen—the business corporation. It gives corporations extraordinary protections from government policies that might limit future profits, and extraordinary rights to force the privatization of virtually all civilian public services. Disputes are settled by secret tribunals of experts, many of whom are employed privately as corporate lawyers and consultants. At the same time, NAFTA excludes protections for workers, the environment and the public that are part of the social contract established through long political struggle in each of the countries.

As Jorge Castañeda, Mexico's recent foreign secretary, observed, NAFTA was "an accord among magnates and potentates: an agreement for the rich and powerful...effectively excluding ordinary people in all three societies." Thus was NAFTA a model for the neoliberal governance of the global economy.

The business-backed politicians who pushed the agreement through the three legislatures promised that NAFTA would generate prosperity that would more than compensate "ordinary" people for its lack of social protections. Foreign investors would make Mexico an economic tiger, turning its poor workers into middle-class consumers who would then buy US and Canadian

goods, creating more jobs in the high-wage countries.

But as soon as the ink was dry on NAFTA, US factories began to shift production to maquiladora factories along the border where the Mexican government assures a docile labor force and virtually no environmental restrictions. The US trade surplus with Mexico quickly turned into a deficit, and since then at least a half-million jobs have been lost, many of them in small towns and rural areas where there are no job alternatives.

Meanwhile, Mexico's overall growth rate has been half of what it needs to be just to generate enough jobs for its growing labor force. The NAFTA-inspired strategy of export-led growth undermined Mexican industries that sold to the domestic market as well as the sixty-year-old social bargain in which workers and peasant farmers shared the benefits of growth in exchange for their support for a privileged oligarchy. NAFTA provided the oligarchs with new partners—the multinational corporations—allowing them to abandon their obligations to their fellow Mexicans. Average real wages in Mexican manufacturing are actually lower than they were ten years ago. Two and a half million farmers and their families have been driven out of their local markets and off their land by heavily subsidized US and Canadian agribusiness. For most Mexicans, half of whom live in poverty, basic food has gotten even more expensive: Today the Mexican minimum wage buys less than half the tortillas it bought in 1994. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Mexicans continue to risk their lives crossing the

by JEFF FAUX

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
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border to get low-wage jobs in the United States.

Canada, which since 1989 has had a similar trade agreement with the United States, and which does much less business with Mexico, was less directly affected. But NAFTA strengthened Canadian corporations' ability to threaten workers and governments with moving south, helping undermine the country's traditionally strong labor and social standards.

In all three countries NAFTA has worsened the distribution of income and wealth. While ordinary people paid the costs, the benefits went to the continent's "rich and powerful." Canadian and US corporate investors got guaranteed access to Mexico's cheap labor as well as its privatized public assets. Mexican elites brokered the deals. In one example, well-connected Mexicans bought the country's second-largest commercial bank from the government for \$3.3 billion and sold it to Citigroup for \$12.5 billion.

Yet despite its failures, NAFTA set in motion the economic integration of Canada, Mexico and the United States, which cannot now be stopped. Every day, more intracontinental connections in finance, marketing, production and other business networks are being hard-wired for a consolidated North American market. Ford pickup trucks are assembled in Mexico with engines from Ontario and transmissions from Ohio and Michigan. Canadian, Mexican and US investors have created a labyrinth of interconnected corporate assets. After a temporary post-9/11 slowdown, the cross-border movement of people—unskilled workers, educated professionals, retirees—continued.

Expanded markets require expanded rules. Out of public sight the rulebooks are being filled in by NAFTA tribunals, trigovernmental commissions, administrative judges. Business-supported academic centers are humming with new proposals, ranging from guestworker programs, to the privatization of Canadian water and Mexican oil, to continental business tax policies. As a former Canadian ambassador to the United States recently commented, "Few days go by without new ideas for deepening NAFTA."

But while corporate business and its political clients are organized continentally, progressives are not. One reason is that the opposition to NAFTA in all three countries was in large part rooted in economic and political nationalism. The political heat that almost defeated the agreement in the US Congress was fueled by the specter of American jobs moving to Mexico. The Canadian opposition painted NAFTA as a threat to Americanize Canadian culture. In Mexico, opposition was rooted in its people's historic mistrust of Yankee imperialism.

Once the fight over NAFTA was settled, opposition groups moved back to domestic issues or moved on to defend against neoliberalism in other global settings, such as the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas and the new round of World Trade Organization negotiations. These are important battles, but the capacity of North American activists to influence these negotiations is marginal. For example, if the FTAA is permanently derailed, it will not be over a lack of social protections but because Latin American and US business interests cannot make a deal.

Back home, however, North American opponents of neoliberalism

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The View From Mexico

This past November, along with six other members of the US Congress, I visited Mexico on a Teamsters-sponsored trip in order to assess what NAFTA has done to Mexico. What we saw and heard was not pretty. We encountered horrendous poverty, environmental degradation and a lawless and corrupt environment. We talked with mothers who couldn't afford to send their kids to school, workers who were fired for the crime of trying to organize a union and religious workers who were trying to protect young women from the murders and rapes that were taking place in Ciudad Juárez, right across the border from El Paso. We also met people who displayed enormous courage and tenacity.

In the Anapra *colonia* of Juárez we visited the dilapidated shack of a young mother: one light bulb, a dirt floor and no healthcare available for her sick child. Not an uncommon situation for that community, where tens of thousands of Mexicans had migrated from the southern and even poorer part of the country in search of a better life. As these people flooded into the Juárez area in search of maquiladora jobs, the infrastructure crumbled and the already low quality of life deteriorated. At a health clinic in the area we were told that many of the illnesses they dealt with resulted from malnutrition and other dietary problems.

In a nearby home another mother feared for the well-being of her older daughter, who traveled an hour and a half to work in a maquiladora factory—where she earned \$35 a week. (Maquiladoras mostly hire women because they think they will be less likely to fight back against poor wages and working conditions.) Would she make it home safely or become another “disappeared” woman whose body would be found in the desert? In talking to law enforcement officials in Texas we were told that police and governmental corruption were rampant in Juárez. At least one high-ranking US law enforcement official told us that he would not go south of the border for fear that he might be killed.

In the city of Puebla we met with textile workers at one maquila who made blue jeans for export to the United States. They had the radical idea that they should have minimal rights on the job and be compensated when they worked overtime. They also wanted protection against chemicals that colored their hands and hair. When they attempted to form an independent union to negotiate for them, they were fired. (In Mexico, almost all union workers are represented by “official” unions, which are authorized by the government and sponsored by the companies. They do nothing to represent the interests of workers.) In Puebla we also met with the leader of one of the few independent unions in the country, José Luis Rodríguez Salazar, secretary general of the Independent Union of Volkswagen Workers. His union, under very difficult circumstances, has managed to negotiate a contract with VW that pays most workers there \$25 a day—a very good wage in Mexico. They are currently struggling against downsizing and fear that in years to come, globalization could mean a reduction of auto manufacturing in Mexico

as companies move to countries with even cheaper labor.

In the countryside, we met farmers whose communities had been devastated by the importation of subsidized, cheap corn from US agribusiness corporations. Since the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico's agricultural sector has lost at least 1.3 million jobs. In the community that we visited there are almost no young workers left on the farms. Most of them are either in the cities or in the United States illegally. In an attempt to get a decent price for their corn, some of the farmers have created a cooperative business in which local corn is made into tortillas and sold in the cities. While they were cautiously optimistic about this new enterprise, they were distressed by the destruction of a way of life that their families had experienced for hundreds of years.

In the US Congress, a funny thing is happening with regard to trade policy. With NAFTA resulting in the loss of almost 900,000 decent-paying American manufacturing jobs, more and more members, Republicans and Democrats, are finding it harder and harder to defend unfettered free trade. I know of a number of members who voted for NAFTA who now see that vote as a mistake. I know of no member who voted against NAFTA who regrets that vote. Interestingly, since I recently introduced legislation to repeal Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with China, fifteen conservative Republicans have joined forty two Democrats as co-sponsors.

The immediate task in Congress is threefold. First, we need to place a moratorium on the passage of all new free-trade legislation that the President is negotiating. Why should we exacerbate an already bad situation? No Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), no trade agreement with Australia, no Central American agreement (CAFTA), no bilateral agreements with individual countries. Second, we must move to terminate those trade agreements that currently exist and that are causing us huge job losses—such as NAFTA and PNTR with China. Third, we need a national conversation and appropriate legislation to create trade policy that works for the average American as well as our trading partners throughout the world.

The word is getting out and the momentum is building. Unfettered free trade has been a disaster not only for Americans but for the working people of Mexico and Canada as well. Our difficult but important job now is to build a new coalition of trade unionists, environmentalists, small-business owners and manufacturers who put the people in their communities ahead of corporate America's reckless search for profits. Included in that coalition must be white-collar and high-tech workers who are also seeing their jobs move to low-wage countries.

If we join together we can create trade policies that expand the middle class in this country, protect the international environment and improve the lives of poor people in developing countries. Together, we can and must end the disastrous race to the bottom that we are currently experiencing.

BERNIE SANDERS

Bernie Sanders is an Independent US Representative from Vermont. For more information go to www.bernie.house.gov.

eralism—because they can be a force in the domestic politics of all three nations—have more leverage to develop a socially responsive model of economic integration between rich and poor economies. Indeed, given the influence of the United States in setting the rules for the global economy, a visible, sustained challenge to the NAFTA model here may be the most important contribution progressives on this continent can make to the building of a more just global economic system.

A continental progressive movement would build on its existing infrastructure in each nation—labor, environmentalists, human rights activists, progressive churches and populist legislators—and the fact that the majority of ordinary citizens in all three nations want a market system with social protections.

One initial organizing step might be to connect existing demands to rewrite NAFTA. For example, over the past year Mexican farmers demonstrated throughout the country—including breaking down the door to the Mexican Congress—demanding that NAFTA's agricultural provisions be changed. Had US and Canadian small farmers, labor unions and environmentalists joined them with their own demands, the Mexican government would not have been able to isolate the farmers with the argument that changing NAFTA is politically impossible.

A new continental agreement could include financial assistance from the United States and Canada to Mexico for building the economic and social infrastructure it needs for growth, just as the European community has redistributed funds to its poorest members in order to create a stronger and more balanced economy. Continentwide enforceable labor, human rights and environ-

mental protections ought to be established to prevent the erosion of living standards in Canada and the United States, and to insure that Mexican workers share in the benefits of rising productivity. Provisions of NAFTA that erode the ability of the local public sectors in all three countries to promote the welfare of their citizens should be stricken.

Progressive legislators in all three countries could begin working out proposals covering issues such as corporate governance, public health and safety, and investment in education that could be simultaneously introduced in all three capitals. A continental labor organizing campaign against a single employer could have an electrifying effect—demonstrating that workers in Canada, Mexico and the United States have more in common with one another than with the CEOs who may share their formal nationality.

Creating a continental political consciousness does not mean forming one nation. Few are ready for that—particularly the majority of Mexicans and Canadians appalled by the US governing class's current imperial obsessions. But despite all the obvious difficulties, if progressives do not want to see a continental society built on NAFTA's reactionary template, they have little choice but to grasp hands across the borders and work together to build an economy that serves the continent's "ordinary" people. ■

The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is the latest effort by the Bush Administration to extend NAFTA southward. Read Mark Engler's analysis at www.thenation.com.


YOU CAN'T GO HOME AGAIN.

'Soft Multilateralism'

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

The hawks around George W. Bush believed the United States had been in a slow decline for at least thirty years. Their remedy called for the United States to flex its considerable military muscle, abandon all pretense of multilateral consultations with hesitant and weak allies, and proceed to intimidate both friends and enemies alike. Then it would be in the world driver's seat again. Instead, Iraq is a growing drain of lives and money, traditional allies are profoundly estranged, national security is more precarious than ever and economic power continues to erode. In short, the hawks have achieved the opposite of everything they intended on the world scene, except toppling Saddam Hussein.

Democratic presidential candidates and even Republican moderates are now calling for a return to the multilateralist foreign



policy of previous administrations. They want to bring back the golden era of Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Madeleine Albright. Is this a plausible alternative?

For the past thirty years, every administration, from Nixon to Clinton, including Reagan and Bush's father, pursued the same basic strategy, a policy I call "soft multilateralism." This policy had three elements: (1) offer our major allies "partnership"; (2) push hard to persuade potential nuclear powers not to "proliferate"; (3) persuade governments of the South that their economic future lay not in state-managed "development" but in export-oriented "globalization." None of these policies were entirely successful, but each was at least partially so.

Let's look at each of the three elements. First, when the United States found it was no longer economically dominant but had become merely one part of a so-called triad (the United States, Western Europe and Japan/East Asia), each more or less competi-

Immanuel Wallerstein, Senior Research Scholar at Yale University, is the author, most recently, of The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World (New Press).

The Erosion of American National Interests

Samuel P. Huntington

THE DISINTEGRATION OF IDENTITY

THE YEARS since the end of the Cold War have seen intense, wide-ranging, and confused debates about American national interests. Much of this confusion stems from the complexity of the post-Cold War world. The new environment has been variously interpreted as involving the end of history, bipolar conflict between rich and poor countries, movement back to a future of traditional power politics, the proliferation of ethnic conflict verging on anarchy, the clash of civilizations, and conflicting trends toward integration and fragmentation. The new world is all these things, and hence there is good reason for uncertainty about American interests in it. Yet that is not the only source of confusion. Efforts to define national interest presuppose agreement on the nature of the country whose interests are to be defined. National interest derives from national identity. We have to know who we are before we can know what our interests are.

Historically, American identity has had two primary components: culture and creed. The first has been the values and institutions of the original settlers, who were Northern European, primarily British, and Christian, primarily Protestant. This culture included most importantly the English language and traditions concerning relations between church and state and the place of the individual in society.

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Over the course of three centuries, black people were slowly and only partially assimilated into this culture. Immigrants from western, southern, and eastern Europe were more fully assimilated, and the original culture evolved and was modified but not fundamentally altered as a result. In *The Next American Nation*, Michael Lind captures the broad outlines of this evolution when he argues that American culture developed through three phases: Anglo-America (1789-1861), Euro-America (1875-1957), and Multicultural America (1972-present). The cultural definition of national identity assumes that while the culture may change, it has a basic continuity.

The second component of American identity has been a set of universal ideas and principles articulated in the founding documents by American leaders: liberty, equality, democracy, constitutionalism, liberalism, limited government, private enterprise. These constitute what Gunnar Myrdal termed the American Creed, and the popular consensus on them has been commented on by foreign observers from Crèvecoeur and Tocqueville down to the present. This identity was neatly summed up by Richard Hofstadter: "It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies but to be one."

These dual sources of identity are, of course, closely related. The creed was a product of the culture. Now, however, the end of the Cold War and social, intellectual, and demographic changes in American society have brought into question the validity and relevance of both traditional components of American identity. Without a sure sense of national identity, Americans have become unable to define their national interests, and as a result subnational commercial interests and transnational and nonnational ethnic interests have come to dominate foreign policy.

LOSS OF THE OTHER

THE MOST profound question concerning the American role in the post-Cold War world was improbably posed by Rabbit Angstrom, the harried central character of John Updike's novels: "Without the cold war, what's the point of being an American?" If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there

threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to be an American, and what becomes of American national interests?

From the start, Americans have constructed their creedal identity in contrast to an undesirable "other." America's opponents are always defined as liberty's opponents. At the time of independence, Americans could not distinguish themselves culturally from Britain; hence they had to do so politically. Britain embodied tyranny, aristocracy, oppression; America, democracy, equality, republicanism. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the United States defined itself in opposition to Europe. Europe was the past: backward, unfree, unequal, characterized by feudalism, monarchy, and imperialism. The United States, in contrast, was the future: progressive, free, equal, republican. In the twentieth century, the United States emerged on the world scene and increasingly saw itself not as the antithesis of Europe but rather as the leader of European-American civilization against upstart challengers to that civilization, imperial and then Nazi Germany.

After World War II the United States defined itself as the leader of the democratic free world against the Soviet Union and world communism. During the Cold War the United States pursued many foreign policy goals, but its one overriding national purpose was to contain and defeat communism. When other goals and interests clashed with this purpose, they were usually subordinated to it. For 40 years virtually all the great American initiatives in foreign policy, as well as many in domestic policy, were justified by this overriding priority: the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Korean War, nuclear weapons and strategic missiles, foreign aid, intelligence operations, reduction of trade barriers, the space program, the Alliance for Progress, military alliances with Japan and Korea, support for Israel, overseas military deployments, an unprecedentedly large military establishment, the Vietnam War, the openings to China, support for the Afghan mujahideen and other anticommunist insurgencies. If there is no Cold War, the rationale for major programs and initiatives like these disappears.

As the Cold War wound down in the late 1980s, Gorbachev's adviser Georgiy Arbatov commented: "We are doing something really terrible to you—we are depriving you of an enemy." Psychologists generally agree that individuals and groups define their identity by differentiating themselves from and placing themselves in opposition

to others.¹ While wars at times may have a divisive effect on society, a common enemy can often help to promote identity and cohesion among people. The weakening or absence of a common enemy can do just the reverse. Abraham Lincoln commented on this effect in his Lyceum speech in 1837 when he argued that the American Revolution and its aftermath had directed enmity outward: "The jealousy, envy, avarice incident to our nature, and so common to a state of peace, prosperity, and conscious strength, were for a time in a great measure smothered and rendered inactive, while the deep-rooted principles of hate, and the powerful motive of revenge, instead of being turned against each other, were directed exclusively against the British nation." Hence, he said, "the basest principles of our nature" were either dormant or "the active agents in the advancement of the noblest of causes—that of establishing and maintaining civil and religious liberty." But he warned, "this state of feeling must fade, is fading, has faded, with the circumstances that produced it." He spoke, of course, as the nation was starting to disintegrate. As the heritage of World War II and the Cold War fades, America may be faced with a comparable dynamic.

The Cold War fostered a common identity between American people and government. Its end is likely to weaken or at least alter that identity. One possible consequence is the rising opposition to the federal government, which is, after all, the principal institutional manifestation of American national identity and unity. Would nationalist fanatics bomb federal buildings and attack federal agents if the federal government was still defending the country against a serious foreign threat? Would the militia movement be as strong as it is today? In the past, comparable bombing attacks were usually the work of foreigners who saw the United States as their enemy, and the first response of many people to the Oklahoma City bombing was to assume that it was the work of a "new enemy," Muslim terrorists. That response could reflect a psychological need to believe that such an act must have been carried out by an external enemy. Ironically, the bombing may have been in part the result of the absence of such an enemy.

¹See Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships*, Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1994, and Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization*, Spring 1996, pp. 237-68.

Georg Simmel, Lewis A. Coser, and other scholars have shown that in some ways and circumstances the existence of an enemy may have positive consequences for group cohesion, morale, and achievement. World War II and the Cold War were responsible for much American economic, technological, and social progress, and the perceived economic challenge from Japan in the 1980s generated public and private efforts to increase American productivity and competitiveness. At present, thanks to the extent to which democracy and market economies have been embraced throughout the world, the United States lacks any single country or threat against which it can convincingly counterpose itself. Saddam Hussein simply does not suffice as a foil. Islamic fundamentalism is too diffuse and too remote geographically. China is too problematic and its potential dangers too distant in the future.

Given the domestic forces pushing toward heterogeneity, diversity, multiculturalism, and ethnic and racial division, however, the United States, perhaps more than most countries, may need an opposing other to maintain its unity. Two millennia ago in 84 B.C., after the Romans had completed their conquest of the known world by defeating the armies of Mithradates, Sulla posed the question: "Now the universe offers us no more enemies, what may be the fate of the Republic?" The answer came quickly; the republic collapsed a few years later. It is unlikely that a similar fate awaits the United States, yet to what extent will the American Creed retain its appeal, command support, and stay vibrant in the absence of competing ideologies? The end of history, the global victory of democracy, if it occurs, could be a most traumatic and unsettling event for America.

IDEOLOGIES OF DIVERSITY

THE DISINTEGRATIVE effects of the end of the Cold War have been reinforced by the interaction of two trends in American society: changes in the scope and sources of immigration and the rise of the cult of multiculturalism.

Immigration, legal and illegal, has increased dramatically since the immigration laws were changed in 1965. Recent immigration is overwhelmingly from Latin America and Asia. Coupled with the high birth rates of some immigrant groups, it is changing the racial, religious,

and ethnic makeup of the United States. By the middle of the next century, according to the Census Bureau, non-Hispanic whites will have dropped from more than three-quarters of the population to only slightly more than half, and one-quarter of Americans will be Hispanic, 14 percent black, and 8 percent of Asian and Pacific heritage. The religious balance is also shifting, with Muslims already reportedly outnumbering Episcopalians.

In the past, assimilation, American style, in Peter Salins' phrase, involved an implicit contract in which immigrants were welcomed as equal members of the national community and urged to become citizens, provided they accepted English as the national language and committed themselves to the principles of the American Creed and the Protestant work ethic.² In return, immigrants could be as ethnic as they wished in their homes and local communities. At times, particularly during the great waves of Irish immigration in the 1840s and 1850s and of the southern and eastern European immigration at the turn of the century, immigrants were discriminated against and simultaneously subjected to major programs of "Americanization" to incorporate them into the national culture and society. Overall, however, assimilation American style worked well. Immigration renewed American society; assimilation preserved American culture.

Past worries about the assimilation of immigrants have proved unfounded: Until recently immigrant groups came to America because they saw immigration as an opportunity to become American. To what extent now, however, do people come because they see it as an opportunity to remain themselves? Previously immigrants felt discriminated against if they were not permitted to join the mainstream. Now it appears that some groups feel discriminated against if they are not allowed to remain apart from the mainstream.

The ideologies of multiculturalism and diversity reinforce and legitimate these trends. They deny the existence of a common culture in the United States, denounce assimilation, and promote the primacy of racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings. They also question a central element in the American Creed by substituting for the rights of individuals the rights of groups, defined

²Peter D. Salins, *Assimilation, American Style*, New York: Basic Books, 1996, pp. 6-7.

largely in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual preference. These goals were manifested in a variety of statutes that followed the civil rights acts of the 1960s, and in the 1990s the Clinton administration made the encouragement of diversity one of its major goals.

The contrast with the past is striking. The Founding Fathers saw diversity as a reality and a problem: hence the national motto, *e pluribus unum*. Later political leaders, also fearful of the dangers of racial, sectional, ethnic, economic, and cultural diversity (which, indeed, produced the biggest war of the century between 1815 and 1914), responded to the need to bring us together, and made the promotion of national unity their central responsibility. "The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all," warned Theodore Roosevelt, "would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities . . ."³ Bill Clinton, in contrast, is almost certainly the first president to promote the diversity rather than the unity of the country he leads. This promotion of ethnic and racial identities means that recent immigrants are not subject to the same pressures and inducements as previous immigrants to integrate themselves into American culture. As a result, ethnic identities are becoming more meaningful and appear to be increasing in relevance compared with national identity.

If the United States becomes truly multicultural, American identity and unity will depend on a continuing consensus on political ideology. Americans have thought of their commitment to universal values such as liberty and equality as a great source of national strength. That ideology, Myrdal observed, has been "the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation." Without an underlying common culture, however, these principles are a fragile basis for national unity. As theories of cognitive dissonance suggest, people can change their ideas and beliefs relatively quickly and easily in response to a changed external environment. Throughout the formerly communist world, elites have redefined themselves as devoted democrats, free marketeers, or fervent nationalists.

³Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1992, p. 118.

The Erosion of American National Interests

For most countries, ideology bears little relation to national identity. China has survived the collapse of many dynasties and will survive the collapse of communism. Absent communism, China will still be China. Britain, France, Japan, Germany, and other countries have survived various dominant ideologies in their history. But could the United States survive the end of its political ideology? The fate of the Soviet Union offers a sobering example for Americans. The United States and the Soviet Union were very different, but they also resembled each other in that neither was a nation-state in the classic sense of the term. In considerable measure, each defined itself in terms of an ideology, which, as the Soviet example suggests, is likely to be a much more fragile basis for unity than a national culture richly grounded in history. If multiculturalism prevails and if the consensus on liberal democracy disintegrates, the United States could join the Soviet Union on the ash heap of history.

IN SEARCH OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

A NATIONAL interest is a public good of concern to all or most Americans; a vital national interest is one which they are willing to expend blood and treasure to defend. National interests usually combine security and material concerns, on the one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other. Military action against Saddam Hussein was seen as a vital national interest because he threatened reliable and inexpensive access to Persian Gulf oil and because he was a rapacious dictator who had blatantly invaded and annexed another country. During the Cold War the Soviet Union and communism were perceived as threats to both American security and American values; a happy coincidence existed between the demands of power politics and the demands of morality. Hence broad public support buttressed government efforts to defeat communism and thus, in Walter Lippmann's terms, to maintain a balance between capabilities and commitments. That balance was often tenuous and arguably got skewed in the 1970s. With the end of the Cold War, however, the danger of a "Lippmann gap" vanished, and instead the United States appears to have a Lippmann surplus. Now the need is not to find the power to serve American purposes but rather to find purposes for the use of American power.

This need has led the American foreign policy establishment to search frantically for new purposes that would justify a continuing U.S. role in world affairs comparable to that in the Cold War. The Commission on America's National Interests put the problem this way in 1996: "After four decades of unusual single-mindedness in containing Soviet Communist expansion, we have seen five years of ad hoc fits and starts. If it continues, this drift will threaten our values, our fortunes, and indeed our lives."⁴

The commission identified five vital national interests: prevent attacks on the United States with weapons of mass destruction, prevent the emergence of hostile hegemonies in Europe or Asia and of hostile powers on U.S. borders or in control of the seas, prevent the collapse of the global systems for trade, financial markets, energy supplies, and the environment, and ensure the survival of U.S. allies.

What, however, are the threats to these interests? Nuclear terrorism against the United States could be a near-term threat, and the emergence of China as an East Asian hegemon could be a longer-term one. Apart from these, however, it is hard to see any major looming challenges to the commission's vital interests. New threats will undoubtedly arise, but given the scarcity of current ones, campaigns to arouse interest in foreign affairs and support for major foreign policy initiatives now fall on deaf ears. The administration's call for the "enlargement" of democracy does not resonate with the public and is belied by the administration's own actions. Arguments from neoconservatives for big increases in defense spending have the same air of unreality that arguments for the abolition of nuclear weapons had during the Cold War.

The argument is frequently made that American "leadership" is needed to deal with world problems. Often it is. The call for leadership, however, begs the question of leadership to do what, and rests on the assumption that the world's problems are America's problems. Often they are not. The fact that things are going wrong in many places in the world is unfortunate, but it does not mean that the United States has either an interest in or the responsibility for correcting

⁴*America's National Interests, A Report from the Commission on America's National Interests*, Cambridge: Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996, p. 1.

them. The National Interests Commission said that presidential leadership is necessary to create a consensus on national interests. In some measure, however, a consensus already exists that American national interests do not warrant extensive American involvement in most problems in most of the world. The foreign policy establishment is asking the president to make a case for a cause that simply will not sell. The most striking feature of the search for national interests has been its failure to generate purposes that command anything remotely resembling broad support and to which people are willing to commit significant resources.

COMMERCIALISM AND ETHNICITY

THE LACK of national interests that command widespread support does not imply a return to isolationism. America remains involved in the world, but its involvement is now directed at commercial and ethnic interests rather than national interests. Economic and ethnic particularism define the current American role in the world. The institutions and capabilities—political, military, economic, intelligence—created to serve a grand national purpose in the Cold War are now being suborned and redirected to serve narrow subnational, transnational, and even nonnational purposes. Increasingly people are arguing that these are precisely the interests foreign policy should serve.

The Clinton administration has given priority to “commercial diplomacy,” making the promotion of American exports a primary foreign policy objective. It has been successful in wringing access to some foreign markets for American products. Commercial achievements have become a primary criterion for judging the performance of American ambassadors. President Clinton may well be spending more time promoting American sales abroad than doing anything else in foreign affairs. If so, that would be a dramatic sign of the redirection of American foreign policy. In case after case, country after country, the dictates of commercialism have prevailed over other purposes including human rights, democracy, alliance relationships, maintaining the balance of power, technology export controls, and other strategic and political considerations described by one administration official as

"stratocrap and globaloney."⁵ "Many in the administration, Congress, and the broader foreign policy community," a former senior official in the Clinton Commerce Department argued in these pages, "still believe that commercial policy is a tool of foreign policy, when it should more often be the other way around—the United States should use all its foreign policy levers to achieve commercial goals." The funds devoted to promoting commercial goals should be greatly increased; the personnel working on these goals should be upgraded and professionalized; the agencies concerned with export promotion need to be strengthened and reorganized. Landing the contract is the name of the game in foreign policy.

Or at least it is the name of one game. The other game is the promotion of ethnic interests. While economic interests are usually subnational, ethnic interests are generally transnational or nonnational. The promotion of particular businesses and industries may not involve a broad public good, as does a general reduction in trade barriers, but it does promote the interests of some Americans. Ethnic groups promote the interests of people and entities outside the United States. Boeing has an interest in aircraft sales and the Polish-American Congress in help for Poland, but the former benefits residents of Seattle, the latter residents of the Eastern Europe.

The growing role of ethnic groups in shaping American foreign policy is reinforced by the waves of recent immigration and by the arguments for diversity and multiculturalism. In addition, the greater wealth of ethnic communities and the dramatic improvements in communications and transportation now make it much easier for ethnic groups to remain in touch with their home countries. As a result, these groups are being transformed from cultural communities within the boundaries of a state into diasporas that transcend these boundaries. State-based diasporas, that is, trans-state cultural communities that control at least one state, are increasingly important and increasingly identify with the interests of their homeland. "Full assimilation into their host societies," a leading expert, Gabriel Sheffer, has observed in *Survival*, "has become unfashionable among both

⁵Lawrence F. Kaplan, "The Selling of American Foreign Policy," *The Weekly Standard*, April 23, 1997, pp. 19-22.

established and incipient state-based diasporas . . . many diasporal communities neither confront overwhelming pressure to assimilate nor feel any marked advantage in assimilating into their host societies or even obtaining citizenship there." Since the United States is the premier immigrant country in the world, it is most affected by the shifts from assimilation to diversity and from ethnic group to diaspora.

During the Cold War, immigrants and refugees from communist countries usually vigorously opposed, for political and ideological reasons, the governments of their home countries and actively supported American anticommunist policies against them. Now, diasporas in the United States support their home governments. Products of the Cold War, Cuban-Americans ardently support U.S. anti-Castro policies. Chinese-Americans, in contrast, overwhelmingly pressure the United States to adopt favorable policies towards China. Culture has supplanted ideology in shaping attitudes in diaspora populations.

Culture has supplanted ideology in shaping attitudes in diaspora populations.

Diasporas provide many benefits to their home countries. Economically prosperous diasporas furnish major financial support to the homeland, Jewish-Americans, for instance, contributing up to \$1 billion a year to Israel. Armenian-Americans send enough to earn Armenia the sobriquet of "the Israel of the Caucasus." Diasporas supply expertise, military recruits, and on occasion political leadership to the homeland. They often pressure their home governments to adopt more nationalist and assertive policies towards neighboring countries. Recent cases in the United States show that they can be a source of spies used to gather information for their homeland governments.



Most important, diasporas can influence the actions and policies of their host country and co-opt its resources and influence to serve the interests of their homeland. Ethnic groups have played active roles in politics throughout American history. Now, ethnic diaspora groups proliferate, are more active, and have greater self-consciousness, legitimacy, and political clout. In recent years, diasporas have had a major impact on American policy towards Greece and Turkey, the Caucasus, the recognition of Macedonia, support for Croatia, sanctions

against South Africa, aid for black Africa, intervention in Haiti, NATO expansion, sanctions against Cuba, the controversy in Northern Ireland, and the relations between Israel and its neighbors. Diaspora-based policies may at times coincide with broader national interests, as could arguably be the case with NATO expansion, but they are also often pursued at the expense of broader interests and American relations with long-standing allies. Overall, as James R. Schlesinger observed in a 1997 lecture at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the United States has "less of a foreign policy in a traditional sense of a great power than we have the stapling together of a series of goals put forth by domestic constituency groups . . . The result is that American foreign policy is incoherent. It is scarcely what one would expect from the leading world power."

Schlesinger had to recognize, however, that multiculturalism and heightened ethnic consciousness have caused many political leaders to believe this is "the *appropriate* way to make foreign policy." In the scholarly community some argue that diasporas can help promote American values in their home countries and hence "the participation of ethnic diasporas in shaping U.S. foreign policy is a truly positive phenomenon."⁶ The validity of diaspora interests was a central theme at a May 1996 conference on "Defining the National Interest: Minorities and U.S. Foreign Policy in the 21st Century." Conference participants attacked the Cold War definition of national interest and what was described as "the traditional policy community's apparent animosity toward the very idea of minority involvement in international affairs." Conferees explored "the experiences of Jewish-Americans and Cuban-Americans and sought to extract lessons from the way these two groups succeeded in influencing foreign policy while others failed." The sponsorship of this conference by the New York Council on Foreign Relations, once the capstone institution of the foreign policy establishment, was the ultimate symbol of the triumph of diaspora interests over national interests in American foreign policy.

The displacement of national interests by commercial and ethnic interests reflects the domesticization of foreign policy. Domestic politics and interests have always inevitably and appropriately influenced

⁶Yossi Shain, "Multicultural Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1995, p. 87.



AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

*Whose national interests?
Ethnic groups protest to shape U.S. foreign policy*

foreign policy. Now, however, previous assumptions that the foreign and domestic policymaking processes differ from each other for important reasons no longer hold. For an understanding of American foreign policy it is necessary to study not the interests of the American state in a world of competing states but rather the play of economic and ethnic interests in American domestic politics. At least in recent years, the latter has been a superb predictor of foreign policy stands. Foreign policy, in the sense of actions consciously designed to promote the interests of the United States as a collective entity in relation to similar collective entities, is slowly but steadily disappearing.

THE PUSH AND PULL OF AMERICAN POWER

A DECADE after the end of the Cold War, a paradox exists with respect to American power. On the one hand, the United States is the only superpower in the world. It has the largest economy and the highest levels of prosperity. Its political and economic principles are increasingly endorsed throughout the world. It spends more on defense than all the other major powers combined and has the only military force capable of acting effectively in almost every part of the world. It is far ahead of any other country in technology and appears certain to retain that lead in the foreseeable future. American popular culture and consumer products have swept the world, permeating the most distant and resistant societies. American economic, ideological, military, technological, and cultural primacy, in short, is overwhelming.

American influence, on the other hand, falls far short of that. Countries large and small, rich and poor, friendly and antagonistic, democratic and authoritarian, all seem able to resist the blandishments and threats of American policymakers. On issues of protectionism, sanctions, intervention, human rights, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, peacekeeping, and others, officials of foreign governments listen politely to American demands and entreaties, perhaps express general agreement with the ideas advanced, and then quietly go their own way. This tendency "to follow their own counsels," Jonathan Clarke observed in *Foreign Policy* in 1996, "includes both great and small nations. Defying intense American pressure in 1994, tiny Singapore proceeded to cane an American teenager. Bankrupt, isolated

Cuba has successfully changed American immigration policy. Poland has defied American requests not to proceed with an arms deal with Iran. Jordan has resisted American pressure to break off commercial links with Iraq . . . China has rebuffed American demands on human rights." The United States has been unable to achieve its goals on trade policy with China and Japan, unable to induce Russia to restrain arms and technology transfers to China and Iran, unable to get rid of Saddam Hussein, Castro, and Qaddafi, unable to pressure Israelis and Palestinians to be more accommodating with each other, unable to induce Serbs, Croats, and Muslims to cooperate meaningfully in Bosnia, unable to secure significant economic reform in Japan. The United States still clearly is able to veto any major international action, but its ability to induce other countries to act in the way it thinks they should act is hardly commensurate with its image as the "world's only superpower."

The American government's demands are not strengthened by the popularity of "Baywatch."

What explains this apparent gap between the extent of American power and the ineffectiveness of American influence? In part, the gap is a result of comparing the resources of a country with the strength of its government. Historically the United States has been a strong country with a weak government.⁷ Apart from the military, most of the resources cited as evidence of American power are not easily subject to the control of the American government. Although its economy is the largest in the world, national government revenues are a smaller proportion of GNP (19.7 percent in 1993) than in all but two (Japan, Switzerland) of 24 high income countries. Similarly, the demands of the American government are not strengthened by the popularity of "Baywatch" and rap music. During the Cold War, major technological advances were in large part a product of the Department of Defense and its requirements. Now the military establishment is increasingly dependent on technological developments in the private sector. Antigovernmentalism is a pervasive

⁷For an explanation that links the structure of the American state to its foreign policy, see Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming.

theme in the American Creed and is not easily overcome in the absence of a foreign enemy. The impetus to balance the budget leads to major cutbacks in key elements of foreign affairs spending.

A second related explanation for the gap between resources and influence stems from the changing nature of American power. The United States is and will remain a global hegemon. The nature of that dominant role, however, is changing, as it changed for other hegemonic states. In their first phase, the influence of hegemons stems from their power to expend resources. They deploy military force, economic investment, loans, bribes, diplomats, and bureaucrats into other countries and often bring those territories and populations under their direct or indirect rule. American expansion in the 1950s and 1960s did not expand American rule, but did produce an American military, political, and economic presence in large areas of the world. In the second phase of hegemony, the power to expend is replaced by the power to attract. By the 1970s, American hegemony began to move into this phase with the outward push in the first phase of hegemonic power giving way to the inward pull characteristic of the second phase, a process that also occurred in the evolution of Rome, Byzantium, Britain, and other hegemonic powers.

In the 1990s the United States still exports food, technology, ideas, culture, and military power. It is, however, importing people, capital, and goods. It has become the largest debtor in the world. It typically takes in more immigrants than all the other countries in the world combined. Farm laborers and Nobel prize winners alike want to move to the United States. Elites everywhere want to send their children to American universities. Most of all, businesses want access to the American market. American popular culture, as Josef Joffe has observed, "is unique; its power comes from pull, not push." American power, in short, has become in Joseph S. Nye's term, the "soft power" to attract rather than the hard power to compel.

The power to attract depends on the willingness of foreigners to find it in their interest to send their money, goods, and children to the United States. It is, however, still power, and the typical form of power for a second-phase hegemon. This became strikingly clear in the Persian Gulf crisis. The fact that the American secretary of state had to go around the world engaging in "tin cup diplomacy," collecting

money to pay for the war, was frequently cited as compelling evidence of American decline. In fact, it was imperial behavior of a classic sort: the collection of tribute by the imperial power from its satellites and dependents. The ability to impose and collect an unanticipated levy of more than \$50 billion from other countries in a few months was an extraordinary exercise of second-phase hegemonic power. In the late 1940s the United States exercised its power in the Marshall Plan by giving large sums of money to its allies. In the 1990s the United States exercised its power by collecting comparable amounts of money from its allies.

In the past, the flow of money and people out of the United States far surpassed the flow into the United States. Increasingly, however, the gap has narrowed, as other countries have developed their resources and have found it desirable to send money and people to the United States. While the United States was previously the world's biggest creditor, by 1997 its net foreign debt was more than \$1 trillion and was increasing at an annual rate of 15 to 20 percent, with Japan owning almost \$300 billion and China more than \$50 billion in U.S. treasury bonds.

Between 1963 and 1967, the outflow of foreign direct investment from the United States was more than ten times the inflow to the United States (\$24.5 billion versus \$2.1 billion). During the late 1970s and 1980s, however, the inflow increased dramatically and by the early 1990s exceeded the outflow (\$198.3 billion in versus \$168.9 billion out for 1989-93.) In the early 1960s, the number of Americans going abroad far exceeded the number of foreigners coming to the United States, an average of 6.1 million foreigners arriving each year between 1960 and 1964. By 1990-1994 the inflows and outflows were equal, an average of 44.2 million Americans going abroad each year versus 44.1 million foreigners coming to the United States.

During its first phase as a hegemonic power, the United States expended billions of dollars each year attempting to influence government decisions, elections, and political outcomes in other countries. These efforts clearly exceeded those of any other government, except possibly the Soviet Union, and almost certainly exceeded the total resources expended by foreign governments to influence American politics. Now this balance has changed dramatically, and the shoe is on the other foot. American activities de-

signed to influence foreign governments have either stopped or been greatly reduced. Foreign aid is down and is concentrated on a few countries. Covert intervention is rare, and the money spent trying to influence elections and other outcomes in foreign countries is only a vestige of what it once was. The efforts of foreign institutions to influence American decision-making, in contrast,

Foreign influence on American elections has undoubtedly increased.

have increased significantly. The United States has thus become less of an actor and more of an arena.

Foreign governments and corporations now expend enormous resources on public relations and lobbying in the United States, with those from Japan, for instance, reportedly reaching \$150 million a year. The governments of other foreign countries that have spent huge amounts to influence U.S. governmental decision-making reportedly include those of Saudi Arabia, Canada, South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, Israel, Germany, the Philippines, and more recently China. Foreign governments make a point of recruiting former U.S. government officials to help them in these efforts. They have also gradually learned that the place to concentrate their attention is not on the relatively powerless State Department but on America's extraordinarily powerful legislature.⁸

Over the years foreign influence on American elections has undoubtedly increased. Registered foreign agents make individual contributions to candidates, with Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.), for instance, receiving \$44,200 from them for his 1996 campaign, even though he refused funds from domestic PACs. Foreign influence has contributed to the defeat for reelection of several representatives whose policies went against the interests of those governments. The 1996 senatorial election in South Dakota was a contest between Indians and Pakistanis as well as between Republicans and

⁸Allan Gotlieb, Canada's ambassador in Washington during most of the 1980s, entertainingly describes how he learned this lesson in *I'll Be With You in a Minute, Mr. Ambassador: The Education of a Canadian Diplomat in Washington*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.

Democrats, with the defeat of Larry Pressler producing elation in Islamabad and dejection in New Delhi. In the coming years, as their numbers, wealth, and political savvy increase, Arabs are likely to fight it out with Jews in elections across the country. The China connection of John Huang and his associates and the millions of dollars they siphoned to the Democratic Party is only the latest and most publicized example of the expenditures of foreign resources to influence American politics.

American politics attracts foreign money because the decisions of its government have an impact on people and interests in every other country. The power to attract resources is thus a result of the power to expend them, and the resource inflow is aimed at affecting the direction of the resource outflow.

There are, however, obvious qualifications to the power to ingest. Elites in other countries have to see it in their interest to provide money and resources to the United States. It is hardly surprising that some allied leaders were heard muttering about "taxation without representation" during the Gulf War collection. And those who invest in capital facilities in the United States obviously expect to exercise some influence in American politics. In addition, the principal collective good the United States provided other countries during the Cold War, protection against the Soviet Union, has disappeared, and the United States may become increasingly unable to continue to provide other collective goods, such as an open world economy and access to the American market. What happens then if the United States levies tribute to support an American-led effort to provide a collective good and no one pays? Or, in a question asked in the 1980s, what happens if the Japanese and Saudis stop buying U.S. government obligations? By the end of the Cold War the United States had gradually lost much of its power to expend resources. It entered the post-Cold War era with substantial power to attract but this too can fade. The United States may then continue to believe that like Glendower it "can call spirits from the vasty deep." The relevant question, however, will be that put by Hotspur: "Why, so can I, or so can any man; / But will they come when you do call for them?"

PARTICULARISM VS. RESTRAINT

AMERICAN FOREIGN policy is becoming a foreign policy of particularism increasingly devoted to the promotion abroad of highly specific commercial and ethnic interests. The institutions, resources, and influence generated to serve national interests in the Cold War are being redirected to serve these interests. These developments may have been furthered by the almost exclusive concern of the Clinton administration with domestic politics, but their roots lie in broader changes in the external and internal context of the United States and changing conceptions of American national identity.

The likelihood that these contextual factors will shift in the near future seems remote. Conceivably China could become a new enemy. Certainly, important groups in China think of the United States as *their* new enemy. A China threat sufficient to generate a new sense of national identity and purpose in the United States, however, is not imminent, and how serious that threat is judged to be will depend on the extent to which the Americans view Chinese hegemony in East Asia as damaging to American interests. Reviving a stronger sense of national identity would also require countering the cults of diversity and multiculturalism within the United States. It would probably involve limiting immigration along the lines proposed by the Jordan Commission and developing new public and private Americanization programs to counter the factors enhancing diaspora loyalties and to promote the assimilation of immigrants. These developments may well occur, but given the extent to which, in Nathan Glazer's phrase, "we are all multiculturalists now," it will be a while before the recent denationalizing trends are reversed.

The replacement of particularism would require the American public to become committed to new national interests that would take priority over and lead to the subordination of commercial and ethnic concerns. At present, as polls show, majorities of the American public are unwilling to support the commitment of significant resources

⁹See John E. Reilly, ed., *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1994*, Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1995, pp. 2-8.

The Erosion of American National Interests

to the defense of American allies, the protection of small nations against aggression, the promotion of human rights and democracy, or economic and social development in the Third World.⁹ As a result the articulation of these and other broad goals by administration officials produces little follow-through, and with rare exceptions the calls of establishment figures for American leadership generate no effective action. Unable to deliver on its broad promises, American foreign policy becomes one of rhetoric and retreat, with the active energies of the administration concentrated on the advancement of particularistic concerns. Foreign governments have learned not to take seriously administration statements of its general policy goals and to take very seriously administration actions devoted to commercial and ethnic interests.

The alternative to particularism is thus not promulgation of a "grand design," "coherent strategy," or "foreign policy vision." It is a policy of restraint and reconstitution aimed at limiting the diversion of American resources to the service of particularistic subnational, transnational, and nonnational interests. The national interest is national restraint, and that appears to be the only national interest the American people are willing to support at this time in their history. Hence, instead of formulating unrealistic schemes for grand endeavors abroad, foreign policy elites might well devote their energies to designing plans for lowering American involvement in the world in ways that will safeguard possible future national interests.

At some point in the future, the combination of security threat and moral challenge will require Americans once again to commit major resources to the defense of national interests. The *de novo* mobilization of those resources from a low base, experience suggests, is likely to be easier than the redirection of resources that have been committed to entrenched particularistic interests. A more restrained role now could facilitate America's assumption of a more positive role in the future when the time comes for it to renew its national identity and to pursue national purposes for which Americans are willing to pledge their lives, their fortunes, and their national honor.☉

(Foreign Policy, sp. 1117)

BUILDING UP NEW BOGEYMEN

THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER

by Samuel P. Huntington
367 pages, New York: Simon & Schuster, \$26.00


by Stephen M. Walt

Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is an ambitious attempt to formulate a conceptual framework that can help citizens and policymakers to make sense of the post-Cold War world. Instead of focusing on power and ideology—as we did during the Cold War—Huntington's paradigm emphasizes cultural competition.

Huntington's central thesis is straightforward. "In the post-Cold War world," he writes, "the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural." Identities and loyalties are shifting from the state to the broader cultural entity of "civilization," and this shift is creating a radically different world order. "For the first time in history," he maintains, "global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational." As a result, conflicts between civilizations will be more frequent than conflicts within them, and "the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will . . . [be] between peoples belonging to different cultural entities."

There are at least three reasons why *The Clash of Civilizations* is likely to enjoy a longer shelf life than some other efforts to formulate

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ILLUSTRATION BY JOHN MACDONALD

a post-Cold War paradigm. First, Huntington presents his argument with great skill and with a keen eye for the apt anecdote. Huntington has always been an adroit conceptualizer, and his knack for summarizing diverse phenomena into simple and memorable frameworks is evident throughout the book. He is also a master of the scholarly sound bite, as in his observation that "in Islam, God is Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar's junior partner." These stylistic felicities make the book a lively read and greatly enhance the seductiveness of its argument.

Second, cultural explanations are very much in vogue these days, whether the subject is foreign policy, educational performance, gender roles, or family values. Huntington's arguments are thus in step with current intellectual fashions, even if many intellectuals will probably recoil from some of his conclusions.

Third, Huntington's arguments possess a powerful *prima facie* plausibility. We all know that cultural differences can foster misunderstanding and suspicion, and even a superficial reading of history reveals that groups from different cultural backgrounds have fought on countless occasions. A brief read of any newspaper seems to offer further support for a cultural perspective: "Western" Croats, Muslims, and "Orthodox" Serbs are at odds in Bosnia; Muslims and Hindus are quarreling over Kashmir; "Orthodox" Russians and Armenians have been fighting Muslim Chechens and Azerbaijanis; and trouble may now be brewing between China and its various non-Sinic neighbors. At first glance, therefore, recent events seem to be remarkably in sync with Huntington's assertions.

Yet despite these strengths, the book's central thesis does not stand up to close scrutiny. Huntington does not explain why loyalties are suddenly shifting from the level of nation-states to that of "civilizations," and he does not explain why this alleged shift will lead to greater intercivilizational conflict. Moreover, some of his central claims are contradicted by both historical and contemporary evidence. Finally, Huntington's focus on the broad concept of civilization has led him to overlook or obscure the far more potent role of nationalism. As a result, *The Clash of Civilizations* is an unreliable guide to the emerging world order and a potentially dangerous blueprint for policy.

A BLUEPRINT FOR POLICY?

Huntington begins by defining a civilization as the "highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity. . . . defined by . . . language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people." Drawing upon the work of historians such as William McNeill, Fernand Braudel, Carroll Quigley, and Oswald Spengler, Huntington identifies six contemporary civilizations (Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Orthodox, Sinic, and Western) and two possible candidates (African and Latin American). Five of these eight civilizations have a dominant core state (India, Japan, Russia, China, and the United States), but the African, Islamic, and Latin American civilizations do not.

According to Huntington, the future world order will be shaped by several powerful trends. First, the era of Western dominance is coming to an end, and several non-Western states are emerging as great powers in their own right. Second, these new great powers increasingly reject Western values in favor of their own cultural norms, and the continuing decline in the West's material superiority will erode its cultural appeal even more. Thus, Huntington rejects the belief that modernization is leading to cultural convergence between the West and "the rest." Third, as different civilizations become more tightly connected by markets and media and as universalist ideologies like Marxism-Leninism or liberalism cease to command belief, the broad cultural values embodied in each civilization will become more important as sources of personal and political identity. Taken together, these trends herald the emergence of a new multipolar world in which each of the great powers is the core state of a different civilization. For Huntington, the end of the Cold War is the critical historical divide between the old world of national rivalries and the new world of clashing civilizations.

What will world politics look like in this multipolar, multicivilizational world? Huntington recognizes that states remain the key actors in world politics, but he believes that they increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms. As a result, "they cooperate with and ally themselves with states with similar or common culture and are more often in conflict with countries of different culture." Or, as he says elsewhere, "alignments defined by ideology and superpower relations are

giving way to alignments defined by culture and civilization."

It follows that conflicts will occur either in "cleft countries"—defined as states where large segments of the population belong to different civilizations, like Ukraine—or in the "fault-line wars" that occur along the boundaries between two or more civilizations. The latter conflicts are likely to be especially complex, as local antagonists try to rally support from their cultural brethren and especially from the core state (if there is one). The chief danger is the possibility that one or more of these "fault-line wars" will escalate into a great-power conflict that transcends civilizational boundaries.

For the West, two dangers are especially salient. The first is Islam, where a demographic explosion, a cultural resurgence, and the absence of a strong core state combine to create a high propensity for conflict. Huntington recognizes that Islam is deeply divided and relatively weak (its share of world economic product is less than one-fourth that of the West), but these facts do not afford him much comfort. Indeed, he sees Islam and the West as very nearly at war already, observing that "dedicated Islamic militants exploit the open societies of the West and plant car bombs at selected targets. Western military professionals exploit the open skies of Islam and drop smart bombs on selected targets." He believes that the challenge from Islam is inherently cultural and likely to be prolonged.

The Clash of Civilizations is an unreliable guide to the emerging world order and a potentially dangerous blueprint for policy.

The second challenge arises from Asia, and especially from China. If the Islamic threat is partly a reflection of the unruly energies of millions of mobilized young Muslims, the Asian threat derives from the order and discipline that has fueled Asia's economic ascendance. Asian societies are rejecting the individualistic culture of the West, their economic success has reinforced their self-confidence and desire for greater global influence, and Huntington sees a clash of interests—and thus, a clash of civilizations—as virtually inevitable.

Huntington's prescriptions follow directly from his basic framework. In a world characterized by civilizational divisions, he favors greater political, economic, and military integration among the member states of the West; advocates expanding NATO to include other Western states (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland); and wants to bring Latin America into the Western fold while preventing Japan from moving toward China. Because the Sinic and Islamic civilizations pose the greatest threats, the West should also accept Russian hegemony among the Orthodox countries and strive to limit the growth of Sinic and Islamic power. On the home front, the United States must prevent advocates of "multiculturalism" from undermining the West's cultural traditions and encourage immigrants to embrace Western values. Huntington also warns that Western intervention in the affairs of other civilizations will be "the single most dangerous source of instability," but he does not suggest that we abstain from such activities entirely.

This summary does not do full justice to Huntington's often insightful analysis. He neatly debunks claims of cultural convergence and bolsters his own arguments with numerous examples of cross-cultural conflict. His analysis of the dynamics of "fault-line" conflicts is especially intriguing, as is his discussion of the conflictive character of contemporary Islamic societies. The civilizational paradigm has the merit of simplicity, and it seems to make sense of some important contemporary events. So why not simply send a copy of the book to every head of state, legislator, and senior government official in the West and gird our loins for the *kulturkampf* that lies ahead?

To fully grasp why *The Clash of Civilizations* should not become the blueprint for U.S. (let alone "Western") foreign policy, we must first consider what world politics was like in the past. Doing so will highlight how Huntington believes it is changing and help us to see the flaws in his argument.

DISSECTING THE THESIS

What was world politics like prior to the end of the Cold War, which Huntington identifies as the starting point for the new era of cultural competition? For the past 200 years or so, states—and especially the great powers—have been the key actors in world affairs. It was generally recognized that

some of these states belonged to different civilizations, but nobody argued that these differences mattered very much for understanding international politics. Cultural differences did matter, but their main political expression took the form of nationalism. The belief that distinct cultural groups—or nations—should have their own state proved to be an extremely powerful political ideology, and it reinforced the state system that has existed since the mid-17th century.

Great-power conflict was a common occurrence throughout this period. Wars occasionally arose for essentially “cultural” (i.e., nationalist) reasons, most notably in the War of Italian Unification (1859) and the wars of German unification (1864, 1866, and 1870). For the most part, however, great-power conflict resulted from the combination of fear, greed, and stupidity that is characteristic of life in the anarchic world of international politics.

According to Huntington, great-power conflict before 1990 was largely, if not entirely, *intracivilizational*. In his words, “for over four hundred years, the nation-states of the West—Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others—constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other.” This characterization is wrong, however, because it omits the two non-Western great powers (Japan and Russia) that “interacted, competed, and fought wars” with the West (and with others) during these four centuries.

With Japan and Russia included, what does the historical record show? There have been four hegemonic conflicts since 1800 (the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War), all of which involved states from two or more civilizations. Moreover, most of the other wars involving great powers (including their colonial wars) were *intercivilizational* as well. Thus, Huntington is wrong to claim that “in the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational.”

Among other things, this error casts doubt on Huntington’s claim that the end of the Cold War constitutes a radical historical watershed. It also means that he cannot use past intercivilizational wars as support for his own thesis, because these various conflicts did not arise from the cultural or “civilizational” differences that Huntington now sees as central to world politics.

At this point, one begins to suspect that Huntington has merely

given a new label to an old phenomenon: Sometimes states with different cultural backgrounds fight with one another. Such a view receives support from Huntington himself, when he writes that “the sources of conflict between states and groups from different civilizations are, in large measure, those which have always generated conflict between groups: control of people, territory, wealth, and resources, and relative power.” Yet he clearly believes that something is different today, or why bother to formulate a new paradigm?

The novel feature is a shift in personal identities. He still regards states as the key actors in world politics but argues that the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by a profound shift in the locus of political loyalty. In a direct challenge to the concept of nationalism, he asserts that both the elites and the masses will increasingly identify with other states in their specific cultural group and that this shift in identities will largely eliminate conflict within each civilization while exacerbating tensions between them.

It is important to recognize how fundamental and far-reaching this claim is: For the past 2,000 years or so, assorted empires, city-states, tribes, and nation-states have repeatedly ignored cultural affinities in order to pursue particular selfish interests. These political units have always been willing to fight other members of their own civilization and have been equally willing to ally with groups from different civilizations when it seemed advantageous to do so. Huntington now claims that states are going to act very differently, however, and will place cultural values above all others.

Yet Huntington never explains why loyalties are shifting in the manner he depicts. He asserts that globalization and the increased contact between different cultures have made broad civilizational identities more powerful, but he provides no theory explaining why this is the case. Why are “civilizational” loyalties now trumping nationalism? Why is culture or ethnicity no longer focused on the state, but on the broader notion of “civilization”? Huntington provides no answer to these questions.

Not only is an answer lacking, but many of his examples of increasing cultural assertiveness are not about “civilizational” consciousness at all. To support his claim that the end of the Cold War led to a global “identity crisis,” for example, he notes that “questions of national identity were actively debated . . . [in] Algeria, Canada, China, Germany, Great Britain, India, Iran, Japan, Mexico, Mo-

rocco, Russia, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States." Most of these "questions of identity" arose from nationalist movements rather than from any "civilizational" affinity, however, and thus do not support his thesis.

Moreover, although *The Clash of Civilizations* devotes roughly 300 pages to a cultural analysis of world politics, Huntington never explains why conflict is more likely to arise between civilizations than within them. He suggests that cultural values are not easily compromised and that people "naturally distrust and see as threats those who are different and have the capability to harm them." Yet even if these propositions are correct—and I am inclined to agree with him on the last one—they do not explain why intercivilizational conflicts will shape the future world order.

Cultural differences do not cause war by themselves, just as cultural similarities do not guarantee harmony. Indeed, one could argue that cultural diversity makes conflict less likely, provided different groups are free to establish their own political and social orders. As Huntington's own analysis of "cleft states" suggests, cultural clashes are most likely not when separate groups come into contact, but when members of different cultures are forced to live in the same community. Once again, many of Huntington's more compelling examples of cultural conflict come from local settings rather than from true "civilizational" clashes. But the ways in which members of different cultures interact within a single community are quite different from the ways in which whole civilizations interact on a global scale.

Finally, the evidence in favor of Huntington's thesis is quite thin. As we have seen, past examples of intercivilizational conflict do not support his thesis, because these were simply conflicts of interest between states and not the result of "civilizational" differences. Given that Huntington sees the civilizational paradigm as relevant only for the post-Cold War period, we have roughly six years of experience with which to evaluate his claims. What does the record show thus far?

Huntington supports his argument by reference to numerous examples of contemporary political leaders employing cultural or even civilizational rhetoric. Not surprisingly, he takes these statements at face value and regards them as persuasive evidence of growing civilizational affinities. But the question is not just what Lee Kuan Yew or Muammar Qaddafi say, because talk is cheap and political rhetoric

serves many functions. The real issue is what these leaders (or their countries) will actually do, and how much blood and treasure they will devote to "civilizational" interests.

On this point, the record of state behavior since 1990 does not lend much support to Huntington's argument. Consider the 1991 Persian Gulf war. Huntington's paradigm predicts that conflicts between civilizations will be more frequent and intense than conflicts within them. Yet in the Gulf war, Iraq attacked a fellow Islamic state, only to be repulsed by a coalition of Western and Islamic states, with tacit support from Israel. Huntington tries to salvage his thesis by arguing that most Islamic populations actually favored Iraq, but, even if this were true, it merely underscores the fact that state interests mattered more than loosely felt and politically impotent loyalties to a particular "civilizational" entity. In the Gulf war, in short, civilizational identities were irrelevant.

What about Bosnia, where Muslims, "Western" Croats, and "Orthodox" Serbs were at war from 1991 to 1995? Although some aspects of the Bosnian tragedy are consistent with Huntington's argument, the overall picture is a striking refutation of it. More than 50,000 U.S.-led troops were deployed to Bosnia in 1996, but they were not there to defend Western (in this case, Croatian) culture. Rather, they were there primarily to protect Muslims. Indeed, although several Islamic countries did send modest amounts of aid to the Bosnian Muslims, the Western states ultimately did far more for them than did their Islamic brethren. Similarly, Russia offered some rhetorical support to the Serbs, but it backed away from its "Orthodox" brethren when Serbian bellicosity made Belgrade an unappealing ally. Even the Western states failed to line up according to cultural criteria, with Britain and France being more sympathetic to the Serbs, Germany backing the Croats, and the United States reserving most of its support for the Muslims.

What about the Rwandan genocide and the subsequent carnage in Zaire? Huntington is not certain whether a true "African civilization" exists, but it is abundantly clear that these bloodlettings did not arise from a clash of civilizations. And, as in the earlier humanitarian mission in Somalia, outside assistance is being provided by members of other civilizations, once again irrespective of the cultural criterion Huntington now claims is paramount.

Thus, conflict and cooperation do not observe the civilizational

boundaries that Huntington's thesis predicts. Interestingly, *The Clash of Civilizations* provides decisive evidence on precisely this point. On pages 256 to 258, Huntington presents two tables on current ethnopolitical conflicts in order to demonstrate the conflictive nature of contemporary Islam. These tables also show that conflicts *within* civilizations are roughly 50 per cent more frequent than conflicts between them. This result directly contradicts Huntington's core thesis, because the number of *potential* conflicts between members of different civilizations is much greater than the number of potential conflicts between members of the same civilization. For example, there are roughly 20 "Western" states with which the United States could find itself at odds, but there are more than 175 non-Western states that the United States could quarrel with as well. Even if conflict occurred on a purely random basis, we would expect most clashes to be *between* groups from different "civilizations." This gap should be even more pronounced if "civilizational" differences are a powerful cause of conflict, as Huntington posits, but the evidence he presents shows that exactly the opposite is occurring. This result merely underscores the fact that cultural differences are of secondary importance in explaining the origins of global conflict in the post-Cold War world.

The Clash of Civilizations is also strangely silent about Israel, which has been a central concern for U.S. foreign policy since its founding in 1948. During the Cold War, U.S. support for Israel could be justified on both ideological and strategic grounds. From a cultural perspective, however, the basis for close ties between Israel and the "West" is unclear. Israel is not a member of the West (at least not by Huntington's criteria) and is probably becoming less "Western" as religious fundamentalism becomes more salient and as the Sephardic population becomes more influential. A "civilizational" approach to U.S. foreign policy can justify close ties with Europeans (as the common descendants of Western Christendom) but not Israelis. Moreover, given that Huntington wants to avoid unnecessary clashes with rival civilizations and given that U.S. support for Israel is a source of tension with the Islamic world, his civilizational paradigm would seem to prescribe a sharp reduction in Western support for the Jewish state. I do not know whether Huntington favors such a step, but that is where the logic of his argument leads. His silence on this issue may reflect an awareness that making this conclusion explicit would not only ~~weaken~~ the appeal of the book, or Israel may simply be an anomaly that lies outside of his framework.

In either case, however, the issue reveals a further limitation of the civilizational paradigm.

Cultural differences do not cause war by themselves, just as cultural similarities do not guarantee harmony.

What has gone wrong here? As should now be apparent, Huntington's central error is his belief that personal loyalties are increasingly centered on "civilizations" rather than on the nation-state. If there is a dominant trend in the world today, however, it is not the coalescing of a half-dozen or so multinational civilizations. On the contrary, the dominant trend is the tendency for existing political communities to split into smaller units, organized primarily along ethnic or national lines. Being part of some larger "civilization" did not convince the Akkhar, Armenians, Azeris, Chechens, Croats, Eritreans, Georgians, Kurds, Ossetians, Quebecois, Serbs, or Slovaks to abandon the quest for their own state, just as being part of the West did not slow Germany's rush to reunify. Thus, it is not civilization that is thriving in the post-Cold War world; it is nationalism.

This neglect of nationalism is the Achilles' heel of the civilizational paradigm. As Huntington himself points out, "civilizations" do not make decisions; they are an abstract cultural category rather than a concrete political agency. States, on the other hand, have defined borders, designated leaders, established decision-making procedures, and direct control over political resources. States can mobilize their citizens, collect taxes, issue threats, reward friends, and wage war; in other words, states can act. Nationalism is a tremendously powerful force precisely because it marries individual cultural affinities to an agency—the state—that can actually do something. In the future as in the past, the principal conflicts in the world will be between states—not civilizations—and between existing states and groups within them who seek to establish states of their own. Some of these conflicts will occur across cultural boundaries—as in the "fault-line" areas that Huntington correctly highlights—but cultural differences

will be at best a secondary cause of conflict.

Once again, Huntington's analysis implicitly acknowledges this point. His emphasis on the "core states" within each civilization reaffirms the central role of the great powers—defined in traditional realist terms—and he admits that "the issues in [core state conflicts] are the classic ones of international politics," such as relative influence, economic and military power, and the control of territory. When it comes to the great powers, therefore, culture does not matter very much, and the concept of civilization largely drops out of his analysis.

The enduring relevance of the realist, statist paradigm is most clearly revealed at the end of the book, when Huntington lays out a possible scenario for a war between China and the West. Several details of this imagined war are striking. First, it begins with a Chinese attack on Vietnam, which by Huntington's criteria is a clash within a particular civilizational group. Thus, World War III is caused not by a clash of civilizations, but by a clash within one—precisely the sort of event that increasing cultural affinities were supposed to overcome. Second, cultural factors play virtually no role either in starting the war or in causing it to escalate; instead, it arises from a competition for oil and escalates because other states are worried about the long-term balance of power. Third, the subsequent war features a number of important intercivilizational alliances (for balance-of-power reasons), which further contradicts the claim that cultural factors are becoming decisive. In short, when he turns away from expounding his paradigm and describes what a 21st-century conflict might actually look like, Huntington largely ignores his own creation and relies on the traditional principles of realpolitik.

A CALL FOR NEW ENEMIES?

In the end, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is a book replete with ironies. It is ironic that a scholar whose earlier works offered brilliant analyses of the role of the state now offers a paradigm in which states are the handmaidens of diffuse cultural groups. It is also ironic that a scholar who effectively challenged the "declinist" arguments made by Paul Kennedy and others now goes them one better: Not only is the United States declining, but so is the rest of Western civilization. And it is surely

ironic that a scholar who was sounding alarm bells about Japan only four years ago is now obsessed with China and Islam and is calling for active efforts to preserve Japan's ties with the West.¹

There may be a common theme in these ironies, however. Huntington has always been a staunch defender of Western civilization in general and the United States in particular, and he is clearly worried that the hedonistic, individualistic culture of the West is no longer up to the challenges it faces. By portraying the contemporary world as one of relentless cultural competition, therefore, he may be trying to provide us with the bogeymen we need to keep our own house in order.

He may be right, and a reaffirmation of certain "Western" values might be wholly desirable. But even if the West does need new enemies in order to hold it together, the civilizational paradigm that Huntington has offered is not a sound basis for making foreign policy. Relying upon an overly broad category like "civilization" would blind us to the differences within broad cultural groups and limit our ability to pursue a strategy of "divide and conquer." Thus, adopting Huntington's paradigm might unwittingly rob policymakers of the flexibility that has always been a cardinal diplomatic virtue. If the world is as dangerous as he seems to think, why limit our options in this way?

Moreover, if we treat all states who are part of some other "civilization" as intrinsically hostile, we are likely to create enemies that might otherwise be neutral or friendly. In fact, a civilizational approach to foreign policy is probably the surest way to get diverse foreign cultures to coordinate their actions and could even bring several civilizations together against us. The West is still the strongest civilization and will remain so for some time to come. Accordingly, a civilizational strategy could encourage two or more civilizations to gang up on us, solely out of a sense of self-preservation. In this sense, *The Clash of Civilizations* offers a dangerous, self-fulfilling prophecy: The more we believe it and make it the basis for action, the more likely it is to come true. Huntington would no doubt feel vindicated, but the rest of us would not be happy with the results.

¹For his earlier views, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs* 67:2 (Winter 1988/89); "America's Changing Strategic Interests," *Survival* 33:1 (January 1991); and "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security* 17:4 (Spring 1993).

**Why Consensus Is So Elusive in U.S.
Foreign Policy**
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Abstract:

US policies such as liberalized free trade, military spending, and foreign aid were once believed to serve the national interest; however, they are now objects of intense debate on Capitol Hill. Trubowitz suggests that bipartisanship has all but disappeared from US politics.

Full Text:

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FUTURE HISTORIANS are unlikely to give America's leaders high marks for foreign policy in the 1990s. In contrast to the postWorld War II era, when America moved decisively on the world stage, the post-Cold War period has reflected disarray and drift. Policies such as liberalized free trade, military spending, and foreign aid were all once widely believed to serve the national interest. They are now objects of intense and often inconclusive debate on Capitol Hill.

Although the White House still dominates foreign policy, it can no longer count on Congressional deference. President Clinton's failure last November to win Congress's backing for authority to negotiate trade agreements directly, something Presidents

regularly enjoyed during the Cold War years, was a stunning reminder of how things have changed. Clinton had made free trade a top legislative priority, but members of his own party stymied him. Congress's message was clear: The power to define the nation's interests abroad is up for grabs.

The trouble, say some prominent scholars and policy makers, is **multiculturalism**. Writing in the journal *Foreign Affairs* last October, the Harvard University political scientist Samuel Huntington blamed ethnic groups who revel in the rhetoric of cultural diversity and reject the idea of a one-size-fits-all foreign policy. The dramatic rise in immigration and the spread of what Huntington called "the cult of **multiculturalism**" have turned foreign policy into a hodgepodge of policies catering to special-interest groups. Echoing this view, James Schlesinger, the former Secretary of Defense, argued in the fall 1997 issue of *The National Interest* that "pandering to ethnic constituencies" has made a mockery of the national interest.

According to this view, the end of the Cold War has allowed groups to turn foreign policy into an instrument for promoting the interests of their real or imagined homelands. African Americans want more aid for Africa, Cuban Americans lobby for tougher sanctions against Castro, and so on. In the absence of a unifying threat such as the old "Evil Empire," the theory goes, our public officials are less hesitant to use foreign policy for narrow electoral ends.

That view is rapidly becoming conventional wisdom in the foreign-policy establishment and is also gaining currency among scholars. But it is misleading. Arguments that trace today's foreign-policy drift to **multiculturalism** not only misread the present, they also view the past through rose-colored glasses. To be sure, foreign-policy making today is highly politicized. But that is not new. Even at the height of the Cold War, electoral politics often had a heavy hand in shaping foreign-policy decisions, such as President Truman's policy of "containing" the Soviet Union and President Reagan's military buildup.

The real question today is why the political process can no longer manufacture consensus, the way it did in the decades after World War II. One thing is certain: The answer does not lie in the ethnic makeup of the American electorate. It is rooted instead in globalization and in the uneven impact that America's integration into the world economy has had on differing regions of the United States. The dislocations caused by international market forces have destroyed the historic compromise between the Northeast and the South that was the backbone of the Cold War consensus.

For well over a decade, debates over foreign policy have pitted the aging Rust Belt states of the Northeast against the growing Sun Belt states of the South and West. Politicians from these regional blocs regularly battle in Congress over issues including defense spending, foreign aid, and foreign trade. The fight over fast-track trade legislation is a good example. Opposition was centered in the industrial states of the Northeast. Clinton's

biggest backers-ironically, many of them Republicans-were overwhelmingly from the West and the South.

There is little mystery as to why. For years, the Northeast has been losing jobs, people, and income to the South and West. Congressional seats and electoral clout have followed. This power shift caught geographers' and demographers' attention in the 1970s. It accelerated throughout most of the 1980s and then again in the 1990s. A recent Census Bureau study indicates that the Northeastern states, some of which experienced a brief renaissance in the late 1980s, are again losing residents to the South and West.

Many factors explain the political and economic power shift from Northeast to South and West. Higher tax rates, labor costs, and energy prices in the Northeast played a role. So did the fact that more military bases and defense contractors are located in the South and West than in the Northeast-meaning that during the Cold War, the South and West benefited disproportionately from federal spending for defense.

Now that the Cold War is over, many Northern lawmakers are calling for large reductions in the Pentagon's budget and for increased public investment in the North's sluggish, densely populated cities. With many of its factories and industries having borne the brunt of the decline of America's commercial power in the 1980s, the Northeast has opposed the North American Free Trade Agreement and other proposals for freetrade zones in the 1990s. By contrast, the South and, especially, the export-oriented West today are positioned better than the Northeast to compete in international markets.

Roll-call votes in Congress underscore the regional cleavage on foreign-policy issues. The National Journal's recently published annual compilation of members' votes on key issues shows that lawmakers from the Sun Belt generally were much more supportive than those from the Rust Belt of increasing Pentagon spending, expanding trade with China, and projecting a more assertive foreign policy, free of today's deference to outside influences like the United Nations. Exceptions-such as bedrock-conservative New Hampshire and liberal-leaning northern California-only prove the rule.

ALTHOUGH these fault lines on foreign-policy issues appeared in the 1980s, the chasm has widened since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The process has been fueled by partisan politics. On one side are Northern Democrats, such as Michigan's David Bonior, New York's Charles Rangel, and Massachusetts' Barney Frank, who are no longer willing to pay the "overhead charges" of American leadership: large defense budgets and low tariff barriers. On the other side are the Sun Belt Republicans, such as House Speaker Newt Gingrich, of Georgia, and House Majority Leader Dick Armey, of Texas. These lions of laissez faire liberated Congress in 1994 from the clutches of the Rust Belt politicians and now advocate a Reaganesque mix of military spending and freer trade.

This is not the first time that America's regions have been divided over foreign policy, of course. The country split along regional lines 100 years ago, in the great debate between

the "imperialists" and "anti-imperialists" over colonial expansion in Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines. That fight pitted the industrial Northeast and the West, which saw those islands as strategic steppingstones to new markets in Latin America and Asia, against the South, which marketed its cotton in Europe and feared a European backlash against U. S. colonial adventurism.

During the Great Depression, politicians from the urban Northeast and the South found common ground in President Roosevelt's "internationalist" foreignpolicy agenda and waged a fierce battle against their "isolationist" rivals in the West. At issue was whether the United States should assume a more assertive role in promoting global economic recovery and preventing the emergence of closed spheres of influence in Europe and Asia. In the 1890s and the 1930s, like today, politicians from different parts of the country sought to equate the particular interests of their region with the nation's foreign-policy stances.

The parallels stop there, however. What makes consensus elusive today is the partisan nature of these sectional divisions. For much of the Cold War, party politics cut across regional boundaries. Eastern "Rockefeller Republicans" aligned with Southern Democrats on foreign-policy matters, keeping political divisiveness in check. This is no longer the case. The Republicans' rapid electoral gains in the West and South, culminating in the 1994 midterm elections that gave them control of Congress, have made them the party of the Sun Belt. The Democrats, once dominant in the South, are quickly becoming the party of the Rust Belt.

The result is predictable: Republicans favor policies such as free trade and military spending, which serve the core interests of the Sun Belt-aerospace, agribusiness, computers, construction, and real estate. Democrats oppose policies that might encourage companies to set up factories abroad and threaten Rust Belt jobs. Bipartisanship-what President Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, once called the "oil of national government"-has all but disappeared from politics.

The foreign-policy imperatives facing the Rust Belt are not the same as those driving the Sun Belt. The polarization of the two-party system along this regional divide has entrenched divisions and significantly reduced the political room for maneuvering. Again, the fast-track trade legislation illustrates the problem. When President Clinton talked about the need for freer trade, he risked Democratic support; if he soft-pedaled free trade, he invited the wrath of the Republicans who control Congress.

Arguments that blame multiculturalism for Washington's foreign-policy failings are not just wrong. They are counterproductive. They make it harder to discuss America's real stakes in the post-Cold War world. Globalization will affect regions, industries, and socioeconomic groups unevenly. Who will gain? Who will pay? These are the questions that will drive foreignpolicy debates for many years to come.












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Ethnic conflict*Foreign Policy*

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Abstract:

The world was paralyzed by indecision as genocidal wars swept Bosnia and Rwanda. However, ethnic conflicts are neither as ancient nor as "ethnic" as they seem. Sadowski exposes some false ideas about ethnic conflict.

Full Text:

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Ethnic conflict seems to have supplanted nuclear war as the most pressing issue on the minds of policymakers. But if yesterday's high priests of mutually assured destruction were guilty of hyper-rationality, today's prophets of anarchy suffer from a collective hysteria triggered by simplistic notions of ethnicity. Debates about intervention in Rwanda or stability in Bosnia demand a more sober perspective.

The Number of Ethnic Conflicts Rose Dramatically at the End of the Cold War

Nope. The idea that the number of ethnic conflicts has recently exploded, ushering us into a violent new era of ethnic "pandaemonium," is one of those optical illusions that round-the-clock and round-the-world television coverage has helped to create. Ethnic conflicts have consistently formed the vast majority of wars ever since the epoch of decolonization began to sweep the developing countries after 1945. Although the number of ethnic conflicts has continued to grow since the Cold War ended, it has done so at a slow and steady rate, remaining consistent with the overall trend of the last 50 years.

In 1990 and 1991, however, several new and highly visible ethnic conflicts erupted as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. The clashes between the armies of Croatia, Serbia, and Slovenia, and the agonizing battle that pitted Bosnia's Croats, Muslims, and Serbs against each other, occurred on Europe's fringes, within easy reach of television cameras. The wars in Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia, and Tajikistan, while more distant, were still impressive in the way that they humbled the remnants of the former Soviet colossus. Many observers mistook these wars for the start of a new trend. Some were so impressed that they began to reclassify conflicts in Angola, Nicaragua, Peru, and Somalia—once seen as ideological or power struggles—as primarily ethnic conflicts.

The state-formation wars that accompanied the "Leninist extinction" now appear to have been a one-time event—a flash flood rather than a global deluge. Many of these battles have already been brought under control. Indeed, the most striking trend in warfare during the 1990s has been its decline: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute documented just 27 major armed conflicts (only one of which, India and Pakistan's slow-motion struggle over Kashmir, was an interstate war) in 1996, down from 33 such struggles in 1989. Once the Cold War ended, a long list of seemingly perennial struggles came to a halt: the Lebanese civil war, the Moro insurrection in the Philippines, regional clashes in Chad, the Eritrean secession and related battles in Ethiopia, the Sahrawi independence struggle, fratricide in South Africa, and the guerrilla wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

The majority of the wars that survive today are ethnic conflicts—but they are mostly persistent battles that have been simmering for decades. They include the (now possibly defunct) IRA insurgency in the United Kingdom; the struggle for Kurdish autonomy in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey; the Israeli-Palestinian tragedy; the Sri Lankan civil war; and long-standing regional insurrections in Burma, India, and Indonesia. Most Ethnic Conflicts Are Rooted in Ancient Tribal or Religious Rivalries No way. The claim that ethnic conflicts have deep roots has long been a standard argument for not getting involved. According to political journalist Elizabeth Drew's famous account, President Bill Clinton in 1993 had intended to intervene in Bosnia until he read Robert Kaplan's book *Balkan Ghosts*, which, as Drew said, conveyed the notion that "these people had been killing each other in tribal and religious wars for centuries." But the reality is that most ethnic conflicts are expressions of "modern hate" and largely products of the twentieth century. The case of Rwanda is typical. When Europeans first stumbled across it, most of the country was already united under a central monarchy whose inhabitants spoke the same language, shared the same cuisine and culture, and practiced the same religion. They were, however, divided into several castes. The largest group, the Hutus, were farmers. The ruling aristocracy, who collected tribute from all other groups, was recruited from the Tutsis, the caste of cattle herders. All groups supplied troops for their common king, and intermarriage was not unusual. Social mobility among castes was quite possible: A rich Hutu who purchased enough cattle could climb into the ranks of the Tutsi; an impoverished Tutsi could fall into the ranks of the Hutu. Anthropologists

considered all castes to be members of a single "tribe," the Banyarwanda.

Then came the Belgians. Upon occupying the country after World War I, they transformed the system. Like many colonial powers, the Belgians chose to rule through a local elite-the Tutsis were eager to collaborate in exchange for Belgian guarantees of their local power and for privileged access to modern education. Districts that had been under Hutu leadership were brought under Tutsi rule. Until 1929, about one-third of the chiefs in Rwanda had been Hutu, but then the Belgians decided to "streamline" the provincial administration by eliminating all non-Tutsi chiefs. In 1933, the Belgians issued mandatory identity cards to all Rwandans, eliminating fluid movement between castes and permanently fixing the identity of each individual, and his or her children, as either Hutu or Tutsi. As the colonial administration penetrated and grew more powerful, Belgian backing allowed the Tutsis to increase their exploitation of the Hutus to levels that would have been impossible in earlier times.

In the 1950s, the Belgians came under pressure from the United Nations to grant Rwanda independence. In preparation, Brussels began to accord the majority Hutus-the Tutsis constituted only 14 percent of the population-a share of political power and greater access to education. Although this policy alarmed the Tutsis, it did not come close to satisfying the Hutus: Both groups began to organize to defend their interests, and their confrontations became increasingly militant. Centrist groups that included both Hutus and Tutsis were gradually squeezed out by extremists on both sides. The era of modern communal violence began with the 1959 attack on a Hutu leader by Tutsi extremists; Hutus retaliated, and several hundred people were killed. This set in motion a cycle of violence that culminated in December 1963, when Hutus massacred 10,000 Tutsis and drove another 130,000-150,000 from the country. These tragedies laid the seeds for the genocide of 1994.

The late emergence of ethnic violence, such as in Rwanda, is the norm, not an exception. In Ceylon, riots that pitted Tamils against Sinhalese did not erupt until 1956. In Bosnia, Serbs and Croats coexisted with one another, and both claimed Muslims as members of their communities, until World War II-and peaceful relations resumed even after the bloodshed of that conflict. Turks and Kurds shared a common identity as Ottomans and wore the same uniforms during World War I; in fact, the first Kurdish revolt against Turkish rule was not recorded until 1925. Muslims and Jews in Palestine had no special history of intercommunal hatred (certainly nothing resembling European anti-Semitism) until the riots of 1921, when nascent Arab nationalism began to conflict with the burgeoning Zionist movement. Although Hindu-Muslim clashes had a long history in India, they were highly localized; it was only after 1880 that the contention between these two groups began to gel into large-scale, organized movements. Of course, the agitators in all these conflicts tend to dream up fancy historic pedigrees for their disputes. Bosnian Serbs imagine that they are fighting to avenge their defeat by the Ottoman Turks in 1389; Hutus declare that Tutsis have "always" treated them as subhumans; and iRA bombers attack their victims in the name of a nationalist tradition they claim has burned since the

Dark Ages. But these mythologies of hatred are themselves largely recent inventions.

Ethnic Conflict Was Powerful Enough to Rip Apart the USSR

Yeah, right. The idea that the Soviet Union was destroyed by an explosion of ethnic atavism has been put forth by a number of influential thinkers, most notably Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. But this theory is not only historically inaccurate, it has misleading policy implications. The collapse of states is more often the cause of ethnic conflicts rather than the result.

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Ethnic Africa

Prior to 1991, ethnic consciousness within the Soviet Union had only developed into mass nationalism in three regions: the Baltic states, Transcaucasia, and Russia itself. Russian nationalism posed no threat to Soviet rule: It had been so successfully grafted onto communism during World War II that even today Leninists and Russian ultranationalists tend to flock to the same parties. In Transcaucasia, the Armenians and Georgians had developed potent national identities but were much more interested in pursuing local feuds (especially with Muslims) than in dismantling the Soviet Union. Only in the Baltic states, which had remained sovereign and independent until 1940, was powerful nationalist sentiment channeled directly against Moscow.

When the August 1991 coup paralyzed the Communist Party, the last threads holding the Soviet state together dissolved. Only then did rapid efforts to spread nationalism to other regions appear. In Belarus, Ukraine, and across Central Asia, the nomenklatura, searching for new instruments to legitimate their rule, began to embrace-and sometimes invent-nationalist mythologies. It was amidst this wave of post-Soviet nationalism that new or rekindled ethnic conflicts broke out in Chechnya, Moldóva, Ukraine, and elsewhere. Yet even amid the chaos of state collapse, ethnonationalist movements remained weaker and less violent than many had expected. Despite the predictions of numerous pundits, revivalist Islamic movements only took root in a couple of places (Chechnya and Tajikistan). Relations between indigenous Turkic peoples and Russian immigrants across most of Central Asia remained civil.

Ethnic Conflicts Are More Savage and Genocidal Than Conventional Wars

Wrong. Although this assumption is inaccurate, the truth is not much more comforting. There appears to be no consistent difference between ethnic and nonethnic wars in terms of their lethality. In fact, the percentage of civilians in the share of total casualties is rising

for all types of warfare. During World War I, civilian casualties constituted about 15 percent of all deaths. That number skyrocketed to 65 percent during World War II, which, by popularizing the use of strategic bombing, blockade-induced famine, and guerrilla warfare, constituted a real, albeit underappreciated, watershed in the history of human slaughter. Ever since, the number of civilian dead has constituted two-thirds or more of the total fatalities in most wars. Indeed, according to UNICEF, the share of civilian casualties has continued to grow since 1945—rising to almost 90 percent by the end of the 1980s and to more than 90 percent during this decade.

Furthermore, ethnic wars are less likely to be associated with genocide than "conventional" wars. The worst genocides of modern times have not been targeted along primarily ethnic lines. Rather, the genocides within Afghanistan, Cambodia, China, the Soviet Union, and even, to a great extent, Indonesia and Uganda, have focused on liquidating political dissidents: To employ the emerging vocabulary, they were *politicides* rather than *ethnicides*. Indeed, the largest genocides of this century were clearly ideologically driven *politicides*: the mass killings committed by the Maoist regime in China from 1949 to 1976, by the Leninist/Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1959, and by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979.

Finally, some pundits have claimed that ethnic conflicts are more likely to be savage because they are often fought by irregular, or guerrilla, troops. In fact, (a) ethnic wars are usually fought by regular armies, and (b) regular armies are quite capable of vicious massacres. Contrary to the stereotypes played out on television, the worst killing in Bosnia did not occur where combatants were members of irregular militias, reeling drunk on slivovitz. The core of the Serb separatist forces consisted of highly disciplined troops that were seconded from the Yugoslav army and led by a spit-and-polish officer corps. It was precisely these units that made the massacres at Srebrenica possible: It required real organizational skill to take between 6,000 and 10,000 Bosnian troops prisoner, disarm and transport them to central locations, and systematically murder them and distribute their bodies among a network of carefully concealed mass graves. Similarly, the wave of ethnic cleansing that followed the seizure of northern and eastern Bosnia by the Serbs in 1991 was not the spontaneous work of crazed irregulars. Transporting the male Bosnian population to concentration camps at Omarska and elsewhere required the talents of men who knew how to coordinate military attacks, read railroad schedules, guard and (under-) supply large prison populations, and organize bus transport for expelling women and children.

Globalization Makes Ethnic Conflict More Likely

Think again. The claim that globalization—the spread of consumer values, democratic institutions, and capitalist enterprise—aggravates ethnic and cultural violence is at the core of Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" hypothesis, Robert Kaplan's vision of "the coming anarchy," and Benjamin Barber's warning that we face a future of "Jihad vs. McWorld." Although these suggestions deserve further study, the early indications are

that globalization plays no real role in spreading ethnic conflict and may actually inhibit it.

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Major Genocides since World War II

Despite the fears of cultural critics that the broad appeal of "Baywatch" heralds a collapse of worldwide values, there is not much concrete evidence linking the outbreak of ethnic wars to the global spread of crude materialism via film, television, radio, and boombox. Denmark has just as many television sets as the former Yugoslavia but has not erupted into ethnic carnage or even mass immigrant bashing. Meanwhile, Burundi, sitting on the distant outskirts of the global village with only one television set for every 4,860 people, has witnessed some of the worst violence in this decade.

The spread of democratic values seems a slightly more plausible candidate as a trigger for ethnic violence: The recent progress of democracy in Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, and South Africa has been attended by ethnic feuding in each country. But this is an inconsistent trend. Some of the most savage internal conflicts of the post-Cold War period have occurred in societies that were growing less free, such as Egypt, India (which faced major secessionist challenges by Kashmiris, Sikhs, Tamils, etc.), Iran, and Peru. For that matter, many of the worst recent ethnic conflicts occurred in countries where the regime type was unstable and vacillated back and forth between more and less free forms, as in Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Lebanon, Liberia, Nigeria, and Tajikistan. Conversely, in numerous cases, such as the so-called third wave of democratization that swept Latin America and East Asia during the 1980s, political liberalization seems to have actually reduced most forms of political violence.

Investigating the impact of economic globalization leads to three surprises. First, the countries affected most by globalization—that is, those that have shown the greatest increase in international trade and benefited most significantly from foreign direct investment—are not the newly industrializing economies of East Asia and Latin America but the old industrial societies of Europe and North America. Second, ethnic conflicts are found, in some form or another, in every type of society: They are not concentrated among poor states, nor are they unusually common among countries experiencing economic globalization. Thus, the bad news is that ethnic conflicts do not disappear when societies "modernize."

The good news, however, lies in the third surprise: Ethnic conflicts are likely to be much less lethal in societies that are developed, economically open, and receptive to globalization. Ethnic battles in industrial and industrializing societies tend either to be

argued civilly or at least limited to the political violence of marginal groups, such as the provisional IRA in the United Kingdom, Mohawk secessionists in Canada, or the Ku Klux Klan in the United States. The most gruesome ethnic wars are found in poorer societies-Afghanistan and Sudan, for example-where economic frustration reinforces political rage. It seems, therefore, that if economic globalization contributes to a country's prosperity, then it also dampens the level of ethnic violence there.

Fanaticism Makes Ethnic Conflicts Harder to Terminate

Not really. Vojislav Seselj, the commander of one of the most murderous Serb paramilitary groups in Bosnia, once warned that if U.S. forces were used there, "the war [would] be total.... We would have tens of thousands of volunteers, and we would score a glorious victory. The Americans would have to send thousands of body bags. It would be a new Vietnam." Of course, several years later, after Serb forces had been handily defeated by a combination of Croat ground forces and NATO airpower, the president of the Serb separatists, Radovan Karadzic, admitted their leadership had thought all along that "if the West put in 10,000 men to cut off our supply corridors, we Serbs would be finished." Militarily, ethnic conflicts are not intrinsically different from any other type of combat. They can take on the form of guerrilla wars or conventional battles; they can be fought by determined and disciplined cadres or by poorly motivated slobes. How much military force will be required to end the fighting varies widely from one ethnic conflict to the next.

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Tribal Wisdom

However, achieving a military victory and building a durable peace are two very different matters. Sealing the peace in ethnic conflicts may prove harder for political-not military-reasons. Ethnic conflicts are fought among neighbors, among people who live intermingled with one other, forced to share the same resources and institutions. When two states end a war, they may need only to agree to stop shooting and respect a mutual border. But in ethnic conflicts there are often no established borders to retreat behind. Sometimes, ethnic disputes can be resolved by drawing new borders-creating new states (such as Bangladesh and "rump" Pakistan) that allow the quarreling groups to live apart. Other times, they can be terminated by convincing the combatants that they must share power peaceably and learn to coexist. This is the objective of the Dayton accord on Bosnia.

In either case, ending ethnic warfare often requires the expensive and delicate construction of new political institutions. Not only may this be more difficult than

terminating a "normal" interstate war, it may also take much longer. Building truly effective states takes time. For this reason, ethnic wars whose participants are already organized into states or protostates (which was true of the combatants in Croatia and Bosnia) are probably easier to bring to a conclusion than battles in regions Afghanistan, for example, not to speak of Somalia-where real states have yet to congeal.

WANT TO KNOW MORE?

The classic introduction to the study of ethnic conflict is still Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (sipri) inventories changing patterns of warfare in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, annual). For a specialist's tally of particular ethnic conflicts, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1993). An absorbing overview of the evolving relations between Tutsi and Hutu is Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). The Human Rights Watch report, *Slaughter among Neighbors: The Political Orgins of Communal Violence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), provides a broader survey of modern hate. An excellent account of the diversity of forms that ethnicity and nationalism have taken in territories of the former Soviet Union is Ronald Grigor Suny's *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). Neal Ascherson reflects upon issues of nationality and ethnicity in his book *Black Sea* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1995), which chronicles the expansive history of a region that has been a nexus of several Asian and European cultures. David Rohde's chilling *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica* (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1997) documents the careful organizational planning underlying the genocide in Bosnia. A recent work that dissects the question of whether, or how, the United States should intervene in ethnic conflicts is David Callahan's *Unwinnable Wars : American Power and Ethnic Conflict* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1998).

For links to relevant Web sites, as well as a comprehensive index of related articles, access www.foreignpolicy.com.

Y A H Y At SA o W S K [is an associate professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. His latest book, *The Myth of Global Chaos* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, forthcoming), critiques the idea that globalization fuels ethnic conflict.

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The clash of Samuel Huntingtons*The American Prospect*

Princeton

Jul/Aug 1998

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Abstract:

One of the fundamental dilemmas of US foreign policy is whether American democracy should be exported. Samuel P. Huntington's powerful case for both sides of the issue is presented.

Full Text:

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Since the end of the Cold War, two opposing schools of thought on American foreign policy have emerged. The first school consists of what we might call triumphalists. Triumphalists argue that America has an obligation to democratize the world. For them the successful conclusion of the Cold War validates a Wilsonian approach to spreading democracy—a core tenet of the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Triumphalists range from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to academics such as Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington. Then there is school number two: the debunkers. Debunkers view the post-Cold War era with apprehension and gloom. Far from believing that the end of the Cold War will usher in a new golden age of American foreign policy, debunkers insist that America should avoid foreign entanglements with a world now riven by ethnic conflict. America, they maintain, should seize the opportunity to mend its own woes rather than waste precious treasure on crusading abroad. Debunkers range from former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to academics such as . . . well, Harvard Professor Samuel P. Huntington.

Huntington may be America's most distinguished political scientist. He is certainly its most exasperating. In the October 1997 issue of the National Endowment for Democracy's *Journal of Democracy*, Huntington wrote: "The Comintern is dead. The time for a Demintern has arrived." But in the September-October 1997 *Foreign Affairs*, he delivered just the opposite message: American foreign power is in decline and its foreign policy is fractured by ethnic lobbies, each pursuing its own particular interests. "[I]nstead of formulating unrealistic schemes for grand endeavors abroad," he wrote, "foreign policy elites might well devote their energies to designing plans for lowering American involvement in the world in ways that will safeguard possible future national interests."

Whom are we to believe? Huntington I or Huntington II? One thing is certain: they can't both be right. Either a democratic international is a fool's errand or it is a sound strategy to safeguard future national interests. It can't be both.

Foreign policy experts can, and often do, change their minds. But to produce two concurrent and flatly contradictory articles is an exceptional feat. These articles do, however, point to a deeper conflict in Huntington, one on display in his most recent books, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991) and *The Clash of Civilizations* (1996). Where Huntington I claimed that a third wave of democracy was washing across the globe, Huntington II now seems to argue that it never amounted to more than a momentary splash. *The Clash of Civilizations* holds that the United States is in decline, that democracy is limited to Western cultures, and that America must accept Asian authoritarianism as a good thing.

This is a profoundly illiberal doctrine, an emphatic denial of universalism. It not only denies that the United States should seek to spread its democratic creed; it also rejects the proposition that other peoples can, or even should, aspire to achieve democratic self-government. Regardless of American action, or inaction, immutable cultural differences dictate authoritarian democracy at best, or tribal warfare at worst. The universality of human rights is replaced with the parochiality of ethnic rights.


Huntington is hardly the only foreign policy thinker to cast doubt on the universality of American democracy. Fareed Zakaria recently wrote that we should distinguish between political democracy and constitutional liberalism, arguing that countries such as Russia and Argentina are "illiberal democracies." Others, such as *Atlantic Monthly* contributor Robert Kaplan and James Schlesinger, take a far more saturnine view: they highlight the rise of ethnic particularism and bemoan what they regard as American liberals' naive and foolish penchant for interventionism.

Huntington, however, is the most substantial and perplexing exponent of this newly fashionable doctrine of noninvolvement. Huntington has always been a Democrat, but never a liberal or a neoconservative. Instead, he is something different—a conservative realist. Realism has always held that in an anarchic world, states must ruthlessly pursue their national interest or face extinction. But defining the national interest has always

been a slippery task and realism a mutable doctrine. Now Huntington appears to have mutated along with it. While he attacks the United States as a decadent society, he apparently views Asian authoritarianism as superior to the American model of democracy. This amounts to a refurbished critique of the charges leveled against American intervention abroad by the 1960s left. Thus Huntington's intellectual odyssey is not just a story of how one of America's leading foreign policy thinkers has repudiated the democratic universalism he once espoused. It is also an example of how the right has begun to attack the country it used to defend: America.

FROM UNIVERSAL TO PARTICULAR

Huntington is a professor of government at Harvard, where he also heads the Olin Center for Strategic Studies. Since he began his career as a graduate student at Harvard along with Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Stanley Hoffmann, he has produced a steady stream of articles and books. Apart from tours of duty at the National Security Council during the Johnson and Carter administrations, he has spent his entire career as an academic.



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Huntington initially focused on civil-military relations. His first book, *The Soldier and the State* (1957), offered a keen examination of the tensions between civilian control and military strategy. Since the book's appearance an entire subfield has emerged in political science to grapple with the question of civil-military relations—a topic that has acquired fresh importance in the post-Cold War era as doubts have surfaced about the reliability of the American officer corps. In his next book, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), Huntington maintained that economic progress could not be divorced from political liberty—again, an argument that is now hotly debated, and one from which Huntington himself now seems to dissent.

It was with *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981) that Huntington first displayed his interest in the question of ethnicity and national identity. Huntington maintained that there was a distinct American creed based on the Protestant ethic, natural rights, and equality. "[E]thnic cultural identities," he wrote, "coexist with a national identity rooted in a particular set of political ideas and institutions." In the United States, he maintained, ethnic groups did not claim to represent a separate national identity, and ideology and nationality were fused.

In his most recent book, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Huntington returns to the question of ethnicity, but on a global scale. He argues that the world is made up of seven major civilizations: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, and Latin American. The post-Cold War world is divided along rigidly civilizational-ethnic lines and therefore

is inhospitable to democracy. In Huntington's view, democracy is a Western creation that cannot be transplanted to the inhospitable environments of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Over the centuries, these countries have developed their own habits and practices, which the West should respect rather than attempt to change. Anything else would smack of cultural imperialism. The best that the U.S. can do is to team up with its western European partners to form a kind of imperium that can resist marauding foreigners.

GETTING REAL

The Clash of Civilizations is brilliant, provocative, and utterly unconvincing. Like so many previous efforts to devise grand theories of history and politics—from Spengler to Toynbee to Fukuyama—Huntington's collapses under the weight of its own assumptions. In fact Huntington's form of theorizing suffers from its own kind of malady. Though he stresses that he has written a popular book rather than a political science text, *The Clash* can be properly understood only in the context of conservative realist and neorealist theory.

Before the Second World War, the study of international relations was simply another term for diplomatic history. Political scientists such as Archibald Cary Coolidge and James Shotwell served on Woodrow Wilson's Inquiry Commission to determine European borders, and they wrote readable prose about America's role in the world. It was only with the arrival of European emigres such as Hans Morgenthau that the European realist tradition—with its neoclassical emphasis on a mechanical balance of power—became dominant in the United States. This tradition emphasized power politics, stability, and a diminished role for ideology—all themes that Henry Kissinger embraced at Harvard and later sought to follow as national security advisor and secretary of state in the Nixon and Ford administrations.

As political science became increasingly wedded to scientific and mechanistic thinking in the 1970s, international relations theory skidded off the rails. The weakness of "realist" theory had always been its assumption that a balance of power should be maintained among nations. Should any nation become too powerful, so the thinking went, opposing nations should form an alliance to balance against it. Neorealism, which emerged in the 1970s, went even further.

Neorealism held that the nature of a regime was largely irrelevant to its behavior. The leading neorealist, Kenneth Waltz of the University of California at Berkeley, explains that the manner in which nations behave is best understood by viewing them in terms of neoclassical economic theory. Whether the Soviet Union was a totalitarian power or a democracy was secondary to its objective geopolitical interests. It was simply responding to the international environment, to the incentives and disincentives of an organized and coherent system. Any government or statesman running a Russian-led empire at mid-century would have behaved more or less like Stalin or Khrushchev. Neorealism thus implies that given a sufficient number of case studies, political scientists should be able

scientifically to predict the behavior of regimes.

Huntington's book moves beyond these increasingly sterile debates. He attempts to integrate an analysis of cultural and civilizational distinctiveness into traditional realism. In arguing that ethnicity stands at the heart of international relations, Huntington turns realism on its head. The nature of regimes becomes the most important factor in what he sees as a battle of rival civilizations jockeying for advantage. But in the end, Huntington himself succumbs to the flaws of the grand theory. For in his attempt to refurbish traditional, conservative realism with culture, Huntington has produced a profoundly illiberal book.

DECLINE, DECLINE, DECLINE

One of the main themes of *The Clash of Civilizations* is that Western arrogance has blinded the West to the true nature of world politics. While American politicians indulge the naive fantasy of a coming liberal universalism, Asian countries are girding themselves to fight off American intrusions into their spheres of influence.

There may be something to this. But the way Huntington describes it, Asia is set to dispense with the United States as an economic, cultural, and military power. In fact, Huntington's views of Asia turn out to be only a slightly more restrained version of the Japanese parliamentarian Shintaro Ishihara's warnings a few years ago: "There is no hope for the United States," said Ishihara. "Right now, the modern civilization built by whites is coming close to its practical end." Huntington approvingly quotes Tommy Koh, Singapore's ambassador to the United States, who observed in 1993 that a "cultural renaissance is sweeping across Asia." Asians, said Koh, "no longer regard everything Western or American as necessarily the best." Huntington agrees; he even goes so far as to argue that the Confucian work ethic is responsible for the economic progress of Asia.

But is this really true? One of the problems with seeking the roots of Asia's economic success in something as vague as Confucianism is that Confucianism might just as plausibly be used to explain Asia's current economic crisis. This is one of the pitfalls of reading broad cultural and civilizational conclusions into momentary economic trends. Confucianism is deeply rooted in the Asian cultural tradition. But its effects on Asia's current economic climate are complex and ambivalent-hurting in some respects and helping in others. And in any case, avarice, foolishness, and luck probably play at least as great a role in charting Asia's economic future.

What's more, Huntington likely has it exactly backward when it comes to Asian self-assertion. Economic failure, rather than success, seems far more likely to spark an anti-American backlash. Some Indonesians and South Koreans are already beginning to view the International Monetary Fund as a tool of the United States intended to upend their countries' economies. To write off Asia as an economic power, as some are now doing, would be absurd. But if we are looking for the roots of tensions between Asian

nations and the United States, the source is less American arrogance than America's inability to absorb ever greater productive capacity from Asia.

When it comes to the Islamic world, Huntington would seem to be on firmer ground. Radical states like Syria, Iran, and Iraq clearly view the United States as an interloper, and even America's relations with more moderate states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are plagued with religious and cultural tensions. But it would be wrong to assume that American dealings with any Islamic nation are fated to be hostile. Turkey, after all, enjoys a cordial and long-standing relationship with the United States. And even in Iran, the revolution appears to have burned out, leaving behind an apathetic youth eager to enjoy the trappings of American culture, despite the Ayatollahs' adjurations.

Viewing Asia and the Middle East as monolithic civilizations is also misleading because it masks the fact that many of the conflicts in these regions are conflicts within civilizations. It is no accident that Saudi Arabia and Egypt respond differently to the United States than Iran and Iraq do; their regimes perceive their interests as best served by friendly ties with the U.S. Similarly, if the West constituted a single bloc, as Huntington seems to believe, then it would be united in confronting the "Islamic peril." But as the collapse of the Gulf War coalition indicates, the West is divided over how to respond to Saddam Hussein's depredations. France and Germany would like to deal with Saddam as well as Teheran, while the United States vainly insists on isolating both countries. And the Middle East as a region corresponds rather closely to traditional realism. Middle Eastern countries are all jockeying for advantage against one another; the dream of Pan-Arab unity, which Nasser attempted to fulfill, has sputtered out, leaving behind a region united only in suspicion and fear.

Huntington's focus on culture becomes particularly far-fetched when he turns to Bosnia. Here he seems intent on ramming every possible event into his framework to supply it with desperately needed evidence. In Huntington's view, "the intensification of religious identity produced by war and ethnic cleansing, the preferences of its leaders, and the support and pressure from other Muslim states were slowly but clearly transforming Bosnia from the Switzerland of the Balkans into the Iran of the Balkans." But this is simply not true. While some Bosnians have gravitated toward Muslim fundamentalism, there is no evidence of anything like a massive upsurge of religious fervor. Rather than acknowledge that most Bosnians are thankful that the fighting has ended, Huntington repeats Serb propaganda. The ethnic differences between the Bosnians and Serbs were, in any case, largely the invention of Serbian nationalists motivated by territorial conquest and racial extermination. But Huntington declares that "the war in Bosnia was a war of civilizations," endowing the Bosnian conflict with a grandeur that it does not deserve. The Serbs were petty tyrants intent on rubbing out an inconvenient and despised neighbor. There is more here of the banality of evil than some grand clash of civilizations.

Huntington's theory runs into similar difficulties in trying to pit the West against another civilization. Since some European countries such as France and Britain were sympathetic

to the Serbs, while the United States was pushing to help the Bosnians, Huntington starts to waffle. Why did the U.S. help the Bosnians, he wonders? He considers and rejects the notion that the Clinton administration was attempting to placate the Arab states. He then attacks the United States for having seen in Bosnia a peaceful example of multiculturalism: "American idealism, moralism, humanitarian instincts, naivete and ignorance concerning the Balkans thus led [the U.S.] to be pro-Bosnian and anti-Serb."

In other words, the American government failed to realize that civilizational demands dictated that it should have stood by while the Serbs rolled over the Bosnians. That seems a rather uncivilized outlook. There is more: "By refusing to recognize the war for what it was, the American government alienated its allies, prolonged the fighting, and helped to create in the Balkans a Muslim state heavily influenced by Iran.... The Spanish Civil War was a prelude to World War II. The Bosnian War is one more bloody episode in an ongoing clash of civilizations." But the United States did not alienate its allies. It did not prolong the fighting. And it certainly did not help create a Muslim state influenced by Iran. On the contrary, the war ended only when America belatedly launched a few strikes against the Serbs. The Balkans have now become a de facto American sphere of influence, while the allies have happily sent their troops to ensure that renewed warfare does not break out. Where are the Iranians?

BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME

The final chapter of *The Clash* makes it clear where Huntington has been heading: American national identity itself is under siege. Other countries may fear American cultural imperialism; but Huntington fears their influence on us. No longer is Huntington sanguine about the American national creed that he extolled in *American Politics*. He believes that multiculturalism is destroying the United States. According to Huntington, Western culture is challenged by groups within Western societies. One such challenge comes from immigrants from other civilizations who reject assimilation and continue to adhere to and propagate the values, customs, and cultures of their home societies. This phenomenon is most notable among Muslims in Europe.... It is also manifest, in lesser degree, among Hispanics in the United States.

What Hispanics could Huntington possibly mean? If anything, Hispanics tend to be among the most patriotic of Americans. And Huntington goes on to declare that "historically American national identity has been defined culturally by the heritage of Western civilization and politically by the principles of the American creed. . ." If the United States is "de-Westernized," he warns, the West could be reduced to Europe and "a few lightly populated overseas European settler countries."

Essentially, Huntington wants the United States to renounce universalism abroad and at home. A multi-civilizational United States, he says, "will not be the United States; it will be the United Nations." But will it? The United States has always contained different ethnicities; the only difference in very recent history is that new groups are sharing power

with the Anglo-Saxon elite. Even the succession of ethnic groups into the American elite is by now an old story. Bill Richardson, the ambassador to the United Nations, may be the first Mexican American to hold a high-level foreign policy appointment in the United States government. But his story is really no different from that of the Jews and Catholics who made their way into the foreign policy elite in the early Cold War era.

What Huntington seems to fear is the rise of ethnicity in the United States itself. In his 1997 Foreign Affairs article, Huntington warned that ethnic lobbies have hijacked foreign policy. A unified national interest, he says, no longer exists. Multiculturalism has taken over. The only option for the United States is retreat. But this grossly exaggerates the perils and influence of multiculturalism. There is little reason to believe that multicultural activists have taken over the nation's foreign policy. Huntington's alarms about multiculturalism in the United States are as excessive as his claims that Bosnia has become an Iranian beachhead in Europe.

Above all, these musings suggest how disaffected American conservatives have become with the country itself. At the very moment when the U.S. is finally attempting to fulfill its promise of a color-blind society, Huntington is lashing out against fringe multicultural movements and depicting immigrants, in tired and sloppy language, as a menace to the Republic. Huntington is by no means the only conservative to bewail the state of the United States. Alexander Haig, who heads the SingaporeAmerica Council, told me a year ago: "Here in our society we're not a good example." Singapore, according to Haig, is in better shape. Under Lee Kuan Yew's direction, "Singapore has made great progress . . . but in a model best suited to Singapore in his own judgment." Other conservatives who have hailed "Asian values" against American sloth include William F. Buckley, Jr., Henry Kissinger, and Patrick Buchanan. After the flogging of young American Michael Fay in Singapore, Buchanan wrote, "It is our moral elite's distance from reality . . . which induces a moral paralysis when it comes to punishing domestic enemies." Blaming America first has become the new code among conservatives.

In the end, Huntington's apprehensions about immigration and civilizational strife prompt him to suggest that the United States should retreat to a spheres-of-influence foreign policy. But why go through all these cultural and civilizational contortions just to arrive at this old conclusion? Huntington believes that the Anglo-Saxon world-Britain and the United States, with perhaps a few continental countries along for the ride-should form an imperium against the Asian, Islamic, and African hordes. But to confine America's role to such a rearguard action hardly corresponds with the country's traditional conception of foreign policy. The truth is that America, far from being an isolationist power, has steadily expanded its power abroad. Already in 1840, American lithographs depicted an eagle with a banner in its beak heralding: "Westward The March of Empire Takes Its Flight." The United States has moved from conquering the West to dominating the Caribbean to occupying Western Europe to, most recently, assuming responsibility for the Balkans and the Middle East.

There is a potential middle ground that Huntington ignores, one between the naive internationalism now embraced by a portion of the American elite and the dark isolationism that Huntington now apparently embraces. Had Huntington considered the work of Adam Watson, a prominent British theorist of international relations, he might have pondered the notion of a society of states. Watson has written what is probably one of the most brilliant texts on international politics, *The Evolution of International Society*. Like Hedley Bull and other English political scientists, Watson realized that it is absurd to project balance-of-power or other procrustean systems theories onto world politics. The norm, as Watson suggests, has been for one power—whether the Assyrian, the Roman, or the British Empire—to dominate over the rest. There is no reason to assume that the United States is not following in that path. Former British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan once mused that the United States was playing the upstart Rome to Britain's tired Greece. And there was something to that. The United States may not be attempting to create military rule over its client states and allies, but it does seek to create a new and peaceful system based on American democracy. Relations between states have historically been based not on anarchy but on organized rules of the game established and enforced by a single great power [see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, "A Multicultural Nationalism?" TAP, January-February 1998].

Whether or not the United States is able to create such a system depends not on civilizational forces but on its resources, skill, luck, and readiness to promote democracy. That is something that Huntington I seemed to understand even if Huntington II has repudiated it. "Other nations may fundamentally change their political systems and continue their existence as nations," wrote Huntington in *The Third Wave*.

"The U.S. does not have that option. Hence Americans have a special interest in the development of a global environment congenial to democracy." The United States is unlikely to engage in reckless crusades, but it might forget that defending human rights abroad is what helps to define its national identity at home. There is no multicultural clash, no uniquely Asian democracy, and no grand clash of civilizations. But there are two Huntingtons. And the real clash is between them. Will the real Samuel P. Huntington please stand up?

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TORTURE AT ABU GHRAIB

by SEYMOUR M. HERSH

American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?

In the era of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, twenty miles west of Baghdad, was one of the world's most notorious prisons, with torture, weekly executions, and vile living conditions. As many as fifty thousand men and women -no accurate count is possible- were jammed into Abu Ghraib at one time, in twelve-by-twelve-foot cells that were little more than human holding pits.

In the looting that followed the regime's collapse, last April, the huge prison complex, by then deserted, was stripped of everything that could be removed, including doors, windows, and bricks. The coalition authorities had the floors tiled, cells cleaned and repaired, and toilets, showers, and a new medical center added. Abu Ghraib was now a U.S. military prison. Most of the prisoners, however by the fall there were several thousand, including women and teen-agers were civilians, many of whom had been picked up in random military sweeps and at highway checkpoints. They fell into three loosely defined categories: common criminals; security detainees suspected of "crimes against the coalition"; and a small number of suspected "high-value" leaders of the insurgency against the coalition forces.

Last June, Janis Karpinski, an Army reserve brigadier general, was named commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade and put in charge of military prisons in Iraq. General Karpinski, the only female commander in the war zone, was an experienced operations and intelligence officer who had served with the Special Forces and in the 1991 Gulf War, but she had never run a prison system. Now she was in charge of three large jails, eight battalions, and thirty-four hundred Army reservists, most of whom, like her, had no training in handling prisoners.

General Karpinski, who had wanted to be a soldier since she was five, is a business consultant in civilian life, and was enthusiastic about her new job. In an interview last December with the *St. Petersburg Times*, she said that, for many of the Iraqi inmates at Abu Ghraib, "living conditions now are better in prison than at home. At one point we were concerned that they wouldn't want to leave."

A month later, General Karpinski was formally admonished and quietly suspended, and a major investigation into the Army's prison system, authorized by Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior commander in Iraq, was under way. A fifty-three-page report, obtained by *The New Yorker*, written by Major General Antonio M. Taguba and not meant for public release, was completed in late February. Its conclusions about the institutional failures of the Army prison system were devastating. Specifically, Taguba found that between October and December of 2003 there were numerous instances of "sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" at Abu Ghraib. This systematic and illegal abuse of detainees, Taguba reported, was perpetrated by soldiers of the 372nd Military Police Company, and also by members of the American intelligence community. (The 372nd was attached to the 320th M.P. Battalion, which reported to Karpinski's brigade headquarters.) Taguba's report listed some of the wrongdoing:

Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees; pouring cold water on naked detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair; threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick, and using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.

There was stunning evidence to support the allegations, Taguba added "detailed witness statements and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence." Photographs and videos taken by the soldiers as the abuses were happening were not included in his report, Taguba said, because of their "extremely sensitive nature."

The photographs -several of which were broadcast on CBS's "60 Minutes 2" last week- show leering G.I.s taunting naked Iraqi prisoners who are forced to assume humiliating poses. Six suspects Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick II, known as Chip, who was the senior enlisted man; Specialist Charles A. Graner; Sergeant Javal Davis; Specialist Megan Ambuhl; Specialist Sabrina Harman; and Private Jeremy Sivits are now facing prosecution in Iraq, on charges that include conspiracy, dereliction of duty, cruelty toward prisoners, maltreatment, assault, and indecent acts. A seventh suspect, Private Lynndie England, was reassigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, after becoming pregnant.

The photographs tell it all. In one, Private England, a cigarette dangling from her mouth, is giving a jaunty thumbs-up sign and pointing at the genitals of a young Iraqi, who is naked except for a sandbag over his head, as he masturbates. Three other hooded and naked Iraqi prisoners are shown, hands reflexively crossed over their genitals. A fifth prisoner has his hands at his sides. In another, England stands arm in arm with Specialist Graner; both are grinning and giving the thumbs-up behind a cluster of perhaps seven naked Iraqis, knees bent, piled clumsily on top of each other in a pyramid. There is another photograph of a cluster of naked prisoners, again piled in a pyramid. Near them stands Graner, smiling, his arms crossed; a woman soldier stands in front of him, bending over, and she, too, is smiling. Then, there is another cluster of hooded bodies, with a female soldier standing in front, taking photographs. Yet another photograph shows a kneeling, naked, unhooded male prisoner, head momentarily turned away from the camera, posed to make it appear that he is performing oral sex on another male prisoner, who is naked and hooded.

Such dehumanization is unacceptable in any culture, but it is especially so in the Arab world. Homosexual acts are against Islamic law and it is humiliating for men to be naked in front of other men, Bernard Haykel, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at New York University, explained. "Being put on top of each other and forced to masturbate, being naked in front of each other it's all a form of torture," Haykel said.

Two Iraqi faces that do appear in the photographs are those of dead men. There is the battered face of prisoner No. 153399, and the bloodied body of another prisoner, wrapped in cellophane and packed in ice. There is a photograph of an empty room, splattered with blood.

The 372nd's abuse of prisoners seemed almost routine -a fact of Army life that the soldiers felt no need to hide. On April 9th, at an Article 32 hearing (the military equivalent of a grand jury) in the case against Sergeant Frederick, at Camp Victory, near Baghdad, one of the witnesses, Specialist Matthew Wisdom, an M.P., told the courtroom what happened when he and other soldiers delivered seven prisoners, hooded and bound, to the so-called "hard site" at Abu Ghraib seven tiers of cells where the inmates who were considered the most dangerous were housed. The men had been accused of starting a riot in another section of the prison. Wisdom said:

SFC Snider grabbed my prisoner and threw him into a pile. . . . I do not think it was right to put them in a pile. I saw SSG Frederic, SGT Davis and CPL Graner walking around the pile hitting the prisoners. I remember SSG Frederick hitting one prisoner in the side of its [sic] ribcage. The prisoner was no danger to SSG Frederick. . . . I left after that.

When he returned later, Wisdom testified:

I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open. I thought I should just get out of there. I didn't think it was right . . . I saw SSG Frederick walking towards me, and he said, "Look what these animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds." I heard PFC England shout out, "He's getting hard."

Wisdom testified that he told his superiors what had happened, and assumed that "the issue was taken care of." He said, "I just didn't want to be part of anything that looked criminal."

The abuses became public because of the outrage of Specialist Joseph M. Darby, an M.P. whose role emerged during the Article 32 hearing against Chip Frederick. A government witness, Special Agent Scott Bobeck, who is a member of the Army's Criminal Investigation Division, or C.I.D., told the court, according to an abridged transcript made available to me, "The investigation started after SPC Darby . . . got a CD from CPL Graner. . . . He came across pictures of naked detainees." Bobeck said that Darby had "initially put an anonymous letter under our door, then he later came forward and gave a sworn statement. He felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong."

Questioned further, the Army investigator said that Frederick and his colleagues had not been given any "training guidelines" that he was aware of. The M.P.s in the 372nd had been assigned to routine traffic and police duties upon their arrival in Iraq, in the spring of 2003. In October of 2003, the 372nd was ordered to prison-guard duty at Abu Ghraib. Frederick, at thirty-seven, was far older than his colleagues, and was a natural leader; he had also worked for six years as a guard for the Virginia Department of Corrections. Bobeck explained:

What I got is that SSG Frederick and CPL Graner were road M.P.s and were put in charge because they were civilian prison guards and had knowledge of how things were supposed to be run.

Bobeck also testified that witnesses had said that Frederick, on one occasion, "had punched a detainee in the chest so hard that the detainee almost went into cardiac arrest."

At the Article 32 hearing, the Army informed Frederick and his attorneys, Captain Robert Shuck, an Army lawyer, and Gary Myers, a civilian, that two dozen witnesses they had sought, including General Karpinski and all of Frederick's co-defendants, would not appear. Some had been excused after exercising their Fifth Amendment right; others were deemed to be too far away from the courtroom. "The purpose of an Article 32 hearing is for us to engage witnesses and discover facts," Gary Myers told me. "We ended up with a c.i.d. agent and no alleged victims to examine." After the hearing, the presiding investigative officer ruled that there was sufficient evidence to convene a court-martial against Frederick.

Myers, who was one of the military defense attorneys in the My Lai prosecutions of the nineteen-seventies, told me that his client's defense will be that he was carrying out the orders of his superiors and, in particular, the directions of military intelligence. He said, "Do you really think a group of kids from rural Virginia decided to do this on their own? Decided that the best way to embarrass Arabs and make them talk was to have them walk around nude?"

In letters and e-mails to family members, Frederick repeatedly noted that the military-intelligence teams, which included C.I.A. officers and linguists and interrogation specialists from private

defense contractors, were the dominant force inside Abu Ghraib. In a letter written in January, he said:

I questioned some of the things that I saw . . . such things as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the door of their cell and the answer I got was, "This is how military intelligence (MI) wants it done." . . . MI has also instructed us to place a prisoner in an isolation cell with little or no clothes, no toilet or running water, no ventilation or window, for as much as three days.

The military-intelligence officers have "encouraged and told us, 'Great job,' they were now getting positive results and information," Frederick wrote. "CID has been present when the military working dogs were used to intimidate prisoners at MI's request." At one point, Frederick told his family, he pulled aside his superior officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Phillabaum, the commander of the 320th M.P. Battalion, and asked about the mistreatment of prisoners. "His reply was 'Don't worry about it.'"

In November, Frederick wrote, an Iraqi prisoner under the control of what the Abu Ghraib guards called "O.G.A.," or other government agencies -that is, the C.I.A. and its paramilitary employees- was brought to his unit for questioning. "They stressed him out so bad that the man passed away. They put his body in a body bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four hours in the shower. . . . The next day the medics came and put his body on a stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took him away." The dead Iraqi was never entered into the prison's inmate-control system, Frederick recounted, "and therefore never had a number."

Frederick's defense is, of course, highly self-serving. But the complaints in his letters and e-mails home were reinforced by two internal Army reports -Taguba's and one by the Army's chief law-enforcement officer, Provost Marshal Donald Ryder, a major general.

Last fall, General Sanchez ordered Ryder to review the prison system in Iraq and recommend ways to improve it. Ryder's report, filed on November 5th, concluded that there were potential human-rights, training, and manpower issues, system-wide, that needed immediate attention. It also discussed serious concerns about the tension between the missions of the military police assigned to guard the prisoners and the intelligence teams who wanted to interrogate them. Army regulations limit intelligence activity by the M.P.s to passive collection. But something had gone wrong at Abu Ghraib.

There was evidence dating back to the Afghanistan war, the Ryder report said, that M.P.s had worked with intelligence operatives to "set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews" -a euphemism for breaking the will of prisoners. "Such actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and docile state." General Karpinski's brigade, Ryder reported, "has not been directed to change its facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor participate in those interrogations." Ryder called for the establishment of procedures to "define the role of military police soldiers . . . clearly separating the actions of the guards from those of the military intelligence personnel." The officers running the war in Iraq were put on notice.

Ryder undercut his warning, however, by concluding that the situation had not yet reached a crisis point. Though some procedures were flawed, he said, he found "no military police units purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices." His investigation was at best a failure and at worst a cover-up.

Taguba, in his report, was polite but direct in refuting his fellow-general. "Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during [Ryder's] assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation," he wrote. "In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment." The report continued, "Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder's report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures to 'set the conditions' for MI interrogations." Army intelligence officers, C.I.A. agents, and private contractors "actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses."

Taguba backed up his assertion by citing evidence from sworn statements to Army C.I.D. investigators. Specialist Sabrina Harman, one of the accused M.P.s, testified that it was her job to keep detainees awake, including one hooded prisoner who was placed on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis. She stated, "MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and Frederick's job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to talk."

Another witness, Sergeant Javal Davis, who is also one of the accused, told C.I.D. investigators, "I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . . being made to do various things that I would question morally. . . . We were told that they had different rules." Taguba wrote, "Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated: 'Loosen this guy up for us.' 'Make sure he has a bad night.' 'Make sure he gets the treatment.'" Military intelligence made these comments to Graner and Frederick, Davis said. "The MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Graner compliments . . . statements like, 'Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They're giving out good information.'"

When asked why he did not inform his chain of command about the abuse, Sergeant Davis answered, "Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the wing" -where the abuse took place"- belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse."

Another witness, Specialist Jason Kennel, who was not accused of wrongdoing, said, "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." (It was his view, he added, that if M.I. wanted him to do this "they needed to give me paperwork.") Taguba also cited an interview with Adel L. Nakhla, a translator who was an employee of Titan, a civilian contractor. He told of one night when a "bunch of people from MI" watched as a group of handcuffed and shackled inmates were subjected to abuse by Graner and Frederick.

General Taguba saved his harshest words for the military-intelligence officers and private contractors. He recommended that Colonel Thomas Pappas, the commander of one of the M.I. brigades, be reprimanded and receive non-judicial punishment, and that Lieutenant Colonel Steven Jordan, the former director of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center, be relieved of duty and reprimanded. He further urged that a civilian contractor, Steven Stephanowicz, of CACI International, be fired from his Army job, reprimanded, and denied his security clearances for lying to the investigating team and allowing or ordering military policemen "who were not trained in interrogation techniques to facilitate interrogations by 'setting conditions' which were neither authorized" nor in accordance with Army regulations. "He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse," Taguba wrote. He also recommended disciplinary action against a second CACI employee, John Israel. (A spokeswoman for CACI said that the company had "received no formal communication" from the Army about the matter.)

"I suspect," Taguba concluded, that Pappas, Jordan, Stephanowicz, and Israel "were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuse at Abu Ghraib," and strongly recommended immediate disciplinary action.

The problems inside the Army prison system in Iraq were not hidden from senior commanders. During Karpinski's seven-month tour of duty, Taguba noted, there were at least a dozen officially reported incidents involving escapes, attempted escapes, and other serious security issues that were investigated by officers of the 800th M.P. Brigade. Some of the incidents had led to the killing or wounding of inmates and M.P.s, and resulted in a series of "lessons learned" inquiries within the brigade. Karpinski invariably approved the reports and signed orders calling for changes in day-to-day procedures. But Taguba found that she did not follow up, doing nothing to insure that the orders were carried out. Had she done so, he added, "cases of abuse may have been prevented."

General Taguba further found that Abu Ghraib was filled beyond capacity, and that the M.P. guard force was significantly undermanned and short of resources. "This imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability lapses," he wrote. There were gross differences, Taguba said, between the actual number of prisoners on hand and the number officially recorded. A lack of proper screening also meant that many innocent Iraqis were wrongly being detained -indefinitely, it seemed, in some cases. The Taguba study noted that more than sixty per cent of the civilian inmates at Abu Ghraib were deemed not to be a threat to society, which should have enabled them to be released. Karpinski's defense, Taguba said, was that her superior officers "routinely" rejected her recommendations regarding the release of such prisoners.

Karpinski was rarely seen at the prisons she was supposed to be running, Taguba wrote. He also found a wide range of administrative problems, including some that he considered "without precedent in my military career." The soldiers, he added, were "poorly prepared and untrained . . . prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout the mission."

General Taguba spent more than four hours interviewing Karpinski, whom he described as extremely emotional: "What I found particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers."

Taguba recommended that Karpinski and seven brigade military-police officers and enlisted men be relieved of command and formally reprimanded. No criminal proceedings were suggested for Karpinski; apparently, the loss of promotion and the indignity of a public rebuke were seen as enough punishment.

After the story broke on CBS last week, the Pentagon announced that Major General Geoffrey Miller, the new head of the Iraqi prison system, had arrived in Baghdad and was on the job. He had been the commander of the Guantánamo Bay detention center. General Sanchez also authorized an investigation into possible wrongdoing by military and civilian interrogators.

As the international furor grew, senior military officers, and President Bush, insisted that the actions of a few did not reflect the conduct of the military as a whole. Taguba's report, however, amounts to an unsparing study of collective wrongdoing and the failure of Army leadership at the highest levels. The picture he draws of Abu Ghraib is one in which Army regulations and the Geneva conventions were routinely violated, and in which much of the day-to-day management

of the prisoners was abdicated to Army military-intelligence units and civilian contract employees. Interrogating prisoners and getting intelligence, including by intimidation and torture, was the priority.

The mistreatment at Abu Ghraib may have done little to further American intelligence, however. Willie J. Rowell, who served for thirty-six years as a C.I.D. agent, told me that the use of force or humiliation with prisoners is invariably counterproductive. "They'll tell you what you want to hear, truth or no truth," Rowell said. "'You can flog me until I tell you what I know you want me to say.' You don't get righteous information."

Under the fourth Geneva convention, an occupying power can jail civilians who pose an "imperative" security threat, but it must establish a regular procedure for insuring that only civilians who remain a genuine security threat be kept imprisoned. Prisoners have the right to appeal any internment decision and have their cases reviewed. Human Rights Watch complained to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that civilians in Iraq remained in custody month after month with no charges brought against them. Abu Ghraib had become, in effect, another Guantánamo.

As the photographs from Abu Ghraib make clear, these detentions have had enormous consequences: for the imprisoned civilian Iraqis, many of whom had nothing to do with the growing insurgency; for the integrity of the Army; and for the United States' reputation in the world.

Captain Robert Shuck, Frederick's military attorney, closed his defense at the Article 32 hearing last month by saying that the Army was "attempting to have these six soldiers atone for its sins." Similarly, Gary Myers, Frederick's civilian attorney, told me that he would argue at the court-martial that culpability in the case extended far beyond his client. "I'm going to drag every involved intelligence officer and civilian contractor I can find into court," he said. "Do you really believe the Army relieved a general officer because of six soldiers? Not a chance."

Guerrilla of the Week

by Jenn Bleyer

Greg Palast is back with an updated, expanded edition of the bestseller that won't die, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy*. GNN's Jenn Bleyer caught up with America's most prolific muckraker at a recent New York event. Palast was in rare form, pulling no punches as he explained how we're headed for another election debacle, the connection between Iraq and America's African-American community, and why Michael Moore is allowed to get away with what he does.

GNN: What's new in this edition of your book?

Palast: Well, there's nothing new in the sense that it's the same old thieving shits that have been walking away with everything in our nation that isn't bolted down, plus hunks of Mesopotamia. That ain't new. What's new is the information that I have on exactly how they do it. What's new on the election story? It's grim. Our president has signed the Help America Vote Act. When George W. Bush is going to help me vote, I'm concerned.

They're pushing it to go digital, and I think a lot of people are getting distracted worrying about the hacking. The real game is what the Civil Rights Commission calls the "no count," which is machines that don't work, power failures, machines that lock up. Hey, you have a laptop, right? Your presidency is hanging on it. This isn't about whether the machines work or not-they work perfectly. That's where I investigated. I went into Broward County's white precinct where touch screen voting works just wonderful, like a coconut oil massage. Real smooth. And you go into the black precincts and it's like plantation whips brought out in digital form. Precincts were shut down for hours while they told people, come back tomorrow. Power failures. You name it. In the black community, thousands of votes were lost in Broward County with the touch screen vote.

In the new edition of the book, I am revealing something that was discovered by the Civil Rights Commission in their raw data. 1.9 million votes were cast and never counted in the last election. Thrown in the friggin' garbage cans. Half of those were cast by African-Americans. And it's state after state after state, with all kinds of different machines. The biggest game they play is saying "blacks don't have education, they can't figure out the ballot." That's a wonderful little racist out. If you give black people the same machines, they have the same vote count as white people. Election supervisors told me they told the Jebster about it beforehand. You can't find this stuff in mainstream newspapers. Ted Koppel runs this story and it's, "blacks is too dumb to figure out how to vote." Dig: You're one thousand times more likely to lose your vote if you're black than if you're white.

GNN: Have you seen concrete evidence of this happening in other black counties in the country?

Sure. Chicago, Illinois is the worst place in the country. I watched as the machine totals on the back of the lever machines were simply read off differently in the black precincts. Chicago has the worst spoilage rate-that's what they call it, the "spoilage rate." That's because the Daly machine can't allow a black majority of the Democratic Party to take back their party from the white folks who maintain the political plantation in Chicago. Basically it's like political cotton pickin' out there. That's an old one.

GNN: So what's the solution?

Palast: Kill the white people, we know that. But since that's not going to happen, we have to say that we know. And we have to say we're not buying this jive ass bullshit they're doing with the Help America Vote Act.

GNN: Has there been any mainstream coverage of this story?

Palast: Absolutely none. The L.A. Times ran this big story about Greg Palast, one of the world's greatest investigative reporters. Big story. Whoa, I can send that to my mom! But then I go to the editor and say, if I'm such a great investigative reporter, why don't you run my story? "Well, what story?" A million black votes missing. "Oh, we've run that story." You've run that story? What, in the invisible ink edition? See, when you defend black people, you suddenly became an invisible man, like black people are. You're invisible. You're behind the glass.

That's not unrelated to what I found on Iraq. What I found on Iraq was a document that's the Iraq strategy, post-conflict plan for the economy. These little weasels had been working on it, as far as I can tell, since before they returned the rented tuxes from the inaugural. This is why we're there. Why are kids there getting their asses shot off? Saddam's gone. What the fuck are we still doing there? That's a simple question and nobody's answering it. The Left is still arguing about whether we should have gone in. Forget all that bullshit. The reason we're still there is to "sell off all the state assets, especially in the oil industry"- that's a quote. They don't want you to know that when your kid comes home in a box, it's because of Appendix B, which says we need 360 days to grab their oil. Big problem. In those 360 days, there's a lot of angry Iraqis. We can call them old Baathists. We can call them Al Qaeda agents. But I'd call them Vietnamese. It's coming.

GNN: If Iraq really does devolve into a modern Vietnam, how will they maintain popular support for it?

Palast: They don't give a shit about popular support. Bush is running on fear. He's the fear candidate. He's the "you better get scared cuz those guys with the towels on their heads, they're coming to git you" candidate. People have to understand what the game is: pump the fear. His daddy created Osama bin Laden, who came back for us. His daddy created Saddam. And now he's creating Musharraf and all the other crazy bastards, and it's going to be a very fucking dangerous world. They're going to make it so goddamn dangerous that then they'll turn around and say, see, you need us. They're selling fear. That's their commodity.

GNN: You seem pretty convinced that this administration is coming back for a sequel.

Palast: No. The way I read it is that Bush is running unopposed. The only hope for regime change is that Kerry is acceptable to the elite. I've been talking to the oil guys behind the plans to take over Iraq, and they're not unhappy with Kerry at all. Obviously, Bush is their guy. He lets them drill in the Oval Office. Right now we've established a puppet government in Iraq, and the Saudis have established a puppet government here. That's what we're talking about. But the puppets have started playing with their own strings, and that's a problem. That's why Jim Baker moved his office right into the White House. And now they're worried that Bush is creating too many problems. The big fear of the oil companies is not Iraqis. It's that the neo cons are going to try to undercut OPEC. So they have to control George.

GNN: And you think they have the same likelihood of controlling Kerry's puppet strings?

Palast: Kerry says we should have more troops there, and we should stay there until it's stabilized. Well. Iraq hasn't been stabilized since 1911. I have one question for Kerry. What the hell do you mean by "stabilized?" Is California stabilized? Think about this: Timothy McVeigh was our homegrown terrorist. And where did we train him? Gulf War I. He was part of the troops that buried Iraqi soldiers alive when they tried to surrender in their trenches in the Gulf. So he learned

that you can murder unarmed people-the Iraqis were surrendering, they were unarmed-you can murder unarmed people if your cause is just. And he took that home from the Gulf War. People would say, how could a Gulf War hero with all these medals kill innocent people? Excuse me, how could a man who killed all these innocent people, kill more innocent people?? So those guys that were having Iraqis rape each other, they're going to come back, and they're going to be your cops on the south side of Los Angeles. Welcome home! The war will come back home. Forget the terrorists, we're creating our own.

GNN: So what's a lefty or progressive or just a mildly skeptical person to do?

Palast: Dance all night. I think the Left is too fucking stiff. The Left hasn't had an erection in years. We are not approaching people in a normal manner. I mean, these weird words like "imperialism." You go to the corner bodega, the average asshole in America isn't an "imperialist." They're just scared like everyone else, or they don't give a shit. In America we run between falling asleep, going to Disneyland, and fear.

GNN: Can you tell yet which are the next Enrons and Global Crossings coming up the pike?

Palast: Well, people look in terms of collapse. What I look at is who's ripping off the public, who's stealing the public blind. Unfortunately, there was too much weeping over the Enron stockholders, who certainly didn't mind when the casino was running hot. I don't give a shit about people who lost money on Enron stock. Who are the next ones? The rip-off industry is coming back. We have Reliance Energy. The Koch Brothers-I'm deeply concerned about their little scams. Bass brothers. These are the barbeque billionaires who Bush hangs out with. I would look to Wackenhut Corporation, which is going from Prisons-R-Us to Spy-for-Hire. They're all dangerous. Plus, when they're not dangerous, they are, as Jello Biafra says, clownocrats. They're complete fuck-ups. It's like Castro and the exploding cigar.

GNN: What has Michael Moore's impact been on disseminating your work?

Palast: He's wonderful. He takes my stuff and he turns it into something that he can get past the censors, because he's a clown. If I can't get it into The New York Times, give it to the fat man in the chicken suit and you get it through as a joke. Which is fine, as long as it's done right. We don't have many choices. I don't mind doing skywriting. I have a dance track out, Silence of the Lambs. We're got a CD out with Jello Biafra. We've got DVD's. Larry Flynt is putting us in between the beaver shots. This weekend I was doing gospel with Jesse Jackson and the choir. Whatever we can do to get the word out.

GNN: Your detractors seem to go after you with pretty low-blow character attacks. Do they ever challenge the actual substance of your work?

Palast: Well, I must say I've been accused of being bald, and there's some substance to that. They never go after the substance. It's these whisper campaigns. I had that in England a lot-even worse in England. Everything from my sex life, or lack thereof, to that I'm twisted and maniacal, as Katherine Harris said. And the IMF said that I'm the master of misinformation. I like it cuz it's like, zing! The arrow hit. If anyone has information to counter what I've said, I'm going to publish it. I'll be the first guy to take back a story and correct it. I correct stories all the time. I have to work on the information that I've got. We're not talking papal infallibility here-we're talking journalism. Shit, it ain't the Magna Carta. On the other hand, most of the people who complain are whiners, bellyachers, and guilty as charged.

http://www.guerrillanews.com/corporate_crime/doc4455.html

THE CRUISE MISSILE LEFT (Part 5): SAMANTHA POWER AND THE GENOCIDE GAMBIT

by Edward S. Herman

Establishment politicians, media, and intellectuals use the word genocide with great abandon, but with a hugely politicized selectivity. It is an invidious word, like terrorism, so that attaching it to an enemy and target is helpful in demonizing, thereby setting up the target for bombing and invasion, and establishing a case for pursuit of its leaders via assassination squads or tribunals. Genocide was used often to describe the killing fields of Pol Pot, but not the killing fields of Vietnam where the United States ravaged the country, killed many more people than did Pol Pot, and left a destroyed country and chemical warfare heritage of hundreds of thousands of children with birth defects. The word was never used in the U.S. mainstream to describe Indonesian operations in East Timor, where the invasion of 1975 and murderous occupation killed off between a quarter and a third of the population, a larger fraction than in Cambodia and not attributable, at least in part, to a prior war and its after-effects (as in Cambodia). But in the one mention of the word genocide in reference to East Timor in the *New York Times* (February 15, 1981), veteran reporter Henry Kamm explained that this was unwarranted hyperbole --that the situation was complex and there were multiple causes of all those deaths (presumably in contrast with Cambodia, where Kamm and the Times never found any complexity or causes other than Pol Pot's policies).

The word genocide is rarely if ever applied to Turkish ethnic cleansing and massacres of its Kurds, and in fact Turkey was mobilized to participate in the 78-day NATO (de facto U.S.) bombing war against Yugoslavia in 1999, supposedly to terminate genocide in Kosovo, although Turkey's attacks on its local Kurds were far more deadly than any pre-bombing-war Yugoslav violence against the Kosovo Albanians. The obvious explanation of the varying word usage is that Turkey was a U.S. ally, and its ethnic cleansing and killings were facilitated by greatly increased U.S. (Clinton administration) military aid, just as Indonesia's violence in East Timor was greatly helped by greater U.S. (Carter administration) aid to the killer state. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, was a U.S. target. Amusingly, as Noam Chomsky points out in *Hegemony or Survival*, when Turkey failed to cooperate in the invasion-occupation of Iraq, suddenly the U.S. media began to report on Turkey's ghastly record of torturing, killing, and disappearing Turkish Kurds that had previously been kept under the rug, although they continued to keep under the rug the fact of massive Clinton administration aid facilitating that ghastly record.

The word genocide has been used often by establishment politicians, media and intellectuals to describe Saddam Hussein's behavior in the 1980s, notably his resort to chemical warfare to kill Iraqi Kurds; but it is never used in the mainstream to describe the sanctions of mass destruction that are credibly estimated to have killed over a million Iraqis. The establishment institutions have avoided all but passing mention of the numbers dead, and they suppress even more completely the evidence that the killings were a consequence of deliberate actions, including the U.S. and British use of the sanctions system to block the import of medicines and equipment to repair water and sanitation systems that were destroyed with full recognition of the disease-threatening consequences.

Genocide was applied frequently to describe Serb actions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, actions supposedly the basis of humanitarian intervention and a major tribunal operation to bring Serbs to book. The link here between Western target, invidious word usage, focus of attention of the cruise missile left and mainstream news and commentary, and dedicated, long-lasting and

expensive tribunal pursuit of the chosen villains, is dramatic. The intellectual apologists for Western imperialism have pretended that the Yugoslavia Tribunal is not fully politicized, but is rather pursuing justice, as they skirt by the facts that nothing happened to Tudjman, Izetbegovic, or any other non-Serb high officials guilty of war crimes in the Balkans. (These would properly include Clinton, Blair and their top associates, guilty of aggression, and whose bombing tactics even Human Rights Watch, a notorious apologist for NATO policies in the Balkans, condemned as violations of international humanitarian law). The apologists claimed that the global reach of justice was approaching institutionalization in the 1990s that human rights has taken hold not just as a rhetorical but as an operating principle in all the major Western capitals (David Rieff)--pointing beyond the Yugoslavia Tribunal to the Spanish effort to bring Pinochet to book, the Belgian case brought against Ariel Sharon, and the installation of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). They slighted the facts that nothing happened to Pinochet, that the case against Sharon was ended by a change in Belgian law (under U.S. pressure), that no tribunal was organized to deal with triple genocidist Suharto, and that the ICJ is repudiated by the United States despite groveling and compromising efforts to accommodate U.S. demands for assured exemption from ICJ jurisdiction.

So it remains a power-out-of-the-gun truth that only a U.S. target can commit genocide or even engage in ethnic cleansing, while the United States can commit blatant aggression with only slightly delayed UN accommodation, and it and its clients don't aggress, ethnically cleanse, or commit genocide. (In ratifying the Genocide Convention, with a 40-year time lag, the U.S. Senate wrote in a U.S. exemption to its application; the U.S. insistence on an above-the-law status is long-standing.)

It is truly Orwellian to see the Yugoslavia Tribunal struggling to pin the genocide label on Milosevic, and to have done that already against Bosnian Serb General Radislav Krstic. In Milosevic's case, the prosecutor, sensing that only 4-5,000 bodies from all causes and on all sides--having been found in Kosovo after a bloody war, would not sustain a charge of genocide, decided to try to make him responsible for all Bosnian Serb killings in Bosnia, something the Tribunal had forgotten to do over the five previous years. This effort has been a notorious failure.

In the Krstic case, the genocide charge was based on the Srebrenica events of July 1995, where some substantial but uncertain number of Bosnian Muslims were killed, some in fighting and some executed. Here again the number of bodies in the discovered grave sites in the Srebrenica area is under 5,000, and certainly includes large numbers killed in the fighting during July. The Tribunal court claimed a Bosnian Serb plan and intent to kill all military age Srebrenica males, although no document or credible witness statement was found sustaining this charge, although thousands of Bosnian Muslim soldiers were allowed passage to safety, although many wounded Bosnian Muslims were allowed repatriation, and although the Bosnian Serbs made a number of actual deals and broader proposals for a prisoner exchange.

The alternative view, that there was no such plan, only a vengeance motive and an intent to locate and execute the Bosnian Muslim cadres responsible for the killing of several thousand Serbs in the Srebrenica vicinity over the prior three years, was quickly dismissed by the Tribunal court. Vengeance as a motive is only acceptable for Western-backed killers (and David Rieff and company have relied on this to explain away the massive ethnic cleansing in Kosovo under NATO auspices). It is also well-known and conceded by the court that all the Bosnian Muslim women and children in Srebrenica were helped to safety in Bosnian Muslim territory, strange behavior with a genocidal intent. The Tribunal reasoning is that in a patriarchal society, the removal of males is especially important for making community survival difficult. Of course, the idea of genocide in one small town is also a path-breaking idea, perhaps to be followed by

genocide in one household. But for such a noble enterprise as putting the Serbs in their place, and making humanitarian intervention palatable, creative thought is useful.

The contrast between the treatment of Yugoslavia and Israel-Palestine remains truly dramatic. For one thing, Israeli ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from the promised land has been going on for half a century, and it is clear that the steady expropriations, demolitions, and killings of the Palestinians is for the benefit of Jewish settlements, not for security. So this is as pure an illustration of ethnic cleansing as can be found on the face of the earth; Israeli historian Benny Morris, in his recent acknowledgement of this ethnic purification, complained only that it hadn't gone far enough. By contrast, the Serb attacks on Kosovo Albanians before and during the 1999 bombing war were never to provide room for Serb settlements, they were a feature of an ongoing civil war (stoked by outsiders), so that this wasn't true ethnic cleansing at all. There was ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Croatia, but it was carried out by all parties, struggling to establish land control in an externally encouraged civil war. Nevertheless, the phrase ethnic cleansing was used lavishly to describe Serb actions in Kosovo, as well as Bosnia, but it is rarely applied to Israeli behavior.

In the Genocide Convention of 1948, the word genocide was defined loosely, as any act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. Genocidal acts included causing serious mental harm or inflicting conditions of life aimed at such destruction. Can anything be clearer than that the Sharon government is trying to destroy the Palestinians as a national group by creating intolerable conditions of life? Under Operation Defensive Shield Israel carried out a systematic process of demolition of Palestinian public and private property, and mass expropriation of Palestinian land on behalf of settlers (Appeal by 153 Israeli academics); the Israeli army deliberately trashed the inside of every Palestinian institution that it did not entirely destroy schools, charities, health organizations, banks, radio and TV stations, even a puppet theatre (Gila Svirsky). As Rania Awwad has said, Sharon's solution is to depopulate as much as possible the Occupied Palestinian Territories by making life for its citizens unbearable. And what could be more unbearable than watching your children cry themselves to sleep from hunger, night after night? The Israeli leadership is not trying to exterminate all Palestinians, but they are prepared to kill them freely, take away their land, and make life so harsh that they will die off or leave. That this is a genocidal process is sometimes suggested in the Israeli media, but not in the Free Press.

The cruise missile left also adheres closely to the party line on genocide, which is why its members thrive in the *New York Times* and other establishment vehicles. This is true of Paul Berman, Michael Ignatieff and David Rieff, but I will focus here on Samantha Power, whose large volume on genocide, *A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* won a Pulitzer prize, and who is currently the expert of choice on the subject in the mainstream media (and even in *The Nation* and on the Bill Moyers show).

Power never departs from the selectivity dictated by the establishment party line. That requires, first and foremost, simply ignoring cases of direct U.S. or U.S.-sponsored (or otherwise approved) genocide. Thus the Vietnam war, in which millions were directly killed by U.S. forces, does not show up in Power's index or text. Guatemala, where there was a mass killing of as many as 100,000 Mayan Indians between 1978 and 1985, in what Amnesty International called A Government Program of Political Murder, but by a government installed and supported by the United States, also does not show up in Power's index. Cambodia is of course included, but only for the second phase of the genocide the first phase, from 1969-1975, in which the United States dropped some 500,000 tons of bombs on the Cambodian countryside and killed vast numbers, she fails to mention. On the Khmer Rouge genocide, Power says they killed 2 million, a figure

widely cited after Jean Lacouture gave that number; his subsequent admission that this number was invented had no effect on its use, and it suits Power's purpose.

A major U.S.-encouraged and supported genocide occurred in Indonesia in 1965-66 in which over 700,000 people were murdered. This genocide is not mentioned by Samantha Power and the names Indonesia and Suharto do not appear in her index. She also fails to mention West Papua, where Indonesia's 40 years of murderous occupation would constitute genocide under her criteria, if carried out under different auspices. Power does refer to East Timor, with extreme brevity, saying that in 1975, when its ally, the oil-producing, anti-Communist Indonesia, invaded East Timor, killing between 100,000 and 200,000 civilians, the United States looked away (146-7). That exhausts her treatment of the subject, although the killings in East Timor involved a larger fraction of the population than in Cambodia, and the numbers killed were probably larger than the grand total for Bosnia and Kosovo, to which she devotes a large fraction of her book. She also misrepresents the U.S. role it did not look away, it gave its approval, protected the aggression from any effective UN response (in his autobiography, then U.S. Ambassador to the UN Daniel Patrick Moynihan bragged about his effectiveness in protecting Indonesia from any UN action), and greatly increased its arms aid to Indonesia, thereby facilitating the genocide.

Power engages in a similar suppression and failure to recognize the U.S. role in her treatment of genocide in Iraq. She attends carefully and at length to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical warfare and killing of Kurds at Halabja and elsewhere, and she does discuss the U.S. failure to oppose and take any action against Saddam Hussein at this juncture. But she does not mention the diplomatic rapprochement with Saddam in the midst of his war with Iran in 1983, the active U.S. logistical support of Saddam during that war, and the U.S. approval of sales and transfers of chemical and biological weapons during the period in which he was using chemical weapons against the Kurds. She also doesn't mention the active efforts by the United States and Britain to block UN actions that might have obstructed Saddam's killings.

The killing of over a million Iraqis via the sanctions of mass destruction, more than were killed by all the weapons of mass destruction in history, according to John and Karl Mueller (*Sanctions of Mass Destruction, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999*), was one of major genocides of the post-World War 2 era. It is unmentioned by Samantha Power. Again, the correlation between exclusion, U.S. responsibility, and the view that such killings were, in Madeleine Albright's words, worth it from the standpoint of U.S. interests, is clear. There is a similar political basis for Power's failure to include Israel's low-intensity genocide of the Palestinians and South Africa's destructive engagement with the frontline states in the 1980s, the latter with a death toll greatly exceeding all the deaths in the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Neither Israel nor South Africa, both constructively engaged by the United States, show up in Power's index.

Samantha Power's conclusion is that the U.S. policy toward genocide has been very imperfect and needs reorientation, less opportunism, and greater vigor. For Power, the United States is the solution, not the problem. These conclusions and policy recommendations rest heavily on her spectacular bias in case selection: She simply bypasses those that are ideologically inconvenient, where the United States has arguably committed genocide (Vietnam, Cambodia 1969-75, Iraq 1991-2003), or has given genocidal processes positive support (Indonesia, West Papua, East Timor, Guatemala, Israel, and South Africa). Incorporating them into an analysis would lead to sharply different conclusions and policy agendas, such as calling upon the United States to simply stop doing it, or urging stronger global opposition to U.S. aggression and support of genocide, and proposing a much needed revolutionary change within the United States to remove the roots of its imperialistic and genocidal thrust. But the actual huge bias, nicely leavened by admissions of imperfections and need for improvement in U.S. policy, readily explains why Samantha

Power is loved by the *New York Times* and won a Pulitzer prize for her masterpiece of evasion and apologetics for our genocides and call for a more aggressive pursuit of theirs.

The crisis in NATO: A geopolitical earthquake?

Introduction by Margo Kingston

February 21, 2003

NATO is just one of the world's power blocs under enormous strain over war on Iraq. Webdiary's international relations expert Scott Burchill has just received an analysis of the NATO crisis his friend Gabriel Kolko, Professor Emeritus at York University, Toronto. "He is arguably the world's most distinguished war historian, author most recently of *Another Century of War?* (The New Press, New York 2002) and a leading political analyst of NATO and US foreign policy," Scott says. Just yesterday, Tony Blair warned France and Germany that undermining the transatlantic alliance was the most dangerous game of all in world politics. John Howard, in hiding from the quality media, told talk-back radio: "If the world walks away from this, the damage to the authority of the United Nations will be incalculable, the damage to the United States will be huge."

Professor Kolko's piece was written just before NATO papered over the cracks and backed preparations to defend Turkey, and Turkey - faced with almost 100 percent opposition to war from its people - demanded more aid money in return for allowing a US attack on Iraq from Turkey. The wild swings in this 'game' never end. Turkey wants NATO to defend it from retaliation from Iraq, NATO says no, then yes, then Turkey says maybe no to the US! What is happening here? Over to Professor Kolko.

The crisis in NATO: A geopolitical earthquake?

by Gabriel Kolko

The next weeks [after February 2003] should reveal whether we are experiencing the equivalent of a geopolitical earthquake.

Washington intended that NATO, from its very inception, serve as its instrument for maintaining its political hegemony over Western Europe, forestalling the emergence of a bloc that could play an independent role in world affairs. Charles DeGaulle, Winston Churchill, and many influential politicians envisioned such an alliance less as a means of confronting the Soviet army than as a way of containing a resurgent Germany as well as balancing American power.

Publicly, the reason for creating NATO in 1949 was the alleged Soviet military menace, but the US always planned to employ strategic nuclear weapons to defeat the USSR - for which it did not need an alliance. But no one in Washington believed a war with Russia was imminent or even likely, a view that prevailed most of the time until the USSR finally disappeared.

There was also the justification of preventing the Western Europeans from being obsessed with fear at reconstructing Germany's economy, and American military planners were concerned with internal subversion.

When the Soviet Union capsized over a decade ago, NATO's nominal rationale for existence died with it. But the principal reason for its creation - to forestall European autonomy - remains.

For Washington, the problem of NATO is linked to the future of Germany, which since 1990 has been undecided about the extent to which it wishes to work through that organization or, more importantly, to conform to US' initiatives in East Europe. Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia in December 1991 was crucial in triggering the war in Bosnia and revealed its potentially dangerous and destabilizing capacity for autonomous action. Its power over the European

Monetary Union and European Union understandably causes other Europeans to fear the revival of German domination.

But for the US, the issue of Germany is also a question of the extent to which it can constrain America's ability to play the same decisive role in Europe in the future as it has in the past. Such grand geopolitical questions have been brewing for over a decade.

NATO provided a peacekeeping force in Bosnia to enforce the agreement that ended the internecine civil war in that part of Yugoslavia, but in 1999 it ceased being a purely defensive alliance and entered the war against the Serbs on behalf of the Albanians in Kosovo. The US employed about half the aircraft it assigns for a full regional war but found the entire experience very frustrating. Targets had to be approved by all 19 members, any one of which could veto American proposals. The Pentagon's after-action report of October 1999 conceded that America needed the cooperation of NATO countries, but "gaining consensus among 19 democratic nations is not easy and can only be achieved through discussion and compromise."

But Wesley Clark, the American who was NATO's supreme commander, regarded the whole experience as a nightmare - both in his relations with the Pentagon and NATO's members. "[W]orking within the NATO alliance," American generals complained, "unduly constrained U.S. military forces from getting the job done quickly and effectively." A war expected to last a few days instead took 78-days. The Yugoslav war taught the Americans a grave lesson.

Long before September 11, 2001, Washington was determined to avoid the serious constraints that NATO could impose. The only question was of timing and how the United States would escape NATO's clear obligations while maintaining its hegemony over its members. It wanted to preserve NATO for the very reason it had created it; to keep Europe from developing an independent political as well as military organization.

Coordinating NATO's command structure with that of any all-European military organization that may be created impinges directly on America's power over Europe's actions and reflects its deep ambiguity. Some of its members wanted NATO to reach a partial accord with Russia, a relationship on which Washington often shifted, but Moscow remains highly suspicious of its plans to extend its membership to Russia's very borders.

When the new administration came to power in January 2001, NATO's fundamental role was already being reconsidered. President Bush is strongly unilateralist, and he repudiated the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, opposes further restrictions on nuclear weapons tests or land mines, and is against a host of other existing and projected accords. He also greatly accelerated the development of Anti-Ballistic Missile system, which will ostensibly give the U.S. a first-strike capacity and which China and Russia justifiably regard as destabilizing - thereby threatening to renew the nuclear arms race.

Downgrading the United Nations, needless to say, was axiomatic.

The war in Afghanistan was fought without NATO but on the US' terms by a "floating" coalition "of the willing," a model for future conflicts "that will evolve and change over time depending on the activity and circumstances of the country". It accepted the small German, French, Italian, and other contingents that were offered only after it became clear that the war, and especially its aftermath, would take considerably longer than the Pentagon expected. But it did not consult them on military matters or crucial political questions.

Washington has decided that its allies must now accept its objectives and work solely on its terms, and it has no intention whatsoever of discussing the merits of its actions in NATO conferences. This applies, above all, to the imminent war against Iraq - a war of choice.

This de facto abandonment of NATO as a military organization was made explicit during 2002 when Washington proposed a simultaneous enlargement of its membership to include the Baltic states and to allow Russia to have a voice, but no veto, on important matters. The nations along Russia's borders regard NATO purely as protection against Russia, and are therefore eager to please the US - which wants no constraints on its potential military actions.

The crisis in NATO was both overdue and inevitable, the result of a decisive American reorientation, and the time and ostensible reason for it was far less important than the underlying reason it occurred: The US' growing realization after the early 1990s that while the organization was militarily a growing liability it remained a political asset.

That the United Nations and Security Council are today also being strained in ways too early to estimate is far less important because the U.S. never assigned the UN the same crucial role as it did its alliance in Europe.

Today, NATO's original *raison d'être* of imposing American hegemony is now the core of the controversy that is now raging. Washington cannot sustain this grandiose objective because a reunited Germany is far too powerful to be treated as it was a half-century ago, and Germany has its own interests in the Middle East and Asia to protect.

Germany and France's independence is reinforced by inept American propaganda on the relationship of Iraq to Al-Qaeda (from which the CIA and British MI6 have openly distanced themselves), overwhelming antiwar public opinion in many nations, and a great deal of opposition within the US establishment and many senior military men to a war with Iraq.

The furious American response to Germany, France, and Belgium's refusal, under article 4 of the NATO treaty, to protect Turkey from an Iraqi counterattack because that would prejudice the Security Council's decision on war and peace is only a contrived reason for confronting fundamental issues that have simmered for many years.

The dispute was far more about symbolism than substance, and the point has been made: Some NATO members refuse to allow the organization to serve as a rubber stamp for American policy, whatever it may be.

Turkey's problem is simple: The US is pressuring it, despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion, to allow American troops to invade Iraq from Turkey and to enter the war on its side. The US wants NATO to aid Turkey in order to strengthen the Ankara government's resolve to ignore overwhelmingly antiwar domestic opinion, for the arms it is to receive are superfluous.

But the Turks are far more concerned with Kurdish separatism in Iraq rekindling the civil war that Kurds have fought in Turkey for much of the past decade, and the conditions they are demanding on these issues have put Washington in a very difficult position from which - as of this writing - it has not extricated itself. Turkey's best - and most obvious - defense is to stay out of the war, which the vast majority of Turks want. It may end up doing so.

America still desires to regain the mastery over Europe it had during the peak of the Cold War but it is also determined not to be bound by European desires - r indeed by the overwhelming European public opposition to a war with Iraq. Genuine dialogue or consultation with its NATO allies is out of the question. The Bush Administration, even more than its predecessors, simply does not believe in it - nor will it accept NATO's formal veto structure; NATO's division on Turkey has nothing to do with it.

Washington cannot have it both ways. Its commitment to aggressive unilateralism is the antithesis of an alliance system that involves real consultation. France and Germany are now far too powerful to be treated as obsequious dependents. They also believe in sovereignty, as does every nation which is strong enough to exercise it, and they are now able to insist that the United States both listen to and take their views seriously. It was precisely this danger that the U.S. sought to forestall when it created NATO over 50 years ago.

The controversy over NATO's future has been exacerbated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's attacks on "Old Europe" and the disdain for Germany and France that he and his adviser, Richard Perle, have repeated, but these are but a reflection of the underlying problems that have been smoldering for years.

Together, the nations that oppose a preemptive American war in Iraq and the Middle East - an open-ended, destabilizing adventure that is likely to last years - can influence Europe's future development and role in the world profoundly. If Russia cooperates with them, even only occasionally, they will be much more powerful, and President Putin's support for their position on the war makes that a real possibility.

Eastern European nations may say what Washington wishes today, but economically they are far more dependent on Germany and those allied with it. When the 15 nations in European Union met on February 17 their statement on Iraq was far closer to the German-French position than the American, reflecting the antiwar nations' economic clout as well as the response of some prowar political leaders to the massive antiwar demonstrations that took place the preceding weekend in Italy, Spain, Britain and the rest of Europe.

There is every likelihood that the U.S. will emerge from this crisis in NATO more belligerent, and more isolated and detested, than ever. NATO will then go the way of SEATO and all of the other defunct American alliances.

The reality is that the world is increasingly multipolar, economically and technologically, and that the US' desire to maintain absolute military superiority over the world is a chimera. Russia remains a military superpower, China is becoming one, and the proliferation of destructive weaponry should have been confronted and stopped 20 years ago.

The US has no alternative but to accept the world as it is, or prepare for doomsday. The conflict in NATO, essentially, reflects this diffusion of all forms of power and the diminution of American hegemony, which remains far more a dream than a reality.

ZNet | Activism

Corporate fronts, astroturf groups and co-opted social movements

Taking the risk out of civil society - part 1 of 4

by Michael Barker; September 17, 2006

Challenging power is crucial to the stability of democracy, without dissent there would be few checks on unbridled power. The overwhelming power of dissent and popular democracy to effect social change is widely acknowledged by corporate and governmental elites and in the 1970s, an influential Trilateral Commission report came to the astonishing conclusions that there was a "crisis of democracy" because there was simply too much democracy. (1) Just prior to this, the underground and illegal mechanisations of the controversial CONTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program) program came to light. (2) It seemed that the era of covert CIA operations was eventually backfiring on the US government, which in turn was suffering from its own crisis of legitimacy with the public. However, the lessons that the US government appeared to learn, were that covert operations were not bad per se, but instead that power politics, played out through covert manoeuvres, did not play well in the public sphere. In a sense this change in strategy, "forced" the US government to consider more public (relations) friendly tactics to achieve the same political objectives. This did not mean that the government cut back on covert operations, it just meant that it realised the potential benefits of carrying out some of their work overtly. Subsequently, this led to the development of various projects, which aimed to undertake "democracy promotion" activities abroad. These were launched in 1981 with "Project Democracy", which later led to the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983.

As previously noted, the worldwide rise of mass protests in the 1960s caused a lot of concern for ruling elites; as for the most part, such popular protests were out of the government's control. But what if governments could control protests or at least manipulate them to their advantage? What if they could help determine which social movements or even revolutions succeeded and which failed? What would happen if powerful governments and corporate elites decided that the promotion of dissent was a cost effective way of maintaining their own power? These are some of the questions that this article will explore by investigating the assortment of ways in which corporations and governments interact with social movements. The study will attempt to provide a global overview of these relationships and as will become more obvious (in later parts of this article), the activities of democratic countries to promote democracy overseas will provide relevant examples of how elite groups are already working closely with social movements to "promote democracy" (or rather polyarchy) instead of more participatory forms of democracy. Initially, this work will briefly outline the development of corporate front groups and astroturf groups in democratic countries and will then introduce the less examined parallel expansion of government regulated or engineered dissent – a process that has been referred to as the promotion of polyarchy. (3)

Corporate fronts, astroturf groups and co-opted social movements

Even prior to 1984, we were living in a world in which surveillance has been increasingly important to the smooth functioning of the status quo. The sheer power and magnitude of modern surveillance techniques means that those in control of sensitive surveillance information can manipulate and control citizens effectively without their consent. (4) This fast tracking of what Aeron Davis referred to as Public Relations Democracy undermines democratic principles because it focuses on methods for "manufacturing consent", rather than seeking

ways by which to engage the public and invite their participation in decision making processes. (5) Precursors to this state of affairs were evident in the 1970s, when both businesses and governments recognised the utility of corporate funded think tanks to undermine popular democracy. Indeed it has been noted that:

"The twentieth century has been characterised by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy." (Alex Carey, 1995, *Taking the risk out of democracy*, p. 18)

Corporate propaganda (often referred to as PR) blossomed in the twentieth-century with the rise of neo-liberalism and stimulated the evolution of corporate front groups (alongside corporate funded think tanks) to covertly distribute pro-business PR from organisations with inconspicuous sounding names (a well know example was the Global Climate Coalition). Corporate front groups are certainly a powerful tool for influencing public opinion, but it is widely recognised that grassroots movements tend to have more credibility with the public and politicians. However, the effectiveness of grassroots groups' political outreach is severely restrained by both their general lack of financial resources and the adversarial or partisan nature of the corporate media. (6) Any group that can overcome these barriers has a distinct advantage in building wider public and political support for their objectives. Accordingly the groups most likely to overcome these hurdles are those whose campaigns are aligned with corporate interests. These may be genuine groups, arising to fill a niche in civil society or impostor "astroturf" groups, financed by businesses to promote corporate interests. Astroturf groups are so-called because they represent fake grassroots movements, whose corporate financed founders are paid for every citizen they can mobilise to support a specific cause. (7) Although the mass media pays scant attention to their position in the public sphere, astroturf activities are by no means marginal and have been acknowledged to be "the most popular political strategy [used] in the 1990s." (8) With high levels of funding these groups can utilise the comprehensive demographic resources provided by database management companies, which allow them to efficiently target individuals who will be most easily persuaded by their sales pitches. Astroturf initiatives are expanding all the time and as there is often no shortage of funding they tend to be only restrained by their instigators' creativity. (9)

One of the problems resulting from the colonisation of the public sphere by corporations, is the increasing difficulty citizens have in determining which organisations in civil society are genuine and which have been either co-opted or created by elite groups to manipulate public opinion. Financial support through the government or a specific corporation does not necessarily imply executive control by that agency over all issues the group is involved in. However, in an increasingly globalised and privatised world, in which many groups compete (domestically or internationally) for a limited pot of money, discriminatory funding will certainly effect which groups prosper and which fade away. Under these circumstances it is evident that the selective backing of certain social movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the exclusion of others can be used as a powerful political tool. (10)

What would happen if countries were able to bypass state sovereignty and support their favoured civil society groups overseas? Despite the relatively low profile of this subject, it does happen (on an increasingly regular basis) under the guise of "promoting democracy." Therefore substantial democracy promoting programs are being undertaken by a number of democratic countries. The best financed programs to "enlarge democracy" are currently being funded by the US, consequently the following section will examine this

undermined democratic processes in the following countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Bolivia, Cuba, East Timor, El Salvador, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Iraq, Jamaica, Libya, Morocco, Nicaragua, Panama, Seychelles, Suriname, and Zaire. A classic example, of a country in which the full spectrum of finely tuned destabilisation tactics were used is Chile. Coincidentally the US's intervention in Chile culminated in the elimination of Salvador Allende's democratically elected government, ten years before the launch of the NED. The following review of the Chilean case study will highlight some commonly used destabilisation strategies that are often deployed to "promote democracy."
(21)

Shortly after Chile's closely contested 1958 election in which Allende's (Marxist) party came close to winning, the CIA decided to ensure that this increasingly popular leader was kept out of government. The CIA proceeded to provide millions of dollars and professional guidance to a centrist presidential candidate and numerous grassroots organisations, which together were able to successfully block Allende's election hopes in 1964. This strategy was also supported by "a massive anti-communist propaganda campaign" waged on the streets and in the media. (22) US support of anti-leftist groups continued, as did the CIA's ongoing work to subvert unions and in 1969 the CIA started supporting a splinter socialist party in an endeavour to weaken Allende's hand in the congressional election. However, despite the CIA's best efforts Allende was elected president in 1970. In the following years, the CIA honed the art of destabilisation (or "promoting democracy") through a war of attrition, which amongst other things involved supporting the ("independent") media – which was already mostly owned by the opposition – in their frequent calls for civil war. To enhance the effects of their internal destabilisation tactics, harsh economic sanctions denied the Allende government (much needed) international development assistance (previously Chile had been the highest per capita aid recipient in the hemisphere); the US even pressured the Interamerican Development Bank to withhold emergency earthquake loans. Development aid may have been cut off, but as part of a strategy to get the military onside the US provided the Chilean military with US\$47 million of arms aid between 1970 and 1973 (this "aid" package included fighter jets, that were later used to attack the presidential palace during the coup). (23) In September 1973, with full knowledge (and support) of the militaries' plan to oust Allende, the US stood by the sidelines as General Pinochet led a brutal military coup – which succeeded in "removing" Allende by killing him – facilitating Chile's transition from a US "unfriendly" socialist democracy to a US "friendly" dictatorship. The following year President Ford publicly recalled that all the United States had wanted to do "was to help assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve the opposition political parties." Alarminglly this is the same type of rhetoric presently being used by world leaders today to justify the "promotion of democracy."

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

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
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
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FROM WORLD DEFENSE REVIEW

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Strategic Interests

by J. Peter Pham, Ph.D.

World Defense Review columnist

Getting AFRICOM Right

Last week President George W. Bush created a new military command for Africa:

"I am pleased to announce my decision to create a Department of Defense Unified Combatant Command for Africa. I have directed the Secretary of Defense to stand up U.S. Africa Command by the end of fiscal year 2008. This new command will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa. Africa Command will enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa."

This development is welcome news, being long overdue, as I have repeatedly argued (including in this column last year), given the continent's strategic importance to key U.S. interests. While Sub-Saharan Africa currently supplies the U.S. with nearly 20 percent of its petroleum needs – a figure that the National Intelligence Council expects to jump to more than 25 percent within the decade – that resource is also particularly vulnerable to both transnational terrorist threats like al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist group which have set their sights on the region and local groups whose fights, with outside support, can and have impacted production, as I have documented extensively in this space. Beyond the security and resource concerns, Africa is also an arena for intense diplomatic competition with other states with global ambitions, like China, as I noted just last week.

Also to consider, as General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the same day the president made his announcement, is the fact that "political and humanitarian challenges in Africa are myriad." The specific challenges the Marine officer singled out included growing instability, genocide, and civil war, and *de facto* safe havens for criminal elements.

Given all of this, it made no sense to parcel out responsibility for Africa to three different regional commands – the European Command (EUCOM), the Central Command (CENTCOM), and the Pacific Command (PACOM) – each of which is already overtaxed with its own strategic command priorities, thus oftentimes leaving African concerns insufficiently address if not entirely ignored until long-summering challenges turn into full-blown crises.

However, reorganizations, like other transformations in the military, are not ends onto themselves; their sole value lies in the strategic effect they advance. In the case of the new AFRICOM, the strategic effect was announced by Defense Secretary Robert Gates as he explained the administration's proposed Pentagon budget for 2008 on Capitol Hill: "This command will enable us to have a more effective and integrated approach...to oversee security cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to non-military missions, and, if directed, military operations on the African continent."

In rising to the challenge of this mission objective, AFRICOM must first overcome four hurdles:

First, there is the question of perception, especially but not exclusively in Africa. New Jersey Representative Donald Payne, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa is put it succinctly when he told a Voice of America interviewer: "I think there'll be a lot of skepticism, because there

has been so little attention given to Africa...All of a sudden to have a special military command, I think the typical person would wonder why now and really what is the end game?"

The answer to the congressman (and others) is found in the much-maligned 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* which declared that "weak states...can pose a great danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders." In Africa, the document went on to assert: "Promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States – preserving human dignity – and our strategic priority – combating terror. American interests and American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity."

Furthermore, while the heyday of the type of pan-Africanism dreamed by African independence leaders like Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah has come and gone, a continental perspective nonetheless does resonate with African states which do tend to see themselves, at least in interactions with non-African powers, as African. Consequently, it behooves U.S. foreign policy to engage those same countries on the basis of that collective identity. The case needs to be consistently made by both the political leaders and military personnel that a unified command focused on the entire continent will be better positioned to coherently address uniquely African challenges and support local efforts to bolster the operational capacities of African states, including those of the African Union and subregional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Second, if the Africa Command get down to doing its job of advancing U.S. interests abroad it must get the support to do so from home. It is one thing to create a skeletal structure – a 60-member transition planning team is already being assembled at Kelley Barracks, a EUCOM installation outside Stuttgart, Germany – and quite another to give it flesh between now and the full stand-up of the command, mandated to occur before September 30, 2008.

In a period when the many within the Congressional majority are not exactly defense hawks, the Bush administration needs to concertedly reach out to the rather eclectic group of Africa advocates on the Hill, some of whom – to put it mildly – are usually not counted as members of the president's fan club. For example, in an interview with an African news service last week, Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold, a fierce critic of the war in Iraq, declared his support for AFRICOM, characterizing it as "vital to strengthening our relationships with African nations." Thus ironically in the same week when the U.S. Senate was introducing conflicting resolutions on the president's troop surge in Iraq, AFRICOM presents a unique opportunity for executive-legislative cooperation in the great American tradition of partisan divisions stopping at the water's edge.

Third, securing Congressional appropriations is not the only domestic hurdle that AFRICOM will need to clear. Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, executive director of the new command's implementation planning team, and his colleagues will have to do battle within the Pentagon for scarce resources, personnel as well as material. Aside from the 60 planners who will report to Admiral Moeller, the only other manpower that the command has are the approximately 1,700 troops in the Djibouti-based Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), which since late 2002, has been carrying out training, humanitarian assistance, and counterterrorism missions in that region, most recently launching air strikes aimed at the three al-Qaeda leaders in Somalia who were responsible for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well as coordinated 2002 attacks on Israeli tourists in Kenya. Even if cooperative endeavors with partners in its 52-nation area of responsibility (AOR) – for sound geopolitical and strategic reasons, Egypt will continue to fall within CENTCOM's AOR – are done in a rotational basis, AFRICOM will certainly need a larger standing force as well as headquarters staff. The question, of course, is where that manpower will come from, considering that it is now admitted by all that the U.S. military is indeed short of its ideal personnel strength.

In addition, the new command requires considerable start-up physical resources, beginning with bases and other capital infrastructure. While it was announced last month that CJTF-HOA's 97-acre base, Camp Lemonier, will be expanded to some 500 acres, the relatively isolated, sweltering abandoned French Foreign Legion outpost is hardly ideal as the headquarters for an Africa-wide

command. Moroccan officials have been quick to step forward to offer AFRICOM a possible home, but it is likely that one or more sites will have to be acquired and constructed in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Fourth, the mission of the Africa Command will necessarily require a major break with conventional doctrinal mentalities both within the armed services themselves and between government agencies. The challenges that the new command will confront will be quite different from those its homologues face in other theatres. Briefing reporters, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry correctly emphasized the comprehensive nature of the mandate which circumstances in Africa will require AFRICOM to assume: "This command, then, will focus on some efforts to reduce conflict, to improve the security environment, to defeat or preclude the development of terrorist networks, and then support in crisis response, whether they be humanitarian or disaster response. We want to help develop a stable environment in which civil society can be built and that the quality of life for the citizenry can be improved."

Fulfilling such a broad mandate would, however, necessitate that the command's theatre-wide engagement be a spectrum array which embraces, in addition to "hard power" options, diplomatic, developmental assistance, humanitarian relief, and other proactive "soft power" missions which some in the military have been hesitant to engage in and which others in the policy community – I can think of certain high officials and career officers at the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as well as a the anti-military "usual suspects" – will be none too eager to see the uniformed services undertake. Likewise, closer in-theatre coordination will be needed between the members of intelligence community whose work is more directly coordinated by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), their counterparts in the Defense Department's intelligence bodies, and AFRICOM's commanders – and effect that last week's Senate confirmation of a career military intelligence officer, retired Vice Admiral Mike McConnell, as DNI will hopefully facilitate.

In any event, the reality is that in today's geostrategic environment, perhaps no one else can leverage the focus and resources that the Pentagon can, as long as it recognizes the limits of its own capabilities. To this end, building on the precedent of some military commands having political advisors as well as the wide behind-the-scenes consultations they have already held, the architects of AFRICOM would do well to incorporate qualified non-military Africa experts into the eventual command, many of whom – especially those not in career bureaucratic positions with other federal agencies – have the "outside-the-box" perspectives that the new mission will require.

The announcement of AFRICOM is an important step towards achieving more active U.S. engagement in an important strategic space that can neither continue to be relegated to tertiary status in the strategic calculations of our national security, political, and economic interests nor be parceled out to several combatant commands in a dysfunctional arrangement which Dr. Gates himself characterized as "outdated." However, we have to do more than just create the new command; we now have a narrow window – barely eighteen months – to get its stand-up right.

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Conform or Reform?

Conform or Reform? Social Movements and the Mass Media

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Abstract: The mass media is an important outlet for social movements, where the quality and nature of media coverage strongly influences how they are perceived in the public eye. This paper examines the complex interface existing between the mass media and social movements, and considers what collective actions social movements may need to undertake, if they are to improve their media coverage in the future. The paper discusses the relationship between social movements (as outsiders) and the mass media in both a historical and contemporary context and argues that media reform is required to enable dissident voices to be democratically heard.

Keywords: Social Movements, Protest, Demonstration, Participatory Democracy, Global Justice, Reform.

Introduction

The mass media is a vital resource for most political actors, and it may be even more important for social movements, whose transitional and adversarial nature weakens their ability to secure public legitimacy (Kielbowicz & Scherer, 1986; Gamson, 1995: 85). Their outsider status, along with their usual resource-poor nature, means that traditional avenues of publicity are not easily accessible and forces them to rely on alternative methods to obtain media access. Traditionally, this involves some form of public spectacle - like a protest - to attract media attention. These activities have become accepted as mechanisms by which social problems are communicated in the public sphere, alongside public opinion polls and elections (Herbst 1993) and they act as vital means by which citizens can signal their discontent.

One of the first detailed examinations of a social movement protest in the media (both press and television) focused on a mass demonstration held against the Vietnam war in Britain (Halloran et al., 1970). The demonstration involved approximately 60,000 protesters, most of who marched peacefully through the streets of London (with an insignificant number of protestors involved in violent actions). However, despite the overwhelmingly peaceful nature of the march, the media concentrated most of its coverage on the issue of violence (Halloran et al., 1970: 237). Although Halloran et al., (1970: 301) noted that there were differences between media outlets in their coverage, they were all united by the overall focus on 'the same limited aspect - the issue of violence.' The misrepresentation of this massive political rally, and the totality of the negative coverage across all media outlets led the investigators to conclude that such reporting poses extreme problems for democracy, which may only be remedied by 'some form of institutional rearrangement' (Halloran et al., 1970: 318). These are serious charges, and the authors acknowledged that further studies needed to be carried out to determine how systemic these problems were. Since then, many researchers have followed up on this investigation, examining how various social movements interact with media systems. Drawing upon this body of work, this paper will analyse the importance of the role of the mass media for social movements. This will include a review of the literature and recommendations on how such groups may best address their relationships with the mass media. To begin with, a brief discussion of some of the external forces beside the media, which effect the development of social movements and their ensuing relations with the mass media, will be presented.

Foundations of Change

The inherent conflict between corporate driven capitalism and democracy has always caused

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ruling elites to have their work cut out dissipating the ebb and flow of popular dissent. This contradiction is best exemplified by Crozier et al.'s (1975) classic study, *The Crisis of Democracy*, which controversially diagnosed the need for 'a greater degree of moderation in democracy.' The first political theorist to accurately document this 'management' dilemma was Antonio Gramsci, who described how elites were able to successfully maintain hegemony over the masses through the use of consensual rather than coercive institutional arrangements. Theobald (2006: 26) notes that the 'central importance' of Gramsci's view to radical mass media criticism is 'that current bourgeois control of society, while certainly manifest in material modes of production, is culturally embedded and naturalised in the minds of the people via its hegemony over discourse.'

One vital but overlooked organ of hegemony, that Gramsci was unable to include in his work, are philanthropic foundations, whose rising influence on the contours of civil society only became visible some decades after Gramsci's death (Roelofs, 2003; Faber & McCarthy, 2005). The hegemonic power of foundations, however, is arguably even greater than other hegemonic elements, like the mass media, precisely because their influence has been downplayed (or in many cases simply omitted) by academia. This is especially the case with liberal foundations, which have actively influenced progressive social change by directly co-opting organisations or channelling their activists towards less radical activities (Arnove, 1980; Fisher, 1983; Jenkins, 1998; Roelofs, 2003).

Historically, the work of philanthropic foundations has been most influential in the US, but now similar foundations operate all over the world, and with the resurgence of corporate social responsibility, corporations are also becoming prominent philanthropists. For example, during the 2000 election cycle in the US, 'the corporate outlay on political philanthropy... was probably a minimum of \$1-2 billion' dwarfing combined PAC and soft money contributions (Sims 2003: 166-167). Some academics have begun to address the urgent task of proposing solutions to counteract the anti-democratic nature of such subtle yet pervasive social engineering (see Faber & McCarthy, 2005), because it is clear that manipulation of civil society (by foundations or governments) through selective support of non-governmental organisations raises questions that reach to the heart of all democracies. Furthermore, a growing body of work suggests that similar 'democracy promoting' practices now serve as an integral foreign policy tool to help 'promote polyarchy' (Dahl, 1971) over more substantive and participatory forms of democracy (Robinson, 1996; Barker, 2006a). Likewise, other research has begun to examine how selective support of 'independent' media organisations in geo-strategically important countries has helped facilitate revolutions (e.g., the coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe) to further the polyarchal interests of trans-national capitalism (Barker, 2006b; Barker, Submitted a). Referring to the Orange Revolution, Herman (2006) observed 'that the civil society uprising in the Ukraine in 2004-2005, [which was] funded heavily by U.S. government agencies and friendly NGOs, was given much more lavish news treatment than domestic [US] protests, along with editorial support.' Indeed, elite patronage - either by governments or philanthropic foundations - confers a degree of 'legitimacy' upon social activists, which in turn may be accompanied by more favourable media coverage. In the light of these findings, Robinson's (1996) promoting polyarchy thesis predicts that individuals or groups vigorously challenging the status quo and/or trans-national capitalist elites would be most likely to be marginalised by the mass media.

Struggling for Praise

The hostile media playing field

For any social movement to draw beneficial attention to its activities in the mass media, the first barrier it must overcome is the structural constraints of the medium itself. According to Herman and Chomsky's (1988) Propaganda Model, there are five filters through which all news must pass, that actively shape the media's content. These are (1) the size, ownership and profit orientation of the media, (2) advertising, (3) sourcing, (4) flak (criticism) and (5) anti-communist ideology, which can be interpreted as keeping the discourse within the boundaries of elite interests. (For a critical review of the Propaganda Model see Klaehn 2002; and for a review of its significance to domestic and foreign policy making processes see Barker 2005). The fact that the Propaganda Model itself is marginalised from most media scholarship is consistent with the model's predictions (Herring & Robinson, 2003). Yet there are still a small number of critical scholars who have been able to illustrate the applicability of the Propaganda Model to countries other than the US (where the model was first developed), e.g., in Australia (Linder 1994, 1998; Cryle & Hillier, 2005), Canada (Babe, 2005; Eglin, 2005; Klaehn, 2005; Winter & Klaehn, 2005), and the UK (Cromwell 2001, Chapter 3; Carvalho, 2005; Doherty, 2005; McKiggan, 2005; Edwards & Cromwell, 2006).

In this way, news values filter what appears in the media - and more importantly what doesn't - not in any prescribed way, but more as a result of a sort of tacit professional consensus which usually acts to 'reinforce conventional opinions and established authority' (Seaton, 1997: 277). Meyer (2002: 30-31) suggests that news must also pass through another filter, which he calls 'the rules of stage-managing', which selects news based on its style of presentation and ability to attract an audience's attention.

Most protestors are not the focus of regular news beats and so tend to rely on protest events to broadcast their news, however, most of these are ignored in the mainstream media (McCarthy et al., 1996a: 494). In addition, social movements have to contend with representative democracy, which leads governments to emphasise that dissent should take place in ballot boxes and not on the streets: a point of view endorsed by the mass media (McChesney, 1999). In spite of this, the mass media's influence is not monolithic and some social movements and interest groups are able to maintain moderately useful media relations, publicising their activities in a predominantly positive light - something that will be discussed later in more detail. The overall inadequacy, or inequality, of coverage of protestors and social movements compared to other better placed insider groups has caused some authors to lament that the only way for social movements to obtain positive coverage is through the adoption of public relations techniques (Shoemaker, 1989: 215). This has led to the development of various media handbooks, which explore how social movements may better exploit the mass media (Monbiot, 2002). At this stage, it is worth considering that it is not only social movements that complain about adversarial media coverage. Both governments and corporations also convey the same general attitude (to the public at least), regarding their negative treatment by the mythical left wing media (Edwards & Cromwell, 2006). However, the big difference between insider groups and most social movements is that the former can mobilise huge political and financial resources to publicise their positive activities, and still spend fifty per cent or more of their public relations resources on preventing media attention to their more secretive 'closed door' activities (Davis, 2002: 179).

Arguably the largest, most credentialed and well-resourced social organisation prior to the 1980s was the labour movement, but research has shown that despite these advantages, the British labour movement has been systematically treated with hostility by the media (Philo & Glasgow University Media Group, 1982). In 1990, US media watchdog Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) published a report entitled 'Lost in the margins: labor and the media' which concluded that 'the lives of 100 million working people are being routinely ignored, marginalised or inaccurately portrayed in the media' (FAIR 1990). Current research from the US also shows how the labour movement is still systematically misrepresented in the media, despite its financial strength, application of professional public relations techniques and fundamentally democratic ideals (Martin, 2004 and www.projectcensored.org).

Ignoring campaigners

Other social movements in less influential political positions than the labour movement suffer even more under the strain to publicise their activities, especially when their activities confront the status quo. The US civil rights movement (1954 to 1968) took years of organising and massive public support (and increased militancy) before the media started regularly covering and supporting the protests in the 1960s (Solomon, 1995; Flournoy, 2003). Few people know the names of the thousands of heroic leaders and ordinary citizens who gave their lives struggling for freedom. Instead, the media focused their positive coverage on the star like qualities of the movement's more moderate leaders, like Martin Luther King, while demonising and marginalising the more radical elements of the movement (Gitlin, 1980: 212, 284; Rhodes, 1999). Two characteristics that strongly influence a social movement's media treatment are the degree to which they are perceived to be 'extreme' (that is, challenging the status quo) and 'militant' (in their tactics); whereby, the more extreme and militant a group, the more critical the media coverage (McLeod & Hertog, 1999). Thus, although Martin Luther King benefited from his relative moderation in both these regards for most of his life (McAdam, 1996), this changed just prior to his assassination (Paletz & Entman, 1981: 129-130). It is then that he began to link the civil rights movement to basic human rights and economic rights, which subsequently led him to oppose the Vietnam War in 1967 and start building the Poor People's Campaign in the last few months of his life. These events were widely dismissed by the media at the time, and even today few Americans are familiar with them, due to an effective media blackout in media reviews of his life (Solomon, 1995). This highlights how central the media's representations of social movements are for generating and sustaining public support. In addition, the elevation of movement leaders to the media's centre stage, to the exclusion of

ordinary movement participants, may have the effect of discouraging 'normal' citizens from identifying with the movement, which can prevent their active involvement. Tunstall (1996: 200) points out how most labour stories during the Thatcher years in the UK focused on the movements leaders, dismissing the grassroots base of ordinary workers. This served to dramatically weaken the labour movement's bargaining position in the media when the Thatcher government decided to phase out much of their communication with the trade union leaders after 1979.

One major difference between earlier popular social movements and the current global justice movement is that the latter tend not to rely on distinct leaders or top-down hierarchal structures to drive their activities. So, in some respects, the media's apparent 'confusion about the protestors' political goals is understandable' (Klein 2002: 3). Unfortunately, this equitable trait of the global justice movement has supplied the media with even more ammunition to undermine the protestors' ideals by portraying them as 'lost' and 'leaderless'. However, it should be recognised that the global justice movements' strong emphasis on grassroots participation and consensus decision-making - which admittedly is sometimes messy (or democratic) is their very strength in countering the domineering corporate power structures evident in society today.

Us and them

Chan and Lee (1984) first described the 'protest paradigm' to illustrate how the mass media tended to focus on limited features of social protests to portray protestors as the 'other'. Characteristics of this reporting paradigm, which separates protestors (them) from non-protesting audiences (us, or some of us), include a reliance on official sources to frame the event, a focus on police confrontation, and an analysis of the protestors' activities (and appearances) rather than their objectives. This somewhat internalised selection process serves to filter which protests are reported, and which are ignored.

The media's exploitation of broad unsubstantiated statements concerning the public's negative opinion of protestors is used to naturalise the status quo, a practice often supported by the utilisation of unfavourable eyewitness comments (McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Media depictions of hostile bystander reactions act as a powerful form of social control, and serve to undermine the protestors' opinions, as passers-by who are sympathetic to the protestors are often considered to be part of the protest, so tend not to be interviewed (Hertog & McLeod, 1995). Research has also shown how the media often fail to report the protestors' official opponents, and instead tend to replace them with the police, thus reducing the chance of any meaningful dialogue or debate between the protestors and the targets of their protests (McLeod & Hertog, 1992; Hertog & McLeod, 1995; Boyle et al., 2004). Another factor that sometimes acts against demonstrators is the media's focus on their social demographics, especially when protests involve high numbers of young adults and students. Under these circumstances, the media may simply dismiss their views as unrepresentative of society, and not worth listening too. In addition, when protest participants are not visibly representative of societal norms, it makes it even easier for the media to label them derogatively as 'outsiders' or 'freaks' (Gitlin 1980; McLeod & Hertog 1992; Coen 2000).

That the media makes systematic use of derogatory stereotypes and negative frames to marginalise outsider groups was born out in Bowie's (1999) examination of the depiction of indigenous American's in three US magazines, Time, Newsweek and US News & World Report from 1968 to 1979. Furthermore, Baylor (1996) undertook a similar assessment of NBC's evening news over the same time period and showed how 'the issue of militancy overshadow[ed] any presentation of the real grievances and issues behind Indian protest' with '98% of the news segments us[ing] either the stereotype or militant frames' (245-246). The US media has made some progress since the nineteenth century - when in 1871 the popular press actually encouraged and justified the massacre of a hundred Indians, mostly women and children (Blänkenburg, 1968) - but unfortunately the exact level of progress is still debateable.

Contrary to the needs of democracy - especially any forms of participatory democracy - citizens who hold politicians and/or corporations directly accountable by protesting in the streets are often labelled by the mass media as 'deviant outsiders' whose activities are directed towards disrupting the status quo for the compliant majority. Hertog and McLeod's (1995) media coverage of anarchist groups in Minneapolis-St. Paul from 1986 to 1988 demonstrated that by systematically defining protestors as abnormal, the media are able to unfairly prejudice their audience against the issues and ideas raised by protestors. They also showed that, depending on the version of protest coverage audiences watched, people

showed big differences in opinion on the way they viewed both the issues raised and the protestors themselves. Other research has also shown how media coverage of protests can act to increase public hostility towards the protestors' cause (McLeod, 1995; McLeod & Detenber, 1999; Shoemaker, 1982). This has important implications for social movements because, if a single report can determine how sympathetic the public is to their goals, consistently antagonistic media treatment is likely to have very negative repercussions regarding public support of protests themselves.

Public empathy towards the activities of social movements changes continuously (Hertog & McLeod, 1995), but the degree to which society accepts protests may give an indication of the strength of their societies democratic values. This is because protests provide a discernible sign that 'that the marketplace of ideas is free and diverse', providing more possibilities for innovative social change (McLeod, 2000: 31). Therefore, in societies where even peaceful activists are depicted as deviants - a tactic exploited by President Nixon in 1970, whose election campaign focused on combating 'the 'anarchy' of the anti-war protest' (Hallin, 1986: 194) - it is not surprising that the general public often has reservations about the necessity of protest. These worries are compounded by the withdrawal of some of the larger social movements from more 'radical' forms of protest in favour of more 'legitimate' partnerships with corporations and governments: which, in the end, may work to change the boundaries for what the public considers acceptable dissent, strengthening the dividing line between us and them.

Framing protestors into obscurity

Analysis of the global justice movements' 2001 May Day protests in London showed how most UK press coverage framed the protests in terms of (1) law and order, and the problem of policing the protest, fifty nine per cent; (2) economics, and the financial 'cost' of protests to the wider public, nine per cent; or (3) irrationality and spectacle, seven per cent (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2003). The remaining coverage (eighteen per cent) identified with the protestors' concerns, but 'with a few notable exceptions, discourses of recognition appeared either in the editorial page columns, leaders, or letters to the editor' (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2003: 143). The little positive news that was generated was clearly isolated from the serious hard news sections of the papers, letting the readers know what the media really thought of the protests.

In the same vein, Martin (2004) identified five dominant news frames for how the mass media view labour news in the US: they are (1) 'the consumer is king' - which encourages an individual based (not collective) form of consumer democracy; (2) 'the process of production is none of the public's business' - whereby citizen consumers should only busy their minds with making product choices; (3) 'the economy is driven by great business leaders and entrepreneurs' - whose efforts can be emulated by anyone with the requisite passion, regardless of background; (4) 'the workplace is a meritocracy' - self advancement is always possible, and the employer bears no responsibility for an individual's problems (of course unions are excluded from this frame); and (5) 'collective economic action is bad' (Martin, 2004: 8-11). Understanding how such frames are continually utilised to negatively categorise social movement issues is crucial to comprehending why subsequent actions taken by activist groups - like protests - are also portrayed in an overwhelmingly bad light. There are frames that are not slanted against protestors, but mainstream media rarely uses them. Instead, the most regularly used frames are those that serve to marginalise protestors, these include the violent crime or property crime story, the carnival frame, the freak show, the Romper Room (or immaturity) frame, the riot frame, the storm watch (warning of potential actions), and lastly the moral decay story (McLeod & Hertog, 1999: 312-313).

What about the citizens who aren't protesting?

On May 1st 1973, London witnessed one of the largest trade union protests seen for years, when nearly two million people joined together to oppose the Conservative Party's Industrial Relations Act. In a similar manner to the coverage of the 2001 May Day protest (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2003) the media downplayed the protest, representing what was 'a sizable manifestation of political class conflict rare in British history' as 'a predictable act of May Day madness' (Young & Crutchley 1978: 31). Typical of the media framing employed surrounding this event, the Daily Telegraph's headline read 'Millions ignore T.U.C. day of protest' (cited in Young & Crutchley 1978: 30). This narrative was eerily echoed some thirty years later by Newsnight (the BBC's flagship news programme) when political correspondent, David Grossman, 'reporting' on the biggest anti-war march ever seen in Britain (held in London on February 15th 2003) said: 'The people have spoken, or have

they? What about the millions who didn't march? Was going to the DIY store or watching the football on Saturday a demonstration of support for the government?' (Medialens, 2004).

Similarly, in Washington DC (US) on April 25th 2004, what might have been the capital's biggest protest ever took place, when an estimated 500,000 to 1,150,000 people took to the streets to march for womens' reproductive rights. However, as in the previous examples, this only seemed to encourage the media to 'downplay the size and significance of the event' and 'largely ignore the issues that marchers attempted to bring back into the public discourse' (Hollar, 2004). Likewise, after the September 11th attacks, a study of the New York Times showed that it had consistently 'downplayed and distorted peace rallies and demonstrations against a military response' (FAIR, 2001). The media messages emitting from the reporting of these protests to the public is unambiguous: don't waste your time with those deviant protestors they're not important! On the other hand, the options for the social movements involved in such demonstrations are not so obvious. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the mass media (and educational systems) should strengthen democratic principles and actively draw social movements into the wider public sphere, not isolate them at its margins.

Violence in the media and social movements

Violence tends to materialise in either personal or group conflicts, and has long been highlighted as a desirable news value in the mass media. Under normal circumstances, policymaking processes do not lend themselves to this particular media frame, as for the most part they are carried out through consensual decision making. But when individuals do choose to come into conflict verbally (or physically), this form of 'policymaking violence' tends to rate highly in the media. The crucial difference between the media's focus on institutional and protestor violence is that for institutional actors the decision to illustrate their conflict through violence, is for the most part a personal choice, while the same is not usually true for peaceful protestors. This is because citizens who feel excluded from political processes often participate in mass activities like protests, and so their representation in the media may be tarred by just a few unrepresentative individuals who choose violent methods of expression over peaceful ones. Thus, Winter and Klæhn (2005: 184) describe how press coverage served to discipline protestors at the Organisation of American State meeting in 2000 (Windsor, Canada) by depicting 'a "crisis of democracy" in the violent, misguided and indoctrinated embodiment of the protestors, who must be eradicated, so that normalcy: peace, order and "good government" may return.' Likewise, Bennett et al's. (2004: 452) study of protests targeting the World Economic Forum (between 2001 and 2003 in the New York Times) concluded that 'the news actively constructed the grassroots globalisation critics as marginal, largely nameless scruffians who threatened civil order with violence, even though actually little disorder actually occurred.'

It is not likely that protestor violence will endear its participants (and their associated social movements) to the public, especially when this becomes (as it nearly always does) the focal point for media coverage. In fact, it seems most likely that media attention obtained through violence will lead to social isolation. However, disturbingly (for democracy), some suggest that the practice of 'engaging in what is seen as spectacular, irrational, coercive, violent, and antisocial behaviour is the most reliable way to introduce [into the media] new rationalities that may have transformative consequences' (Wahi-Jorgensen, 2003: 144; also see Owen and Palmer 2003). The use of violence is clearly a contestable, and in many people's view, an undesirable solution to resolving the problem of the nexus between social movements' and the media, but it proves how desperately outsider groups fight to get their message heard. Indeed, in some regards, the media encourages such behaviour, because if there are few differences between two protest groups, it is the more conflictual or violent event that obtains the most media coverage (McLeod & Hertog, 1999; Oliver and Myers, 1999). Fortunately, though, most people still believe in the power of non-violent protests (as evidenced by the majority of peaceful activists present at most mass protests) even if, as is often the case, their peaceful pleas remain unheard in the mass media (for a summary of the argument against violence see Edwards 2001).

Another problem of the media's fixation on protestor violence is that it often means that the media overlook the role of police violence. For example, environmental protestors had occupied US Congressional Republican Representative Frank Riggs office in California October 1997 and were confronted by police who used pepper spray to restrain them. Throughout this confrontation - which was filmed - one of the protestors managed to calmly articulate her group's reasons for protesting; however, that segment was edited out from the television news report (Opel, 2003: 58). As well as demonstrating how activists can be silenced in the media (or have their agendas distorted), this type of reporting serves to

normalise police violence against protestors, which is dangerous for all involved in peaceful protest (see FAIR, 2003).

Playing the Media Game

Highly visible activists: winners of the 'media game'

Despite the extremely negative picture painted in the previous section, there are still some winners in the 'media game'. So while losers, like the largest protest ever held in Washington, DC (see previous description of the women's march in 2004) received just a single story on page three in USA Today the day after the march, and a 'handful of march-related stories over a few days' in the New York Times and The Washington Post, 'others ignored the event almost completely' (Hollar, 2004). A 1997 march organised by the Promise Keepers 'an evangelical men's organization with an anti-feminist and anti-gay theology' end up as winners of the media game. Again, the Promise Keepers march took place in Washington DC and although it was approximately half the size of the women's march (estimated attendance of 480,000-750,000 demonstrators) it received far more media coverage. USA Today ran four stories before the event and four afterwards, while the broadcast networks (ABC, CBS and NBC) ran 'more than three times the coverage the networks devoted to the women's march' (Hollar, 2004). Furthermore, the only study examining media coverage of the Promise Keepers in US newspapers - from 1991 (their founding year) through to April 1996 - concluded that their coverage was 'overwhelmingly positive' (Claussen, 1998), making the Promise Keepers true winners of the media game.

Another 'winner' was a brand new social movement (formed in Belgium in the wake of the controversy surrounding the arrest of murderer Marc Dutroux in 1996), which mobilised Belgium's largest ever demonstration - the White March. A study examining the media coverage surrounding this protest determined that the primary reason for its overwhelming success was because the media 'undertook large-scale and unconcealed motivational framing efforts' to mobilise the public in support of the protest (Walgrave and Manssens, 2005: 132). This is a perfect example of a social movement that is an impressive winner of the media game, and a crucial question to ask is why was this the case? Walgrave and Manssens (2005: 135-136) outlined a number of specific contextual factors that might have encouraged the media to support the protest. Sadly, many of these factors were met when Howard Sattler, the host of a popular Australian talkback radio program, stirred up racist sentiments amongst his listeners, promoting a 'Rally for Justice' which drew thirty thousand angry protestors on to the streets (Mickler, 1998: 64). The protests were even able to pressure the government to introduce racist laws that contravened international human rights legislation (Stockwell, 1992: 279).

Winners are losers?

Even when progressive activist groups 'win' in the media game, obtaining positive media coverage supportive of their objectives; they may still be losing in other respects, as the following discussion of the (US) anti-sweatshop movement illustrates. After a long history of labour abuse in sweatshops worldwide, it was only in the mid 1990s that the issue started receiving serious attention in the US mass media (coinciding with a couple of high profile sweatshop investigations). Contrary to 'normal' social movement coverage, analysis of this coverage showed that sweatshop activists actually 'achieved a position of definitional prominence' over corporate interests, a position typically reserved for powerful institutional actors (Greenberg & Knight, 2004: 169). This was a remarkable achievement, however, this success was undermined by the media's dominant focus on micro-level issues, such as individual sweatshops, and their aversion to the discussion of the systemic structural inequalities supporting the use of sweatshops (Greenberg & Knight, 2004: 170). Media coverage also located the root of the problem in western consumer shopping activities, not at the doorstep of the businesses profiting from the use of sweatshops, which served to cloud the issue of responsibility. Therefore, although the anti-sweatshop movement may have successfully campaigned for limited labour reforms (i.e., by Nike) - some of which have now become institutionalised - paradoxically, this success may render their long-term goal of eradicating sweatshops inoperable. Businesses successfully avoided regulation by promoting self-regulation, and even though the use of sweatshops is still common practice, media coverage of sweatshops has been far less visible since 2000, reducing the anti-sweatshop movement's ability to maintain public support and awareness for their campaigns. Furthermore, current estimates suggest that there are still about 250,000 sweatshop workers employed in the US alone (Ross, 2004).

Some social movements obtain their desired media coverage by adopting tactics that focus on mobilising short-term public support. One commonly used tactic - that may work against

longer-term mobilisation of social movement supporters - is emotional management. Such tactics, rely upon manipulating audiences by pushing emotional hot buttons, stimulating reactive responses from targets, but not necessarily well thought out responses that might lead on to long term commitments. The use of emotive images in the media to generate support for the victims of the famine in Niger 2005 is a good example of this type of campaigning. The politics of symbols and their manipulation may be successful in the short term, but social movements engaged in such practices need to consider whether they are weakening the ability of other progressive social movements to recruit people committed to long term social change. Lasting commitments to social movements are built on the basis of trusting relationships, which are most effectively developed through one on one communications, not through the media (Gamson 1995: 106). Social movements need to encourage their participants to be critical of manipulative practices because it is the results of activities that discourage activism in the first place.

Competing for coverage

Taking a historical approach to understanding differences in movement-media relations, Rucht (2004) suggests that new social movements in the 1970s and 1980s gradually moved away from more confrontational approaches to the mass media, and increasingly utilised 'adaptation strategies' (44-52). This in turn, has led social movements to a greater reliance on the mainstream media, with less emphasis on maintaining their inwardly focused alternative media. The rise of trans-national social movements in the 1990s saw this trend extend, and increasingly, social movements have adopted professionalised public relations techniques to market their causes.

Davis (2002) recognised that various UK campaigning groups have been able to acquire positive media profiles by relying on professional public relations techniques, rather than the creation of dramatic mediagenic images. This seems to have enabled increasing numbers of outsider interest groups greater opportunities to obtain positive media coverage (Davis, 2002: 176). However, in order to gain a ticket to this exclusive media club, there is an unwritten price that must be paid because as Gamson (1995: 99) pointed out 'the media may offer occasional models of collective action that make a difference, but they are highly selective ones.' Reformist movements are far more likely to survive the ravages of media distortion than more revolutionary ones, whose public relations messages can be overwhelmed by disparaging media frames. Gitlin (1980: 284) describes how more reformist campaigns, like those led by Ralph Nader in the 1960s (which fought for consumer rights), were rewarded with acceptance by the mainstream media and promoted to the status of 'regular news makers.' This is particularly important, as one study comparing press and television coverage of protests in Washington DC (between 1982 and 1991), showed that overall coverage had decreased while the number of protests had increased massively (McCarthy et al., 1998). Furthermore, the ongoing corporatisation of social movements encourages the larger non-governmental organisations to view their success through an economic lens, which leads them to focus predominantly on maintaining and expanding membership/funding (Roelofs, 2003). The rational result of this economic orientation, is that they often 'deliberately design their actions and broader campaigns to attract media attention and positive coverage' (Rucht, 2004: 49). Therefore, social movements may water down their demands - to appear less challenging to the status quo - leaving them more vulnerable to cooption by political and economic elites (Paletz & Entman, 1981: 130). In such cases, social movement may even start to consider the development of positive relationships with the media as more important than mobilising activists or influencing policy decisions.

Playing by corporate rules

The general mainstreaming of media tactics has also been accompanied by the general dilution of radical media critiques (to 'safer' moderate criticisms) which only superficially confront the status quo: arguably strengthening media organisations hegemonic position in society. The future may appear to look rosy for some social movements, but if they just sit by and watch the more radical (media compromised) groups fall by the wayside, how long will it take before they themselves rank among the most 'radical' groups. Maybe then, such groups will have to re-evaluate their media-centric tactics in the light of their newfound 'radical' status.

Unions are a good example of a group that through access to significant financial resources, have been able to adapt their tactics to become more media friendly. This can be seen by their tactical focus on 'the needs of 'the public' and/or attack[s on] 'greedy' and 'incompetent' corporate and government elites' (Davis, 2002: 177). However, in utilising

such strategies unions are now 'less likely to argue about jobs and money' and have 'dilut[ed] some of their long-term political objectives' (ibid.). Their media-centric approach, serves to fragment and isolate their successful actions from one another, encouraging media coverage in an episodic, instead of thematic manner (Bennett, 1988: 24). Similarly, in the 1960s and 1970s the National Organization for Women, adopted a position of media pragmatism, and although they succeeded in becoming a key feminist source for the media in the US, their 'leader[s] were very sensitive to questions and debate on sexuality...opt[ing] out of an important part of the domain of personal politics that ha[d] been the hallmark of the feminist movement' (Barker-Plummer, 1995: 315). As Tuchman (1978: 152) concluded: 'Ironically, yet logically, the successful institutionalization of the women's movement limited its ability to carry forth radical issues.' Social movements may improve their media visibility, but paradoxically by making tactical concessions to obtain media coverage, they may render their longer-term objectives invisible to their audience.

McCarthy et al. (1998) studied which factors contributed towards media coverage of demonstrations in Washington DC and concluded that other than the estimated size of the protest, one of the best predictors of coverage is its conformity with current media issue attention cycles. Other research has also shown that if protests are not tied to legislative issues, they have a much harder time achieving media coverage, especially if they occurred in a '31-day period in which many other local public message events were also occurring' (Oliver & Maney, 2000: 496-97). These findings portend dire consequences for recruitment of future activists through the media, and for sustainable activism in general, as they place severe limitations on a movement's ability to receive thematic coverage of their protest activities. This is because: 'If media issue attention cycles come to play a more significant role than do the form, context, substance, or size of citizen protests in determining which demonstrations are selected for media coverage, then protest in modern democracies will have become mediated to a greater extent' than ever supposed (McCarthy et al., 1998: 497).

Invisible activists: losers of the 'media game'

Research in the US has shown that protests or social movements that challenge the legitimacy of the governments foreign policies, are less likely to be covered by the mass media (Smith et al., 2001; Shaw 2004) or more likely to be heavily 'denigrated and delegitimised' (Carragee, 1991). A prominent example of this was the discussions surrounding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Goss (2001) examined the New York Times' coverage of NAFTA and found that it served as an effective mouthpiece for the government and corporate interests, downplaying the significance of the agreement and limiting the terms of the debate to elite interests. In this way, the labour movement, who totally opposed the terms of the agreement, were almost completely ignored in the media coverage. In direct response to the disastrous consequences of NAFTA, thousands of people came together in Seattle in 1999 to campaign for more equitable global trade rules. Previously, the mass media were able to easily bury the activist case, but in Seattle this was not so simple due to the physical presence of 50,000 concerned citizens. This placed the media in a fix, because if they were to honestly discuss the issues being raised by the protest they would have had to question the validity of the entire economic system (Martin, 2004: 179-180). So instead, the media made full use of the adversarial tactics and frames (outlined previously) to systematically misrepresent and delegitimise the protestors' opinions (Ackerman, 2000; Herman & Chomsky, 2002: xiii; Goeddertz & Kraidy, 2003; Herman, 2006).

The same principle of marginalisation normally holds true for groups challenging domestic policy making issues where there is elite consensus. The US anti-nuclear energy movement is a good example, and their actions were rendered next-to-invisible by the media. In spite of this, through determined grassroots education and organising, the anti-nuclear energy movement slowly grew, until public opinion polls in 1975 showed that between twenty to thirty per cent of the public opposed nuclear energy (Moyer, 2001). However, even with increasing public support, the mass arrest of 177 demonstrators the following year went unreported in the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times, while receiving just two paragraphs on page 32 of the New York Times (Gitlin, 1980: 287). This illustrates the enormity of the media barriers facing social movements, as this occurred to a movement that had a sizable proportion of public support. Not surprisingly, the movement against nuclear weapons was treated with even more disdain by the media, so that 'during the biggest demonstrations, in late April and early May 1978, the New York Times ran a small notice on page 14' and the 'Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times ran nothing' (Gitlin, 1980: 291-292). Similarly, the environmental movement has also found itself regularly marginalised from the media (for a full account, see Barker, Submitted b).

Smaller social movements, targeting local issues, will be more likely to receive positive coverage than larger groups calling for more systemic and challenging reforms: as it tends to be the social movements that are most vigorously pushing the boundaries for dissent in society that are most marginalised from the mainstream media (McLeod & Hertog, 1999). This may be true, but that does not necessarily mean that reformist groups will obtain glowing media coverage. In fact, a recent survey of newspaper coverage of social protest in Wisconsin, US, from 1960 to 1999 concluded that even moderate reform groups tend to receive marginalising media coverage, and only 'protest groups seeking to support the status quo can expect more favourable treatment' (Boyle et al., 2004: 57).

All the examples in this section have shown how social movements are routinely marginalised or disappeared by the mainstream media. This may set in motion (or perpetuate) a 'spiral of silence', as media audiences sympathetic to social movement ideas, may feel less likely to speak out if they perceive the activists to be part of a small (invisible) minority in society, an idea forcefully communicated by the media (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). This of course has knock-on effects for a social movement's recruitment and long-term viability. Unfortunately, despite receiving consistently negative coverage some social movements still struggle to obtain further poor coverage: so is bad publicity actually worse than no publicity? This is not an easy question to answer, as poor publicity may still result in the recruitment of new members (see Owen and Palmer, 2003). However, maybe the question need not even be asked, as surely good publicity is better than either poor publicity or none at all. Instead, perhaps social movements should be questioning the mass media's portrayal of 'reality' not just their own promotional activities - with a view to changing and reforming the mass media itself.

Necessary Reforms for Social Justice

Cromwell (2001: 80) argues 'that campaigners are often unwilling to contemplate the notion that there is an inherent media resistance to their message.' Furthermore, he suggests that even activists who are familiar with radical mass media critiques, like Herman and Chomsky's (1988) propaganda model, often hold the 'false impression that "big companies try to control the news in their favour"' which 'is the "conspiracy" charge that Herman and Chomsky cogently refuted from day one' (Cromwell 2001: 80). Therefore, listening to activists, and working out how they relate to the media, should be the first step for any activists working towards developing the case for media reform.

Difficult choices: institutional or global support?

Social movements have a limited number of outlets for their stories: internally distributed news, which typically reaches few people (especially those outside of the social movements immediate activities), and externally distributed news whose distribution relies on the mainstream media. Rising use of the internet has strengthened many social movements ability to distribute their news more widely via alternative media, but most progress has been made in developing effective internal communications. Unfortunately, most people lie outside of activist communication networks, and the wealth of information produced by social movements passes them by unnoticed. A single daily newspaper already provides a vast amount of information to digest. So considering that most people do not read newspapers cover to cover, it may be reasonable to suggest that few people feel the need to actively search for additional information to supplement their daily news intake.

Social movements who wish to reach out to a mass audience must (at present) primarily rely on the mass media to publicise their cause. However, the relationship between the two is fundamentally asymmetrical, which leaves social movements vulnerable to the media's beck and call - placing social movements in a catch 22 situation. Should they make the best of their media-given lot, good or bad? Or should they attempt to reform the media, and risk biting (or at least nibbling) the hand that feeds them?

With the advent of trans-national social movements and improved international communications, new doors have opened, which may help make such questions a little easier to answer. In recent years, in minority countries, participation in social movements has risen substantially, but it is in the majority countries where growth in social movements has advanced most rapidly. This is despite the fact that protesting is a genuinely dangerous form of political expression in countries where governments routinely utilise repressive forms of social control to clamp down on dissidents (Podobnik, 2005: 55). In the face of this oppression, millions of people from the majority world are joining together to protest against the multitude of exploitative economic reforms being imposed on them by corporate driven globalisation (Podobnik, 2005: 56). However, '[i]ronically... the era of globalisation

has coincided with an increasingly parochial focus by the Western media... Meanwhile coverage of the South, where it existed at all, has diminished, allowing a limited and distorted view of the developing world' (Miller, 2003: 116).

In minority countries, global justice movements are working hard to expose the gross bankruptcy of the current form of globalisation, and are sometimes able to permeate the public's consciousness through the mass media. However, while they struggle to be heard, there are already signs in majority countries of massive mobilisations of citizens who oppose corporate hegemony (Walton and Seddon, 1994). Yet, these millions of protestors remain hidden away from most Western eyes (Palast, 2000), by the very same media that social movements in the minority countries cooperate with. Western media portray the global justice movement at home as either 'violent troublemakers' or 'middle-class do-gooders' and marginalise the bulk of protestors in majority countries who are campaigning against the same neo-liberalism by simply not reporting their activities (Podobnik, 2005: 57). To compound this problem, on the rare occasion when the media does delve into majority world issues, audiences were misinformed, due to the low level of explanations and context given, and generally hold majority world citizens in low regard (although it has been shown that such opinions could be radically changed by the quality of information received) (Glasgow University Media Group, 2001).

What then would happen if the media covered these popular uprisings in the majority world in a sympathetic way? Obviously, a lot – however, it is unlikely that this will happen in the near future, as the media do not even report positively on the global justice movement in their own countries. Instead, it might be more interesting for activists to consider which of the two they should be allying themselves with: media institutions or the majority of the global citizenry? Choosing the latter does not mean neglecting all media outlets in favour of interpersonal communication. Far from it: by choosing to side wholeheartedly with the public, social movements would need to make substantial investments in alternative media (in minority and majority countries alike) to publicise their activities globally, while also concentrating on the urgent task of publicising the need for media reform. The global justice movement might then be able to stop wasting precious resources in their uphill struggle to coax the mass media to support them, which counts upon the media acting against its own - profit orientated - interests.

Democratising the messenger

If the media continues to encourage apathy through the use of 'neutral frames', non-coverage, or over-coverage with limited solutions, social movements need to consider how beneficial it is to seek such disempowering media coverage. Furthermore, there is the possibility that even positive coverage may ultimately work to undermine their (or other movements) long-term objectives (that is to strengthen democratic processes). Most people are aware that numerous catastrophic problems are challenging human existence, but if they learn about these issues in an episodic manner that leaves them feeling helpless, where the only consistent solution offered by the media is changing their personal consumption patterns, can social movements really expect to build a mass movement for global justice in the minority world?

The media systems we currently have are not up to this task, so social movement activists need to begin seriously thinking about how they might change the mass media. To a limited extent some social movements (especially in the US) are already undertaking some actions to create a more democratic media environment, but more needs to be done to build these actions into a truly global project, to counter the global reach of media corporations. However, to date, progressive social movements have generally rejected media democratisation as a political issue. The rationale for this un-decision may be numerous (see Hackett and Carroll, 2004), but ultimately, the desertion of media democratisation has worked against many progressive social movements, who continue to suffer within the confines of the increasingly conservative mass media.

Conclusions

Key to any social movement's eventual success in reforming the current world order is its ability to garner majority support, which is severely restricted by the mass media. Global justice movements profess to want to mobilise entire communities worldwide to enable truly participative decision-making. However, if this is really the case, they need to consider whether the same media system that serves to naturalise and legitimise elite decision-making, can really encourage its antithesis, collective grassroots decision-making. It seems an anathema to even consider that by working on the terms set by the mass

media, social movements are actually legitimising and tightening its hegemonic power over society, even while it simultaneously acts to de-legitimise or ignore the global justice movement.

Therefore, it is time for social movements to take collective action. To start with 'democratic media reform needs to be recast as an end in itself - a public good - not simply a means by which each movement can get its message out' (Hackett & Carroll, 2004). In this way, a media reform project can be linked to the wider array of social movements calling for a more equitable and participatory democracy.

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