The US Must be
Isolated and Constrained
(The Coming
Elections and the Future of American Global Power)
We are
now experiencing fundamental changes in the international system whose implications
and consequences may ultimately be as far-reaching as the dissolution of the
Soviet bloc.
The
So long
as the future is to a large degree--to paraphrase Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld--"unknowable," it is not to the national interest of its
traditional allies to perpetuate the relationships created from 1945 to 1990.
The Bush Administration, through ineptness and a vague ideology of American
power that acknowledges no limits on its global ambitions, and a preference for
unilateralist initiatives which discounts
consultations with its friends much less the United Nations, has seriously
eroded the alliance system upon which
If Bush
is reelected then the international order may be very different in 2008 than it
is today, much less in 1999, but there is no reason to believe that objective
assessments of the costs and consequences of its actions will significantly
alter his foreign policy priorities over the next four years.
If the
Democrats win they will attempt in the name of internationalism to reconstruct
the alliance system as it existed before the Yugoslav war of 1999, when even
the Clinton Administration turned against the veto powers built into the NATO
system.
Critics
of the existing foreign or domestic order will not take over Washington this
November. As dangerous as it is, Bush's reelection may be a lesser evil because
he is much more likely to continue the destruction of the alliance system that
is so crucial to American power. One does not have to believe that the worse
the better but we have to consider candidly the foreign policy consequences of
a renewal of Bush's mandate.
Bush's
policies have managed to alienate, in varying degrees, innumerable nations, and
even its firmest allies--such as Britain, Australia, and Canada--are being
compelled to ask if giving Washington a blank check is to their national
interest or if it undermines the tenure of parties in power. The way the war in
Iraq was justified compelled France and Germany to become far more independent,
much earlier, than they had intended, and NATO's future role is now questioned
in a way that was inconceivable two years ago. Europe's future defense
arrangements are today an open question but there will be some sort of European
military force independent of NATO and American control. Germany, with French
support, strongly opposes the Bush doctrine of preemption. Tony Blair, however
much he intends acting as a proxy for the U.S. on military questions, must
return Britain to the European project, and his willingness since late 2003 to
emphasize his nation's role in Europe reflects political necessities. To do
otherwise is to alienate his increasingly powerful neighbors and risk losing
elections. His domestic credibility is already at its nadir due to his slavish
support for the war in Iraq.
In a
word, politicians who place America's imperious demands over national interest
have less future than those who are responsive to domestic opinion and needs.
This
process of alienating traditional close friends is best seen in Australia, but
in different ways and for quite distinctive reasons it is also true
elsewhere--especially Canada and Mexico, the U.S.' two neighbors. In the case
of Australia, Washington is willing to allow it to do the onerous chores of
policing the vast South Pacific and even take greater initiatives, at least to
a point, on Indonesia. But the Bush Administration passed along to it false
intelligence on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, which many of Australia's
own experts disputed, and Bush even telephoned Prime Minister John Howard to
convince him to support America's efforts in innumerable ways. As Alexander
Downer, the foreign minister, admitted earlier this month, "it wasn't a
time in our history to have a great and historic breach with the United
States," and the desire to preserve the alliance became paramount. (1) But
true alliances are based on consultation and an element of reciprocity is
possible, and the Bush Administration prefers "coalitions of the
willing" that raise no substantive questions about American actions--in
effect, a blank check. Giving it produced strong criticism of the Howard
government's reliance on Washington's false information on WMD and it has been
compelled to endorse a joint parliamentary committee to investigate the
intelligence system--sure to play into opposition hands this election year.
Even more
dangerous, the Bush Administration has managed to turn what was in the
mid-1990s a budding cordial friendship with the former Soviet Union into an
increasingly tense relationship. Despite a 1997 non-binding American pledge not
to station substantial numbers of combat troops in the territories of new
members, Washington plans to extend NATO to Russia's very borders--Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania especially concern Moscow--and it is in the process of
establishing a vague number of bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia
has stated that the U.S. encircling it warrants its retaining and modernizing
its nuclear arsenal--to remain a military superpower--that will be more than a
match for the increasingly expensive and ambitious missile defense system the
Pentagon is now building. It has over 4,600 strategic nuclear warheads and over
1,000 ballistic missiles to deliver them. Last month Russia threatened to pull
out of the crucial Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which has yet to enter
into force, because it regards America's ambitions in the former Soviet bloc as
provocation. "I would like to remind the representatives of [NATO],"
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told a security conference in Munich last
February, "that with its expansion they are beginning to operate in the
zone of vitally important interests of our country." (2) The question
Washington's allies will ask themselves is whether their traditional alliances
have far more risks than benefits--and if they are necessary.
In the
case of China, Bush's key advisers were publicly committed to constraining its
burgeoning military and geopolitical power the moment they took office. But
China's military budget is growing rapidly--12 percent this coming year--and
the European Union wants to lift its 15-year old arms embargo and get a share
of the enticingly large market. The Bush Administration, of course, is strongly
resisting any relaxation of the export ban. Establishing bases on China's
western borders is the logic of its ambitions.
The
United States is not so much engaged in "power projection" against an
amorphously defined terrorism by installing bases in small or weak Eastern
European and Central Asian nations as again confronting Russia and China in an
open-ended context which may have profound and protracted consequences neither
America's allies nor its own people have any interest or inclination to
support. Even some Pentagon analysts have warned against this strategy because
any American attempt to save failed states in the Caucasus or Central Asia,
implicit in its new obligations, will risk exhausting what are ultimately its
finite military resources. (3)
There is
no way to predict what emergencies will arise or what these commitments entail,
either for the U. S. or its allies, not the least because--as Iraq proved last
year and Vietnam long before it--its intelligence on the capabilities and
intentions of possible enemies against which it is ready to preempt is so
completely faulty. Without accurate information a nation can believe and do
anything, and this is the predicament the Bush Administration's allies are in.
It is simply not to their national interest to pursue foreign policies based on
a blind, uncritical faith in fictions or flamboyant adventurism premised on
false premises and information. It is far too open-ended both in terms of time
and costs. If Bush is reelected, America's allies and friends will have to
confront such stark choices, a painful process that will redefine and perhaps
shatter existing alliances.
But
America will be more prudent and the world will be far safer only if the Bush
Administration is constrained by a lack of allies and isolated.
______
Notes
:
1.
Australian Broadcasting Company Online interview with Downer, March 2, 2004.
2. Wade
Boese, "Russia, NATO at Loggerheads Over Military Bases," Arms Control Today, March 2004.
3. Dr.
Stephen J. Blank, "Toward a New U.S. Strategy in Asia," U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute,
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