Newsletter Numéro 26                                                            12 mars 2005
 
 
Noam Chomsky(*)    

*[Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics at MIT, has been affiliated with CEIMSA since its origins at Stendhal University during the fall semester 2000. While unable to accept our invitation to attend the first international colloquium, he very generously aided us in making contact with specialists like Edward Herman, Richard Du Boff, Michael Albert and other renown scholars who rearranged their busy schedules in order to attend this important conference in Grenoble that attracted more than 1200 people to Stendhal University campus on 11-12 January 2002. At the end of that same year, in December 2002, CEIMSA sponsored a student trip to Geneva to hear Chomsky speak at The International Council on Human Rights Policy. The article below was first published as chapter 1 in Hegemony or Survival, America’s Quest for Global Dominance (Metropolitan Books, 2003).]

 

Priorities and Prospects

    A few years ago, one of the great figures of contemporary biology, Ernst Mayr, published some reflections on the likelihood of success in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence.1 He considered the prospects very low. His reasoning had to do with the adaptive value of what we call "higher intelligence," meaning the particular human form of intellectual organization. Mayr estimated the number of spe­cies since the origin of life at about fifty billion, only one of which "achieved the kind of intelligence needed to establish a civilization." It did so very recently, perhaps 100,000 years ago. It is generally assumed that only one small breeding group survived, of which we are all descendants.

 Mayr speculated that the human form of intellectual organization may not be favored by selection. The history of life on Earth, he wrote, refutes the claim that "it is better to be smart than to be stupid," at least judging by biological success: beetles and bacteria, for example, are vastly more successful than humans in terms of survival. He also made the rather somber observation that "the aver­age life expectancy of a species is about 100,000 years."

 We are entering a period of human history that may provide an answer to the question of whether it is better to be smart than stu­pid. The most hopeful prospect is that the question will not be answered: if it receives a definite answer, that answer can only be that humans were a kind of "biological error, using their allotted 100,000 years to destroy themselves and, in the process, much else.

 The species has surely developed the capacity to do just that, and a hypothetical extraterrestrial observer might well conclude that humans have demonstrated that capacity throughout their history, dramatically in the past few hundred years, with an assault on the environment that sustains life, on the diversity of more complex organisms, and with cold and calculated savagery, on each other as well.

   

TWO SUPERPOWERS

 The year 2003 opened with many indications that concerns about human survival are all too realistic. To mention just a few examples, in the early fall of 2002 it was learned that a possibly terminal nuclear war was barely avoided forty years earlier. Immediately after this startling discovery, the Bush administration blocked UN efforts to ban the militarization of space, a serious threat to survival. The administration also terminated international negotiations to prevent biological warfare and moved to ensure the inevitability of an attack on Iraq , despite popular Opposition that was without historical precedent.

 Aid organizations with extensive experience in Iraq and studies by respected medical organizations warned that the planned inva­sion might precipitate a humanitarian catastrophe. The warnings were ignored by Washington and evoked little media interest. A high-level US task force concluded that attacks with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) within the United States are "likely," and would become more so in the event of war with Iraq. Numerous specialists and intelligence agencies issued similar warnings, adding that Washington 's belligerence, not only with regard to Iraq , was increasing the long-term threat of international terrorism and pro­liferation of WMD. These warnings too were dismissed.

 In September 2002 the Bush administration announced its National Security Strategy, which declared the right to resort to force to eliminate any perceived challenge to US global hegemony, which is to be permanent. The new grand strategy aroused deep concern worldwide, even within the foreign policy elite at home. Also in September, a propaganda campaign was launched to depict Saddam Hussein as an imminent threat to the United States and to insinuate that he was responsible for the 9-11 atrocities and was planning others. The campaign, timed to the onset of the midterm congressional elections, was highly successful in shifting attitudes. It soon drove American public opinion off the global spectrum and helped the administration achieve electoral aims and establish Iraq as a proper test case for the newly announced doctrine of resort to force at will.

 President Bush and his associates also persisted in undermining international efforts to reduce threats to the environment that are recognized to be severe, with pretexts that barely concealed their devotion to narrow sectors of private power. The administration's Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), wrote Science magazine editor Donald Kennedy, is a travesty that "included no recommen­dations for emission limitation or other forms of mitigation," con­tenting itself with "voluntary reduction targets, which, even if met, would allow US emission rates to continue to grow at around 14% per decade." The CCSP did not even consider the likelihood, sug­gested by "a growing body of evidence," that the short-term warm­ing changes it ignores "will trigger an abrupt nonlinear process," producing dramatic temperature changes that could carry extreme risks for the United States , Europe , and other temperate zones. The Bush administration's "contemptuous pass on multilateral engage­ment with the global warming problem," Kennedy continued, is the "stance that began the long continuing process of eroding its friend-ships in Europe ," leading to "smoldering resentment."2

 By October 2002 it was becoming hard to ignore the fact that the world was "more concerned about the unbridled use of Ameri­can power than ... about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein," and "as intent on limiting the giant's power as ,.. in taking away the despot's weapons."3 World concerns mounted in the months that followed, as the giant made Clear its intent to attack Iraq even if the UN inspections it reluctantly tolerated failed to unearth weapons that would provide a pretext. By December, support for Wash­ington 's war plans scarcely reached 10 percent almost anywhere outside the US , according to international polls. Two months later, after enormous worldwide protests, the press reported that "there may still be two Superpower5 on the planet: the United States and world public Opinion" ("the United States " here meaning state power, not the public or even elite Opinion).4

 By early 2003, studies revealed that fear of the United States had reached remarkable heights throughout the world, along with dis­trust of the political leadership. Dismissal of elementary human rights and needs was matched by a display of contempt for democ­racy for which no parallel comes easily to mind, accompanied by professions of sincere dedication to human rights and democracy. The unfolding events should be deeply disturbing to those who have concerns about the world they are leaving to their grandchildren.

 Though Bush planners are at an extreme end of the traditional US Policy spectrum, their programs and doctrines have many pre­cursors, both in US history and among earlier aspirants to global power. More ominously, their decisions may not be irrational within the framework of prevailing ideology and the institutions that embody it. There is ample historical precedent for the willingness of leaders to threaten or resort to violence in the face of significant risk of catastrophe. But the stakes are far higher today. The choice between hegemony and survival has rarely, if ever, been so starkly posed.

 Let us try to unravel some of the many strands that enter into this complex tapestry, focusing attention on the world power that proclaims global hegemony. Its actions and guiding doctrines must be a primary concern for everyone on the planet, particularly, of course, for Americans. Many enjoy unusual advantages and free­dom, hence the ability to shape the future, and should face with care the responsibilities that are the immediate corollary of such privilege.

   

ENEMY TERRITORY

 Those who want to face their responsibilities with a genuine com­mitment to democracy and freedom -even to decent survival- should recognize the barriers that stand in the way. In violent states these are not concealed. In more democratic societies barriers are more subtle. While methods differ sharply from more brutal to more free societies, the goals are in many ways similar: to ensure that the "great beast," as Alexander Hamilton called the people, does not stray from its proper confines.

 Controlling the general population has always been a dominant concern of power and privilege, particularly since the first modern democratic revolution in seventeenth-century England . The self-described "men of best quality" were appalled as a "giddy multitude of beasts in men's shapes" rejected the basic framework of the civil conflict raging in England between king and Parliament, and called for government "by countrymen like ourselves, that know our wants," not by "knights and gentlemen that make us laws, that are chosen for fear and do but oppress us, and do not know the people's sores." The men of best quality recognized that if the people are so "depraved and corrupt as to "confer places of power and trust upon wicked and undeserving men, they forfeit their power in this behalf unto those that are good, though but a few." Almost three centuries later, Wilsonian idealism, as it is standardly termed, adopted a rather similar stance. Abroad, it is Washington 's respon­sibility to ensure that government is in the hands of "the good, though but a few." At home, it is necessary to safeguard a system of elite decision-making and public ratification -"polyarchy," in the terminology of political science -not democracy.5

 As president, Woodrow Wilson himself did not shrink from severely repressive policies even within the United States , but such measures are not normally available in places where popular strug­gles have won a substantial measure of freedom and rights. By Wil­son's day it was widely recognized by elite sectors in the US and Britain that within their societies, coercion was a tool of diminishing utility, and that it would be necessary to devise new means to tame the beast, primarily through control of opinion and attitude. Huge industries have since developed devoted to these ends.

  Wilson 's own view was that an elite of gentlemen with "elevated ideals" must be empowered to preserve "stability and righteous­ness."6 Leading public intellectuals agreed. "The public must be put in its place," Walter Lippmann declared in his progressive essays on democracy. That goal could be achieved in part through "the man­ufacture of consent," a "self-conscious art and regular organ of pop­ular government." This "revolution" in the "practice of democracy" should enable a "specialized class" to manage the "common inter­ests" that "very largely elude public opinion entirely." In essence, the Leninist ideal. Lippmann had observed the revolution in the practice of democracy firsthand as a member of Wilson 's Committee on Public Information, which was established to coordinate wartime propaganda and achieved great success in whipping the population into war fever.

 The "responsible men" who are the proper decision-makers, Lippmann continued, must "live free of the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd." These "ignorant and meddlesome outsiders" are to be "spectators," not "participants." The herd does have a "function": to trample periodically in support of one or another element of the leadership class in an election. Unstated is that the responsible men gain that status not by virtue of any special talent or knowledge but by willing subordination to the systems of actual power and loyalty to their operative principles-crucially, that basic decisions over social and economic life are to be kept within insti­tutions with top-down authoritarian control, while the participation of the beast is to be limited to a diminished public arena.

 Just how diminished the public arena should be is a matter of debate. Neoliberal initiatives of the past thirty years have been designed to restrict it, leaving basic decision-making within largely unaccountable private tyrannies, linked closely to one another and to a few powerful states. Democracy can then survive, but in sharply reduced form. The Reagan-Bush sectors have taken an extreme posi­tion in this regard, but the policy spectrum is fairly narrow. Some argue that it scarcely exists at all, mocking the pundits who "actually make a living contrasting the finer points of the sitcoms on NBC with those broadcast on CBS" during election campaigns: "Through tacit agreement the two major parties approach the contest for the presidency [as] political kabuki [in which] the players know their roles and everyone sticks to the script," "striking poses" that cannot be taken seriously.7

 If the public escapes its marginalization and passivity, we face a "crisis of democracy" that must be overcome, liberal intellectuals explain, in part through measures to discipline the institutions responsible for "the indoctrination of the young"-schools, univer­sities, churches, and the like-and perhaps even through government control of the media, if self-censorship does not suffice.8

 In taking these views, contemporary intellectuals are drawing on good constitutional sources. James Madison held that power must be delegated to "the wealth of the nation," "the more capa­ble set of men," who understand that the role of government is "to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority." Pre­capitalist in his worldview, Madison had faith that the "enlight­ened Statesman" and "benevolent philosopher" who were to exercise power would "discern the true interest of their country" and guard the public interest against the "mischief" of democratic majorities. The mischief would be avoided, Madison hoped, under the system of fragmentation he devised. In later years he came to fear that severe problems would arise with the likely increase of those who "will labor under all the hardships of life, and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its benefits." A good deal of modern history reflects these conflicts over who will make deci­sions, and how.

 Recognition that control of opinion is the foundation of govern­ment, from the most despotic to the most free, goes back at least to David Hume, but a qualification should be added. It is far more important in the more free societies, where obedience cannot be maintained by the lash. It is only natural that the modern institutions of thought control-frankly called propaganda before the word became unfashionable because of totalitarian associations-should have originated in the most free Societies. Britain Pioneered with its Ministry of Information, which undertook "to direct the thought of most of the world." Wilson followed Soon after with his Committee on Public Information. Its propaganda successes inspired progressive democratic theorists and the modern public-relations industry. Lead­ing participants in the CPI, like Lippmann and Edward Bernays, quite explicitly drew from these achievements of thought control, which Bernays called "the engineering of consent, ... the very essence of the democratic process." The term Propaganda became an entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1922 and in the Ency­clopedia of Social Sciences a decade later, with Harold Lasswell's scholarly endorsement of the new techniques for controlling the pub­lic mind. The methods of the pioneers were particularly significant, Randal Marlin writes in his history of propaganda, because of their "widespread imitation... by Nazi Germany, South Africa , the Soviet Union , and the US Pentagon," though the achievements of the PR industry dwarf them all.9

 Problems of domestic control become Particularly Severe when the governing authorities carry out policies that are opposed by the general population. in those cases, the political leadership may be tempted to follow the path of the Reagan administration, which established an Office of Public Diplomacy to manufacture consent for its murderous Policies in Central America . One high government official described its Operation Truth as "a huge psychological oper­ation of the kind the military conducts to influence a population in denied or enemy terntory" -a frank characterization of pervasive attitudes toward the domestic Population.10

   

ENEMY TERRITORY ABROAD

 While the enemy at home often has to be controlled by intensive Propaganda, beyond the borders more direct means are available. The leaders of the current Bush administration -mostly recycled from more reactionary sectors of the Bush-Reagan I administrations- provided Sufficiently clear illustrations during their earlier stints in office. When the traditional regime of violence and repres­sion was challenged by the Church and other miscreants in the Cen­tral American domains of US power, the Reagan administration responded with a "war on terror," declared as soon as it took office in 1981. Not surprisingly, the US initiative instantly became a ter­rorist war-a campaign of slaughter, torture, and barbarism-that soon extended to other regions of the world as well.

 In one country, Nicaragua , Washington had lost control of the armed forces that had traditionally subdued the region's population, one of the bitter legacies of Wilsonian idealism. The US-backed Somoza dictatorship was overthrown by the Sandinista rebels, and the murderous National Guard was dismantled. Therefore Nicara­gua had to be subjected to a campaign of international terrorism that left the country in ruins. Even the psychological effects of Wash­ington 's terrorist war are severe. The spirit of exuberance, vitality, and optimism that followed the overthrow of the dictatorship could not long survive as the reigning superpower intervened to dash the hopes that a grim history might finally take a different course.

 In the other Central American countries targeted by the Reaganite "war on terror," forces equipped and trained by the United States maintained control. Without an army to defend the population against the terrorists -that is, the security forces themselves- atrocities were even worse. The record of murder, torture, and dev­astation was extensively reported by human rights organizations, church groups, Latin American scholars, and many others, but it remained little known to citizens of the state that bore prime respon­sibility, and was quickly effaced.11

 By the mid-1980s, the US-backed state terrorist campaigns had created societies "affected by terror and panic . . . collective intimi­dation and generalized fear," in the words of a leading Church-based Salvadoran human rights organization: the population had “internalized acceptance” of "the daily and frequent use of violent means" and "the frequent appearance of tortured bodies." Return­ing from a brief visit to his native Guatemala , journalist Julio Godoy wrote that "one is tempted to believe that some people in the White House worship Aztec gods-with the offering of Central American blood." He had fled a year earlier when his newspaper, La Epoca, was blown up by state terrorists, an operation that aroused no inter­est in the United States : attention was carefully focused on the misdeeds of the official enemy, real no doubt but hardly detectable given the scale of US-backed state terror in the region. The White House, Godoy wrote, installed and supported forces in Central America that could "easily compete against Nicolae Ceausescu's Securitate for the World Cruelty Prize."12

 After the terrorist commanders had achieved their goals, the con­sequences were reviewed at a conference in San Salvador of Jesuits and lay associates, who had more than enough personal experience to draw on, quite apart from what they had observed through the grisly decade of the 1980s. The conference concluded that it does not suffice to focus on the terror alone. it is no less important "to explore... what weight the culture of terror has had in domesti­cating the expectations of the majority," preventing them from con­sidering "alternatives to the demands of the powerful."13 Not only in Central America .

 Destroying hope is a critically important project. And when it is achieved, formal democracy is allowed -even preferred, if only for public-relations purposes. In more honest circles, much of this is conceded. Of course, it is understood much more profoundly by the beasts in men's shapes who endure the consequences of challenging the imperatives of stability and order.

 These are all matters that the second superpower, world public opinion, should make every effort to understand if it hopes to escape the containment to which it is subjected and to take seriously the ideals of justice and freedom that come easily to the lips but are harder to defend and advance.  

_______

 NOTES

  1.       Mayr, Bioastronomy News 7, no.3 (1995).

  2.       Donald Kennedy, Science 299, 21 March 2003.

  3.       Howard LaFranchi, Christian Science Monitor, 30 October 2002.

  4.       Patrick Tyler, New York Times, 17 February 2003.

  5.       For sources on Wilsonian idealism and the seventeenth century, see my Deterring

            Democracy (Verso, 1991; extended edition, Hill & Wang, 1992), chapter 12, and my

            Profit over People (Seven Stories, 1999), chapter 2. For a more extensive discussion and

            contemporary scholarly sources, see my "Consent without Consent," Cleveland State Law

            Review 44, no.4 (1996). Minor changes (punctuation, etc.) are intro­duced here for ease of

            reading.

  6.       Cited by David Foglesong, America's Secret War Against Bokhevism (North Carolina,

            1995), p.28.

  7.       Andrew Bacevich, American Empire (Harvard, 2003), pp. 200ff.

  8.       M. J. Crozier, S. P. Huntington, and J. Watanuki, The Crisis of Democ­racy (New York

            University, 1975), report to the Trilateral Commission.

  9.       Randal Marlin, Propaganda and the Ethics of Persuasion (Broadview, 2002).

10.       For a discussion of this vast disinformation campaign, see my Culture of Terrorism

 (South End, 1988) and Necessary Illusions (South End, 1989), which draw particularly

on the important but mostly neglected expose's by Alfonso Chardy of the Miami Herald

and later official sources.

11.       On the narrow limits of permitted discussion, see my Necessary Illu­sions. For case

studies over a wider range, see Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent (Pantheon, 1988; updated edition 2002).

12.       Latin American Documentation (LADOC), Torture in Latin America (Lima, Peru), 1987.

            Julio Godoy, Nation, 5 March 1990.

13.       Juan Hernandez Pico, Envio (Managua, Nicaragua), March 1994.

     

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